Corpus v Administrator

F: Teodoro Yangco died in 1939. At the time of his death, he had no

forced heirs. His nearest relatives were (1) his half brother Luis
Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco (3) Amalia, Jose, and Ramon
Corpus children of half brother, Pablo Corpus and (4)
Juana/Juanita Corpus, daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus.
Teodoro was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles.
Before marrying Luis Rafael, Ramona had begotten five children
with a Tomas Corpus, including Pablo and Jose Corpus.
Tomas Corpus, son of Juanita Corpus, filed an action to recover
her supposed share in Teodoros intestate estate. He alleged among
others, that the decedents estate should be distributed according
to rules on intestacy. TC dismissed the action on the ground of res
judicata and laches ruling that the intrinsic validity of Teodoros will
was already passed upon.
Tomas appealed contending that TC erred in holding that (1)
Teodoro was a natural child (2) that his will was duly legalized (3)
that his action is barred by res judicata and laches.
On the question of WON Juanita was a legal heir of Teodoro, and if
Tomas had a cause of action to recover his mothers share, the SC
ruled in the negative. It was held that based on a will by Teodoros
father (Luis Rafael), Teodoro was an acknowledged natural
child (illegitimate) together with three others. This being so,
Juanita, who was the legitimate child of Jose (who was also a
legitimate child), cannot be Teodoros legal heir, and Tomas
has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed share of
Juanita in Teodoros estate. This is because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
D: Article 943 CC (Now Article 992) prohibits all successor
reciprocity mortis cause between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives. The rule is base on the theory that illegitimate children
is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while
the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid
further grounds of resentment. Hence, Teodoros half brothers on
the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to
his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Leonardo v CA
F: Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was
survived by 2 daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a

grandson, Sotero Leonardo (son of predeceased daughter). Sotero

died without issue in 1944, while Silvestra died in 1949 without
issue.
On October 1964, petitioner Cresencio Leonardo, claiming to be the
son of Sotero, filed a complaint for ownership pf properties, sum of
money and accounting in the CFI seeking judgment (1) to be
declared one of the lawful heirs of Francisca, entitled to share in
the estate jointly with defendant Maria, (2) to have the proeprties
left by Francisca partitioned between him and Maria, and (3) to
have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties
from the time defendants took possession thereof until said
accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share
therein with legal interest.
Maria asserted exclusive ownership over the properties and alleged
that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by the
right of representation. TC ruled in favor of petitioner. CA reversed
TC.
D: Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero, still he
cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left
by the deceased Francisa considering that he was born outside
wedlock as shown by the fact that he was born on September 13,
1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married,
and what is more, his alleged fathers first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who
has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father, liked Francisca.
Diaz v. IAC (1987)
F: Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero died. Upon her death, her only
surviving relatives were: (a) her niece, Felisa Pamuti Jardin (the
legitimate daughter of her sister); and (b) her 6 minor
grandchildren (who are illegitimate children of Simona's son,
Pablo, who was already deceased4 of which are surnamed Diaz,
2 are surnamed Parcusa).
TC through Judge Jose Raval declared that Felisa Pamuti Jardin, the
niece, is the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero,
decedent.
The grandchildren/the illegitimate children of Pablo with the
surname Diaz, contend that they, as illegitimate children of a
legitimate child of the decedent (i.e. as illegitimate children of
Pablo who is the legitimate child of decedent Simona), have the
right to represent their father Pablo and therefore be declared as
heirs of the decedent Simona. They argue that Article 990 of the

New Civil Code recognizes that both legitimate and illegitimate

descendants may exercise the right of representation. While the
Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
grandparents, that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by
Article 990 of the New Civil Code, which expressly grants
illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father
(Pablo) in the estate of their grandmother (Simona).
SC disagreed, and ruled that the illegitimate children of Pablo may
not exercise the right of representation to inherit from Simona's
intestate estate through their father Pablo.
The applicable provision is Article 992 of the New Civil Code. Article
992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely
intestate succession between the illegitimate child, borne of a
parent who is a legitimate child, and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of the parent. There is
presumed to be antagonism and incompatibility between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family, where the illegitimate
child is looked disgracefully down upon by his parent, the
legitimate child (as well as the parent's family). The illegitimate
child is deprived of the resources of the latter. The parent
(legitimate child) looks at his illegitimate child as nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; and
the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment.
The Court also cites Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, who says that there is
an inconsistency in the Civil Code. CIvil Code's Article 992 adhered
to the Spanish Civil Code, which said that an illegitimate child
cannot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. On the other hand, the Civil
Code's subsequent articles, Article 990, 995 and 998, allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Outrightly, the
effect is that Article 992 prevents the illegitimate child of a
legitimate child from representing the latter in the
intestate succession of the grandparent, while the
illegitimate child of an illegitimate child can do so, from the
subsequent articles. Because of this difference, according to Justice
Reyes, we must in a future revision of the Civil Code make a choice
and decide either that illegitimate children enjoy in all cases the
right of representation (abolish Article 992) or maintain Article 992
and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more
in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.

