THE YEAR OF THE FENIANS

( A Self-Guided Tour of Discovery and An lllustrated History of The Fenian Invasion of the Niagara
Peninsula and The Battle of Ridgeway in 1866.)

by
David Owen

THE YEAR OF THE FENIANS

Written by David Owen
Published by:
The Western New York Heritage Institute
2001 Main Street
Buffalo, New York 14208

This book, The Year of the Fenians, a joint project of the Fort Erie
Museum Board and the Western New York Heritage Institute of Canisius College,
is part of a larger commemorative programme to interpret the Fenian invasion of
the Niagara Peninsula on the 125th anniversary of its occurrence.

Copyright @ 1990 by David Owen

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or used in any form by
any means - graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
taping of information storage and retrieval systems - without written permission or the
publishers.
ISBN 1-878097-02-4
(The image on the cover depicts the Fenians fighting the battle of Ridgeway, June 2,
1866. It is from a series of watercolours generously loaned to the Fort Erie Museum by
Mr. and Mrs. Charles Jewell of Newport News, Virginia. The artist is Alexander Von
Erichsen.)

THE 1.25thANNIVERSARY FENIAN RAIDS

FULL RE.ENACTMENT . JUNE 15, 16, 1991
I3AT1;"LEl'lELD MUSEUM llWY. 113' PORT ERIE

II

III

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements

VI

How to use this book

VII

A brief historical overview for the tour

A self-guided tour of discovery of the Fenian invasion
of the Niagara peninsula and the Battle of Ridgeway
Maps

IX-X
1 - 22

23 - 38

An illustrated history of the Fenian movement

in North America
(A) Background of the Fenian movement
(B) Establishment of Fenianism in the United
States
(C) Development of the Fenian movement in the
era of the American Civil War
(D) Anglo-Canadian reactions during the American
Civil War
(E) Schism in the Fenian movement and the
proposed invasion of Canada
(F) The Campobello fiasco and its effects
(0) Anglo-Canadian reactions between 1865 and
early 1866
(H) The invasion of Canada: the campaign in the
Niagara peninsula
(1) Further Fenian activity and decline of the
movement
(1) An evaluation of Fenianism and its
significance
Sources of further reading

39 - 44
45 - 48

49 - 52
53 - 56
57 - 62
63 - 64
65 - 66
67 - 86
87 - 88
89 - 90

91 - 94

How to Use This Book

Acknowledgements

~story is, i~ several senses, ~ living thing. The present, whatever it is specifically, is but the latest
s~ate m a developmg pa~t. ~ur p~:nnt of view may easily grow as our viewing point unfolds. Thus
hIstory! as each ge~era.tlOn m a gIven society attempts to understand its circumstances, is much more a

Fittingly similar to the subject studied, no treatment of history is in reality the product of a single
source.

dynamIcally evolvmg Journey than an inertly factual destination.

The maps enthusiastically rendered by my wife, Martha, are but a small portion of her vast
contribution to this project. She has always and intuitively understood a willing scribe shackled to a
leviathan truth. Whatever I am would be less if not for her example, assistance and encouragement.

. In ~eeping.with the philc;>sophy o~ hi~tory, this work is offered as an introduction only to the
fascmaung and Important.to~)lC of Femam.sm, a 19th century movement which significantly affected
Canada, Ireland, Great Bntam and the Umted States. The content is designed to provide the reader with
a reasonable framework from which more detailed questions could, and should, be launched.

This work would have remained as an unfulfilled responsibility of mine if not for Jane Davies,
curator of the museums operated by the Town of Fort Erie. Her enthusiastic dedication to historical
interpretation is equalled only by her many abilities.

.The table of contents iJ.ldicates the location of the .progressive levels of infornlation as they are
reqUIred ,?y the reader. ~asmg the ?ook upon a self-guIded tour of the Fenians' invasion of Niagara and
the resultm~ Battle of ~dgew~y WIll, I hope, make the subject more immediately understandable, and
even mo:e Importantly mterestmg. The brief historical synopsis which precedes the tour, in addition to
map~, WIll qUIckly put the local terrain ~nd its Fenian history within a more appreciable context. The
tour IS followed .by a more c~mprehen~Ive account of the movement, including its background,
de~elopment, ~lI~ary op~ratlons, declme and significance, if such is required. For the most seriously
srmtten, a partIal lIst of pnnted sources to consult completes the introduction.

The Bradford Galleries and Museums Special Collection Room at Brock University, Buffalo and
Erie County Historical Society, Western New York Heritage Institute of Canisius College, the Town of
Fort Erie museums, Library of Congress, Lundy's Lane Historical Museum, Metro Toronto Library,
National Archives of Canada, National Museum of 1. E. Elam, and the Toronto Historical Board all
assisted in some facet on information, illustration, permission and production assistance.
While it is impossible to mention everyone who has quietly added their bit, I would like to
especially thank Peter Beresford Ellis, Pierre d'Entremont, Mrs. Charles A. Jewell, Ben Maryniak, Ed
Patton, Paul F. Redding, David Plato and Ken Ruch for their various and considerable contributions of
effort, illustrations, photographs, information, opinions and encouragement. I must also acknowledge
the influence of William S. Neidhardt; in the early 1970's when I was seriously attempting to hone my
understanding of the Fenian movement, his thoughtful writings on the subject proved invaluable.

For the i!1sa~able, ~he galaxies of primary document sources, as well as the inspirations which
come when vIewmg hentage ground, always await discovery.

Finally, and I think most appropriately on what would have been his birthday, I wish to dedicate
this work to my father. His reverence for that which had been was the first trait of his of which I was
really aware. For my father, it was as natural and vital as breathing and, as such, was quite divorced
from the dry and disciplined rattle of bleached academic bones. In short, unlike his son, he never
degenerated into a mere historian. When at his finest, he simply stood in awe of the almost sacerdotal
mystique which he sensed in the presence of the past and if I could be permitted to inherit but one of my
father's attributes, without hesitation my selection would be that.
The Fenian movement was an old and favourite subject for the two of us. I was only a child when
my father introduced me to the topic and despite, or because of, the mysterious vicissitudes inherent in a
deliciously meandering fate, it was a passion to which we independently and always returned. Had my
father lived beyond his allotted span within time's tuneful turnings, I am quietly convinced that the
musician within him would have been pleased to see his lyric led wayward son finally dance a set with
an old and patiently waiting love. Somehow, though, I suspect that he always knew that the incorrigible
impracticality of Celtic temperament would allow me to do no other.
David Owen
Stevensville, Ontario
21 December, 1990

Lt. Routn of the 13th battalio~, when wounded was assisted by Col. J. O'Neill
who allowed Routn to keep hIS sword.
From the collection of Mr. & Mrs. C. Jewell

tF=~======~

Jt

lID@~fill@ @~

VI

mn(Q1~@~~

c+

Look for these signs along most of the roads in the self-guided tour.
Certain restrictions prevented signing the entire route.
VII

A Brief Historical Overview For The Tour

The year of the Fenians, 1866, in which their threatened invasions of Canada culminated in the
campaign in the Niagara peninsula and the Battle of Ridgeway, was the eventual transatlantic result of
the Anglo-Norman occupation of increasingly larger portions of Celtic Ireland, beginning in the Middle
Ages.
The failure of both the Irish potato crop and the uprising of 1848 greatly increased Irish
immigration to the United States. By the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, there were well
over a million people of Irish birth in the United States, largely concentrated in the burgeoning urban
centres of the eastern states, with a growing electoral power which the contemporary American
politicians thought they could not ignore with impunity. This large and politically astute element of
American society was leavened with refugee Irish revolutionaries and it is not surprising that in 1858 the
Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, soon to be renamed the Fenian Brotherhood, was instituted. Their
goal was the establishment of a republican government in Ireland. The original purpose of the American
branch of the movement was the supply of manpower, money and logistics for a future insurrection in
the Irish homeland.
Both the movement and its effectiveness grew tremendously during the American Civil War from
1861 to 1865. Large numbers of young Irish, at least some of whom were desirous of military
experience to eventually employ on the movement's behalf, enlisted in the Union Army and many Irish
were of the opinion that both the American people and government were placed in a position of
indebtedness with respect to the Fenian cause. At the conclusion of the conflict, the Irish-American
veterans were allowed to purchase their arms and equipment, as well as other surplus equipment, from
the government at almost token cost. The often stormy relations between the Union government and that
of Great Britain only encouraged the Fenians; an Anglo-American war would have potentially furthered
the Fenians' objectives and many in the movement believed that, at worst, the American government
would not interfere with Fenian designs as they were a convenient means of forcing the British to
consider American demands for reparations arising from the Civil War. The concurrent timing of
American internal politics, the national election of 1866 and international disputes originating in the
Civil War was the essence of the mutual political opportunism which existed between the Fenian
movement and the government of the United States in the mid-1860's.
By late 1865, as a result of the serious suppression of the movement in Ireland, the American
branch split into two wings which were quickly and increasingly antagonistic to each other. One
retained the original purpose of exclusively supporting a homeland revolt against British authority. The
other, and newer wing, believing that an Irish uprising was now impossible, advocated the view that an
invasion of Canada was much more likely to achieve Irish independence, albeit in a somewhat more
circuitous manner. The Fenians calculated that it was quite possible that their invasion of Canada would
embroil the governments of the United States and Great Britain in a war which would divert British
military resources from Ireland and gain even more American support for the attempt to annex portions
of Canada. If the invasion was successful, Canada could be bartered for Irish home rule. By very early
1866, the wing favouring Canadian invasion, with an Irish Republican government-in-exile modelled on
that of the United States, had created with the aid of professional soldiers a complex plan of military
operations designed to wrest a substantial amount of Canada away from the British empire.

IX

Judged by the movement's stately goals, the Fenian invasions of Canada were strategic failures.
Although Fenian scares periodically surfaced for several years afterwards, by the end of 1866 it was
increasingly obvious that the Fenianism was a spent force. As Irish-American support weakened with
repeated failure, so did the American politician's fear that an anti-Fenian stance would hazard the
Irish-American vote. The Anglo-American problems of the Civil War began to diminish, and with it,the
Fenians' chances of capitalizing upon such disputes. The power of the Fenian Brotherhood in the
United States ultimately rested upon the short lived opp0l1unities possible in political issues whose
direction and duration it did not control.
Ironically, the Fenians' desire for an Irish national government fostered a greater sense of nationalism
amongst Canadians. The Canadian Confederation process, already initiated in the early-mid 1860's, was
seriously accelerated by the need for defence against the perceived post-Civil War American invasion
threat, a considerable ponion of which was posed by the activities of the Fenian Brotherhood.

A Self-Guided Tour of Discovery

of the Fenian Invasion of the Niagara Peninsula and the Battle of Ridgeway
In the late May of 1866, the Fenian Army began to assemble at several places along the
Canada-United States border to begin to put into effect the invasion plan prepared months before by
General Thomas Sweeny, the Fenians' Secretary of War.
This scheme employing thousands of Fenian troops, called for several thrusts into Ontario. These
were designed to be perceived by the British as threats to vital lines of communications and municipal
areas. When the Crown's forces were drawn out of Quebec into Ontario, the major Fenian assault
would sever their line of communication and set up an Irish government to secure Irish independence.
[see map of Canada]
Thus, the invasion of Ontario was to be a large feint, and the operation in Niagara was an integral
part of this. The Fenians had a good grasp of the local terrain, and saw that the WeIland Canal and
Welland River would form not only a good bridgehead for an initial lodgement behind a water barrier,
but would also force the British and Canadians to react to the problems that the seizure of the canal
would eventually cause. A large Anglo-Canadian deployment of men and military resources in the
Niagara region would assist Sweeny's grand design. [see map of Niagara]
As Sweeny was a former professional soldier, and the Fenian troops which he proposed to employ
in Canada were largely veterans of the vast armies of the Civil War, experienced in large and modern
operations, it is not surprising to find that the strategy for the Niagara invasion properly called for the
risking of a smaller body of men who would take and hold a bridgehead prior to reinforcement.
Colonel John O'Neill was selected to lead an understrength Fenian infantry brigade across the
Niagara River to Fort Erie to capture a bridgehead for the large force gathering in Buffalo, New York,
behind him. In turn, O'Neill asked one of his battalions, with the securing of a perimeter in Fort Erie in
which the rest of the leading brigade could safely land before they proceeded, to capture the selected
features which would form the bridgehead. Shortly after midnight on 1 June, O'Neill's advance battalion
began to cross the Niagara River from Black Rock, nonh of Buffalo.

A Fenian officer smashed a gun from the Queen's Own Rifles against a rock
From the collection of Mr. & Mrs. C. Jewell.
and accidentally shot himself.

The basic tour follows as closely as possible the roughly circular invasion route of the Fenians from
entrance to exit. In order to minimize travel while giving as much appreciation as possible of things
such as Anglo-Canadian movement, or other special features which are pertinent, alternate side trips are
offered at appropriate places. These options always return to the Fenian route. Approximate distances
are given in both kilometres and miles between the features. The photographs should help in orienting
yourself to the features discussed.
#1 The Fenian Landing at Bowen Road and the Niagara Parkway

[see map ofFon Erie, map #3]

The Fenian advance elements landed here at Freebury's Wharf at the intersection of Bowen Road
and the Niagara Parkway. The commanding officer of the leading battalion attempted to seize any
railroad rolling stock. Although they were unsuccessful in this, the Fenians captured the train depot, cut
telegraph lines, partially destroyed Sauerwein's Bridge [see #10] to prevent rail-carried troops from
approaching their initial perimeter and captured a handful of British troops in the ruins of what is now
Historic Fort Erie [see #13]. After posting pickets at vital points, the leading battalion was joined before
dawn by the rest of the brigade which crossed the river in barges towed by tugs which also landed at
Freebury's Wharf.

#3 The Fenian Positions on Black Creek

Now proceed north on the Niagara Parkway about 1 km (.Smile) to Frenchman's Creek.
#2 The Fenian Position on Frenchman's Creek

By midnight, the remainder of the Fenian brigade had moved into this general area to the south of
Black Creek and deployed to cover the bridges.

By mid-morning, O'Neill's force had moved to the south bank of Frenchman's Creek and set up
defensive positions here. The waterway provided a convenient barrier to any force advancing from the
north, and the Fenians' fire positions were strengthened during the course of the day by split rail
barricades. A temporary headquarters was established here at Newbigging's farm, and reinforcements
joined the Fenian expeditionary force here by late morning. It is still unknown why O'Neill spent the
afternoon of 1 June in the position before moving to seize the WeIland River at Chippawa as the
northern end of his intended bridgehead.

Aware that the British had reached Chippawa, O'Neill realized that a smaller bridgehead had to be
employed. The natural barriers of Black Creek and its tributaries running to the southwest, in
combination with the limestone ridge which ran north from Lake Erie towards Beaver Creek, the
southern fork of Black Creek, afforded admirable obstacles to forces moving south and east towards Fort
Erie.
About 100 m west of the intersection of Switch Road and the Niagara Parkway, you will notice the
roadbed of the abandoned rail line which connected Fort Erie and Chippawa. This crossed Black Creek
to your right and as you proceed along Switch Road you are roughly parallel to the water barrier
employed by the Fenians. On your left you will periodically notice that the ground is slightly higher,
and the period sources note that this then-wooded feature afforded a good screen for the Fenian
deployment as they covered the then-open and cultivated fields to the north of the creek. When we view
this and later ground from a military standpoint, we begin to appreciate both the effectiveness of the
previous Fenian reconnaissance of the local terrain and O'Neill's ability to quickly grasp its strengths and
weaknesses as it affected troop deployment.

By the early evening, O'Neill sent one of his battalions north to begin to secure the WeIland River.
Somewhat near Black Creek, the leading elements encountered civilian dressed horsemen who retired to
the north. Sending word back to O'Neill that they had been potentially discovered, the battalion
deployed along the south bank of Black Creek in anticipation of an assault from the direction of
Chippawa.

The Fenian clandestine intelligence system informed O'Neill that he was between two columns: the
one in Chippawa of which he was already aware, and another recently arrived in Port Colborne. It is
probable that O'Neill.reali~edfrom the Anglo-Canadian reactions that they gauged his objective to be
the WeIland Canal-River lme and had put themselves between the Fenians and their objectives before
joining to drive to the east.
An experienced tactician, O'Neill was well aware of the advantages of operating within interior
lines and that he should, if possible, concentrate his force against a still divided enemy. Aware that the
weaker column at Port Colborne would detrain at Ridgeway and march north to rendezvous with the
other column at Stevensville in the morning, O'Neill, having calculated the relative distances between
the forces, decided that he had time to intercept the Canadian column north of Ridgeway along the ridge
where the ground advantage lay with the Fenians.
O'Neill assembled his brigade around 3 AM. It is possible that he left a strong picket at Black
Creek to stall any British probing in this area, but he knew that the British had realized that it was safer
for them to consolidate to the west of his location. The Fenians moved to the southwest using Black and
Beaver Creeks as a water barrier before ascending the ridge itself.

Frenchman's Creek and Niagara Parkway looking North.

~oceed along Switch Road for 1.5 km (l mile) and come to a stop at the intersection with
Townhne Road. The overpass over the Q. E. W. should be visible to your immediate right. If you
desire.a better view, park on the shoulder of the road and carefully walk to the top of the overpass. To
your nght, the northeast, you will see Black Creek flowing towards the Niagara River where the Fenians'
positions were. To your left, the southwest, you will observe the forking of Black and Beaver Creeks.
The southern bank of the left one was followed by the Fenians for several miles towards the limestone
ridge which is visible to the south.

Photos of the driving tour courtesy of

Peter d'Entrement

Proceed north along the Niagara Parkway for about 10 km (6 miles) past Townline Road and
Service Road 12, and turn left on Switch Road.

Optional Tour to #4 and #5

If you have decided to follow an interesti'ng portion of the route of the British column as it moved
south from Chippawa to the rendezvous at Stevensville, turn right on the Townline Road at its
intersection with Switch Road and go over the Q. E. W. overpass. About 1 km (.5 mile) onwards, you
will come to the intersection with Netherby Road (Regional 25). Turn left or west, on Netherby Road
and proceed less than 3 krn (2 miles). You will come to # 4 on your map. The crossroad of Snyder was
historically known as New Germany. Pull over at a safe and convenient spot near the intersection of
Netherby and Sodom Roads.
#4 Peacocke's Column at New Germany
Having properly assessed the Fenians' probable initial intentions, the British moved to secure the
WeIland Canal-River line as quickly as possible. A British column of infantry and artillery, commanded
by Colonel George Peacocke, had arrived in the village of Chippawa on the evening of 1 June. A
Canadian column of infantry only was detailed to cover Port Colborne, the southern terminal of the
canal and arrived later the same evening. Peacocke, awaiting further reinforcements at Chippawa,
ordered the Canadian commander of the Port Colborne column to rendezvous with his force in
Stevensville on the morning of 2 June.

West of Limestone Ridge in the area where Fenians climbed the ridge near Bowen Road and Ridge
Road.

You must now decide if you wish to roughly follow the Fenian route to the place where they gained
the height advantage of the ridge [see #7], a distance of? krn (3 miles) from ~o~r present locat~on, or
take a short side trip to follow the movements of the Chippawa column exammmg several pertment
features [see #4 and #5, and optionally #6] before you rejoin the Fenian route at #7 Intersection of Ridge
and Bowen Roads to follow it to the location of the Battle of Ridgeway.
If you have chosen the Fenian route, move to the next paragraph. If you have selected the side trip
depicting the route of the British column from Chippawa, move in the guide .to Optional Tour #4 and.#5.
This will be a distance of about 10 krn (6 miles) before you return to the Feman routes at #7 IntersectIOn
of Ridge and Bowen Roads.
To follow approximately the route of the Fenians' advance, tum l~ft on Townline Ro~d where it
intersects with Switch Road and proceed eastwards for about 1 krn (.5 ITI1les) and then turn nght on
Ridgemount Road. Move south and you ~ill cross the Q. E. W. ~)Verpass aut0!llatically. About 1 km (.5
miles) to the south of the overpass you WIll come to a level crossI.ng. The Femans advance~ so~th along
Beaver Creek roughly parallel and to the right of your route (;)ll Ridgemount Road ~nd at thIS p~)lnt, ~s
the waterway was the closest to the heights to the southwest I!1 ~o.n~ of you, .they clImbed th~ ndge m.
this locale. This would have had the military advantage of ffiilllITI1Zmg the tIme when they dId not enJoy
.
a terrain advantage. Proceed from here up the ridge and come ~o a stop at the intersec~ion of
Ridgemount and Bowen Roads, a distance of about 1 krn (.5 mIle) from the tracks .WhiCh Y0l.;l have Ju.st
crossed. Tum right on Bowen Road, and move westward for less t~an 1 ~ (.5 ITI1le) to th~ mtersectI?n
of Bowen and Ridge Roads. As you decided not to take the followmg optIOnal tour, move m your gUIde
to #7 Intersection of Ridge and Bowen Roads.

