Professional Documents
Culture Documents
United States Court of Appeals: Published
United States Court of Appeals: Published
and
KIMBERLY ANN KNUSSMAN, on behalf
of themselves and their infant
daughter, a/k/a Riley Paige
Knussman,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND; DAVID B.
MITCHELL, Colonel, individually and
in his official capacity as
Superintendent; DAVID CZORAPINSKI,
Captain, individually and in his
official capacity as Assistant
Commander of Aviation; RONNIE P.
CREEL, First Sergeant, individually
and in his official capacity as
Director of Flight Operations; JILL
D. MULLINEAUX,
Defendants-Appellants,
No. 99-2349
and
MARYLAND STATE POLICE,
Defendant.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: David Phelps Kennedy, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Robin R. Cockey, COCKEY,
BRENNAN & MALONEY, Salisbury, Maryland, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Betty
Stemley Sconion, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. Hoffman,
Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants.
Deborah A. Jeon, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND, Centreville, Maryland; Sara L. Mandelbaum, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, New York, New
York, for Appellee.
OPINION
TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:
Howard Kevin Knussman, a trooper in the Maryland State Police,
brought an action alleging that the State of Maryland and several individual employees of the Maryland State Police (collectively "the
defendants") unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his
gender, for which he sought recourse under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 (West
Supp. 2000); and that the defendants violated his rights under the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), see 29 U.S.C.A.
2601 2654 (West 1999), for which he sought recourse under
1983 and directly under the FMLA. Following a jury trial and vari-
Maryland law permitted a state employee to use paid sick leave for
reasons other than the employees own illness, including "for death, illness, or disability in the employees immediate family." Md. Code Ann.,
State Pers. & Pens. 7-502(b)(2) (1994). The statute was later amended
and reorganized; however, Maryland law still permits this particular use
of a state employees sick leave. See Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens.
9-501(b)(2) (1996).
Section 7-508 has been amended and recodified, and it now provides
for the use of up to an aggregate of 40 days of accrued sick leave if two
state employees are responsible for the care of a newborn. See Md. Code
Ann., State Pers. & Pens. 9-505(b)(1) (1996). Section 7-508(b)(1), had
it been in effect at the time, apparently would have applied to the Knussmans, who were both state employees.
3
For ease of reference, we adopt the term "nurturing leave." This term,
however, does not appear in the statute.
as secondary care givers since they "couldnt breast feed a baby." J.A.
136. Mullineaux, who testified that she was merely passing along the
Maryland Department of Personnels (DOP) view of "primary care
giver," denied adopting such a categorical interpretation.4 In any case,
Knussmans superior officers in the Aviation Division, having consulted Mullineaux about the untested nurturing leave provision,
granted him 10 days of paid sick leave as the secondary care giver
under 7-508(b).
The Knussmans daughter was born on December 9, 1994. Kimberly Knussman, however, continued to experience health problems.
Before his authorized 10-day leave expired, Knussman contacted Sergeant J.C. Collins, one of his supervisors, and inquired whether his
status could be changed to that of primary care giver and his paid sick
leave extended to 30 days under section 7-508(a). Knussman
explained to Collins that he was the primary care giver for the child
because, given his wifes condition following delivery, he was performing the majority of the essential functions such as diaper changing, feeding, bathing and taking the child to the doctor.
David Czorapinski, the Assistant Commander for the Aviation
Division during this time, learned of Knussmans inquiry and, unable
to reach Mullineaux, gathered some preliminary information on the
new law himself. Czorapinski learned that the Maryland DOP
intended to take the position that the mother was the primary care
giver and the father was secondary. Czorapinski passed this information down the chain-of-command and Knussman was told that it was
unlikely that his paid sick leave would be extended under section 7508(a).
On the day before Knussman was scheduled to return to work,
Knussman made a final attempt at obtaining additional sick leave.
4
Mullineaux testified that she never told Knussman that fathers were,
as a class, ineligible for primary care giver status. Rather, Mullineauxs
version was that she told Knussman, based on information provided by
the state Department of Personnel, "that the birth mother was presumed
to be the primary care giver and if he wanted to qualify as the primary
care giver, he could, if he could provide [supporting] information." J.A.
488.
