Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Che Guevara Terrorist Murderer CIA - Foia - CIA
Che Guevara Terrorist Murderer CIA - Foia - CIA
TV
17 March 1959
NSC BRIEFING
CUBA
I.
forms:
encouragement of r e v o l u t i o n a r y p l o t t i n g a g a i n s t
support.
Some low
Tr
C,
A,
3.
4.
B.
inflammatory
includ-
1,
Nicaragua
of member nations.
TH1
Brlt/lnf (198th}, Tbttriutir, ft torch LOU
DELETED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BAY OF Pi
Llfht of
to t * Ulc*a
4.
T*a
full l u l l hoar.
WTTQff
HSC BRIEFING
1359
CUBA
E*
d?
Castro has absolute power and 1B sole arbiter of P I I governfedttt policies and fictions,
1.
."
L _ .
Tbe
l1
as abroad,
D*
II*
shaped by intense
deaajjofju
B,
news ftrgan*
Cftfitro
2*
press,
A,
2#
3,
-T
e<3uefttiag1f the
fj-r
Cuba,
support.
XT'I
Argentine pro-Communist Ernesto
with revolutionary groups.
l1
^^
_L.
'/
is
exile
flalti
end KicAra^ua,
B*
the
"
33
FOB tBI
or
ex.
s
B3
Si \
JOB* a . FARSIUGTOJI
April
tiSC BAIEFING
32 April 1953
GT,
CUBA
I.
if.'
probably
remain unchanged
C
III,
ties,
and press*
A.
B.
V,
From a position of open and aggressive support for axitidictator movements, hct claims to have moved to a more cautious
one of moral support and has taken token steps to prevent tne
launching of invasion expeditions from Ctiba.
1,
There had been no action, however, against Communistinfiltrated j^ro-ups generally associated Tith^frChetr Guevara
and Raul Castro.
2,
r:\ .^v
July IBi*
FOB TOI
16 July
brlsfinfa mre
;DELFTED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BW '
tfa* *tdtrltrtm!f
NSC BRIEFING
16 July
AREA
case hae aroused C a s t r o , as well us most o t h e r
(TS
officials,
t h i s " t r a i t o r , ri
At
r ? ' ;
fl
tlon,
B,
C,
II
since
IJI,
ri
A.
it,
5
UJ
policy colors.
-2-
DELETED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BAY OF ? m
CASTRO EXCESSES
Cunhi
In Havana, f e ^ s proposed Brazilian efforts to discuss vitb
Fidel Castro A Cuhyi-US rapwould be. inopportunet
i t i s th* del i t era i* jpolioy of the Cuban Qovto sainthid relations
th-e United 3tht*a in a
a t i t e of agitation, Cunha r e cently advieAd Foreign llinlater
Later to refute Cuban ?oriffQ
Hintstec aofcfK invitation to
aoae to HstfUfc unless th.e vidLt
would cleftrly be useful. Th*
BBbABsador f*lt It would b*
used Inste-fcd to Indicate BrAzlllan srnpattiy fcd4 to give prestige to tba Cuban Government1ft
^irresponsibleLaiftr' apparen t doci S iOP
indicative Of ft
disapproval Ol Ci*tro 1 s
sive method*, an attitude which
i s becoming apparent in Othtr
Latin American countries.
30 Hovember 1959
NSC BRIEFING
I,
en
opening of Soviet exhibit was significant move in this direction and cHipha*i=^s increased importance USSR attaches to
Its propaganda and penetration efforts in area.
1.
B
C.
SECR
I.
2*
3,
II
it voted
3.
A.
2.
3.
4.
5+
-4-
J
l.
-5-
.. I. .. ' "
L
JJTQB
T B B ASCXHU)
THOMAS J. PATTOV.
tt natarial
ID
ft
IS
CUBA
I.
left.
iE
3,
4.
3.
3.
4.