Unknown to O'Neill, and unauthorized by Peacocke, the two senior officers in Port Colborne
decided to send a small portion of their force by ship to Fort Erie in the night and cut off the retirement
of the Fenians, whom they believed to be militarily incompetent drunkards. After telegraphing
Peacocke that they wished to alter his campaign plan, Colonel Dennis left for Fort Erie with less than
100 men from the 900 man force. Peacocke's wired disapproval thus arrived too late, and Colonel
Booker agreed to follow the original plan and join with Peacocke in Stevensville.
Having been reinforced by two Canadian infantry battalions, Peacocke left Chippawa in the
morning. Plagued by poor maps and bridges over the tributaries of the Niagara River which broke down
under the weight of his field artillery, Peacocke's column marched in oppressive heat southward along
what is now the Niagara Parkway. Somewhere to the northeast of YOljr location, they turned southwest
to reach your present location by the late morning. Having both heard the, heavy firing to the south in
the morning and having received a message from Booker that he was engaging the Fenians as he
advanced towards Stevensville, Peacocke realized that the situation had considerably changed. He
decided to rest, feed and gather his troops as he sought fresh intelligence. Concerned that the Fenians
were in strength, and believing them to be equipped with artillery, Peacocke's caution is quite
understandable. The column spent the afternoon in the New Germany area.
Many of Peacocke's men were exhausted by the time they reached New Germany. The heavy packs
and heat had taken their toll. One NCO died of heat stroke, and local tradition notes
the location of this untimely demise as by the graveyard on Sodom Road several hundred metres to the
north of the crossroad.

#5 1866 Barn North of Stevensville

About 100-200 m north of the tracks, on the right hand side of the road as you proceed to the south,
you will note a large barn about 100 m to the west. The eaves is marked to the effect that the southern
portion of the structure was erected in 1866. On 2 June, as Peacocke's column was in New Germany
and moving south, this barn was being raised. A large meal had been prepared for the work party by
women who had subsequently fled south southwest with the children to the safety of the Humberstone
Marsh, as many locals did during the invasion. Local tradition notes that the troops stopped to help
those labouring in the muggy weather, and later partook of the meal. This was in the orchard which
then existed between the bam and the road where you are now.

Graveyard several hundred metres to the east of the intersection of Sodom and Netherby Roads.
Tradition relates that an NCO died of heat stroke here.
By late afternoon, Peacocke had received further reinforcements bringing his command to abo.ut
2,000 officers and men. A unit of Canadian cavalry from Toronto was amon~st these, and for the fIrst
time in the campaign, the Crown forces had the means to properly screen theIr movements and gather
local intelligence.
The commander of this cavalry formation noted, in his account of the ca~~a.ign, an interesting
incident which occurred at New Germany. Peacocke's staff was approached by a CIVIlIan g~rbed
stranger, who, if provided with a horse, would reconnoitre t~e Fenian position and return with .the results
of his reconnaissance, Receiving a government mount, he dIsappeared eastwards. When h~ dId not
.
return, the officers began to suspect that they had encountered a dm:ing me:nber .of the Feman
intelligence gathering network which was operating befor~ and dun~g the InVaSIOn. Afte: th~ Femans
had withdrawn from Fort Erie, the unattended horse was dIscovered In the area of the Femans last
toehold in Fort Erie.
Having learned that the Fenians had withdrawn eastward and Booker's force westward after the
engagement at Ridgeway, Peacocke's reinforced column began to move south along Sodom Road
toward Stevensville in the late afternoon.
Turn left on Sodom Road (Regional 116) at its intersection with Netherby Road and proceed south
for around 2 km (1 mile).

1866 Barn west of Stevensville Road.

Move south through Stevensville for about 2 km (1 mile) and turn left on Bowen Road (Regional 21).
On the evening of 2 June, screened by cavalry, Peacocke's column moved to the east along this
road. Approximately 3 km (2 miles) from your last tum, you should begin to see the height advantage
of the limestone ridge running north and south. At the crest is #7 Intersection of Ridge and Bowen
Roads. If you do not wish to continue east for 4 km (2 miles) to see #6 Location of Fenian Pickets and
Peacocke's Nocturnal Deployment (where Peacocke first encountered Fenian pickets as he probed
eastwards on the night of 2 June and deployed expecting a night assault) before returning to this spot,
stop at a convenient place near this intersection and move to #7 Intersection of Ridge and Bowen Roads
in your guide. If you have decided to continue with Peacocke's route, as noted above, move to the next
paragraph.
Optional Tour to # 6 Location of Fenian Pickets and Peacocke's Nocturnal Deployment
Having chosen to see the place where Peacocke's column first encountered Fenians, you should
proceed east on Bowen Road for about 4 km (2 miles), in the process going over the Q.E.W. overpass.

To the left of the intersection of Bowen and Pettit Roads was the location of Bowen Road in the 1860's
where it crossed a tributary of Miller's Creek. Peacocke's cavalry enc~untere~ a I?icket in t~is location,
probably on the far bank of the creek. As O'Neill's bridgehead was r~pldly ~hrinkmg followmg the .
retreat to Fort Erie, he threw out pickets on the night of 2 June. Fearmg a nIght assault from the FenIans,
Peacocke's column was deployed here for the night. The J?ritish were still quite c?ncerned about the
.
Fenian strength, and had recently received information, ultImately fals~, th~t O'Ne.Ill had been
substantially reinforced. On the morning of 3 June, Peacocke learned m thIS locatIOn that the FenIans
had evacuated Fort Erie the night before. Peacocke's forces moved south and then east to clear the area
of any stragglers.

Looking east toward the intersection of ~owen Road and Ridge Road

A fuller appreciation of the advantages of the limestone ridge may be gained by walking about,
near the edge of the crest, to look west and north.

Bowen Road, just to the west of its intersection with Pettit Road, looking east. Peacocke's column
encountered Fenian pickets here and deployed for the night in fields to the left.

You should now reverse your direction and return to #7 Intersection of Ridge and Bowen Roads.

Led by th~ same battalion which had made the initial landing at Freebury's Wharf, O'Neill's brigade
left t~e protec~IOn o~ Beaver Creek when it came closest to this ridge, somewhat to the north of this
locat~on ..Hav~ng ga~ned the ridge, they moved through this area southward on Ridge Road. From this
locatIon nght mt? RIdgeway the Fe?i~~s would have a constant height advantage. It was approximately
here that the FenIans encountered cIvIlIan horsemen who fled toward Ridgeway spreading the alarm.
. As,You I?roceed south along ~idge Roa~, y?U will see constant evidence of the competence of the
FenIans prevIOus ground reconnaIssance. 0 NellI expected to engage the Canadians as they moved
north from Ridgeway on his right and front, and better ground could not have chosen for the Fenian's
purpose.

#8 Battle of Ridgeway

[see Battle of Ridgeway map, maps 4-8]

O'Neill's brigade reached this approximate area on Ridge Road at some point after 6 AM on June 2,
having moved south about 11 km (7 miles) from his position on Black Creek. Upon hearing the train
whistles and the bugle calls of the rifle units in the still morning air, O'Neill realized that the Canadian
infantry was at the train station in Ridgeway and that he had to competently deploy his men as quickly
as possible. The intersection of Ridge and Bertie Roads was roughly the centre of the defensive position
chosen by O'Neill in which to receive the Canadians. The height of the ridge to the east, and the rising
slope to the north, when combined with the open fields to the south and southwest was the key to the
position's defensive strength. Posting his reserve on the wooded height to the north gave O'Neill a
commanding view of the battle as well as reaction time if his position was constructed in depth. Bertie
Road by the brick home eastward to the ridge, and forward into what was then a wooded crest, was the
main line with the possibility of enfilade fire arranged. Barricades of split rail fencing were thrown up
along the south side of Bertie Road. Note the excellent fields of fire to the south and southwest, the
direction from which the Canadians were expected to corne. Move up the ridge to the east along Bertie
Road to examine the crossfire which could be delivered from the forward position on the crest. In 1866,
the Fenian positions would have been behind scrub and trees, while the Canadians would be largely in
wheat fields. A skirmish line was thrown forward about lkm (.5 miles) to the intersection of Ridge and
Garrison Roads to the south. These men were to deliberately retire to draw the Canadians into the
killing ground to the south of Bertie Road and to the east of the limestone ridge. In the 1860's, a tavern
known as "The Smuggler's Inn" stood at the northeast corner of the Ridge-Garrison Road intersection,
and there were several small buildings along Ridge Road.

On Ridge Road between Bowen and Bertie Roads along the Fenians' axis of advance.
Note the height advantage over the land to the west.

Turn on to Ridge Road and proceed south along this scenic and historic road for approximately 4 km (2
miles) and stop at the intersection of Ridge and Bertie Roads.

Intersection of Garrison and Ridge Roads looking northwest. "The Smuggler's Inn" was located here.
This was the area of the Fenians' skirmish line.

,
11

10

The Feniar:s began to re~u:e through the orchard to the immediate north of the brick home and up the
slope to theIr reserve posItIon on the wooded heights.

The Canadian column, comprised of several militia units, the Queen's Own Rifles, the 13th
Battalion, and the Caledonia and York Rifle Companies with a total strength of less than 900 officers
and men, had left Port Colbome around 5 AM and arrived at the train station in Ridgeway about an hour
later. Some time was spent in forming up and inspecting the men. Although warned by the mounted
men that O'Neill's brigade was only a few miles away and heading south, Booker ignored this
information. Expecting nothing more than a route march of several miles, Booker's column began to
proceed north along Ridge Road towards Stevensville, employing a route which took it into the lower
ground to the immediate west of the limestone ridge. As the Canadians moved towards the intersection
of Ridge and Garrison Roads, they may have sung a song quite popular in the militia units in the
summer of 1866:
Tramp, tramp, tramp, our boys are marching,
Cheer up, let the Fenians come.
For beneath the Union Jack, we'll drive the rabble back
And we'll fight for our beloved Canadian home!
Running into the Fenian skirmishers posted at Garrison and Ridge Roads, the leading rifle
companies deployed into line around 8 AM and began firing. The Fenians deliberately retired towards
their main line and the Canadians swept north to the west of the ridge. Heavy firing ensued which
Peacocke's column heard as it advanced from Chippawa. Premature firing from enfilade position on the
ridge disclosed O'Neill's crossfire trap too soon, and two companies of the Queen's Own were detailed to
clear this area. A portion of the Canadian line, by working into the lower ground to the west of the
intersection of Bertie and Ridge Road, began to turn the right flank of the Fenian main line along Bertie
Road.

~ertie Bay east of the int~rsection. Anger's brick home is visible. The Fenian main line was on the left
SIde of the road. The enfIlade fire position was on the ridge to the left.

___- - - . 1

.~
I.

l~_-

Intersection of Ridge and Bertie Roads

Looking south along Ridge Road. Canadian line came towards this location.

12

o~ Bertie Road.look~ng south. The Fenian main line faced this way and the Canadians advanced into
thIS area. The ndge IS to the left. The excellent fire position of the Fenian is quite visible.

13

Some sources have suggested that this retirement was deliberately executed to draw the
Canadian centre forward into another enfilade fire from the higher ground to the east. The appearance
of a few horsemen somewhere to the north or northwest somewhat disturbed the Canadians who then
attempted to move from line to square, the 19th century means of protecting infantry from cavalry. This
occurred to the south of the intersection of Bertie and Ridge Roads. Booker, realizing that they were not
facing cavalry, ordered the men to form line again. This confused many, and panic began to develop.
Booker ordered a retirement and began, along with a number of officers and men, to attempt to regain
control of the retreating Canadian infantry. These efforts were largely unsuccessful.
As the Canadians retired to the south, O'Neill's men, who had been firing heavily into the
increasingly confused Canadian ranks, were ordered to fix bayonets and advance down the slope in
pursuit. Most of O'Neill's brigade consolidated on Garrison Road as the Canadians rapidly continued
their retreat into Ridgeway.

Bertie Road east of Ridge Road.

Looking southwest. This was the area of the junction of the Fenian main line and their enfilade fire
position to the south along the ridge. The Canadian square was formed several hundred metres from
this location, to the southwest in about the centre of photograph.

.
Se.veral s~all houses along Ridge Road, including the previously mentioned tavern, were hastily
ImproVIsed as fIeld hospitals.
The Canadians retreated on foot along the rail line toward Port Colborne.

Ridge Road, north of the intersection of Ridge and Bertie.

Looking east. The Fenian reserve position was on the height in the distance. The Fenians launched a
bayonet assault through an orchard here when the Canadians retreated.

In spite of their tactical victory at Ridgeway, the Fenians were in a critical situation. Still to the
north was a st:~ng enemy, which they had to either engage or outmanoeuvre, and the Fenian brigade
had yet to be JOIned by the much larger force gathering in Buffalo, New York. O'Neill realized that it
was dangerous to remain unreinforced 11 km (7 miles) away from the Niagara River, as his force had
b~en .weake.ned by str~ggling, ~e~ertion,.and most.recently,.a small degree of battle loss. Consequently,
o .NeIll deCIded to retIre to a mlmmal bndgehead In Fort Ene where he could either be quickly
relnforc~d and rr:<?ve to fac~ Pe~cocke, or. easily withdraw across the Niagara River if the larger force
was not In a posltl.on to .asslst hIm. ~y mI~-afternoon of 2 June, after resting his men and tending to the
wounded, the Feman bngade b.egan ItS retrr~ment to the east. Their main force moved along Garrison
Road, and. a small~r force, WhICh had gone lnt~ the largely deserted village of Ridgeway [see #9] to cut
telegr~ph hnes, retrred roughl~ parallel to O'NeIll's main body by moving along the rail line ripping up
track In order to prevent a rapId follow-up by Crown forces into their final positions in Fort Erie [see
#13 and #14].
You must now make some decisions about your tour options.

14

15

If you wish to go to Ridgeway to see the rail line upon which part of O'Neill's force retired
eastward and/or the Ridgeway Museum of Ridge Road, before seeing #11 Ridgeway Battlefield
Museum and following the route of the Fenians' withdrawal in Fort Erie and their final positions
[see#12, #13, #14], move to Optional Tour to #9 Ridgeway Railroad Track Area and Ridgeway Museum
in your guide.
If you have decided not to go into Ridgeway to see the above noted features, or have just returned
from Ridgeway as per the note below, turn east on Garrison Road (Highway 3). The Ridgeway
Battlefield Museum is on your left hand side about 200 m east of the intersection of Garrison and Ridge
Roads. If you wish to visit this museum, turn into the entrance for this facility and move to #11
Ridgeway Battlefield Museum in your guide. If you are not interested in this, or have just left it, and are
interested in seeing Sauerwein's Bridge [see #101. the bridge partially destroyed by the leading elements
of the Fenian brigade shortly after they landed in Fort Erie, immediately turn to Optional Tour to #10
Sauerwein's Bridge in your guide before you go past Centralia Avenue which is about 2 km (1 mile) east
of Garrison and Ridge Roads. The side trip to Sauerwein's Bridge is about 3 km (2 miles) and return. If
you are not interested in this side trip, or have just finished it as per the note below, proceed eastward
along Garrison Road (Highway 3) for about 10 km (6 miles) and turn left, or north, at the intersection
with Central Avenue (Regional 124). This height of land at Garrison and Central was the general
location of a large camp of British and Canadian troops who occupied Fort Erie for several weeks after
the Fenian invasion. Proceed north for about 1 km (.5 miles) and turn right on either Bertie or Murray.
Come to a stop where whichever road you have taken intersects with the Niagara Parkway.
Move to #12 Engagement at Fort Erie Dock in your guide.
Optional Tour to #9 Ridgeway Track Area and Ridgeway Museum

Move to Optional Tour to # 10 Sauerwein's Bridge in your guide if you are interested in this
feature.
If you are not interested in Sauerwein's Bridge, or wish to see it after you have seen the Ridgeway
BattlefIeld Museum [see #11], retrace your steps by driving north on Ridge Road back to its intersection
y.'ith Garri~on Road (in doing so you follow the route taken by Booker's column to the battle), and return
m your gmde to the last paragraph of #8 Battle of Ridgeway.
Optional Tour to #10 Sauerwein's Bridge
. If you ~e coming from Garrison and Ridge Roads, proceed east on Garrison for about 2 km (1
mIle), turn nght, or south, on Centralia Avenue to its intersection with Dominion Road (Regional 1).
If you are coming from Ridgeway, turn right, or east on Dominion Road (Regional 1) and proceed
for about 3 km (2 miles) to its intersection with Centralia Avenue.
In either case, at the intersection of Dominion and Centralia, go south on the latter. This would be a
right turn if coming from Ridgeway, or straight through if coming from Garrison Road. Proceed about
300 m on Centralia to the old roadbed which crosses Centralia. About 100 m to the east is the location
of Sauerwein's ~ridge ~he~e it cross~s Six Mile Creek. This was partially burned by O'Neill's men
shortly after theIr landmg ill Fort Ene on 1 June. Its destruction early in the campaign indicates the
competence of the Fenians' pre-invasion reconnaissance with respect to features which could affect their
ability to hold their bridgehead. Having inspected this area, proceed north on Centralia Avenue to its
intersection with Garrison Road.

Proceed south on Ridge Road into the village of Ridgeway. The road bed of the old track which
the Fenians followed to the east, and ripped up as well, is about 3 km (2 miles) south of the Intersection
of Garrison and Ridge Roads. The Ridgeway Museum is in a large stone building, the former Bertie
Town Hall, on your left hand side at 402 Ridge Road. This facility is about 2 km (1 mile) to the south of
the previously mentioned intersection.

Sauerwein's Bridge over Six Mile Creek looking east. The Fenians partially destroyed this bridge
shortly after their landing in Fort Erie.

16

17

If you have not yet seen the Ridgeway Battlefield Museum [see #11] and wish to do so, turn left, or
west, on Garrison Road and move to #11 Ridgeway Battlefield Museum in your guide. If you have
seen this facility, or do not wish to do so, turn right or east, on Garrison Road. In either case, note the
appropriate subsequent instructions in the last paragraph of #8 Battle of Ridgeway in your guide.

#11 Ridgeway Battlefield Museum

This facility is located about 200 m to the east of the intersection of Ridge and Garrison Roads on
the latter thoroughfare. If you are coming from the east, it is on your right-hand side.
This building was moved here in the mid-1970's from its original location of Ridge Road near the
battlefield.

Memorial Cairn
Return in your guide to the appropriate instructions in the last paragraph of #8 Battle of Ridgeway.
#12 Engagement at Fort Erie Dock
Having moved down Garrison Road and the parallel rail line, O'Neill'~ force appeared on the
heights in this area overlooking the dock near here, where a small party of Canadian troops had been
shipped from Port Colborne. After fighting courageously near the dock against overwhelming odds, the
cut off Canadians were overpowered by Fenians and captured in the late afternoon of 2 June. The tug
which had brought the Canadian landing party managed to escape and return to Port Colborne with a
number of Fenians who had been captured by the Canadian troops when they arrived behind the Fenian
lines in Fort Erie that morning.

Ridgewfty Battlefield Museum and Memorial Cairn

18

19

#14 The Fenian Embarkation at the Railroad Ferry Dock

A lar~e railn?ad ferry do~k existed here near the foot of Beatrice Street, and O'Neill moved his
force t<;> thIS locatIOn on th~ mg.ht of 2/3 June. Vessels were sent across the Niagara River from the New
York SIde and evac.uate~ hIS bnga~e. Halfway back, they were intercepted by U.S. naval forces and
were arrested for VIOlatIng the Umted States Neutrality Act. Released by American authorities shortly
afterward, the officers and men of O'Neill's battalion disappeared into histOIy.

Location of Fort Erie Dock, near Bertie Street and the Niagara Parkway.
Turn right on the Niagara Parkway and proceed southward on this road for 3 km (2 miles) to lli
Historic Fort Erie.
#13 Historic Fort Erie
After their brief, but fierce, engagement with the Canadians on the dock, O'Neill moved both his
brigade, and the prisoners taken at Ridgeway and the dock, into the ruins of Fort Erie. This had been
captured early on 1 June by his lead battalion. His reason for this move was quite sound; his intelligence
system had supplied him with fairly accurate information concerning the Anglo-Canadian forces
massing against the Fenians. If O'Neill was to fight for time for the larger force to cross from Buffalo or
to force the British to divert forces from their potential use against any other Fenian thrust then
occurring in Canada, he needed something defendable. Being immediately contiguous to his line of
communication, O'Neill could either be quickly reinforced at this location (if the American government
did not interfere), or withdraw comparatively easily. Employing his men in the ruins by the early
evening of 2 June, O'Neill threw out pickets to stall any Anglo-Canadian probing into his last
bridgehead; it was one of these that Peacocke's column encountered on Bowen Road as it moved
eastward that evening.
Upon communication with the Fenian authorities in Buffalo, O'Neill learned that the American
authorities would prevent any reinforcements from crossing the Niagara River. To spare his command
the needless loss of any more men, O'Neill made the decision to withdraw his troops that night.
You may wish to examine this important historic site and its early 19th century fortifications.

