Module Framework and

ROB
Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning
hours, ran to the market-place, and cried incessantly: "I am looking for
Framework! I am looking for Framework!" As many of those who did not
believe in Framework were standing together there, he excited considerable
laughter. Have you lost it, then? said one. Did it lose his way like a child? said
another. Or is it hiding? Is it afraid of us? Has it gone on a voyage? or
emigrated? Thus they shouted and laughed. The madman sprang into their
midst and pierced them with his glances.
"Where has Framework gone?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed it you and I. We are its murderers. But how have we done this? How were we
able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire
horizon? What did we do when we unchained the earth from its sun? Whither
is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we
not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is
there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing?
Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is it not
more and more night coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the
morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who
are burying Framework? Do we not smell anything yet of Framework's
decomposition? Frameworks too decompose. Framework is dead. Framework
remains dead. And we have killed it. How shall we, murderers of all
murderers, console ourselves? That which was the holiest and mightiest of all
that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives. Who
will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify ourselves? What
festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we need to invent? Is not
the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become
gods simply to be worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and
whosoever shall be born after us - for the sake of this deed he shall be part of
a higher history than all history hitherto."
Here the madman fell silent and again regarded his listeners; and they too
were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern to
the ground, and it broke and went out. "I have come too early," he said then;
"my time has not come yet. The tremendous event is still on its way, still
travelling - it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder
require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even
after they are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still
more distant from them than the distant stars - and yet they have done it
themselves."

It has been further related that on that same day the madman entered [ ]
labs and there sang a requiem. Led out and quietened, he is said to have
retorted each time: "what are these camps now if they are not the tombs and
sepulchres of Framework?"
- Nietzsche (sort of)

Introduction

What is the ROB and how is it different?

ROB is framing that explains how to evaluate the round:
the method and the content.
a. The method: the form of offense that should be the object of
evaluation: representations, epistemology, ontology, scholarship, etc.
The conventional method is the hypothetical consequence of the
enacting of the aff.
b. The content: the impacts that are most important

It is theoretically justified It makes an educational

appeal to the telos of debate. So it precludes the
conventionally justified framework. Thus, you must
either
a. You have to make a counter-educational claim about your method of
engagement.
b. Win an internal link to their ROB.
c. Should not decide our approach in terms of educational.

Top Level: Debate is Debate

---- Pedagogical Freedom 1nc

As an overview, Debate should be an open forum for
students to defend their own approach. When assigning a
research paper, a teacher may allow students to pick their
own topics. While the teacher will reserve the right to
veto topics below a certain educational threshold, the
added flexibility, even if students pick sub-optimal topics,
is still a far better model for student learning.
Analogously, you should have a very high threshold for
disregarding the debated validity of my framework by just
assuming their impact filter matters more. Thus, if I win
sufficient reason why my approach has pedagogical value,
then evaluate the framework arguments on the flow.

---- Shouldnt Instrumentalize Debate

By instrumentalizing the humanities, you rob humans of
dignity, preclude meaningful communion, remove any
capacity for the use of intellection as a space for
sanctuary and retreat, render the humanities deeply
competitive destroying the space for cooperative
investigation and instrumentalize individuals so that their
worth in the activity is limited by their intellectual gifts
because if the aim of education is to make a difference
then if you cannot make a difference it entails a lack of
worth.
Zina Hitz [B.A., St. Johns College, Annapolis, 1995; M.Phil., Classics, Cambridge University, 1996; Ph.D.
Philosophy, Princeton University, 2005; Assistant Professor, Auburn University, 2005-6; Assistant Professor,
University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 2006-2012; Fellow, Center for Hellenic Studies, 2008-9; Visiting
Fellow, James Madison Program, Princeton University, 2010-11; Tutor, St. John's College, Annapolis, 2015-].
4/7/16. Freedom and Intellectual Life. First Things. http://www.firstthings.com/webexclusives/2016/04/freedom-and-intellectual-life MT

What is the point of

humanities? The question reflects the

anxiety shading into despair. As
enrollments decline, programs are cut, and tenure diminishes, mainstream
educational institutions are becoming uncomfortable places for teachers who
want to pass on a zeal for humanist learning. But the crisis in the humanities is not just a crisis caused by
some Bad Guys who want to destroy All That Is Good. It is primarily something far more worrying: a
crisis of confidence among ourselves, a crisis caused by a failure of selfunderstanding. We are haunted by a sense that what we do is somehow
inadequate or pointless. This is a failure of imagination as much as it is a failure of
studying the

current climate among humanist educators:

understanding. Mona Achache's 2009 film The Hedgehog (Le hrisson) presents an uncommon image
of intellectual life. The film tells the story of the friendship of three people in a bourgeois Paris apartment
building. At the center of the story is Rene, an ugly middle-aged woman of the working classes, the
concierge of the building. Rene's middle age is filmed with unsettling realismher heavyset figure, her
unadorned face, her slouchy cardigans, and her solitary chocolate eating. Yet Rene exerts a mysterious
attraction over Paloma, a twelve-year old daughter of privilege haunted by the meaningless lives led by
her family members and who is somewhat whimsically plotting her own suicide. Rene also attracts
Kakuro, the new Japanese resident in the building, who takes a romantic interest in her. It is a shock to the
viewer that such an un-cinematic figure should be a romantic lead. Rene's filmic predecessor in raw
middle age is Emmi , the romantic lead of R.W. Fassbinder's 1974 masterpiece Ali: Angst Essen Seele Auf
(Ali: Fear Eats The Soul). Unlike contemporary Hollywood images of middle agefor instance, the
playwright played by Diane Keaton in Something's Gotta Give (2003), wealthy, accomplished, charming,
and still sexyFassbinder's Emmi is fat, wrinkled, silly, and a cleaning lady, the bottom of the social barrel.
Emmi falls in love with a younger Moroccan guest-worker, to the disgust of her xenophobic children, as well
as her neighbors and co-workers. Rene falls in love with Kakuro, breaking the sharp boundary between
her and the building's wealthy residents. The love affair in both cases amounts to a real human connection
that stands out in sharp contrast from their fearful, status-driven social environments. The twist that The
Hedgehog puts on this themeand here it follows the novel it is inspired by, The Elegance of the
Hedgehog, by Muriel Barberyis that this unsettling but authentic human connection has its source and
basis in intellectual life. Rene the concierge, cranky and ignorant in public, has a secret: she reads
voraciously, great novels and philosophy, history and classics. At a key point she is pictured in private,
door closed, reading philosophy at her dinner table. Later she is seen withdrawn into a hidden chamber
behind her kitchen, stuffed with books and a reading chair. It is her secret life that attracts her Japanese
suitor as well as the protagonist of the film, Paloma. So Kakuro, the suitor, recognizes who she is because
her cat is named for Leo Tolstoy, as are his cats. So Paloma, the protagonist, realizes that Rene is a
kindred spirit when she discovers a philosophical treatise accidentally left on the kitchen table. In a central

scene, Paloma is in Renes kitchen and notices the closed door to her reading chamber. Intrigued, she
asks her, What is behind that door? It is Renes hidden life that attracts the other characters and that
forges friendships that give them refuge from the privileged, empty bubble that surrounds them. The

intellectual life as portrayed in this film has four central features: 1) It is a form of the
inner life of a person, a place of retreat and reflection. 2) As such it is
withdrawn from the world, where the world' is understood in its (originally Platonic, later
Christian) sense as the locus of competition and struggle for wealth, power, prestige,
and status. 3) It is a source of dignitymade obvious in this case by Renee's low status as an unattractive working-class
woman without children and past child-bearing age. 4) It opens space for communion: it allows for profound connection between
human beings. Of these four features of intellectual life, it is the notion of

withdrawal that is centrally

important. It is removal of intellectual life from the world that accounts for its true inwardnessan
inwardness distinct from the narcissistic inner tracking of one's social standing. It is the withdrawn
person's independence from contests over wealth or status that provides or reveals a dignity
that can't be ranked or traded. This dignity, along with the universality of the
objects of the intellectthat is, that they are available to everyoneis what
opens up space for real communion. The image of the intellect as a refuge from the
world is rare nowadays, but its history is distinguished. As the Socrates of Plato's Republic acknowledges
the likelihood of the world continuing in its evils, he describes the philosopher as someone who retreats
from public life like someone who takes refuge under a little wall from a storm of dust or hail driven by the
wind (Republic 496d). The unworldly thinker is a figure of ancient legend: Socrates himself, of course,
losing himself in thought at the threshold of a dinner party, as described in Plato's Symposium; or Thales,
who reportedly fell into a well from looking at the stars; or Diogenes the Cynic, whose only request to
Alexander the Great upon meeting him was that he get out of his sunlight. Perhaps most extraordinary is
Plutarch's account of the great mathematician Archimedes, so taken up in a mathematical proof that he
did not notice his city being taken by the Romans, and killed by a soldier when he insisted on finishing his
proof before being taken to the Roman authorities. Ancient Christian accounts of intellectual life draw on