C*
-2-
h>
30 November
REVIEW PROGRAM
ii-LtASt INRJLl 1997
for
IS Castro can collect for the entire harvtit ht will tiave about
$500, 000, 000 to pour into the. govcinntierit, i. e, thfi Agrarian Refc-rni
Institute, In previous years this money was avBilablc to private citizens.
4.
CJE-3 oldie rs
if not in jail, cannot g&t wo*k because they are classified * E enemies of
the state.
r. -t
Ptdraia
retired from active service by fiattsta in 1953, when BatistA toolc over
power irom Prlo.
of ttc TCvolution.
S* Pedrata ba* told opposition leaders that be wotild iead an irraed
force jgatnst Castro- ftnd> if successful, would obey the civU autbnritiej
wbo took over fi-orn the Cast To
'
16 December 19S$
NSC BEIEFIWG
COBA
I.
E.
I n v i t a t i o n s hive been
ftlto ^
2 -
L, 7 .- . #
r
,-.
DELETED TEXT
NOT RELEVANT
TO BAY OF PfGS
JCMOCHX
13 January 1$&O
nsc
CUBA
II.
1,
B.
WqS cov
as long: ago
as
IV*
Qfi \tv
policjr
In keeping
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064529
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JzklSf.
CUBAN GOVERNMENT
Introduction
The objective of the Fartldo Socialists-Popular (FSF Cuban Communist Party] at thai time is to incre^Be its
control over Fidel Castro and hie government without unduly
empJiaB.izi.ng the em Stance of Cn-mmuniet Party members in
official positions. Its tactics, therefore, are to conceal the
membership,, recruitment^ dr rtaffiliatlon of Party members
who now occupy key position a in the government, Thia is in
accord with the- training in inlegaL and illegal activity^ which
Communist Farty leaders from Latin America, have be*n. given
in China sine*- 1956^ epitomited in a secret training
prepared by the CF China which states, in part, tka.t:
"All of the Party members who work in
and institutions ahoul.d patiently retain thmr
legal pasition far a long tim*. wfithout r*vftiling- their
Party affiliation* They shoidd gain power in the orgattiz-ations and institutions in which they work and they
should retain their legal position as long as necessary. "
Through Eheee secret P*rty menibera, the FftTty is able to
influence governmental policy, ind bring about the appointment
of additional CcmmnniEt Party members (flsCret or known) to
governmental positions, and/or the diermesal or neuttalistation
ot individuals who cannpt be easily influenced or uted as fronts.
Thus within the Cuban government today there are same known
Communist a (particularly in tlue Armed forces). *OTH* secret
Commuflifit Party membera -vrh.n meek to guide and direct
governmental policy and adjnlnistratiBn, and numerous
Communists, often young and inexperienced > who are used by
S-E^C-R-E-T
r- ::l::
the Conrimunists to fljcecutc their plans for national and international subvereion. These secret memberg are also used to
defend "unity of action11, i s advocated by tht CortLmuftist
Party and its known leader^ in order to prepare public and
official opinion for the acceptance of recognized Comtnunlsts
in progressively higher ieve-ls of government.
