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TodayisFriday,January08,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.74457March20,1987
RESTITUTOYNOT,petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATECOURT,THESTATIONCOMMANDER,INTEGRATEDNATIONALPOLICE,
BAROTACNUEVO,ILOILOandTHEREGIONALDIRECTOR,BUREAUOFANIMALINDUSTRY,REGIONIV,
ILOILOCITY,respondents.
RamonA.Gonzalesforpetitioner.

CRUZ,J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me
first!"ItisthiscrythatthepetitionerineffectrepeatshereashechallengestheconstitutionalityofExecutiveOrder
No.626A.
Thesaidexecutiveorderreadsinfullasfollows:
WHEREAS,thePresidenthasgivenordersprohibitingtheinterprovincialmovementofcarabaosand
the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626
particularlywithrespecttoage
WHEREAS,ithasbeenobservedthatdespitesuchorderstheviolatorsstillmanagetocircumventthe
prohibitionagainstinterprovincialmovementofcarabaosbytransportingcarabeefinsteadand
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
ExecutiveOrderandprovideforthedispositionofthecarabaosandcarabeefsubjectoftheviolation
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,PresidentofthePhilippines,byvirtueofthepowers
vestedinmebytheConstitution,doherebypromulgatethefollowing:
SECTION1.ExecutiveOrderNo.626isherebyamendedsuchthathenceforth,nocarabaoregardless
ofage,sex,physicalconditionorpurposeandnocarabeefshallbetransportedfromoneprovinceto
another.ThecarabaoorcarabeeftransportedinviolationofthisExecutiveOrderasamendedshallbe
subjecttoconfiscationandforfeiturebythegovernment,tobedistributedtocharitableinstitutionsand
othersimilarinstitutionsastheChairmanoftheNationalMeatInspectionCommissionmayayseefit,in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
mayseefit,inthecaseofcarabaos.
SECTION2.ThisExecutiveOrdershalltakeeffectimmediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty.
(SGD.)FERDINANDE.MARCOS
President
RepublicofthePhilippines
ThepetitionerhadtransportedsixcarabaosinapumpboatfromMasbatetoIloiloonJanuary13,1984,whenthey
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wereconfiscatedbythepolicestationcommanderofBarotacNuevo,Iloilo,forviolationoftheabovemeasure. 1The

petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
consideringthemeritsofthecase,thecourtsustainedtheconfiscationofthecarabaosand,sincetheycouldnolongerbeproduced,orderedtheconfiscationof
thebond.Thecourtalsodeclinedtoruleontheconstitutionalityoftheexecutiveorder,asraisebythepetitioner,forlackofauthorityandalsoforitspresumed
validity.2

ThepetitionerappealedthedecisiontotheIntermediateAppellateCourt,*3whichupheldthetrialcourt, **andhehasnow
comebeforeusinthispetitionforreviewoncertiorari.

Thethrustofhispetitionisthattheexecutiveorderisunconstitutionalinsofarasitauthorizesoutrightconfiscationof
the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid
because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteedbydueprocess.Hecomplainsthatthemeasureshouldnothavebeenpresumed,andsosustained,as
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President
underAmendmentNo.6ofthe1973Constitution.4
Whilealsoinvolvingthesameexecutiveorder,thecaseofPesiganv.Angeles 5isnotapplicablehere.Thequestion
raisedtherewasthenecessityofthepreviouspublicationofthemeasureintheOfficialGazettebeforeitcouldbeconsidered
enforceable.Weimposedtherequirementthenonthebasisofdueprocessoflaw.Indoingso,however,thisCourtdidnot,
ascontendedbytheSolicitorGeneral,impliedlyaffirmtheconstitutionalityofExecutiveOrderNo.626A.Thatisanentirely
differentmatter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions,theyarenonethelessnotpreventedfromresolvingthesamewheneverwarranted,subjectonlytoreview
bythehighesttribunal.6WehavejurisdictionundertheConstitutionto"review,revise,reverse,modifyoraffirmonappeal
orcertiorari,asthelaworrulesofcourtmayprovide,"finaljudgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin,amongothers,allcases
involvingtheconstitutionalityofcertainmeasures.7Thissimplymeansthattheresolutionofsuchcasesmaybemadeinthe
firstinstancebytheselowercourts.

Andwhileitistruethatlawsarepresumedtobeconstitutional,thatpresumptionisnotbyanymeansconclusive
andinfactmayberebutted.Indeed,iftherebeaclearshowingoftheirinvalidity,andoftheneedtodeclarethem
so,then"willbethetimetomakethehammerfall,andheavily," 8torecallJusticeLaurel'strenchantwarning.Stated
otherwise,courtsshouldnotfollowthepathofleastresistancebysimplypresumingtheconstitutionalityofalawwhenitis
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another
distinguishedjurist,9andsohealthewoundorexcisetheaffliction.