Location of old Fort Erie Railroad Dock, near foot of Bean1ce Street.

EPILOGUE
You have just finished what h.as, hopefully, been the start of a deeper appreciation of the land,
thought, marched and fought over In 1866, the year of the Fenians.
. Jo~n O'Ne~ll's ~ort Erie campaign to seize and hold a bridgehead for a larger force which never
amved IS a faSCInatIng one. He marched his largely veteran soldiery some 40 km (25 miles) with little
food and rest, and with a quick eye for both terrain and tactics, he achieved two tactical vict0I1es in less
than t~o ~ays. Finding that he was to be unsupported, he made [he militarily correct decision to retire,
but thIS w~thdrawal m~ant that the campaign in Nia~ara was to be a strategic failure. In spite of periodic
sab~e rattlIng, the Femans were ~ever to return to Niagara, but they left behind an interesting study in
tactIcal land use as well as a major effect upon Canadian nationalism which lasted to this day.

Move north along the Niagara Parkway less than 1 km (.5 mile) to the foot of Beatrice Street.

20

21

o
o

en
u

..s:
u

1. Fenian Grand Strategy for the invasion of Canada

23

2. Intended Fenian bridgehead in the southern part of the Niagara Peninsula.

SNI(DEt:\

at New Germany

..----.. . ;;;;j.~::~~1fi--ll'2.
Gar-riso" Rd.
Mu.se.u",

Do
10.

inion Rd.

50uerw,.in's
Br;dge

CR'iSTAL
BEACH

3. Driving tour map of the invasion.

27

Erie
Fort

Dock

Farm Rd.

FIRS'T STAGE

BA"TTLE OF

P\IO<;EWA'f

Far"" Rd.

Sec.ONO

SI~GE ~

BATiLE OF RID6E.VVAY

farm Ad.

""'IRO

STA<;E

BATTLE

OF

RIDGEWAY

farm Rd.

FOVRTH

STAGE ~

BATTLE

OF RIDCOEWAY

Farm Rd.

a/d:J.~J:l

Fe: l'\ \ on

Re:o;.e:r"e.

Canadian
Ret if'erne nt
fifTH

STAGE: 8ATTLE.

OF

RIDvEVVA'/

An Illustrated History of the Fenian Movement in North America

CA) Background of the Fenian Movement

Fittingly similar to the beautiful and arabesque patterns of Celtic art, the history of the slow return
of Irish sovereignty has interwoven with that of other lands, particularly North American.
Invaded by the Anglo-Normans in the Middle Ages, Ireland, part of the repository of western
Europe's oldest culture, became the first English colony. By the 16th century, it was clear to the English
that imposed garrisons alone would not indelibly alter the indigenous Celtic society. The plantation of
non-Irish settlers was attempted in the early-mid Elizabethan period, notably by Humphrey Gilbert and
Walter Raleigh, and this experience was the forerunner of similar settlements in Virginia. Thus,
Anglo-Irish relations involved North America quite early, and when Walter Raleigh introduced the
humble potato plant from America into Ireland before the beginning of the 17th century, a seed was
literally planted whose failed harvest two and a half centuries later would change both the population
and political situation in North America.
The legal and military repercussions imposed by the English after periodic rebellions in Ireland
inevitably produced deep changes within Irish society. In turn, these developments made, under certain
circumstances, mass emigration inevitable if political sovereignty, the object of revolt, was impossible to
achieve. To say that the cumulative efforts of the Elizabethan, Cromwellian and Williamite periods
were hard on Ireland is to understate. By the end of the 17th century, the ethnic Irish were in a position
of potential rootlessness on their ancestral land, and the issues of political rights and land tenure were
the driving forces behind much of the history of the last few centuries of Ireland.
The denial of many rights to Roman Catholics, which started in the 17th century and did not legally
end until the 19th, tended to stratify the emerging Anglo-Irish society upon the basis of denomination.
Barred from public employment by the 17th century Test Act, including enlistment in the British Army
until the manpower crisis of the 1790's, large numbers of Irish, often the most talented and adventurous,
sought situations in Europe. By the first half of the 18th century, some 400,000 Irish had enlisted in the
French Army alone. These emigres from a fast fading Celtic world, spread across the European
continent, became known to Irish history as the Wild Geese. For those remaining in Ireland, their lot
was either apostasy or the acceptance of considerable limitations.

39

Famine Funeral at Skibbereen

Irish troops of the French Army after the ba ttle of Fontenoy, 1745
At least equally serious in its effect upon a largely agrarian society was the system of land holding.
As Ireland was progressively militarily conquered, the older Celtic aristocracy was displaced and their
tribal lands were made available to the London based government to distribute to the non-Irish as a
reward for various services. In many cases, these holdings were not lived upon, and in some cases not
even seen, by their often English owners. Usually, with some notable exceptions, these often vast Irish
estates were treated as revenue sources only by the commonly absent landlords. Managed by estate
agents, the land was subleased to smaller agents, who in turn leased the estates and with the usually
pyramidal system of leasing, it is little wonder that the tenants had little actual money (in many cases
they could not even recognize currency beyond a certain value), no security of tenure beyond a crop and
relatively little of their lease which they could afford to devote to their own sustenance. This situation
was aided and abetted by the introduction of the potato which happened at approximately the same time
as the bulk of the land was passing to English or Anglo-Irish owners. Comparatively easy to grow, the
Ilish farmers quickly found tbat a small plot could produce a high yield of potatoes for their own use.
The rest of their produce, often grain and livestock, went to the paying of their rent. l1lUs to a large and
therefore potentially dangero"us degree, the stability of Ireland depended upon the single crop which
formed the tenants' food staple.
The potato blight of the mid-late 1840's was catastrophic. The apparent contradiction in the
fact that Ireland was exporting food in the midst of mass starvation amongst the agrarian class
demonstrated clearly the rea on for Ireland's constantly precarious situation.

After the eviction, the ejected family takes

refuge in a ditch.

40

41

While emigration had been a factor in Irish life for generations, especially after periods of
insurrection, the inevitable mass evictions following the crop failures resulted in previously unseen
levels of emigration for large numbers of those who could afford it. The figures are staggering; over one
million emigrated at the height of the famine between 1846 and 1851. The census of the latter year
records a total Irish population of 6, 532,385 which indicates a substantial decline from the population
of 8, 175,124 in the census of 1841. Most of the emigrants went to the United States. All areas of the
new republic received at least a sprinkling of Irish immigrants, but about two-thirds settled in the
growing municipalities of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the New England states, usually
finding employment as unskilled or semi-skilled labourers. In 1847 alone, for example, the city of
Boston had over 37,000 Irish immigrants and New York City in excess of 75,000. By 1855, the Irish
constituted over one-third of the electorate of the latter city. There were over 1,6000,000 people of Irish
birth residing in the United States by 1860.

The Irish poor before and after emigration to the United States.
Seeking a fresh start in life and comparative security, they were often quite hostile to the foreign
domination in Ireland which they perceived as the real cause of their emigration. Indeed, some even
seemed willing to believe the wild rumours that the potato blight had been purposely introduced into
Ireland by the English as a means of genocide, and were obviously .unaware that the blight had struck
much of the potato crop throughout the British Isles. In reality, what mattered was perception and in the
works of an Irish historian Ireland became for many of these emigrants anq their families "either a
passionate memory or an ancestral poetry". By the outbreak of the American Civil War and the
resultant worsening of Anglo-American relations, the growing electoral power of the Irish, especially on
the eastern seaboard, could not be safely disregarded by politicians proposing any American policy
which even remotely touched upon Irish-American interests. To this end, the 3 October, 1865, issue of
the London Times commented:
The happy institution of universal suffrage,
the foundations on which American
institutions repose, has given the ignorant
and prejudiced Irishman a power which he
could never possess under any other
circumstances. The Irish vote has become a
matter of consequence, and American
newspapers and American politicians have
not been slow to pander to the weaknesses
and delusions of those who dispose of it.
Emigration ship embarking for North America.
The Fenian movement was to prove to be quite effective in utilizing this power.

42

43

(B)

Establishment of Fenianism in the United States

In various ways, each Irish revolutionary movement influenced its successor as it in turn emerged
with the passage of time. The efficient British suppression of the Young Ireland's armed insurrection in
1848, directed by the Crown's representatives in Dublin Castle, did nothing to assuage the bitterness of
the revolt's survivors. In many cases, they fled either directly or eventually to the United States, and
these still zealous firebrands were the revolutionary leaven within Irish-American society which was, at
worst, slowly improving its own lot.
As British military resources would be largely diverted elsewhere, the outbreak of the Crimean War
in 1854, between Great Britain and Russia, signalled for many Irish the possibility of Irish independence. Various Irish societies cropped up on the eastern seaboard; the Irishmen's Civil and Military Republican Union, the Emmett Monument Association and the Massachusetts Irish Emigrant Aid Society
were all basically pledged to work for Irish liberation. However, these societies were not destined to
long survive. The effect of the ending of the Crimean War in the spring of 1856, and its chance to
situationally profit, was exacerbated by the traditional Celtic propensity for factionalism within such
movements.
Such turns of fortune only made the objective more of a challenge for a number of zealots. The
Fenian movement in the United States had its distinct organizational roots in the latter part of 1857 when
John O'Mahony and Michael Doheny, both refugees from the 1848 revolt and still desirous of building
another organization in Ireland for armed revolution, sent an associate Irish-American, Owen Considine,
over to Ireland with a message for James Stephens.

45

These demands were quickly accepted by Stephens' American correspondents in ~ew Yor~ City.
and despite a recession, American raised money began to find its way across the ~tlantlc. K~epmg hIS
part of the agreement, Stephens, on the evening of 17 March 1858, ~Ol~nded the Insh Revolu!lOnary
Brotherhood in a back room of Peter Langan's timberyard almost wlthm the shadow of Dubl~n.Castle,
the seat of British power in Ireland. Pledging their lives, a small number of men swore to ongmal L R.
B. oath:

John O'Mahony, American Fenian Leader

James Stephens, Head Centre of the I. R. B.

In his youth a gentleman farmer and Gaelic scholar, O'Mahony was born in 1816 in the village of
Clonkilla in County Cork. He translated Geoffrey
Keating's History of Ireland, Feasa Ar Eirinn, into
English. He lived the life of a country squire until
the rising of 1848 when he raised 2,000 men for the
revolt. Escaping to Paris after 1848, he roomed with
Stephens and studied at the Sorbonne until going to
America around 1856, when he suffered a brief mental collapse. Physically very powerful, O'Mahony
had a commanding moustache, piercing eyes and a
constantly immaculate appearance. Cautious almost
to a fault, O'Mahony tended to keep his thoughts and
feelings to himself.
In 1872, he came out of retirement to head the
Fenian movement once again. His last years were
ones of hunger, poverty and disease and he died of
lung ailments in a small unheated room in a New
York tenement in 1877. O'Mahony was interred in
Glasnevin Cemetery in Ireland. In the words of one
of his colleagues, although John O'Mahony "was not
.... an ideal leader, he was an ideal Irishman."

Known in Gaelic as As Seabhac Siulaih, the wandering hawk, Stephens was born in Kilkenny in 1824.
A clerk, he espoused quite early the nationalist
cause. During the 1848 rising, he fought and was
wounded in Tipperary, and escaped a manhunt by the
novel expedient of being buried in a mock funeral.
Fleeing to France, he wrote and taught in Paris until
1856. Stephens was noted for his boundless energy
and his organizational ability.
After being deposed as the leader of the Irish Revolutionary brotherhood in 1867, Stephens returned to
France. He resided in New York City for a brief period as an agent for a Bordeaux wine house, but was
despised by American Fenians. Until the British government permitted him to return to Ireland in the autumn of 1891, Stephens eked a living as a translator
and journalist in Switzerland. At the age of 76, Stephens died in 1901, and was buried with other members of the 1848 and Fenian movements in the "Patriots' Plot", in Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin.

A friend of O'Mahony's, Stephens was also a veteran of 1848. No longer sought by the British,
Stephens had returned to Ireland in 1856 after a long exile in France where he had taught and written for
~ev:spapers to.support. himself as he pursued knowledge and furthered his mastery of revolutionary
mtngue. To hIS Amencan brethren, at least, James Stephens was unrepentant with respect to his earlier
political g?als. This. in;unediate tran~atlanti~ feature of incipient Fenianism, which was also apparent in
the short lIved aSSOCIatIOns of the mld-1850 s was based upon an awareness of the possibility of
substantial Irish-American support.

L.do solemnly swear, in the presence of Almighty God,

that I will do my utmost, at every risk, while life lasts,
to make Ireland an independent Democratic Republic;
that I will yield implicit obedience, in all things not
contrary to the law of God [or "the laws of morality"] to
the commands of my superior officers; and that I shall
preserve inviolable secrecy regarding all the tran.sactions of this secret society that may be confided m me.
So help me God! Amen.
By the middle of the following year, the oath was r~vised. As the. Roma~ Catholic church
denounced all forms of secret oaths, this portion was revIsed, but the hIerarchIal nature of the
organization was deliberately kept.
I, A.B., in the presence of Almighty God, do solemnly swear
allegiance to the Irish Republic, now virtually established; and
that I will do my very utmost, at every risk, while life lasts, to
defend its independence and integrity; and, finally, that I will
yield implicit obedience in all things, not contrary to the law of
God [or "the laws of morality"] to the commands of my superior officers. So help me God. Amen.
Both Stephens and O'Mahony were aware of European methods of reyolutionary organization as a
result of their exile in France and Stephens employed its simple cell structure when he created the
Organization, as the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood was popularly known in Ireland until 186~. This
pattern was also used by O'Mahony in the United States. The moveme~t, with"Stephens a~ the fIrSt.
'Head Centre", was composed of circles, each in turn commanded by a centre who had mne Captams
subordinate to him. Each of these had nine Sergeants who had nine Privates. Initially the idea was to
limit the size of each circle, but later larger circles seem to have been permitted. Support and sympathy
for the LR.B. soon made itself apparent in Ireland, the majority of it conung from the labouring and
lower middle classes. Despite denouncement by the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic church, th~
movement spread in both Ireland and even Britain itself to the point that Stephens eventually clmmed
that the movement had some 200,000 adherents in the British Isles. The government believed that the
movement enjoyed very widespread support and feared that there were members even in the Irish
Constabulary and British Army.

The selection of James Stephens to organize an American assisted revolt in Ireland was not a
haphazard one. He had already proven himself to be an intelligent and resourceful leader with a
pronounced gift ~or organizati?n. Though eagerly willing to establish another revolutionary movement,
Stephens was qUIte frank that It must be done on his terms, which he noted to Doheny in a letter on
New Year's Day of 1858. Basically, Stephens desired that the Irish-Americans would organize to
provide the ~ogist~cs and finances for his revolt, and that he would arrange for the manpower and supply
the leadershIp WhICh he stated "should be perfectly unshackled". As a,result of his previous experiences,
Stephens believed that a "provisional dictator" was absolutely mandatory if the organization was to be
successful.
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47

The development of the I.R.B. in the United States was concurrent with its growth in Great Britain
and Ireland. Concerned with what he thought was a lack of American financial contribution, Stephens
made a personal tour of the United States in the autumn of 1858. At a meeting at Tammany Hall in New
York City he installed his long-time associate John O'Mahony as the "supreme organizer and director of
the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in America". In later years, when discussing his responsibilities in
the embryonic organization of 1858, O'Mahony noted:
I accepted the position of Head Centre of the Fenian Brotherhood, with the understanding that my duty should be to unite
and organize, as far as possible, the Irish element in America, and to concentrate its moral and material forces, and to
direct them systematically. The understanding was that the
Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood should be organized secretly with James Stephens as its leader and chief.
Undoubtedly indulging his scholarly bent, O'Mahony altered the American LR.B.'s name to the
Fenian Brotherhood not long after Stephens left in early 1859 to return to Ireland. The name derived
from "Fianna Eirionn", a warrior class in ancient Ireland. O'Mahony probably invoked this
se.mi-mythical Celtic image to appeal for contemporary equivalents who were willing to sacrifice for the
Insh homeland. Stephens' subsequent correspondence with O'Mahony indicates that he was willing to
agree to this. He was more concerned about the supply of money and arms.
Ini~ially, me~bership grew quite slowly in ~he United States, probably because of the suspicions
many. Iri~h-Amencans .harboured a~out the altrUIsm of the Fenians. Eventually, recruitment began to
steadIly mcrease and CIrcles spread m New England, New York, the midwest states, the Great Lakes
region and even in the territories of Oregon, Nevada and Utah.

H<;>wever, as the movement grew in the United States, so did the emergence of organizational

dlssen~lOn. O'Mahony and Stephens began to be rivals, the former being quite unhappy with the

subordmate role of the American organization. Stephens' unceasing demand for more American funding

ar:noye~ O'Mahony as did his concerns about O'Mahony's attempts to independently gauge the political

clImate 10 Ireland.

In order to resolve at least some of their disagreements, O'Mahony went to Ireland in late 1860 and
met reJ?eatedly with t~e leading I.R.B. members, including James Stephens. Returning to the United
States m the early spnng of 1861, John O'Mahony believed that a number of their differences, in the
areas of both decision making and policy, had been reconciled and that the movement would succeed in
its aims of violent revolution.

CC) Development of the Fenian Movement in the Era of the American Civil War
The era of the American Civil War was the turning point in the development of the Fenian
movement. The considerable opportunities to acquire valuable modern military experience in the vast
citizen armies of the conflict, in addition to the chance to profit from the periodically stormy climate of
Anglo-American relations, put the Fenian star into ascendancy.
In 1861, the same year as the outbreak of the Civil War, the Fenians, both American and Irish,
managed a public relational success which, for many, linked their movement with the increasingly
revered revolt of 1848. In January of 1861, Terence McManus, a prominent figure in the Young Ireland
movement of the 1940's, died in California after considerable wanderings in exile. His remains were
returned to Ireland in what became an international funeral procession managed by the Fenians. The
exhibition of his body in several large American cities created much sympathy and support for the
Fenian cause. As McManus was transported from Cork to Dublin and burial, vast crowds of mourners
turned out. The skillful utilization of this situation marked their increasing initiative and political
sophistication, and it foreshadowed the eventual autonomy of the American Fenians.
Originally viewed as an arsenal of insurrection, the American branch of the LR.B. began to
seriously participate in the Civil War. Scholarly estimates have stated that the Irish comprised about
40% of all foreign born enlistments in the Union Army and about 17% of its entire strength. A number
of units raised by the various states were almost exclusively Irish, and in a number of cases entire Fenian
circles enlisted. As the catastrophic conflict dragged on, ultimately causing the deaths of some 600,000
Americans, the Union government, desperate for manpower and offering large bounties, recruited
directly in Ireland. A total of 150,000 to 175,000 Irish served in the Union forces. It was not
uncommon for both Northern politicians and recruiters to imply to the Fenians that Irish support for the
Union cause would result in the sanctioning, and possibly even actual support, of the cause once the
Confederacy was defeated.
The Fenian leaders were quick to grasp that Anglo-American problems emerging from the
fratricidal struggle could be to their advantage. Incidents such as the Trent affair, in which Confederate
commissioners bound for Europe were removed from a British steamer by the crew of a U.S. Navy
warship, the considerable damage done to Northern commercial shipping by vessels of the Confederate
Navy built in British yards, the St. Albans raid conducted by Canadian-based Confederate agents who
robbed a bank in Vermont and the broadly perceived British support of the South, part of which was the
granting of belligerent status to the Confederacy, made an Anglo-American war at least something of a
possibility. Indeed, many expected such a conflict. The ongoing past war disputes with the British
government concerning the American demands for reparations, the so-called "Alabama" claims, when
combined with the Fenian movement's awareness of its growing strength, part of which stemmed from
their large contribution to the Union effort, created an environment of political opportunism, especially
as the 1866 election approached.
It had become apparent to the American Fenians by 1863 that a number of issues required
clarification. Increasingly, the movement was facing opposition from the Roman Catholic church which
viewed it as atheistic and guilty of plotting the overthrow of a legitimate government. The supposed
secrecy of the Brotherhood was also attacked by the church hierarchy, although it is difficult to
understand the basis for this particular condemnation, especially in the United States, as the movement
was quite ingenuous. The lower clergy, notably the American, seems to have exhibited much less of a
tendency to disparage the movement, when compared to the higher church officials, such as the Bishop
Kerry, who commented publicly in Ireland that "hell is not hot enough nor eternity long enough to
punish the miscreants."
Distinct fissures were developing once again in the relationship between Stephens and his

48

49

..,

American Lieutenant. O'Mahony disliked what he termed the "dictatorial arrogance" of his Irish chief
and he was beginning to envision a role which far exceeded the logistical and financial supply function
stipulated by Stephens who, in turn, was concurrently complaining that O'Mahony's ?rganization ~as
failing to provide enough money. Although a formal breach never happened, such dIssent undermll1ed
the Fenian movement's ability to achieve its objectives.

the midwest states, in addition to military camps to which he had been given complete a~cess by a highly placed official in Washington, D.C., he stressed the unanimity of th~ Fenians. Declanng that 1865
would be the year of "insurrection or dissolution", Stephens sought to lI1crease the I??vement's reve~ues
from donations, and was to return to Ireland in August with close to $50,000. Reahzll1g that ~h~ Umon
Army would possibly be the movement's great strength, Stephens was set on personally recrUltmg from
the North's forces for eventual service in Ireland.