Pursuant to Article 992, the 6 minor illegitimate children of Pablo

therefore cannot inherit from Pablo's mother Simona, since they are
barred by Article 992 from succeeding to her intestate estate.
D: Illegitimate children cannot exercise the right of representation
by representing their father or mother, in relation to succeeding to
the intestate estate of their grandparent.
Diaz v. IAC (1990) - 2nd Resolution
F: (See also the 1987 decision) Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; Simona and Felisa's mother Juliana
were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion; Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their
union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during
infancy; Simona Pamuti V da. de Santero is the widow of Pascual
Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero, who was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero; Pascual Santero died in 1970, Pablo Santero in
1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death, was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz
and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
The real issue in this case is who are the legal heirs of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero---her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? SC held that
Felisa is the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of Simona
since Pablos natural children are barred from representing their
father under Art. 992.
D: Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants of these
illegitimate children who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate (but the persons to
be represented are themselves illegitimate). The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation
is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued that
the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides
that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow
intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at

naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to

instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss
to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.
Prof. Balane: to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by
any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the
law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies
the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of
the New Civil Code. Thus, the word ''relatives" is a general term
and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives
but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sensewhich, as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
J. Gutierrez, Jr., dissenting: The adoption of a harsh and absurd
interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not impress
me as correct. Precisely, the word ''relatives, in Art. 992 calls for
reinterpretation because the Code has been amended. The
meaning of ''relatives" must follow the changes in various
provisions upon which the word's effectivity is dependent. Law is
based on considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to
accord with what appears right and just. Unless the opposite is
proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her
grandchildren-legitimate or illegitimate- more than the second
cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said cousins. The
grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why
should the law include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that
anger. ''Relatives" can only refer to collateral relatives, to members
of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.
Santillon v Miranda
F: Santillon died intestate, leaving several parcels of land to one
son (Claro) and his wife (Perfecta). Four years after his death, Claro
filed a petition for letters of administration which were opposed by
Perfecta and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales on
several grounds (1) the properties were conjugal, except three
parcels which were exclusive property of Perfecta, (2) Perfecta
conveyed of her share in the properties to the spouses, (3)
administration was not necessary since there was a pending

partition, and (4) if administration was necessary, Perfecta was

better qualified for the post. Perfecta was subsequently appointed
administratrix of the estate.
Claro later filed a Motion to Declare Share of Heirs and to resolve
their conflicting claims re: rights in the estate. Claro: Article 892,
after deducting the from the conjugal properties as Perfectas
conjugal share, the remaining should be divided where is for
Perfecta, and is for Claro. Claro says that Article 996 is unjust
and unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same
share as that of children in intestate succession, whereas in testate,
she is given and the only child . Perfecta: Article 996, she is
entitled to another of the remaining .
SC held in Perfectas favour, ruling that Article 996 should control,
regardless of inequity, since in statutory construction, the plural
word children includes the singular child.
D: Court held that Claro cannot rely on Article 892 since it merely
fixes the legitime of the spouse, and Article 888, the legitime of
children in testate succession. This case involves intestate
succession, so Article 996 should apply.
Commentators like JBL Reyes and Tolentino are of the opinion that
when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share
the estate in equal parts. Although the law refers to children or
descendants, the rule in statutory construction that the plural can
be understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. If
not, the consequences would be tremendous because children
will not include child in Articles 887, 888, 896.
Further, from the Spanish Civil Code where Article 996 was taken,
there were two paragraphs governing two contingencies (1) where
widow survives with legit children which is the general rule and (2)
widow survives with only one child. Article 996 omitted the second
one, therefore indicating the legislators desire to promulgate just
one general rule applicable to both.
Extra: It is not correct to assume that in testate succession, the
widow gets only 1/4., since s/he may still get if the testator so
wishes.