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Case Digest of Dy Vs Ca
Case Digest of Dy Vs Ca
Case Digest of Dy Vs Ca
, and
ANTONIO V. GONZALES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 92989 July 8, 1991
FACTS:
Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck and a farm tractor through LIBRA which was also
mortgaged with the latter, as a security to the loan.
Petitioner, expresses his desire to purchased his brothers tractor in a letter to LIBRA
which also includes his intention to shoulder its mortgaged. LIBRA approved the
request. At the time that Wilfredo Dy executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
petitioner, the tractor and truck were in the possession of LIBRA for his failure to pay
the amortization.
When petitioner finally fulfilled its obligation to pay the tractor, LIBRA would only
release the same only if he would also pay for the truck. In order to fulfill LIBRAs
condition, petitioner convinced his sister to pay for the remaining truck, to which
she released a check amounting to P22,000. LIBRA however, insisted that the check
must be first cleared before it delivers the truck and tractor.
Meanwhile, another case penned Gelac Trading Inc vs. Wilfredo Dy was pending in
Cebu as a case to recover for a sum of money (P12,269.80). By a writ of execution
the court in Cebu ordered to seize and levy the tractor which was in the premise of
LIBRA, it was sold in a public auction to which it was purchased by GELAC. The latter
then sold the tractor to Antonio Gonzales.
RTC rendered in favor of petitioner.
CA dismissed the case, alleging that it still belongs to Wilfredo Dy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a consummated sale between Petitioner and LIBRA?
HELD:NO. The mortgagor who gave the property as security under a chattel
mortgage did not part with the ownership over the same. He had the right to sell it
although he was under the obligation to secure the written consent of the
mortgagee. And even if no consent was obtained from the mortgagee, the validity
of the sale would still not be affected.
Article 1496 of the Civil Code states that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired
by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in
Articles 1497 to 1501 or in any other manner signing an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. In the instant case, actual
delivery of the subject tractor could not be made. However, there was constructive
delivery already upon the execution of the public instrument pursuant to Article
1498 and upon the consent or agreement of the parties when the thing sold cannot
be immediately transferred to the possession of the vendee.
The payment of the check was actually intended to extinguish the mortgage
obligation so that the tractor could be released to the petitioner. It was never
intended nor could it be considered as payment of the purchase price because the
relationship between Libra and the petitioner is not one of sale but still a mortgage.
The clearing or encashment of the check which produced the effect of payment
determined the full payment of the money obligation and the release of the chattel
mortgage. It was not determinative of the consummation of the sale. The
transaction between the brothers is distinct and apart from the transaction between
Libra and the petitioner. The contention, therefore, that the consummation of the
sale depended upon the encashment of the check is untenable.
Hardware. Petitioner herein opposed the motion with respect to the 100 sheets that
he had bought from Soto. Notwithstanding the opposition, the court ordered the
return of the galvanized iron sheets to Ong Shu. Petitioner then presented a motion
to reconsider the order, alleging that by the return thereof to the offended party,
the court had not only violated the contract of deposit, because it was in that
concept that petitioner had delivered the 100 sheets to the Manila Police
Department, and that said return to Ong Shu amounted to a deprivation of his
property without due process of law. It is also claimed that Article 105 of the
Revised Penal Code, under whose authority the return was ordered, can be invoked
only after the termination of the criminal case and not while said criminal case is
still pending trial.
The court having given no heed to these protests on the part of the petitioner, the
latter brought the present petition to this Court alleging that the order of the
respondent judge constitutes a deprivation of petitioner's property without due
process of law, violating the contract of deposit under which the sheets were
delivered to the police department of the City of Manila, and determining the
respective rights of petitioner and respondent Ong Shu without a previous trial of
the criminal case all of which constitute a grave abuse of discretion and excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to make good tge price would rescind the sale
HELD: No.
It can not be assumed at this stage of the proceedings that respondent Ong Shu is
still the owner of the property; to do so it take for granted that the estafa was in fact
committed, when so far, the trial on the merits has not even started, and the
presumption of innocence holds full sway.
The civil liability of the offender to make restitution, under Art. 105 of the Revised
Penal Code, does not arise until his criminal liability is finally declared, since the
former is a consequence of the latter. Art. 105 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore,
can not be invoked to justify the order of the court below, since that very article
recognizes the title of an innocent purchaser when it says:
But even if the articles in dispute had not been acquired in a market, fair or
merchant's store, still, so far as disclosed, the facts do not justify a finding that the
owner, respondent Ong Shu, was illegally deprived of the iron sheets, at least in so
far as appellant was concerned. It is not denied that Ong Shu delivered the sheets
to Soto upon a perfected contract of sale, and such delivery transferred title or
ownership to the purchaser. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the
vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in
articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the
ownership to revest in the seller until and unless the bilateral contract of sale is first
rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article 1191 of the new Civil Code.
And, assuming that the consent of Ong Shu to the sale in favor of Sotto was
obtained by the latter through fraud or deceit, the contract was not thereby
rendered void ab initio, but only voidable by reason of the fraud,.
Hence, until the contract of Ong Shu with Sotto is set aside by a competent court
(assuming that the fraud is established to its satisfaction), the validity of appellant's
claim to the property in question cannot be disputed, and his right to the possession
thereof should be respected.
It is no excuse that the respondent Ong Shu was required to post a redelivery bond.
An indemnity bond, while answering for damages, is not, by itself alone, sufficient
reason for disturbing property rights, whether temporarily or permanently. If the
invasion is not warranted, the filing of a bond will not make it justifiable.