To address these issues and overhaul their incipient organization, the Fenians held their first convention in early November of 1863 at Chicago, Illinois. Delegates from twelve states and the Union armies were in attendance. In the course of the convention's duration of three days, a constitution was
adopted and an executive was elected for the coming year. In addition to a treasurer and his assistant, a
council of five was instituted, all of whom were to be subject to annual election. O'Mahony, elected for
the year as American Head Centre, was to be responsible for all of the national activities of the Brotherhood, and was to appoint all the state centres in the country. These individuals in turn would select the
district centre who were responsible for the individual circles. In essence, the movement's fixed constitution outlined an elected body responsible for a hierarchy of appointments.

In mid-January of 1865, the second Fenian convention was held in Cincinnati, Ohio. In attendance
were 348 delegates, representing 273 circles, which marked an increase of over 400% when co~pare? to
the delegate strength at the first convention. The organization was .further devel?ped; ~he counCIl of five
was doubled, and organizers were appointed to oversee the formatlOn of more CIrcles 111 each state. The
representatives of the Brotherhood, now about 10,000 strong, were exposed to ~he move.ment's po~t-w~r
plans, which included Stephens' promise of an 1865 homeland revolt. By th~ tlme of thI~ convention, It
was clear that the Confederacy's ability to militarily resist the North was rapidly attenuatll1g, and that the
Fenians would be able to build their own army by offering bounties to the many thousands of soon to be
demobilized veterans.

The convention undertook the adoption of a number of resolutions which included an eschewing of
secrecy, and a statement to the people of Ireland that the delegates were bound "to labor earnestly and
continuously for the regeneration of our beloved Ireland".
The members of this Congress, which declared itself to be "a fixed and permanent institution in
America", took an oath:

I
solemnly pledge my sacred word of honor as a
truthful and honest man, that I will labor with earnest zeal for the
liberation of Ireland from the yoke of England, and for the establishment of a free and independent government on Irish soil; that I
_--=-=--_--:-----:--=will implicitly obey the commands of my superior officers in the Fenian Brotherhood; that I will faithfully discharge
the duties of my membership, as laid down in the Constitution and
By-Laws thereof; that I will do my utmost to promote feelings of
love, harmony and kindly forbearance among all Irishmen; and that I
will foster, defend and propagate the aforesaid Fenian Brotherhood
to the utmost of my power.

As a result of this self-confident declaration of coming of age with a formal organization of the
movement, the Fenian Brotherhood expanded greatly. In the last two years of the Civil War, the movement gained many members, particularly from the Union Army. Fenian agents seem to have had virtually an unrestricted access to their encampments. O'Mahony's sister created a Fenian Sisterhood. Generous donatons became much more common from prominent politicians and soldiers. Bazaars, raffles,
dances fairs and picnics became almost epidemic in the North, and political aspirants increasingly
viewed the avoidance of such Fenian fundraisers as being tantamount to political suicide.
In the early spring of 1864, James Stephens, who had the previous year initiated a Fenian newspaper in Ireland with American funding, arrived in New York City. He was somewhat alarmed about
O'Mahony's increasingly independent direction and wished to tactfully, but firmly, establish his position
as the supreme organizer. Publicly, in his many speaking engagements in New York, New England and

50

51

CD) Anglo -Canadian Reactions During the American Civil War

The Civil War had a considerable effect upon the future nation of Canada.
The Fenians' rapid growth in what appeared to be a milieu of American toleration and even, at
times, encouragement, was in reality not as indicative of pro-Irish sentiment as it was the result of
widespread Northern resentment towards the British. Although American opinion was, in fairness, not
entirely unanimous on the issue, an editorial which appeared in a late 1861 issue of the New York
Herald gave food for sober thought concerning the possible ramifications of American sentiments:
Let them remember, however, when the termination of our evil
conflict shall have arrived, it may be the turn of our foreign enemies
to suffer the consequences of the mischiefs they are attempting to do
us. Four hundred thousand thoroughly disciplined troops will ask no
better occupation than to destroy the last vestiges of British rule on
the American continent, and annex Canada to the United States.
For the British North American colonies, nurtured, if not created, in a rejection of Americanism,
and which had endured several American invasions and generations of periodic Manifest Destiny sabre
rattling, the implications inherent in the Civil War, and its Fenian byproduct, were indeed chilling.
History has shown to Canadians their vulnerability in Anglo-American disputes. Such fears raised the
difficult matter of Canadian defence. Traditionally, the colonies had relied largely upon the protection
afforded by the Royal Navy and the British Army, whose cost was borne by the taxpayers in the United
Kingdom. Although British defence expenditure increased in Canada threefold between 1861 and 1862,
largely as a result of the infamous Trent affair, Anglo-Canadian authorities were quite cognizant that
even this "could not secure the whole of the frontier". Strong sentiments were spreading among the
British that they were shouldering too large a portion of the responsibility for the defence of British
North America. A London Times editorial of mid-1862 spoke for the concerns of many British
taxpayers, which were to shape future Canadian development, when it said that if the Canadians were
"to be defended at all, they must make up their minds to bear the greater part of their own defence". By
the late summer of 1862, it had become clear that such editorials mirrored official opinion, for the
Secretary of the Colonies asked Governor-General Lord Monck for "some better military organization of
the inhabitants than that which now exists", as British professional military assessments indicated "that
no body of troops which England could send would be able to make Canada safe without the efficient
aid of the Canadian peoples."
As the Union forces were preoccupied with operations far from the Canadian border for the
duration of the Civil War, little serious military development occurred in British North America which
acted upon the reports of military experts who suggested an extensive series of fortifications and
programmes aimed at the achievement of naval supremacy on the Great Lakes. Suddenly, in the autumn
of 1864, tensions exploded. Canadian-based Confederate agents had raided a Vermont bank before
retiring to Canada, and the American public was outraged. Many Canadians, alarmed over the
possibility of the repercussions, shared the views of one Canadian who recorded in her diary that "there
appears to be a great probability of war with the Yankees".
In order to preserve neutrality with the United States 1:,j preventing further such abuses of asylum,
the government placed 2,000 officers and men of Canadian militia units on active service along the
border shortly before Christmas of 1864. In addition, John A. Macdonald, the minister of militia and the
future first Prime Minister of Canada, placed Gilbert McMicken and Edward Ermatinger as stipendiary
magistrates charged with the responsibility of thwarting further attempts by the Confederacy to employ
Canadian soil as a base of operations against the United States.

53

Thomas D'Arcy McGee, originally a member of theYoung Ireland movement of 1848 and later
anti-Fenian politician in Canada.

Sir John A.

MacDonald,
Minister of Militia
and Canada'a First
Prime Minister.

By the end of the Civil War in 1865, less was heard of annexation from the United States, as it was
evident that they were understandably very involved with their own domestic concerns about
reconstruction. However, considerable anti-British sentiment remained which could be exploited, and it
was within this climate that the Fenian Brotherhood was to further grow.

This apprehensive atmosphere set the tone for the Canadian politicians who met in Quebec City to
discuss the possibility of a union of the colonies into a single nation. Those pro-Confederation
politicians, who saw the union as a means of providing a much greater and unified defence budget, had
only to display the annexationist sentiments expressed in a number of American newspapers to give
weight to their position that the American invasion attempts and threats in the first half of the 19th
century were the history of still ongoing ambitions in the republic to the south. Rather ironically, one of
the most eloquent Canadian politicians who feared American intentions, and thus favoured
Confederation, was Thomas D'Arcy McGee, a former Young Irelander who fled into exile in North
America after 1848. The American termination of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, contrary to the
expectations of many Americans who predicted that it would cause the Canadians to apply for
absorption into the United States, actively strengthened the arguments of the Confederationists. The
various colonies waxed and waned with respect to Confederation according to their perceptions of its
benefits in particular circumstances.

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55

CE) Schism in the Fenian Movement and the Proposed Invasion of Canada
Events in the autumn of 1865 were to have far reaching effects upon the subsequent history of the
Fenian movement.
By early-mid 1865, the year which Stephens had proclaimed to be the one of revolt in Ireland, the
I.R.B.'s claim of sworn membership in the homeland had climbed to several hundred thousand. The
British authorities in Dublin Castle, in receipt of the detailed inforn1ation supplied by an agent planted
with Stephens' staff, decide to tolerate the Fenians no longer. In a nocturnal raid in mid-September on
the office of his newspaper, the "Irish People", the leaders and staff were arrested, the paper suppressed
and the organization's centre was effectively destroyed. Stephens himself ma'naged to evade capture for
several weeks, but eventually surrendered in November. An American vessel, Erin's Hope, carrying
men and arms to assist the Fenian revolt was seized by the Royal Navy. The ranks of the LR.B. were in
total disorder, and Stephen's promised "Movement of '65" was nullified.
Managing to escape from prison less than two weeks after his incarceration, Stephens eluded the
British dragnet and was not betrayed by his countrymen in spite of large rewards offered for information
concerning his whereabouts. Casting abroad, he found that French officials were willing to express only
sympathy for his concerns. The demonstrated British capacity of reacting swiftly had made revolution
in Ireland decidedly impractical.
Given the calamitous developments in Ireland, it is hardly surprising that the third annual Fenian
convention met in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in October of 1865 in a mood of concerned urgency.
There were over 600 delegates from all over North America. A group of these, calling themselves "men
of action", were seriously concerned with what they considered to be O'Mahony's circumspect and
dilatory attitude and their efforts in this convention were to produce a radical reshaping of both the
movement's organization and its subsequent activities.
The American congressional system formed the model for the organization's overhaul. The old
Head Centre position, as well as the council, disappeared to be replaced by a Congress who annually
elected a President. Real power now lay with a fifteen-member Senate, which had to approve all policy
by a two-thirds majority, and whose own President was a sort of Vice President for the movement.
O'Mahony was handily elected as President, but the position had lost much, of its policy making
capacity, and was now circumscribed to the appointment of different officers within the movement.
Not surprisingly, the elected President of the newly created Fenian Senate was William Randall
Roberts, the leader of the critics of O'Mahony's past performance. A number of members of the Fenian
Brotherhood disliked Roberts, considering him to be conceited, designing and ostentatious. In
addition, Roberts and his followers found little favour amongst the Irish Fenians, who tern1ed them
people whom they knew little and for whom we cared less".

57

William Randall Roberts,

American Fenian Leader
Born in Mitchelstown in Ccunty Cork in 1830, Roberts
emigrated in 1849 and worked in dry goods stores in New
York City before opening his own business. A self-made
millionaire, he was prominent in Irish expatriate politics
and became the chairman of the Fenian Senate. Roberts
conceived the Canadian scheme which was responsible
for dividing the Fenian movement in the United States.
He retired from the movement after the failure of the Canadian invasion in 1866, and lived off the income of his
business and real estate investments. From 1870 to 1875,
he was the Democratic representative in Congress for
Brooklyn, New York and served as the American ambassador to Chile from 1885 to 1889.

The lack of approbation which the Senate wing encountered, particularly from Stephens'
.
organization, was due in no small part to the considerably different means advocated by Roberts and hIS
followers to secure the independence of Ireland. The "men of action" believed that an invasion of the
British North American colonies would be much more feasible. Elected as the Secretary of War and the
Commander-in-Chief of the incipient Fenian Army, Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sweeny, a
professional soldier in the U. S. Regular Army, was in the process of creating a master plan for the
invasion of Canada. Sweeny was convinced that the British North American colonies could be taken
and that the population could be reconciled to the Fenian cause. This, combined with the depredations
to be committed by a fleet of Irish privateers operating from the Canadian ports, Sweeny envisioned,
would force the British government to negotiate with the Fenians. The possibility of a concurrent
Anglo-American war, brought on in part by the Fenians' activities, would only aid their cause. In
Sweeny's plan, the Roberts wing thought that a viable alternative to the Stephens-O'Mahony project had
ansen.

Thomas Sweeny
Born in Cork, in 1819, Sweeny emigrated to the
United States in 1832 and worked as a printer in New
York City. He joined the U.S. Regular Army and ultimately rose to the rank of Major-General. He lost
his right arm in the Mexicru War of the 1840's,
fought in the Indian Campaigns, and was twice
wounded in the Civil War before commanding a brigade under General Lew Wallace at Shiloh in 1862
and a division of the XVI Corps during Sherman's
campaign against Atlanta two years later. "Fighting
Torn" as Sweeny was widely known, was a much admired figure in the Irish-American community.
Joining the Fenian movement in the late summer
of 1865, he was appointed its Secretary of War and
Commander of the fledgling Fenian Army by Robert
who admired his energy, military ability and honesty.
He resigned from the movement in the autumn of
1866 and was reinstated in the U.S. Regular Army.
He retired as a Brigadier-General in 1870 to his Long
Island horne and died in early 1892.

The bumptious energy of the reshaped Fenian

movement, which had announced during the
Philadelphia convention that the "Irish Republic
was now in existence" and whose headqual1erS
were now ensconced in a sumptuously
appointed mansion in New York City's Union
Square, attracted the watchful concern of the
British Consul in the United States. By various
means, they gained access to the designs of
Sweeny and his staff, and the British Minister to
the United States, Sir Frederick Bruce, on the
request of his government, discussed the
illegally threatening ambitions of the Fenians
with the American authorities. Though not
really desirous of a war with Great Britain, the
Americans were quite interested in negotiating
with the British a spectrum of unresolved Civil
War claims for reparations, and the presence of
the bellicose Fenian movement was a
convenient political lever to be employed. In
addition, the internal disputes emanating from
the immediate postwar reconstruction era and
the upcoming elections of 1866 made the
incumbent administration wary of anything
which would hazard the retention of the
considerable Irish vote. The Fenians had a large
degree of faith in the United States government;
the Secretary of State, W. H. Seward, was noted
for his Irish empathy, as were a number of of
other American politicians and it was quite
obvious during the late conflict that the
government had countenanced open Fenian
activity within the Union forces. Several
prominent politicians were under considerable
pressure from Fenians to "not forget the many

brave Irish hearts who marched to death beneath the starry banner" and to therefore honour the Irish
contribution to the Union's forces in the Civil War with reciprocal assistance "when the day of Ireland's
trial came". Given these political realities, it is not surprising that the American response to British
questions about Fenian activities in the United States was deliberately vague; Seward informed Sir
Frederick Bruce that "the Fenian affair was much exaggerated, and that nothing would serve so much to
give it importance as that it became the subject of official correspondence", and yet, when it suited
American purposes, the British would be presented with hinted reminders of the lack of total British
neutrality during the Civil War.
Although Seward had written to the Fenian treasurer in late 1865 that the American government did
not view it "compatible with the public interest" to get involved in any official correspondence with the
movement, and would "perform its duties toward all other nations", the Fenians were not discouraged.
They were quite aware of their political power, especially as elections approached, and the fact that their
Secretary of War and Commander-in-Chief, Thomas Sweeny, was allowed to retain his reserve status in

58

59

the U. S. Army, a condition about which the British government raised questions concerning American
intentions. While to the modern mind the Fenian plan to invade Canada may seem incredible with its
predicated expectation of either American assistance or, at worst, neutrality, the scheme is not
completely bizarre when understood within its 19th century milieu. Such expeditions launched from its
shores were not uncommon in American history. Less than a decade before, California's William
Walker had invaded Nicaragua and, with the assistance of a private army, had installed himself as
President of the Nicaraguan Republic. Walker's plan had also relied upon American assistance or
neutrality during a similar period of fragile relations with Great Britain.
The fracturing which began with the Philadelphia convention was exacerbated over the winter of
1865-1866. O'Mahony was resentful after being shorn of much of his previous power and adamantly
opposed any Canadian invasion plans. In spite of his personal differences with Stephens, he basically
believed in the undivided support of an Irish insurrection. To further supply Stephens with funds,
O'Mahony issued, towards the end of 1865, a series of bonds which were to be redeemable after an Irish
Republic was legally established. Having failed to secure the Senate's approval for this step, the Fenian
Senate accused O'Mahony of violating the organization's constitution. When O'Mahony dismissed this
concern, the Senate deposed him. His response in tum was to exclude all. of Roberts' adherents from the
Fenian headquarters in New York City. The personal intervention of James Stephens in late December
of 1865, calling the Senate wing's plan "a mad and traitorous end", did nothing to reverse the growth of
the ever widening gulf between the factions of O'Mahony and Roberts.
Seriously concerned about the erosion of support for the original plan, O'Mahony asked for another
national convention. In early January of 1866, O'Mahony's supporters met in New York City; the only
delegate from the Senate wing was Thomas Sweeny, who reiterated their plan and asked for "deeds not
words" and an end to the Fenians' "disgraceful squabble". Given the unbalanced composition of the
convention, it is not surprising that the original constitution of 1863 was resurrected and the Philadelphia
modifications totally discarded. Eschewing the Canadian scheme and the organization which produced
it, O'Mahony's immovable will was now in contest with Roberts' irresistible force. However, by 1866,
the O'Mahony wing enjoyed the support of only a small fraction of the movement's total membership.
Having left the New York convention in a somewhat upset state after a frank rebuff by O'Mahony's
adherents, Thomas Sweeny soon visited the American midwest, accompanied by Roberts, and both
extolled the virtues of the Canadian plan. Sweeny mellifluently promised his audiences that "before the
summer's sun kisses the hill tops of old Ireland, a territory will have been conquered on which the green
flag, the sunburst of old Ireland, shall float in triumph, and base be formed for some glorious operations
there".
On 19 February, 1866, the Senate wing held its own convention in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
O'Mahony made through his representatives a weak attempt at reconciliation, but the Roberts' wing,
probably motivated at least in part by O'Mahony's cavalier rejection of Sweeny, treated his delegates in
similar fashion. The Senate wing was fixed upon the Canadian invasion and it was at this convention
that Sweeny's specific plans were revealed to the Fenian Brotherhood.

60

Sweeny's plan had as its goal the capture of Quebec which would become the seat of the Irish
operations could be launched from the Gulf of St. Lawrence against
BrltIsh commercial Shlpp1l1g, If needs be, and the Fenians expected that negotiations would be
~vent~ally opened with the British government. Sweeny anticipated that the biggest obstacle the
1I1vaSlOn would face would be the units of the British Army then in Canada. To draw them away from
their base of supply and reinforcement in Quebec, and thus with an invasion of Quebec seal their fate,
?weeny proposed ~ three-pronged a~~ault; the western and central prongs to be launched against targets
111 Ontano were feInts. When the BntIsh had committed themselves against these distant thrusts to the
west, the main Fenian would cross into Quebec and sever the lines of communication for the British
forces.
Rep~blic-in-exil~. Fu:th~r m~time

. T~e left, or western, wing.of the invasion was to be an army of 3,000 men commanded by
B:lgadler-General Charles T~VIS, ~ graduate of West Point and adjutant-general of the Fenian Army.
HIS command was to muster 111 ChIcago and Milwaukee.
:rhe ~entre wing o~ t~e invasion force, comprised of 5,000 troops, was slated to be commanded by
Bngadler-General WIlham F. Lynch and was to asemble at the cities along the south shore of Lake Erie.
The plan nebtuibs Toledo, Sandusky City, their headquarters at Cleveland, Erie, Dunkirk and Buffalo.
. T~e right, or eastern wing of the invasion army was to include 16,800 men and be commanded by
Bngadier-Ge~eral Sam~el P. Spear. Its mustering area was St.Albans, Vernlont. Spear was to have
seventeen regIments of 1I1fantry and five of cavalry, commanded by Brigadier-General Michael C.
Murphy, based at Malone. The main assault on Canada was to be led by Spear.
The

arm~es of.Te~is and Lync~

were to make movements which would be interpreted by the British

Canada, LIeutenant-General Sir John Michell, as serious threats against
Toron~o. S~~~n~ estImated that the ~rown c~uld draw upo~ 8,000 British regulars and 20,000
CanadIan rmlltla In Quebec and Ontano. TeVIS was to get hIS men across Lakes Huron and Michigan
~nd march on Stratford and London, threatening Toronto from the southwest. Lynch's force was to cross
111 t~o columns; one. from Cleveland across Lake Erie, and having secured Port Stanley would join
T~VIS at Lo~don, w~Ile the ot~er from Buffalo, having crossed the Niagara River and seized a
bndgehead In the N.I~gara Pemnsula, would advance to Paris, Hamilton and Guelph before threatening
T?ronto.. As the Bntlsh m?ved westward to protect Toronto, Canadian Fenians acting in conjunction
WIth radl~al French-CanadIans, would destroy St. Ann's Bridge at the junction of the St. Lawrence and
Ottawa RIvers on the route of the Grand Trunk Railroad and the Beauharnois Canal. This would cut the
British line of communication with their supply base.
Commander-1I1-Chle~ 111

With this a~complished, Spear's force would be committed. Murphy's cavalry would cross from
Malone threatemng Cornwall and Prescott and would proceed along both sides of the Richelieu River
and c~p.ture the garrisons of Ile-aux-Noix, St. Johns and Port Chambley. Murphy was also to occupy
LaPr~me and threaten Montreal by ~he Victoria Bridge, holding it until reinforced by Spear's infantry
battahons. Spear exp.ected to be assIsted by both the Montreal Irish and the republican Parti Rouge,
who~e French-CanadIan memb.ers had already negotiated with the Fenians. Spear's army was to follow
the .hne of the Grand !runk RaIlroad and capture Point Levis opposite Quebec City. This point had been
desI.gnated as. the Femans' port to the Atlantic Ocean. Once ;lis facility was in Fenian hands, three
Feman warshIps, purchased from the U.S. Navy, were to sail from the Brooklyn Navy Yard and
blockade the St. Lawrence to prevent British convoys from coming to the assistance of the beleacruered
British Army in Ontario. In the eve~t that Quebec and Montreal could not be secured, Spear halbeen
ordered by Sweeny to concentrate hIS force between the St. Francis and Richelieu Rivers on and around
the town of Sherbrooke which would become the capital of the exiled Irish Republic.

