Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division, and
Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division, and
legislative
intent
must
be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or
a particular provision alone.[6]
AISA's solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards finds support in
Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code, to wit:
"ART. 106. Contractor or Sub-Contractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with
another person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of
the latter's sub-contractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this code.
In the event that the contractor or sub-contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor
or sub-contractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in
the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him. xxx
ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise
apply to any person, partnership association or corporation which, nor being an employer,
contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
ART. 109. Solidary Liability. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding,
every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent
of their civil liability under the Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers."
The joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the
Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including the statutory minimum
wage.[7] The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer, while
the principal becomes the indirect employer of the former's employees for the purpose
of paying their wages in the event of failure of the contractor to pay them. This gives the
workers ample protection consonant with the labor and social justice provisions of the
1987 Constitution.[8]
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that private respondents are the employees of
AISA. Neither is there any question that they were assigned to guard the premises of
DMMSU pursuant to the latter's security service agreement with AISA and that these
two entities paid their wage increases.
It is to be borne in mind that wages orders, being statutory and mandatory, cannot
be waived. AISA cannot escape liability since the law provides for the joint and solidary
liability of the principal and the contractor to protect the laborers. [9] Thus, the Court held
in the Eagle Security v. NLRC:[10]
"The solidary liability of PTSI and EAGLE, however, does not preclude the right of
reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid (See Article 1217, Civil Code). It is with
respect to this right of reimbursement that petitioners can find support in the aforecited
contractual stipulation and Wage Order provision.
The Wage Orders are explicit that payment of the increases are 'to be borne' by the principal or
client. 'To be borne', however, does not mean that the principal, PTSI in this case, would directly
pay the security guards the wage and allowance increases because there is no privity of contract
between them. The security guards' contractual relationship is with their immediate employer,
EAGLE. As an employer, EAGLE is tasked, among others, with the payment of their
wages. (See Article VII Sec. 3 of the Contract for Security Services, supra and Bautista v.
Inciong, G.R. No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 556).
Premises considered, the security guards' immediate recourse for the payment of the increases is
with their direct employer, EAGLE. However, in order for the security agency to comply with
the new wage and allowance rates it has to pay the security guards, the Wage Order made
specific provision to amend existing contracts for security services by allowing the adjustments
of the consideration paid by the principal to the security agency concerned. What the Wage
Orders require, therefore, is the amendment of the contract as to the consideration to cover the
service contractor's payment of the increases mandated. In the end, therefore, ultimate liability
for the payment of the increases rests with the principal." (Underscoring supplied)
Section 6 of RA 6727 merely provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a
salary differential, the liability of the principal and the contractor shall be joint and
several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code,
which refer to the prevailing standard minimum wage.
The Court finds that the NLRC acted correctly in holding petitioner jointly and
severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of the wage increases to private
respondents. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the NLRC
in arriving at the impugned decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the assailed resolution is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
B. G.R. No. 162059
FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UPCebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1,
2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner,
with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3 One of the projects of the OSRFI
was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the
Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a systemwide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
Office of the Ombudsman.6 The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to
the Sandiganbayan.7 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied with finality.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa
case? (2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with Salary Grade 27?
DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan reads: Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office. (2) While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who
are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court.
RATIONALE:
(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive
a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature.34 Evidently, from the provisions of Section
4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one
of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
(b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she
does not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed there by express provision
of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D.
No. 1606.
Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and
Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.