Sergeant Carl Lee, one of Knussmans immediate superiors, had earlier informed Knussman that although nurturing leave as a primary
care giver was probably not an option, Knussman might be eligible
for additional paid leave under the family sick leave provision, see
Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. 7-502(b)(2), as long as he
could demonstrate that it was medically necessary for him to care for
his wife. Knussman contacted Mullineaux to find out what information he needed to supply for family sick leave.5 During this conversation, Knussman again discussed his eligibility for nurturing leave as
a primary care provider under section 7-508(a) with Mullineaux, who
explained that "God made women to have babies and, unless [he]
could have a baby, there is no way [he] could be primary care
[giver]," J.A. 153, and that his wife had to be "in a coma or dead,"
J.A. 154, for Knussman to qualify as the primary care giver.
Mullineaux denied Knussmans request for paid sick leave under
7-508(a) as a primary care giver. Knussman returned to work as
ordered and immediately filed an administrative grievance on the
grounds that he had been improperly denied primary care giver status
under 7-508(a). He did not seek review of Mullineauxs denial of
his request for family sick leave under section 7-502(b)(2). Once the
grievance process was underway, Knussmans claim went up the
MSP chain-of-command and Mullineauxs involvement ceased.
Knussmans grievance was denied at each stage of the four-level
grievance procedure. By the time Knussman reached step two, which
consisted of a review conference held by Knussmans Assistant Commanding Officer Czorapinski, the MSP apparently had retreated from
Mullineauxs earlier, categorical classification of mothers as primary
care givers and fathers as secondary providers. Czorapinski testified
5
Knussman subsequently submitted a letter from Kimberly Knussmans doctor in support of his request for family sick leave; however,
Mullineaux concluded that the letter was insufficient to justify family
sick leave because "it [did not] say what care [Knussman was] going to
provide, and it [did not] say that [Knussman] need[ed] to be home . . .
like its [Knussmans] choice and not the doctors requirement." J.A.
827. Although Czorapinski suggested to Knussman that the deficiencies
could be easily corrected, Knussman refused "to pursue this option any
further." J.A. 828.
between himself and Mrs. Knussman in skill, talent or ability in providing care and nurturing for the child. Since Mrs.
Knussman was already receiving benefits equal to those
specified for primary care givers according to statute, there
is no reason to extend similar primary care benefits [to] Tfc.
Knussman. He was afforded benefits of [a] secondary care
provider as he was rightfully entitled. While Tfc. Knussman
may have desired the designation as primary, he has failed
to justify that claim.
J.A. 1209-10. Essentially, Czorapinski believed that Kimberly Knussman, who was also a state employee, was enjoying the benefits of
nurturing leave as a primary care giver because, following delivery,
she took sick leave for a 30-day period the same amount of time
afforded a primary care giver under 7-508(a). Thus, Czorapinski
was concerned that both Knussmans were attempting to qualify as the
primary care giver for their daughter when the statute indicated only
one person could qualify. At trial, Knussman presented evidence that,
prior to the step two grievance conference, Mullineaux and Czorapinski were made aware of the fact the Kimberly Knussman was, in fact,
on sick leave for her own disability resulting from the difficult pregnancy. Following Czorapinskis decision, Knussman pursued his
complaint through the two remaining steps of the internal grievance
procedure without success.
Knussman then filed a three-count action in federal court. In Count
I, Knussman sought relief under 1983, claiming that his leave
request under 7-508(a) was denied as a result of gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Count II, Knussman
asserted that the denial of his request for additional paid leave violated the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C.A. 2612(d)(2)(A) ("An eligible
employee may elect . . . to substitute any of the accrued paid . . . personal leave, or family leave of the employee for leave provided under
[the FMLA] for any part of the 12-week period of such leave . . . .").
Knussman brought Count II directly under the FMLA as well as
under 1983. Third, Knussman asserted a claim under the Maryland
Equal Rights Amendment but subsequently agreed to dismiss it. He
named as defendants the State of Maryland, the MSP, and several
employees of the MSP, in both their individual and official capacities:
10
Thus, the case went to trial on portions of both counts in the complaint. As for Count I, Knussmans 1983 equal protection claim
remained intact against the State of Maryland (but only for declaratory and injunctive relief) and the defendants in their individual
capacities. At the close of the evidence, the court submitted the question of qualified immunity to the jury as well as the ultimate question
of liability. The jury concluded that each defendant denied Knussmans request for leave because of his gender; however, the jury also
found that every defendant except Mullineaux was entitled to qualified immunity. Knussman does not challenge this conclusion on
appeal. On Count II, the FMLA claim brought under both the FMLA
and 1983 against the State of Maryland and the defendants in their
official capacities, the jury concluded that all of the defendants denied
Knussman leave to which he was entitled under the FMLA. The jury
awarded Knussman the sum of $375,000 in damages.