61

CF) The Campobello Fiasco and Its Effects

Although Sweeny's plan is strategically interesting and appears to have gr.asped the military importance of Quebec to the British Army, he seems to ha,:e glo~sed over ot~er c~uc~al aspects.. In some senses, Sweeny proposed to repeat the major mistakes eVIdent In the Amencans f.aIled campaIgns to capture
during the War of 1812. His appreciation of men and logistic~ was woefully Ina~equate, and h~ ap~ears
to have made no contingency plans if even these were not avaIlable. TransportatIOn and commIssarIat
issues, surprisingly, seem to have been of little concern for this professional soldier; Sweeny blithely assumed that Canadians would supply these. It is possible that Sweeny had absorbed the common 19th
century American belief in Manifest Destiny, "Yhic~ was.at least partially ~ased .upon the false ass.umption that other countries would welcome Amencan InVaSIOn because theIr InhabItants secretly desIred to
be Americans. Sweeny expected that the non-Fenian Irish in Canada would be impressed by their military capacity and assist their cause; the fact that many of the Irish in Canada were fr?m Ulster se~ms to
have completely escaped him. The whole military operation depended ~P?n ne~trahty by th~ UnIt~d
States government, and their formal acknowledgement once the Repubhc-In-exile was estabhshed In
Quebec.
In spite of these problems, the Senate wing was nothing if not completely confider:t. E~pecting a~
easy time of it, thousands of young Irish-Americans, many of them recent veterans, enhsted In the Feman Army. From contemporary newspaper accounts, it is clear that Roberts. and Sweeny were garnering
areat support from local Fenian organizers. In early February of 1866, Patrick Q'Day, the prominent
Buffalo, New York, Fenian wrote to the Buffalo Courier and exhorted the American Irish to prepare for
war, noting:
.... a veteran Irish officer of unsullied honour and a brilliant
military reputation, who has spent eighteen years in the
military service of the United States, has volunteered his
services to lead the hosts which are now about to be marshalled
under the green flag of Ireland. The time for action has
arrived. The plans of action are perfected, and all that is now
required is arms to place in the hands of the thousands of brave
men who are today ready to take the field and fight for their
country's liberation.....our fellow American citizens....not...deaf
to the call which the Fenian Brotherhood of America now
makes on them to aid the work of winning Irish independence.

This confidence manifested itself in a song soon making the rounds in the Roberts-Sweeny wing of
the movement.

We are the Fenian Brotherhood, skilled in the arts of war,

And we're going to fight for Ireland, the land we adore,
Many battles we have won, along with the boys in blue,
And we'l! go and capture Canada for we've nothing else to do.

The year of the Fenians had arrived.

Two days before the Senate wing's Pittsburgh convention in February, the Br~ti~h goverr:ment
suspended habeas corpus as an emergency measure in Ireland. Concerned abou~ CIVIl unrest Ir: Ireland
which they feared could be manipulate.d by t~e elusi~e !ame~ ~tephen~, and seeIng no alternatIve, the
Parliament in London passed a bIll whIch senously lImIted CIVIl hbertles. Hundreds were arrested,
including many Irish-Americans.
The reaction of the American Fenians can only be described as vitriolic. Rather ironi~ally, British
attempts to further suppress unre.st in Ireland ha~ ef~ective~y stimulated ev:en further Amencan
Fenianism just at the time when It was approachIng Its zemth. Mass meetm~s were soon he~~ across the
United States and the Fenian headquarters in Union Square was swamped w:th concerned VIsItors. In
spite of Archbishop John McCloskey's warning to hi~ flock "to take r:oyart In what must be regarde? as
an open profanation of the Lord's Day, an act of pu~hc scandal to ~ehgIC!n and an outrage to the feelIngs
of all good Catholics", Jones' Wood In New York CIty was swarmIng wIth thousands on Sunday, 4
March, 1866, eager to be addressed by prominent Fenians. Both wings of the ~ovement were
temporarily united in castigating "the foul tyrants of our race", and Q'Mahony dId not lose any
opportunity to plead for money for the Irish cause.
In the uproar following these Irish civil developments, the Q'Mahony f~c~ion sudde?ly bloss?med
with a previously unseen militancy. ~he split wit.h Rob~rt.s .ha~ beer: ver~ dIffIcult for Q ~ahony s
organization, and they were most anxIOu~ to ~egam credlblhty In t.helr claIm to be the offiCIal ~o.vement.
Sensing a shift towards even greater belhcosIty on the part of Feman supporters, Bernard D. KIllIan,
O'Mahony's treasurer and New York lawyer, began to constantly pressure his chi~f to take action.or risk
the atrophy of their wing. Killian argues that Campobello Island, whose ownershIp was a matt~r m
international dispute, and which was located at the western entrance to Passamaquoddy Bay adJacen~ to
the New Brunswick-Maine boundary, would make an excellent naval base for Insh pnvat~ers 0I?eratIng
against British shipping. Reluctantly, in mid-March, Q'Mahony agreed to an a~tempt agamst th~s.
objective when Killian implied to him that Seward was not opposed to any Feman assault on Bntlsh
North American possessions.
This rolling of the military dice in mid-April proved to be an unmitigated debacle fo~ the
O'Mahony wing. Well informed by agents about O'Mahony's intenti.o.os, the New B~nswlck
government was able to potentially resp?nd with.a large for~e of BntIsh and CanadIan troops, as well as
with elements of the Royal Navy. DespIte the seIzure of theIr supply vessel by U.S. Customs
authorities, the now poorly armed Fenians landed in Indian Island near Ca~pobel1o, and managed to
torch several warehouses one of which contained liquor, and purloin a Umon Jack from a customs
inspector before withdra~ing. After a week's delay, as they were uncertain as to which wing of the
Fenian movement was involved, the United States government finally sent General George Meade, the
victor at Gettysburg three years earlier, to clear the troubled f~ontier region. Many of ~he Fenians
utilized the officially provided railway tickets to return to th.elr hom~s. Th~ ~3.5,OOO ~Ia~co cost
O'Mahony both the contents of his treasure and the last vestlg.es of hIS. credlb:lIty. WIthm a few weeks
.
after Campobello, hundreds of his previous supporters had shIfted theIr allegIance t~ the
Roberts-Sweeny faction, whose invasion plan and private army exuded an allure whIch was ObVIOusly
missing from Q'Mahony's recent slipshod affair.
On 10 May, 1866, James Stephens arrived in New York City and upbraided Q'Mahony for allowing
what he termed a "most deplorable divergence from the true path".. Compl.etely shattered, Q'1:'1ahony .
tendered his resignation as President of the Fenian Brotherhood; thIS declSlon was accepted WIth alacnty
by James Stephens.
The Campobello incident had some unexpected results for Canadians. The spring e~ection in New
Brunswick in 1866 was massively influenced by the invasion scare. The pro-ConfederatIOn party of
Samuel Tilley was voted into power in the New Brunswick Assembly as the border ridings, not

62

63

CG) Anglo-Canadian Reactions Between 1865 and 1866

surprisingly, voted for Tilley and what one provincial newspaper termed" a good and efficient system of
mutual defence". The New Brunswick attempt also proved to be an excellent, but unintentional, feint
for the Roberts-Sweeny faction which seems to have been comparatively overlooked by the
~nglo-C~nadian agents who did not appreciate the importance of the gulf between the wings. Ontario,
m the spnng of 1866, treated the New Brunswick campaign as a virtual obituary for the entire
movement. The lacklustre reception of James Stephens in New York City seemed to only confirm this.
The Sarnia Observer opined to its readership that "so far as any fear of a Fenian invasion is concerned,
the whole force [on the frontier] might be disbanded; for we do not believe the Fenians will venture
across the border". Even the watchful John A. Macdonald thought "that the Fenian war may be
considered as over". O'Mahony's fumbled operation had unwittingly benefitted both New Brunswick
and William Roberts.
Roberts' Senate had met in New York at the same time as the Campobello attempt and discussed
th~ ti:ning of the ~mplementation o.f Sweeny's invasion plan which had already been approved in
pnnclple at the PIttsburgh convention the previous February. By the end of April, Roberts' headquarters
on Broadway Avenue was a whirlwind of activity, and the New York Herald was reporting that Roberts
and Sweeny were in constant consultation.
. Frankly delighted with the Campobello failure, and having bluntly dismissed O'Mahony's effort to
umfy the Brotherhood, Roberts, on the 10th of May, the very day that Stephens arrived in the United
States to mend the fissure in the movement, made the decision to launch his veteran ~oldiery against
Canada.

Serious Canadian concerns about Fenianism surfaced with the alarm caused by the St. Albans raid
of late 1864. The powerful Orange Lodge often had considerable difficulty distinguishing between
Fenianism and Irish Catholicism, and rumours soon began to spread in Ontario that indigenous bands of
Fenians were arming and being nocturnally drilled by priests. Prominent leaders of Irish Canadians
societies, sensing the potential danger in this association, sought to distance ethnicity from politics;
D'Arcy McGee, who had previously announced that "we have no right to intrude our Irish patriotism on
this soil, for our first duty is to the land where we live", further clarified his views in early 1865 by
publicly stating that Fenianism was" a serious Irish society" and" a foreign disease".
By the summer of 1865, Canadian fears had shifted from that of American machination to Fenian
invasion and, as such, formed a considerable part of both private and official correspondence. The
British Consul in New York, receiving intelligence from several informants, one of which was the
assistant secretary of the Fenian Brotherhood, urgently contacted Governor-General Monck to the effect
that he expected Fenian incursions into Canada to be imminent. Canadian authorities were, by this
point, increasingly watchful. John A. Macdonald expanded the detective force which he had created
after the St. Albans affair. The future Prime Minister informed Monck "that the movement must not be
despised" and that he was so convinced of their potential threat that he would "spare no expense in
watching them on both sides of the line".
By November, the British government began to officially react to the Fenian situation in North
America. The British colonial secretary had sent to the American authorities a strong message noting
"Her Majesty's great displeasure" concerning "the Fenian agitation in the United States". Sir John
Michel, the Commander-in-Chief of all British forces in North America, received a dispatch from the
British Consul in New York which indicated that he felt the danger of invasion was immediate.
Rumours of Fenian invasion burgeoned, and a number of banks in Ontario moved their assets away from
the border. In the early part of November, the government called out a number of militia companies for
active service on the frontier during the winter. These units were under the command of Sir John
Michel, who delegated the eastern part of Ontario to Major-General James Lindsay and the western
portion to Major-General George Napier. Prescott, Niagara, Windsor and Sarnia were garrisoned, but
despite the rumours, the vaunted invasion did not materialize. However, the espionage operations
conducted by Gilbert McMicken's agents continued unabated during the winter of 1865-1866.
By the end of February of 1866, Canadian concerns about Fenian intentions quickly ascended to
new heights. The effect upon the Fenians of the British suspension of habeas corpus in Ireland was well
gauged by both the newspapers and McMicken's operatives, who reported that the Fenians would "make
a demonstration against Canada about the middle of March". In the early part of that month, Macdonald
informed Colonel Patrick MacDougall, the Adjutant-General of Militia, that 10,000 militia were to be
mobilized for at least several weeks. Canadians, increasingly nervous, overwhelmingly applauded these
moves of officialdom. Many newspapers denounced the American government for turning a blind eye
to the Fenian preparations, and the Roman Catholic church in Ontario, sensitive to the potential
backlash, clearly and publicly spurned the movement, reminding its Irish Catholic flock that it had a
"duty towards the Government under which we have liberty, protection and just laws".
Some American newspapers responded to Canadian editorials by noting that the current situation
was a just reward for what they termed Anglo-Canadian "misconduct" during the late American conflict.
Once again, however, the threatened invasion did not occur, and the British Consul in New York
was convinced that the Canadian mobilization had prevented it. In late March, when most of the militia
units on active service were standing down, the Toronto Globe evaluated the benefit of the spring scare:

64

65

The events of the last fortnight have not only shown

unmistakeably [sic] that the true British spirit beats
universally throughout our country--that the people of
Canada are ready, as one man, to defend their homes
and firesides--but they have established the fact that the
military system of the Province works efficiently ....The
Fenians have unwittingly done an essential service to
the Canadian people, by inspiring them with a degree of
confidence in their defensive strength which they did
not before possess. They have, moreover, given our
Republican neighbours an opportunity of seeing how
earnest and unanimous is the love of the people of
British North America for British alliance, and how
utterly groundless has been the impression so diligently
propagated, that the desire for annexation to the United
States was general in Canada.
Canadian response in early 1866 proved that their loyalty was not ~n issue and that F~nianism ~ad
made no real inroads north of the border, particularly amongst the consIderable body of Irish-CanadIans
upon whom Sweeny's plan blithely placed so much reliance. In real,ity, a .l~ge numbe~ of Iris~- .
Canadians were Ulster Protestants. With no doubt about the church s posltlon concermng Femamsm,
the Catholic Irish in Canada found a basically good government, with an adequate legal and educational
system in place. The vast majority of Irish-Canadians, uPO? comparison of their conditions with those
in Ireland in the "Hungry Forties", were not prepared, despIte Orange Lodge fears to the contrary, to
hazard this general improvement in their lot.
Such generalloyaIty to the Anglo-Canadian connection prompted the North J\merican correspondent of the London Times, in early April, to comment that the "hearts of the CanadIans beat tru~ and
steadily for England. This Fenian conspiracy will make the proposed confederation of the ProvInces
qui te certain".
In the late spring of 1866, the relaxing of Ontario's apprehensions after the scare in March was
reinforced by the Campobello failure. The natural and inevitable tendency to disregard rumours after a
plethora of them was encouraged by the avalanche of editorial opinion on both sides of the border that
Fenianism was not a thing of the past.
Yet it was only the O'Mahony wing which was moribund, and as the summer of 1866 approached,
Canada reposed in a false sense of security.

CH) The Invasion of Canada: The Campaign in the Niagara Peninsula and the Battle of Ridgeway
On Sweeny's order in early May, Fenian units in the deep south began to mobilize to I?ove north to
gather at Cincinnati, Ohio. Roberts' general mobilization decision of 10 May, 1866, auth?~zed Sv.:eeny
to place the rest of the units tasked for the operation on active service..Many of the entraInIng Feman
soldiers offered to curious spectators the explanation that they were gOIng out west to see~ employment;
the plausible validity of this subterfuge evaporated once they turned eastward. Sweeny, dIrectIng
operations from his headquarters at Albany, New York, expected t~at he would soon have thousands of
Fenian troops in the previously noted assembly areas along the Umted States-Canada border.
A number of problems had come to Sweeny's attention towards the end of May. AI~hough the
Fenian Army had responded fairly quickly to the mobilization, his mustered forces at ChIcago,.
Milwaukee, Cleveland, Buffalo and St. Albans were insufficient when compared to those requlfements
laid down in his planned order of battle and their attendant logistics. In his campaign ~lan of early 1866,
Sweeny had noted an initial minimum of 10,000 all ranks with ~O.O rounds of ball cartrIdge per man and
three batteries of field artillery with 500 rounds of fixed ammumtIOn per gun. Several U.S. government
arsenals had provided Sweeny with 10,000 small arms and 2,5000,000 rounds, but he was completely
devoid of artillery and hoped to employ captured pieces. The centre column had problems beyond those
of manpower and military f3quipment; the transports which were to take one of the two centre armx
columns from Cleveland to ort Stanley were not available, and the central prong's commander, thlftyyear-old Brigadier-General William ~ynch, wh? had been tw~ce ~o~n?ed durin~ the Civil Wa~, was
prostrated by recurring fever originatI~g from hIS sever~ wartI~e InJunes. In spIte of these m~Jor
setbacks, Sweeny decide to proceed WIth the attempt. HIS of~cIal report; co~pIled ~fter the failure of the
invasion, recorded that when he had appeared before the Feman Senate In mid-Apnl, he was strongly
and unanimously exhorted to begin field operations and avoid the movement's collapse. Caught
between his military realizations and what were, in effect, P?litic~l press~res, the Fe~i~n
.
Commander-in-Chief chose "the chances of an honorable failure In the fIeld, to the dlSlntegratIon of the
organization".
The actions which Sweeny took to deal with the chance indisposition of Lynch, and the transport
problems of his command, set in motion a fortuitous chain o.f events .~hich ~ere to ultimately display
the military talents of their best field commander to emerge In the mIlItary hIstory of the Feman
movement. Sweeny directed that, in the absence of transport across Lake Erie from Cleveland, Lynch's
assembled command was to move to Buffalo where transport had been secured, and ordered that
Colonel Sherwin, Lynch's adjutant, take command. Unfortunately, Sherwin was personally u.nable to
reach Buffalo until early June, and Sweeney considered it to be essential that the centre crossIng was to
occur on the night of 31 May, in keeping with his overall planning. Accordingly, the Fenian assistant
adjutant with the centre army in Buffalo, Captain William F. Hynes, a Fenian senator from Boston,
Massachusetts, made the proper decision to appoint the senior officer present to the command of the
central column which was to commence its crossing of the Niagara River.
The senior officer present in Buffalo was Colonel John O'Neill, a respected and experienced Union
officer in the Civil War who had begun his military career in the ranks of the United States Regular
Army in the 1850's. Commanding the 13th Regiment of th~ Irish Republican Army, as the ~enian. A:my
was often known, O'Neill and his mobilized unit left Nash .He, Tennessee, on 27 May and In LOUISVIlle,
Kentucky, joined forces with the mobilized 17 Regiment, commanded by Colonel Owen Starr. The
Fenian troops under O'Neill and Starr arrived in Cleveland, Ohio, to join the centre army on the night of
28 May, but found neither orders nor staff willing to issue them. The 13th and 1?t~ RegIments w~re part
of the Cleveland assembled force which Sweeny ordered moved to Buffalo to utIlIze the only avaIlable
transports.

66

67

services during the invasion, for he made correct decisions consistently based upon both the terrai~ in
the peninsula and the movements of the Anglo-Canadian forces. The number of rumours concernmg the
Fenians may have used double agents locally to delay British reaction which in tum would allow the
Fenians more time to establish an increasingly viable bridgehead.

In the late morning of 31 May, O'Neill received his

orders from Captain Hynes. In this briefing, he learned
what he was to immediately accomplish before he was
to be joined by Sherwin's force assembling in Buffalo
behind him.
O'Neill's strength was to be only about 20% of the
5,000 that Sweeny had detailed to form the centre
column, and he would probably not be able to get all of
them across the Niagara immediately. O'Neill's orde.r
of battle was comprised of several understreng!h Feman
infantry units; his own and Starr's, the 7th RegIment
raised in Buffalo and commanded by Colonel John Hoy,
the 18th Regiment from the Cleveland area and
commanded by Colonel John Grace and an independent
company from Terre Haute, Indiana, under t.he
command of Captain Hugh Haggerty. A tram load of
small arms and ammunition had arrived in Buffalo, but
the force's promised field artillery had been seized while
in transit from Pittsburgh by U.S. marshals. Although
O'Neill was to lack a commissariat, he did have a small
medical team officered by Eamonn Donnelly. O'Neill's
men, many of whom were considerably eX1?erienced
field soldiers, were probably a motley looking lot.
Contemporary sources no.te t?eir appear~nces as . . .
consisting of Civil War kit, m whole or m part, clvlhan
clothing and some green uniforms. The units also
appear to have had distinctive green regimen~al colours.
Largely quiet and orderly, they were housed m large
warehouses in Buffalo while they waited for
embarkation.

