Agustin vs Edu

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices.
Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to
provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of
reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and
dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the
fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4)
well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the
signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any
part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the
travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other
hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still
think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement
car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus
increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v.
Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by

Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential,
insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to
all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may
be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act
of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being nonexistent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found
nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon,
and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of
fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the
National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the
imperative demands of public safety.

Binay vs Domingo
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

Facts:

On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved

Resolution No. 60 (A resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program
extending P500 to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds
existing in the municipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for the
implementation of the program. However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in
audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners reconsideration as Resolution 60
has no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public
safety, general welfare, etc of the inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a
few individuals. Public funds should only be used for public purposes.

Issue:

WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a
valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Held:
Yes.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which
was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et
ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the
general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power
by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation
of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the
creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may
exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably
proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the
enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this
power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to
"enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP
337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as
to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and
order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government.
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by
the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards
state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare social
justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the
poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare
of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is
a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision however must not be taken

as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a

philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA

GR L-34915 JUNE 24, 1983

FACTS:

Quezon City Council passed Ordinance No. 6118 where under Section 9 of
whichprovides for regulation of private memorial type cemetery and providing penalties fornoncompliance thereof. The said section ordered private cemeteries to allot at leastsix (6) percent
of the total area for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupersand who have been
resident of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. Butrespondent Himlayang
Pilipino reacted and alleged the ordinance to be contrary to theConstitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act and the RevisedAdministrative Code. Petitioners argue that the
taking of the respondents property is avalid and reasonable exercise of police lower and that
land taken for a public use as itis intended for the burial ground of paupers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
NO.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is not a mere police regulation but an
outrightconfiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process by lawand
even without just compensation. Police power usually exercised in the form of mere regulation
or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of thegeneral welfare. It does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property with theexception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property inorder to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the
peace and order and of promotingthe general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally-possessed articlesuch as opium and firearms.

PASEI vs Drilon Case Digest

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. DRILON G.R.
NO. L-81958JUNE 30, 1988FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges
theConstitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Departmentof Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THETEMPORARY SUSPENSION
OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC ANDHOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in
this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically,the measure is assailed
for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does notapply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise
to be an invalidexercise of the lawmaking power, police power
being legislative, and not executive, incharacter.In its supplement to the
petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII,
of theConstitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and d
ecision-makingprocesses affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law." DepartmentOrder No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the
absence of prior consultations. It isclaimed, finally, to be in violation of the
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition tothe "great and irreparable
injury" that PASEI members face should the Order befurther enforced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power
isvalid under the Constitution?
HELD:
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. As a general
rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear
andconvincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically
stands.The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure shouldbe nullified. There is no question that Department Order No.
1 applies only to "femalecontract workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between thesexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution does noti m p o r t
a perfect Identity of rights among all men and
w o m e n . I t a d m i t s o f classifications, provided that (1) such classifications
rest on substantial distinctions;(2) they are germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) they are not confined to existingconditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class.The Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor forceabroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked byphysical
and personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights,
theCourt is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
duty, the Courtsustains the Government's efforts.The same, however, cannot
be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is noevidence that,
except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have
beenaffl icted with an identical predicament. Suffi ce it to state,
then, that insofar asclassifications are concerned, this Court is content
that distinctions are borne by theevidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified.There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to
the purpose behindthe measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective
of Department Order No. 1 to"enhance the protection for Filipino female
overseas workers" this Court has no
SECTION 17. Basic Services
a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) For a Barangay:
(i) Agricultural support services which include planting materials
distribution system and operation of farm produce collection
and buying stations;
(ii) Health and social welfare services which include maintenance of
Barangay health center and day-care center;
(iii) Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation,
beautification, and solid waste collection;
(iv) Maintenance of Katarungang Pambarangay;
(v) Maintenance of Barangay roads and bridges and water supply
systems
(vi) Infrastructure facilities such as multi- purpose hall, multipurpose
pavement, plaza, sports center, and other similar facilities;
(vii) Information and reading center; and
(viii) Satellite or public market, where viable;
(2) For a municipality:
(i) Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to
agriculture and fishery activities which include dispersal of
livestock and poultry, fingerlings, and other seeding materials
for aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms;
medicinal plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of
seedling nurseries; demonstration farms; quality control of
copra and improvement and development of local distribution
channels, preferably through cooperatives; inter -Barangay
irrigation system; water and soil resource utilization and
conservation projects; and enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves;
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and
review of the DENR, implementation of community-based
forestry projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and control of
communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar
forest development projects;
(iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health
services which include the implementation of programs and
projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and
communicable and non-communicable disease control
services; access to secondary and tertiary health services;
purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment
needed to carry out the services herein enumerated;
(iv) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on
child and youth welfare, family and community welfare,
women's welfare, welfare of the elderly and disabled persons;
community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants,
beggars, street children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and
victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects;
nutrition services; and family planning services;
(v) Information services which include investments and job placement
information systems, tax and marketing information systems,
and maintenance of a public library;
(vi) Solid waste disposal system or environmental management
system and services or facilities related to general hygiene and
sanitation;
(vii) Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks including
freedom parks, playgrounds, and sports facilities and
equipment, and other similar facilities;
(viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of
the residents of the municipality and which are funded out of
municipal funds including, but not limited to, municipal roads
and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public
elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health centers and
other health facilities necessary to carry out health services;
communal irrigation, small water impounding projects