The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or, alternatively,
for a new trial under Rule 59(a). See Knussman v. State of Maryland,
65 F. Supp. 2d 353, 354 (D. Md. 1999) ("Knussman III"). The district
court rejected Mullineauxs renewed argument that she was entitled
to qualified immunity:
The Court finds no reason to disturb the jurys findings in
this regard. A jury could have reasonably concluded from
the evidence that Mullineaux, as the personnel officer in the
States Personnel Management Division, should have recognized that she was applying a gender neutral leave statute in
a discriminatory manner by making only men prove they are
primary care givers to a newborn or adopted child.
Knussman III, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 360.
The defendants also raised various challenges to the damages
awarded by the jury on Count II, the FMLA claim. Ultimately, the
district court vacated the jurys verdict on Count II and "amend[ed]
the judgment to remove the State and the individual defendants in
their official capacities from liability for money damages." Id. at 360.
Thus, Mullineaux became the only defendant subject to monetary liability. She argued that the $375,000 award of damages was excessive.
11
The district court rejected this argument, concluding there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Knussman suffered significant emotional damage. See id.
On appeal, Mullineaux contends that she was entitled to qualified
immunity on Knussmans equal protection claim under 1983. She
also challenges, on multiple grounds, the jurys verdict as well as the
courts jury instructions.6
II.
First, we turn to defendant Mullineauxs argument that she was
entitled to qualified immunity from Knussmans claims. Public officials "are protected by qualified immunity when performing their
duties within the scope of their employment insofar as their conduct
does not breach clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known." Sigman v. Town
of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782, 786 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "The reasonableness inquiry
is an objective one, measured by reference to clearly established law."
Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 161 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Essentially, officials
performing a discretionary function enjoy an immunity that
shields them from liability for civil damages unless (1) the
officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the
time of the conduct, such that (3) an objectively reasonable
officer would have understood that the conduct violated that
right.
6
12
13
14
A.
We first consider the issue of whether the evidence adduced at trial
is sufficient to establish that Mullineaux committed a constitutional
violation under the law as it currently stands. In a nutshell, Knussmans contention is that Mullineaux applied a facially neutral statute
unequally solely on the basis of a gender stereotype in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The only distinction created by the statute was between "primary care givers" and
"secondary care givers," the former being entitled to 30 days of
accrued sick leave to care for a newborn and the latter being entitled
to 10 days of accrued sick leave. See Md. Code Ann., State Pers. &
Pens. 7-508. The statute made no reference to gender. Rather, the
gender classification was created in the application of 7-508.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Knussman, Mullineaux, based
on the comments of an administrative assistant to the DOPs Director
of Legislation, took the position that only mothers could qualify for
additional paid leave as primary care givers under 7-508(a). Essentially, Mullineaux applied an irrebutable presumption that the mother
is the primary care giver, and therefore entitled to greater employment
benefits.7
We agree with Knussman that Mullineauxs conduct violated his
rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Government classifications
drawn on the basis of gender have been viewed with suspicion for
three decades, beginning with the Supreme Courts decision in Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971), in which the Court condemned "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated."
As its equal protection jurisprudence developed in subsequent cases,
the Court did not view gender classifications as "benign":
7
The fact that Mullineaux told Knussman that he would be eligible for
primary care giver status if his wife were "in a coma or dead" is of no
moment. That was the same as telling Knussman he could never qualify.
If Knussman is given the benefit of the doubt, the evidence establishes
that Mullineaux categorically denied fathers eligibility for primary care
giver status. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether Mullineaux
could have constitutionally applied a truly rebuttable presumption in
favor of the mother.
15
16
17
18
ernmental interest and, therefore, was not permissible under the Equal
Protection Clause.8
B.
