Professional Documents
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Week 9 Digests
Week 9 Digests
ISSUES:
a) W/N the case should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction
RULING + RATIO:
a) No.
Although Respondents claim is without basis, the motion to
dismiss should nevertheless be denied. Respondent in this
case filed the action for unlawful detainer within one month
of the demand. P.D. 1508 requires that cases filed with the
Barangay Court must be concluded within 60 days. As such,
Respondent would have a whole 9 months to file with the
RTC.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas
standing on registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy
A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin, Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin
and Ester L. Jarantilla.
2. The lease contract among others contained a "reservation of rights"
clause stating that LESSOR reserves the rights to sell, mortgage,
hypothecate or encumber the property so long as it requires the
purchase(r) or mortgage creditors to respect the terms of this lease
contract; provided further that LESSEE shall be duly informed about
LESSOR's plan to sell the property.
3. After the expiration of the period fixed in the lease agreements, the
lessors executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute
Sale," to Star Group Resources and Development Inc.
4. On November 22, 1989, the buyer, Star Group, brought separate
actions of unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court In Cities of
Iloilo City against the lessees
5. The lessees refused to concede, and indeed impugned, Star Group's
right to eject them.
6. They argued that in so selling the properties and seeking their
ejectment therefrom, the lessors and their buyer had violated
their leasehold rights because (i) they (the lessees) were not
accorded the right of preemption, (b) the buyer was not required to
honor the leases, and (c) the lessees were denied the option to
renew their leases upon the expiration thereof.
7. The same propositions were also set out as causes of action in a
complaint filed in the RTC.
ISSUES: W/N an action for unlawful detainer filed in the MTC be suspended
by an action filed in RTC on the claim that he is entitled to right of preemption
RULING + RATIO:
No. An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed in the RTC
based on tenants claim that his right of pre-emption was violated
The action in the RTC did not involve physical or de facto possession
and the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceedings, or that the issue presented in the former
could quite as easily be set up as defense in the ejectment action
and there resolved.
Cases wherein ownership is the issue does not bar or suspend
ejectment cases which tackle possession de facto
DISPOSITION: Decision AFFIRMED
Author: Marti
of 2,200 sq. m. from the 822.5 sq. m. belonged to him. An claimed that
since An only sold 822.5 sq. m. to his nephew, then Cipriano could not
have sold the rest of the 2,200 sq. m. to Semira.
7. The MTC, after denying the petition at first for lack of jurisdiction since
the case involved the question of ownership, which used to be the
original jurisdiction of the RTC (BP Blg. 129 gave MTC the power to
decide on the ownership of the land ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING PRIOR POSSESSION), ruled that Semira is the rightful
owner and possessor of such land and therefore cannot be ejected
therefrom.
8. RTC ruled otherwise by saying that since An has been in possession of
the land since 1964 and possession was disputed by Semira only on
1979, An therefore had prior possession. CA affirmed this ruling.
ISSUES:
1. WoN forcible entry case will prosper.
a. WoN Semira is the owner of the whole 2,200 sq. m.
i. WoN the whole lot was validly sold to him.
PROVISION:
Art. 1542. Civil Code. In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum
and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number,
there shall be no increase or decrease of the price although there be
greater or less area or number than that stated in a contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovable are sold
for a single price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is
indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number
should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to
deliver all that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds
the area or number specified in the contract; and, should he not be able
to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is
lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded because
vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been
stipulated.
Author: Marti
1&2. Yes, the whole of Lot 4211 was sold to Cipriano and therefore
was validly transferred to Semira through a subsequent sale.
a. See Art. 1542 above.
3.No, forcible entry case will not prosper.
a. Since Semira is the rightful owner of the whole lot, he cannot
be ejected therefrom.
2. However, the court noted here that though Semira was determined to
be the owner in the case of forcible entry for the purpose of
determining prior possession, An is not barred from instituting a
separate proceeding for determination of ownership of the land. This
is because any pronouncement as to the ownership of the real
property in a case of forcible entry is provisional.
WONG VS CARPIO
Petitioners: IGNACIO WONG
Respondent: HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO
Ponencia: BIDIN, J
3. Before July 1976, Ignacio Wong went to the land to find out if there
were other people residing or claiming it besides the owner and he
found none.
a. As a result, Wong bought the land from William Giger and
asked for the delivery of the title to him.
4. Wong then placed laborers on the land and built a small farm house
and placed signboards.
FACTS:
a.
This was when Mercado visited the land to make copra and
the matter was brought to court.