Judicialpowerauthorizesthisandwhentheexerciseisdemanded,thereshouldbenoshirkingofthetaskforfear
ofretaliation,orlossoffavor,orpopularcensure,oranyothersimilarinhibitionunworthyofthebench,especially
thisCourt.
Thechallengedmeasureisdenominatedanexecutiveorderbutitisreallypresidentialdecree,promulgatinganew
ruleinsteadofmerelyimplementinganexistinglaw.ItwasissuedbyPresidentMarcosnotforthepurposeoftaking
carethatthelawswerefaithfullyexecutedbutintheexerciseofhislegislativeauthorityunderAmendmentNo.6.It
wasprovidedthereunderthatwheneverinhisjudgmentthereexistedagraveemergencyorathreatorimminence
thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction
thatweretohavetheforceandeffectoflaw.Asthereisnoshowingofanyexigencytojustifytheexerciseofthat
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment,"aphrasethatwillleadtoprotracteddiscussionnotreallynecessaryatthistime,wereserveresolutionof
this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental
questionofdueprocess.
It is part of the art of constitutionmaking that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable
languagetoavoidcontroversiesthatmightariseontheircorrectinterpretation.ThatistheIdeal.Inthecaseofthe
due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept
ambiguous.Infact,aproposaltodelineateitmoreclearlywassubmittedintheConstitutionalConventionof1934,
but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully
arguedagainstit.Hewassustainedbythebody.10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessarybecausedueprocessisnot,likesomeprovisionsofthefundamentallaw,an"ironrule"layingdownan
implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the
guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
enlargingorconstrictingitsprotectionasthechangingtimesandcircumstancesmayrequire.
Awareofthis,thecourtshavealsohesitatedtoadopttheirownspecificdescriptionofdueprocesslesttheyconfine
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themselvesinalegalstraitjacketthatwilldeprivethemoftheelbowroomtheymayneedtovarythemeaningofthe
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection openended, as it
were,tobe"graduallyascertainedbytheprocessofinclusionandexclusioninthecourseofthedecisionofcases
astheyarise."11Thus,JusticeFelixFrankfurteroftheU.S.SupremeCourt,forexample,wouldgonofartherthantodefinedueprocessandinsodoing
sumsitallupasnothingmoreandnothinglessthan"theembodimentofthesportingIdeaoffairplay."12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would
thenceforthnotproceedagainstthelifelibertyorpropertyofanyofitssubjectsexceptbythelawfuljudgmentofhis
peersorthelawoftheland,theytherebywonforthemselvesandtheirprogenythatsplendidguarantyoffairness
thatisnowthehallmarkofthefreesociety.ThesolemnvowthatKingJohnmadeatRunnymedein1215hassince
thenresoundedthroughtheages,asaringingremindertoallrulers,benevolentorbase,thateveryperson,when
confrontedbythesternvisageofthelaw,isentitledtohavehissayinafairandopenhearingofhiscause.
Theclosedmindhasnoplaceintheopensociety.ItispartofthesportingIdeaoffairplaytohear"theotherside"
beforeanopinionisformedoradecisionismadebythosewhositinjudgment.Obviously,onesideisonlyonehalf
ofthequestiontheotherhalfmustalsobeconsideredifanimpartialverdictistobereachedbasedonaninformed
appreciationoftheissuesincontention.Itisindispensablethatthetwosidescomplementeachother,asuntothe
bowthearrow,inleadingtothecorrectrulingafterexaminationoftheproblemnotfromoneortheotherperspective
onlybutinitstotality.Ajudgmentbasedonlessthatthisfullappraisal,onthepretextthatahearingisunnecessary
or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the
insolenceofpower.
Theminimumrequirementsofdueprocessarenoticeandhearing 13which,generallyspeaking,maynotbedispensedwithbecause