We next must decide whether Mullineauxs actions contravened
"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). "Clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity means that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right." Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614-15 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although it is not required that the exact action
at issue has been previously determined to be unlawful, "in the light
of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Id. at 615
(internal quotation marks omitted); Saucier, 533 U.S. ___, No. 991977, slip op. at 6. Wilson reiterated that "the right allegedly violated
must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court
can determine if it was clearly established." Id. Therefore, our analysis of whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established
must proceed "at a high level of particularity." Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1999).9
8
We agree with the concurring opinion to the extent that it highlights
the general proposition that the discriminatory application of a statute
that is neutral on its face violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Sylvia
Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818-19 (4th Cir. 1995).
Respectfully, however, we doubt that we have mischaracterized the
nature of the constitutional right at issue by not focusing on the distinction between a gender classification created by legislative enactment and
one created by the actions of a single state official. See OBar v. Pinion,
953 F.2d 74, 81 (4th Cir. 1991) ("When we conduct an equal protection
review of the individualized decision of a state official made within his
lawful authority, we apply the same analysis as is commonly used in the
context of allegedly unlawful legislative decisions.").
9
Here, the concurring opinion departs and would, like the district court,
define the right in fairly broad terms: whether "a persons right not to
have a gender neutral statute applied in a discriminatory manner" was
clearly established in 1994. Such a broad definition is not faithful to the
particularity principle which "mandates that courts refer to concrete
19
20
tive classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in Reed . . . and Frontiero
. . . . Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing
that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just
as with respect to any other physical condition.
Id. at 496 n.20. Likewise, Mullineauxs reliance on decisions such as
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam), is unavailing.
In Webster, the Court approved a provision of the Social Security Act
that afforded women a more favorable method of calculating "old-age
insurance benefits" than for similarly situated males, see id. at 314-16,
because Congress aimed the statute at reducing "the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history
of discrimination," id. at 317. Thus, the statutes disparate treatment
of men and women "was not the accidental byproduct of a traditional
way of thinking about females." Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The authority cited by Mullineaux actually underscores our conclusion regarding the clarity of the law in December 1994. Mullineauxs
distribution of sick leave benefits under 7-508 was a by-product of
traditional ideas about a womans role in rearing a child, which was
clearly impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time in question.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity to Mullineaux and the jurys verdict with respect to liability. Given our finding in this regard, we need not consider the effect of the overly broad
definition of the constitutional right contained in the jury instructions.
III.
Mullineaux seeks a new trial on damages, raising several challenges to the jurys award of $375,000. Mullineauxs principal argument is that the verdict was excessive and that the district court erred
21
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24
25
26
IV.
In sum, we hold that Mullineaux was not entitled to qualified
immunity against Knussmans equal protection claim under 1983
and affirm the judgment as to liability, but we conclude that the jurys
award of $375,000 was excessive. Accordingly, we vacate the jurys
award and remand for a new trial on damages with respect to Knussmans equal protection claim (Count I). Knussman is entitled to be
compensated for emotional distress caused by Mullineauxs constitutional violation but not for any emotional distress associated with the
litigation of this action or his employers general internal grievance
process.13
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
LEE, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Two issues are before the Court. First, whether a reasonable personnel official in Mullineauxs position and with her experience
would have known in 1994 that it was unlawful to apply a gender
neutral child nurturing leave law in a discriminatory manner by basing a decision with respect to employment benefits on gender stereotypes. Second, whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding
that the clear weight of the evidence supported the jurys verdict of
13
27
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29
30
31
the Fifth Amendment due process clause to fire a person because she
is a woman); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that sex-based distinctions between unmarried mothers and
unmarried fathers, in a domestic relations law provision, are unconstitutional because it bears no substantial relation to any important state
interest); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-7 (1977) (holding
that a gender based distinction between widows and widowers violates the due process and equal protection clauses because they are
based on archaic and over-broad generalizations); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (noting that the archaic and over-broad generalizations of women could not justify use of gender distinctions). In
addition by 1994, the Supreme Court conclusively drew the contours
of the right to be free from having a neutral statute applied in a discriminatory manner. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1943)
(holding that the unlawful administration of a statute fair on its face,
resulting in its unequal application, is a denial of equal protection if
it is shown to be intentional or purposeful discrimination present);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that it is
unconstitutional to administer a law that is fair on its face in an
unequal manner). The established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in 1994 protected Knussmans right to receive nurturing leave
benefits under a gender neutral leave statute without his gender effecting or impeding such decision. Therefore, the right at issue was
clearly established because the contours of the right to be free from
discriminatory behavior afforded Mullineaux adequate notice that her
interpretation of a gender neutral leave statute, which resulted in the
gender based denial of a benefit, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.