ISSUE:
a. In 1973, William Giger again asked an additional amount of
2,500 from Manuel Mercado and so Mercado required Giger
to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro sale.
2. In 1972, Manuel Mercado began harvesting coconut fruits and he
paid the taxes on the lands for Mr. Giger. His use of the land had the
following characteristics:
a. He only periodically went to the land to make copra
b. He did not place any person on the land to watch it
c.
JAVIER v. VERIDIANO
Doctrine: A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes
a bar to an action for determination of who has right or title of ownership.
Facts:
Babol allegedly took possession with stealth and strategy the southwestern part of
land, with the assistance of hired helpers and started construction of riprap along
the Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of land.
Said entry was further augmented by removing Javiers chain link fence with
galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete, and also destroying plants introduced
by Javier. By these actions, Babol started exercising illegal possession of said
portion of land which contains an area of 200 sqm.
The trial court ruled in 1973 that the 200sqm contested area of the lot is NOT
within Lot 1641 applied by petitioner.In 1973, the sales application was granted
and an OCT was given covering Lot No. 1641.
Meanwhile, Ben Babol had sold the property he was occupying, including the
portion of about 200 sqm in question, to private respondent Reino Rosete.
Petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete
who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand.
In 1977, after 4 years since the dismissal of her earlier forcible entry complaint, she
files an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession against Babol and
Rosete. Rosete moved for the dismissal of the case based on res judicata.
Trial court ruled in favor of Rosete. Petitioner contends that res juricata cannot
apply in the case since there is no identity of causes of action since the first case
was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the
property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into
the ownership of the disputed land. Private respondent however submits that
there is identity of parties in the two cases since he is a successor in interest by title
of the defendant in the first case after the commencement of the first action.
Issue: Whether or not res juricata is applicable to the case?
Held: No. Res judicata is NOT applicable. Petition granted. Petitioner won.
Ratio:
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must
concur:
(1) There must be a final judgment or order;
(2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and,
(4) There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject
matter and of causes of action
The presence of the first three requirements and the identity of subject matter in the fourth
requirement are not disputed. Hence, the only issues remaining are whether there is identity
of parties and identity of causes of action in the forcible entry case and the action for
quieting of title & recovery of possession.
Room 301 when the lock of the main door was changed without his
knowledge and consent.
11. An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for lack
of merit. Hence, this petition for review the main thrust of which is that
the action being one for specific performance the jurisdiction thereof is
vested in the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint filed is one for forcible entry and detainer or
one for specific performance?
PROVISION: Article 539 Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or
restored in or restored to said possession by the means established by laws
and the Rules of Court. A possessor deprived of his possession through the
forcible entry may within 10 days from the filing of the complaint present a
motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession.
RULING + RATIO:
The suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. Private respondent retained the possession of Room 301 of
petitioner's building which he claimed to have the right to use and enjoy, but
petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right
of egress and ingress through the main door of the building. Through
stealth, petitioner changed the key to the main door thus depriving
private respondent of the possession of his rented room.
The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the
title to property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be
turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy,
breaches of the peace and criminal disorder would be minimized. A party out
of possession must respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he
claims is his.
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part
thereof, may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper
inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding
possession from him. This relief is not only available to a landlord,
vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other person
against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof,
is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession
thereof, within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession.
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED. No costs.
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for unlawful detainer was filed in time.
RULING + RATIO:
YES. We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals, and hence
set it aside. Petitioners correctly cite our ruling in Sy Oh v. Garcia upholding
the established rule that the 1 year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can
be filed should be counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate,
the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of
In the present case, it is of note that the first demand letter addressed by
petitioners to private respondent gave the latter the option to either vacate
the premises on or before 28 February 1990 or agree to execute a new lease
contract for 1 year at an increased rental rate of P2,500 per month.
In Vda. de Murga v. Chan we held that:
The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental
or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of
Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to
stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until
he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.
The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from said settled doctrine. It
should be noted that even if the private respondent was depositing rentals in
trust for the petitioners, what was being deposited were rentals at the old
rate, which petitioners were not bound to accept or withdraw. When private
respondent elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent him
the letter of 18 January 1990 giving him the option to vacate by 28 February
1990 or to sign a new lease contract for 1 year at an increased rental rate of
P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) a month, he assumed the new rental
rate and could be ejected from the premises only upon default and by a
proper demand from the petitioners. The demand was made on 10 August
1992, followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992.