theyareintendedasasafeguardagainstofficialarbitrariness.Itisagratifyingcommentaryonourjudicialsystemthatthejurisprudenceofthiscountryisrichwith
applicationsofthisguarantyasproofofourfealtytotheruleoflawandtheancientrudimentsoffairplay.Wehaveconsistentlydeclaredthateveryperson,faced
bytheawesomepoweroftheState,isentitledto"thelawoftheland,"whichDanielWebsterdescribedalmosttwohundredyearsagointhefamousDartmouth
CollegeCase,14as"thelawwhichhearsbeforeitcondemns,whichproceedsuponinquiryandrendersjudgmentonlyaftertrial."Ithastobesoiftherightsof
everypersonaretobesecuredbeyondthereachofofficialswho,outofmistakenzealorplainarrogance,woulddegradethedueprocessclauseintoawornand
emptycatchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of
admittedexceptions.Theconclusivepresumption,forexample,barstheadmissionofcontraryevidenceaslongas
suchpresumptionisbasedonhumanexperienceorthereisarationalconnectionbetweenthefactprovedandthe
factultimatelypresumedtherefrom. 15Thereareinstanceswhentheneedforexpeditionsactionwilljustifyomissionoftheserequisites,asinthe

summaryabatementofanuisanceperse,likeamaddogontheloose,whichmaybekilledonsightbecauseoftheimmediatedangeritposestothesafetyand
livesofthepeople.Pornographicmaterials,contaminatedmeatandnarcoticdrugsareinherentlyperniciousandmaybesummarilydestroyed.Thepassportofa
personsoughtforacriminaloffensemaybecancelledwithouthearing,tocompelhisreturntothecountryhehasfled.16Filthyrestaurantsmaybesummarily
padlockedintheinterestofthepublichealthandbawdyhousestoprotectthepublicmorals.17Insuchinstances,previousjudicialhearingmaybeomittedwithout
violationofdueprocessinviewofthenatureofthepropertyinvolvedortheurgencyoftheneedtoprotectthegeneralwelfarefromaclearandpresentdanger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrainedbydueprocess.ThepolicepowerissimplydefinedasthepowerinherentintheStatetoregulateliberty
andpropertyforthepromotionofthegeneralwelfare.18Byreasonofitsfunction,itextendstoallthegreatpublicneedsandisdescribedas

the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual,asamemberofsociety,ishemmedinbythepolicepower,whichaffectshimevenbeforeheisbornandfollowshimstillafterheisdeadfromthe
wombtobeyondthetombinpracticallyeverythinghedoesorowns.Itsreachisvirtuallylimitless.Itisaubiquitousandoftenunwelcomeintrusion.Evenso,as
long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the
justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populiestsupremalexandSic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individualintereststothebenefitofthegreaternumber.

ItisthispowerthatisnowinvokedbythegovernmenttojustifyExecutiveOrderNo.626A,amendingthebasicrule
in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original
measurewasissuedforthereason,asexpressedinoneofitsWhereases,that"presentconditionsdemandthatthe
carabaosandthebuffaloesbeconservedforthebenefitofthesmallfarmerswhorelyonthemforenergyneeds."
Weaffirmattheoutsettheneedforsuchameasure.Inthefaceoftheworseningenergycrisisandtheincreased
dependenceofourfarmsonthesetraditionalbeastsofburden,thegovernmentwouldhavebeenremiss,indeed,if
ithadnottakenstepstoprotectandpreservethem.
AsimilarprohibitionwaschallengedinUnitedStatesv.Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of

largecattlewasclaimedtobeadeprivationofpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.Thedefendanthadbeenconvictedthereunderforhavingslaughteredhisown
carabaowithouttherequiredpermit,andheappealedtotheSupremeCourt.Theconvictionwasaffirmed.Thelawwassustainedasavalidpolicemeasureto
preventtheindiscriminatekillingofcarabaos,whichwerethenbadlyneededbyfarmers.Anepidemichadstrickenmanyoftheseanimalsandthereductionof
their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the
animalsandtheconsequentincreaseintheirprice,cattlerustlinghadspreadalarmingly,necessitatingmoreeffectivemeasuresfortheregistrationandbranding
oftheseanimals.TheCourtheldthatthequestionedstatutewasavalidexerciseofthepolicepoweranddeclaredinpartasfollows:

TojustifytheStateinthusinterposingitsauthorityinbehalfofthepublic,itmustappear,first,thatthe
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose,andnotundulyoppressiveuponindividuals....
Fromwhathasbeensaid,wethinkitisclearthattheenactmentoftheprovisionsofthestatuteunder
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particularclass"andthattheprohibitionoftheslaughterofcarabaosforhumanconsumption,solong
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astheseanimalsarefitforagriculturalworkordraftpurposeswasa"reasonablynecessary"limitation
onprivateownership,toprotectthecommunityfromthelossoftheservicesofsuchanimalsbytheir
slaughterbyimprovidentowners,temptedeitherbygreedofmomentarygain,orbyadesiretoenjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurablyanddangerouslyaffected.
Inthelightofthetestsmentionedabove,weholdwiththeToribioCasethatthecarabao,asthepoorman'stractor,
sotospeak,hasadirectrelevancetothepublicwelfareandsoisalawfulsubjectofExecutiveOrderNo.626.The
methodchoseninthebasicmeasureisalsoreasonablynecessaryforthepurposesoughttobeachievedandnot
undulyoppressiveuponindividuals,againfollowingtheaboveciteddoctrine.Thereisnodoubtthatbybanningthe
slaughterof these animalsexceptwherethey are atleastsevenyears oldif male and elevenyears old iffemale
uponissuanceofthenecessarypermit,theexecutiveorderwillbeconservingthosestillfitforfarmworkorbreeding
andpreventingtheirimprovidentdepletion.
Butwhileconcedingthattheamendatorymeasurehasthesamelawfulsubjectastheoriginalexecutiveorder,we
cannotsaywithequalcertaintythatitcomplieswiththesecondrequirement,viz.,thattherebealawfulmethod.We
note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achievedbythequestionedmeasureismissing
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously,retainingthecarabaosinoneprovincewillnotpreventtheirslaughterthere,anymorethanmovingthem
toanotherprovincewillmakeiteasiertokillthemthere.Asforthecarabeef,theprohibitionismadetoapplytoitas
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However,ifthemovementoftheliveanimalsforthepurposeofpreventingtheirslaughtercannotbeprohibited,it
shouldfollowthatthereisnoreasoneithertoprohibittheirtransferas,nottobeflippantdeadmeat.
Evenifareasonablerelationbetweenthemeansandtheendweretobeassumed,wewouldstillhavetoreckon
withthesanctionthatthemeasureappliesforviolationoftheprohibition.Thepenaltyisoutrightconfiscationofthe
carabaoorcarabeefbeingtransported,tobemetedoutbytheexecutiveauthorities,usuallythepoliceonly.Inthe
ToribioCase,thestatutewassustainedbecausethepenaltyprescribedwasfineandimprisonment,tobeimposed
bythecourtaftertrialandconvictionoftheaccused.Underthechallengedmeasure,significantly,nosuchtrialis
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measureitself,asforfeitedtothegovernment.
Intheinstantcase,thecarabaoswerearbitrarilyconfiscatedbythepolicestationcommander,werereturnedtothe
petitioneronlyafterhehadfiledacomplaintforrecoveryandgivenasupersedeasbondofP12,000.00,whichwas
orderedconfiscateduponhisfailuretoproducethecarabaoswhenorderedbythetrialcourt.Theexecutiveorder
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright.Themeasurestruckatonceandpounceduponthepetitionerwithoutgivinghimachancetobeheard,
thusdenyinghimthecenturiesoldguarantyofelementaryfairplay.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that
summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicialonly.20Intheexceptionalcasesaccepted,however.thereisajustificationfortheomissionoftherighttoaprevious
hearing,towit,theimmediacyoftheproblemsoughttobecorrectedandtheurgencyoftheneedtocorrectit.

Inthecasebeforeus,therewasnosuchpressureoftimeoractioncallingforthepetitioner'speremptorytreatment.
Thepropertiesinvolvedwerenoteveninimicalperseastorequiretheirinstantdestruction.Therecertainlywasno
reasonwhytheoffenseprohibitedbytheexecutiveordershouldnothavebeenprovedfirstinacourtofjustice,with
theaccusedbeingaccordedalltherightssafeguardedtohimundertheConstitution.Consideringthat,asweheldin
Pesiganv.Angeles, 21ExecutiveOrderNo.626Aispenalinnature,theviolationthereofshouldhavebeenpronounced
notbythepoliceonlybutbyacourtofjustice,whichalonewouldhavehadtheauthoritytoimposetheprescribedpenalty,
andonlyaftertrialandconvictionoftheaccused.