Augustine describes the love of wisdom as an effort to

gather our whole soul somehow to that which we attain by the mind, to station
ourselves and become wholly entrenched there, so that we may no longer rejoice in
our own private goods, which are bound up with ephemeral things, but instead
cast aside all attachment to times and places and apprehend that which is always one
and the same. (On Free Will 2.16) So in the Middle Ages and later the virgin Mary is often pictured reading
this Platonic ideal. So

in a chamber when the angel Gabriel arrives with his proposal. Sometimes there is one book, the Torah, as
in Robert Campins Merode Altarpiece. Sometimes the books are piled high in a study, as in Fra Filippo
Lippis Annunciation, where Mary is clearly in the midst of some serious work. However many or few the
books, the girl is always alone and always in some way sheltered or enclosed. The artists draw on an
ancient tradition of Mary as herself a voracious reader, stewed in holy Scriptures, and a notion, then
commonplace, of the affinity between the intellectual and spiritual lives, of the garden enclosed' where
the God of truth meets the believer, set apart from the demands of the world.

Such a view of the

is quite at odds with one dominant nowadays among educators or

theorists of education. The liberal arts are for the world; and the more
intellectual life

integrated they are with worldly practice, the better. Here the defenders of the humanities fall into two
camps: those who think the liberal arts promote the effective acquisition of wealth, and those who think

they promote social and political goods. So we read, on the first count, that
philosophy is prized in Silicon Valley; or, in arguments made popular by Fareed Zakaria, the liberal arts are
essential for innovation and so the promotion of prosperity. But even authors who understand that the
value of learning is quite distinct from the value of prosperity fall into similar traps. For them, the study of
the humanities is meant to form citizens; its ultimate aim is civic engagement. Such a view is
found even among those who are concerned to defend the value of the humanities for their own sake.
Martha Nussbaum is a useful example. Along with Anthony Appiah and other current writers about the
university, she acknowledges the intrinsic value of study (her most recent book on the topic is titled Not for

In
doing so, she subjugates the intellectual life to politics and political
concerns. Nussbaum recognizes that prosperity is inadequate as a final end for human beings and as
Profit), while ultimately defending the value of liberal arts as essential for social and political progress.

a goal for their education, but she seems to think that democratic citizenship is such an end. She appears
not to understand that there are things beyond citizenship, more splendid and more fundamentaland
that these very things, at the present moment more than ever, need to be securedand need to be
secured most especially from the infinite demands of citizenship. So too, we find even among
contemporary Christian defenders of the liberal arts a tendency to instrumentalize them. Consider George
Weigel's discussion of intellectual life in his 2013 book Evangelical Catholicism. It would be easy to
conclude from Weigel's discussion that the purpose of intellectual life is catechesis and evangelismthat
is, the instillation and dissemination of correct opinionsand that its enemies are people with false
opinions, modernists and post-modernists. Theres nothing wrong with the promulgating of correct opinions
or the attempt to refute errors. But to treat the cultivation of correct opinions as the goal of intellectual life,
as do so many Christian intellectuals these days, is a destructive mistake. To treat correct opinions as an
end forms obstacles to real intellectual development, not because of their content, but because by doing

we reduce human beings to their social role. So we are subtly

indoctrinated into abandoning our inner lives so that we better serve
social and political aims. Intellectuals on the right and on the left have
succumbed to activism: intellectual life is for the sake of social change. But just like the art
of acquiring wealth, the art of struggling for political power requires no special discipline. There is no
danger, in our hyper-moralized, hyper-political culture, that our young
people will somehow fail to be enchanted by the prospect of making a
difference. The danger is quite otherwise: that as all human goods are
either put to use or discarded in the struggle for social and political ends, we lose
our humanity and the dignity it implies. We lose what makes life worth
living, whether that is intellectual life or any of the other unutterably precious human
activities that dwell in peace and holy uselessness. The pressures of the world
the pressures to amass wealth and to struggle for powerare enormously strong, and so is the
threat that our humanity be diminished to the capacity to make a
contribution or to make a difference. This has always been the case. What is needed,
now as ever, are forms of asceticism, forms of discipline that protect human beings from
these pressures and help to preserve the manifestations of human dignity and the forms of
community that dignity makes possible. Intellectual life is one such crucial form of
asceticism. May it be preserved as such.
so

---- Arrogance
The move to instrumentalize our thought is epistemic
arrogance.
Justin W: (Justin W. The Unpredictable Progress of Knowledge, Dailynous. May 20, 2016//FT)
The whole thing is predicated on what amounts to a shotgun approach to knowledge: you let people
metaphorically fire wherever they wish, and statistically speaking theyll occasionally hit a worthy target.
Crucially, there doesnt seem to be a way, certainly not a centralized or hierarchically determinable way, to

If we want knowledge about the world (or

our best bet is to give smart and dedicated people pretty
much free rein and a modest salary, then sit back and wait for the
possible societal returnswhich will fail to materialize more than
99% of the times. The demand for justifying academic endeavors on
the grounds of their usefulness often ignores this point. Good for Massimo
Pigliucci (CUNY) for raising it in a post on progress in philosophy at Platos Footnote. More
generally, the demand for practicality is often an epistemic
overreach, and thats certainly the case when politicians start
complaining about funding allegedly useless academic work. This is
improve the efficacy of the target shooting.
anything else),

not to say that the value of academic work, or more specifically, the value of philosophy, lies solely in its

when we find ourselves having to defend philosophys

usefulness, its good to be ready to deploy one of the philosophys
oldest weapons: pointing out how ignorant we really are.
usefulness. But

---- ROB PIC

Philosophy is dying.
Justin W: (Justin W. There Is No One Thing Philosophers Should Be Doing. Dailynous. May 20,
2016//FT)

Philosophy can draw on its deepest historical roots as a publicly

engaged activity while cultivating the synthesis of a wide range of
disciplinary perspectives. Our vision of a philosophy at home in the public
land-grant university requires the disciplinary pursuit of a progressive
research agenda that emphasizes democratic and inclusive public
engagement with real-world issues. Theres a lot packed in here, including a lot to
agree with. Yes, philosophers should address the challenges of our
time. This is something that has been said many times here (and not just in the Philosophers On
series). Yes, philosophers should be able to engage with the public. And yes, philosophers should be
interdisciplinary (and in at least one way we are more interdisciplinary than other humanities fields). These

more and more philosophers

are producing more and more work that looks like what Long and
ORourke are after. And philosophers should continue to do so. But not all
philosophers. I dont know if Long and ORourke mean to be issuing a methodological program for
are good suggestions. Contrary to the narrative of their essay,

all of philosophy. Sometimes they come off like that, but I dont want to be uncharitable. However, the

there
is no one thing philosophers should be doing. Well there is: they should be
philosophizing. Ha ha ha, you got me there. Well lets put it this way: there is no
one way to philosophize well. (Mutatis mutandis as necessary.) So while there is
value in publicly-engaged, practical, interdisciplinary philosophy, there are other
kinds of philosophy worth doing, worth supporting, worth promoting, even at
public institutions. Philosophy that is effectively inaccessible to the
broader public, that is abstract and theoretical and serves no
practical problem-solving purpose, and that isnt in any way
interdisciplinary can still be great philosophy: interesting, insightful,
joyful, beautiful, and quite possibly true. Its good to keep this in mind. First off, its
correct. Secondly, if practicality becomes the measurement of the value of
a discipline, philosophy will lose, and then disappear; we are already
seeing this. Third, it is respectful to hard-working and intelligent philosophers whose work does not
seem practical or relevant at all. Fourth, while not oriented at solving real
world problems, such philosophy nonetheless has real world
effects, particularly on our students, some of whom are disturbed
into thoughtfulness by philosophys deep problems. More generally,
pluralism about the aims and methods of philosophy (and not just along the
practical-theoretical axis ) is all were epistemically entitled to. As Ive said elsewhere:
thought that they might be doing so, and that others might agree with them, prompts me to say:

We need to be more welcoming of a variety of approaches to philosophy. This is not to abandon qualitative
judgments, but it is to have a certain kind of modesty in our judgments about what counts as a worthwhile
philosophical question or a worthwhile philosophical method. I mean, it seems silly to think that finally,
after a couple of thousand years, we, the dominant Anglo-American analytic philosophers, have, in the last
century, finally hit upon the correct set of questions and the correct method of philosophy. I happily admit
that those are my questions and my method, but nonetheless I think I have to be open to the idea that it
may be limited in important respects. That was originally said in a discussion of cultural diversity, but it
applies here, too. We should all be in favor of good, practical, publicly-engaged, interdisciplinary
philosophy. And other kinds of good philosophy, too.

--- Mitigate ROB

Diminishing marginal utility

Philosophizing is educational
ROB that makes content claims would indict the necessity
of a framework debate within the debate you need to
win its valuable.

---- Appropriate Response

[CLAIM] We agree framework debate isnt necessary to
determine that racism is bad but we need them to
answer complex ethical questions like the resolution. For
example, we wouldnt say we should stop capitalism by
killing 1000 babies of rich CEOs. Its unclear why their
ROB can assume consequentialism and we need some
debate of ethics to determine what is an appropriate
response.
In other words, we need increasing amounts of
abstraction as reality becomes more complex. Gravity
example.
The thesis is not that racism/oppression is unimportant
but the jump to exclusivity that minimizing
(consequential) forms of oppression is always the priority
is not morally justified.
Use Examples: (e.g. black nationalism)

---- Philosophy debate creates deep learning.

[CLAIM] Debating philosophy teaches kids deep thinking
that is important to living lives as ethical social agents.

Winning an internal link to ROB

Ultimately you can prove that the value-criterion is better
at accessing the warrants for the ROB.

Ideal Theory Good

What is Ideal theory?
Ideal theory is the idea that we should deduce the ideal society and
determine what said society would do in the specified situation.
One variant of Non-ideal theory is the idea that we can use ideals to
determine the ideal society and then determine the best way to get there
from the squo. [Charles Mills]

Some will argue that any abstract ideals are bad --- this
is not non-ideal theory as defended in the literature. If
this happens:
1. Explain why ideals to work towards are good
2. Explain how their ROB/Alt/K also has implicit ideals

The Argument would claim ideal theory is the more

effective way at mapping a solution to oppression.
John Simmons,
Swift

---- Mapping
Ideal theory provides a fixed goal
Swift 1: (Adam Swift, British Poliicla Philosopher, Oxford University Ideal and Nonideal Theory
Oxford Handbooks Online. June 2012. FT)

ideal theory correctly identifies the long-term goal we want to

achieve. We know from Rawls that this goal is realistic, in the sense that it is achievable, if only in the long, perhaps
Suppose our

very long, run. As he says, ideal theory probes the limits of practicable political possibility (2001, 4, 13). Why would
knowing this long-term goal be irrelevant to us here and now? It would be irrelevant if we were simply not interested in
long-term goals, but this seems implausible. Or it would be irrelevant if we had reason to believe that all roads led, equally
quickly and efficiently, to the long-term goal. But, for any given long-term goal, it seems very unlikely that it would be
equally well pursued by all incremental short-term reforms. And in any case, how could we have reason to believe that all

without
knowing [it] our long term goal, a course of action that might appear
to advance justice, and might indeed constitute a short-term
improvement with respect to justice, might nonetheless make less
likely, or perhaps even impossible, achievement of the long-term
goal. There is, then, some ambiguity in what it means for a reform to
constitute an improvement with respect to, or progress toward, the
ideal. In mountaineering, the climber who myopically tak[ing]es
immediate gains in height wherever she can is less likely to reach the
summit than the one who plans her route carefully. The immediate
gains do indeed take her higherwith respect to altitude she is closer to the topbut they
may also be taking her away from her goal. The same is true of
normative ideals. To eliminate an injustice in the world is surely to
make the world more just, but it could also be to take us further
away from, not closer toward, the achievement of a just society. Rawls,
as we have seen, sees ideal theory as having [has] both a target role and an
urgency role, each of which can guide us when we engage in nonideal
theory: It tells us where we are trying to get to in the long run, but it
also informs our justice-promoting attempts here and now by
providing the basis on which to evaluate the relative importance or
urgency of the various ways in which the world deviates from the
ideal. Even if Sen is right that we do not need ideal theory to do the latter, Simmons is right that we do need it for the
roads led to it if we had not yet identified what the long-term goal was? As A. J. Simmons (2010) has argued,

former.

Maybe ideals are bad, but they are inevitable to any

human project --- its most dangerous to those who dont
have any experience and have not yet deliberated on
ideals --- We should still engage in philosophical
investigation as training --- Will you be a lion-tamer or a
teototaller?
Chesterton: (Gilbert K. Chesterton, HERETICS, John Lane Company, 1905//FT) **Could also
work with deep thinking argument - as the flip side i.e. the lack of deep thinking.

There are people, however, who dig somewhat deeper than this into
the possible evils of dogma. It is felt by many that strong
philosophical conviction, while it does not (as they perceive) produce that

sluggish and fundamentally frivolous condition which we call bigotry,

does produce a certain concentration, exaggeration, and moral
impatience, which we may agree to call fanaticism. They say, in
brief, that ideas are dangerous things. In politics, for example, it is commonly urged
against a man like Mr. Balfour, or against a man like Mr. John Morley, that a wealth of ideas is dangerous.

The true doctrine on this point, again, is surely not very difficult to
state. Ideas are dangerous, but the man to whom they are least
dangerous is the man of ideas. He is acquainted with ideas, and
moves among them like a lion-tamer. Ideas are dangerous, but the
man to whom they are most dangerous is the man of no ideas. The
man of no ideas will find the first idea fly to his head like wine to the
head of a teetotaller. It is a common error, I think, among the Radical
idealists of my own party and period to suggest that financiers and
business men are a danger to the empire because they are so sordid
or so materialistic. The truth is that financiers and business men are
a danger to the empire because they can be sentimental about any
sentiment, and idealistic about any ideal, any ideal that they find
lying about. just as a boy who has not known much of women is apt too easily to take a woman for
the woman, so these practical men, unaccustomed to causes, are always inclined to think that if a thing is

Many, for example, avowedly

followed Cecil Rhodes because he had a vision. They might as well
have followed him because he had a nose; a man without some kind
of dream of perfection is quite as much of a monstrosity as a
noseless man. People say of such a figure, in almost feverish whispers, "He knows his own mind,"
which is exactly like saying in equally feverish whispers, "He blows his own nose." Human nature
simply cannot subsist without a hope and aim of some kind ; as the sanity
of the Old Testament truly said, where there is no vision the people perisheth.
But it is precisely because an ideal is necessary to man that the man
without ideals is in permanent danger of fanaticism. There is nothing
which is so likely to leave a man open to the sudden and irresistible
inroad of an unbalanced vision as the cultivation of business habits.
proved to be an ideal it is proved to be the ideal.

