emedial Law Review

A. ADMISSIBILITY

Evidence
Digests
Congress, no effort was undertaken for the publication

GARCILLANO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(Note: Sir did not give any citation for this but I only
found 1 garcillano vs house of reps lang naman.
Also, case is more on Consti rather than evidence.
Super short lang yung for rem)
Facts: Tapes which appears to contain a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between GMA and a high
ranking official of the comelec (Garci) surfaced. The
hello garci tapes allegedly contained GMAs
instructions to garci to manipulate the votes in her
favor.
A congressional investigation in the House of
Reps was conducted. And after a prolonged debate,
the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of
the house. However, the house committees decided to
suspend the hearings indefinitely. Garcia filed a
petition for prohibition and injunction with the SC to
retrain the house committees from using these tape
recordings in their reports and for other purposes.
Later, the house discussion and debates on the hello
garci tapes abruptly stopped.
2years later, the matter was brought to life
again in the Senate after Lacsons privilege speech.
Lengthy debates ensued as to whether conducting a
legislative inquiry on the matter will violate the AntiWiretapping Law and the Consti. A petition was filed
with the SC by retired justices of the CA to bar the
senate from conducting its scheduled legislative
inquiry. SC did not issue an injunctive writ so the
senate proceeded with its public hearings.
Issue: Whether proceedings of the House and of the
Senate should be stopped? YES.
Held: Petition regarding proceeding in the House is
dismissed for being moot and academic. Recall that the
proceedings have been stopped already. As to the
proceedings in the Senate, SC grants petition to stop
them.
SC reasons out that the Senate cannot be
allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear violation of the constitutional
requirement under Art6, sec21: Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. What constitutes publication is set forth in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws
shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Note that the respondents in this case (house
of reps) admit the senate rules of procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation had been published only in
1995 and 2006. With respect to the present 14 th

of these rules when they first opened their session.

[Discussion on jurisprudence and law on when
should Senate publish its rules followed. Basically,
Senate as an institution is continuing. However, with
regard to its day-to-day business, Senate of each
Congress (13th vs 14th vs 15th...etc) acts separately and
independently. Note that Senate has determined that
its MAIN rules are valid from their date of adoption
until they are amended or repealed. However, with
regard to the RULES such as the one governing
inquiries in aid of legislation, it only states that there
must be publication.]
IMPORTANT PART: House of Reps justify their
non-observance of this constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and that they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the senates internet page.
They claim that there was valid publication through the
internet by virtue of the E-Commerce Act.
SC does not agree. R.A. 8792 (E-Commerce)
considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other
words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.
E-Commerce Act provides: For evidentiary
purposes, an electronic document shall be the
functional equivalent of a written document under
existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule
relating to the admissibility of electronic data
messages or electronic documents, except the rules
relating to authentication and best evidence.

PEOPLE V LAUGA
FACTS: Lauga was accused of qualified rape for raping
his 13 year old daughter AAA. It was alleged in the
Information that in the afternoon of March 15, 2000,
AAA was left alone at home while her father, Lauga,
went to have a drinking spree at the neighbors place.
AAAs mother and brother, BBB, also went out. At
10pm, Lauga woke AAA up, removed his pants, slid
inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her
pants and underwear; warned her not to shout for help
while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he
had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to
mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his
penis inside her vagina.
When BBB arrived, he found AAA crying. Lauga
claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB
decided to take AAA with him. On their way to their
maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted her
harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching
their
grandmothers
house,
they
told
their
grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which,
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Evidence
Digests
this case, Laugas extrajudicial confession was taken

they sought the assistance of the head of the Bantay

Bayan, Moises Boy Banting.
Banting found Lauga in his house wearing only
his underwear. He invited appellant to the police
station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost,
he admitted that he raped AAA because he was unable
to control himself.
After a physical examination, the medical
certificate of Dra. Alsula shows that the victims hymen
was freshly lacerated. On his defense, Lauga asserted
that the charge against him was ill-motivated because
he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of
their
children
after
engaging
in
a
heated
argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary
measure. He said that, on the day of the alleged rape,
he was furious to find that no food was prepared for
him and when his wife answered back when
confronted, this infuriated him that he kicked her hard
on her buttocks. Later that evening, he was awakened
by the members of Bantay Bayan and asked him to
go with them. He later learned that he was under
detention because AAA charged him with rape.
RTC found Lauga guilty of qualified rape. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. WON the alleged confession made before
a bantay bayan is admissible NO
2. WON the testimony of prosecution witnesses
are credible - YES

HELD:
1. NO. Lauga argued that even if he confessed to
Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted
by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.
First, this Court needs to ascertain whether or
not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law
enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this
Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
"bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents
living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."
This Court is convinced that "bantay bayan,"
are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, any inquiry he
makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Therefore, Lauga was already under custodial
investigation when he was apprehended by Banting
and his Miranda Rights should have been observed.
However, the inadmissibility of said confession
does not automatically lead to acquittal. But since in

without a counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence.

2. YES. Lauga assails the inconsistencies in the

testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified
that BBB accompanied her to the house of their
grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her
relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On
the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister
to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned
of the incident.
The testimony of AAA does not run contrary to
that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of
a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ
only as to when the help was sought for, which this
Court could well attribute to the nature of the
testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs
testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of
the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in
holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to
affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact,
inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that
such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
Side Note:
Laugas contention that AAA charged him of rape only
because she bore grudges against him is likewise
unmeritorious. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong
enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a
charge that would not only bring shame and
humiliation upon them and their families but also bring
their fathers into the gallows of death. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a
daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing
herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public
trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if
such heinous crime was not in fact committed. No
person, much less a woman, could attain such height
of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom
she owes her very existence, and for which she
naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness. Even
when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young woman
to concoct a story which would put her own father to
jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest
of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. It
is highly improbable for the victim against whom no
proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been
shown to fake charges much more against her own
father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater
weight since her accusing words were directed against
a close relative.
B. JUDICIAL NOTICE
CORINTHIAN GARDENS VS SPOUSES TANJANGCO

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the third party complaint in the RTC. Both submitted

FACTS: This case relates to a property dispute within

the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, managed by their
association (Corinthian). Sps. Tanjangco alleges that
the perimeter fence of the Cuasos, encroached on their
lot which is directly adjacent to theirs. Because the
Cuasos refused to demolish the fence, the Tanjangcos
filed a suit for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
In turn, the Cuasos filed a Third Party
Complaint against Corinthian, Paraz Construction and
De Dios Realty and Surveying. They ascribed
negligence to Paraz for its failure to ascertain the
proper specifications of their house; and to De Dios
for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation
survey, thereby exposing them to litigation.
They faulted Corinthian for approving their
relocation survey and building plans without verifying
their accuracy, as well as making representations as to
De Dios' integrity and competence (being the firm who
conducted all the previous surveying for the developer,
Corinthian recommended the services of De Dios).
The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian
exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would
not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the
Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian
should also be held answerable for any damages that
they might incur as a result of such construction.
The RTC ruled that the fence did in fact
encroach on the Tanjangco lot. However, since the
Cuasos were builders in good faith, the court gave the
Tanjangcos the option to sell and the former the option
to buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price
to be agreed upon by both. In the event that the
Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said
portion, the perimeter wall should be demolished at
the latter's expense. The RTC also ordered the Cuasos
to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from
the time of the filing of the complaint. Paraz was found
negligent for their disregard of the boundaries and was
ordered to pay damages. The complaint with respect to
De Dios and Corinthian was dismissed.
Because the RTC denied their Motion for
Reconsideration, the Tanjangcos appealed to the CA.
The Cuasos and Paraz also appealed.
On appeal, the CA reversed. It held that the
Cuasos were in bad faith and were land grabbers. Thus
the Tanjangcos were given the right to demand the
demolition of the fence, subject to their reimbursement
to the Cuasos of the necessary expenses for the
preservation of the fence. Also, the Cuasos were
ordered to pay, considering its location and category,
P10k a month as rent for the use and occupation of the
lot. They were also ordered to pay hefty sums for
damages and attorneys fees.
The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos
were dismissed. Paraz, De Dios and Corinthian were all
found negligent, and were ordered to contribute to all
judgment sums that the Cuasos would pay under the
decision, and interest on the same.
Only Corinthian filed for reconsideration. Upon
denial by the CA, Corinthian filed for Certiorari,
impleading the Cuasos as one of the respondents in

their respective memorandums to the SC.

ISSUE RELEVANT TO RULE 129:

W/n the CA had legal basis to unilaterally increase the
amount of the adjudged rent from P2,000.00 to
P10,000.00 (which was not prayed for by the
Tanjangcos in their complaint and in the absence of
evidence adduced by the parties)? YES
RULING: The Tanjangcos opine that a court can take
judicial notice of the general increase in the rentals of
real estate, as in this case, where the CA considered
the value of their lot in the "posh-and-swank"
Corinthian Gardens Subdivision and the fact that they
were deprived of it for almost two decades. The
Tanjangcos pray that this Court sustain the ruling of
the CA.
On this issue, the ruling in Spouses Badillo v.
Tayag is instructive:
Petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial
notice of the reasonable rental or the general price
increase of land in order to determine the amount
of rent that may be awarded to them. In that case,
however, this Court relied on the CA's factual
findings, which were based on the evidence
presented before the trial court. In determining
reasonable rent, the RTC therein took account of
the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of
the land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the
prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the
trial court relied, not on mere judicial notice, but
on the evidence presented before it.
[C]ourts may fix the reasonable amount of rent
for the use and occupation of a disputed property.
However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that
courts, in determining the amount of rent, could
simply rely on their own appreciation of land
values without considering any evidence. As we
have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable
amount of rent, but it must still base its action on
the evidence adduced by the parties.
Also, in Herrera v. Bollos the Court declared
that the reasonable amount of rent could be
determined not by mere judicial notice, but by
supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual
matter in controversy. The court may take judicial
notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the
court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon."
Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the
rental value of the premises in question without
supporting evidence. Truly, mere judicial notice is
inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to
determine the proper rental value.

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the first ordinance. (recall the SC ruling in the first

Now, contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both

the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the
Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession
and use of their property. This uniform factual finding
of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence
presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v.
Hao, we considered the increase in the award of
rentals
as
reasonable
given
the
particular
circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the
respondent denied the petitioners the benefits,
including rightful possession, of their property for
almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos
were deprived of possession and use of their property
for more than two decades through no fault of their
own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
monthly rental fixed by the CA. All told, the CA
committed no reversible error.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY et al. v. ATIENZA

Note: this digest only contains facts, issue, and ratio in
relation to the topic under which it was assigned.
FACTS: Herein petitioners (SJS, Cabigao, Tumbokon)
filed a case for mandamus (Rule 65) to compel then
Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance 8027, which was
enacted in November 2001. Under the said Ordinance,
certain areas in Manila were reclassified from industrial
to commercial area. As such, the businesses of certain
groups, including petroleum companies (Chevron,
Petron and Shell are intervenors in the case, since they
were affected) became disallowed. The ordinance
directed them to cease and desist from operating in
the Pandacan Terminals. Later, a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) was entered into between the
Dept of Energy and the oil companies, which was to be
effective only for 6 months. The agreement was to the
effect that there would be only a scaling down of the
Pandacan terminals, and for this purpose, special
business permits were issued to the oil companies. The
MOU was extended for a number of months. (This is
why the petitioners filed a mandamus case to
compel the Mayor to enforce the Ordinance instead).
In 2007, the SC ruled that it was ministerial for the
mayor to enforce all ordinances.
The 3 oil companies and the DOE filed an MR.
This case is the resolution of such MR. as it turns out,
in the beginning, the 3 companies filed a complaint in
the Manila RTC to have the Ordinance annulled. The
court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the
Mayor to refrain from enforcing the Ordinance.
Years after (in 2006), Ordinance 8119 known
as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Ordinance was enacted. Because of this new
Ordinance, the oil companies filed new complaints to
nullify it and they filed motions to withdraw their
earlier complaint (the one for nullifying the original
ordinance). In effect, their argument was that the later
ordinance superseded that first one, such that it was
error for the SC to rule that the Mayor should enforce

paragraph of this digest)

Issue: was the first Ordinance superseded by the

second one? No.
[should courts take mandatory judicial notice of local
ordinances? No]
Ruling: The 2007 decision did not take into
consideration the passage of the second Ordinance.
The simple reason was that the SC was never informed
about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice
of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect
to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not
included in the enumeration of matters covered by
mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court.
Section 50 of RA 409provides that: Judicial
notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall
take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the
SangguniangPanglungsod.However, this cannot be
taken to mean that the SC, since it has its seat in the
City of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a
copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of
any duty to inform the Court about it. Because even
where there is a statute that requires a court to take
judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not
required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are
not before it and to which it does not have access. The
party asking the court to take judicial notice is
obligated to supply the court with the full text of the
rules the party desires it to have notice of.Counsels
should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court
take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a
statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local
ordinances.
The failure to present the Ordinance is
inexcusable.

G HOLDINGS V. NATIONAL MINES

FACTS:The petitioner, G Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a
domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business
of owning and holding shares of stock of different
companies. MMC was incorporated by the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) on account of their foreclosure of
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporations assets.
Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement executed
between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), the
former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMCs shares
and financial claims. These financial claims were
converted into three Promissory Notes issued by MMC
in favor of GHI totaling P500M and secured by
mortgages over MMCs properties. Upon the signing of
the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full
satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHI
immediately took physical possession of the mine site
and its facilities, and took full control of the
management and operation of MMC.
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previous decisions related to the matter? Must it take

Almost four years thereafter, a labor dispute

arose between MMC and NAMAWU. Labor secretary
(Quisumbing) said that there was illegal dismissal and
that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then
ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with
payment of full backwages and benefits, and directed
the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) incorporating the terms and conditions of the
previous CBA providing for an annual increase in the
workers daily wage. In two separate cases filed with
this Court, we sustained the validity of the Quisumbing
Order, which became final and executory. Then DOLE
Secretary Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU,
directed the issuance of a partial writ of execution
(Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs to proceed
to the MMC premises for the execution of the same.
The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMCs
resident manager resisted its enforcement. On motion
of NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ).
On October 11, 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs,
the members of the union, and several armed men
implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied on the
properties of MMC located at its compound in Sipalay,
Negros Occidental.
GHI filed a for Contempt with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and to Nullify the Sheriffs Levy on Properties. GHI
contended that the levied properties were the subject
of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage,
executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the
aforesaid P550M promissory notes; that this deed was
registered on February 24, 2000; and that the
mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially
foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest
bidder.
The CA ruled, among others, that the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the
September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the deed was
sham, fictitious and fraudulent; that it was executed
two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but
surprisingly, it was registered only on February 24,
2000, immediately after the Court affirmed with finality
the Quisumbing Order. The CA also found that the
certificates of title to MMCs real properties did not
contain any annotation of a mortgage lien, and,
suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawnout labor proceedings to protect its right as a
mortgagee of virtually all the properties of MMC.
The CA further ruled that the subsequent
foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected
precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment
against MMC.
ISSUE: To decide whether or not CA committed
GADLEJ, the Court has to determine whether or not
GHI and MMC are one and the same company and
whether or not the alleged mortgages were valid
mortgages. To do this, must the court consider its

judicial notice? YES.

HELD: Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its

Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld the
right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its
labor claims.
Upon the same principle of judicial
notice, we acknowledge our Decision in
Republic of
the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset
Privatization Trust v. G Holdings, Inc., in which GHI
was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares
of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of
the company notes accompanying the said purchase.
These company notes, consisting of three (3)
Promissory Notes, were part of the documents
executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of
these
notes
uniformly
contains
stipulations
establishing and constituting in favor of GHI
mortgages over MMCs real and personal properties.
The stipulations were subsequently formalized in a
separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate
and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996.
Thereafter, the Deed was registered on February 4,
2000.
We find both decisions critically relevant
to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have
guided the courts below in the disposition of the
controversy at their respective levels. To repeat,
these decisions respectively confirm the right of
NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right
of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over
the real and personal properties of MMC, as will
be explained below. The assailed CA decision
apparently failed to consider the impact of these
two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it
timely to reiterate that: courts have also taken
judicial notice of previous cases to determine
whether or not the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to
the case under consideration.
However, the CA correctly assessed that the
authority of the lower court to issue the challenged
writ of injunction depends on the validity of the third
partys (GHIs) claim of ownership over the property
subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor
department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed
by the CA decision was whether GHI could be treated
as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute,
whose properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of
Execution dated December 18, 2001.
In this light, all the more does it become
imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases
aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to
determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid
ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ
of execution.
In Juaban v. Espina, we held that
in some instances, courts have also taken
judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that
are closely connected to the matter in
controversy.
These cases may be so closely
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showing that it was made through palpable mistake or

interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to

invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases
that we have taken judicial notice of are of such
character, and our review of the instant case cannot
stray from the findings and conclusions therein.
(REGARDING THE MERITS: Court ruled that the
mortgage was valid, hence at that time, MMC had no
more properties to attach. Also, just because the GH
bought majority of the shares of the MMC is not valid
reason per se to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.)

SPOUSES LATIP VS CHUA

C. JUDICIAL ADMISSION
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA
Facts: An ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila. This ordinance reclassified a
certain area from industrial to commercial. This area
included the Pandacan Terminals owned by the
certain oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell). The
ordinance directed the owners of businesses located
within the reclassified area to cease and desist their
operations within 6 months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. Aggrieved, the oil companies filed separate
complaints for the annulment of the ordinance. In the
case filed by Petron, the parties filed a joint motion to
withdraw complaint and counterclaim, which was
granted.
Thereafter, the city of Manila passed another
ordinance called the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 (I think this was
basically the same with the previous ordinance). So
again, the oil companies filed several complaints
challenging the validity of this new ordinance.
The oil companies are now arguing that the
subsequent ordinance had repealed the earlier one.
They argue that in the case filed by Petron where the
parties filed a joint motion to withdraw, it was stated
therein that the issue has been rendered moot and
academic by the passage of [the subsequent
ordinance]. In addition, they also argue that in one of
the complaints filed against the subsequent ordinance,
the city of Manila mentioned in its answer that [the
earlier ordinance], which in effect, replaced [the
subsequent ordinance] Hence, they argue that this
was tantamount to an admission by the city of Manila
that the new ordinance repealed the old one.
Issue: W/N the city of Manila made an admission that
the subsequent ordinance repealed the older one. NO!
Held/Ratio:
Rule 129, Section 4
Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by

that no such admission was made.

Judicial admission must be made in the same case in

which it is offered
While it is true that a party making a judicial
admission cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the
Rule 129, Section 4 is not applicable here. The city of
Manila made the statements regarding the ordinances
in the civil cases (complaints for annulment of the
ordinance) which are not "the same" as this case
before the SC. To constitute a judicial admission, the
admission must be made in the same case in which it
is offered.
Hence, the city of Manila is not estopped from
claiming the new ordinance repealed the older one. On
the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be
considered estopped. They rely on the argument that
latter ordinance superseded the older one but, at the
same time, also impugn its (the subsequent
ordinances) validity. Parties cannot take vacillating or
contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or
ordinance.

CUENCO V TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX

FACTS: Cuenco leased from Talisay the Talisay Tourist
Sports Complex for 2 years to be used as cockpit
arena. The contract of lease was subsequently
renewed for 4 years. Cuenco made a deposit
equivalent to 6 months rental or five hundred thousand
pesos. The deposit was for the purpose of answering
any damage which may be caused to the complex.
Upon expiration of the contract, the lease was
awarded to another lessee. This promted Cuenco to
demand the return of the deposit. After 4 demands
which were all unheeded, Cuenco instituted an action
for the collection of a sum of money with the RTC. RTC
ruled in favor of Cuenco.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC judgment.
On appeal, the SC reinstated the RTC
judgment but modifying it by ordering Talisay to
deduct 2 months worth of rental from the deposit after
finding that Cuenco overstayed for 2 months. Both
parties filed their respective MRs. Cuenco claims that
he did not overstay while Talisay claims that an
additional amount be still deducted from the deposit
representing the expense it incurred in renovating the
facility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cuenco in fact overstayed for 2
months YES
HELD: It is elementary that the Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts especially if appeal has been taken by
way of petition for review on certiorari under rule 45.
However, as an exception, the SC may review findings
of facts of the findings of the RTC differ from that of
the CA
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Borne out by the records of the case is the

testimony of Ateniso Coronado that Cuenco continued
to hold cockfights for two months beyond the
expiration of the lease contract. Such declaration was
neither questioned nor denied by petitioner during the
trial of the case in the RTC and on appeal before the
CA. Neither was it contested by petitioner in his
Memorandum filed with this Court. In effect, such
declaration constitutes a judicial admission and may
not be refuted anymore.