Hence it was filed within 1 year from the beginning of the unlawful
possession.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 31480 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
decision rendered:
1. Ordering private respondent Lupo Calaycay to immediately vacate the
premises located at 24-B Scout Santiago Street, Barangay Laging Handa,
Quezon City.
2. Ordering private respondent Lupo Calaycay to pay back rentals in the
amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos per month from March 1990
until he finally vacates the leased premises.
3. Ordering private respondent to pay Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as
attorney's fees.
PROVISIONS:
1. PD 957 Sec 23 (not cited in case, please google nalang I
have limited internet and my eye is throbbing. thanks)
2. Rule 6 Sec 8 (in summary:) a party may file a counterclaim
only if the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim; otherwise it
cannot be filed.
RULING + RATIO:
1. No. MTC correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction. Under PD
957, respondent did in fact have a right to stop paying amortizations
after giving notice to the owner or developer (Francel Realty) due to
petitioners failure to develop the subdivision/condominium project
according to approved plans and with compliance with time. The
case thus involves a determination of rights and obligations of parties
in a sale of real estate under PD 957. In short, this is not a simple
case for unlawful detainer arising from failure of lessee to pay rent.
There is a determinative question cognizable by the HLURB, the
question of right of petitioner must be determined by the petitioner.
2. No. MTC correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the
complaint; it follows that it has no jurisdiction to award counterclaim
for damages in pursuant to Rule 6 Sec 8.
cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of
the possession.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes
Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being
ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending
harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly
provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code.
As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendantsappellants from gathering the pending fruits, which fruits were the
result of their possession and cultivation of the land, it cannot be said
that the defendants-appellants committed an act which is clear
violation of the courts' order.
A person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is
ordinarily not prohibited from taking with him his own effects and
possession, unless there is an express prohibition to this effect. No
such, prohibition was contained in the order for the defendants to
leave the land.
DISPOSITION: The finding of the CA regarding contempt of court is set
aside, and the petitioners are acquitted of the charge against them.
DOCTRINE:
A homesteader who exercises his right to repurchase within 5 years from
conveyance of the homestead should do so in accordance with Article 1616.
However, if he chooses not to pay the useful improvements, as the contrary
would grant the vendee the right of retention over the property (Article 546),
the vendee may resort to remedies afforded by Article 547 which is to
remove the useful improvements, provided no substantial damage or injury is
made.
FACTS:
1. MANGULON Calagan and wife, TAKURA, were granted a
Homestead Patent over a 5.2905 hectare-land in Dawis, Digos,
Davao
2. TAKURA died a year after and was survived by her husband and
children
3. 1961: MANGULON and daughter, PAULA, sold a portion of their
homestead (9,230 square meters) to PETRA Sandoval for P2,340.
The latter borrowed the title of the land to have the sale annotated
thereon
4. 1963: MANGULON offered to repurchase the portion sold to PETRA,
but she refused. The CALAGANS (petitioners) made subsequent
offers but PETRA was adamant. She later on maintained that she
was willing to comply provided she was reimbursed the value of the
house that she constructed on the subject of the land.
5. The trial Court ruled for the CALAGANS, however ordered them to
return the P 2,340 and pay P 3,000 for the value of the house
constructed thereon.
ISSUES:
WoN the CALAGANS may be ordered to pay the value of the house
PROVISION: Public Land Act, Article 1616, 546 and 547 (Civil Code)
RULING + RATIO:
No.
There is no provision in the PUBLIC LAND ACT which provides for
the terms and conditions under which repurchase may be effected by
RULING + RATIO:
1. Cruz has the better right of possession
Both (Cruz and Bulahan) were found by the lower court to be
innocent and to have acted in good faith
BUT Cruz has a better right to the car in question than Bulahan
for it cannot be disputed that Cruz had been illegally deprived
thereof because of the ingenious scheme utilized by Belizo to
enable him to dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof.
o Cruz, therefore, can still recover the possession of the
car even if Bulahan had acted in good faith in purchasing
it from Belizo.
o The maxim that no man can transfer to another a better
title than he has himself obtain in the civil as well as in
common law.
The common law principle that where one of two innocent
parties must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law
imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed cannot be
applied to this case which is covered by an express provision of
the New Civil Code.
DISPOSITION: Petition appealed from is reversed. No cost.
10. After some time, Irineo found out that the car and their unidentified
companion were gone.
11. When Irineo went back to Marellas house, it was closed and Marella
was gone.
a. The matter was reported to his father and the police.
12. On the same day, in the afternoon, Marcella sold the car to petitioner
Jose Aznar for P15,000.
