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Gwyniece Hutchins v. U.S. Department of Labor, 4th Cir. (2012)
Gwyniece Hutchins v. U.S. Department of Labor, 4th Cir. (2012)
No. 11-1375
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Gregory concurred.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Beth Drake, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Edwin L. Turnage, HARRIS & GRAVES,
PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N.
Nettles, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
OPINION
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
5 U.S.C. 8132 states that "[i]f an injury or death for
which compensation is payable under" the Federal Employees Compensation Act "is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in a person other than the United States to
pay damages, and a beneficiary entitled to compensation from
the United States for that injury or death receives money or
other property in satisfaction of that liability[,]" the beneficiary "shall refund to the United States the amount of compensation paid by the United States." Because we agree with
the Department of Labor that the Town of Ninety Six, South
Carolina qualifies as a "person other than the United States,"
we uphold the district courts determination that Gwyniece
Hutchins must reimburse the Department of Labor out of a
money judgment she obtained in a state court action against
the Town of Ninety Six. Accordingly, we affirm the district
courts grant of summary judgment in the Department of
Labors favor.
I.
In August 2004, Gwyniece Hutchins, a letter carrier with
the United States Postal Service, stepped on an improperlyfitted manhole cover maintained by the Town of Ninety Six,
II.
On appeal, Hutchins argues, first, that the word "person" as
used in 5 U.S.C. 8132 does not capture the Town and that
she is therefore not required by the statute to reimburse the
Department of Labor. Second, Hutchins argues that if the
word "person" does include political subdivisions such as the
Town, 5 U.S.C. 8131 is unlawful. We address each issue in
turn, "review[ing the] district courts decision to grant summary judgment de novo, [and] applying the same legal standards as the district court." Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558,
563 (4th Cir. 2009).
A.
5 U.S.C. 8132 states in relevant part that:
If an injury or death for which compensation is payable under [FECA] is caused under circumstances
creating a legal liability in a person other than the
United States to pay damages, and a beneficiary entitled to compensation from the United States for that
injury or death receives money or other property in
satisfaction of that liability as the result of suit or settlement by him or in his behalf, the beneficiary, after
deducting therefrom the costs of suit and a reasonable attorneys fee, shall refund to the United States
the amount of compensation paid by the United
States.
5 U.S.C. 8132 (emphasis added). The issue before this
Court is whether the Town qualifies as a "person other than
the United States" such that Hutchins is liable to reimburse
the Department of Labor out of her state court judgment.
"When confronted with a question of statutory interpretation, [this Courts] inquiry begins with an examination of the
language used in the statute." Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co.,
91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1996). In cases where "the statutory language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and . . . the sole
function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to
its terms." United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir.
1994) (quotation marks omitted).
Further, where a word is not defined by statute, the Court
"normally construe[s] it in accord with its ordinary or natural
meaning." Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
"We customarily turn to dictionaries for help in determining
whether a word in a statute has a plain or common meaning."
Natl Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def.
Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1998).
Turning to the statute at hand, we agree with the district
court that the statutes language, on its face, makes quite clear
that the term "person" includes political bodies, of which
municipalities such as the Town are one. The statute provides
that reimbursement is required where, among other things, a
beneficiarys injuries are caused by circumstances "creating a
legal liability in a person other than the United States." 5
U.S.C. 8132 (emphasis added).
Congresss stating that the liable party must be a "person"
besides the United States makes plain that, at least for purposes of this statute, the United States is a person. Logically,
then, political entities can be "persons." Hutchinss contention
that "Congress did not intend for the word person . . . to
include States and political subdivisions" thus cannot be
squared with the statutes plain language. Appellants Br. at
8. Or, in the words of the district court, "Congresss use of the
United States, a body politic, in comparison to a person in
whom liability could be created suggests that Congress
intended like entities to be subsumed in the . . . Statute." J.A.
89.