GAUDENCIO RAYO vs.

COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BULACAN G.R. No. L-55273-83
December 19, 1981

FACTS: During "Kading", the respondent opened the floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted to the
inundation of towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the respondent
corporation.
Petitioners contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that
under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the management and
operation of the Angat Dam.
HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and
be sued in any court under its charter. As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the government.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R.

No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which was used by the government.
Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot.
She then fled for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot and payment for damages.The
defendant contended that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give
its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a
suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

Estrada v. Disierto, [G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]

253 SCRA 452
Estrada v. Disierto,
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001]
253 SCRA 452 5g
FACTS: Following the impeachment trial & the resignation of the members of the Cabinet & the defection

of the military & the police, at about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, V-pres Arroyo was sworn into office as Pres. of
the Phil., while Pres. Estrada left Malacanang. On the same day, Pres. Estrada wrote a letter to the Senate
stating that he was unable to exercise the powers of the office of the Presidency
ISSUE: Is the Pres. only temporarily unable to act as Pres?
RULING: NO. On Jan. 20, 2001, despite receipt of the letter, the House issued a resolution supporting the
assumption of Arroyoi as Pres. on Feb. 7, it confirmed the nomination by Pres. Arroyo of Sen. Guingona as
V-Pres. Congress has recognized Arroyo as the Pres., & that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary.
In the face of this determination by a co-equal branch, the court is w/out authority to review. It is a poll
question, w/c cannot be decided by the Court w/out transgressing the princ. of separation of powers.

Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands GR No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

Facts:
Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was
stated in the application that he owned the parcelby right of accretion. the land in
question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposists caused by the action of the
Manila bay. The petition was denied by the lower court and decided that the land to be
registered are part of the public domain. Faustino, however, contended that the court
could have declared the land not to be part of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts have the power to reclassify a land
Ruling:
No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called
upon to determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is only limited
there. A formal declaration of reclassification of land should come from the government,
specifically from the executive department or the legislature
1. City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
Facts:
An ordinance in Quezon city approved the the establishment of private
cemeteries in the said city., wherein 6% of the total area of the private memorial park
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of
property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the
properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of
the public.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property
Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private

cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Passing the
ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due
process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property.

1. Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:
Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by
other immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were
occupying the property. One of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere
had been built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it
narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence
and extended it to the entire passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The
case was broguth to the trial court and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give
Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to the punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay
Custodios and Santoses for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way
Ruling:
Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the
natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is
no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and
proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to
another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property
makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used,
such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having
been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a
mere consequence of community life

Bicerra vs. Tenezza, 6 SCRA 648

FACTS:

The Bicerras were the owners of a house built on a lot owned by them and
situated in the municipality of Lagangilang. Tenezza forcibly demolished the
house, asserting that they are the rightful owners of the land. Failure to restore the
house and to deliver the materials by the defendants,
plaintiffs were forced to file an action against them for damages as well as praying that
the court hold them as the proper owners of the house.

ISSUES: Whether or not the house demolished is still considered an immovable

property?
HELD:

No. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on
which it is built. The classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be
situated on land belonging to another owner. But once the house is demolished, it ceases
to exist as such and the hence its character as immovable likewise ceases.
15. Sergs Products and Gaquiloy vs. PCI Leasing and Finance 338 SCRA 499
FACTS:
PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin
for the seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by petitioner
in favor of PCI. Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion
for special protective order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could
not be subject of a chattel mortgage.
Issue: Whether or not the machineries become real property by virtue of immobilization.
HELD:
The machineries in question have become immobilized by destination because they
are essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in
nature.
Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise

. NAVARRO VS. PINEDA

9 SCRA 631
FACTS:
Pineda and his mother executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of
Navarro, to secure a loan they got from the latter. The REM covered a parcel of land
owned by the mother while the chattel mortgage covered a residential house. Due to
the failure to pay the loan, they asked for extensions to pay for the loan. On the
second extension, Pineda executed a promise wherein in case of default in payment, he
wouldnt ask for any additional extension and there would be no need for any formal
demand. In spite of this, they still failed to pay. Navarro then filed for the foreclosure of
the mortgages. The court
decided in his favor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage appended to
the complaint is valid notwithstanding the fact that the house was made subject of chattel
mortgage for the reason that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third person.
HELD:
Yes. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it
may be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage as personal property if so stipulated in the
document of mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure, the validity
. US vs. TAMBUNTING 41 PHIL 364
FACTS:

The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a
house at Evangelista. After the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the
services discontinued. Later Mr. Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and
spliced the tubing to leech free gas for household use. Alas, the crime was discovered
by the gas company. The prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr. Tambunting to court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.