TOSHIBA V CIR
FACTS: Toshiba is registered with PEZA as an Economic
Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise. It is also
registered with BIR as a VAT-taxpayer. As a taxexempt entity and with its export sales VAT-exempt,
Toshiba wants to claim for credit/refund of its
unutilized input VAT payments attributable to its export
sales. CIR opposes this claim, stating that Toshiba
failed to show that the total amount claimed as VAT
input taxes are properly substantiated by official
receipts and invoices, and have been offset against any
output tax. It also said that Toshiba is not entitled to
the credit/refund of its input VAT payments because,
being a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise,
Toshiba is not subject to VAT. Well-established is the
rule that claims for refund/tax credit are construed
in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer as it partakes
the nature of exemption from tax. During the trial
before the CTA, Toshiba presented documentary
evidence in support of its claim for tax credit/refund,
while the CIR did not present any evidence at all.
Issue: Is Toshiba VAT-registered and are its export
sales subject to zero-rated VAT? Yes.
Held: The arguments of the CIR that Toshiba is VATexempt and the latters export sales are VAT-exempt
transactions are inconsistent with the explicit
admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba is a
registered VAT entity and that it is subject to zero
percent (0%) VAT on its export sales. 1 The CIR is
bound by these admissions, which it could not
eventually contradict in its MR.
The Joint Stipulation was executed and
submitted by Toshiba and the CIR upon being advised
to do so by the CTA at the end of the pre-trial
conference. The approval of the Joint Stipulation by the
CTA marked the start of the pre-trial process. Under
Rule 18, sec. 2(d), part of the purposes of pre-trial is
the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of
facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof.
1

Toshiba is a duly registered value-added tax entity in

accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as
amended[,] that is subject to zero percent (0%) valueadded tax on its export sales in accordance with then Section
100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended.

Evidence

admission having been made in a

stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must
be treated as a judicial admission. Section 4, Rule 129
provides that a judicial admission requires no
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made. The Court cannot
lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when
the opposing party relied upon the same and
accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact
already admitted.
Absent finding of the commission of a mistake,
much more, of a palpable one, the Court holds that the
CIR cannot escape the binding effect of its
judicial admissions. The CIR does not deny that his
counsel, Revenue Attorney Biazon of the BIR, signed
the Joint Stipulation, together with the counsel of
Toshiba. Considering the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, Atty. Biazon is
presumed to have read, studied, and understood the
contents of the Joint Stipulation before he signed the
same. It rests on the CIR to present evidence to the
contrary, which it failed to do so.
Further, the judicial admissions of the CIR in
the Joint Stipulation are not intrinsically false,
wrong, or illegal. On the contrary, they are
consistent with the ruling of this Court in a previous
case involving the same parties, CIR v Toshiba,
explaining the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered
enterprises.
An admission made by a party in the course of
the proceedings does not require proof. Thus, in light
of the judicial admissions of Toshiba, the CTA correctly
confined itself to the other factual issues submitted for
resolution by the parties.
D. PARAFFIN TEST
MARTURILLAS V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Marturillas, a barangay capt. in Davao City,
was charged with homicide, for the shooting of the
victim Artemio Pantinople. Basically, around 7:30pm at
the night of the incident, witness Lito Santos, neighbor
of Artemio, heard a gunshot while eating supper. When
he looked outside, he noticed smoke and fire coming
from the muzzle of a big gun, which was about 10
meters away. Moments later, Lito saw Artemio clasping
his chest and staggering towards his (Litos) kitchen,
while shouting Help me, I was shot by the captain.
Lito however did not approach Artemio right after the
shooting because his own wife warned him that he
might also be shot. Lito then saw Artemios wife,
Ernita, who shouted and cried, Kapitan, bakit mo
binaril ang aking asawa? Lito did not see who the
shooter was, but Ernita, who also testified during trial,
saw appellant Marturillas carrying with him a long
firearm, which looked like an M-14 rifle. She testified
that she had a clear view of Marturillas at that time
since the place was well illuminated. Immediately after
the shooting incident, Ernita called out to her
neighbors for help. When the police arrived at the
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in the hospital, while Abraham lost his left eye and

scene, Ernita informed them that it was Marturillas

who was responsible for the shooting. With this
information, the police went to the house of Marturillas
and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing
of Artemio. Marturillas was invited to go to the police
station and was asked by the police to bring with him
his M-14 rifle, to which the accused-appellant
complied. Marturillas was then subjected to paraffin
testing by the PNP Crime Lab the day after the
shooting incident. The next day, the results of the
paraffin test were released which found Marturillas
NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates. After trial, the RTC
found Marturillas guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, saying that
Marturillas was positively identified as the person
running away from the crime scene immediately after
the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of
the victim himself that he had been shot by the
captain, clearly established the latters complicity in
the crime. Now with the SC, Marturillas contends
that there should have been no finding of guilt
because of the negative results of the paraffin
test and that the prosecution miserably failed to
establish the type of gun used in the commission of
the crime.
ISSUE: W/N Marturillas should be acquitted on
the ground of the negative results of the paraffin
test. NO.

RATIO: While they were negative, that fact alone did

not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and
time again, the SC has held that a negative paraffin
test result is not a conclusive proof that a person
has not fired a gun. In other words, it is possible to
fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when
culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or
are bathed in perspiration. Besides, the prosecution
was able to establish the events during the shooting,
including the presence of petitioner at the scene of the
crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the negative
paraffin test result, are of lesser probative value. As
long as the prosecution has presented sufficient proof
of the corpus delicti, even the failure to conduct a
paraffin test is not fatal to its case. In another case,
the SC has ruled that: "Anent the failure of the
investigators to conduct a paraffin test on petitioner,
this Court has time and again held that such failure is
not fatal to the case of the prosecution as scientific
experts agree that the paraffin test is extremely
unreliable and it is not conclusive as to an accuseds
complicity in the crime committed."
E. PHOTOGRAPH AS EVIDENCE
ARMANDO JOSE AND MANILA
LINES V. CA January 18, 2000

CENTRAL

BUS

FACTS: Armando Jose is a Bus driver of Manila Central

Bus Lines. The bus collided with a red Ford escort
driven by John Macarubo, a passenger on said car was
private respondent Rommel Abraham. Macarubo died

suffered a head fracture.

Heirs of Macarubo and Abraham sued Jose and
Bus Co. for damage. On the other hand Bus Co. filed
third party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, the
owner of the Ford escort who likewise filed a
counterclaim against the Bus Co. for damages to her
car.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Bus Co.,
dismissing the complaint for damages of Macarubo and
Abraham. RTC ordered Juanita Macarubo to pay for the
damages to the bus.
The RTC held that Macarubo and Abraham
came from a party the night before. The Ford Escort
broke down at around 11PM in the evening and had to
be repaired and when it was repaired it was already
6AM. Thus the RTC held that at that time, Macarubo
was already tired and he must have been speeding to
get home quickly. This conclusion was supported by 3
pictures that showed that the Bus was at the right lane
and the position of the car indicated that it was
overtaking at the time of the accident.
CA reversed and held the Bus Co liable. It
ruled that the photographs were taken an hour after
the collision and the position of the vehicles could have
been changed in the interim. Moreover, the pictures do
not show that Macarubo was overtaking at the time of
the accident and that he was negligent.
ISSUE: Who is at fault? Macarubo and not the Bus.
HELD: The trial court was justified in relying on the
photographs rather than on Abrahams testimony
which was obviously biased and unsupported by any
other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an
eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. Physical
evidence on record should prevail over testimony that
runs counter to it.
Here, the positions of the two vehicles, as
shown in the photographs taken by the Bus Co.s
inspector about an hour after the collision, disputes
Abrahams self-serving testimony that the two vehicles
collided because the Bus invaded the lane of the Ford
Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the
opposite of what he claimed happened.
Contrary
to
Abrahams
testimony,
the
photographs show clearly that Bus was in its proper
lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped the
opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford
Escort positioned diagonally on the highway, with its
two front wheels occupying Buss lane.
Moreover, the testimony of Abraham shows
that more likely the reason for the accident was a
mechanical defect of the Ford Escort due to the failure
of Macarubo to properly repair the vehicle. The defect
was in the cross-joint of the car which should have
been replaced but was merely welded in order for them
to get home quickly.
F. BEST EVIDENCE RULE/SECONDARY EVIDENCE

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rule. BF however claims that said documents were in

EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. et

al. v. BF CORPORATION
FACTS:These are 2 consolidated petitions where the
1st petition is Edsa Shang, Colayco, Samaniego, Chen,
and Tsen. The petitioner in the 2 nd petition is Cynthia
Del Castillo.
EDHRI entered into a constraction contract
with BF, where BF was to construct the EDSA Shanri-la
Hotel. Among other things, the contract stipulate for
the payment of the contract price on the basis of
monthly progress billing to ESHRI, which would then
re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a
Progress Payment Certificate for that months progress
billing.
The procedure for BF to collect was it should
submit a PROGRESS BILLING to ESHRIs Engineering
dept. first, and then ESHRI should prepare a Progress
Payment Certificate after re-measuring the progress
done, so BF should follow up release of its payment.
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF adhered to
this process. It submitted a total of 19 progress
billings. Based on PB Nos. 1-13, ESHRI paid P86.5
million.
However, for PB Nos. 14-19, BF alleges that
ESHRI did not re-measure the work done and did not
remit payment. In this regard, BF claimed having been
misled into working continuously on the project by the
assurance of ESHRI that it is processing its progress
payment certificates.
After futile attempts to collect unpaid billings,
BF filed a suit for a sum of money and damages.
ESHRI in its defense, asked BF to refund excess
payments overpaid supposedly for PB Nos. 1-13. They
also alleged incurring delay and inferior work
accomplishment.
RTC ruled in favor of BF. It the dispositive
portion it held Colayco, Samaniego, Dean Del, Chan
and Tsen solidarily liable to pay P24.7 million, retention
sum of P5.8 million, interest, P1M moral and P1M
exemplary damages and P1M attys fees. RTC held that
ESHRIs refusal to pay BFs claims is evident of bad
faith. MR denied.
Appeal to the CA. Meanwhile, the RTC granted
BFs motion for execution pending appeal and ESHRIs
PNB bank account was garnished for the amount of
P35M. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the RTC to lift the garnishment. The CA later on
set aside the garnishment order. But CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. CA held that ESHRI was remiss in
its obligation to re-measure BF's later work
accomplishments and pay the same. On the other
hand, ESHRI had failed to prove the basis of its
disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the
defective work accomplished by BF.
ISSUE: W/N the lower courts erred in allowing the
admission in evidence of PHOTOCOPIES of Progress
Billings Nos. 14-19, as well as the complementing PMIs
and WVOs. ESHRI alleges that BF failed to lay the
basis for the presentation of the photocopies as
secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence

the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them

over to BF despite requests.

HELD/RATIO: ADMISSIBLE
The only actual rule that the term "best
evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original
of a writing must, as a general proposition, be
produced17 and secondary evidence of its contents is
not admissible except where the original cannot be
had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule
130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse
party's custody or control. - If the document is
in the custody or under control of the adverse
party, he must have reasonable notice to
produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence
may be presented as in the case of loss.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a
written instrument or document refers to evidence
other than the original instrument or document
itself.18 A party may present secondary evidence of the
contents of a writing not only when the original is lost
or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or
under the control of the adverse party. In either
instance, however, certain explanations must be given
before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
Four factual premises are readily deducible
from the exchanges between the lawyers of the
respective parties, to wit: (1) the existence of the
original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2)
a request was made on ESHRI to produce the
documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to
produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to
produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this
case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule
130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for
the presentation and reception of the photocopies of
the original document as secondary evidence have
been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original
document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof
of the cause of the original document's unavailability;
and (3) the offeror is in good faith.
Mere fact that the original of the writing is in
the custody of the party against whom it is offered
does not warrant submission of secondary evidence. It
must be proven that the offeror has done everything in
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parents and that he is the current owner of the lots

his power to secure the best evidence but the other

party refuses to produce it.

CONCEPCION CHUA GAW V. SUY BEN CHUA

(2008)
Facts:

Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were founders of

3 business enterprises: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol
Sawmill
Corporation,
and
Columbia
Wood
Industries. They had 7 children, including
respondent Suy Ben Chua and petitioner
Concepcion Chua Gaw. On June 19, 1986, Chua
Chin died leaving Chan Chi and his 7 children his
only surviving heirs. At that time, the net worth of
Hagonoy Lumber was P415, 487.20.

On Dec. 8, 1986, the heirs execute a Deed of

Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of
Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir, wherein
the heirs voluntarily renounced and waived their
shares (including Chan Chis share by virtue of
her share in the conjugal partnership) in Hagonoy
Lumber in favor of their co-heir Chua Sioc Huan.

In May 1988, petitioner Chua Gaw and her

husband Antonio Gaw asked respondent Suy Ben
to lend them P200T for the construction of their
house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that
the loan will be payable within 6 months w/o
interest. Suy Ben issued in their favor a check for
P200T which he delivered to the couples house in
Marilao.

On Aug. 1990, Chua Sioc Huan executed a Deed of

Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy
Lumber for a consideration of P255T in favor of
Suy Ben.

Because the spouses Gaw failed to settle their

obligation with Suy Ben, he filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the
RTC.

In their Answer (w/ Amended Compulsory

Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw claimed that the
P200T was not a loan but their share in the profits
of Hagonoy Lumber. They insisted that Concepcion
Chua Gaw, as one of the compulsory heirs, is
entitled to 1/6 of Hagonoy Lumber which Suy Ben
arrogated to himself. They thus prayed that Suy
Ben make an accounting of the operations of
Hagonoy Lumber and deliver to Concepcion Gaw
her 1/6 share thereof, which was estimated to be
P500T.

In his Answer to the Amended Counterclaim, Suy

Ben explained that his sister Chua Sioc Huan
became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when
they executed the Deed of Partition. In turn, he
became the sole owner when he bought it from
Chua Sioc Huan, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale.

During trial, the spouses Gaw called Suy Ben to

testify as adverse witness under Sec 10, Rule 132.
On direct examination, Suy Ben testified that
Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his

where Hagonoy Lumber is operating. On crossexamination, Suy Ben explained that he ceased to
be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold
his shares to the other stockholders. He also
testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy
Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed
by the heirs of Chua Chin. In turn, he became the
owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought it from
Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale. On redirect examination, Suy Ben stated that he sold his
shares in Capitol Sawmill for P254T (in cash) and
paid the purchase price of P255T for Hagonoy
Lumber (in cash) but said payment was not
covered by a separate receipt but merely delivered
the payment to Chua Sioc Huan at her house
Valenzuela.
Although
he
maintains
several
accounts in 3 banks, the amount he paid to Chua
Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them since
he had enough cash in his house because he was
engaged in rediscounting checks of people from
the public market.
On Dec. 1998, Antonio Gaw died.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Suy Ben and
denied Concepcion Gaws counterclaim. The RTC
held that the validity and due execution of the
Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale was never
impugned. It said that even if Suy Ben failed to
produce the originals of the document, Concepcion
Gaw judicially admitted the due execution of the
Deed of Partition and acknowledged her signature
thereon, thus constituting an exception to the best
evidence rule. As for the Deed of Sale, since the
contents thereof were not put in issue, the RTC
said that non-presentation of the original
document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity
as well as the truth of its contents.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. The CA found petitioners argument that the
RTC should have not included Suy Bens testimony
as part of her evidence baseless.
Petitioner Concepcion Gaw filed this petition for
review on certiorari assailing the CA decision. Gaw
contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by
the RTCs treatment of Suy Bens testimony as
adverse witness during cross-examination by his
own counsel as part of her evidence.

Issues:
1. Whether there was error in the application of
Rule 132 Section 10 (d) and (e)? No.
2. Whether there was error in the application of
the best evidence rule under Rule 130
Section 3? No.
Held: Petition denied.
Rule 132 Section 10 (d) and (e)
Gaws case was not prejudiced by the RTCs treatment
of Suy Bens testimony during cross-examination as
her evidence.
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document

The delineation of a piece of evidence as part

of the evidence of one party or the other is only
significant in determining whether the party on whose
shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the
quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden.
In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff
who must establish her case by preponderance of
evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of
evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to
consider the entirety of the evidence presented by
both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then
determined by considering all the facts and
circumstances of the case, culled from the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.
That the witness is the adverse party does not
necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the former's testimony. Unlike an ordinary
witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse
witness in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character.
Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an
adverse witness, although the calling party does not
vouch for the witness' veracity, he is nonetheless
bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or
remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is,
therefore, not bound by the latter's testimony only in
the sense that he may contradict him by introducing
other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides
that the party calling an adverse witness shall
not be bound by his testimony does not mean
that such testimony may not be given its proper
weight, but merely that the calling party shall not
be precluded from rebutting his testimony or
from impeaching him. This, the petitioner failed
to do. Petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to
discredit the respondent's testimony on how Hagonoy
Lumber became his sole property.
The best evidence rule under Rule 130 Section 3
The RTC's finding that the P200T was as a loan is
supported by the evidence on record.
The allegation that the P200T was advance on
her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber is
implausible. When the Suy Ben delivered to the
petitioner the P200T check, it could not have been
given as an advance on petitioner's share in the
business, because at that moment in time both of
them had no participation, interest or share in
Hagonoy Lumber.
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of
Partition and the Deed of Sale were acknowledged
before a Notary Public. The notarization of a private
document converts it into a public document, and
makes it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity. It is entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. Such a document must be
given full force and effect absent a strong, complete
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account
of some flaws or defects recognized by law. A public

Evidence

executed and attested through the

intervention of a notary public is, generally,
evidence of the facts therein express in clear
unequivocal manner.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in
admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of
Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best
evidence rule. The "best evidence rule" as
encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only
when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether such document was actually executed, or
exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any
other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need to account for the original. Moreover,
production of the original may be dispensed with,
in the trial court's discretion, whenever the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule
is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was
no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the
RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the
two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due
execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of
Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in
effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution
when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner
required by the rules. The petitioner merely claimed
that said documents do not express the true
agreement and intention of the parties since they were
only provisional paper arrangements made upon the
advice of counsel.