A reasonable person in Mullineauxs position would have known
that her conduct violated a persons right not to have nurturing leave
benefits administered in a discriminatory manner. Mullineaux was the
Manager of Medical Leave Benefits. She worked previously at the
Maryland State Department of Personnel, and had approximately 15
years of experience in state employment and administrative policy
matters at the time of the incident. J.A. 670, 1058. In 1994, a person
in Mullineauxs position and with her experience should have known
that Maryland law prohibited her from drawing a distinction on the
basis of gender when administering leave benefits to parents caring
32
for their children. Maryland law has made it clear that gender is not
a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of a woman or
man. See Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817, 822 (Md.
1985); Condore v. Prince Georges Co., 425 A.2d 1011, 1015 (Md.
1981). Therefore, the treatment of any person by the law may not be
based on the mere circumstances that such person is of one gender or
the other. See Burning Tree Club, Inc., 501 A.2d at 822. Marylands
Equal Protection Act flatly prohibits gender-based classifications
absent substantial justification, whether contained in legal enactments, government policies, or by application of common law rules.
See State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 387 (Md. 1989);
Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900, 903 (Md. 1977). Maryland reinforced
its mandate of parental equality in 1978 when it unequivocally abolished the maternal preference in child custody cases. See McAndrew
v. McAndrew, 382 A.2d 1081, 1086 (Md. 1978). The highest court in
Maryland has clearly stated that a parent is no longer presumed to be
clothed with, or to lack, a particular attribute merely because that parent is a male or female. See id. Despite this unequivocal mandate,
which Mullineaux should have been aware of given her experience
and position, Mullineaux discriminated against Knussman by assuming that he, as a man, could not have been the primary care giver for
his child.
Moreover, a reasonable leave benefits manager would have known
to pursue the proper channels at work to determine the parameters of
the newly enacted statute. Mullineaux knew that Director of Legislative and Policy Services, John Irick, had the authority to make policy
rulings for the Maryland State Department of Police. J.A. 711. Irick
knew that the gender-based denial of Knussmans nurturing leave
request was discriminatory and illegal. J.A. 423, 425, 429. A reasonable leave benefits manager would have known to confirm the statutes requirements with Irick, prior to giving false information. If
promptly asked, Mullineaux could have discovered early on what she
should have known: that confining the primary care giver category to
women was discriminatory and unconstitutional. Ultimately, a reasonable leave benefits manager should have recognized that she was
applying a gender neutral leave statute in a discriminatory manner by
making only men prove they were primary care givers to newborn or
adopted children. A reasonable person in Mullineauxs position
would have known that they were violating Knussmans right to be
33
34
35
36
The Majority holds that the clear weight of the evidence does not support a causal connection between Knussmans emotional distress and the
constitutional injury. However, as discussed infra Part II.C, the Majoritys premise for this conclusion is erroneous.
37
38
based on its view that Knussmans emotional distress was the result
of this litigation, not the constitutional injury. This approach is flawed
for three reasons. First, the Majority minimizes the constitutional
injury at issue by describing the injury as Mullineauxs "slanderous
words."3 Second, the Majority utilizes an amorphous standard, which
calls for a jury to explain its particular rationale for its proximate
cause finding. Third, the Majority implies that the jury mistakenly
included litigation related distress within its calculation of damages
yet the Majority does not reference any erroneous jury instruction
given by the district court which would lead the jury to incorporate
litigation related stress4 into damages. As seen below, the Majoritys
approach does not support the conclusion that the district court abused
its discretion in upholding the jurys verdict.
1.
The Majority minimizes the constitutional violation at issue. The
Majority contends that the constitutional violation was Mullineaux
denying Knussman the same opportunity to qualify for primary care
giver status as would be afforded to a mother. By limiting the constitutional violation to Mullineauxs sole actions, the Majority minimizes the injury thus enabling it to conclude that the verdict was
excessive in light of the evidence. The constitutional violation was
gender discrimination. The jury returned a verdict that stated that
David Mitchell, David Czorapinski, Ronnie Creel, Jill Mullineaux,
and the State of Maryland all denied Knussman leave under Maryland
law because of his gender. J.A. 1211. Therefore, the actions of all of
the Defendants, not just Mullineaux, compromised the constitutional
violation.