All of us know angular business men who think that the earth is flat, or that Mr. Kruger was at the head of a

Religious
and philosophical beliefs are, indeed, as dangerous as fire, and
nothing can take from them that beauty of danger. But there is only
one way of really guarding ourselves against the excessive danger of
them, and that is to be steeped in philosophy and soaked in religion.
great military despotism, or that men are graminivorous, or that Bacon wrote Shakespeare.

Things to Consider

1] Prefs

2] Occupying the Common Sense

1] Your NC needs to not suck
2] Build internal consistency

3] #not-every-f/w-debater
Need not only to win that f/w debate is good but that
your f/w is better than other f/ws. If you try to justify all
the crappy f/ws that LD has you will lose.
Explain alt cause to the crappy f/w people see.
Having the wonder K on the wiki could greatly help this.

4] Win a DA to their ROB

Maybe Chesterton?
Maybe Pedagogical Freedom?
Maybe Instrumetnalization of Debate?
But you need a DA b/c the weighing debate, if close, will
get resolved by the judges own biases.

5] FVA (Framework version of the aff)

They are excluding you not the other way around

A2 COMMON CRITICISMS

AT: We are Tainted

WE can untangle.
Stevedarcy: (Stevedarcy, On Heidegger in Particular, and Racist Philosophers in General,
http://publicautonomy.org/2015/01/22/heidegger/?
utm_content=buffer440dc&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer, Jan
22, 2015//FT)

But what conclusion should we draw about people like Hume,

Heidegger, Frege, Kant, and JS Mill? Should we regard their
intellectual output as thoroughly tainted, or even (more strongly) as
completely discredited, by the entwinement or interweaving of their
philosophical conceptions with racist (and/or colonialist and/or
sexist, etc.) ideas and assumptions? Should we, indeed, stop reading
these people and studying them or trying to learn from an
engagement with their ideas? No doubt, this is a tempting posture , for
some. But it seems not to be plausible, on reflection. To see why, notice
that the activity of disentangling defensible from indefensible
thoughts and ideas, which are at first apparently integral and
interconnected, is not a special undertaking on which we might
propose to embark in the special case of racist (etc.) philosophers. No,
it is fundamental to our very understanding of rational inquiry and
intellectual life. To think is to perform precisely this operation of
disentangling. I agree with you on this point, and this other one,
but not on this third point; there I insist you have gone astray, and I
can tell you why. Isnt the compulsion to repeat this performance,
to cycle through this disentangling action again and again, the
ultimate source of philosophys drama and its enduring appeal? Isnt
it, too, an inescapable obligation that everyone is saddled with,
unavoidably and perhaps involuntarily, as soon as one takes up the
task of thinking? Yes. Of course. To dislodge and debunk the tangle of
error and confusion that weaves itself through even our best
intellectual achievements is exactly what we mean by thinking. And
so, why not respond to the interweaving of Lockes right of
revolution with his defence of slavery in the old-fashioned way:
by thinking it through? No other response seems authentically
available, in fact, since to respond by sweeping him under the rug
only invites his spectral persistence, as a haunting presence that we
quietly agree not to mention, much less to grapple with and to
confront.

These steps are required --- you are shying away

Stevedarcy: (Stevedarcy, On Heidegger in Particular, and Racist Philosophers in General,
http://publicautonomy.org/2015/01/22/heidegger/?
utm_content=buffer440dc&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer, Jan
22, 2015//FT)

we should resist the

temptation to insist, as if in the grip of an unrelenting yet
This, it seems, informs us about how to respond to Heidegger. Above all,

unacknowledged panic, that we can just forget him and all his fascist rantings.
On the contrary, we really have to accept our responsibility to think
our way through Heidegger. When he claims, for instance, that a chair or a work of art can
only be, i.e., is only possible at all (as chair, as work), by virtue of unthematic but operative interpretive
contexts that confer intelligibility by themselves retreating from intelligibility, like the language that only
functions to illuminate a text so long as its own readability as a text is suspended or displaced, is this
suggestion itself retrievable at all in the context of an anti-racist practice of inquiry and understanding? Or,
by taking it seriously, by working with it intellectually, even in a critical or differentiated way, do we in

There are those

who presume this question to be settled in advance. I must admit (impolitely,
I fear) that I regard such people as, well, a little bit unsophisticated, at least in this area. The idea
that this question can be resolved without sorting through the
particulars of Heideggers writings and the questions they raise is a
crude and simplistic position: the sort of thing that one whispers to
oneself, seeking comfort and reassurance, insulation from the
unease of not-knowing and from the necessity to think things
through. Im reminded of Marxs admonition: There is no royal road
to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of
its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.
effect bolster the forces of racial domination, or anti-Semitic demonization, etc.?

We need to challenge it
Stevedarcy: (Stevedarcy, On Heidegger in Particular, and Racist Philosophers in General,
http://publicautonomy.org/2015/01/22/heidegger/?
utm_content=buffer440dc&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer, Jan
22, 2015//FT)
This brings us back to Dr. Figal. Does he dread the fatigue of the steep climb? Does he worry about the
absence of guard-rails or padding to cushion his fall? I assume he does not. I am sure that he will continue

thinking about
them is not a matter of agreeing with them, or depicting them as special or great:
to think about Heidegger, and also about Kant, Hume, Frege, and the others. But

the Heidegger Society, if such a thing is necessary, should not have any investment in defending or
upholding the supposed greatness of Heidegger (an investment made all too evident by Figals

Perhaps these great philosophers are persistently,

pervasively wrong about one thing after another. Perhaps we have
to fight them, or parts of them, by any means necessary. Certainly,
they are, in each case, wrong about a great deal, often but not
always in obvious ways. So be it. We dont owe them any personal or
intellectual loyalty. Rather, we owe our loyalty to the difficulty and
the pleasure of thinking, and that makes us enemies of simplistic,
superficial, ill-informed and otherwise indefensible ideas, whether
they come from people we admire (Marx?) or people we find
repulsive (Heidegger, Frege, etc.), or people whose character we neither
know about nor care about. If there is to be a Heidegger Society,
that should be its function: to insist on the need to disentangle
insights from idiocy, because there is plenty of both in Heideggers
body of work, as there is in the work of anyone who is fantasized by misguided
resignation).

disciples into the ludicrous position of being labeled a great philosopher.

A2: Social Agency/Civic engagement

Examples

Reparations + Libertarianism

NC
From self-ownership stems the right to private property
Locke *bracketed for gendered language* (John Locke, Second Treatise,
25--51, 12326//FT)

Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every
[person] man has a property in his [her] own person: this no body has any right to but himself.
The labour of [her] his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are
properly [hers] his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state
that nature hath provided, and left it in, [s]he hath mixed [her] his
labour with, and joined to it something that is [her] his own, and
thereby makes it [her] his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it
in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the
common right of other[s] men: for this labour being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a
right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough,
and as good, left in common for others.
Sec. 27.

Thus the standard is respecting liberty defined as

respecting the legislative right of agents to use their
means as they see fit free of domination. To clarify,
1] The framework is not concerned with availability of
ends but a right to pursue them. I do not wrong you by
buying the last jug of milk before you get to the store,
leaving you use orange juice for your morning cereal. I
violate if I legislate that you have no right to attempt to
purchase milk as that subverts the ends to which you can
direct your will.
2] The framework has non-ideal applications Unjust
acquisition of property must be rectified or it extends
violations of the liberty of another person.
Nozick: (Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia. 1974)
According to the entitlement conception of justice in holdings that we have
presented, there is no argument based upon the first two principles for distributive
justice, the principles of acquisition and of transfer, for such a more extensive state. If the set of holdings is properly
generated, there is no argument for a more extensive state based upon distributive justice. (Nor, we have claimed, will

If, however, these

principles are violated, the principle of rectification comes into play .
the Lockean proviso actually provide occasion for a more extensive state.)

Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough rules of thumb meant to approximate
the general results of applying the principle of rectification of injustice. For example, lacking much historical information,

victims of injustice generally do worse than they

otherwise would and (2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities
of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed
compensation by those who benefited from the injustices (assumed to be
and assuming (i) that

those better off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a rough rule of thumb for

rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever group
ends up least well-off in the society. This particular example may well be implausible, but an important question for each
society will be the following: given its particular history, what operable rule of thumb best
approximates the results of a detailed application in that society of the principle of rectification? These issues are very
complex and are best left to a full treatment of the principle of rectification. In the absence of such a treatment applied to
a particular society, one cannot use the analysis and theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer
payments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to justify it. Although to

past injustices might be so

great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state
in order to rectify them. (231)
introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far,

Contention:
Democracy promotion unjustly uses peoples labor to
exploit foreign countries.
RT 10 [Russian state-funded television network which runs cable and satellite television channels, as
well as Internet content directed to audiences outside the Russian Federation], Democracy promotion:
Americas new regime change formula, 27 Nov 2010, FT.

Were talking here about hundreds of millions of dollars, and over

the years since this policy was consolidated, were talking about
billions. The State Department will have an appropriation of several billion dollars for what it called the Office of Transition Initiatives.

The Congress will have an appropriation hundreds of millions of dollars for the National Endowment for Democracy, USAID will have its own

USAID has spent 9 billion dollars

promoting Washingtons democracy initiatives. The National Endowment for Democracy
budget as well, said Robinson. Over the past two decades,

(NED) received $132 million dollars during 2009; nearly all of the money came from U.S. government agencies. However, USAID and NED are
not the only ones. There is an entire network of organizations involved in the democracy promotion business such as the National Democratic
Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the American Center for International Labor, the Center for International Private

these are just the tip of the iceberg

Enterprise and Freedom House. But

. Theres an entire network of
organizations involved in the democracy promotion business. Although all the organizations insist there is no political affiliation, the board of
directors for both NDI and IRI suggest otherwise. Both boards consist of former Secretaries of State, national security advisers, members of
Congress, and even Clinton, Bush and Reagan administration officials. They all have a history in Washington. One deeply rooted in sustaining
the current foreign policy priorities. Blum said, to understand US foreign policy, one must understand a very basic fact; the US government
wants to dominate the world." He insists the soft money working behind scenes is directly linked to the CIA. They had to have a new
organization with a nice sounding name, with the word democracy, which would be free of the taint of the CIA, and thats why the NED was
created, Blum added. One of the key areas the democracy promotion network has invested in is Central America, where there is a rising tide
in leftist, socialist ideologies. According to the North American Congress on Latin America, USAIDs latest $2 million disbursement to
Honduras was based on proposals to make the Central American country economically competitive on the global market.Since 2004, the
United States has spent over $18 million on democracy promotion in Honduras. While USAID requests $800,000 for more democracy
promotion programs in Honduras for FY 2011, journalists and activists are being brutalized and killed under the U.S. backed government In
Egypt, a revolt against the US backed policies of Hosni Mubarak regime has mobilized these agencies to co-opt opposition groups to ensure
the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections are beneficial to Washington. Wael Nawara of the opposition party Al Ghad told RT
funding and guidance from NED, NDI, IRI and USAID has increased in the past two years, and that NDI and IRI are operating in Egypt illegally.
Other countries the US has intervened in include the Philippines, Haiti, Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Kyrgyzstan, and the Palestinian

USAID has implemented so called democracy promotion

initiatives in over 100 countries in the past 25 years. This years
budget is $1 billion dollars. According to USAIDs website, spending $10 million in a target country increases its
amount of democratic change fivefold. Blum insists there is pure hypocrisy in Washingtons democracy promotion agenda. " We have
a very clear law on the books prohibiting foreign governments from
interfering in our elections of supporting any candidates with
money. So we do exactly abroad what we prohibit here at home , he said.
territories. The

Encouraging transparency is a stated core element of the US governments democracy promotion efforts in foreign countries. But here at
home the agencies themselves are far from transparent. Detailed program budgets and information are unavailable to the public and contact
with the media is limited. Over the last six weeks, RT repeatedly requested interviews from USAID, NED, IRI and NDI. All of these requests were
denied or unanswered. Pepe Escobar, a South America based journalist for the Asia Times said US democracy promotion programs use
political or other grievances in countries to push and coordinate their own agenda. They use the locals, said Escobar. They mix their
preoccupations and their grievances with the classic full spectrum dominance Washington agenda. The US targets nations who are strategic
competitors and regimes that antagonize the United States. It utilizes the Pentagon and CIA strategy of full spectrum dominance. Escobar
explained that anti-government messages are often propelled through mainstream corporate media outlets in Brazil and Venezuela that are
indirectly linked and influenced by US organizations like Freedom House and the National Endowment for Democracy. He argued that over
time it is possible other nations, like China, will use their growth to influence US elections; however that could take some time. They [China]
still do not understand the notion of soft power and smart power, Escobar said. Maybe its going to take a generation to understand how the
West thinks. Jacob Hornberger, the president of The Future of Freedom Foundation explained that this policy of democracy promotion is not
merely an Obama or Bush policy, but instead a systemic issue in overall US policy. This is essentially US foreign policy and has been for
decades, he said.

They funnel money into elections, they engage in

invasions, assassinations, coups, regime change operations. Thats

what foreign policy has been about for a long time. Those who feel the policy is truly
the promotion of democracy are operating under a lie, Hornberger argued. The Government has no more commitment to democracy than it
does to dictatorship, he said. The US government supports those who best serve their interest at a given time, including having supported
leaders Saddam Hussein in the past. Theyre trying to get their people in public office in countries all over the world, Hornberger said.
They will stop at nothing to affect that kind of regime change when the administration in that country isnt towing the official line. With the

Americans should be more outspoken against

these programs which spend millions in US taxpayer dollars.
government on the brink of bankruptcy,

Of course authoritarian governments are not just; but irrespective of its

rightness there are no grounds to legislatively require it. It is immoral not to
give to charity, but that does not mean I can steal your income and donate it
for you. You cannot subject anothers means even to good ends, just as
slavery is no less repugnant if one sets their slaves to humanitarian projects.

In fact, charitable assistance is the wrong discussion. U.S.

wealth is built on unjust acquisition the money the aff
uses isnt their property to tailor towards teleological
ends of democracy that suit U.S interests in the first
place. The aim should not be redistribution but
rectification.
Hickel 15: (Jason Hickel, Enough of aid lets talk reparations. The Guardian, 27 November
2015//FT)

Colonialism is one of those things youre not supposed to discuss

Most people
would rather pretend it
didnt happen. In fact, that appears to be the official position. In the
mainstream narrative of international development peddled by
institutions from the World Bank to the UKs Department of
International Development, the history of colonialism is routinely
erased.
in polite

company at least not north of the Mediterranean.

feel uncomfortable about it, and

According to the official story, developing countries are poor because of their own internal problems, while western countries are rich because they worked hard, and upheld the right values

and policies. And because the west happens to be further ahead, its countries generously reach out across the chasm to give aid to the rest just a little something to help them along. If colonialism is ever
acknowledged, its to say that it was not a crime, but rather a benefit to the colonised a leg up the development ladder. But the historical record tells a very different story, and that opens up difficult questions
about another topic that Europeans prefer to avoid: reparations. No matter how much they try, however, this topic resurfaces over and over again. Recently, after a debate at the Oxford Union, Indian MP Shashi
Tharoors powerful case for reparations went viral, attracting more than 3 million views on YouTube. Clearly the issue is hitting a nerve. The reparations debate is threatening because it completely upends the usual
narrative of development. It suggests that poverty in the global south is not a natural phenomenon, but has been actively created. And it casts western countries in the role not of benefactors, but of plunderers.
When it comes to the colonial legacy, some of the facts are almost too shocking to comprehend. When Europeans arrived in what is now Latin America in 1492, the region may have been inhabited by between 50
million and 100 million indigenous people. By the mid 1600s, their population was slashed to about 3.5 million. The vast majority succumbed to foreign disease and many were slaughtered, died of slavery or
starved to death after being kicked off their land. It was like the holocaust seven times over. What were the Europeans after? Silver was a big part of it. Between 1503 and 1660, 16m kilograms of silver were shipped
to Europe, amounting to three times the total European reserves of the metal. By the early 1800s, a total of 100m kg of silver had been drained from the veins of Latin America and pumped into the European
economy, providing much of the capital for the industrial revolution. To get a sense for the scale of this wealth, consider this thought experiment: if 100m kg of silver was invested in 1800 at 5% interest the
historical average it would amount to 110trn ($165trn) today. An unimaginable sum. Europeans slaked their need for labour in the colonies in the mines and on the plantations not only by enslaving indigenous

In the North American colonies alone

Europeans extracted an estimated [222 million]
hours of forced
labour from African slaves between 1619 and 1865.
thats worth $97trn more than the entire global GDP.
Americans but also by shipping slaves across the Atlantic from Africa. Up to 15 million of them.