SASAN v. NLRC, E-PCIBank and HI

(Citation in the syllabus is really wrong so I just got
the nearest case to the title which discusses the
relevant topic)
Facts: Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank)
entered into a Contract for Services with Helpmate,
Inc. (HI), a domestic corporation primarily engaged in
the business of providing janitorial and messengerial
services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and
assign
workers
to
E-PCIBank
to
perform
janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The
contract was impliedly renewed year after year.
Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr., Leonilo Dayday,
Modesto Aguirre, Alejandro Ardimer, Eleuterio Sacil,
Wilfredo Juegos, Petronilo Carcedo, and Cesar
Peciencia were among those employed and assigned to
E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug,
Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the
Visayas.
Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC in Cebu City separate complaints against EPCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for
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separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances,

damages, attorney's fees and costs. Later, they
amended their complaints to include a claim for 13 th
month pay.
Petitioners claimed that they had become
regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the
activities for which they were employed, having
continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial
services to the bank for more than one year; that EPCIBank had direct control and supervision over the
means and methods by which they were to perform
their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and
void because the latter had no power to do so since
they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a
Contract for Services with HI, an independent job
contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the
bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services
thereat. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for
whatever misdeed HI had committed against its
employees. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was
an independent job contractor.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding
that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the
ground that it did not possess the required substantial
capital or investment to actually perform the job, work,
or service under its own account and responsibility as
required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a laboronly contractor and the real employer of petitioners is
E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.
Respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to
the NLRC. In support of its allegation that it was a
legitimate job contractor, HI submitted before
the NLRC several documents which it did not
present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez (Certificate
of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock,
Certificate of Filing Amended Articles of Incorporation,
and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation of
HI, Audited Financial Statement of HI, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No.
GR2K-09-063-00582 registered under the name of HI,
Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered
under the name of HI).
The NLRC promulgated its Decision modifying
the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC took into
consideration the documentary evidence presented by
HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis
thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture
with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be
considered engaged in "labor-only contracting." CA
affirmed.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in accepting and
appreciating the pieces of evidence submitted by
respondents during appeal NO.
Held: The Court found no merit in petitioners'
protestations against the documentary evidence
submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies.
Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence
rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of
Court. It provides that:

Evidence

Section 3. - Original document must be

produced; exceptions. - When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original
document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. Notably, certified true
copies of these documents, acceptable under the
Rules of Courtwere furnished to the petitioners. Even
assuming
that
petitioners
were
given
mere
photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before
the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of
evidence and procedure as observed in the regular
courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant the petition proceeds from an
examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look
into the arguments contained in position papers and
other documents.
Petitioners
had
more
than
adequate
opportunity when they filed their motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the
Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or
present their counter-evidence to the documentary
evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect,
petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about
these documentary evidences presented by HI upon
which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its
finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.

DECS V. DEL ROSARIO

Facts: The Del Rosarios filed a complaint for recovery
of possession against DECS alleging that the
Kaypombo Primary School (KPPS) was occupying a
portion of the property of the Del Rosarios. DECS, in its
defense, alleged that such property was donated by
Isaias Del Rosario, the father of the Del Rosarios in this
case.
DECS presented witnesses who saw that a
deed of donation was executed by Judge Eli Natividad
and that a resolution was signed in the office of the
municipal mayor. However, the deed and the resolution
got lost in the transfer of records in the old building to
the new building.
The RTC ruled in favor of DECS stating that
they were able to prove the due execution of the deed
of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss of
the same, in accordance with the Rules on Evidence. It
is recalled that Judge Eli Natividad, then a municipal
councilor of Sta. Maria, testified that he was the person
who prepared the deed of donation and later notarized
the same, and that said deed was duly executed and
signed before him and in his presence. They stated
that a recantation/recollection of witness is a form of
secondary evidence to prove the existence/content of a
document. Since the loss of the deed subject matter of
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kept by the person in whose custody the document lost

this case was likewise duly proved by DECS, exerting

the best possible efforts to locate or secure a copy of
the same and without bad faith on its part, the RTC a
greater weight to the secondary evidence adduced by
DECS.
The CA ruled against DECS stating that they
were not able to prove the due execution or existence
of the deed of donation and the resolution, as well as
the loss of these documents as the cause of their
unavailability. The Rule requires that the defendant
must "prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of the witnesses in the order stated".
However, DECS proceeded with the last resorttestimony of the witnesses, without even showing any
diligent effort to secure a copy of the deed of donation
and the resolution.
Issue: Was DECS able to prove the loss of the
documents thus making the rule on secondary
evidence applicable? NO.
Decision: In this case, the best or primary evidence of
a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the
deed of donation with all the formalities required by
Civil Code. The duty to produce the original document
arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents
of the writing in which case there can be no evidence
of the contents of the writing other than the writing
itself. Simply put, when a party wants to prove the
contents of the document, the best evidence is the
original writing itself.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a
document refers to evidence other than the original
document itself. A party may introduce secondary
evidence of the contents of a written instrument not
only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is
no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a
party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the
best or primary evidence before he can resort to
secondary evidence. A party must first present to the
court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for
non-production of the original instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,
contents, although the court in its discretion may
change this order if necessary.
In this case, the CA found inadequate proof
that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search in
the places where the deed of donation may likely be
found and that the search was unsuccessful.
Prior to the introduction of secondary
evidence, a party must establish the existence and due
execution of the instrument. After a party establishes
the existence and due execution of the document, he
must prove that the document was lost or destroyed.
The destruction of the instrument may be proved by
any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown
by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by
anyone who had made, on the judgment of the court,
a sufficient examination in the place [or] places where
the document or papers of similar character are usually

was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made
any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost.
Judge Natividad who claimed to have notarized
the deed of donation failed to account for other copies
of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to
record, and furnish to other designated government
offices. As a notary public, The Notarial Law mandates
him to record in his notarial register the necessary
information regarding the instrument acknowledged
before him. The Notarial Law also mandates the notary
public to retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged
before him when it is a contract.
DECS should have produced at the trial the
notarial register where Judge Natividad as the notary
public should have recorded the deed of donation.
Alternatively, DECS should have explained the
unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad
could have also explained why he did not retain a copy
of the deed of donation as required by law. As the
Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was no
evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from
the Clerk of Court concerned or from the National
Archives. All told, these circumstances preclude a
finding that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent
search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.
G. PAROLE EVIDENCE
ACI PHILS V COQUIA
FACTS: ACI Phils contracted w/Coquia for the purchase
of several thousand tons of flint cullets. After several
deliveries they demanded the reduction of the
purchase price to which Coquia agreed but after
receiving the order they refused to pay further
demanding reductions.(from 4.2 went down to 3.65
then to 3.1)
Coquia filed a complaint for ACI to accept and
pay for the delivery at the reduced price of 3.65. After
3 days, ACI paid.
TC ruled in favor of Coquia and ordered ACI to
accept and pay for the deliveries at 4.20 per kilo +
2.5M in damages plus interest at legal rate + 200k
Attys fees +20k cost of suit.
CA affirmed but deleted Attys fees & cost of
suit. It held that the Purchase Order was a contract of
adhesion which must be strictly construed against ACI,
it was also contrary to the orig agreement since it
reduced the price.
ACI claims that CA was wrong in compelling
them to pay at 4.20 and to pay damages for the
alleged unrealized profits and it wasnot a contract of
adhesion since Coquia had the freedom to negotiate
the terms of the contract she entered. It maintained
that it didnt exercise any intimidation on Coquia to
agree on the new Purchase order and assuming that it
did it was ratified by the delivery and that the
Statment of Acct already reflected the reduced price. It
alsoentered into the contract upon Coquias assurance
that she would promptly deliver. Both courts erred in
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to SEAOIL.

refusing to receive evidence aliunde to prove that time

was an important element of the agreement.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the PO was a contract of adhesion? NO! Coquia
has financial savvy, she deals with big corporations like
La Tondena. She was also the one who sought the
contract with ACI. Even the terms and conditions of
the purchase orders themselves dont show any hint of
one-sidedness.

2. W/N Courts erred in refusing to receive evidence

aliunde to prove that time was an important element of
the agreement? NO! Condition 4 of the PO specifically
mentions that the "delivery date shown on (the
purchase order) shall be of the essence of any contract
arising" and that "delivery must be made in strict
accordance with the order or delivery schedule..." but
the PO didnt mention when the cullets were needed.
RATIO: ACI argued that the PO failed to express the
true intent of the parties, i.e., that petitioner entered
into a contract with respondent conditioned upon the
latter's prompt delivery of flint cullets.
TC rejected claim based on the parol
evidence rule.The written document is the best
evidence of its own contents. When the written
contract is established as the repository of the
parties' stipulations, any other evidence is
excluded and the same cannot be used as a
substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or
contradict them.The exception is Sec 9, Rule 130, a
party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. Since an exception was
raised as an issue in the answer, the trial court should
not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard
ACIs evidence.
Coquia was not given definite days during
which she should deliver the flint cullets but ACI
presented the unrebutted testimony of Batalon, its
materials control manager, to prove that it agreed to
the P4.20 per kilo purchase price only because
Coquiaassured it of prompt deliveries sufficient for
their production requirements.
ACI was able to prove that the second
purchase order with the reduced the price was
accepted by Coquia and they didnt contain the
quantity to be delivered. And she accepted the
payment for these deliveries without protest.

SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP. VS AUTOCORP GROUP

FACTS: SEAOIL bought an excavator from AUTOCORP,
where the original cost wasP2.5M but was increased to
P3.1M because payment was in installments (via
checks). This agreement was embodied in a sales
invoice, and included an agreement that ownership will
remain with AUTOCORP until fully paid despite delivery

Evidence

The first 2 checks were good but the

remaining 10 bounced, as SEAOIL stopped payment.
Since SEAOIL refused to pay the balance despite
repeated demands, AUTOCORP filed a complaint for
recovery of personal property.
[*Warning: magulong part] SEAOIL contended
that this isnt really what happened as it was really
RODRIGUEZ (director of AUTOCORP) who owed YU
(President of SEAOIL) in another transaction involving
their other companies (UNILINE for RODRIGUEZ and
FOCUS for YU). RODRIGUEZ was supposed to pay by
check to AUTOCORP but since theres a company
policy not to honor checks from its own directors,
RODRIGUEZ asked YU to issue the checks in his behalf,
to be funded by RODRIGUEZ own checks. SEAOIL said
RODRIGUEZ stopped payment so it also stopped
payment!
Note: Wala sa case, pero I think the latter transaction
(between YU and RODRIGUEZ) was verbal lang. And
this allegation was presented via Yus testimony in
court kaya sasabihin ng CA na merely verbal lang yung
transaction.
RTC: against SEAOIL, ordered it to pay balance
to AUTOCORP.
CA: held that the transaction between Yu and
Rodriguez was merely verbal. This cannot alter the
sales contract between Seaoil and Autocorp as this will
run counter to the parol evidence rule which prohibits
the introduction of oral and parol evidence to modify
the terms of the contract. The claim that it falls under
the exceptions to the parol evidence rule has not been
sufficiently proven.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in partially applying the parol
evidence rule to prove only some terms contained in
one portion of the document but disregarded the rule
with respect to another but substantial portion or entry
also contained in the same document which should
have proven the true nature of the transaction
involved. NO. (Hinde ko gets tohinde naman sinabi
sa facts. Sarili kong issue: W/N SEAOILs parol
evidence is admissible because it falls under one
of the exceptions [failure to express true
agreement of parties] NO.)
RATIO: The parol evidence rule forbids any addition
to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting
to show that different terms were agreed upon by the
parties. Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of
verbal agreements which tends to vary the terms of a
written agreement, is inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule.
The SC invalidated SEAOILs contention that
the written agreement failed to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties. It reasoned that
although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which
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the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the

are not mentioned at all in the writing unless

there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a
prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid contract.
SEAOILs contention that the document falls
within the exception to the parol evidence rule is
untenable. Only in cases where "the written contract is
so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
intention of the parties cannot be understood from a
mere reading of the instrument would the exception
apply.

MARQUEZ v. ESPEJO
Facts: The Espejos were the original registered owners
of 2 parcels of agricultural land: the Lantap property
and the Murong property. The Murong property was
tenanted by petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz while
the Lantap property was tenanted by Nemi.
Espejos mortgaged both lands to Rural Bank of
Bayombong.
They failed to pay and the bank
foreclosed and bought the properties, and eventually
consolidated title to them.
Espejos bought back one of their lots.
However, the Deed of Sale did not mention the
barangay where the property was located but
mentioned the title of the property, which corresponds
to the Murong property. There is no evidence, though,
that the Espejos took possession of the Murong
property, demanded lease rentals from the tenants, or
otherwise exercised acts of ownership. On the other
hand, Nemi continued working on the Lantap property
without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to the
bank or to the landowner.
Meanwhile, Rural Bank executed Deeds of
Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of the tenants
of the Murong property. DAR issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs). Both CLOAs stated
that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land in
Barangay Murong.
Esepjos filed complaint after more than 10
years before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD), praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs.
This was based on the theory that the Murong property
was the one they bought back, since the Deed of Sale
refers to the TCT corresponding to it. Rural Bank said
it was the Lantap property that was bought back. The
RARAD gave precedence to the TCT appearing in the
Deed of Sale.
Upon appeal, the DARAB reversed. In assailing
the validity of the CLOAs, Espejos had the burden of
proof. There being no evidence that the DAR filed
personnel were remiss in the performance of their
official duties when they issued these, the presumption
of regular performance of duty prevails. Furthermore,
Espejos failed to support their allegation that they
bought back the Murong property with substantial
evidence.
The CA reversed. Using the Best Evidence
Rule (Sec. 3, Rule 130), it held that the Deed of Sale is

description of the land. The VLTs referred to the TCT

of the Lantap property. The additional description that
it was located in Murong was a mere typo.
The
technical description in the TCT is more accurate, since
it particularly describes the metes and bounds.
Issue: Whether the Best Evidence Rule should apply
NO (NOTE: CA actually applied the Parol Evidence
Rule)
Ratio: The Best Evidence Rule states that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the
best evidence is the original document itself and no
other evidence (such as reproduction, photocopy or
oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The
original is preferred because it reduces the chance of
undetected tampering. In the instant case, there is no
room for the application of this Rule because there is
no dispute regarding the contents of the documents.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of
these documents adequately and correctly express the
true intention of the parties. The dispute reflects an
intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an
apparent failure of the instruments to adequately
express the true intention of the parties. To resolve it,
resort must be had to evidence outside the
instruments.
Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it
appears that what it actually applied was the Parol
Evidence Rule, which is still improper in this case. In
the first place, the Espejos are not parties to the VLTs,
they are strangers to these contracts. Rule 130, sec. 9
provides that parol evidence rule is exclusively
between the parties and their successors-in-interest.
It may not be invoked where at least one of the parties
to the suit is not a party or privy to the written
document, and does not base his claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating from it.
Moreover, the case falls under the exceptions
to the Parol Evidence Rule: 1) intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; and
2) failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. The resolution of
the case necessitates an examination of the parties
respective parol evidence to determine their true
intent. In case of doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the
soul of a contract. (Side note: SC ruled that SM of sale
was the Lantap Property based on the circumstances)
H. DISQUALIFICATION
IMMATURITY
PEOPLE OF
GOLIMLIM

THE

BY

PHILIPPINES

REASON

V.

OF

SALVADOR

Facts: Salvador Golimlim was charged of raping

Evelyn Canchela. Evelyn, a mental retardate, stays
with her aunt Jovita and uncle Salvador Golimlim.
When Jovita left the house, Salvador instructed evelyn
to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed
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of relating them truthfully.

her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an

object, which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded
to insert his penis into her vagina. Later on, Evelyns
half-sister, Lorna, allowed her to stay with her (Lorna).
Lorna noticed Evelyns growing belly when checked, it
turns out that Evelyn was pregnant. Evelyn told Lorna
that she had sexual intercourse with Salvador while
the latter was holding a knife. The sisters filed a
complaint for rape against Salvador. The trial court
convicted Salvador of rape.
Issue: W/N the court should have given weight and
credence to the contradictory and implausible
testimony of Evelyn, a mental retardate. YES.
Held: In giving credence to Evelyns testimony and
finding against appellant, the trial court made the
following observations:1) Despite her weak and dull
mental state the victim was consistent in her claim
that her Salvador had carnal knowledge of her and was
the author of her pregnancy, and nobody else; 2) She
remains consistent that Salvador raped her only once;
3) That the contradictory statements she made in open
court relative to the details of how she was raped,
although would seem derogatory to her credibility and
reliability as a witness under normal conditions, were
amply explained by the psychiatrist who examined her
and supported by her findings; and 4) Despite her
claim that several persons laid on top of her, the lucid
fact remains that she never pointed to anybody else as
the author of her pregnancy, but Salvador. Which only
shows that the trauma that was created in her mind by
the incident has remained printed in her memory
despite her weak mental state. Furthermore, granting
for the sake of argument that other men also laid on
top of her, this does not deviate from the fact that
Salvador had sexual intercourse with her.
In the present case, no cogent reason can be
appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of
the trial court with respect to the assessment of
Evelyns testimony.
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify
her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of
truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.
Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time
of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as
to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and

Evidence

A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is

not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her
mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility.
It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a
valid objection to the competency of a witness so long
as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has
upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on
statements given in court by the victim who was a
mental retardate.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of
this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyns
credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without
discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
The psychiatrist who examined Evelyn said
that although Evelyn was suffering from moderate
mental retardation with an IQ of 46,she is capable of
perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
Evelyn could give spontaneous and consistent answers
to the same but differently framed questions under
conditions which do not inhibit her from answering.
Salvadors bare denial is not only an inherently weak
defense. It is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive
declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him
as her rapist.
I.

DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF DEATH

SANSON et al. v. CA and MELECIA T. SY, as

Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the Late
Juan Bon Fing Sy
FACTS: Petitioners herein (Felecito Sanson and his
sister Celedonia Sanson; and Angeles Montinola and
her son Eduardo Montinola) are creditors of the
deceased, Juan Bon Fing Sy. In their capacity as
creditors, petitioners herein filed for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. There are three
transactions to remember:
1. Transaction between Felecito (creditor) and
deceased (debtor):
During the trial, the
Petitioner Felecito Sanson, as creditor, testified
that deceased was indebted to him, as
evidenced by 5 checks. To support Felecitos
claim, Celedonia (Felecitos sister) testified as a
witness to the transaction that respondent
issued 5 checks to Felecito, but was dishonored
once it was presented for payment after the
death of respondent. [Note: The first
transaction is between Felecito (creditor) and
deceased (debtor) only. Celedonia was merely
presented as a witness to the transaction to
supported the testimony of his brother
Felecito]
2. Transaction between Celedonia (creditor) and
deceased (debtor): During the trial, Celedonia
claims that deceased was indebted to her, as
evidence by 6 checks. To support her claim,
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conversation or transaction between the deceased and

Felecito (her brother) testified that his sister

tried to enforce the settlement of the check
while the deceased was still alive but she was
assured that the obligation would be settled as
soon as respondent would get well. When
respondent died, Celedonia presented the
checks for payment but were dishonored by
the bank due to closure of account. [Note: The
second
transaction is between Celedonia
(creditor) and deceased (debtor) only. Felecito
as a witness to the transaction merely
supported the testimony of his sister. But
Felecito is NOT a creditor of the deceased in
this transaction which he testified]
3. Transaction between the Montinolas (creditors)
and deceased (debtor): With regard to the
Montinola creditors, they claim that the
deceased borrowed money from them as
evidenced by 3 checks. Similarly, they tried to
enforce settlement of the checks before
respondent died but they were told not to
deposit the checks yet because they will be
paid in cash instead, but respondent never did.
When they deposited the checks after
respondents
death,
the
checks
were
dishonored. [Note: in the case of the Montinola
creditors, the one who testified to the
transaction is Jade, the daughter-in-law of
claimant Angeles and who is at the same time
the wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr. ]
Respondent-Administratix Melecia Sy now objects
to the admission of the checks and check return slipsexhibits offered in evidence by the claimants upon the
ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are
disqualified under the Dead Mans Statute which reads:
SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or
insanity of adverse party.Parties or assignors
of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creditors evidence of their
claim is incompetent under the dead mans statute,
and inadmissible. (NO. HENCE, ADMISSIBLE)

HELD: As for the administratrixs invocation of the

Dead Mans Statute, the same does not likewise lie.
The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2)
their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. The rule is exclusive and cannot be
construed to extend its scope by implication so as to
disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere
witnesses who are not included in the above
enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a

a third person, if he took no active part therein.

Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an
assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being
prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the
transaction. In transactions similar to those involved
in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family
members or relatives of the parties. Should their
testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest
as a result of their relationship to the parties, there
would be a dearth of evidence to prove the
transactions. In any event, independently of the
testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would
still prosper on the basis of their documentary
evidencethe checks.
As to the Sansons, the administratix argued that
the law speaks of parties or assignors of parties to a
case. Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and
Saquin on each others behalf, as co-parties to the
same case, falls under the prohibition. The
administratix claims that since the law disqualifies
parties to a case or assignors to a case without
distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and
that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from
testifying for his co-parties.
However, in
denying
the
claim
of
the
administratix, the SC held: But Sansons and
Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from
separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with
respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third
party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not thus
disqualified to testify on the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute
proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence
upon a claim which arose before the death of the
deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving
of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and
Celedonia
are
supported
by
checksdocumentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted
on the bases of said checks.
J.

CHILD WITNESS EXAMINATION RULE

PEOPLE V. CANETE
FACTS:
Spouses Paquito and Sedaria Caete had 3
children, one of whom was Alma. Later on, the
spouses decided to live separately. As a result,
Alma lived with his father.
Paquito and Alma lived with the formers brother,
Kakingcio Caete, who was also married and had
children. Alma called Kakingcios wife Yaya
Alejandra.
Paquito and Alma eventually went back to their old
home after a while. But Paquito became blind and
a paralytic. So Kakingcio had Paquito and Alma
fetched to live with him and his family again. By
then, Alma was already twelve years old. She
noticed that her uncle Kakingcio was nice and
amiable to her.

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examine or

One night, may ganap! Alma was sleeping when

she felt someone caressing her Kakingcio.
Eventually, he raped her after threatening her with
an 8-inch..knife. She lost consciousness in the
process and woke up with a bloody vagina. She
cried.
Another evening, Alma was awakened when she
felt her pants being pulled down. She resisted then
ran to Ka Caring (a neighbor) and revealed that
her uncle raped her and that he was about to rape
her again. Caring adviced Alma not to return to
their house. Alma slept in the house of Caring.
Alma returned to their house the next day.
Alma told Alejandra. Alejandra quarreled with
Kakingcio then the latter left. Then, Alejandra
accompanied Alma to the barangay captain and
complained against Kakingcio. The Barangay
Captain wrote a letter to the local police authorities
requesting assistance to Alejandra and Alma. A
Municipal Health Officer examined Alma, which
showed that she had lacerations.
An information for rape was charged against
Kakingcio. He eaded not guilty.
His defense was an alibi. RTC: guilty with a penalty
of death.
Hence, this petition. It is the contention of the
accused that the prosecution had a difficulty
proving that the appellant raped the private
complainant in light of her testimony that when the
appellant mounted her, he still had his short pants
on. When the prosecution tried to elicit from the
offended party how appellants penis could have
been inserted into her vagina with his pants still on
and the appellants counsel objected to the
question, the presiding judge himself took the
cudgels for the prosecution and propounded
questions on the private complainant. Worse, the
presiding judge posed leading questions to the
private complainant. He contends that the
presiding judge was biased and partial to the
prosecution.

ISSUE: W/N the presiding judge is allowed to propound

questions (leading) on a witness to elicit info. YES.
HELD/RATIO: A presiding judge enjoys a great deal of
latitude in examining witnesses within the course of
evidentiary rules. The presiding judge should see to it
that a testimony should not be incomplete or obscure.
The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway
in putting such questions to witnesses as may be
essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record
speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are
judges of both the law and the facts, and they would
be negligent in the performance of their duties if they
permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a
failure to propound a proper question to a witness
which might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may
put such question to the witness as will enable him to
formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may

Evidence

cross-examine a witness. He may

propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility
of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to
draw out relevant and material testimony though that
testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken
against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy
the theory of one party.
Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21
of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,
child witnesses may testify in a narrative form
and leading questions may be allowed by the trial
court in all stages of the examination if the same
will further the interest of justice. Objections to
questions should be couched in a manner so as
not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate
the child:
Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. The court
shall exercise control over the questioning
of children so as to (1) facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure
that questions are stated in a form
appropriate to the developmental level of
the child, (3) protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and
(4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify
in a narrative form.
K. PRIVILEGE
1. Government Privilege
Romulo
Neri
v.
Senate
Accountability
of
Public
Investigations
*sorry mahabang digest

Committee
Officers

on
and

Facts: On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a

contract
with
Zhong
Xing
Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project for approximately P16 Billion Pesos. The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic
of China.
In connection with this, various Resolutions
were introduced in the Senate: 1) P.S. Res. No. 127,
directing the Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee
on Trade and Industry to Investigate, in aid of
legislation, the approval of the broadband contract; 2)
P.S. Res. No. 144, urging Pres. Arroyo to cancel the
ZTE contract; 3) P.S. Res. No. 129, directing the
Committee on National Defense and Security to
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
national security implications of awarding the contract
to ZTE; and 4) P.S. Res. No. 136, directing the
proper Senate Committed to conduct an inquiry, in aid
of legislation, on the legal and economic justification of
the NBN project. The investigations were claimed to be
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government

relevant to the consideration of 3 pending bills in the

Senate.
Respondent
Committees
initiated
the
investigation by sending invitations to certain
personalities
and
cabinet
officials
involved
in the NBN Project. Neri (NEDA Director General at that
time) was among those invited. He was summoned to
appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26
and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the
September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of town
during the other dates.
In the September 18 hearing, businessman
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. The Project was initially approved as a BuildOperate-Transfer project but, the NEDA acquiesced to
convert it into a government-to-government project, to
be financed through a loan from the Chinese
Government. On September 26, Neri testified before
respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed
that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on: 1. W/N President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, 2. W/N she directed him
to prioritize it, and 3. W/N she directed him to
approve.
Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to appear and
testify
on November
20. However,
in
the
Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense
with
Neris
testimony
on
the
ground
of executive privilege the privilege was claimed on
the ground that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these
information were conveyed to the President, Neri could
not provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect. Thus on November
20, Neri did not appear before respondent
Committees.
The Committees later issued the show
cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should
not be cited in contempt. Neri replied that it was not
his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He
submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, stating,
among others that: (1) his non-appearance was upon
the order of the President; and (2) his conversation
with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the
impact of the bribery scandal involving high

Evidence

officials and the possible loss of

confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of
Neris request that he be furnished in advance as to
what else he needs to clarify so that he may
adequately prepare for the hearing.
In the interim, Neri filed with the SC the
present
petition
for certiorari assailing
the show
cause Letter
of
the
Committees.
Respondent
Committees
found
Neris
explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request, they
issued the Order, citing him in contempt and ordering
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear
and give his testimony. On the same date, Neri moved
for the reconsideration of the Order. In view of the
contempt Order, Neri filed a Supplemental Petition for
Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of
the said contempt Order. SC issued a Status Quo Ante
Order.
On March
6,
2008,
President
Arroyo
issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking EO No.
464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She
advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case
of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Issue: Are the communications elicited by the subject
3 questions covered by executive privilege (Rule 30,
Sec. 24(e) of the Rules of Court), despite the
revocation of EO No. 464? Yes, the questions are
covered by executive privilege.
Held and Ratio: The revocation of E.O. 464 does not
in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege.
This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings. Unlike
the US which
has
further
accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting
the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, the Philippines has retained
its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted
only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of
these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court
declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O.
464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive
Ermitas Letter limits its bases for the claim of
executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v.
Vasquez and Chavez v. PEA. There was never a
mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,
have comprehensively discussed the concept of
executive privilege, the Court in this case went on to
clearly define the communications covered by
executive privilege.
In US v. Nixon, the U.S. Court recognized a
great
public
interest
in
preserving the
confidentiality of conversations that take place in
the Presidents performance of his official
duties. It considered presidential communications as
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eventual concessions which may have been proposed

presumptively privileged. The presumption is

founded on the Presidents generalized interest in
confidentiality. The privilege is said to be necessary
to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to
provide the President and those who assist him
with freedom to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions
and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately.
In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals ruled that there are 2 kinds of executive
privilege;
one
is
the presidential communications privilege and,
the other is the deliberative process privilege. The
former pertains to communications, documents or
other materials that reflect presidential decisionmaking and deliberations and that the President
believes should remain confidential. The latter
includes advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.
Presidential
communications
privilege applies
to decision-making
of
the
President while, the deliberative process privilege,
to decision-making
of executive officials. The first is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the
Presidents
unique
constitutional
role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the
deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in
their entirety, and covers final and postdecisional materials as well as pre-deliberative
ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial
negation
of
the presidential
communications
privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than
denial of the deliberative process privilege.
The
In
Re:
Sealed
Case
confines
the presidential communications privilege, only to
White House Staff that has operational proximity to
direct presidential decision-making. The privilege is
meant to encompass only those functions that form
the core of presidential authority, involving what the
court characterized as quintessential and nondelegable Presidential power, such as commander-inchief power, appointment and removal power, the
power to grant pardons and reprieves, the soleauthority to receive ambassadors and other public
officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.
In older cases, Courts ruled that the Executive
has a right to withhold documents that might
reveal military
or
state
secrets, identity
of
government
informers
in
some
circumstances, and information
related
to
pending investigations. An area where the privilege
is highly revered is in foreign relations. In US v.
Curtiss-Wright
Export
Corp, the U.S.
Court,
pronounced: The nature of foreign negotiations
requires caution, and their success must often depend
on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a
full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or

or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this

might have a pernicious influence on future
negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences,
perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other
powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was
one cogent reason for vesting the power of making
treaties in the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, the principle on which the body was
formed confining it to a small number of members. To
admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to
demand and to have as a matter of course all the
papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign
power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re
Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements
of presidential
communications
privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication
must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power; 2) The communication must be
authored or solicited and received by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President; 3) The presidential
communications
privilege remains
a
qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought
likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita
premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that
the
communications
elicited
by
the
3
questions fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials necessary in
her
executive
and
policy
decision-making
process and, that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of
China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced
that, indeed, the communications elicited by the 3
questions
are
covered
by
the presidential
communications
privilege. First,
the
communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications
are received by a close advisor of the President.
Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can
be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

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privilege in

US v. Nixon held that a claim of executive

privilege is subject to balancing against other
interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive
privilege
is not
absolutely protected
by
the
Constitution. The U.S. Court held: [N]either the
doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without
more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances. Nixon v. Sirica held that presidential
communications are presumptively privileged and
that the presumption can be overcome only by
mere showing of public need by the branch
seeking access to conversations. The courts are
enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the
political branches of the government in the manner
that preserves the essential functions of each
Branch. Here, the record is bereft of any categorical
explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or critical need for the answers to the 3
questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the
questions veer more towards the exercise of the
legislative oversight function under Section 22 (power
to conduct question hour oversight function) of
Article VI rather than Section 21(power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation legislative function) of
the
same
Article. Senate
v.
Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of
Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed
in pursuit of legislation.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of
executive privilege does not guard against a possible
disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no
dispute
on
this. US
v.
Nixon has
held
that demonstrated, specific need for evidence
in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the
present cases distinction with the Nixon case is very
evident.
In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding
where the information is requested and it is the
demands of due process of law and the fair
administration
of
criminal
justice
that
the
information be disclosed. This is the reason why
the U.S. Court was quick to limit the scope of its
decision. It stressed that it is not concerned here
with the balance between the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and
congressional demands for information. Unlike
in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a
criminal proceeding,
but in a legislative
inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that
the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends
not only on the ground invoked but, also, on
the procedural setting or the context in which the
claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President
did not interpose any claim of need to protect
military, diplomatic or sensitive national security
secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary
Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the
grounds
of presidential
communications

Evidence

relation to her executive and policy

decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot,
any more than the other branches of government,
invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its
officials and employees from investigations by the
proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing
required to overcome the presumption favoring
confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the
presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material
might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and
appropriateness
of
the
function
in
the
performance of which the material was sought,
and the degree to which the material was
necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task
requires and our decision implies no judgment
whatever
concerning
possible
presidential
involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary,
we think the sufficiency of the Committee's
showing must depend solely on whether the
subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to
the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's
functions...The sufficiency of the Committee's
showing of need has come to depend, therefore,
entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are
critical to the performance of its legislative
functions. There is a clear difference between
Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a
grand jury, or any institution engaged in like
functions. While fact-finding by a legislative
committee is undeniably a part of its task,
legislative judgments normally depend more on
the
predicted
consequences
of
proposed
legislative
actions
and
their
political
acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of
past events; Congress frequently legislates on the
basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings.
In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns
entirely on its ability to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that certain named
individuals did or did not commit specific crimes.
*On the claim that the grant of petitioners claim of
executive privilege will violate the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern: SC might have agreed with
such contention if petitioner did not appear before
them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for 11 hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested
his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information (Article III, Sec.
7 of the Constitution), like any other right, is subject to
limitation. The provision itself expressly provides the
limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of
these laws are Section 7 of RA No. 6713, Article 229 of
the RPC, Section 3 (k) of R.A. No. 3019, and Section
24(e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These
are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence
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that an allegation be made whether the information

classifies as confidential and what our Constitution

considers as belonging to the larger concept of
executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized
public interest in the confidentiality of certain
information. We find the information subject of this
case belonging to such kind.
Moreover, the right of Congress or any of its
Committees
to
obtain
information in
aid
of
legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to
public information. The former cannot claim that
every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the peoples
right to information. The distinction between such
rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:There are,
clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and
the right of people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as
a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power
to exact testimony from government officials. These
powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual
citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of
representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in
every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people
are exercising their right to information. The
members of respondent Committees should not invoke
as justification in their exercise of power a right
properly belonging to the people in general. This is
because when they discharge their power, they do so
as public officials and members of Congress. Be that
as it may, the right to information must be balanced
with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to
constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to
delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review by
numerous decided cases.
*On whether the claim is properly invoked:
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly
invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter. A formal and proper claim of
executive privilege requires a precise and certain
reason for preserving their confidentiality. The Letter
dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the
formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states
that this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined
in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary
Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the
Office of the President. That is more than enough
compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical
letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
The find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita are specific enough so as not to
leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the
requested
information
could
be
classified
as
privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires

demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets,

closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular
ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not
even intended to be comprehensive. At any rate, as
held further in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress must
not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of
the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and
co-equal department.
2. Judicial Privilege
Per Curiam Decision of the SC in connection with
the Letter of the House Prosecution Panel to
Subpoena Justices of the SC
Facts: (Corona Impeachment) Congressman Emilio
Abaya, the Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager,
in behalf of the prosecution; wrote several letters
dated January 19, and 25, 2012, requesting that the
prosecution be allowed to examine the rollo of several
impeachment related cases. These included FASAP v.
PAL, Navarro v. Ermita, Gutierrez v. House and League
of Cities v. Comelec. He even asked for certified true
copies of the Agenda and Minutes of Deliberation of the
FASAP case.
Meanwhile the Senate Impeachment Court
directed the Clerk of Court(CoC) and the Asst. Clerk of
Court via a subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum
to appear and produce certain documents of the FASAP
case. These included the records of the raffle of the
case and four letters written by Atty. Estrelito Mendoza
addressed to the CoC
Another subpoeana ad testificandum was
issued ordering the CoC to bring with her certain
documents related to the TRO issued in relation to
Gloria Arroyos leaving the country. Also required were
the records of Coronas appointment to the SC and
Coronas appointment as CJ.
Around Jan. 27, 2012, the Prosecution
manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present
about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand
documents, to be secured from both private and public
offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices
of the SC, and Court officials and employees who will
testify on matters, many of which are, internal to the
Court. Save for League of Cities and Gutierrez, the
cases were still pending with the SC.
On Feb. 7 and 8, the prosecution again asked
for subpoenas for the production of records of cases,
and the attendance of Justices, officials and employees
of the Supreme Court, to testify on the records and on
the various cases mentioned above
Instead of issuing the subpoenas, Senator Judge Enrile
issued an Order denying the request for subpoena ad
testificandum to JJ. Villarama, Sereno, Reyes and
Velasco. Thus, the attendance of SC Justices under
compulsory process became moot and academic.

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server for personal service or to the mailing section of

Issue: Whether or not the requests of the letters can

be granted.

Held: It depends. The SC said the rollo of the cases,

whether decided or pending, are privileged. Certified
true copies of orders, decisions, resolutions, being
matters of public record can be provided. The parties
pleadings may be examined as well. The Court can also
give copies of Mendozas letters.
However, it cant release documents related to
the FASAP case as it is still pending. The Court cannot
as well waive the privileges attendant to the proposed
testimony of CoC Vidal and of the other Court officials
and employees on matters covered by privilege and
confidentiality. The witness can only testify on the
documents or records allowed under the listing.
Ratio: Philippine law, rules and jurisprudence prohibit
the disclosure of confidential or privileged information
under well-defined rules. At the most basic level and
subject to the principle of comity, Members of the
Court, and Court officials and employees may not be
compelled to testify on matters that are part of the
internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the
exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties,
while testimony on matters
external to their
adjudicatory functions and duties may be compelled by
compulsory processes.
To summarize these rules, the following are
privileged documents or communications, and are not
subject to disclosure:
(1)
Court actions such as the result of the raffle of
cases and the actions taken by the Court on each case
included in the agenda of the Courts session on acts
done material to pending cases, except where a party
litigant requests information on the result of the raffle
of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC declares that the
results of the raffle of cases shall only be available to
the parties and their counsels, unless the cases involve
bar matters, administrative cases and criminal cases
involving the penalty of life imprisonment, which are
treated with strict confidentiality and where the raffle
results are not disclosed even to the parties
themselves.
(2)
Court deliberations or the deliberations of the
Members in court sessions on cases and matters
pending before the Court;
Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that
the actions taken in each case in the Courts agenda,
which are noted by the Chief Justice or the Division
Chairman, are also to be treated with strict
confidentiality.
Only after the official release of the resolution
embodying the Court action may that action be made
available to the public.
A resolution is considered officially released
once the envelope containing its final copy, addressed
to the parties, has been transmitted to the process

the Judicial Records Office.

IRSC provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. Court
sessions are executive in character, with only the
Members of the Court present.
Court deliberations
are confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside
parties, except as may be provided herein or as
authorized by the Court.
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the
rule in his concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in
Arroyo v. De Lima(TRO on Watch List Order case): the
rules on confidentiality will enable the Members of the
Court to freely discuss the issues without fear of
criticism for holding unpopular positions or fear of
humiliation for ones comments. The privilege against
disclosure of these kinds of information/communication
is known as deliberative process privilege,
involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching
a decision.
Written advice from a variety of
individuals
is
an
important
element
of
the
governments decision-making process and that the
interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced
the
government
to
disclose
those
recommendations;the privilege is intended to
prevent the chilling of deliberative communications.
(3)
Court records
which are predecisional and
deliberative in nature, in particular, documents and
other communications which are part of or related to
the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research
papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized
as privileged communication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the
While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC speaks
only of the confidentiality of court deliberations, it is
understood that the rule extends to documents and
other communications which are part of or are related
to the deliberative process. The deliberative process
privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
that are component parts of the process for
formulating governmental decisions and policies.
Obviously, the privilege may also be claimed by other
court officials and employees when asked to act on
these documents and other communications.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative
process privilege, the agency must show that the
document is both (1)
predecisional and (2)
deliberative.
A document is predecisional under the
deliberative process privilege if it precedes, in temporal
sequence, the decision to which it relates.In other
words, communications are considered predecisional if
they were made in the attempt to reach a final
conclusion.
A material is deliberative, on the other hand,
if it reflects the give and take of the consultative
process. The key question in determining whether the
material is deliberative in nature is whether disclosure
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Atty. Vitriolo is guilty of breaching their privileged and

of the information would discourage candid discussion

within the agency.
If the disclosure of the information would
expose the governments decision making process in a
way that discourages candid discussion among the
decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts
ability to perform their functions), the information is
deemed privileged.

confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be

dibarred.
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
found Atty. Vitriolo guilty of violating the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client,
and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for 1 year.

(4)
Confidential Information secured by justices,
judges, court officials and employees in the course of
their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above,
are privileged even after their term of office.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on

privileged communication between attorney and client
when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public
document against Rosa? NO

(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision

are privileged materials that cannot be disclosed,
except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that
have been made available by the court to the general
public.