The record demonstrates that Jill Mullineauxs actions were egregious by themselves. In response to Knussmans inquiries, Mullineaux, as the Manager of Medical Leave and Benefits, performed a
3
Mullineaux told Knussman "Unless your wife is in a coma or dead,
you cant be primary care provider." J.A. 1154, 202-04, 232.
4
Defendants raised the issue of non-compensable litigation related
stress in its cross-examination of Dr. Toler, J.A. 588, two questions in
cross-examination of Dr. Crowley, J.A. 319-320, and several questions
to Plaintiff, J.A. 259-263.
39
cursory inquiry into the meaning of the statute, then she erroneously
informed Knussman that he was only entitled to secondary care giver
status. Subsequently, when Knussman asked a second time if he could
receive extended leave as the primary care giver, Mullineaux communicated that the only way that Knussman could qualify for primary
care giver status was for his wife to be dead or in a coma.
Similarly, Captain David Czorapinski, participated in the discrimination against Knussman because he initially misinformed Knussmans supervisor that the primary care giver was presumed to be the
mother. Czorapinski subsequently realized that he was misinformed
about the presumption of primary care givers being a mother. Nonetheless, during the grievance procedure Czorapinski maintained this
erroneous bias. This is evident in Czorapinskis statement that "All
indicators show that Mrs. Knussman was capable of providing for the
care and nurturing of their child . . . there was nothing offered to indicate that she was unwilling or otherwise unable to provide care for the
child." J.A. 1209. In a less egregious manner, Czorapinski continued
to apply the same unconstitutional presumption as Mullineaux: unless
Knussman could show that his wife was incapable of taking care of
his daughter, Knussman could not be considered the primary care
giver under the statute. The jury also found David Mitchell and Ronnie Creels actions resulted in a constitutional violation. The evidence
submitted showed that both Mitchell and Creel were privy to all of
the information, knew of Czorapinski and Mullineauxs actions, yet
failed to act. J.A. 1118, 1132. Therefore, the constitutional violation
encompassed (1) Mullineaux and Czorapinskis initial joint decision
to only allow Knussman two weeks nurturing leave, (2) Mullineaux,
Creel, and Czorapinskis subsequent denial of Knussmans request to
have his two week nurturing leave extended, (3) Mullineauxs
remarks that Knussmans wife had to be dead or in a coma before he
could qualify for more leave, (4) Czorapinskis continued application
of the unconstitutional gender presumption during the grievance procedure, and (5) Creel and Mitchells ambivalence and inaction to
Knussman even though they were aware of the gender presumption
being applied against Knussman. The jury found Knussman was entitled to $375,000 in damages as a result of a series of actions by all
of the Defendants. J.A. 1211-13. The damages were not limited to
Mullineauxs actions. Therefore, the weight of the evidence supports
40
the finding that the constitutional injury could have resulted in the
damages sustained.
2.
The Majority Opinion creates an amorphous new standard of
review for an excessive jury verdict claim, which calls for an appellate court to determine the proportional component of a jury verdict.
The Majority remands this case for a trial on damages because it
claims it was not possible to determine what proportion of the verdict
was intended to compensate Knussman for emotional damages. The
Majority looks to the precedent of Carey, Hetzel, and Price to support
its conclusion that the constitutional violation did not cause emotional
distress warranting $375,000 in damages. See Carey, 435 U.S. 247;
Hetzel v. County of Prince William, 89 F.3d 169, 171 (4th Cir. 1996);
Price, 93 F.3d 1241.