General John O'Neill

Born in Drumgallon in County Monaghan in
1834, O'Neill enlisted in the U.S. Regular Army
in 1857, and served with the U.S. 2nd Cavalry in
the Mormon War in Utah. He served as an officer in the Union Army during the Civil War with
both the 15th U.S. Coloured Infantry and the 7th
Michigan Cavalry. O'Neill was wounded in
1864 during the struggle for Nashville.
Elected President of the Senate wing of the
Fenian Brotherhood in 1868, he settled in the
American west after the Manitoba fiasco of
1871. O'Neill's attempts to make a living in land
speculation in Nebraska were dogged by marital
problems, alcoholism, poor health and bad luck.
The town of O'Neill, Nebraska, was named after
him, and the Fenians' greatest field soldier in ear
ly 1878. According to a British spy, O'Neill
"combined an undoubted military bearing with a
rich sonorous voice, which lent to his presence a
certain charm".

As it has sometimes been assumed that O'Neill had

little or no idea as to what he was to do, his operation
has at times been trivialized to a bumbling and pointless
raid. Nothing could be further from the truth, and it can
only be surmised that such opinions arose from a
misunderstanding of O'Neill's comment on his official
report that he had "received no written instructions and
had no map of the country". Hynes, in his briefing, had given him ve.ry definite instructions .verbally as
to what "he should attempt on the other side". In simple terms, O'Neill's forc.e was tasked with th~
seizing of a practical bridgehead and holding it for Sherwin's larger force Whl~h ~ould complete Its
assembly in Buffalo once O'Neill's men were ~ver the border. ~u~h an operatlOn s success. was
predicated upon several factors: an understandmg of the su:ateglc lmport~nce of.t~e. ?peratlon, a
command equal to the task and a good grasp of the terrai~ .mvolved and ItS POSSI~lhtles for defence. In
addition, it was essential that the enemy's strength, capacltles and probable reactlons ~e k~own, a~~ the
commander of the invading force be endowed with a quick judgement to m~e effectlVe fIeld declSlons
with respect to the tactical means by which the strategic en~s were to be aC~leve~ or, at worst, to know
when and how to preserve his command. Given these requrrements, Hynes appomtment of Colonel
John 1. O'Neill was to prove to be an admirable choice.

O'Neill and his officers were to be the beneficiaries of a well established and ongoing Fenian
intelligence system in Niagara, one which proved to be superior t~ the Anglo-C:a~adia~ force ~hich was
to operate against him. Since January, when S~~enJ: began to.senously pla.n hIS mva~lOn, MaJ.or Joh~
Canty of the Fenians' 7th Regiment, had been hvmg m Fort Ene and gath~nng useful mform~tlo~ w~lle
he was employed as a section foreman on the Buffalo and Lake.Huron RaIlroad. ~lthol;lgh 0 Nelli dId
not specifically mention the intelligence mechanism in his pubhshed report, he Utlhzed ItS constant
68

The selection of the southern portion of the Niagara Peninsula for a bridgehead was not haphazard,
and in some ways reflected the accurate appreciation the American planners made for their invasion of
Niagara in July of 1814. At least initially, the Fenians' lines of communication would be short as Fort
Erie was immediately adjacent to Buffalo, itself a major transportation terminal. There were no real
geographic impediments to invasion, and there were no local garrisons or fie~d forces to ov~rcome. In
addition, the Fenians were probably aware that the area had a number of reSIdents of Amencan
background. An Anglo-Canadian force would take some time to react to operations in the area,
particularly if the Fenian strength was ~hought to ~e c~:msi~erable. The terrain ~~voured defence, once a
bridgehead was competently placed; with the Feman mtelhgence network, declSlons ~ould be I?ade to
utilize the military advantages of operating within interior lines and to concentrate qmckly agamst any
divided foe. The terrain of the southern peninsula offered two bridgeheads, one inside the other. The
larger of the two was the Welland Canal, completed from Port Robinson to Port Colbome in the 1840's,
largely by Irish labour. By destroying the Port Robinson locks and the Montrose ~ridge on the Welland
River, a Fenian deployment behind the waterways of the canal and the Welland RIver would have forced
the British and Canadians to contemplate the extremely hazardous military operation of crossing a body
of water under fire. O'Neill may have known that the Anglo-Canadian forces able to operate against him
within a few days were not equipped with pontoon bridge equipment, as the account of one Canadian
officer had admitted. To effect a crossing, the Crown's forces would have to gather, which would have
gained time for Sherwin's column to join O'Neill's bridgehead. In addition, the interruption of canal
operations would have had such a significant effect upon the economy that British and Canadians would
have been compelled to plan a major operation against an increasingly strong bridgehead. Such a
concentration would have fitted in perfectly with the feint strategy of Sweeny's planning. A smaller
bridgehead, or natural line for defense for the Fenians if the Welland Canal and River position was
breached, would have been the south bank of Black Creek and the heights of the limestone ridge running
southerly to Lake Erie. O'Neill appears to have recognized that it was safer for the Fenians to initially
operate more north to south along the Niagara River, than east to west, as the former would minimize
the possibility that his line of communication and possible retirement would be interdicted.
The initial problem for O'Neill to solve was one of interrupted transportation across the Niagara
River. The railroad ferry "International" was purposely docked on the Canadian side of the river for the
night of 31 May. The anti-Fenian mayor of Buffalo, John Wells, concerned about the Fenian
assemblage in his city, had alerted the appropriate authorities. The port had been closed, and U.S.S.
Michigan, a warship of eight guns, had moved into the area to prevent a crossing. The small garrison of
Fort Porter, on the outskirts of the city, possibly safely, kept out of the way of the Fenian troops. Wires
of warning sent to Ottawa and Toronto by the British consul in Buffalo complicated the Fenian
expeditionary force's situation.
By various routes, the Fenian troops were moved in small parties to Black Rock shortly after
midnight on 1 June. Captain Hynes had secured two steam tugs and four scows at Pratt's Ironworks, a
few miles north of Buffalo along the Niagara River, and it was here that the Fenians rendezvoused with
wagon loads of small arms and ammunition. Colonel Ower. Starr, a former Union officer with a
reputation for intrepidity, was delegated by O'Neill to use his regiment to effect the initial crossing.
Landing at Freebury's Wharf at the foot of Bowen Road, about two miles north of the small
municipality of Fort Erie, Starr w~shed to immediately secure any rolling stock and cut telegraph lines as
he was quite mindful of the value of such in the Civil War. However, the crossing of Starr's advance
force was observed by local fisherman who quickly spread the alarm and the railroad staff, obviously
alert, managed to get a train moving from the Fort Erie depot to Port Colborne. One of the officers of

69

of Starr's battalion Captain John Geary, took a party westwards along the rail line as far Six Mile Creek
in between Fort Erie and Ridgeway. Tearing up railroad tracks and partially burning Sauerwein's
Bridge over the creek, the Fenians prevented any Anglo-Canadian rail incursion frC?m the west de~p into
their minimal bridgehead along the limestone ridge and Black Creek. In the meantIme, Starr, havmg
intemlpted the telegraph service and gained control of the railway depot, proceeded to capture the
international railway ferry at the foot of the present Beatrice Street as well as six men of the Royal
Canadian Rifles in the ruins of Fort Erie. Starr's leading troops had secured all of O'Neill's immediate
objectives quickly and without loss.
Having established a safe perimeter for the rest of O'Neill's force to land into, Starr posted sentries
at all the taverns and ordered the village reeve, Dr. Kempson, to arrange provisioning for his men.
Aware of the value of public relations, Starr ensured that his command was as orderly as possible in
order to prevent useless depredations. An Irish flag was raised, which, according to some sources, was a
<Treen, white and orange tricolor presented by the French President to the Young Ireland movement in
1848. A proclamation from General Thomas Sweeny was also read to the local inhabitants:
We come among you as the foes of British rule in Ireland. We
have taken up the sword to strike down the oppressor's rod to
deliver Ireland from the tyrant, the despoiler, the robber. ..We have
no issue with the people of these provinces, and wish to have none
but the most friendly relations. Our weapons are for the oppressors
of Ireland. Our blows shall be directed only against the power of
England; her privileges alone shall we invade, not yours. We do
not propose to divest you of a solitary right you now enjoy....We
are here neither as murderers, nor robbers for plunder and
spoilation. We are here as an Irish army of liberation, the friends
of liberty against despotism, of democracy against aristocracy, of
the people against the oppressors: in a word, our war is with the
armed power of England, not with the people, not with these
Provinces. Against England, upon land and sea, till Ireland is
free ....To Irishmen throughout these Provinces we appeal in the
name of seven centuries of British iniquity and Irish misery and
suffering, in the name of our murdered sires, our desolate homes,
our desecrated altars, our millions of famine graves, our insulted
name and race--to stretch forth the hand of brotherhood in the holy
cause of fatherland, and smite the tyrant where we can....We wish
to meet with friends, we are prepared to meet with enemies. We
shall endeavour to merit the confidence of the former, and the
latter can expect from us the restraints and relations imposed by
civilised warfare.
The successful footing which Starr and his battalion had lodged in Fort Erie allowed the crossing of
the remainder of O'Neill's units. By dawn, a headquarters was established at the farmof Thomas
Newbigging, a local official. This position about three miles north of Fort Erie! was along the south
bank of Frenchman's Creek and afforded a good water barrier against any force probing from the north.
The Fenians during the course of their occupation strengthened this position with barricades made of
split rail fencing material. In mid-late morning, O'Neill received further arms and supplies, along with a
body of reinforcements for his units, from the American side of the Niagara River. Buffalo newspaper
reporters, visiting his camp in the afternoon, noted officers studying maps and men eating and sleeping.
As many local residents were fleeing with their property, O'Neill was concerned about the lack of local
horses. Apart from the mounts themselves, he had prepared to field a small party of horsemen to screen
his movements and provide immediate and rapid reconnaissance. In order to forestall any probing from
the north, one of the two directions from which he expected Anglo-Canadian reaction, O'Neill sent

70

a company of the 18th Regiment, under Captain Donoghue, to cover the bridge at Miller's Creek to the
north. With this arrangement, the Fenians remained at Frenchman's Creek until the late afternoon of the
1st of June.
Without instructions from the American federal politicians, and probably at this point unknown to
O'Neill, the American military officials began to react to the initial Fenian crossing and the possibility of
a massive subsequent crossing. General George Meade, responsible for the Atlantic district, which
included New York, appointed Major-General W. Barry to be responsible for the border between
Oswego, New York, to Erie, Pennsylvania, and noted to him that he was to:
....use the forces at your command to preserve the
neutrality by preventing the crossing of armed bodies;
by cutting off reinforcements and supplies; by seizing
all arms, ammunition etc., which you have reason to
believe are destined to be used unlawfully, and in fine,
taking all measures precautionary or otherwise to
prevent violations of the law. For this purpose you
shall move the forces at your command to such points
as are threatened, and you shall employ such tugs or
vessels as can be procured for watching the river and
lake shores, and taking all such measures as in your
judgement the emergency requires.
In keeping with these general instructions, U.S. S. Michigan was ordered to proc~ed to the landing
at Pratt's Ironworks in the late afternoon to prevent the crossing of Sherwin's gathering army for which
O'Neill was preparing a bridgehead.
Around 5 PM, elements of O'Neill's command began their movement northward along the Niagara
River in order to take up positions along the WeIland River near Chippawa before moving westward to
secure the southern portion of the WeIland Canal. Some five or six miles to the north of Fort Erie,
Colonel Hoy's 7th Regiment ran into civilian garbed horsemen who fled northward. Assuming that
these men were scouts of the Crown's forces, Hoy sent word back to O'Neill, who, in the meantime, had
received positive intelligence that British troops had been observed moving southwards from Niagara
Falls towards Chippawa on the WeIland River. Realizing that the British would reach the WeIland
River before he was able to secure it, he opted for the smaller bridgehead and ordered Hoy's battalion to
advance to Black Creek to cover the bridges and take up positions on the south bank of the water barrier.
Having disposed of his surplus of small arms, the rest of O'Neill's units left the Frenchman's Creek
position sometime between 9 and 10 PM. Around midnight, O'Neill's men had moved into the Black
Creek position, and deployed to dispute the anticipated British advance southwards.
Sometime during the night of 1/2 June, as his men rotationally rested in their positions along Black
Creek, O'Neill received further intelligence concerning the movements and composition of the forces
arrayed against him. Two columns had been assembled; the one at Chippawa, of which O'Neill was
already aware, was at least partially comprised of professional infantry and field artillery, and the
column which had just arrived at Port Colborne was entirely Canadian infantry. Neither force enjoyed
the advantage of Canadian or British cavalry units and thus were deprived of immediate intelligence
concerning the precise size and location of their Fenian opponents. An experienced tactician, O'Neill
undoubtedly realized from the Anglo-Canadian deployment that they had correctly grasped his objective
and had placed troops at either end of the potential bridgehead. The deployment of the stronger force at
Chippawa probably indicated to O'Neill that they correctly anticipated that he would be more likely to
move initially along a north-south axis as he moved to seize the WeIland Canal/River line. Aware that
the Port Colborne column would advance by train to Ridgeway and then move overland northward, he
probably guessed that the Anglo-Canadian force would rendezvous somewhere to the west of his
location, denying him movement westward, and presenting him with a combined force moving towards
the river. Logically, this rendezvous point would be central between the two columns and positioned
such that it was in the middle of the Fenians' possible movements. Having evaluated this probable
71

Anglo-Canadian development, and the relative strengths and locations, O'Neill decided to intercept, on
the heights of his selected bridgehead along the limestone ridge, the weaker Port Colborne column after
it had detrained in Ridgeway and begun to move north. It is currently unknown if O'Neill decided to
leave a covering force at Black Creek to stall the British force if it came against this position from the
north after the Fenian force had moved toward Ridgeway. It is probable that he realized that the British
force would eventually tum southwest to effect a juncture with the Canadians, and would not risk
cutting his line of communications from the north with a divided force as this would commit the British
to fighting with water at their back, a potentially superior enemy. O'Neill was undoubtedly aware that
the ambulatory infantry battalions and horse drawn artillery at Chippawa would be moving fairly slowly
in comparison to the train transported column, and this would allow him time to defeat the weaker force
before the stronger was a serious threat. If O'Neill had not made this decision, he would have
condemned his force to eventually face a much stronger enemy, and be correspondingly less able to hold
his bridgehead. With this appreciation, Colonel John O'Neill consciously set the stage for the Battle of
Ridgeway.

This force was comprised completely of Canadian militia infantry units: the 2nd Battalion from
Toronto, usually known as the Queen's Own Rifles, the 13th Battalion from Hamilton, the York and
Caledonia Rifle Companies and the WeIland Canal Field Battery which had had its guns removed to
Hamilton for security reasons some time previously, and was now armed with Enfield rifles. The
command of the Queen's Own, normally held by a Major Gilmor, had been given to Lieutenant-Colonel
John S. Dennis, the brigade major of the Toronto militia district, after he had vigourously lobbied
Napier.

About the same time that Colonel Owen Starr's leading troops were crossing the Niagara River,
Viscount Monck, an Irish peer and landowner as well as the Governor-General of British North
America, was contacted by the British Consul in Buffalo concerning developments in that area. In turn,
John A. Macdonald, leader of the Assemblies for the Provinces of Canada East and West (now Quebec
and Ontario), Colonel Patrick MacDougall, Adjutant-General of the militia and Lieutenant-General Sir
John Michel, an experienced soldier and Commander-in-Chief of H. M. Forces in British North America
went into conference.
The senior soldier in what is now Ontario was Major-General George T.C. Napier, headquartered
in Toronto. He had available about 5,000 British regulars and 20,000 Canadian militia for the defence
of the province. Napier had been informed that 1,340 Fenians, with six field guns and almost twice their
strength in small arms, had crossed into the Niagara Peninsula where he was to contain them. The
WeIland Canal was an obvious Fenian objective, and Napier decided to protect it and then place his
forces between the Fenians and what he correctly gauged to be their objective. The command of the
field force which was to assemble and entrain for Niagara was given to Colonel George Peacocke, noted
as a sound, steady and cautious soldier who commanded the 16th Regiment of Foot stationed at
Hamilton. Napier would have preferred Colonel Robert Lowry, commanding the 47th Regiment of Foot
and the 2nd Battalion/47th Regiment of Foot, in addition to a six-gun field battery of the Royal Artillery.
Concerned about the suspension bridge at Niagara Falls, as well as the WeIland Canal, Peacocke moved
his column southward by train towards Chippawa. Discovering that there was no platform at the train
station which could be used to unload his artillery, he ordered his gunners to detrain at Niagara Falls
and move their equipment by road to Chippawa. Entering that village about the same time that O'Neill's
force left Frenchman's Creek, Peacocke established a temporary headquarters at the home of a local
magistrate, J. Kirkpatrick. Aware that he lacked intelligence concerning the Fenians' current positions,
Peacocke decided to rest his troops until the remainder of his force, both regular and militia, could be
assembled by the next morning.
A second rail-transported column was ordered by Napier to assemble at Port Colborne to protect
immediately the southern terminal of the WeIland Canal.

Rifleman of the Queen's Own Rifles in 1866.

72

73

Lt. Col. John Stoughton Dennis

A surveyor by profession, and a hard working,
charming man by nature, Dennis was a born staff officer and it is hardly surprising that he was the brigade major, for what he considered to be his tactical
Lalent caused him to lobby the British for command
of the Queen's Own Rifles once it was apparent that
they were slated for the front. Dennis was obviously
unconcerned about the effect such political interference would produce in the battalion whose leadership
he demanded. Charged with cowardice and incompetence after the Fort Erie debacle, Dennis was absolved by the court, but the president dissented.
Many considered that the decision was a whitewash
and it was widely rumoured that John A. Macdonald
had personally intervened to save Dennis. Several
years later, his attitude and ineptitude embroiled him
in the Metis problem in Manitoba. Once again he
survived an inquiry. Dennis seems to have been one
of those individuals who escaped not only the immediate consequences of the questionable baLtles they
cause, but also subsequent inquiry. One cannot refrain from speculating that his appointment as a cabinet minister in the federal government in 1878 was in
parting recognition of this rare talent.

Alfred Booker
A wealthy merchant originally from Nottingham,
England, Booker had served with a Canadian artillery
unit before gaining the command of the 13th Battalion, a milita infantry unit from Hamilton, Ontario.
Despite his complete exoneration at the inquiry into
the management of the engagement at Ridgeway, he
was hounded by gossip and left military service to
move to Montreal. Four years later, Booker died,
embittered by the Canadian public's unrelenting and
largely unfair condemnation of his conduct in what
he termed "the trying circumstances in which we
were placed".