RULING: In engaging the services of an attorney, the

client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and
highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of
such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is
required by necessity and public interest. Only by such
confidentiality and protection will a person be
encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney.
The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice. Thus, the preservation and
protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
paramount importance to the administration of
justice. One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the
attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep
inviolate his clients secrets or confidence and not to
abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination
of the attorney-client relationship, and continues even
after the clients death. It is the glory of the legal
profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended
on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and
converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in
any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyers
tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. With full
disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his
attorney, adequate legal representation will result in
the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the
prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or
a prospective attorney-client relationship, and
it is by reason of this relationship that the
client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective
client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged
communication
even
if
the
prospective client does not thereafter retain
the lawyer or the latter declines the
employment. The reason for this is to make
the prospective client free to discuss whatever
he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client.

(6)
The principle of comity or inter-departmental
courtesy demands that the highest officials of each
department be exempt from the compulsory processes
of the other departments.
(7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as
an institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her
individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the
individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired
justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim
exception without the consent of the Court
Note: Read this case in the original. It said so many
things and cited many laws related to judicial privilege.
3. Privilege Communication
MERCADO VS. VITRIOLO
FACTS: Rosa Mercado is Senior Education Specialist of
the Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards. Atty. Julito Vitriolo, on the
other hand, is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
Rosas husband filed for an annulment of their
marriage before the RTC of Pasig City. The latter
dismissed the annulment case and the dismissal
became final and executory.
In August 1992, Atty. Anastasio de Leon,
counsel of Rosa, died. On February 7, 1994, Atty.
Vitriolo entered his appearance before the RTC as
collaborating counsel for Rosa.
On April 13, 1999, Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal
complaint against Rosa for Falsification of Public
Document, alleging that Rosa made false entries in the
Certificates of Live Birth of her children and for
indicating that she is married to a certain Ferdinand
Fernandez when in truth, she is legally married to
Ruben Mercado.
Rosa filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the bar. She
claimed that in filing the criminal case for falsification,

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as to his rights

On the other hand, a communication

from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for
some purpose other than on account of the
(prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v.
Palanca, where the client and his wife leased to
their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land
for a period of ten years. In their contract, the
parties agreed, among others, that a specified
portion of the lease rentals would be paid to
the client-lessors, and the remainder would be
delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed
creditors. The client alleged that the list of
creditors which he had confidentially supplied
counsel for the purpose of carrying out the
terms of payment contained in the lease
contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation
of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose
interests are adverse to those of the client. As
the client himself, however, states, in the
execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease
contract between the parties, he furnished
counsel with the confidential list of his
creditors. We ruled that this indicates that
client delivered the list of his creditors to
counsel not because of the professional
relation then existing between them, but on
account of the lease agreement. We then held
that a violation of the confidence that
accompanied the delivery of that list would
partake more of a private and civil wrong than
of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer
to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in
confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and
client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no
third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on
quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of
his client and delivered to the opposing party, an
offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional
capacity, are
not
privileged
communications, the element of confidentiality not
being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to
his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking

or obligations. The communication must have

been transmitted by a client to his attorney for
the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting
service, or
business
or
personal
assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege
does not attach to a communication disclosed
for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at
bar, the SC held that the evidence on record
fails to substantiate Rosas allegations. It
noted that Rosa did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed
by respondent. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity. She
contends that Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a
criminal action against her for falsification of
public documents because the criminal
complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil
case for annulment then handled by Atty.
Vitriolo. She did not, however, spell out these
facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The SC cannot be involved in a
guessing game as to the existence of facts
which Rosa must prove.
Indeed, Rosa failed to attend the
hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony
from Rosa as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Vitriolo
without her consent, it is difficult, if not
impossible to determine if there was any
violation
of
the
rule
on
privileged
communication. Such confidential information
is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the
rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely
assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden
of proving that the privilege applies is placed
upon the party asserting the privilege.

4. Filial Privilege
PEOPLE OF
INVENCION

THE

PHILIPPINES

V.

ARTEMIO

Facts: Artemio Invencion was charged before the

Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of
rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter,
Cynthia (his daughter with his first common-law-wife,
Gloria Pagala).
During trial, the witnesses presented by the
prosecution in its evidence in chief included Elven
Invencion, the son of Artemio with his second
common-law wife. Elven testified that that sometime
before the end of the school year in 1996, while he
was sleeping in one room with his father, Cynthia, and
two other younger brothers, he was awakened by
Cynthias loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his
father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion.
After about two minutes, his father put on his short
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the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons who

pants. Elven further testified that Artemio was a very

strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily
prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her
suitors. .
The trial court convicted Artemio for one count
of rape. Artemio challenges the competency and
credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven,
as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness
against him under pursuant to the rule on filial
privilege.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Elven Invencion should be
disqualified as a witness pursuant to the rule on filial
privilege. NO.

RATIO: There is no cogent reason to overturn the

findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.
The competency of Elven to testify is not affected by
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the rule on filial privilege. This rule is not
strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant
is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify,
which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was
not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to
waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified
against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying
as a witness against his father of his own accord and
only to tell the truth. Hence, his testimony is entitled
to full credence.
L.

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS/CONFESSION

PEOPLE VS. MILLANO MUIT

FACTS: Muit, Pancho, Dequillo, Romeo, Hermano and
Ferraer were charged with
kidnapping for
ransom
with
homicide
and carnapping in
two
separate informations. The kidnapping for ransom with
homicide and the carnapping were established by the
direct
testimony
of Ferraer, Seraspe
and
Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached
and convinced him to let them use his house to keep
the victim they planned to kidnap (Ong). They planned
the crime in Ferraers house and waited for the call
from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be
at the construction site. The group received a call from
Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them that the
victim was already at the construction site, and so they
went there to carry out their plan. At the construction
site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and
the other members of the group pointed their guns at
the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie
prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to
the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to
board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They
immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to
the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the
group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that
the kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the
police in a shoot out in which the victim was among

survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the

police.
Pancho,
Jr.
returned
to
the
house
of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their
meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., andPancho, Sr.
learned from the news that the group engaged the
police in a shoot out and most of them were killed, and
that Muit was
arrested
by
the
police.
After
investigation, the police were able to apprehend
Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all took part in
the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim.
During
the
investigation, Pancho,
Jr., Dequillo,
and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and
family members, executed extra judical confessions
divulging their respective roles in the planning and
execution of the crimes. RTC found Muit, Pancho, Jr.,
Dequillo and Romeo guilty. The RTC held that mere
denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. CA
affirmed.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in giving credence to
the
extra-judicial
confessions
of Pancho,
Jr.
and Dequillo, and to the sworn statement and
testimony of Ferraer in convicting them NO!
Ratio: (i only included the relevant issue which is on
extra judicial confessions)
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho,
Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against
them. There is nothing on record to support
appellants claim that they were coerced and tortured
into executing their extra judicial confessions. One of
the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants extra judicial statements is that each
contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could
not have supplied, without the knowledge and
information given by appellants. Moreover, the
appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they
executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that
Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements
voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked
with them alone and informed them of their
constitutional rights. Muit, on the other hand, was
assisted by counsels in each instance when he
executed his two extra judicial confessions; his
second statement was even witnessed by his
uncle, Bonifacio,
and
his
brother, Dominador.Muit cannot
just
conveniently
disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra
judicial confession. Nevertheless, in Muits case, he
was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez
as the one who pointed a gun at them during the
kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the
ground.
Appellants claims of torture are not supported
by medical certificates from the physical examinations
done on them. These claims of torture were mere
afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time
during trial; appellants did not even inform their
family members who visited them while they were
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Issue: Whether

imprisoned about the alleged tortures. Dequillo, for

his part, also had the opportunity to complain of the
alleged torture done to him to the Department of
Justice when he was brought there. Claims of torture
are easily concocted, and cannot be given credence
unless substantiated by competent and independent
corroborating evidence.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo,
and Muit also strengthened the prosecutions case
against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial
confession is evidence only against the person making
it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is
where several extra judicial statements had been made
by several persons charged with an offense and there
could have been no collusion with reference to said
several confessions, the fact that the statements are in
all material respects identical is confirmatory of the
confession of the co-defendants and is admissible
against other persons implicated therein. They are also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the
person implicated therein to show the probability of the
latters actual participation in the commission of the
crime and may likewise serve as corroborative
evidence if it is clear from other facts and circums
tances that other persons had participated in the
perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These
are known as interlocking confessions.
Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo,
relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial
statements but also on Ferraers testimony that Romeo
was introduced to him in his house as the informant
when they were planning the kidnapping.

PEOPLE VS SATORRE
Facts: Herminiano Satorre was charged with the
Murder of Romero Pantilgan. Wife of victim testified
that while she was asleep, she was awakened by a
gunshot. When she went out to the porch, she found
her dead husband lying on the ground with a gunshot
wound on his head.
Rufino Abayata, a baranggay kagawad,
testified that they went they went to the Pantilgan
residence to verify a report regarding a dead person.
Rufino testified that Abraham Satorre, the accuseds
father, admitted that it was his son who shot Pantilgan.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied
Satorre and his father to the barangay captain. There,
Satorre allegedly admitted killing Pantilgan. Cynthia
Castanares, the Baranggay captain, corroborated
Flavios story. She testified that Satorre admitted that
he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a
piece of wood.
Satorre denies the charges and alleges that he
was asleep at his home at the time of hte incident. He
also denied his confession. The father corroborated his
sons story and denied accompanying him to the
baranggay captain.
Note that these alleged confessions were not in
writing.

Evidence

Satorre was proven guilty beyond

reasonable doubt? NO
Held: Rules of Court defines an admission as an act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact. A confession, on the other hand is the
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein.
Evidently, Satorres alleged declaration owning
up to the killing before the Barangay Captain was a
confession. Since the declaration was not put in
writing and made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial
confession. There is no question as to the admissibility
of appellants alleged oral extrajudicial confession. The
Rules of Court makes no distinction whether the
confession is judicial or extrajudicial.
The rationale for the admissibility of a
confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily, a
confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it
is supported by the strong presumption that no sane
person or one of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a
crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a
confession is was it voluntarily and freely made.
Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in evidence
hinges on its voluntariness.
The problem with appraising voluntariness
occurs when the confession is an oral extrajudicial
confession because the proof of voluntariness cannot
be inferred from the testimony of a witness who
allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written
proof
that
such
confession
was
voluntarily
made. Neither can the confessant be appraised by the
court since it was made outside the judicial
proceeding.
On the question of whether a confession is
made
voluntarily,
the
age,
character,
and
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must
be considered. The intelligence of the accused or want
of it must also be taken into account. It must be
shown that the defendant realized the import of his
act. In this case, Satorre was a 19yr old farmer who
did not even finish 1st grade. Even if he did confess to
the baranggay captain, he may not have realized the
full import of his confession and its consequences. Of
course its entirely possible that he did admit to the
act, but the problem is that the voluntariness of such
oral confession is not definitively appraised or
evaluated. At any rate, an extrajudicial confession
forms only a prima facia case. They are not conclusive
proof.
A confession is not required to be in any
particular form. It may be oral or written, formal or
informal in character. It may be recorded on video
tape, sound motion pictures, or tape. However, while
not required to be in writing to be admissible in
evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by
video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to
writing. This adds weight to the confession and helps

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her with his mother, came and they helped each other

convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily

made.
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not
support a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There
must be such corroboration that, when considered in
connection with confession, will show the guilt of
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a
confession.
On the whole, it appears that the trial court
simply based Satorres conviction on the testimonial
evidence of prosecution witnesses. SC cannot affirm
the conviction on mere testimonial evidence,
considering that the voluntariness of said confession
cannot be conclusively established because of Satorres
personal circumstances and the failure of the police to
reduce the alleged oral confession into writing. [note:
testimony of prosec witnesses had some discrepancies
with regard to the establish facts of the case ie.
Location of gunshot wound...etc)
M. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
PEOPLE V VILLACORTA GIL

FACTS: Gil was convicted of the crime of Destructive

Arson with Homicide. On March 1, 1998, Gil set fire the
residential house owned by Angge Arguelles and that
the same resulted into the burning of other adjacent
houses causing damage and the death of a certain
Rodolfo Cabrera.
The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution
consisted of the following:

the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo about

the behavior and remarks of Gil at the time she
caused a public disturbance and threatened to
cause chaos and arson and to drag her neighbors
into this turmoil, two days prior to the
conflagration;

the testimony of Ronnie Gallardo that, when he

saw the burning mattress in the room of the Gil,
the latter said to him in the vernacular: "Pabayaan
mo na iyan. Damay-damay na tayo.";

the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that, at

the time he tried to chase the Gil during the fire
incident, he again heard her utter a nonchalant
remark: "Damay-damay na tayo diyan, huwag
ninyo nang patayin ang sunog."; and

the testimony of Kagawad William Lim that the Gil

approached and admitted to him immediately after
the incident that she was the person responsible
for the conflagration.
On the other hand, the Gil relied on her lone
testimony in her defense. While she admitted the
authenticity of her written confession (the one made
before William Lim), she denied on the witness stand
that she voluntarily wrote the confession. According to
Gil, the fire resulted from her defective gas stove
which suddenly caught fire while she was boiling water.
When the stove caught fire, she got flustered and
poured water on the stove. To her surprise, the fire got
bigger. Ronnie, who was also renting a room next to

to put off the fire. When their efforts seemed

unsuccessful, she told Ronnie: "xxx hindi na natin
kayang patayin ang apoy, baba na lang po kami para
humingi ng tulong". When they went out, people were
already helping each other to contain the fire. She then
left the place passing through an alley. According to
her, it was William Lim who took custody of him for
reasons unknown to her. Thereafter, they gave her a
paper with something written on it and they instructed
her to copy the same in another paper. Confused, she
did what was told of her because they told her that it
would be good for her.
ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in finding Gil guilty based on
circumstantial evidence NO [WON Gil was positively
identified by the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution YES]
2. WON the CA erred in considering as evidence the
alleged extrajudicial confession Gil made before
William Lim - NO
HELD: Gil contends that the circumstantial evidence of
the prosecution failed to produce the required quantum
of proof to hold her criminally liable for the charge.
She explained that prosecution witness Ronnie
Gallardo saw her mattress already on fire but never
saw her deliberately burn her mattress. Ronnie
Gallardo neither saw nor identified any overt act which
would suggest that the she intentionally put her
mattress on fire. She claimed that Ronnie Gallardo
might have gotten anxious after he saw the raging fire
and misunderstood her remark "pabayaan mo na yan,
damay-damay na tayo" when what she meant to say
after all was "pabayaan mo na yan, madadamay
tayo." She would not have pulled out Ronnie Gallardo
from the burning house had her intention been to
cause injury to others. She also disputed the TCs
reliance on the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo
that she intentionally burned her residential house
because of personal problems. She rhetorically
questioned the credibility of the said prosecution
witness when, as a person in authority, he failed to
report to the police his supposed knowledge of what
she was planning to do two days prior to the fire that
occurred in their neighborhood.
The she also argues that her written confession
is inadmissible in evidence. She claims that she was
not assisted by counsel at the time she executed the
same; and that she was merely led to believe, without
apprising her of its legal significance, that it would help
her.
1. NO. [YES] This court agrees with the CA that the
RTC has passed upon enough circumstantial evidence
to hold Gil guilty. As cited, People v. Gallarde,
provides: Positive identification pertains essentially to
proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the
crime. There
are
two
types
of
positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect
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testifying, demeanor and behavior while in the witness

or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator

of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of
the commission of the crime. This constitutes
direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not
have actually seen the very act of commission of
a crime, he may still be able to positively identify
a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a
crime as for instance when the latter is the
person or one of the persons last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type
of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
together
with
other
pieces
of
evidence
constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only
fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the
accused is the author of the crime to the
exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitness are
the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a
suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then
nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an
eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that
there can be no conviction until and unless an accused
is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence
would not be allowed to prove identity of the
accused on the absence of direct evidence, then
felons would go free and the community would
be denied proper protection. [Emphasis supplied]
The aforementioned circumstantial evidence
would constitute positive identification of Gil as the
perpetrator of the crime charged, to the exclusion of
others. She was the person who had the motive to
commit the crime, and the series of events following
her threat to cause chaos and arson in her
neighborhood -- the fire that started in her room, and
her actuations and remarks during, as well as
immediately before and after the fire-- sufficiently
points to the accused-appellant as the author of the
said crime.
We are not persuaded by the bare and
uncorroborated allegation of the Gil that the fire was
accidental, and that she was arrested and forced
by Kagawad William Lim to copy the contents of her
written confession from a piece of paper handed to her
by the said barangay official.
To quote a well-entrenched legal precept, the
"factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
their probative weight are given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will
alter the outcome of the case" and the said trial court
"is in the best position to ascertain and measure the
sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through its
actual observation of the witnesses' manner of

box."

The Gil failed to show any "misconstrued,

misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance" that could alter the
outcome of the case. She also did not show any
credible motive why the prosecution witnesses testified
against her. Thus, this Court finds conclusive the
findings and observation of the TC that the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses were candid and
trustworthy, and that the testimony of the accusedappellant was not impressed with candor and honesty.
2. No. Regarding her extrajudicial confession, Gil made
the confessions not only toKagawad William Lim but
also to Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo while the fire was in
progress. Moreover, as correctly held by the CA, even if
the written extra-judicial confession is disregarded, the
evidence presented by the prosecution is more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of the Gil beyond
reasonable doubt.
N. DOCUMENTED ALIBI
LEJANO V. PEOPLE
Facts: Estrellita, Carmela, and Jennifer Vizconde were
murdered in their home in BF Homes, Paranaque.
Among the accused in this case is Hubert Webb. He
was convicted by the trial court and the appellate court
based on the testimony of a star witness, Jessica
Alfaro.
In her testimony, Alfaro stated that she was
there when Webb and his companions raped and killed
Carmela Vizconde. Her testimony also matched the
physical evidence found the next day (such as the
unscrewed lightbulb, the broken glass at the front
door, the scattered contents of the bag, etc)
In his defense of an alibi, Webb presented
evidence (photocopies of his passport, letters to a
friend, US certification of immigration, printout of his
arrival and departure, etc) to show that he was in the
US when the crime was committed.
The trial court and CA ruled against Webb
stating that Webb was actually in Paraaque when the
Vizconde killings took place. They stated that he was
not in the U.S. and if he did leave, he actually
returned, committed the crime, erased the fact of his
return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S.
and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of
the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the
normal way.
They also stated that Webbs alibi cannot stand
against Alfaros positive identification of him as the
rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer
as well of her mother and younger sister.
Issue: Did Webb have a valid alibi? YES.
Decision: To establish alibi, the accused must prove
by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he
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physical evidence found at

was present at another place at the time of the

perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The lower courts were wrong in theorizing that
Webb used his influence in fixing such records. This is
pure speculation since there had been no indication
that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could
Webb fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest,
officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the
U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix
with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two
dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates
when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S.
to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return
there?
Webbs documents were also authenticated by
various departments (such as the DFA, and the US
Immigration). Lastly, if the SC were to subscribe to the
lower courts extremely skeptical view, it might as well
tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and
regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons
for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records,
which carry the presumption of truth of what they
state, are immune to attack. They are not. That
presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present
evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs passport
and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.
immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S.
and back.
As for Alfaro, she was not a credible witness. A
positive declaration from a witness that he saw the
accused commit the crime should not automatically
cancel out the accuseds claim that he did not do it. A
lying witness can make as positive an identification as
a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say
as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without
blinking an eye.
The positive identification must meet at least
two criteria: First, the positive identification of the
offender must come from a credible witness. She is
credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually
based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to
one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness story of what she
personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she
never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes
bewildering claims.
Alfaros statements fail because she had prior
access to the details that the investigators knew of the
case. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous
witness bothered by her conscience. She had been
hanging around that agency for some time as a stool
pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them.
As such, she took advantage of her familiarity
with these details to include in her testimony the
clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the
front door glass frames even when they were trying to
slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this
crime scene feature. This also applied to the other