RULING
Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a
valuable merchandise that can be bought and sold like other personal property,

susceptible of being siphoned from a larger mass and transported from place to place.

INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER vs. RAMIREZ

44 PHIL 933

FACTS:

The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with
Fidelity & Surety Co. on March 10, 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of
property, while another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September
1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared
the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso
Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez
did.

ISSUE:

Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property.

RULING:

Yes. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the

nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such
interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the

enumeration of movable properties in Article 414 of the Civil Code, and may be
the subject of mortgage.
CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
384 SCRA 152
FACTS:

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the
DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA
sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares
of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer is valid.

RULING:

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA
as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
VILLARICA V. COURT OF APPEALS
309 SCRA 193
FACTS:
Spouses Teofilo and Maxima Villarica, filed an application for confirmation of the
title over a parcel of land which they allege they bought from Teofilos father. Said
application was opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms
part of the public domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan and is not
available for private appropriation. The trial court dismissed the case since the property

forms part of the public domain therefore the certificate of title is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land still forms part of the public domain
HELD:
Yes, there has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the land in
question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants have
not introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule otherwise.
Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.
Felipe Calub vs CA April 27,2000 GR no.115634
Facts:
The Petitioner from DENR apprehended two motor vehicles which was carrying illegally
sourced lumber in violation of the Revised Forestry Code,and thereafter confiscated
them.The owners of the subject vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover such
vehicles.They succeed in the trial court averring on the ground that the Petitioner did not
act in accordance with the law.Petitioner appeals on the ground that the replevin in this
case is a suit against the State and therefore invalid.
Issue:
Whether or not Replevin may be instituted for the reconveyance of the vehicles under
custodia legis? and whether such replevin in the case is a suit against the State?
Ruling:
No.Writ of Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of
legal process and considered in the custody of law. This suit is not valid because the State
may not be sued without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in the
discharge of his duties.
GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES V. COURT OF APPEALS
177 SCRA 495
FACTS:
Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitioner for the
development of their parcel of land into a subdivision. Private respondents were
occupying the land and petitioner advised them to vacate but they refused.
Thereafter,
petitioner
continued
their
development
and construction.
Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and this was reversed by the CA.
Issue: WON the possessors of a land may file a case of forcible entry even against the
owner himself

Held:
Notwithstanding petitioners claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop
the subject property, private respondents as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry
case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process, and never determines the actual title to an estate

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

Francisco vs. House of Representeatives
Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the
constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules
of impeachment provided for by law.

Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice is
constitutional,

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

which were approved by the House of Representatives are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, is barred under aragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

JAKA Food Processing vs. Pacot - GR No. 151378 Case Digest

FACTS:
Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on August 29, 1997 because the
Corporation was in dire financial straits. It was not disputed that they were terminated

without complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code regarding the
service of notice upon the employees and DOLE at least one month before the intended
date of termination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to respondents when
employers effected termination without complying with the twin notice rule.
RULING:
The dismissal of the respondents was for an authorized cause under Article 283. A
dismissal for authorized cause does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on
the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employers
exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. when the employer opts to install laborsaving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when he undertakes to
implement a retrenchment program.

Abbot vs. Honorable Mapayo - GR No. 134102 Case

Digest
Facts:
P was charged with a crime before the Sandiganbayan. By virtue of R.A. 7975 amending
P.D. 1606, the case was transferred to the RTC. P filed a motion to dismiss which the
RTC denied. P filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to reverse the
ruling of the RTC. The Solicitor General filed a Comment, raising the point that the CA
was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition because jurisdiction was already vested
in the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari and
prohibition
Held:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded in RA 7975 to include petitions
for the issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Siasoco vs. Narvasa - 315 SCRA 144 Case Digest
Facts:

P filed with the trial court a complaint for specific performance against subdivision
developers to compel the latter to execute deeds of absolute sale and to deliver the
certificates of title to buyers.
Issue:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over such as a complaint.
Held:
No. Under the Executive Order creating it, the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund
filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of
specific performance.

Salvador De Vera vs. Honorable Pelayo - GR No. 137354

Case Digest
Facts:
P filed a criminal case against Judge X for knowingly rendering unjust judgment and
malicious delay in the administration of justice before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman
referred the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. P assails the referral of the
case to the Supreme Court arguing that the Ombudsman, not the Supreme Court, is the
one vested with jurisdiction to resolve whether the crime charged was committed by the
judge.
Issue:
Whether the referral of the case to the Supreme Court is correct
Held:
Yes. Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205
can be entertained, there must first be a final and authoritative judicial declaration that
the decision or order in question is indeed unjust. The pronouncement may result from
either: (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of
the judgment; or (b) an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge
precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the determination of
whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive
judicial function.