However, in contrast to Knussmans situation, the Carey, Hetzel,
and Price decisions focus on cases where the plaintiff failed to show
emotional damages. In Carey, several suspended students brought
procedural due process claims against a school district. See Carey,
435 U.S. at 263-64. The plaintiffs put no evidence in the record to
show what damages, if any, they sustained as a result of the constitutional injury. The record was completely devoid of any evidence that
could form the basis for measuring the extent of their injuries. Ultimately, the Carey Court held that absent proof of actual injury from
the constitutional violation, the students were entitled to recover only
nominal damages. See id. at 264. Similarly, in Hetzel, this Court
found that the record was devoid of evidence to show that the plaintiff
suffered an actual constitutional injury. See Hetzel, 89 F.3d at 172. In
Hetzel, a Hispanic female police officer brought suit against the
county and police chief alleging harassment and discrimination on the
basis of sex and national origin. Hetzels evidence concerning the
emotional distress consisted almost exclusively of "Hetzels own
brief, conclusory statements compromising less then ten pages of
a joint appendix exceeding 5,000 pages that she had headaches,
stress, trouble reading to her daughter, and problems with her family
life as a result of appellants actions." Id. at 171. She presented no
evidence corroborating specific harm, she continued to perform her
duties without a noticeable diminution in performance, and she never
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saw a doctor, therapist, or other professional. The Court held that the
$500,000 award was grossly excessive in light of the limited evidence
of harm presented at trial. See id. (holding that the award must be proportional to the actual injury incurred and must focus on the real
injury sustained). In addition, in Price, this Court reversed the plaintiffs award of compensatory damages due to the insufficiency of the
evidence. See Price, 93 F.3d at 1250. Several White police officers
sued the city contending that its race-based promotion policy for
police sergeants violated the equal protection clause. At trial, plaintiffs proffered only vague, conclusory testimony concerning their
injury. In sum, the police officers said that they suffered feelings of
betrayal and humiliation. See id. at 1254. This Court held that the
police officers testimony simply failed to show any demonstrable
emotional injury. See id. at 1254-55. Accordingly, the Court reversed
the $3,000 compensatory award damages and awarded $1 in nominal
damages. Ultimately, the issues focused upon in Carey, Hetzel, and
Price are distinguishable from the case at hand. As demonstrated
above, Knussman presented overwhelming and uncontroverted medical and non-medical evidence demonstrating that he suffered emotional distress.
The jury was capable of determining that the constitutional violation caused Knussmans injuries. It is well settled that causation is
ordinarily left for a jury to determine. See Exxon Co., USA v. Sofec
Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1996) (holding that the issue of proximate
causation involves application of law to fact, which should be left to
the fact finder, subject to limited review); Conner, 227 F.3d at 201
(holding that the district court erred by overturning the jurys verdict
based on its determination that irrelevant and prejudicial evidence
affected the verdict); Aravanis v. Elsenberg, 206 A.2d 148, 158 (Md.
1965) (holding that violations and proximate cause of injury were
questions of fact properly left for the jurys determination). Dr. Toler
specifically and repeatedly connected the emotional distress experienced by Knussman to the overall denial of leave. J.A. 550-58. After
weighing the testimony of the witnesses, and examining the evidence,
the jury concluded that Knussman was entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of $375,000. Medical and eyewitness testimony
within the record supports the jury finding that Knussmans injury
resulted from the constitutional violation. No reason exists to doubt
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3.
Nothing within record shows that the jury considered litigation
related distress as a factor in damages. The Majority remands for
damages because in its view the jury factored litigation related distress into its calculation of damages. Defendants had the opportunity
to cross-examine Dr. Crowley and Dr. Toler on the issue of litigation
related distress. J.A. 319-20, 571-80, 588. In particular, Dr. Toler
admitted that the lawsuit was stressful on Knussman because it tended
to magnify the events, circumstances, and adversarial relationship that
had developed over the course of the years. J.A. 571. Notwithstanding
this testimony, it remains possible that the jury found the emotional
distress due to the constitutional injury, not due to litigation, caused
the injury. Defendants stressed to the jury during the trial that Knussman could not recover damages for litigation related distress.5 Moreover, the district courts instructions were clear that Knussman could
only recover for damages sustained by the constitutional injury itself.
J.A. 1097-98. The Majority references no erroneous instruction given
by the district court, which would confuse the jury into incorporating
litigation related distress as recoverable damages. See, e.g., Memphis
Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986) (reversing jurys verdict because the trial judge gave an erroneous jury
instruction allowing the jury to compensate the plaintiff for circumstances that should not be compensated). The Majority simply implies
that it is not comfortable with the jurys ability to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, or the trial judges ability to utilize its discretion,
and reach its conclusion that Knussmans injuries resulted from the
constitutional violation. The Majority has no reason to infer or imply
that the jury improperly calculated litigation related distress into its
$375,000 damages determination. The Majority should not set aside
the jurys verdict as excessive because it cannot succinctly enunciate
clear principles for assessment of whether a verdict for compensatory
damages, including the medical and emotional distress components,
is excessive as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district courts decision upholding the jurys award should be affirmed. Therefore, while
5
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