Evidence

the scene of the crime

(such as the bag, the light bulb, etc) She also failed
to corroborate facts on the sweetheart theory
between Webb and Vizconde.
Thus, Webb and the others were acquitted.
O. OFFER OF COMPROMISE
PEOPLE v. ERGUIZA
FACTS: Erguiza was found guilty of 1 count of rape,
with a 13-y.o. minor as victim. At the back of a public
school in Pangasinan, Erugiza, armed with a kitchen
knife, forced AAA, a 1 st year high school student, to
have sexual intercourse with him. Erguiza ordered AAA
to not tell anyone, otherwise hed kill all her family.
The mother of the victim, BBB, had her
daughter examined when she missed her period. It
was only at this time that the mother discovered the
rape incident, after prodding her daughter to confess.
The mother and the victim then filed the criminal case.
CCC, the vicitms father, testified that the
family of Erguiza went to their house after the case
was filed, and offered 50k, later increased to 150k.
Albina, the mother of the accused admitted that she
did talk with BBB and CCC, but according to her, it was
the spouses who asked for 1M, later reduced to 250k,
to settle the case. She said her counter-offer was 5k
only.
Issue: Can the offer of compromise given by the
mother of the accused be used as evidence of his
guilt? No.
Ruling: The alleged offer of the parents of accused to
settle the case cannot be used against him as evidence
of his guilt. Accused testified that he never asked his
parents to settle the case. It was his parents initiative
because they and the parents of the victim are actually
in-laws and they did not want their relations to turn
sour. Moreover, accused was not present when the
offer to settle was allegedly made.
An
offer
of
compromise
from
an
unauthorized person cannot amount to an
admission of the party himself. Although the Court
has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents
of the accused to settle the case is an implied
admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is
that for a compromise to amount to an implied
admission of guilt, the accused should have been
present or at least authorized the proposed
compromise.
Moreover, it has been held in other decisions of
the court that where the accused was not present
at the time the offer for monetary consideration
was made, such offer of compromise would not
save the day for the prosecution.
Accused acquitted, no proof beyond reasonable
doubt (also on other grounds).
P. ADMISSION BY CONSPIRATOR

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Digests
(DOJ). On

Facts: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old

daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed. The
police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime
until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed
an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that
a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by
respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was
one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that
he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the
sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
Eventually Columna was arrested. Apart from him,
there were other respondents.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an
affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as
"look out" during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as
the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also
tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio
Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd
Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the
latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time.
When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in
detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo
was acting as private prosecutor. Respondents denied
any involvement in the killings.
During
the
preliminary
investigation,
respondent Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited
handwritten letter dated to respondent Lloyd, sent
from Columnas jail cell in Manila. In the letter,
Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004
affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until
he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that
those he implicated had no participation in the killings.
Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of
Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter
essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten
letter.
Due to the submission of Columnas letter and
affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory
hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory
affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing
held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically
admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the
unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004
affidavit and denied that any violence had been
employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.
Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating
prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges.
This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter
addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated
October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only
forced to withdraw all his statements against
respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory
hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.
He requested that he be transferred to another
detention center.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges,
petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of Justice

Evidence

May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then

Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal
and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.
He opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial
confession was not effectively impeached by the
subsequent recantation and that there was enough
evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents.
Later on Gonzalez reversed this finding and declared
this extrajudicial confession inadmissible.
ISSUE: W/N there was probable cause against the
other respondents given the rule on res inter alios
acta? NO.
HELD: The lower court judge was wrong when it found
probable cause against the othe respondents.
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna
limited herself only to the following: (1) Columnas
affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated
the respondents in the murders; (2) his affirmation of
this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory
hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4)
the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the
prosecutors recommendation to file the murder
charges.
She completely ignored other relevant pieces
of evidence such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004 letter
to respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he
suffered to force him to admit his participation in the
crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May
25, 2004 affidavit where he stated that neither he nor
the respondents had any involvement in the murders
and (3) his testimony during the October 22, 2004
clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed
his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
Moreover,
Judge
Daguna
failed
to
consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession
in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible
as evidence against respondents in view of the
rule on res inter alios acta.
The rule on res inter alios acta provides that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her coaccused and is considered as hearsay against them.
The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a mans own acts are
binding upon himself, and are evidence
against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly
inconvenient,
but
also
manifestly unjust, that a man should
be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party
ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against
him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta
rule is an admission made by a conspirator
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through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated August 22,

under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of

Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to
the
conspiracy
and
during
its
existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration
of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence may be given in evidence against coconspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself
(b) the admission relates to the common object and
(c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be
used against the alleged co-conspirators without
violating their constitutional right to be confronted with
the witnesses against them and to cross-examine
them.
Here,
aside
from
the
extrajudicial
confession, which was later on recanted, no
other piece of evidence was presented to prove
the alleged conspiracy. There was no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial,
which
the
extrajudicial
confession
could
corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession
of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the
evidence presented against the respondents, it
would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is
ascertained that no probable cause exists to form
a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused,
they should be relieved from the pain of going
through a full blown court case. When, at the
outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary
investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated
extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the
criminal complaint should not prosper so that the
system would be spared from the unnecessary
expense of such useless and expensive litigation.
Q. SIMILAR CONDUCT
BOSTON BANK (FORMERLY BANK OF COMMERCE)
V. PERLA MANALO AND CARLOS MANALO.
Facts: Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The
Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) some residential lots in
Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI continued
selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent
of OBM. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its
President Emerito Ramos, to purchase two lots in the
Xavierville subdivision and offered as part of the
downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI,

1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the

reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the
price of the lots at P348,060 with a 20% downpayment
of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 (less
the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos), payable as soon
as
XEI
resumes
its
selling
operations;
the
corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then
be signed on or before the same date. Perla Manalo
conformed to the letter agreement. Thereafter, the
spouses constructed a house on the property. The
spouses were notified of XEIs resumption of selling
operations. However, they did not pay the balance of
the downpayment because XEI failed to prepare a
contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to
them. XEI also billed them for unpaid interests which
they also refused to pay.
XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM.
Subsequently, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM)
acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM
requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going
construction on the property since it (CBM) was the
owner of the lot and she had no permission for such
construction.
Perla informed them that her husband had a
contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the
property. She promised to send CBM the documents.
However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses.
But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint
because of theissues raised. In the meantime, CBM
was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines.
Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank before the
RTC. The spouses alleged that they had always been
ready and willing to pay the installments on the lots
sold to them but no contract was forthcoming. The
spouses further alleged that upon their partial payment
of the downpayment, they were entitled to the
execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale
covering the subject lots. During the trial, the spouses
adduced
in
evidence
the
separate
Contracts
of Conditional Sale executed between XEI and 3 other
buyers to prove that XEI continued selling residential
lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter
had acquired the said lots.
The trial court ordered the petitioner to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
spouses upon the payment of the spouses of the
balance of the purchase price. It ruled that under the
August 22,1972 letter agreement of XEI and the
spouses, the parties had a "complete contract to sell"
over the lots, and that they had already partially
consummated the same.
The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling
of the RTC, but declared that the balance of the
purchase price of the property was payable in fixed
amounts on a monthly basis for 120 months, based on
the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor
of other lot buyers. Boston Bank filed a Motion for the
Reconsideration of the decision alleging that there was
no perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was
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respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts

no agreement between XEI and the respondents on the

manner of payment as well as the other terms and
conditions of the sale. Boston Bank also asserts that
there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the
terms and conditions relating to the payment of
thebalance of the purchase price of the property (as
agreed upon by XEI and other lot buyers in the same
subdivision) were also applicable to the contract
entered into between the petitioner and the
respondents.
CA denied the MR.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA correctly held that the
terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI
in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision,
which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly
installments, constitute evidence that XEI also agreed
to give the Manalo spouses the same mode and
timeline
of
payment.
(Evidence,
Disputable
Presumptions, Habits and Customs Rule 130, Section
34) NO.

HELD: The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed
to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments
does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to
give the respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did the
same or similar thing at another time, although such
evidence may be received to prove habit, usage,
pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Habit,
custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved
like any other facts. The offering party must establish
the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform
response that ensures more than a mere tendency to
act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semiautomatic in nature. The offering party must allege
and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might
constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in
evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must
be numerous enough to base on inference of
systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does
not
present
the
kind
of
sufficiently
similar
circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and
confusion. In determining whether the examples are
numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of
response. It is only when examples offered to establish
pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to
lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples
are admissible.
Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as
a matter of business usage, habit or pattern
of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay
the balance of the purchase price in installments
of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed
interests, and that XEI and the respondents had
intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to
the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed,

of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot

buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots
in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it
acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern
of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in
the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase
price of said lots in 120 months.
R. DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE V TABARNERO
FACTS: The accused in this case are Gary Tabarnero
and Alberto Tabarnero, father and son respectively.
They were charged and convicted by the RTC and CA
of the crime of murder for the death of Ernesto
Canatoy.
Gary and Ernestos step daughter Mary Jane
were lovers and living together in Ernestos place.
When Ernesto knew of their relationship, he got mad
and tried to separate them together. Gary claims that
while he pleaded to Ernesto to let them continue their
relationship, the latter suddenly attacked the former
and when Gary felt that Ernesto had a bladed weapon
tucked in his waist, Gary immediately grabbed it and
stabbed Ernesto by way of self defense. Alberto, on the
other hand denied having participated in the crime and
claimed that when he went looking for his son Gary,
the latter told him that he may have killed Ernesto,
both fled in different directions until Gary surrendered,
followed by Alberto.
SPO2 Morales testified that he was on duty on
the night of the incident and that a housemate of
Ernesto came to report the incident. He then went to
the hospital where Ernesto was brought and asked him
questions regarding the assailants. Ernesto allegedly
confirmed that Alberto and Gary were the culprits.
However, Ernesto was not able to sign the Sinumpaang
Salaysay because he could no longer answer the
succeeding questions. Then he died.
RTC and CA convicted both accused of the
crime of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not both courts a quo are correct in
finding that Gary and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto
YES
HELD: The participation of Alberto as co-conspirator
and therefore principal by direct participation was
established by the dying declaration of Ernesto. As an
exception to hearsay evidence, it must be shown that a
dying declaration was made under a realization by the
decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at
hand. This may be proven by the statement of the
deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature
and extent of the decedent's wounds, or other relevant
circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab
wounds which caused his death within the next 48
hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing
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Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was

already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his
inability to speak and write towards the end of the
questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is
entitled to the highest credence, for no person who
knows of his impending death would make a careless
or false accusation. When a person is at the point of
death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to
speak the truth. It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very
weak as he was and with his body already manifesting
an impending demise, would summon every remaining
strength he had just to lie about his true assailants,
whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
S. RES GESTAE
MARTURILLAS vs. PEOPLE

Facts: Marturillas was found guilty of homicide for the

death of Artemio Pantinople. According to the
prosecution witnesses, Artemio was eater dinner in the
house of Lito Santos, his neighbor. After eating,
Artemio went outside and sat on a bench in front of his
store. While Lito was eating, he heard a gunshot and
then moments later, he saw Artemio staggering
backwards towards his [Litos] kitchen (the kitchen was
open). Artemio shouted to Lito, Help me, Pre, I was
shot by the captain! The other witnesses for the
prosecution, including Artemios wife, also testified that
they heard Artemio shout the same thing. Moreover,
Artemios wife also made this statement, Captain, why
did you shoot my husband? It was likewise testified
that Marturillas was seen fleeing the scene (it rhymes)
after Artemio was shot. The trial court considered the
statement made by Artemio as either his dying
declaration or as part of res gestae. The CA agreed,
affirming the conviction of Marturillas.
Issue: W/N the statement made by Artemio is part of
res gestae? YES! SC affirmed the conviction.
Held/Ratio:
First of all, was it a dying declaration? Yes! It complied
with the requisites.
To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1)
refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the
declarants death; 2) be made under the consciousness
of an impending death; 3) be made freely and
voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper
influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the
death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5)
have been made by a declarant competent to testify as
a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.
Just because it falls under dying declaration doesnt
preclude it from being admitted as part of res gestae
The fact that the victims statement constituted
a dying declaration does not preclude it from being
admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of
both are present.

Evidence

Section 42 of Rule 130

Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by
a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
What is Res Gestae?
Res gestae refers to statements made by the
participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a
crime immediately before, during, or after its
commission. These statements are a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to
fabricate a false statement. An important consideration
is whether there intervened, between the occurrence
and the statement, any circumstance calculated to
divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of
the declarant; and afford an opportunity for
deliberation.
Requisites for res gestae
1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
All these requisites are present in this case.
The principal act, the shooting, was a startling
occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under
the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the
victim made the declaration without any prior
opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner.
Also, the declaration concerned the one who shot the
victim. Thus, the latters statement was correctly
appreciated as part of the res gestae.
Aside from the victims statement, which is part of the
res gestae, that of his wife -- "Captain, why did you
shoot my husband?" -- may be considered to be in the
same category. Her statement was about the same
startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously,
right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity
to concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to
the circumstances of the shooting.
T. ENTRIES IN
BUSINESS

THE

REGULAR

COURSE

OF

SECURITY BANK V GAN

FACTS: Eric Gan opened a current account with
Security Bank. Mr. Qui, branch manager, allegedly
allowed Gan a special arrangement to transfer funds
from his account to another persons account. Gan
availed himself of this several times by depositing
checks in his account, and even before they cleared,
he withdrew the proceeds thereof and transferred
them to the other account. These transactions were
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Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission

covered by what were known as "debit memos" since

Gan had no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he
transferred. Later on, Gan purportedly incurred an
overdraft or negative balance in his account. The
overdraft balance came up to P154k. According to
Security Bank, Gan refused to heed its repeated
demands for payment. The payable ballooned to
P300k, with interests applied. Security Bank filed a
sum of money case; Gan claimed that the alleged
overdraft resulted from transactions done without his
knowledge and consent. Lower courts dismissed the
case: no proof of money owed.

Issue: Did the ledger cards and the testimony of Mr.

Patricio Mercado constitute the best evidence of the
transactions made by Security Bank relative to Gans
account? No.
Held: Under Rule 45, only questions of law, not of fact,
may be raised before the SC Here, both the trial court
and the CA found that the bank failed to substantiate
its claim that Gan knowingly incurred an overdraft
against his account. No reason to disturb this finding.
To prove its claim, Security Bank presented
Patricio Mercado, the bookkeeper who handled Gans
account and recorded his transactions in a ledger.
Based on this ledger, Gan allegedly had a negative
balance of P154k. This resulted from transfers of funds
from Gans current account to another persons
account. These transfers were made under the
authority of Mr. Qui, the branch manager. Gan
categorically denied that he ever authorized these
"funds transfers."
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by
Mercado, were not competent evidence to prove that
Gan consented to the transfers of funds. These entries
merely showed that the transfers were indeed made
and that Qui approved them. Security Banks claim
that Gan availed of a special arrangement to transfer
funds from his account to another persons account
was a bare allegation that was never substantiated.
Admittedly, Mercado had no personal knowledge of this
arrangement. In fact, when asked about the details of
the alleged consent given by respondent to the
transfers, he stated that he could not remember
because respondent talked to Qui and not to
him. Security Bank could have presented Qui whom
they alleged allowed the special arrangement with
Gan. But it did not.
Neither can we accept the banks argument
that the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were
competent evidence to prove how and when the
negative balance was incurred. The bank invokes
Section 43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. Entries
made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated,
may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or
in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.

in evidence of entries in corporate books required the

satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be
dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the
facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or religious;
and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and
third requisites. Mercado, petitioners bookkeeper who
prepared the entries, was presented to testify on the
transactions pertaining to the account of respondent. It
was in the course of his testimony that the ledger
entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither
justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to
testify in court.
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge
of the facts constituting the entries, particularly those
entries which resulted in the negative balance. He had
no knowledge of the truth or falsity of these entries.
The bank submits that the ledger cards constituted the
best evidence of the transactions made by Gan with
the bank relative to his account, pursuant to Section
43 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. There
is no question that the entries in the ledgers were
made by one whose duty it was to record transactions
in the ordinary or regular course of the business. But
for the entries to be prima facie evidence of the facts
recorded, the Rule interpose[s] a very important
condition, one which we think is truly indispensable to
the probative worth of the entries as an exception to
the hearsay rule, and that is that the entrant must be
"in a position to know the facts therein stated."
Undeniably, Mr. Mercado was in a position to know the
facts of the check deposits and withdrawals. But the
transfers of funds through the debit memos in
question?
Let us be clear, at the outset, what the
transactions covered by the debit memos are. They
are, at bottom, credit accommodations said to have
been granted by the banks branch manager Mr. [Q]ui
to Gan, and they are, therefore loans, to prove which
competent testimonial or documentary evidence must
be presented. In the fac[e] of the denial by the
defendant of the existence of any such agreement, and
the absence of any document reflecting it, the
testimony of a party to the transaction, i.e., Mr. [Q]ui,
or of any witness to the same, would be necessary.
The plaintiff failed to explain why it did not or could not
present any party or witness to the transactions, but
even if it had a reason why it could not, it is clear that
the existence of the agreements cannot be established
through the testimony of Mr. Mercado, for he was [not
in] a position to [know] those facts. As a subordinate,
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ISSUE: W/N the All Asia Capital Report can be an

he could not have done more than record what was

reported to him by his superior the branch manager,
and unless he was allowed to be privy to the latters
dealings with the defendant, the information that he
received and entered in the ledgers was incapable of
being confirmed by him.
There is good reason why evidence of this
nature is incorrigibly hearsay. Entries in business
records which spring from the duty of other employees
to communicate facts occurring in the ordinary course
of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to
communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of
the entries, but not when they purport to record what
were independent agreements arrived at by some bank
officials and a client. In this case, the entries become
mere casual or voluntary reports of the official
concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the
bank at its own instance, to substitute the contract as
proof of the agreements with third parties, is to set a
dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed as
an exception to the hearsay rule only under certain
conditions specified in Section 43, which must be
scrupulously observed to prevent them from being
used as a source of undue advantage for the party
preparing them.
Thus, petitioner did not prove that respondent
had incurred a negative balance in his account.
Consequently, there was nothing to show that
respondent was indebted to it in the amount claimed.
U. COMMERCIAL LIST
MERALCO V. QUISUMBING (Sec. of Labor) and
Meralco Employees and Workers Assoc. (MEWA)
(2000)
FACTS: In the 1999 labor case decided by the SC
involving the same parties, the issue of the validity of
the Sec. of Labors resolution regarding a wage award
was put in issue. The SC ruled in the 1999 case that in
determining the amount of such award, the focal point
in the consideration is the projected net income of
Meralco for 1996. Based on financial reports of its
actual performance, MERALCO projected that the net
operating income for 1996 was 4.171 Billion. On the
other hand, the Union, by relying heavily on a
newspaper report citing an all Asia capital
financial analyst (All Asia Capital Report), placed
the 1996 net operating income at 5.795 Billion.
The Court ruled that the Sec. of Labor gravely abused
its discretion in relying solely on the evidence
presented by MEWA, namely the All Asia Capital
Report, in fixing the wage award at P2,200. The SC
further stated that the All-Asia Capital Report was
nothing more than a newspaper report that did not
show any specific breakdown or computations, and
that the Sec. of Labor should have given more weight
on the evidence presented by Meralco. Dissatisfied
with the SC decision, the Union filed a MR.

accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the

rate of wage increase?
HELD/RATIO: NO.
Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list,
register,
periodical,
or
other
published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if
that compilation is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them
therein.
Under this rule, statement of matters
contained in a periodical, may be admitted only
"if that compilation is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein."
As correctly held in the 1999 Decision, the cited report
is a mere newspaper account and not even a
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or
opinion which carries no persuasive weight for
purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support
it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its
accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally
rely on news items such as this in their occupation.
Besides, no evidence was presented that the
publication was regularly prepared by a person in
touch with the market and that it is generally regarded
as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of
their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the
same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations
are not admissible in evidence when the source of the
reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses
or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In
particular, the source of the report in this case can be
easily made available considering that the same is
necessary for compliance with certain governmental
requirements.
V. OPINION RULE
TURADIO DOMINGO V. DOMINGO FAMILY AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
FACTS: Petitioner and the four private respondents are
siblings. Petitioner is the eldest child. The family
quarrel arose over the validity of a sale of the house of
their father to the 4 respondents.
Bruno Domingo (hereinafter called Father
Domingo hes not a priest) in the 70s needed money
for his medical expenses. So what he did was to sell
the subject land to the respondents. New TCT was
issued in the name of Respondents. Petitioner only
learned of the deed of sale in 1981 when an ejectment
suit was filed against him by the respondents.

