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United States v. Kenneth Donnell Granger, 35 F.3d 557, 4th Cir. (1994)
United States v. Kenneth Donnell Granger, 35 F.3d 557, 4th Cir. (1994)
United States v. Kenneth Donnell Granger, 35 F.3d 557, 4th Cir. (1994)
3d 557
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge. (CR-92-213).
Argued: James Orlando Broccoletti, Zoby & Broccoletti, P.C., Norfolk,
VA. On brief: Kimberly L. Shoemaker, Zoby & Broccoletti, P.C.,
Norfolk, VA, for Appellant.
Argued: Arenda L. Wright Allen, Assistant United States Attorney,
Norfolk, VA. On brief: Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Norfolk,
VA, for Appellee.
E.D.Va.
AFFIRMED.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and BUTZNER and PHILLIPS, Senior
Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Detective Snipes parked his car and approached Granger who then, according
to Snipes, stepped in front of another door of the house and actually knocked on
it. Although Snipes was not in uniform, because the weapon in his shoulder
holster was visible, Granger realized Snipes was a police officer. Snipes
requested identification from Granger and asked why he was in the area. Snipes
then asked Granger whether he had any weapons or narcotics. Granger
responded that he did not. Snipes next asked Granger "you don't mind if I check
you?" to which Granger answered "no" and lifted his hands up slightly. Snipes
checked Granger's front pockets and then the back ones. In Granger's rear
pocket, the officer felt what he believed to be a weapon. He retrieved a loaded
Walther .32 caliber semi-automatic weapon. Snipes then arrested Granger.
Granger testified that he took a bus to the area, got off, and began walking
quickly to a friend's house. He stated that he went directly to the door of his
friend's apartment and knocked twice. According to Granger, Snipes
approached, accused him of trespassing, and asked for permission to search.
Granger testified that when he responded "no", Snipes grabbed his arm and told
him that he was going to search him anyway. Granger claimed Snipes then
turned him around so that he faced the wall and searched him.
The district court found that Snipes had observed Granger walking towards him
quickly and glancing periodically over his shoulder at several undercover
officers. The court further found that when Granger noticed Snipes, Granger
turned around, retraced his steps a few feet and approached the house in which
Ronald Benton lived. In light of Granger's actions, the reputation of the
neighborhood, and the officer's suspicion that Granger might be associated with
the person sought by the detectives, the court concluded that Snipes had an
articulable and reasonable suspicion that Granger was engaged in criminal
activity. The court also determined that Snipes was justified in requesting
identification, and when Granger failed to produce any, in asking Granger
whether he possessed any weapons or narcotics. The court also found as fact
that in response to Snipes' request to search for weapons or drugs, Granger
consented to the search, both verbally and by raising his hands.
II
9
10
11
Snipes testified that he found Granger's actions suspicious because Granger was
walking quickly, continually glancing over his shoulder at several undercover
officers, retraced his steps, and pretended to knock on a door and then actually
knocked on the adjoining door. Further, the neighborhood was a high crime
area, and Snipes believed that Granger might have been an associate of the
narcotics suspect for whom the officers were searching. Under these
circumstances, Snipes possessed the requisite reasonable and articulable
suspicion justifying a Terry stop of Granger.
12
Granger asserts that Snipes' reasonable suspicion could not be based on the fact
that the area has a reputation for high crime and drug trafficking. Of course, the
nature of the area cannot be the only factor justifying the investigatory stop, see
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979), but it is one factor which an officer
may appropriately consider. See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987); United States v. Constantine, 567
F.2d 266, 267 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). Here, Snipes'
reasonable suspicion was based on the nature of the area as well as Granger's
suspicious actions and Snipes' belief that Granger could be an associate of the
narcotics suspect sought by the officers. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 418 (1981) (in assessing whether the stop was justified the totality of the
circumstances facing the officer must be taken into account).
13
Granger also argues that the stop of Granger was not permissible because the
fact that an individual notices police officers in a high crime area and attempts
to avoid them does not create reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. We
believe Granger's actions revealed more than an attempt merely to avoid
crossing paths with the officers. Snipes observed Granger looking nervously at
the undercover officers after he passed them. The officers were not following
Granger. Then, when Granger noticed Snipes, he retraced his steps, walked up
to a door of a house he had just passed, and pretended to knock on it. Because
Granger acted nervously and took some unusual actions, Snipes reasonably
could have suspected Granger of criminal activity. Examining the totality of the
circumstances--Granger's actions, the character of the neighborhood, and the
officer's purpose in being in the area--we find no error in the district court's
conclusion that the Terry stop of Granger was justified.
14
We also uphold the district court's finding that the officer's actions were
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances initially justifying the stop.
Snipes inquired into Granger's purpose in the area and asked for some
identification. When Granger could produce none, Snipes asked whether
Granger was carrying any weapons or narcotics. Given the fact that Granger
had no identification, the nature of the area, and the officer's belief that Granger
might have been associated with the narcotics suspect, his question and concern
for his safety were reasonable. That brings us to the issue whether Granger
consented to the search that followed.
B
15
16
AFFIRMED.