Battle of Ridgeway, June 2, 1866

From the collection of Mr. & Mrs. C. Jewell

The 13th Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Booker, arrived in Port Colborne
around 11 PM on 1 June about two hours after Peacocke had arrived in Chippawa. Being the senior
officer present Booker took command of the entire force assembled in Port Colborne which had a total.
strength of about 900 officers and men. At some point in the small hours of 2 June, Booker and Denms
received a report at Port Colborne from a senior railroad employee that the Fenians were drunkenly
immobile at Newbigging's farm on Frenchman's Creek. Dennis thought little of the Irish, and this news
simply reinforced his opinion that they would only be dealing with a militarily incompetent rabble prone
to substitute bottle for battle.
Death of a Fenian leader

74

From the collection of Mr. & Mrs. C. Jewell

75

The arrival in Port Colborne of the tug W.T. Robb carrying elements of the Dunnville Naval
Brigade, in addition to the railroad official's evaluation which Dennis' eagerness for action was all too
willing to believe, quickly gave rise to a plan to land a small force in Fort Erie, via the tug, to secure the
shoreline and cut off the Fenian retreat. Dennis, quite willing now to desert the battalion whose
command he actively sought, proposed to take charge of a landing party of less than one hundred men,
comprised of the WeIland Canal Field Battery and the Dunnville Naval Brigade. Booker was to take the
infantry units in his command into Fort Erie along the Buffalo and Lake Huron Railroad. The
enthusiasm displayed by Dennis for this plan swept Booker into agreement.
As Dennis and Booker were energetically planning their own cobbled campaign, Peacocke sent
Captain Charles Akers, of the Royal Engineers, to Port Colborne with orders for Booker. Not certain of
the strength of his enemy, and believing the Fenians to be equipped with field artillery, Peacocke had
correctly decided to move his force somewhat west of the last known Fenian position, and having joined
between the Fenians and their objective, drive eastwards towards the Niagara River. As Stevensville
was quite central, being thirteen miles from Port Colborne and ten from both Fort Erie and Chippawa,
Peacocke had selected it as a logical rendezvous point. An officer who had not demonstrated great military capacity despite his twenty years of experience, Akers transmitted to Booker his orders that he was
"to move his whole force by rail not later that 5:30 AM and march to join him [Peacocke] at Stevensville
at 10 AM next day".
Upon his arrival in Port Colborne, Akers was convinced by Dennis that Peacocke's plan was inferior, and that he should accompany Dennis as the landing party's second in command. Peacocke was telegraphed concerning this plan about 3 AM, and the tug left for Fort Erie about half an hour later. Shortly
after the landing party's departure, Booker received Peacocke's telegraphed response that he did not approve of this scheme and required Booker's acknowledgement of, and compliance with, the orders which
the now absent Akers had delivered to the force at Port Colborne.
Although it does not appear that Booker made any attempt to recall Dennis and landing party, he did
proceed to punctiliously adhere to the rest of Peacocke's directives. He decided to entrain his troops at 5
AM, take them to the station at Ridgeway and then march north along Ridge Road for several miles
before turning to his rendezvous at Stevensville with Peacocke's column. It is not known why Booker
decided to detrain his men at Ridgeway and move them along Ridge Road; to do so would expose his
men to a flank assault from the rising ground of the limestone ridge to the immediate east of his axis of
advance. One can only assume that Booker had much less of an understandi1)g of the ground than did
~'Neill. A much more cautious r~ute which would have crossed flat land, and involved no greater
dIstance, would have been to detram at Sherkston and march northeast to Stevensville. Booker's force of
840 officers and men, which one Canadian source notes had been drinking freely and were restless and
n~isy, arrived in Ridgeway around 6 AM. In the small, largely deserted, village consisting of a flour
ffilll, twenty houses, two taverns and a few stores, Booker, the only mounted officer in the column, ordered his infantrymen to load with ball cartridge. His force, seriously underequipped with respect to
small arms ammunition, blankets, water bottles, mess tins and food, was then inspected. The Canadians
~ere further hampered by a total lack of staff, and apart from three doctors, no means of operating a
fIeld surgery. As Booker's men assembled to begin their route march to Stevensville, the train whistles
and the bugles of the rifle units could be clearly heard for several miles.

76

After his men had made a hasty breakfast in their positions along the south bank of Black Creek
running to the west of the Niagara River, O'Neill at some point after 3 AM began to move his brigade
south to intercept Booker's column as it moved north. Proceeding along the south shore of the southern
tributary, known as Beaver Creek, as it ran to the south southwest, the Fenians were provided with a water barrier between themselves and any force approaching from the north or west. He left the protection
of the water course to gain the height advantage of the limestone ridge at a point where the distance between the two was minimal, somewhat to the north of the intersection of the present Ridge and Bowen
Roads. Ascending the ridge and proceeding south, the Fenian leading elements, comprised of Starr's
battalion, encountered a group of horsemen who fled south along Ridge Road towards Ridgeway with
news of the Fenian approach.
Coming upon the Canadian column preparing to march north, one of the riders, Samuel Johnston,
informed Booker that the Fenians were within a few miles of his location and were moving south. After
responding in the negative to Booker's inquiry concerning the presence of field artillery or cavalry in the
Fenian force, Johnston began to give unsolicited military advice to Booker. The Lieutenant Colonel
testily dismissed what he considered to be Johnston's impudence.
As this exchange was occurring, O'Neill's brigade was moving south along Ridge Road, constantly
enjoying the height advar 'age for which this axis of advance was chosen. O'Neill expected to engage
the Canadians on the lower ground to the right and forward of the Fenians' southward movement.
Having heard both the train whistles and the Rifle's bugles, O'Neill knew that his men had to be
deployed advantageously as soon as possible,. The ground several hundred yards to the north of Ridge
and Bertie Roads and south about half a mile to Garrison Road, and westward from the ridge, suited the
Fenians' purposes admirably. The appreciable heights to the northeast were wooded and would screen
the movements of the Fenians' reserves, as well as providing a commanding view from which to direct
the engagement. The Canadians would be approaching this through lower and fairly open wheat fields
to the south and southwest of the Fenian position. The wooded ridge to the east offered the possibility
of enfilade fire. A defence in depth could be constructed, as the ground to the front of the position was
slightly rolling to allow Fenian skirmishers to fall back deliberately through dead ground as they
hopefully pulled the Canadians into a crossfrre. The position's weakness was a possible turning of the
Fenian left flank on the ridge, but this would be minimized by pushing forward into the wooded portion
of the ridge and not disclosing the enfilade fire until the enemy was drawn deeply into the position and
were at least somewhat trapped in a killing ground. If worse came to worse, O'Neill could retire along
the heights of his axis of advance. The position selected by O'Neill upon which to deploy his battalions
was an ideal one for a defensive engagement.
Under the brilliant sunshine of a cloudless morning sky, whose still air promised a hot day, O'Neill
quickly deployed his troops. A main line was established on Bertie Road which crossed Ridge Road at
right angles. The ditch on the south side was strengthened by fence rails and other obstacles moved
across the road from the north side. Hoy's 7th Regiment was posted on the right by John Anger's brick
house, bam and other out buildings located at the southeast comer of the intersection of Ridge and
Bertie Roads. The left of the line which extended eastwards for a quarter-mile or so, and curved forward
into the maple grove on the crest of the ridge, was occupied by Grace's 18th Regiment. This position
would provide enfilade fire westward and southward as the Canadians advanced. Somewhat to the north
northeast of the mainline, in an orchard on the heights, 0 ~eill's reserve, comprised of his own battalion,
was located. To the south, at the intersection of Ridge and Garrison Roads in the area of Michael
Hoffman's tavern, "The Smuggler's Inn", Starr's battalion and Haggerty's independent company took up
skirmishing positions. It is highly probable that Starr and Haggerty deliberately did not occupy the
heights to their left; to have done so would have drawn the Canadians onto the ridge and thus lost the
advantage of the enfilade fire to be launched by Grace's men once the skirmishers had performed their
role. Although O'Neill's understrength units had been further weakened by straggling and desertion to
800 men or less, his well chosen position was held by competently deployed men who were well trained
and aware that they faced immediate action.

77

Having left the reserve small arms ammunition on the train which was returning to Port Colborne,
Booker's force began its march toward Stevensville. Although he expected nothing more than a routine
route march, Booker had reasonably arranged his men in column of route. In advance of the Queen's
Own Rifles was their No.5 Company, armed with the modern Spencer rifles. Following the Queen's
Own was the York Rifle Company, commanded by Captain R. Davis, and the 13th Battalion, under its
second in command, Major Skiller. The rearguard was the responsibility of Captain Jackson's Caledonia
Rifle Company.
Around 8 AM, No.5 Company under Captain Edwards bumped into the Fenian skirmishers. A few
scattered shots developed into a continuous, fire as Gilmor deployed No.2 and 3 Companies to both
flanks of Edwards' Company. With considerable skill, Gilmor deployed three more companies to
support the three in front and moved one to each flank as well. The Fenian skirmishers began to fall
back onto the main line at Bertie Road, according to O'Neill's plan. At this point, as Booker appeared to
be driving in the Fenians, he received a message that Peacocke would be delayed in his departure from
Chippawa. Booker decided not break off the engagement.
The trap laid by O'Neill was prematurely disclosed by firing from Grace's men on the ridge to the
Canadian right. The Highland and University Companies of the Queen's Own were deployed and
extended to clear this area of the ridge on the Canadian right flank. At the same time, the Trinity .
College Company of the same battalion had worked its way into the low ground to the west of Ridge
Road pr?bing to turn the Fenians' left flank. Approaching the Bertie Road position, the first three
c~mpames of the queen's Own had almost expended their ammunition and had enveloped themselves in
thIck clouds of whIte smoke. Booker replaced these men with three Companies of the red-coated 13th
Battalion, while the York Rifles took ground to the 13th's left. The forward troops just described were
separate~ fr~m the two Companies of the Queen's Own still engaged on the ridge to the right. The
Caledoma RIfle Company and the undeployed Companies of the 13th were in reserve several hundred
yards to the rear of the line to the right of Ridge Road. Further back were the rest of the Companies of
the Queen's Own Rifles in quarter column, including those Companies just withdrawn.
Having taken steps to retrieve the ammunition sent back with the train, Booker was with the
reserve, and w~s increasingly hampered by the lack of aides to pass orders as the engagement developed.
As the york Rifles and the ~eployed eleme~ts of the 13th began to turn the Fenians' right flank with a
regularIty of movement whIch was later praIsed by O'Neill, they evacuated their position on Bertie Road
and re~ed northward to their reserve position on the wooded heights. Some sources suggest that this
w~s delIberately e~ecuted to draw the Canadian centre forward to expose it to enfilade fire from the
helghts on the Feman left. However, regardless of the intention of the Fenian retirement up the slope an
unexpected disaster struck the Canadians.
'
. . Hors~~en, ~t le~st several in number, appeared to the north of the Canadian line. Although their
clvlI or mllItary IdentIty has ~e~n a matter of some debate, their effect was singular and dramatic. A cry
swept the fO~"'Yard troops advI~I~g .th.em to prepare to receive cavalry. In the 19th century, a square was
the most effIclent means of mImmIZIng cavalry's potential damage to infantry, and the Canadians were
ordere? to perfo~ the difficult manoeuvre of immediately shifting from line to square formation. This
alter~tIon w~s partIally complete, when Booker, realizing the error, attempted to reform the line and
contll1ue theIr advance. The apparently contradictory control, Booker ordered a retirement which made
matt~rs worse. T~e two Companies of the Queen's Own, still engaged on the ridge, heard the command
to wahdraw. At flrst they fired and retired in a leisurely manner, but seeing the rapid move to the rear,
speeded up a.nd diagonally crossed the Fenian front in the area of the orchard, drawing fire and losing
several men In the process.

78

From the collection of Mr. & Mrs. C. Jewell

Battle of Ridgeway, British form square.

Observing the consternation of Booker's forward troops, O'Neill seized the moment. His entire
line, having delivered considerable fire into the area of the square and retiring troops, was ordered to fix
bayonets and drive south through the orchard and beyond.
Although Booker himself and several of his subordinates made repeated attempts to rally the men,
he Canadians retired towards Ridgeway with a general confusion which one eyewitness compared to the
retreat from Bull Run in 1861. A counterattack was considered an impossibility by Booker and his
dispirited force moved back along the railroad line towards Port Colborne. About halfway back they
were met by the train returning with the requested ammunition. Joining with Thorold Volunteer Infantry
which had just arrived at Port Colborne, a defensive position was established as Booker expected the
Fenians to pursue them. His confidence shattered, Booker asked to be relieved of his command.
In spite of the fact that he had never commanded any fornlation larger than a battalion on parade,
and that the underpreparation of the Canadian column could not be realistically blamed upon its
commander, Booker was much criticized after Ridgeway. At his own request, he testified at an inquiry
in November of 1866. Although he was completely exonerated, public condemnation forced him to
leave both Hamilton and military service. John O'Neill, in both his account of the battle and his public
statements, was far more magnanimous to Alfred Booker than was the Canadian press.

79

The casualties .at Ridgeway, always a matter of some discussion, were comparatively light given
the number of men mvolved and the amount of ammunition expended. This was at least partially due to
the recorded.tende~cy for men to fue high. Booker himself was overheard on the field joking to the men
that, by bowm~ theIr heads, they were too polite to the Fenian volleys passing overhead. It is probable
that the CanadIan losses were ten killed and thirty-seven wounded, the majority in the Queen's Own
Rifles. The Fenians lost eight men killed and sixteen wounded.
As Starr's battalion pursued the retreating Canadians as far as Ridgeway, and the rest of O'Neill's
units consolidated on Garrison Road, the wounded were moved into Hoffman's tavern and other local
buildings for treatment by the Fenian surgeon Eamon Donnelly and Doctor Brewster, a local physician
who had served as a surgeon in the Union Army. There is some evidence that O'Neill visited the
:vound~d of both sides. At least some of the Fenian dead at Ridgeway were temporarily inhumed in the
Immediate locale of the engagement. The Hamilton Times relayed to its readership a rather bizarre note
concerning one of the Fenian dead; confused with a rifleman from the Queen's Own, he was interred in
TOfC;mto when the fatalities of the battalion were given a massively attended public funeral, and his
coffm was draped with a banner of the Orange Lodge.
The Fenian retirement to Fort Erie was conducted on two parallel lines. Starr's battalion in
Ridgeway was detailed to retire along the railroad ripping up track to prevent pursuit into their final
bridgehead, while the remainder of the Fenian units proceeded eastward along Garrison Road. The
move to 0rt Erie be~an ~n ear~y~mid ~fternoon, and t~e Garris~:m Road column, at least, according to
one eyewitness, was m hIgh spmts as It passed CanadIan dwellmgs. In all likelihood, O'Neill was
completely unaware of the presence of the landing party under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Dennis in Fort Erie.

t:

The tug W. T. Robb carrying the eighty seven all ranks force comprised of the Welland Canal Field

Ba~tery under Captai~ Richard King, and Captain Lachlan McCallum's Dunnville Naval Brigade, had
~I.v~d at the Fort Ene ferry dock around dawn. Having taken into custody several suspicious
mdI.vlduals, ,the. tug m~)Ved down~t~eaI?' It is possible.that the men Dennis captured were guides left
behmd by 0 NellI to drrect Sherwm s fIeld force when It crossed from Buffalo. The landing party

st?pped at Freebury's dock. around mid-morning. Reconnaissance along both Bowen Road and the
RIver Road produced nothmg except for a few stragglers, and, to Dennis's surprise, the encampment at
Frefolchman's Creek was f<:>u.n~ de~erted. Hailed in mid-stream by U.S.S. Michigan, they learned of the
Feman mo~e north, and CIVIlIans mformed them of the Fenian march southwards towards Ridgeway.
Re-embarkmg on the tug at Black Creek, the landing party returned to Fort Erie.
Arriving back in the village in mid-afternoon, the landed troops were told of the imminent Fenian
colurr: n by a retire~ soldier, C~ptain Lewis Palmer. Ensuring that his prisoners were all embarked,
Denms [ormed ~ lme on the RIVer R~ad near the dock. He may have assumed that Booker had defeated
the F~mans, w~Ich would have e::cplamed Booker's lack of appearance in Fort Erie, as he had no way of
knowI~g that hI,S plan had been dlsapprov.ed ~y Pe~c.ocke. He mu~t have .conclud~d that he was facing a
small, and pOSSIbly shaken, body of men If hIS declSlon to fight WIth a heIght to hIS front and water at his
back was at all sanely based.
. ,Facing a l~~e column of experienced and victorious men, Dennis was to quickly realize that his
ongmal appreCIatIOn was completely wrong. Although the engagement was to be of short duration it
'
was of fierce character.

Battle at Fort Erie Docks

From the collection of Mr. & Mrs. C. Jewell

The leading elements of the Fenian column appeared on the heights by Bertie Street. Seeing the
Canadians drawn up near the wharf, one of the senior regimental officers went forward with a flag of
truce to see if the Canadians wished to capitulate. Rifle fire opened up from the Canadian ranks and the
officer fell, shot in the chest. Rather ironically, the first round had been fired by Private Daniel Sullivan
of the Royal Canadian Rifles, who had been captured by Starr's men at FoLt Erie and released on parole.
When a large Fenian force began advancing along River Road, the tug cast off. Dennis, facing
overwhelming Fenian superiority, was suddenly unable to give commands. The two small units were
left to extricate themselves from the predicament in which Dennis had placed them. Some of the
Dunnville Naval Brigade made it back to the tug, which steamed with its prisoners and rescued troops
out of rifle range and eventually back to Port Colborne. The remaining Canadian troops, after a
stubborn resistance, were overwhelmed. Captain King and several of his men fought from behind cords
of wood stacked on the dock, and a number of others barricaded themselves in the post office nearby
and fought until they ran out of ammunition. Six of the Canadians were seriously wounded, including
Captain King who had to have his leg amputated. Three Fenians were killed and four wounded in the
blief but sharp exchange of small arms fire. The Fenians took around forty prisoners, and these were
added to those captured at Ridgeway.
Both Dennis and Akers escaped. The latter officer somehow managed to get a buggy through to
Port Colborne. Discarding both his uniform and his distinctive Dundreary whiskers, Dennis hid in a
garbage shed until he was able to make his way into Peacocke's lines later on. In November of 1866, he
faced charges of cowardice and desertion. Dennis was exonerated, but the court president dissented.
Governor-General Monck called him rash, but not cowardly. Akers seemed to have escaped censure.

80

81

..

-~.

By the late afternoon on 2 June, having gained further intelligence concerning P~acocke's str~ngth
and movements O'Neill had moved his entire command to the ferry dock near the rums of Fort Ene. At
that location, h; would be in a position to follow any of the options he co?sidered after the eng~geI?ent
at Ridgeway: if he was to retire, h~ was adjacen~ to his means of escape? if he was t~ fight to gam tIme
for Sherwin's force to cross, the rums of Fort Ene were the most defensIbl.e small bn?gehea~ .local~y.
By the fall of night, after throwing ,?ut stro~g picket~, the Fen~ans moved mto. defensIv~ pOSItIOnS m the
ruins and O'Neill began to commumcate WIth Captam Hynes m Buffalo. Ba~Ically, he mformed them
that he should either be withdrawn or massively reinforced as he knew that hIS command would soon
face a large Anglo-Canadian force equipped with field artillery.

At roughly the same time, the forces

operational against O'Neill were even
further strengthened. A new column had
arrived in Chippawa, where a militia field
battery and a company of the 1st
Battalion/16th Regiment of Foot had been
left by Peacocke to protect the village and
the waterway. This newly arrived force
was commanded by Colonel Robert Lowry
of the 47th Regiment of Foot, Napier's
original choice for the overall commander
of the field force in Niagara. Lowry,
bringing with him a regular battery of field
artillery, a battalion of the 60th Rifles, a
militia infantry battalion from Toronto and
a rifle company from Oakville with a total
strength of approximately 1,000 officers
and men, now took over from Peacocke as
the expeditionary force's commander.
Later during the same day, the Port
Colborne position to which Booker's men
had withdrawn was reinforced by several
companies of the 22nd Battalion from
Oxford, the Drumbo Rifle Company and
the 7th Battalion, bringing the total militia
infantry strength on the southern terminal
of the Welland Canal to around 1,400 all
ranks.

The advance of Peacocke's column from Chippawa on 2 June was hampered by a number of
conditions over which the British officer had little controL He had only a poor quality post office m.ap
with which to plan his movements, and consequently took his command along the actually l,?nger RIver
Road before turning southwest to reach New Germany, now Snyde~, on the way to Stevensville..The
little local intelligence which he was able to gather suggested a Fem~n force mu.ch stronger ~~an It was
in reality, and consequently he was to proceed with understanda~le CITC~~~p~ctIOn. The ~ntIsh were
forced to wait for the arrival of the 10th (Royals) and 19th BattalIOns, ffilllua mfantry regIments from
Toronto and St. Catharines respectively, and further companies of the ~7th Regiment of Foot stationed
in London Ontario. Poor commissariat arrangements meant that messmg for the men took an undue
amount of'time. It was for these reasons that he sent to Booker a message advising him to delay his
departure from Port Colborne. Broken bridges over th~ tributaries flowing into t~e .Niagara River
slowed the movement of his field artillery, and oppreSSIve heat caused some of hIS mfantry to straggle.
The pace was so intense that one regular NCO died of heat stroke, and. ~ of~cer of the. 10th (Royals)
later recalled that the men of his battalion often employed the old soldier s trlck of placmg a sm~oth
pebble in the mouth to assuage thirst. By mid-morning, still several miles to the north of the actIOn,
Peacocke heard the heavy small arms fITe to the south and received Booker's message that he was .
engaging the enemy. Before noon, Peacocke reached the crossroad of New Germany, where he deCIded
to rest, feed and consolidate his force.
The entire afternoon was spent in this area as Peacocke slowly learned that th~ Fenians had retired
eastward and that Booker had withdrawn to the west. At New Germany he was reInforced by three
companies of the 2nd Battalion/16th Regiment of Foot and the same number from the 60th Rifles, both
British units. The fITst cavalry to make its appearance with the Crown's forces in the Niagara Peninsula
arrived as well; the well trained me.mbers of the Canadian militia unit, the Governor-General's
Bodyguard, would be able to provide the eyes and ears which the column previously lacked. Peacocke,
by the late afternoon, had over 2,000 officers and men massed in New Germany.