and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring

development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems;
seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage, and flood control;
traffic signals and road signs; and similar facilities;
(ix) Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal enterprises;
(x) Public cemetery;
(xi) Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the
acquisition of equipment, regulation and supervision of
business concessions, and security services for such facilities;
and
(xii) Sites for police and fire stations and substations and the municipal
jail;
(3) For a Province:
(i) Agricultural extension and on-site research services and
facilities which include the prevention and control of plant and
animal pests and diseases; dairy farms, livestock markets,
animal breeding stations, and artificial insemination centers;
and assistance in the organization of farmers' and fishermen's
cooperatives and other collective organizations, as well as the
transfer of appropriate technology;
(ii) Industrial research and development services, as well as the
transfer of appropriate technology;
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control
and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to
community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, smallscale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the
environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local
purposes;
(iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health
services which include hospitals and other tertiary health
services;
(v) Social welfare services which include pro grams and projects on
rebel returnees and evacuees; relief operations; and,
population development services;
(vi) Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks and other
public assembly areas, and other similar facilities;
(vii) Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the
residents of the province and which are funded out of provincial
funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges;
inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood
control, and irrigation systems; reclamation projects; and similar
facilities;
(viii) Programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass
dwellings, except those funded by the Social Security System
(SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF): Provided, That
national funds for these programs and projects shall be
equitably allocated among the regions in proportion to the ratio
of the homeless to the population;
(ix) Investment support services, including access to credit financing;
(x) Upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection
services through the use of computer hardware and software
and other means;
(xi) Inter-municipal telecommunications services, subject to national
policy guidelines; and
(xii) Tourism development and promotion programs;
(4) For a City:
All the services and facilities of the municipality and province, and in
addition thereto, the following:
(i) Adequate communication and transportation facilities;
(ii) Support for education, police and fire services and facilities.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities funded by the national government
under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent
executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources,

are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency
for such projects, facilities, programs, and services.
(d) The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of
equipment and materials from both foreign and local sources necessary for
the provision of the foregoing services and facilities shall be undertaken by
the local government unit concerned, based on national policies, standards
and guidelines.
(e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units
the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated
in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code.
As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the
national government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
(f) The national government or the next higher level of local government unit may
provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level
of local government unit when such services or facilities are not made
available or, if made available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its
inhabitants.
(g) The basic services and facilities hereinabove enumerated shall be funded from
the share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and
other local revenues and funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned or -controlled corporations which
are tasked by law to establish and maintain such services or facilities. Any
fund or resource available for the use of local government units shall be first
allocated for the provision of basic services or facilities enumerated in
subsection (b) hereof before applying the same for other purposes, unless
otherwise provided in this Code.
(h) The Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved
to local government units as provided herein shall be phased out within one
(1) year from the approval of this Code. Said national agencies and offices
may establish such field units as may be necessary for monitoring purposes
and providing technical assistance to local government units. The properties,
equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be distributed to
the local government units in the region in accordance with the rules and
regulations issued by the oversight committee created under this Code.
(i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local
government units of the records, equipment and other assets and personnel
of national agencies and offices, corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions, and responsibilities. Personnel of said national agencies or offices
shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in
whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable
as determined by the said oversight committee: Provided, That the rights
accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and
regulations shall not be impaired: Provided, Further, That regional directors
who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in
the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government
unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of
rank, salary or tenure.
(j) To ensure the active participation of the private sector in local governance, local
government units may, by ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise
dispose of public economic enterprises owned by them in their proprietary
capacity.
Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic services or facilities
enumerated in this Section.