222,505,049

Valued at the US minimum wage, with a modest rate

of interest,

reparations Facebook Twitter

Pinterest A newspaper illustration of a slave ship transporting 510 captives from Africa to the Caribbean. The Caribbean nations are currently suing for reparations. Photograph: Alamy Right now, 14 Caribbean
nations are in the process of suing Britain for slavery reparations. They point out that when Britain abolished slavery in 1834 it compensated not the slaves but rather the owners of slaves, to the tune of 20m, the
equivalent of 200bn today. Perhaps they will demand reparations equivalent to this figure, but it is conservative: it reflects only the price of the slaves, and tells us nothing of the total value they produced during
their lifetimes, nor of the trauma they endured, nor of the hundreds of thousands of slaves who worked and died during the centuries before 1834. These numbers tell only a small part of the story, but they do help
us imagine the scale of the value that flowed from the Americas and Africa into European coffers after 1492. Europe didnt develop the colonies. The colonies developed Europe. Then there is India. When the British
seized control of India, they completely reorganised the agricultural system, destroying traditional subsistence practices to make way for cash crops for export to Europe. As a result of British interventions, up to 29
million Indians died of famine during the last few decades of the 19th century in what historian Mike Davis calls the late Victorian holocaust. Laid head to foot, their corpses would stretch the length of England 85
times over. And this happened while India was exporting an unprecedented amount of food, up to 10m tonnes per year. British colonisers also set out to transform India into a captive market for British goods. To do
that, they had to destroy Indias impressive indigenous industries. Before the British arrived, India commanded 27% of the world economy, according to economist Angus Maddison. By the time they left, Indias
share had been cut to just 3%. The same thing happened to China. After the Opium Wars, when Britain invaded China and forced open its borders to British goods on unequal terms, Chinas share of the world
economy dwindled from 35% to an all-time low of 7%. Meanwhile, Europeans increased their share of global GDP from 20% to 60% during the colonial period. Europe didnt develop the colonies. The colonies
developed Europe. And we havent even begun to touch the scramble for Africa. In the Congo, to cite just one brief example, as historian Adam Hochschild recounts in his haunting book King Leopolds Ghost,
Belgiums lust for ivory and rubber killed some 10 million Congolese roughly half the countrys population. The wealth gleaned from that plunder was siphoned back to Belgium to fund beautiful stately architecture
and impressive public works, including arches and parks and railway stations all the markers of development that adorn Brussels today, the bejewelled headquarters of the European Union. It will take 100 years
for the worlds poorest people to earn $1.25 a day Jason Hickel Read more We could go on. It is tempting to see this as just a list of crimes, but it is much more than that. These snippets hint at the contours of a
world economic system that was designed over hundreds of years to enrich a small portion of humanity at the expense of the vast majority. This history makes the narrative of international development seem a bit
absurd, and even outright false. Frankie Boyle got it right: Even our charity is essentially patronising. Give a man a fish and he can eat for a day. Give him a fishing rod and he can feed himself. Alternatively, dont

We cant put a price

on the suffering wrought by colonialism. And there is not enough
money in the world to compensate for the damage it inflicted. We
poison the fishing waters, abduct his great-grandparents into slavery, then turn up 400 years later on your gap year talking a lot of shite about fish.

can, however, stop talking about charity, and instead acknowledge

the debt that the west owes to the rest of the world.

Even more importantly, we can work to quash the

colonial instinct whenever it rears its ugly head, as it is doing right now in the form of land grabs, illicit financial extraction, and unfair trade deals. Shashi Tharoor argued for a reparations payment of only 1 a
token acknowledgement of historical fact. That might not do much to assuage the continued suffering of those whose countries have been ravaged by the colonial encounter. But at least it would set the story
straight, and put us on a path towards rebalancing the global economy.

The violation stems from the hypocrisy of the aff- the problem is not
that affirming steals property people have a right to, but that it tries
to pretend people have that right by taking their money not for the
purposes of rectification but to advance U.S interests or give
altruistic assistance.

K
The aff frames democracy promotion as a gift from the
west this misses the question.
Hickel 15: (Jason Hickel, Enough of aid lets talk reparations. The Guardian, 27 November
2015//FT)

Colonialism is one of those things youre not supposed to discuss in polite

company at least not north of the Mediterranean. Most people feel uncomfortable about it, and would rather pretend
it didnt happen. In fact, that appears to be the official position. In
the mainstream narrative of international development peddled by
institutions from the World Bank to the UKs Department of
International Development, the history of colonialism is routinely
erased. According to the official story, developing countries are poor
because of their own internal problems, while western countries are
rich because they worked hard, and upheld the right values and
policies. And because the west happens to be further ahead, its
countries generously reach out across the chasm to give aid to the
rest just a little something to help them along. If colonialism is ever acknowledged, its to say
that it was not a crime, but rather a benefit to the colonised a leg up the development ladder. But the historical record tells
a very different story, and that opens up difficult questions about
another topic that Europeans prefer to avoid: reparations. No matter how much they
try, however, this topic resurfaces over and over again. Recently, after a debate at the Oxford Union, Indian MP Shashi Tharoors powerful case for reparations went viral,

The reparations debate is

threatening because it completely upends the usual narrative of
development. It suggests that poverty in the global south is not a natural
phenomenon, but has been actively created. And it casts western
countries in the role not of benefactors, but of plunderers. When it comes to the
attracting more than 3 million views on YouTube. Clearly the issue is hitting a nerve.

colonial legacy, some of the facts are almost too shocking to comprehend. When Europeans arrived in what is now Latin America in 1492, the region may have been
inhabited by between 50 million and 100 million indigenous people. By the mid 1600s, their population was slashed to about 3.5 million. The vast majority succumbed to
foreign disease and many were slaughtered, died of slavery or starved to death after being kicked off their land. It was like the holocaust seven times over. What were the
Europeans after? Silver was a big part of it. Between 1503 and 1660, 16m kilograms of silver were shipped to Europe, amounting to three times the total European
reserves of the metal. By the early 1800s, a total of 100m kg of silver had been drained from the veins of Latin America and pumped into the European economy, providing
much of the capital for the industrial revolution. To get a sense for the scale of this wealth, consider this thought experiment: if 100m kg of silver was invested in 1800 at
5% interest the historical average it would amount to 110trn ($165trn) today. An unimaginable sum. Europeans slaked their need for labour in the colonies in the

In
the North American colonies alone, Europeans extracted an
estimated [222 million] 222,505,049 hours of forced labour from African
slaves between 1619 and 1865. Valued at the US minimum wage, with a modest rate of interest, thats
worth $97trn more than the entire global GDP. reparations Facebook Twitter Pinterest A newspaper
mines and on the plantations not only by enslaving indigenous Americans but also by shipping slaves across the Atlantic from Africa. Up to 15 million of them.