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on the television.

Petitioner went to the PNP crime lab to have

the signature of Father Domingo examined. The PNP
came out with a report that the signature on the Deed
was not Father Domingos. This report was confirmed
by another PNP report.
Petitioner field a criminal complaint for
falsification but the prosecutor dismissed the case on
the basis NBI report that the signature was genuine.
Now, Petitioner filed a complaint for the
declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale. Petitioners
contention is that the signature of Father Domingo was
forged. Respondents rely on the findings of the NBI
that the signature was authentic.
RTC dismissed the case and disregarded the
PNP and NBI conflicting reports. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE: Is the Signature forged? NO. SC affirms CA.
Case dismissed.

HELD: Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a

handwriting may be proved by the following:
(1)
A witness who actually saw the person
writing the instrument;
(2)
A witness familiar with such handwriting
and who can give his opinion thereon,
such opinion being an exception to the
opinion rule;
(3)
A comparison by the court of the
questioned handwriting and admitted
genuine specimen thereof; and
(4)
Expert evidence.
The law makes no preference in the manner of
proving the handwriting of a person. And the Court is
not mandated to give probative weight or evidentiary
value to the opinion of handwriting experts since resort
to experts is not mandatory.
The lower courts correctly disregarded the PNP
report since the comparison was made between
documents written eight years apart. The passage of
time and a persons increase in age may have decisive
influence in his handwriting characteristics. Thus, in
order to bring about an accurate comparison and
analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close
as possible in point of time to the suspected signature.
Here the testimony of three respondents to the
effect that they saw Father Domingo sign the Deed is
unrebutted. Genuineness of a handwriting may be
proven, under Rule 132, Section 22, by anyone who
actually saw the person write or affix his signature on
a document.
Moreover, the Deed is a notarized document
and as such is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated unless contradicted by clear evidence, which
petitioner failed to show.
W. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
PEOPLE v. NOEL LEE
Facts: At the time of the commission of the crime,
Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, were in the
living room of their house watching a basketball game

Evidence

The living room was brightly lit.

Herminia was seated on an armchair and across her
Joseph sat on a sofa, which against the wall and
window of their house, the television was to his
right. Herminia looked away from the game and
casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise,
she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open
window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw Lee
peering through the window and holding the gun
aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph
turned
his
body
towards
the
window,
and
simultaneously, Lee fired his gun hitting Josephs head.
Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but
could not move as Lee fired a second shot at Joseph
and 3 shots more two hit the sofa and one the
cement floor. When no more shots were fired, Herminia
ran to the window and saw Lee, in a blue sando, flee
towards the direction of his house. With the aid of her
neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to
the MCU Hospital where he later died.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against
Lee. The complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. Herminia appealed to the Secretary of
Justice. Secretary of Justice Bello III set aside the
Resolution and ordered the City Prosecutor of Caloocan
to file the information for murder against Lee.
Lee
is
a
well-known figure
in their
neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending
against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with
frustrated homicide in 1984 (dismissed due to victims
desistance) and attempted murder in 1989 (real
assailant appeared and admitted the crime). He denies
the killing of Joseph Marquez (claims that was in house
at the time of the crime and was having some drinks
with his neighbour, Bermudez, and his driver,
Columba). Lee had known the victim since childhood
and their houses are only two blocks apart.
Joseph had a bad reputation in their
neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days
before his death, Lee caught Joseph inside his car
trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away.
As proof of the victims bad reputation, Lee presented
a letter handwritten by Herminia, addressed to Mayor
Malonzo of Caloocan City. In the letter, Herminia was
surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation
because he was hooked on shabu and was a thief.
Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not
just steal but kill her and everyone in their household
because of his drug habit.
RTC convicted Lee of murder and sentenced
him to the penalty of death. Case went up to SC on
automatic review.
Issue: W/N Josephs bad reputation is admissible as
character evidence (Rule 130, sec.8, par. a.3) to
establish Lees innocence? No, character of offended
party immaterial.
Held and Ratio: Lee alleges that the Josephs drug
habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have
been shot by any of the persons from whom he had
stolen. As proof of Josephs bad character, Lee
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the accused. And this evidence must be pertinent to

presented Herminias letter to Mayor Malonzo. On

rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter
to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her sons
thievery.
Character evidence is governed by Section 51,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Character
is defined to be the possession by a person of certain
qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from
others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a
person derived from the common report of the people
who are acquainted with him; his reputation. Good
moral character includes all the elements essential to
make up such a character; among these are common
honesty and veracity, especially in all professional
intercourse; a character that measures up as good
among people of the community in which the person
lives, or that is up to the standard of the average
citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good
behavior and upright conduct.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a
party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not
admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were
allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character
or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to
have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a
factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the
business of the court is to try the case, and not the
man; and a very bad man may have a righteous
cause. There are exceptions to this rule however and
Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section
51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove
his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the
accused presents proof of his good moral character,
this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and
where good character and reputation are established,
an inference arises that the accused did not commit
the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory
that a person of good character and high reputation is
not likely to have committed the act charged against
him. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution
may not prove the bad moral character of the accused
except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to
the accused who might otherwise be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad
character. The offering of character evidence on his
behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the
prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the
defendant to produce such evidence. Once the
defendant raises the issue of his good character, the
prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant,
secure from refutation, would have a license to
unscrupulously impose a false character upon the
tribunal.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51
of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of

the moral trait involved in the offense charged,

meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant
and germane to the kind of the act charged, e.g., on a
charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of
assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a
charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and
integrity. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said
Rule refers to the character of the offended
party. Character evidence, whether good or bad, of
the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged. Such evidence is
most commonly offered to support a claim of selfdefense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of
consent in a rape case.
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait
of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as
evidence of the deceaseds aggression; and (2) as
evidence of the state of mind of the accused. The
pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character
of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and
peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in
determining whether the deceased or the accused was
the aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove selfdefense, the known violent character of the deceased
is also admissible to show that it produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of
the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt
defensive action was necessary.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral
character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Lee has not
alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the
killing was made in self-defense. There is no
connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and
thievery with his violent death in the hands of accusedappellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony,
the claim that because of the victims bad character he
could have been killed by any one of those from whom
he had stolen is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral
character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation. In People
v. Soliman, the Supreme Court held: x x x While
good or bad moral character may be availed of as
an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense
(Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in
the crime of murder where the killing is
committed through treachery or premeditation.
The proof of such character may only be allowed
in homicide cases to show that it has produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind
of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol.
3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of
murder.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is
charged with murder committed through treachery and
evident premeditation. Following the ruling in People
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evidence was produced to prove that it was solely

v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was

attended by treachery, proof of the victims bad
character is not necessary. The presence of this
aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of
proving the victims bad character to establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged and,
at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph
Marquez to murder.

a paraphernal property. Respondents appealed.

X. BURDEN OF PROOF
MANONGSONG V. ESTIMO
Facts:

Spouses Agatona Guevarra and Ciraoco Lopez had

6 children including petitioner Manongsong (and
his wife) and the respondents.

Petitioners filed a Complaint alleging that

Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro
indiviso of a parcel of land in Las Pinas. Invoking
Art. 494 of the Civil Code, petitioners prayed for
the partition and award to them of 1/5 of the land.
They alleged that Agatona was the original owner
and upon her death, her children inherited the
land. Respondents have been in possession of the
land for as long as they can remember and
petitioners were the only descendants not
occupying any portion of the property.

Most respondents entered into a compromise

agreement with petitioners. Under the Agreement,
trhey agreed that each group of heirs would
receive an equal share in the property.

The remaining respondents did not sign the

Agreement and one group (Jumaquio sisters)
actively opposed petitioners claim. They alleged
that Navarro (the mother of Agatona) sold the
property to their mother (Enriquita LopezJumaquio). The Jumaquio sisters presented
provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 for the year
1949 in the sole name of Navarro. In addition, the
Tax Declarations stated that the houses of Agatona
and Enriquita stood on the property as
improvements. The sisters also presented a
notarized Kasulatan (Deed of Sale) dated October
11, 1957 in favor of Enriquita and signed by
Navarro. The Clerk of Court of RTC Manila certified
that the Kasulatan was notarized by the notary
public for the City of Manila Atty. Andrada on
October 11, 1957 and entered in his Notarial
Register. Because they were in peaceful possession
of their portion of the property for more than 30
years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive
prescription against petitioners and charged the
petitioners of laches.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that the

Kasulata was void, even absent evidence attacking
its validity. Thus even if there was no
countervailing proof adduced to impugn the
documents validity, it was null and void because
the property was conjugal property and no

CA reversed the RTC. Petitioners in their appellees

brief presented for the first time a supposed
photocopy of Agatonas death certificate showing
that her mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo.
They also attached an affidavit from Benjamin de
la Cruz, Sr. stating that he only knew Navarro by
name and never met her personally. On the basis
of these documents, petitioners assailed the
genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan. The
CA refused to take cognizance of the death
certificate and affidavit on the ground that they
never formally offered the documents in evidence.
The CA also held that they were bound by their
admission that Navarro was the original of the
Property. The CA further held that the RTC erred in
assuming that the property was conjugal in nature
when Navarro sold it.2

Issue: Whether petitioners were able to prove, by the

requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a
co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to
demand for its partition? No.
Held: Petition denied.
We review the factual and legal issues of this
case in light of the general rules of evidence and the
burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this
Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue
has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the
course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden
of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must
produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendants. The concept of preponderance of
evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight,
or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition
to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on
the claim that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of
the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the
heir of her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise
2

It is a settled rule that the party who invokes the

presumption that all property of marriage belongs to the
conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coveture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to
prove that the subject property was acquired by Justina
Navarro during her marriage.
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of Court. To admit these documents now is contrary to

allege that the Property originally belonged to

Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from
Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As the
parties claiming the affirmative of these issues,
petitioners had the burden of proof to establish
their case by preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both
contending parties presented tax declarations and the
testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio
sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA
BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted petitioners claim
of co-ownership. The Kasulatan, being a document
acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document
and prima
facie evidence
of
its
authenticity and due execution. To assail the
authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document,
the
evidence
must
be
clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the
document should be upheld. The trial court itself held
that (n)o countervailing proof was adduced by
plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents
legality or its validity.[
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it
would be deemed an ancient document and thus still
presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more
than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and
(3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to
be genuine.
The trial courts conclusion that the Property
was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on
a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code. The
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies
only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. There was no evidence presented to
establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her
marriage. There is no basis for applying the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the
present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No.
911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property
was declared solely in Navarros name. This tends to
support the argument that the Property was not
conjugal.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
admitting
the
documents
presented
by
petitioners for the first time on appeal
The CA was correct in refusing to give any
probative value to the alleged death certificate of
Guevarra and the affidavit of dela Cruz. Petitioners
belatedly attached these documents to their appellees
brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these
documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents
for the first time on appeal without any explanation.
For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally
offer in evidence these documents before the trial
court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules

due process, as it deprives respondents of the

opportunity to examine and controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were
admitted, they would not controvert Navarros
ownership of the Property. These documents do not
prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that
Navarro did not own the Property. Petitioners admitted
before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of
Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the
Court of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of
Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this
constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When
a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he
cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to
do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence
of greater weight which petitioners failed to
refute by clear and convincing evidence, this
Court holds that petitioners were not able to
prove by preponderance of evidence that the
Property belonged to Guevarras estate. There is
therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint
for partition of the Property.
Y. CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION
DATALIFT MOVERS v. BELGRAVIA REALTY
Facts: PNR owned a lot which it leased out to
Sampaguita Borkerage, Inc. Sampaguita thereafter
entered into a special arrangement with its sister
company, Belgravia Realty & Development Corp.
whereby Belgravia would put up on the lot a
warehouse for its own use. Belgarvia did put up a
warehouse. However, instead of using the said
warehouse for its own use, Belgravia sublet it to
petitioner Datalift Movers for a period of 1 year. By the
terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a monthly
rental of P40,000.00 payable on or before the 15 th day
of each month, provided an advance rental for two (2)
months is paid upon execution of the contract.
After the expiration of the contract, Datalift
continued
to
occupy
the
property,
evidently
by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or
by
verbal
understanding
of
the
parties.
Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally
increased
the
monthly rental to P60,000.00. Monthly rental was
again increased fromP60,000.00 to P130,000.00.
Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia,
Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the
warehouse.
Thereafter, Sampaguita
addressed
demand
letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in
arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to vacate
and surrender the warehouse in dispute. Since Datalift
failed to pay, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed a
complaint for ejectment with MeTC against Datalift
and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime Aquino.

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witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling

MeTC ruled in favor of Belgravia. It

also rejected
the
defendants
challenge
against Belgravias title over the PNR lot occupied by
the subject warehouse. In their appeal, Datalift and
Aquino questioned the MeTCs finding that there was
an implied new lease between PNR and Sampaquita on
the lot on which the warehouse in question stands, and
accordingly fault the same court for ordering them to
vacate the same warehouse and to pay rentals as well
as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. RTC and CA
affirmed MeTCs ruling.
Issue: Whether
Datalift
can
question Belgravias
ownership over the property NO.
Held: The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields
respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned
by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or
better right of possession as lessor because having
admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship,
the
petitioners
are
barred
from
assailing Belgravia's title of better right of possession
as their lessor.
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC.
2. Conclusive
presumptions. -- The following are instances
of conclusive presumptions:
xxx
(b)
The
tenant
is
not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between
them.
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as
inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it
will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary
proof however strong. As long as the lessor-lessee
relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia
exists as in this case, the former, as lessees, cannot by
any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive
presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better
right of possession to the subject leased premises than
they have.
Side note: The Court found that it was superfluous on
the part of the MeTC to rule on the source or validity
ofBelgravia's title or right of possession over the leased
premises as against the petitioners as lessees in this
case. If at all, Belgravia's title or right of possession
should only be taken cognizance of in a proper case
between PNR and Belgravia, but not in the present
case (which is between Belgravia and Datalift).
Z. ADVERSE PARTY WITNESS
CHUA GAW V SUY BEN CHUA AND FELISA CHUA
Ratio: that the witness is the adverse party does not
necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that
it was at his instance that his adversary was put on the

party may impeach an adverse witness in all respects

as if he had been called by the adverse party, except
by evidence of his bad character. Under the rule
permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness,
although the calling party does not vouch for the
witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his
testimony if it is not contradicted or remains
unrebutted.
FACTS: Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the
founders of three business enterprises namely:
Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and
Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had 7 children:
Santos chua, Suy Ben Chua, Chua Suy Phen; Chua
Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. When Chua
Chin died, he left his wife Chan Chi and his 7 children
as his only surviving heirs. At the time of his death,
the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was 415,487.20. On
December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of
Hereditary rights in Favor of a Co-Heir (Deed of
Partition), wherein the heirs settled their interest in
Hagonoy Lumber. In the said document, Chan Chi and
the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce
and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor
of their co-heir Chua Sioc Huan.
In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw
and her husband, Antonio Gaw (Spouses Gaw), asked
respondent Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P 200,000 to
be used for the construction of their house in Marilao,
Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be
payable within six (6) months without interest. Suy
Ben issued a check in the amount of P200,000.00 to
the couple. The spouses defaulted for which, Suy Ben
filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money before the RTC.
During trial, the spouses Gaw called Suy Ben
to testify as adverse witness under Rule 132 Section
10. On direct examination, Suy Ben testified that
Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his
parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both
Chinese citizens. He said that, initially, his father
leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently
located from his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his
father constructed the two-storey concrete building
standing thereon. According to Suy Bien, when he was
in highschool, it was his father who managed the
business but he and his other siblings were helping
him. Later, his sister, Sioc Huan, managed Hagonoy
Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters.
He stated that he also managed Hagonoy when he was
in high school, but he stopped when he got married
and found another job. He said that he now owns the
lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating.
On cross-examination, Concepcion explained
that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill
when he sold shares of stock to other Stockholders on
Jan 1, 1991. He further testified that Sioc Huan
acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of
Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He in
turn became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he
bought the same from Sioc Huan through a Deed of
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mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the entirety of the

Sale dated August 1, 1990. On re-direct examination,

Concepcion stated that he sold shares of stock in
Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he
received in cash. He also paid the purchase price of
225,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which
payment was not covered by a separate receipt as he
merely delivered the same to Sioc Huan at her house
in Paso de Blas Valenzuela. Although he maintains
several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng
Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Sioc
Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the
amount in the house because he was engaged in
rediscounting checks of people from the public market.
Prior to the RTC Decision, Antonio Gaw died die
to cardio vascular and respiratory failure. RTC then
ruled in favor of Suy Ben stating that the latter is
entitled to the payment of 200,000 pesos with interest.
Concepcion appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed. MR
filed but denied as well.
Concepcion contends in the present petition for
review on certiorari that her case was unduly
prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the Suy Bens
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination
by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Concepcion
argues that the adverse witess testimony elicted
during cross-examination should not be considered as
evidence of the calling party.
Issue: Whether or not the adverse witness testimony
elicited during cross-examination should be considered
as evidence of the calling party. NO.