13. While the car was in Aznars possession and while he was attending
to its registration in his name, the agents of Phil. Constabulary,
headed by respondent Yapdiangco, seized the car based on
Teodoro Santos report that said car was unlawfully taken from him.
14. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Yapdiangco.
15. Lower court rendered a decision awarding the car to intervenor
Teodoro Santos.
ISSUE:
Who has the better the right to the possession of the car, Teodoro Santos or
Jose Aznar?
PROVISION: Art.559, Civil Code
The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of
the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
RULING + RATIO:
Teodoro Santos has a better right to the car.
The rule is that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the
finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have
acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief, or robber.
o In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner, who may recover it without paying
indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public
sale.
In this case, Teodoro had been unlawfully deprived of his car by
Marella. Therefore, he can still recover possession of his car even if
it is in the possession of a third party who had acquired it in good
faith.
DISPOSITION: Appeal dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor is not yet the owner. It is
only a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive
prescription, that the clause immediately following provides that `one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof,
may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
FACTS:
1. October 11, 1953 Angelina Guevara while talking to Consuelo
de Garcia, owner of La Bulakea restaurant recognized her
ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and inquired where she bought
it, which the Consuelo told her that she bought it from her
comadre.
2. Angelina explained that that ring was stolen from her house in
February, 1952. Consuelo handed the ring to Angelina and it
fitted the latters finger. (lady's diamond ring 18 cts. white gold
mounting, with a 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and four brills
0.10 cts.)
3. Two or three days later, Angelina and her husband Lt. Col.
Juan Guevara along with Consuelo de Garcia and her
attorney, proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they
showed the ring in question.
4. Mr. Rebullida a examined the ring with the aid of high power
lens and concluded that it was the indeed the ring that
Angelina bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to
Consuelo, who failed to return the ring to Angelina despite a
written request.
RATIO + RULING:
NO. Consuelos possession in good faith is not equivalent to
title and did not defeat Angelinas title over the ring.
Angelina Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the
diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner
Consuelo de Garcia who was found in possession of the same.
Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor is not yet the
owner. The title established by the first clause of Art. 559 is only a
presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive
prescription, that the clause immediately following provides that `one
DIZON v SUNTAY
Petitioner: Dominador Dizon, doing business under the firm name
Pawnshop of Dominador Dizon
Respondent: Lourdes G. Suntay
Ponencia: Fernando, J.
DOCTRINE:
Owner unlawfully deprived of movable property may recover
possession of same from third party.
RULING + RATIO:
FACTS:
YES!
PROVISIONS:
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot
obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass
to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
RULING + RATIO:
No.
EDCA assails that the Spouses Santos have not established their
ownership of the disputed books because they have not even
produced a receipt to prove they had bought the stock. This is
unacceptable. Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559
provides that "the possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title," thus dispensing with further
proof.
Moreover, the general rule is that: Ownership shall pass from the
vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the
thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
The exception would be that: Ownership in the thing sold shall not
pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a
stipulation to that effect. Absent the stipulation above noted, delivery
of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who
can in turn transfer it to another.
Appyling these to the case at bar, although the title of Cruz was
presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books,
these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless
demanded more proof from Cruz by requesting for the EDCA invoice
before deciding to buy them. This was extra caution on the Spouses
Santos part and it would certainly be unfair now to make them bear
the prejudice sustained by EDCA, which should have been more
vigilant in dealing with Cruz.
LEDESMA v CA (1992)
Petition: Appeal from CA, reversing CFI-Rizal in replevin case
Petitioner: Jaime Ledesma
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Citiwide Motors, Inc.
Ponencia: DAVIDE, Jr., J.:
DOCTRINE:
... ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such
ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or
to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation
above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the
buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. (EDCA Publishing and Distributing
Corp. v. Santos)
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
On Sept. 27, 1977, Citiwide sold to a certain Jojo Consuji, two cars (1977 Isuzu
Gemini, PhP42.2k, and 1977 Holden Premiere, PhP58.8k), ostensibly on behalf
of his daddy, Rustico T. Consuji. For this, Jojo was to pay with a Phil. Comm. and
Indust. Bank Managers Check for PhP101,000.00.
The next day, Citiwide delivered the cars to Jojo, and Jojo turned over the
Managers Check (dated Sept. 28) to Citiwide.
When Citiwide took the check to PCIB, IT WAS DISHONORED. PCIB found that
the check was tampered with to make the correct amount of PhP101.00 look
like PhP101,000.00 (material alteration).
Citiwide reported this to the Constabulary, which found that Jojo was in fact
Armando Suarez, and this check-altering is his favored modus operandi.