illustration of a slave ship transporting 510 captives from Africa to the Caribbean. The Caribbean nations are currently suing for reparations. Photograph: Alamy Right now,
14 Caribbean nations are in the process of suing Britain for slavery reparations. They point out that when Britain abolished slavery in 1834 it compensated not the slaves
but rather the owners of slaves, to the tune of 20m, the equivalent of 200bn today. Perhaps they will demand reparations equivalent to this figure, but it is conservative:
it reflects only the price of the slaves, and tells us nothing of the total value they produced during their lifetimes, nor of the trauma they endured, nor of the hundreds of
thousands of slaves who worked and died during the centuries before 1834. These numbers tell only a small part of the story, but they do help us imagine the scale of the
value that flowed from the Americas and Africa into European coffers after 1492. Europe didnt develop the colonies. The colonies developed Europe. Then there is India.
When the British seized control of India, they completely reorganised the agricultural system, destroying traditional subsistence practices to make way for cash crops for
export to Europe. As a result of British interventions, up to 29 million Indians died of famine during the last few decades of the 19th century in what historian Mike Davis
calls the late Victorian holocaust. Laid head to foot, their corpses would stretch the length of England 85 times over. And this happened while India was exporting an
unprecedented amount of food, up to 10m tonnes per year. British colonisers also set out to transform India into a captive market for British goods. To do that, they had to
destroy Indias impressive indigenous industries. Before the British arrived, India commanded 27% of the world economy, according to economist Angus Maddison. By the
time they left, Indias share had been cut to just 3%. The same thing happened to China. After the Opium Wars, when Britain invaded China and forced open its borders to
British goods on unequal terms, Chinas share of the world economy dwindled from 35% to an all-time low of 7%. Meanwhile, Europeans increased their share of global
GDP from 20% to 60% during the colonial period. Europe didnt develop the colonies. The colonies developed Europe. And we havent even begun to touch the scramble
for Africa. In the Congo, to cite just one brief example, as historian Adam Hochschild recounts in his haunting book King Leopolds Ghost, Belgiums lust for ivory and
rubber killed some 10 million Congolese roughly half the countrys population. The wealth gleaned from that plunder was siphoned back to Belgium to fund beautiful
stately architecture and impressive public works, including arches and parks and railway stations all the markers of development that adorn Brussels today, the
bejewelled headquarters of the European Union. It will take 100 years for the worlds poorest people to earn $1.25 a day Jason Hickel Read more

Refusal to acknowledge the historicity of colonialism is

coloniality at its finest. [ Never finished this part ]
The alternative is to acknowledge and repay our debts --the U.S ought not promote democracy, but it ought to pay
Middle Eastern Countries Reparations. This is mutually
exclusive with the aff --- we do not put conditions on
reparations nor fund specific projects we deem best --- we
put the money back into the hands of Middle Eastern
people and countries.
Hickel 15: (Jason Hickel, Enough of aid lets talk reparations. The Guardian, 27 November
2015//FT)

It is tempting to see this as just a list of crimes, but it is much

more than that. These snippets hint at the contours of a world economic system that was designed over hundreds of years to enrich a small portion
We could go on.

of humanity at the expense of the vast majority. This history makes the narrative of international development seem a bit absurd, and even outright false. Frankie Boyle
got it right: Even our charity is essentially patronising. Give a man a fish and he can eat for a day. Give him a fishing rod and he can feed himself. Alternatively, dont

We cant
put a price on the suffering wrought by colonialism. And there is not
enough money in the world to compensate for the damage it
inflicted. We can, however, stop talking about charity, and instead
acknowledge the debt that the west owes to the rest of the world. Even
more importantly, we can work to quash the colonial instinct whenever it rears
its ugly head, as it is doing right now in the form of land grabs, illicit
financial extraction, and unfair trade deals. Shashi Tharoor argued for a reparations payment of only 1 a
token acknowledgement of historical fact. That might not do much to assuage the continued
suffering of those whose countries have been ravaged by the
colonial encounter. But at least it would set the story straight, and
put us on a path towards rebalancing the global economy.
poison the fishing waters, abduct his great-grandparents into slavery, then turn up 400 years later on your gap year talking a lot of shite about fish.

Locke Self Defense (Guns Topic)

*** This NC was not explained in the module if you have questions find me
at Socrates. --- Basic idea was the offense used a non-ideal context to justify
the right to self defense that was consistent with the sort of Black self
defense K that was being read so the 1NC could have been NC Black Self
defense Ceasefire CP Case.

I value morality. Normative evaluations can be divided

into two dimensions justification and legitimacy. If I
witness a crime, that alone does not allow me to justly
punish the criminal. While punishment of the crime is
justified, I lack legitimacy to be the agent of that
punishment. Thus the nc precludes since legitimacy is a
prior question to the justification of the aff.
Why do we even have the agent called the state in our
normative evaluations? Notions of governmental authority
can only be explained against the backdrop of a natural
executive right, or the right to punish.
Simmons 1: (John Simmons. Locke and the Right to Punish. Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20,
No. 4 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 311-349)

When we ask what makes it just for a particular person or group , rather
than another, to punish some person, the answer that seems most natural
concerns neither utility nor desert. It is not that our governments
deserve to punish us, or that their doing so maximizes happiness; it
is rather that they have authority or the right to do so. Locke put the point
thus: "To justify bringing such evil [i.e., punishment] on any man two things are requisite. First, that he who
does it has commission and power to do so. Secondly, that it be directly useful for the procuring of some
greater good.... Usefulness, when present, being but one of those conditions, cannot give the other, which

The natural answer to our question makes central

reference to authorization and rights, and it has been the natural rights tradition in political
is a commission to punish.",

philosophy that has emphasized this point most forcefully. According to that tradition, one person (A) may
justly punish another (B) only if either (i) A has a natural right to punish the crimes (wrongs) of B, or (2) B
has alienated to A or created for A by forfeiture a right to punish B for B's crimes (wrongs). This position
cannot, I think, adequately be characterized as either purely utilitarian or purely retributivist.2 It will not be
my purpose here to evaluate the entire natural rights position on punishment, or to explore its relations to
other views (e.g., whether it is consistent with or even reducible to retributivist or deterrence views).3 I
wish to concentrate on only one aspect of natural rights theory's claims about punishment, a position
shared by classical natural rights theorists (such as Grotius and Locke) and contemporary ones (such as
Nozick and Rothbard). All persons in a state of nature, these authors claim, have a moral right to punish
moral wrongdoers. This "natural executive right," of course, plays a central role in Locke's account of how a
government can come to have the right to punish its citizens (as it must in any Lockean account of these
matters), and Locke's defense of the executive right is the best known of the classical defenses. I will,
accordingly, focus much of my attention on Locke's arguments and possible extensions or developments of
them. But any theory of punishment must either accommodate or reject this right, so my discussion of
Locke's views should prove of more than purely historical interest. The motivation for defending the natural

Locke and other philosophers in the natural rights tradition

have normally wanted to claim that all political authority (or "power") is artificial,
and so must be explained in terms of more basic, natural forms of authority.
executive right seems reasonably clear.

Governments have rights to limit our liberty, for instance, only insofar as they
have been granted those rights by us; we, however, possess these rights naturally (or,
rather, are "born to" a basic set of moral rights). Governmental rights, then, are simply
composed of the natural rights of those who become citizens, transferred to government
by some voluntary undertaking (e.g., contract, consent, or the granting of a trust). This transfer of
rights may go unobserved by some (as when consent is "tacit" only), but it
must take place if government is to have any de jure power. However
beneficial and fair the practices and policies a government enforces, it has no right or
authority to enforce them against an uncommitted "independent." 4 The
same story can be told about a government's right to punish criminals. This right, like all governmental
rights, must be composed of the redistributed natural rights of citizens, rights that the citizens must
therefore have been capable of possessing in a nonpolitical state of nature. It is hard to deny that
governments do, at least sometimes, have (or are capable of having) the de jure authority or right to
punish criminals. But if they do, the argument continues, persons in a state of nature must also, at least
sometimes, have the right to punish wrongdoers. From what other source could a government have
obtained its right?

