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United States v. Sheik Pearson, 4th Cir. (2015)
United States v. Sheik Pearson, 4th Cir. (2015)
No. 13-4982
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:12-cr-00077-CCB-1)
Argued:
Decided:
January 6, 2015
PER CURIAM:
Sheik Pearson pled guilty to one count of money laundering.
The
district
court
calculated
Pearsons
advisory
sentencing
an
responsibility
Pearsons
additional
offense
under
motion
to
offense
level
reduction
U.S.S.G.
compel
level
the
for
3E1.1(a),
government
reduction
for
acceptance
but
to
it
move
of
denied
for
acceptance
an
of
sentencing
law
requires
the
district
judge
in
necessary,
sentencing,
in
to
comply
light
of
with
the
the
purposes
Guidelines
and
other
of
federal
3553(a)
18
U.S.C.
3553(a)).
Under
the
current
sentencing
in
3553(a),
subject
to
appellate
review
for
Reasonableness
review
has
procedural
and
substantive
to
determine
defendants
sentence.
Substantive
subject
to
harmlessness
review,
United
States
v.
Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S.Ct. 2403 (2013) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 141 (2009)); and the government argues (among other things)
that
any
error
in
the
courts
3E1.1(b)
determination
is
harmless.
A claimed procedural sentencing error is considered to be
harmless if the resulting sentence was not longer than that to
which the defendant would otherwise be subject. Hargrove, 701
F.3d at 161. In performing harmless-error review, we may assume
that a sentencing error occurred and proceed to examine whether
the
error
affected
the
sentence
imposed.
Id.
Thus,
we
may
issue
that
in
the
the
defendants
sentence
would
be
favor
and
reasonable
(2)
we
can
even
if
the
resolution
of
the
first
step
of
the
harmlessness
reduction,
the
court
expressly
stated
that
the
also
J.A.
495
(I
would
impose
the
same
sentence.).
51-63
month
Guidelines
range
calculated
by
the
district
States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012), and Pearson
bears the burden to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 3553(a)
factors, see United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379
(4th Cir. 2006). Pearson has failed to meet this burden.
In our view, the district court adequately considered the
appropriate
factors
under
3553(a).
Turning
to
Pearsons
adequately
consider
3553(a)(2)(A)
and
3553(a)(6)
in
sentencing him to a longer term of incarceration than his codefendants received. See J.A. 490-92 (courts explanation of the
relative
sentences).
On
this
point,
Pearson
is
essentially
526
F.3d
155,
160
(4th
Cir.
2008)
(noting
that
an
appellate court must defer to the trial court and can reverse a
sentence only if it is unreasonable, even if the sentence would
not have been the choice of the appellate court (emphasis in
original)).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the 36-month sentence.
AFFIRMED