Wealsomark,ontopofallthis,thequestionablemannerofthedispositionoftheconfiscatedpropertyasprescribed
inthequestionedexecutiveorder.Itisthereauthorizedthattheseizedpropertyshall"bedistributedtocharitable
institutionsandothersimilarinstitutionsastheChairmanoftheNationalMeatInspectionCommissionmayseefit,in
thecaseofcarabeef,andtodeservingfarmersthroughdispersalastheDirectorofAnimalIndustrymayseefit,in
the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition,ifconditionitis.Itisladenwithperilousopportunitiesforpartialityandabuse,andevencorruption.One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said
officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
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Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officersnamedcansupplytheanswer,theyandtheyalonemaychoosethegranteeastheyseefit,andintheirown
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalizedwithinbanksthatkeepitfromoverflowing,"inshort,aclearlyprofligateandthereforeinvaliddelegationof
legislativepowers.
Tosumupthen,wefindthatthechallengedmeasureisaninvalidexerciseofthepolicepowerbecausethemethod
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.Dueprocessisviolatedbecausetheownerofthepropertyconfiscatedisdeniedtherighttobeheardin
hisdefenseandisimmediatelycondemnedandpunished.Theconfermentontheadministrativeauthoritiesofthe
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
againstthedoctrineofseparationofpowers.Thereis,finally,alsoaninvaliddelegationoflegislativepowerstothe
officersmentionedthereinwhoaregrantedunlimiteddiscretioninthedistributionofthepropertiesarbitrarilytaken.
Forthesereasons,weherebydeclareExecutiveOrderNo.626Aunconstitutional.
Weagreewiththerespondentcourt,however,thatthepolicestationcommanderwhoconfiscatedthepetitioner's
carabaosisnotliableindamagesforenforcingtheexecutiveorderinaccordancewithitsmandate.Thelawwasat
thattimepresumptivelyvalid,anditwashisobligation,asamemberofthepolice,toenforceit.Itwouldhavebeen
impertinentofhim,beingameresubordinateofthePresident,todeclaretheexecutiveorderunconstitutionaland,
onhisownresponsibilityalone,refusetoexecuteit.Eventhetrialcourt,infact,andtheCourtofAppealsitselfdid
notfeeltheyhadthecompetence,foralltheirsuperiorauthority,toquestiontheorderwenowannul.
TheCourtnotesthatifthepetitionerhadnotseenfittoassertandprotecthisrightsashesawthem,thiscasewould
never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait
accomplidespiteitsinvalidity.Wecommendhimforhisspirit.Withoutthepresentchallenge,thematterwouldhave
endedinthatpumpboatinMasbateandanotherviolationoftheConstitution,forallitsobviousness,wouldhave
beenperpetrated,allowedwithoutprotest,andsoonforgotteninthelimboofrelinquishedrights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenevertheyareignoredorviolated.Rightsarebutweaponsonthewallif,likeexpensivetapestry,alltheydois
embellishandimpress.Rights,asweapons,mustbeapromiseofprotection.Theybecometrulymeaningful,and
fulfilltheroleassignedtotheminthefreesociety,iftheyarekeptbrightandsharpwithusebythosewhoarenot
afraidtoassertthem.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decisionoftheCourtofAppealsisreversed.Thesupersedeasbondiscancelledandtheamountthereofisordered
restoredtothepetitioner.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Teehankee,C.J.,Yap,Fernan,Narvasa,Gutierrez,Jr.,Paras,Gancayco,PadillaBidinSarmientoandCortes,JJ.,
concur.
MelencioHerreraandFeliciano,JJ.,areonleave.

Footnotes
1Rollo,pp.7,28,29,34.
2Ibid,pp.67AnnexB.
*JusticesCoquia,BartolomeandEjercito.
3Rollo,pp.6,27,33.
**JudgeBethelKatalbasMoscardon.
4Ibid.,pp.1011,1416,76.
5129SCRA174.
6Espirituvs.Fugoso,81Phil.637.
7Sec.5[2(a)],Art.X,1973ConstitutionSec.5[2(a)],Art.VIII,1987Constitution.
8J.Laurel,concurringopinion,Zanduetav.delaCosta,66Phil.615,627.
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9USv.Bustos,37Phil.731.
10IAruego,TheFramingoftheConstitution(1936),pp.153159.
11Twinningvs.NewJersey,211U.S.78.
12Frankfurter,Mr.JusticeHolmesandtheSupremeCourt,pp.3233.
13Davidvs.Aquilizan,94SCRA707Montemayorvs.AranetaUniv.Foundation,77SCRA321
Lenteleravs.Amores,70SCRA37Floresvs.Buencamino,74SCRA332DBPvs.Bautista,26
SCRA366OngSuHanvs.GutierrezDavid,76Phil.546BancoEspanolFilipinovs.Palanca,37Phil.
921.
14DartmouthCollegevs.Woodward,4Wheaton518.
15Manleyv.Georgia,279U.S.11Cooley639.
16Suntayvs.People,101Phil.833.
1712C.J.1224.
18Peoplev.VeraReyes,67Phil.190ErmitaMalateHotel&MotelOperatorsAss.v.CityMayor,20
SCRA849Primiciasv.Fugoso80Phil.75U.S.v.LingSuTan,10Phil.114Collinsv.Wolfe5Phil.
297U.S.v.GomezJesus,31Phil.225Churchillv.Rafferty32Phil.603.
1915Phil.85.
20NewFilipinoMaritimeAgencies,Inc.vs.Rivera,83SCRA602GasCorp.ofthePhil.vs.Inciong93
SCRA653.
21supra.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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