This contractual origin places significant reciprocal

obligations on the government, fulfillment of which is a
contractual necessity to maintain social legitimacy.
John Locke. Two Treatises of Government. Ontario, Canada: McMaster University, Archive of the History
of Economic Thought, Vol. 5, 1690. MT

IF [humans]

in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of

his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part
with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it
is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature [s]he hath such a right,
yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being
man

kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of
the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure.

this condition
seeks out and is willing

This makes

him

[her] willing to quit

which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he

to join in society

with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite

for

the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name - property.
124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government,
is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting. Firstly, there wants an
established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the
common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow
of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases. 125. Secondly, in the state of Nature there
wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For
every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion
and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and
unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's. 126. Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to
back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom
fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment
dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of
the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to
pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are
therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of
others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their
property. It is this that makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such
alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by such rules as the community, or those authorised by them to that
purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power as well
as of the governments and societies themselves. 128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent

[humans have] has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever [s]he

thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of Nature; by
delights, a man

which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society distinct from all
other creatures, and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any

other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and associate into lesser

[and] to punish the

crimes committed against that law. Both these [powers] [s]he gives up when [s]he
joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and incorporates into any commonwealth
combinations. The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power

separate from the rest of mankind. 129. The first power - viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of
himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation
of himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by
the law of Nature. 130. Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, which he
might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the
executive power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many
conveniencies from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its
whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and
safety of the society shall require, which is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the society do the like.
131. But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the
state of Nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall

yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve
him[her]self, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be
require,

supposed to change [her] his condition with an intention to be

worse), the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to
is obliged to secure every one's property by
providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of
Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so, whoever has the legislative or supreme
power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws,
promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent and
upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the
community at home only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries
and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end
but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
extend farther than the common good, but

Thus the standard is consistency with the restraints of a

Lockean executive contract.
I content that the U.S has failed its obligations to justly
promulgate law and thus lacks legitimacy to justly disarm
those it claims to represent.
Cottrol and Diamond 92: (Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond1992 ("Toward
an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration of the Second Amendment," Georgetown Law Journal 80
~~~[1992~~~]: 309-361).

Twice in this nation's historyonce following the Revolution, and again after the Civil War
America has held out to blacks the promise of a nation (pg.361) that
would live up to its ideology of equality and of freedom. Twice the nation
has reneged on that promise. The ending of separate but equal under Brown v.
Board in 1954,287the civil rights movement of the 1960s, culminating in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,288 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,289 and the judicial triumphs of the 1960s
and early 70sall

these have held out to blacks in this century that same

promise. Yet, given this history, it is not unreasonable to fear that law,
politics, and societal mores will swing the pendulum of social progress in a
different direction, to the potential detriment of blacks and their
rights, property, and safety. The history of blacks, firearms regulations, and
the right to bear arms should cause us to ask new questions
regarding the Second Amendment. These questions will pose problems both for

Much of the
contemporary crime that concerns Americans is in poor black
neighborhoods 290 and a case can be made that greater firearms
restrictions might alleviate this tragedy. But another, perhaps
stronger case can be made that a society with a dismal record of
protecting a people has a dubious claim on the right to disarm them.
Perhaps a re-examination of this history can lead us to a modern
realization of what the framers of the Second Amendment
understood: that it is unwise to place the means of protection totally
in the hands of the state, and that self-defense is also a civil right.
advocates of stricter gun controls and for those who argue against them.

This links to the standard because a government that is

not grounded within a legitimate and proper social
contract loses a) its monopoly on force denying its ability
to disarm its citizenry and b) loses its moral justification
in coercisively enforcing bans on means to natural ends
like self defense.
John Simmons
1991), pp. 311-349

2.

Locke and the Right to Punish. Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn,

If it is ever morally
permissible to punish wrongdoers-that is, to coercively control them in certain ways-in the
state of nature (and, of course, I have argued that, at least often, it is), then our natural
rights of self government must be taken (as Locke took them) to be limited to
those areas of our lives where we operate within the bounds of natural law. The
government cannot, then, obtain in the manner suggested in Section III (by a simple
transfer of rights of self-government) an exclusive right to punish moral
wrongdoers. If it tries to forcibly exclude attempts by private citizens to
punish wrongdoers, it invades their natural liberty to use
competitive interference in punishing. In the absence of a Lockean
"contract" of government, in which this liberty to punish is laid aside by citizens, leaving their governors free to
legitimately exercise their liberty to punish (and to force citizens not to punish wrongdoers), any
government's claim to a "monopoly on force" within its territories must be
morally indefensible.63 However-badly this account may fit with some of the details of Locke's own
The force of this account might be captured more simply as follows.

presentation, it surely captures the central spirit of his views. On the account I have sketched, the government's exclusive
right to punish must be understood to be composed of its exclusive liberty to punish moral wrongdoers, plus its claim
right(s) to control individual citizens (collectively) in other designated areas of their lives. Similarly, Locke insisted that
governments could rightfully punish only if empowered in a fiduciary transaction between citizen and government-and
that the rights transferred to government in this transaction must include both rights to control our lives and rights
connected with the punishment of wrongdoers (II, I28-30). My agreement with Locke is, then, quite substantial. I agree

if there is a natural executive right (and if it is possible to defend the theories of natural
then this Lockean transaction between
government and citizens is necessary for the moral legitimacy of the common
practice of punishment within political communities. Since I am further persuaded that there
that

rights and desert on which the executive right depends),

are good reasons to support the natural right to punish, Locke's beliefs about the necessity of this transaction may well be
justified.64 The results for which I have argued here seem to square well with the central intuition about the justifiability
of "natural punishment" expressed in Section I. But what of the apparently conflicting intuitions (e.g., that private citizens
within civil society might also be justified in punishing unpunished wrongdoers)? I suspect that such beliefs arise largely
from skepticism about Locke's claims that we have in fact given up our natural right to punish to our government in the
kind of transaction he describes. And this skepticism may well be warranted.

The Lockean account I have

is an account of what must take place if legal punishment is

to be legitimate. We must not confusedly suppose that it is a descriptive account
of what in fact occurs in most civil societies (though Locke himself, of course, seems to
have supposed just this). It may be true that punishment in many or most civil
societies is not legitimate, and that private citizens in these societies
are entitled to punish wrongdoers who go unpunished (either within or without
just defended

their societies).65 Lockean consent may be necessary for legitimate legal punishment, but not sufficiently in evidence in
real political societies to justify our actual practices.

Korsgaard Aff (Autonomous

medical Choices)
This was just a typical deon aff --- since affs are usually
already left leaning all you have to do is create a proper
framing of the argument. For example My original
extension of this argument was:
The fundamental project of moral deliberation is the formation of cogent
interpersonal justification. This requires moral reasons to be publically
accessible. While external contingencies may hinder my ability to
successfully understand the reason, there must be nothing internal to the
reason itself that renders it impossible to be shared for any person. To regard
a person as a moral agent is to regard them as capable of shared moral
deliberation --- this debate verifies this since you require explicable warrants
to justify this claim --- Thus violent forms of interaction which bypass the
moral reasoning of another and treat them as a puppet to be manipulated for
your moral purposes is absolutely and universally prohibited.

Marshalls reformulation to have better interaction with

Ks
Before we can assess if policies and actions are justified, we need to assess if
the very form of justification is already exclusive of certain classes of persons.
Consequentialist theories encouraged a discussion of the cost and benefits of
slavery thereby ignoring the exclusion of perspective from even being able to
access that calculation.
Thus, there are absolute constraints on our form of justification; slavery is
bad not just because the Pros outweigh the Cons, but because something in
principle cannot even be a reason for slavery.
The AC has demonstrated that the form of paternalistic coercion is rooted in a
fundamentally exclusive logic and so requires prior and formal rejection even
before we assess what positive alternatives to develop in its place.
Contention 2 is compatible with non-ideal theory, we still treat people with
respect.