On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the
City of Naga a claim for refund of the following amounts, together with
interests thereon from the date of payments: To Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to
Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing the
difference between the amounts they paid under Section 3, Ordinance No. 4
of the City of Naga, i.e., P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They
alleged that under existing law, Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section
3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not take effect in 1970, the year it
was approved but in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval,
or in 1971, and that therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross
sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal
and should be refunded to them by the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So
private respondents filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga
(Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declared effective
only in the year following the year of its approval, that is, in 1971; to have
Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive and
arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners to refund
the sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes
complained of were paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the
sum of P1,000.00. Private respondents further prayed that the petitioners be
enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private
respondents were not "compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of
their taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the said ordinance was published
in accordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act No. 305
(Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth day
following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under
existing law the City of Naga is authorized to impose certain conditions to
secure and accomplish the collection of sales taxes in the most effective
manner. As special and affirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the
private respondents have no cause of action against them; that granting that
the collection of taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; that the
refund prayed for by the private respondents is untenable; that petitioners
Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and Treasurer of the
City of Naga, respectively are not proper parties in interest; that the private
respondents are estopped from questioning the validity and/or
constitutionality of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners
counterclaimed for P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged
unlawful and malicious filing of the claim against them, in such amount as
the court may determine.
During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and at the pre-trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits
of the case, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts: That on
June 15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360
entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a
sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of
Naga," which ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or
veto on June 25, 1970; that the ordinance was duly posted in the designated
places by the Secretary of the Municipal Board; that private respondents
voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but that
on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City Treasurer
who denied the same.
On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that
Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the
year following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971 and required the
petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they paid their
taxes to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe
Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding
interests from the filing of the complaint up to the reimbursement of the
amounts plus the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the
proceedings.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of
Naga, took effect in the quarter of the year of its approval, that is in July
1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, 1 as amended, otherwise
known as the Charter of the City of Naga, which, among others, provides that
"Each approved ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced on and after
the 10th day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said
ordinance ... ". They contend that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the
Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and was transmitted
to the City Mayor for his approval or veto on June 25, 1970 3 but it was not
acted upon by the City Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, said ordinance should have taken effect
after the 10th day following its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25,
1970. But because the ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect upon
its approval, it becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance No. 360
was deemed approved. According to the same Section 14 of Republic Act No.
305, "if within 10 days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor does not
return it with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance is deemed approved."
Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the City Mayor with his
veto or approval within 10 days after he received it on June 25, 1970, the
same was deemed approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June 25,
1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the petitioners claim that Ordinance
No. 360 became effective. They further contend that even under Section 2,
of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly provides:
"A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage
unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have
taken effect on June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day after its passage by
the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as earlier
explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the ordinance
was deemed approved because the ordinance itself provides that it shall take
Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax
ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing Section 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code. All that is mentioned therein is Section 9
which reads:
Section 9 All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations
or parts thereof, inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly.
The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section
2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is a well established principle in
statutory construction that a statute will not be construed as repealing prior
acts on the same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there
is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is
evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to
comprise itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject.
Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and
reasonable interpretation ... . 6 It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter-enactment and effectivity of
a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari materia.
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person
or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose
or object. 7 When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory
construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is because
enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are
supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the
passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with
reference thereto. 8 Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is
deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative
policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of
the old and they all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the
old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the
new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However,
when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be
reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the
legislative will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of the Republic Act No.
2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It
is one that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be
reconciled by applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised
aliens; hence, should be construed together. They averred that the benefit of
Section 15 of CA No. 473 should also be granted to the petitioners whose
father was granted naturalization under LOI No. 270. However, the RTC
issued an Order on April 27, 1999, denying their motion for reconsideration
for the following reasons: (a) although Commonwealth Act No. 473 and Letter
of Instructions No. 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they
do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children
of the applicant. Section 15 of CA No. 473 expressly provides for the effect of
the naturalization on the wife and children of the applicant while LOI No. 270
does not have any proviso to that effect; (b) LOI No. 270 clearly refers to
qualified individuals only. The rules and regulations promulgated by the
Committee established pursuant to LOI No. 270 and the amendments issued
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (LOI Nos. 292 and 491) clearly speak
of qualified individuals only; no proviso therein referred to its effect on the
wife and children of the individual; (c) Section 15 of CA No. 473 should not be
deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and, (d) the
application of the so-called pari materia rule of construction made by the
petitioners is misplaced, as what should be applied in the instant case is the
rule on strict construction of legislative grants or franchise. The court a
quostressed that legislative grants, whether they be of property, rights or
privileges, whether granted to corporations or individuals, must be strictly
construed against the grantee and in favor of the grantor.
Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assailing the court a
quos Order dismissing their petition outright and its Order denying their
motion for the reconsideration of the same.
The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holding that their petition
was insufficient. They assert that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, they
are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473, which provides
that minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were born in the
Philippines shall likewise be considered citizens thereof. They contend that
although LOI No. 270, under which the petitioners father was naturalized
does not contain a provision similar to Section 15 of CA No. 473, the latter
provision should be deemed incorporated therein. They point out that both
laws have the same purpose and objective, i.e., to grant Philippine
citizenship to qualified aliens permanently residing in the Philippines. The
petitioners invoke the rule that statutes in pari materia are to be read
together.[5] They posit that CA No. 473 and LOI No. 270 should be harmonized
and reconciled since all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the
same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, and should be
construed together as they constitute one law.[6]
The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of LOI No. 270 was to grant
the privilege of Philippine citizenship not only to qualified aliens but also to
their minor children who were born in the country. They assert that this is
apparent from paragraph 4-A thereof, which extends the option to adopt
Filipino names not only to qualified applicants for naturalization but also to
their wives and minor children. They submit that when then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted LOI No. 270, he must be presumed to have
been acquainted with the provisions of CA No. 473 and did not intend to
abrogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of Section 15 thereof;
otherwise, Pres. Marcos would have expressly repealed Section 15 of CA No.
473 in relation to LOI No. 270. Thus, according to the petitioners, the
naturalization of their father during their minority is an act or event affecting
their civil status that must be recorded in the Civil Register pursuant to
Article 407 of the Civil Code.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the court a quo did not
err in issuing the assailed orders. Contrary to the petitioners theory, LOI No.
270 and CA No. 473 are separate and distinct laws; therefore, are not
in pari materia. He points out that although LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 both
govern the naturalization of aliens, CA No. 473 deals with the requirements
and procedure for naturalization by judicial decree; LOI No. 270, on the other
hand, deals with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by
presidential decree.
The Solicitor General further asserts that the petitioners contention that the
naturalization of their father is an event affecting and concerning their civil
status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil Code has no legal basis. The
correction sought and allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court must be
one that reflects a fact existing before or at the time of birth. In the
petitioners case, the naturalization of their father in 1977 took place long
after they were born. Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, under LOI
No. 270 and its amendatory laws, the naturalization of a father did not ipso
facto render his children also naturalized. The petitioners thus cannot invoke
Article 407 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to avoid strict
compliance with the naturalization laws.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule on statutory construction provides that:
Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because
enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to
form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts
the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the
subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto.[7]
Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose
of an expressed national policy, thus:
On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in
mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that
in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those
prior statutes, and they all should be construed together. Provisions in an act
which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be
applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its
purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be
(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status but
also nationality.[11] The acts, events or factual errors envisaged in Article 407
of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of the
petitioner. However, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth will
not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the petition
shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil
register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. [12]
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from. To change means to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the
New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or
corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or
change may be.[13] Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but
also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein. [14]
The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries
in the civil register sought to be corrected are clerical or innocuous in
nature. However, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed are
substantial: i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the
citizenship of their parents,[15] the proceedings are adversarial in nature as
defined by this Court in Republic v. Valencia, thus:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes
an adoption proceeding.[16]
In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective defendants
are (a) the local civil registrar; and, (b) all persons who have claims any
interest which would be affected thereby.[17]
In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they are the
legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was naturalized as a Filipino citizen,
but that their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a Chinese
national. In view of their fathers naturalization, they pray that the entries in
their certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of their father be changed
from Chinese to Filipino.
The petitioners recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, being appropriate, it behooved the trial court to do its duty
under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, namely:
Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissing the petition or
issue an order granting the same. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in the certificates of birth of the petitioners. The
judgment of the court shall form part of the records of the local civil register.
[18]
In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright in violation of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Patently, then, the trial court erred in so doing.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the petition in Special
Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court docket, and ORDERED to continue
with the proceedings in the said case under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
as amended.
SO ORDERED.