As they believed that O'Neill's force

was comprised of several thousand men
equipped with field artillery, the British
decided that it was best to be cautious as
they advanced to a contact they reasoned
would occur somewhere to the south or
southeast. Around 5:30 PM, Peacocke's command began to move south from New Germany through
Stevensville, properly screened by the Canadian cavalry. Turning eastward on Bowen Road, they
eventually ran into a Fenian picket near the in~ersection with Pettit Road as ~vening fell. Judging the
ground to be favourable for a Fenian ambush If they proceeded further east m. the dar~ness, the colu~
was deployed to the west of the Fenian position on ground favourable to rec~Ive the mght assault ,whiCh
Peacocke anticipated. It was in this position that Peacocke's men spent the mght of 2/3 June rotatIOnally
sleeping upon their arms. Receiving information, ultimately false, that O'~eill was being reinf?rced by
several thousand men crossing the Niagara River, Peacocke believed that hIS nocturnal precautlons were
even further justified.
This infomlation probably originated in the actual e:n.bar~ation of a large number ?f Fenians that
night before the crossing was cancelled by Fenian autho:1tles m Buffalo. Peacocke d~cIded not to.
advance from this position until dawn removed the conSiderable problems of controllmg an offenSIve
battle at night.

82

83

With these Anglo-Canadian movements, O'Neill was quite accurate in his assertions to Captain
Hynes across the Niagara River that by the morning of 3 June his small command would potentially
have to cope with a force of some 5,000 men supported by artillery. O'Neill was frank: that his decision
to stay or withdraw his men depended upon the intentions of Sherwin's staff. While the American
federal politicians had yet to take a public position, the local authorities were not vacillating. The senior
official in the United States Army, Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, had come to Buffalo to observe
the situation, and troops were soon guarding all potential crossing places. In addition, two American
warships, U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Harrison, were constantly patrolling the river.

About 2 AM on 3 June, vessels that had been waiting in Buffalo Creek steamed across to the wharf
of the Buffalo and Lake Huron Railroad and the vast majority of O'Neill's force was evacuated. The
Fenian embarkation point was well selected as U.S.S. Michigan was downstream at Pratt's Ironworks.
However, the vessels were overhauled about halfway across by U.S.S. Harrison and Fenians were
a~Test~d. On 6 June, .0'Neill and his o.fficers appeared at the Erie County courthouse on charges of
vIO~at1l1g the NeutralIty Act of the Umted States and were fined, the American politicians finally having
deCIded to take a clear position once the invasion had failed. The Fenian rank: and file, having spent
several miserable days in the open scows, were released.
Very early on the morning of 3 June, several hours after O'Neill's force was evacuated from
Fort Erie, Peacocke's column rendezvoused with leading elements of Lowry's column which had probed
southwards along the Niagara River from Chippawa and learned that the Fenians had withdrawn.
Peacocke's column moved south and split into two columns which worked eastward along Bertie and
Garrison Roads. A long line of skirmishers was pushed through the area west of the fort's ruins to clear
it. A few stragglers were taken, as were the seriously wounded Fenians left in the care of one of their
chaplains, father John Mac Mahon. A number of other stragglers and deserters from O'Neill's force
appear to have avoided capture and eventually made their way back across the river. Upon their arrival
in Fort Erie, Peacocke and Lowry received assurances from both the United States military and naval
authorities locally that their sincere intention was to prevent further such incidents.
. On 6 June, 1866~ President Johnson finally made a proclamation of enforcement concerning the
Umted States NeutralIty law and ordered the arrest of the leading Fenians, including Sweeny and
R?berts. Jc:>hnson's ambi.valence towards the Fenian movement shocked and dismayed those within the
Insh-Amencan commumty who supported the Fenian cause.
. By 15 June, Brigadier-General Michael Burns had been appointed to the command of the mustered
Feman centre army still i!1 Buffalo, replaci~g the ailing Lyn~h. An agreement of parole was quickly
reach~d for the 5,000 offIcers ~~d men of hIS force. The Umted States government, upon receipt of a
promIse to abandon the eXpeditIOn, would provide the Fenian troops with free transportation to their
homes. Seve~al days before, there had been an attempt in the United States Congress to repeal both the
18~8.NeutralIty A~t and to recognize the Fenians as legitimate belligerents in the same way that Great
BritaIn had recogmzed the Confederacy during the Civil War. When these motions failed, the
government sy~ter.nati~ally p,roceeded to bloc~ further mustering on the border and to seize supplies of
arms. It was wIthm thIS realIty that Burns deCIded to demobilize the centre army and accept the terms of
the government's parole.

U. S. S. Michigan with captured Fenians.

Although over 5,000 Fenian officers and men had mustered in Buffalo ready to cross the Niagara
River under Sherwin's command, it was evident that his present situation was completely militarily
untenable for any real duration, and therefore he efused the offer of one Fenian regiment to cross and
assist him. His appreciation of the growing Anglo-Canadian strength indicated that the entire force
available to Sherwin must cross if the effort was to be worthwhile. O'Neill made it clear that if Tevis or
Spear had begun their operations, he was willing to sacrifice his command if it would gain the other
column time
and reduced Anglo-Canadian opposition. Upon being informed that this was not the case, O'Neill
decided to withdraw his men as there was nothing now to justify further Fenian loss.

Camp at Thorold

From the collection

of Mr. & Mrs. C.
Jewell

84

85

Fort Erie was occupied in strength by both British regular and Canadian militia units until well into
June, as scares of further crossing periodically abounded. Indeed, tensions were such that one private
soldier on nocturnal picket duty was embarrassed to discover the Fenian soldier which he had fired upon
and killed was in fact a cow. A large camp was established later in the summer of 1866 at Thorold to
act as both a staging and training area for Canadian militia units to employ if the need to concentrate in
the Niagara Peninsula occurred again.
The Fenian campaign in Niagara in 1866 had a tremendously positive effect upon the Canadian
forces. The Canadian citizen soldier was suddenly very popular and many militia regiments returned to
their hometowns to receive massive displays of public appreciation for their efforts on the frontier.
Even more importantly, the operations in Niagara had illuminated the inadequacies of the defence of the
provinces, particularly at a high level, concerning such areas as equipment, supporting services and to
some extent, command. The issue of national defence was brought before the Canadian public at a
fOltuitous time when it was both willing and able, with Confederation imminent, to attend the situation.
Within five years of the Fenian invasion, a Canadian professional force was born.
It is interesting to note that the accounts of both Canadian soldiers and civilians who were in
contact with the Fenians in Niagara express a quite consistent opinion concerning their general good
conduct during the invasion. In spite of the realities of heated international politics and the
understandably cold military world, at least some Canadians sensed an almost quixotic element in the
poignantly whimsical activities of these soldiers-in-exile. In the words of Major George Denison, who
commanded the Governor-General's Bodyguard during Peacocke's advance, and spent some time in Fort
Erie in the summer of 1866:

(l)

Further Fenian Activity and Decline of the Movement

The year of 1866 proved to be the zenith of the movement.

The rest of the attempted implementation of Sweeny's plan was of comparatively little
consequence. On 6 June, Brigadier Murphy's cavalry crossed the border, but was withdrawn. The next
day, while thousands of Toronto residents attended the public funeral of members of the Queen's Own
Rifles, Brigadier Spear and a thousand followers crossed the Quebec-Vermont boundary without
opposition and raised their green standard close to the village of Pigeon Hill. As Spear had but $20.15
on his person and his command lacked adequate arms, ammunition and food, his men plundered
shamelessly and in great contrast to the restrained conduct of O'Neill's men. Within a day, a force of
British regulars and Canadian militia converged on the Fenian position, and after a brief skirmish, they
either surrendered or retreated back into the United States. Spear and his staff surrendered voluntarily to
American authorities awaiting their return. Tevis' wing fared even worse; his units mustered according
to plan but he failed to move into into Ontario. His defence at the subsequent court martial was that he
lacked sufficient transportation for his command. Tevis was found guilty of cowardice, and suffered the
indignity of being removed from his rank in the organization. In the meantime, both Roberts and
Sweeny were arrested in New York City, but were quickly released on bail. In mid-June, Roberts,
hollowly promising another attempt in the not too far distant future, urged his followers to return home
by means of the officially provided railway passes. O'Neill's tactically well managed, but unsupported
bridgehead operation in Niagara was the flash in the pan of Thomas Sweeny's invasion plan.

They have been called plunderers, robbers and marauders, yet, no matter how unwilling we may be to
admit it, the positive fact remains that they stole but
few valuables, that they destroyed, comparatively
speaking, little or nothing, and they committed no
outrages on the inhabitants, but treated everyone with
unvarying courtesy. It seems like a perfect burlesque
to see a ragged rabble without a government, country
or flag affecting chivalrous sentiments and doing acts
that put one in mind of the days of knighterrantry.

Trial of the Fenian Prisoners

From the collection of Mr. & Mrs. C. Jewell

Hoping to rally his severely shaken following, and furious about what the Fenians considered to be
the United States government's duplicity, Roberts gathered the Brotherhood in Troy, New York, in early
September.Roberts banked on the need of the American politicians for the Irish vote as t late 1866
elections approached, as well as on the potential martyrdom of the Fenian prisoners taken in Niagara.
However, the Canadian authorities avoided this snare by delaying the trials, claiming that the mood of
the Canadian public would not allow a fair trial if undertaken immediately. Over two dozen Fenians
were eventually condemned to death, but the sentences were deliberately not carried out and all but one,
who died while incarcerated, were quietly released by the early 1870's. In addition, it had slowly
become apparent with the passage of time that the pragmatic American politicians had little to fear from
offending the movement as the Fenians enjoyed less and less support from the Irish-Americans. With
thi~ realization, and the improving Anglo-American relationship, came the loss of their greatest power.
Nelt~er Robert~ nor Sweeny, the most prominent proponents of the Canadian invasion scheme,
remamed long 10 the movement after the failure of 1866.
86

87

..
In the next few years after Canadian Confederation in 1867, the now shrinking movement
periodically threatened another attempt, but the lack of funds and support rendered these to be almost
m~~ingle~s pos~ures. In late May of 1870, John O'Neill launched an invasion, once again along the
MISSISquOl frontler north of Vermont. As before, the attempt was a failure. One of O'Neill's most
trusted advisors was in fact a British spy, and his force was routed at Eccles Hill. Arrested, O'Neill and
several of his staff spent several months in an American prison until a presidential pardon secured their
release. Resigning.from the Brotherhood because of lack of support for his plans, O'Neill once again
crossed the border m the autumn of 1871, even though he had promised American authorities that he
would refrain from such projects in the future. His brief incursion into Manitoba with a handful of
followers resulted in his arrest by a troop of United States cavalry which had pursued him into Canadian
territory. Released on a technicality, John O'Neill, undoubtedly the Fenian movement's most capable
and sedulous soldier, faded from history. Rather appropriately, with his departure the movement
militarily died.
The ailing Fenian Brotherhood managed to stagger as far as the mid-1880's, but after the Fenians'
repeated military failures in the immediate post-Civil War years, it was in reality a corpse which did not
have the capacity to conduct its own funeral.
It is perhaps fitting to conclude the history of the movement with a postscript note, which, with its

chm:ac~eristically Celtic co~bination of whimsy and practicality, seems to exemplify the essence of

Femamsm. In t?e late 1870 s, when the movement was well past its heyday, a young educator, John
Holland, was stIll devoted to the possibility of military activity. His idea was to design and construct an
~nderwater torpedo b~at which could be used to defeat the Royal Navy, the most powerful naval force
m the w~)fld at t.hat pomt., A~though many we~e skeptical, Holland managed to get funding from the
atte?uatmg Feman orgamzatlon, and progreSSIve prototypes were built and successfully tested. His
deSIgns were the basis of the modern submarine. T.he Fenians did not capitalize upon these possibilities,
~nd H?lland turn,ed to the U.S. Navy, but the Amencans did not really become interested in his
mventIOn for theIr own use. Frustrated, Holland died in 1914 and thus did not live to see the German
Navy, in two world wars, ~~e his cr~ation with devast~ting results against both the merchant shipping
a?d naval forces of the Bntlsh EmpIre, the enemy WhICh the Fenian Brotherhhood had always set its
SIghts upon.

88

(J)

An Evaluation of Fenianism and its Significance

Any study of the important subject of Fenianism in North America is at least to some degree one of
the timing of relationships.
Given the inextricable realities bound up in what the Fenians eagerly undertook to accomplish in
North America, it is not surprising that they failed. The eventual bitter factionalism of the Brotherhood
belied its name. Their military resources were inadequate, their appreciation of Canadian reaction
unrealistic, their comprehension of British strength poor and their choice of invasion target questionable.
(It is interesting to speculate the result if the Fenians had selected to invade Canadian territory west of
Ontario.) In addition, the movement needed the outbreak of an Anglo-American war, and neither
potential belligerent, despite periodic verbal bellicosity, was really prepared at that time to settle their
differences by what Clausewitz once termed a continuation of diplomacy by other means. The
movement was at its short-lived zenith in 1866, its power being an ephemeral product of its relationship
in time to the politics of both the Civil War and the resulting need for reconstruction in the South.
Though the Fenian movement did not achieve its stated goals, it was not without positive effect.
The British were quite aware that, even though the Fenian movement was effectively suppressed in
Ireland in 1865, the conditions which produced it were not, and several reforms, particularly those
dealing with land, occurred within a generation. The movement definitely kept Irish nationalism in the
international eye; James Stephens later remarked that "if Fenians had not aroused the Irish race from its
torpor, a generation would have passed away without any uprising against English supremacy, and the
succeeding generation might possibly bury the hatchet for ever, and accept established facts". In its own
way, Fenianism had its role in the long and slow process of the establishment of an Irish state.
Apart from the generally unwarranted suspicions which all too often arose about Catholic
Irish-Canadians, the Fenian experience was largely good for the citizens of the future Dominion. The
real nationalism which the Fenian movement helped to immediately and seriously foster was that of
Canada's. The idea of Confederation of the British North American colonies did not arise with the
Fenian threat; the discussions within and between the colonies had been ongoing for some time. The
significance of the invasion threat was in the timing of its appearance with respect to pending Canadian
political developments. The defence advantages brought New Brunswick into a position of favouring
union, and it gave a sense of urgency to those colonies already committed ,to Confederation. The
Dominion of Canada was created less than thirteen months after the major Fenian invasion attempts in
1866.

89

;ss

Uncle Sam kicked out. Much of 19th

century Canada's sense of nationalism was
based upon a rejection of perceived
American attempts at intervention in
Canadian affairs. This cartoon was
published in 1869.

Sources of Further Reading

Contemporary Accounts
Beatty, Stephen, Fenian Raid of 1866, St. Catharines (1910)
Denieffe, J., A Personal Narration of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, New York (1906)
Denison, G. T., History of the Fenian Raid of Fort Erie, Toronto (1866)
Soldiering in Canada: Recollections and Experiences, Toronto (1901)
Gauust, D., History of the Fenian Invasion of Canada, Hamilton (not dated)
Gregg, G. R.and Roden, E.P., Trial of the Fenian Prisoners, Toronto (1867)
LeCaron, H.,Twenty-five Years in the Secret Service, London (1892)
MacDonald, lA., Troublous Time in Canada, Toronto (1910)
O'Neill, J., Official Report of General John O'Neill, New York (1870)
Somerville, A., Narrative of the Fenian Invasion of Canada, Hamilton (1866)
Sweeny, T.W., Official Report of General Thomas W. Sweeny, Journal of the Irish American
Historical Society 23 (1924)
Secondary Sources

The sense of nationalism which usually emerges from a people facing a common and potentially
cope
a marked
growth In CanadIan natIOnal feelIng. For 19th century Canada, these were those times when Canadians
believed that serious invasions from the United States had been thwarted. In a sense, just as the War of
1812 w~s f<;>r C~ada a war of i~dependencefrom early 19th century American expansionist ambitions,
the. Fe.man InVaSIOn was a conflIct.for Confederat~on, a union which would strengthen Canada's ability to
reSIst III the future such feared deSIgns. An 1870 Issue of the Weekly Globe placed before its readership
this evaluation of the effects of the Fenian movement:
p~werful external enemy ~oes beyond what.ever .organizational means a people may produce to
WIth th~t threat. .The c~cIal fact~ of CanadIan hIstory are probably those which have produced

Canadians have gained more in national character

during the last six years than in any previous
twenty; .....the outrageous proceedings of the
Fenians and their abettors have been among the
chief agencies.

Campbell, F. W., The Fenian Invasion of Canada of 1866 and 1870, Montreal (1904)
Creighton, D. G.,The Road to Confederation, Toronto (1969)
D'Arcy, W. M., The Fenian Movement in the United States: 1858-1886. Washington, D.,C. (1947)
Harmon, M., Fenians and Fenianism, Dublin (1968)
Hitsman, J. M., Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871, Toronto (1968)
Jenkins, B., Fenians and Anglo-American Relationsduring Reconstruction, Ithaca (1969)
Neidhardt, W. S., Fenianism in North America, University of Pennsylvania Press (1975)
O'Brion, L., Fenian Fever: An Anglo-American Dilemma New York (1971)
Senior, Hereward, The Fenians and Canada, Toronto (1978)
Shippee, L.B., Canadian-American Relations: 1849-1874, New Haven (1939)
Stacey, C. P., Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871, Toronto (1963)
Stanley, G.F. C., Canada's Soldiers. 1604-1954, Toronto (1960)

90

91

Articles and Theses

- - - -"The Fenian Brotherhood of Western Ontario: The Final Years", Ontario History 60 (1968)

Asher, E. ,"Number One Company, Niagara", Niagara Historical Society 27 (1915)

_ _ _ _"The Abortive Fenian Uprising in Canada West: A Document Study",

Ontario History 61 (1969)

Bertie Historical Society,"The Battle of Limeridge", Fort Erie (1976)

Brewster, N. ,"Recollections of the Fenian Raid", WeIland County Historical Society
.
Papers and Records Vol. 2 (1926)

_ _ _ _"The American Government and the Fenian Brotherhood: A Study in Mutual Political
Opportunism"
Ontario History 64 (1972)
_ _ _ _"The Fenian Brotherhood and its Role in Canadian History", The York Pioneer (1972)

Chewett, W. C., "The Fenian Raid at Fort Erie June the First and Second, 1866", Toronto (1866)
Cooper, J. A, "Fenian Raid of 1866", Canadian Magazine 10 (1897)
Cruikshank, E. A, "The Fenian Raid of 1866", Welland County Historical Society
Papers and Record Vol. 2 (1926)

_ _ _ _"We've Nothing Else to Do: The Fenian Invasion of Canada, 1866", Canada: An Historical
Magazine 1 No.2 (1973)
_ _ _ _"The Fenian Trials in the Province of Canada, 1866-1867", Ontario History 66 (1974)
Quealy, F.M., "The Fenian Invasion of Canada West", Ontario History 53 (1961)

Cumberland, B., "The Fenian Raid of 1866 and Events on the Frontier", Transactions and Proceedings
of the Royal Society of Canada
3rd Ser. 4 (1910)
Donovan, H., "Fenian Memories in Northern New York", "Journal of the Irish-American
Historical Society 28 (1929/30)
Duff, L. B., "Sam Johnson, Smuggler, Soldier and Bearer of News", Welland County Historical
Society Papers and Records
Vol. 2 (1926)
Dunn, J. F., "Recollections of the Battle of Ridgeway", Welland County Historical Society Papers
Records Vol. 2 (1926)

Reavely, AW., "Personal Experiences in the Fenian Raid", Welland County Historical Society Papers
and Records Vol. 2, (1926)
Severance, F. H., "The Fenian Raid of '66", Buffalo Historical Society 25 (1921)
Sherk, M.G., "My Recollections of the Fenian Raid", Welland County Historical Society Papers and
Record Vol. 2 (1926)
Stacey, c.P., "Fenianism and the Rise of National Feeling in Canada at the Time of the Confederation",
Canadian Historical Review 12 (1931)
_ _ _ _"British Military Policy in Canada in the Era of Federation", Canadian Historical Association
Report (1934)

Ellis, P. B. ,"The Battle of Ridgeway", The Irish Sword, Ireland

Ellis, W. , "The Adventures of a Prisoner of War", Canadian Magazine 13 (1899)

"The Fenian Troubles and Canadian Military Development, 1865-1871", Canadian Historical
---Association Report (1935)

Epps, B.J., and Brennan, M. K., "The Day the Irish Invaded Fort Erie", Buffalo (1984)
Hamilton, C.F., "The Canadian Militia: The Fenian Raids", Canadian Defence Quarterly 6 (1929)
Hunter, C., "Reminiscences of the Fenian Raid", Niagara Historical Society 20 (1911)

_ _ _ _"Britain's Withdrawal from North America, 1864-1871", Canadian Historical Review 36

(1955)
Sweeny, W.M., "Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sweeny, United States Army", Journal of the IrishAmerican Historical Society 27 (1928)

Junor, David, "Taken Prisoner by the Fenians", Canadian Magazine (1911)

Langan, M. ,"General John 1: O'Neill, Soldier, Fenian and Leader of Irish Catholic Colonization in
America", MA thesis, Notre Dame University (1937)

Tucker, G. ,"The Famine Immigration to Canada, 1847", American Historical Review 36 (1931)
Wallace, W. S., "The Growth of Canada's National Feeling", Canadian Historical Review 1 (1920)

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