The Premiere was later found abandoned in QC. Its the Gemini thats the
problem: its now in the possession of Jaime Ledesma. Citiwide filed for
replevin.
Ledesmas defense: he purchased the vehicle in good faith from its registered
owner, Pedro Neyra.
In case its asked: was Citiwide able to recover the vehicle during the case? YES.
Had to post double the cars value as bond.
CFI-Rizal ruled IN FAVOR OF LEDESMA, awarding the return of the car, plus
damages (PhP35k actual, and PhP10k wrongful issue of writ of seizure)
9.
Citiwide appealed, saying: ART. 559. Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of vehicle
by Jojo/Suarez. Ledesmas good faith does not bar recovery. And the Court of
Appeals agreed, ruling in Citywides favor.
10. Could be important if asked: Ledesmas motion for reconsideration argued that
Jojo/Suarez title to the car was voidable at least, and was not declared void
by a competent court at the time of transfer to Ledesma, for purposes of
applying Art. 1506. But the CA denied the reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N Citiwide is entitled to recover the Gemini, by virtue of Art. 559.
(Conversely: Whether Ledesma is entitled to the car by virtue of Art. 1506)
PROVISIONS:
Civil Code Art. 559: The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the
same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Civil Code Art. 1506: Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his
title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to
the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the
sellers defect of title.
Civil Code Arts. 1477 and 1478: The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred
to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. // The parties may
stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has
fully paid the price.
HELD/RATIO:
CITIWIDE IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVERY OF THE CAR. The short version is, It is
EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. v. Santos all over again. The Supreme Court
even explicitly says so. Long version, though:
1.
As per Art. 1477 and 1478, unless the parties stipulate that ownership does
not pass to buyer until full payment of purchase price, then it is the act of
delivery that transfers ownership to the buyer. Citiwide did not stipulate
this when it delivered the car to Jojo/Suarez. Therefore, ownership did
validly pass to Jojo/Suarez, due to an unconditional contract of sale, but
voidable due to Suarezs fraud.
2.
3.
4.
Therefore, the CA was wrong when it said that Citiwide was illegally
deprived of the car due to Suarezs fraud. It was not. Even if it was due to
fraud, ownership was lawfully transferred by delivery, and all fraud can do
is vitiate consent, making the contract voidablebut not void ab initio.
Law on Sales!
When Ledesma bought the car from Neyra, that contract of sale with
Jojo/Suarez had not even been declared void yet by a competent court.
Citing the case of Chua Hai v. Hon. Kapunan, the SC noted that Ledesmas
claim to the Gemini remains valid, and must be respected by the courts.
So the CA was also wrong to rule that Citiwide could repossess the vehicle.
Ledesma paid for the vehicle in good faith. The transfers of ownership
down to him remain uncontested in court.
thing
It had yet to be proven that estafa was actually committed
Civil liability to make restitution under Article 105 arises only when
criminal liability is finally declared
Last paragraph of Artcile 105 provides that restution cannot be
effected if the thing has been acquired im such a manner that
recovery is now barred
Purchasesmade in a merchant's store/fairs/markets (Article 1505
CC)
Even arguing that the purchase was not made in accordance with
Article 1505, failure of a buyer to make goos the price does not
revest title in the seller unleas the sale is first rescinded
Assuming also that the sale was obtained through fraud and deceit,
the contract was made merely voidable
Article1506 CC provides that a buyer in good faith wherein the
seller has a voidable title thereto acquires a good title to the thing
if the title has not been avoided at the time of sale
Queations of ownership and possession being civil in nature, they
should not be settled by exclusive reference to the RPC
Proper remedy lies in a civil suit and attachment
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Order of the court revoked and set aside. G
alvanized Iron Sheets returned to Chua Hai.
Justice Felix, concurrin: Agrees with majority decision but basis of his vote is
that the Article105of the RPC which was relied upon by the court cannot be i
nvoked and applied in the case at bar
Where the ownership of the effects of the crime has been transferred to
an innocent third party, restitution in Article 105 is limited to cases where
the offended party was illegally deprived of the thing (theft, robbery) but
not to cases where the offended party has been deprived of his property
which he delivered to the purchaser with the expectatiom of receiving
consideration for the sale
Justice Labrador, dissenting: It is paragraph 2 of Article 559 which shpuld be
controlling in this case
The only way Chua Hai could vae been protected by the law was if he
purchased the sheets in a public sale as per paragraph 2 of Article 559
Even if Chua Hai has possessed the thing in good faith, Ong Shu still
has a better right over the thing