Held: A party who calls his adversary as a witness is,

therefore, not bound by the latter's testimony only in
the sense that he may contradict him by introducing
other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that
the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound
by his testimony does not mean that such testimony
may not be given its proper weight, but merely that
the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting
his testimony or from impeaching him. This, petitioner
Concepcion failed to do.
In the present case, the petitioner, by her own
testimony, failed to discredit the respondent's
testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole
property. The petitioner admitted having signed the
Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of
the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary.
On cross-examination, she confessed that no other
document was executed to indicate that the transfer of
the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary
arrangement. She declared that, after their mother
died in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning
Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim
in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim
over the business.
Due process requires that in reaching a
decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence
presented. All the parties to the case, therefore, are
considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable
effects resulting from the evidence. As already

evidence presented will be considered, regardless of

the party who offered them in evidence. In this light,
the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of
evidence was properly attributed to one party, but
whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight
by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is
evidence in the case and should be given its proper
weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the
other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict
his testimony.
AA.PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
SUERTE-FELIPE V PEOPLE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
(also has testimonial evidence -omitted)
FACTS: RTC found Felipe guilty of homicide after
having shot to death Ariate. The prosecutions
witnesses consisted of Alumbres, William Ariate and
Bgy Chairman Arce who all saw the shooting, Edgardo
Ariate who ordered his autopsy and Dr. Lagat who
performed the autopsy on Ariate who sustained 3
gunshot wounds.
In Felipes version Ariate allegedly repeatedly stabbed
him which was why he had to defend himself and
accidentally shot him. He also presented a street
vendor to corroborate his story.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Felipe filed a
petition for review questioning the rulings on two
basis: the physical evidence and the testimonial
evidence.
Physical Evidence
1. W/N it was Ariates body which was autopsied
by Dr. Lagat? YES
2. Assuming it was, W/N the slug recovered from
the fatal wound caused his death? YES, 2nd
and 3rd wounds were both fatal (he was
arguing that he caused 2nd wound)
3. Assuming it did, W/N the slug came from
Felipes firearm? YES but the evidence was not
conclusive but found that the bullet came from
a .45mm and he was the only one carrying
that weapon the circumstantial evidence
presented with the other evidence was
sufficient to prove that the slug came from
him.
Whether the autopsied body was that of
Godofredo Ariate
Felipe claims that Dr. Lagats testimony failed
to prove that the body autopsied was that of Ariate
since the request for autopsy and the Cert of
Identification of Dead body was only referred to him,
they didnt personally know the deceased and no
relative was around to identify the body during
autopsy.
CA said that the records clearly show that it
was Ariate since the body was identified by
Godofredos son, Edgardo. Also the pictures of
Godofredos body taken during the autopsy, likewise
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establish the identity of the victim. Moreover, the

entries found in the assailed Autopsy Report should be
deemed prima facieevidence of the facts stated
therein, as there had been no proof of any intent on
the part of Dr. Lagat to falsely testify on the identity of
the victims body.
SC: Affirm CAs findings. The presentation in
evidence of the Certificate of Identification of Dead
Body being a public record made in the performance of
a duty of officers in the Medico-Legal Office of the
National Bureau of Investigation, is governed by Rule
132, Sections 19 and 23 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of
their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

Public documents are: (c) Public records, kept in

the Philippines, of private documents required by
law
to
be
entered
therein.
xxxx
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.
So
the
entries
in
the
Certificate
of
Identification of Dead Body are deemed prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein, i.e., that a body
has been properly identified as that of Godofredo
Ariate. There was no indication of any impropriety or
irregularity committed by Dr. Lagat. His duty was to
perform the autopsy and not to obsessively investigate
the authenticity of the signature appearing on all
requests presented to him. So Dr. Lagat, as a medicolegal officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity in
the performance of his duties.
BB. FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVT CORP.
VS CIR.
FACTS: ATLAS filed a VAT return for the first quarter of
1993 and subsequently, applied with the BIR for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund for such
VAT paid.
CTA: Denied the application for tax credit or
refund for insufficiency of evidence as ATLAS did not
comply with the submission of the necessary
documents as mandated by RR 3-88.
CA: Denied. ATLAS failure to submit necessary
documents in accordance to RR 3-88 is fatal to the
application for tax credit or refund, for, without these
documents, Atlas VAT export sales indicated in its
amended VAT return and the creditable or refundable
input VAT could not be ascertained.
ISSUE: W/N ATLAS has sufficiently proven entitlement
to a tax credit or refund. NO.

Evidence

RATIO: Sec. 34 of Rule 132, Revised Rules on

Evidence, is clear that no evidence which has not
been formally offered shall be considered. ATLAS
has failed to meet the burden of proof required in
order to establish the factual basis of its claim for a tax
credit or refund. Where the receipts and the export
documents purportedly showing the VAT paid
by Atlas were not submitted, the court could not
determine the authenticity of the input VAT Atlas has
paid. The most competent evidence must be adduced
and presented to prove the allegations in a complaint,
petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where
the best evidence cannot be submitted, secondary
evidence may be presented. In this case, the pertinent
documents which are the best pieces of evidence were
not presented.
In
addition,
the
summary
presented
by Atlas does not replace the pertinent documents as
competent evidence to prove the fact of refundable or
creditable input VAT. These documents are the best
and competent pieces of evidence required to
substantiate Atlas claim for tax credit or refund.
As tax refunds are in the nature of tax
exemptions and construed strictly against the
taxpayer, it is improper to allow ATLAS to simply
prevail and compel a tax credit or refund in the
amount it claims without proving the amount of its
claim.

DIZON V CTA
Facts: Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a
petition for the probate was filed with the RTC. The
probate court then appointed retired SC Justice Dizon
and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon (petitioner)
as Special and Assistant Special Administrator,
respectively, of the Estate of Jose (Estate). Justice
Dizon
informed respondent Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of the special
proceedings for the Estate.
Justice Dizon authorized Atty. Jesus M.
Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of
the Estate the required estate tax return. Atty.
Gonzales filed the estate tax return with the BIR
Regional Office, showing therein a NIL (ZERO) estate
tax liability.
However, the Assistant Commissioner for
Collection of the BIR, Montalban, issued Estate Tax
Assessment Notice, demanding the payment of
P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax.
Atty. Gonzales moved for the reconsideration
of the said estate tax assessment. However, in her
letter, the BIR Commissioner denied the request and
reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of
P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax. Dizon filed a
petition for review before the CTA.
During the trial before the CTA, the BIRs
counsel presented one witness in the person of Alberto
Enriquez, who was one of the revenue examiners who
conducted the investigation on the estate tax case of
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witness stand. Alberto identified these pieces

the late Jose P. Fernandez. In the course of the direct

examination of the witness, he identified a number of
documentary evidence.
Dizon contends that the evidence should not
have been admitted because there was no formal offer
of evidence.
The CTA, relying on the case of Vda. de Oate,
ruled that the evidence was admissible despite lack of
a formal offer stating:
Although
the
above-mentioned
documents were not formally offered
as
evidence
for
respondent,
considering that respondent has been
declared
to
have
waived
the
presentation thereof during the hearing
on March 20, 1996, still they could be
considered as evidence for respondent
since they were properly identified
during the presentation of respondent's
witness, whose testimony was duly
recorded as part of the records of this
case. Besides, the documents marked
as respondent's exhibits formed part of
the BIR records of the case.
Issue (Only REM issue discussed. The rest are
Tax issues): Is a formal offer of evidence
required? -YES
Ratio:
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of
Vda. de Oate, which reiterated this Court's
previous rulings in People v. Napat-a and
People v. Mate on the admission and
consideration of exhibits which were not
formally offered during the trial.
In Vda. de Oate, it was held that from
the foregoing provision, it is clear that for
evidence to be considered, the same must be
formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that
a particular document is identified and marked
as an exhibit does not mean that it has already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v.
Mate, the forgoing rule was relaxed and
evidence not formally offered was allowed
to be admitted and considered by the trial
court provided the following requirements
were present, viz.: first, the same must
have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must
have been incorporated in the records of
the case.
This exception may be applied only
when there is strict compliance with the
requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, the
general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court should prevail.
In this case, these requirements have
not been satisfied. The assailed pieces of
evidence were presented and marked during
the trial particularly when Alberto took the

of evidence in his direct testimony. He was also

subjected to cross-examination and re-cross
examination by petitioner. But Albertos
account and the exchanges between Alberto
and Dizon did not sufficiently describe the
contents of the said pieces of evidence
presented by the BIR. In fact, Dizon sought
that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc, be summoned to testify, inasmuch as
Alberto was incompetent to answer questions
relative to the working papers. The lead
examiner never testified. Moreover, while
Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's
evidence was duly recorded, the BIR
documents themselves were not incorporated
in the records of the case.
Furthermore, The Court in Constantino
v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal
offer of one's evidence is deemed waived
after failing to submit it within a
considerable period of time. It explained
that the court cannot admit an offer of
evidence made after a lapse of three (3)
months because to do so would "condone
an
inexcusable
laxity
if
not
noncompliance with a court order which, in
effect, would encourage needless delays
and derail the speedy administration of
justice."
In this case, the BIR failed to appear at
several hearings. It also failed to file its
respective memorandum. In all of these
proceedings, BIR was duly notified. It can be
said that the BIR has waived presentation of
its evidence.
CC. TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
CRUZ-AREVALO V. QUERUBIN-LAYOSA

Facts: Josefina Cruz-Arevalo filed an administrative

complaint against Judge Querubin-Layosa (judge) for
manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law
relative to a civil case entitled Cruz-Arevalo and
Conrado Cruz v. Home Development Mutual Fund.
Conrado Cruz executed an authorization letter
and SPA in her favor to represent him in the said civil
case while Conrado undergoes a medical treatment in
the USA. Notwithstanding the presentation of said
letter and SPA, the judge declared Cruz non-suited due
to his absence during pre-trial.
The judge also
excluded several paragraphs in the Affidavit which was
adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without
giving her counsel a chance to comment on the
objections raised by Cruz-Arevalo. Moreover, she
refused to issue a written order excluding certain
paragraphs
thus
depriving
Cruz-Arevalo
the
opportunity to file certiorari proceedings. Cruz-Arevalo
prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure
impartiality. The judge inhibited herself from trying the
case.
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irrelevant, or otherwise improper. Objections based on

The judge explained that the letter presented

by Cruz-Arevalo is defective because it was not
notarized and authenticated. The SPA is also defective
because it gave Cruz-Arevalo the authority to receive
Cruzs contribution to the PAG-IBIG fund and not to
represent him in the case. As regards the exclusion of
several paragraphs in the Affidavit constituting as the
direct testimony of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., the
judge points out that she gave the other party the
chance to go over the affidavit and make objections
thereto like any direct testimonial evidence. She
claims that no written order is necessary as demanded
by complainants counsel because her rulings were
made in open court during the course of trial and are
already reflected in the transcript of the stenographic
notes.
Office of the Court Administrator found the
accusations unmeritorious and recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case for lack of merit.
Issue: W/N Judge Querubin-Layosa
administratively liable. - NO.

should

be

Held: While non-appearance of a party may be

excused if a duly authorized representative shall
appear in his behalf, however Cruz failed to validly
constitute complainant because his authorization letter
and SPA were not respectively authenticated and
specific as to its purpose. Without any authorized
representative, the failure of Cruz to appear at the pretrial made him non-suited. Respondent judge thus
correctly dismissed the complaint in so far as he is
concerned.
As regards the exclusion of certain
paragraphs in the affidavit of complainants
witness, the rule is that evidence formally
offered by a party may be admitted or excluded
by the court. If a partys offered documentary or
object evidence is excluded, he may move or
request that it be attached to form part of the
record of the case. If the excluded evidence is
oral, he may state for the record the name and
other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony. These
procedures are known as offer of proof or tender
of excluded evidence and are made for purposes
of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually
rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal
assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence.
The appellate court will better understand and
appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence
involved is included in the record of the case.
On the other hand, the ruling on an objection
must be given immediately after an objection is made,
as what respondent judge did, unless the court desires
to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the
question presented; but the ruling shall always be
made during the trial and at such time as will give the
party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet
the situations presented by the ruling. Respondent
judge correctly ordered the striking out of portions in
Atty. Arevalos affidavit which are incompetent,

irrelevancy and immateriality need no specification or

explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a
matter of logic, since it is determined simply by
ascertaining its logical connection to a fact in issue in
the case.
Finally, complainant failed to present evidence
to show the alleged bias of respondent judge; mere
suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough.
DD.

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE

RAYMUNDO et al. (debtors) v. LUNARIA et al.

(creditors/ commission agent)
FACTS: There are two agreements to remember in
this case: (1) the written Exclusive Authority to Sell in
favor of Lunaria et al.; and (2) a Subsequent Verbal
Agreement.
Petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to
help them find a buyer for their property. Respondent
Lunaria was promised a 5% agent's commission in the
event that he finds a buyer. Eventually, respondents
found a buyer and a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed. Later on, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the
co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank to
receive partial payment of their total commission.
Version of respondent-creditors: Pursuant to
the written Exclusive Authority to Sell, respondents
(Lunaria et al.) went to the bank to claim their full
commission. However, they were told that the check
covering the balance of their commission was already
given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo,
the representative of the petitioners. Respondents
tried to get the check from the petitioners, however,
they were told that there is nothing more due them by
way of commission as they have already divided and
distributed the balance of the commissions among
their nephews and nieces.
Version of petitioner-debtors: For their part,
petitioners counter that there was a subsequent
verbal agreement entered into by the parties after
the execution of the written agreement, and hence
there is no more balance due to respondent Lunaria.
Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agent's
commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the
agents, 2/5 for Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the
buyer, Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo
shall be in consideration for the help she would extend
in the processing of documents of sale of the property,
the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and in securing an order from the
court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the
other hand, will be used by him for the payment of
realty taxes. [Note: the latter part of the case would
show that the lower court rendered a decision against
the petitioner-debtors herein allegedly because they
failed to prove this subsequent verbal agreement by
means of more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. Petitioner Raymundos argue that this is
plainly contrary to law, which merely requires
preponderance of evidence in civil cases].
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presented as witness to corroborate the claim of the

Now, for failure of the respondents to receive

the balance of their agent's commission, they filed an
action for the collection of a sum of money.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in

requiring the petitioners to establish the verbal
agreement modifying the earlier written agreement
(the exclusive authority to sell) by more than a
preponderance of evidence. (NO. Petitioners claim
is without merit)
HELD: As to the second issue, petitioners contend
that the appellate court erred in requiring them to
prove the existence of the subsequent verbal
agreement by more than a mere preponderance of
evidence since no rule of evidence requires them to do
so. In support of this allegation, petitioners presented
petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she
was given 2/5 share of the commission pursuant to the
verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the
payment of the capital gains tax, the preparation of
the documents of sale and of securing an authority
from the court to sell the property.
For their part, respondents counter that the
appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the
existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more
than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the
appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to
prove and establish the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners' abovecited allegation has no merit.
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the
evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to
that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence". It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
Both the appellate court and trial court ruled
that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not
sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent
verbal agreement was entered into by the parties. In
fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes
Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5 share of the
agent's commission for the purpose of assisting
respondent Lunaria in the documentation requirement,
then why did the petitioners not present any written
court order on her authority, tax receipt or sales
document to support her self-serving testimony?
Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the
commission sharing was unilaterally prepared by
petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that
respondents participated in the preparation thereof or
gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of
1/5 of the commission to the buyer to be used in the
payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence
since the payment of realty taxes is the obligation of
the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the said
sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to the
wishes of the buyer, then he should have been

petitioners. However, he was not.

EE. CORPUS DELICTI

RIMORIN V. PEOPLE
(Corpus delicti in its legal sense refers to the fact of
the commission of the crime, not to the physical body
of the deceased or to the ashes of a burned building or
-- as in the present case -- to the smuggled cigarettes.
The corpus delicti may be proven by the credible
testimony of a sole witness, not necessarily by
physical evidence such as those aforementioned.)
FACTS:
Col. Panfilo Lacson received information that
certain syndicated groups were engaged in
smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area,
Manila. He fielded three surveillance stake-out
teams the following night along Roxas Boulevard
and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby
they were to watch out for a cargo truck bound for
Malabon. Nothing came out of it. On the basis of
his investigation, it was discovered that the truck
was registered in the name of Teresita Estacio of
Pasay City.
Col. Lacson and his men returned to the same
area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the
immediate vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment
in Port Area, Manila, because as per information
given to him, the said cargo truck will come out
from the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment
in said place. No truck came.
The next morning, a green cargo truck came out
from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and
escorted closely by a light brown Toyota Corona
car with 4 men on board. At that time, Lt. Col.
Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever
about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his
men to intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo
truck was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that
the Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly
made a sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the
cargo truck which was going south. Almost by
impulse, Col. Lacsons car also made a U-turn and
gave chase to the speeding Toyota car. The chase
lasted for less than 5 minutes, until said car made
a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan
Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car
and they found several firearms.
When the cargo truck was searched, 305 cases of
blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside
said truck in possession of Rimorin.
RTC convicted petitioner of smuggling. CA
affirmed. The CA, however, found no sufficient
evidence against the other co-accused who, unlike
petitioner, were not found to be in possession of
any blue seal cigarettes. Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of
smuggling under the Tariff and Customs Code,
because respondent failed to present the seized
contraband cigarettes in court. Equating the actual
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whom Conchita introduced as her nephew, came in.

physical evidence -- the 305 cases of blue seal

cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti, he urges this
Court to rule that the failure to present it was fatal
to respondents cause.
ISSUE: W/N it was necessary to present the seized
goods to prove the corpus delicti. NO.

HELD/RATIO: Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the

commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not
refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom or to the body of the person murdered.
Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for
the prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact
has been proven -- say, a person has died or a building
has been burned; and (2) a particular person is
criminally responsible for the act.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the
commission of the crime, the Court has ruled that even
a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible,
may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus
delicti
had
been
competently
established
by
respondents evidence, which consisted of the
testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody
Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the
confiscated goods.
Col. Panfilo Lacsons testimony on the
apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure of the
blue seal cigarettes was clear and straightforward.
Moreover, it is well-settled that findings of fact
of lower courts are binding on this Court, absent any
showing that they overlooked or misinterpreted facts
or circumstances of weight and substance. This
doctrine applies particularly to this case in which the
RTCs findings, as far as petitioner is concerned, were
affirmed by the appellate court.
FF. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE V. QUIZON
FACTS: Conchita Pasquin was found dead in her office
at Suarez Travel Services. The trial court found Johnny
Quizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt for robbery
with homicide with a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
testimony of the prosecutions witnesses showed that
at around 1pm to 2pm of Sept. 5, 1997, Rowena Abril,
a secretary of the adjacent office, heard loud noises
coming from Conchitas office. 25 minutes after, she
saw a Quizon walking hurriedly who came from
Conchitas office. At 4:30pm, she went to see Conchita
but the main door was closed and since nobody
opened the door, she decided to leave.
At lunch time that day, Myla Miclat together
with her live-in partner Roel Sicangco went to see
Conchita to hand over 17,000 pesos in payment for
Mylas round trip plane fare. While they were inside
Conchitas
office,
Johnny Quizon,

Conchita told Myla that her nephew was a former drug

addict, and that she was helping him mend his
ways. Quizon was present when Myla gave the money
to Conchita. Conchita told Myla that she was going to
purchase the ticket and instructed her to return later
that day to pick it up. When Myla returned at 7pm, she
knocked at the door but nobody answered. The
following
day
around
5:30am,
Myla returned
to Conchitas
office.
Again,
nobody
was
in
sight. Myla went to the agencys neighbor to inquire if
there was someone inside the office. The neighbor
climbed, peeped inside and saw a body covered with a
blanket. The policemen forced open the door and found
the body of Conchita wrapped with a white blanket.
Conchitas jewelry
box
and
the
money
paid
by Myla were missing.
Quizon was not found and he never showed up
in the wake and did not attend the burial.
The
trial
court
held
that
based
on
circumstantial evidence, Quizon is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstances clearly made an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
The accused appealed. The OSG averred that the
existence of every bit of circumstantial evidence was
not satisfactorily established.
ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence
found by the trial court could produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt NO!
RATIO: Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that for circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient for conviction, it must be
shown that (a) that there is more than one
circumstance and the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been firmly established and (b) that
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The foregoing elements must all be obtaining
in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an accused.
The circumstances proved must be congruous with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilt.
A
judgment
of
conviction
based
on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person.
In this case, the circumstances recited by the
trial court would be insufficient to create in the mind of
the Court a moral certainty that appellant was the one
responsible for the commission of the crime. Quizons
mere
presence
at
the locus criminis would
be
inadequate to implicate him in the commission of the
crime. No evidence was adduced that Quizon was the
last person to see or talk to the victim before she was
killed. Furthermore, even while the trial court had
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observed that Conchitas jewelry and money were

never found, no evidence was introduced that Quizon
had them, or that he had them in his possession at
anytime after Conchitas death. The fact that Quizon
did not attend Conchitas wake is not an indication of
either flight or guilt. He was warned against going to
the wake after he earned the ire of their relatives who
had suspected him to be the killer. Significantly, no illmotive was ascribed on Quizon to either kill or rob his
own aunt.
The circumstances recited by the trial court
might be enough to create some kind of suspicion on
the part of the trial court of appellants involvement,
but suspicion is not enough to warrant conviction. A
finding of guilt based on conjecture, even if likely,
cannot satisfy the need for evidence required for a
pronouncement of guilt, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the complicity in the crime. No matter how
weak the defense is, it is still imperative for the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. An accused has the right to be
presumed innocent, and this presumption prevails until
and unless it is overturned by competent and credible
evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
case of any reservation against the guilt of accused,
the Court should entertain no other alternative but to
acquit him.
Therefore, Quizon is acquitted.

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