These secret Conrtmuniit P i t t y members are in close
contact vfith. known Cammuniflt Party l*a<3tr&, such a.s Blag
Roci, Joaquin Orddqui, S^vetn A^uirre. and Carlos Rafael
Rodrifuei, who- establish public ComrnuTtist Party policy and
arc in turn, in contact with the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union {CPSUJ and the international Communist apparatus. tt
is the intention of th* Cottimuniats to eventually bring- such
known Communist Psrty officials into the gDvernment> hut
only after the 2tth of July Movement (M-26-7) and other
revolutionary political parties have been infiltrated sufficiently
to insure protection foT the Communists under the guise ol a
"popular democratic government of national liberatlonu lr
Since the victory of the Castro forces, Cowrnunist infiltration of the Cuban government and government--Supported
institutions ha.s been progressing rapidly at all levels. This
report cannot cover, in detail, the entire scape of the Comnnijnist effort, which is totalitarian in nature. It concentrates,
therefore, on evidence of Communist policy and planning
prior Co the rebel victory and on three areas of major Communist effort. These three areas, on whic-h. the Communists
have concentrated successively as their strength, and influence
hawiiscreascdj are control of the armed forces, control of
agrarian refoirn and the peasantry, and control of foreign
policy in support of the USSR. These are treated in the
following sections*
>'-'-
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Cuban Communist leaders hive reported to foreign ComtnunisE partite that the political indoctrination given within the
army is controlled by Communists. Th& purpose of this
indoctrination Ha& not ben. to emphasize or identify ha role of
the C-oromunist Paxty gr to train Communist party members,
but rather to develO'p a cadx* of pro-Communi&t and ctypto^Commiinist tnstructor& and propagandists who accept the
elemtntaRy principles of histDricaJ materialiam and its
a*incia.ted beliefs which make up the o-called "Bcience" of
Marxian socialism, Tftese ptineipies include the inevitability
Of the decline of capitalism, the collapse of "colonialism" and
tH
impe.ri&lism"h and the development of Socialism, and. Communism in the image oi the ChinfrSe and Russian SyStvtnS. The
emphaii* in the political indoctrination tourge has been on the
development of CKtf eme nationalism, hatred f&r the United
States based on "evidence" (datXxij; frfirn the nineteentb centUTy
to the present) o outrages aftd ir.jurieS auffeied hy Cut?- a.5 the
result of United States political and economic ' 'interference1' in
Cuban aifiira. The course a also deal with the need for agrarian
rcioim &.tl^[ Other generally progressive measures, aglin with
the emphasis an. the "lib*-ration" nf Cuba, frofft foreign controls
rather than on the manner in which the agrarian reform and
other measures are bein$ executed.
Aa, a refluJ.t a the Communist-controlled
courses, the pxeJletentii] appointmertt of Co-mrtiunists and
Communists to controlling positions in th= army, and the
elimination of anr^-Comrnunists> n an - Com muni st s, and
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WOT RELEVANT
TOeAVOFPIQS
AMERICA
rsl
Page 2
/ SS S
at
12 July
Pago
s s
14
CUBA
Bnthuaiaatic I n i t i a l response of Caetro officials
to Khrushchev's
GL. I
But Titffcl, in his sickbed TV talk on t t e Bane day, vhile recogsizing Khrushchevfa "spontaneous" declaration of support, eald:
33 =
rr
-!
C.
II.
1.
B.
2.
1*
B,
Cuban ambassador in Bonn defected H July vitb strong antiCastro, anti-Communist declaration and announcement he wouH
*ork to oust Castro *
1.
F.
2.
What
V.
VI.
consideration
C^H^J
OAS Council la to meet Saturday morning to consider Peru*s r e quest for meeting of foreign ministers.
1*
2,
3N
officials
initiative,
4*
5.
B*
C\
Mexico, probably traditionally the moat sensitive to any suggestion of foreign interference in internal affairs t has
1.
Toledano reliably
2t
(t
Uateofi adninistrittion.
b.
c*
VII,
president
2*
S<
LATIN AMERICA
B31-915S3fiffiSBL
B
GaHch used to be secretary general of An organlof Cuatemalana vho received Asylub in Argantina after
revolution In Guitemalu in 1954*' In \recent monthst howhe reportedly ha,a been connected with an international
croup 1 OCA ted in Havana, and Caracas and tea*Jt>d by foJ^ner
folJtt&iri&lAu President Juftn Jbsa Arerato* jftccordling ta AH un-<
tested source with Oubaji cocaections lit Buenos Air ad, t i e fritteBAlftvn e x i l e group in Argentina, i s 1H close contact with
Cubft-'fl press agency, Frenaa Latlna/ Guatemala bjfie been deeply concerned tfeat Cuba toigbt ltd revolutitttary plotting by *
the exlleflj eonie
of whom are fblende of Argentine-born "die"
Guevara, Cubha1^ econotlic tsar who lived In
the revolution,
propagat
GO
IWTBLLIGEKCE DIGEST
Page 5
Page 4
of the
th
the
S re
I*
n t ] i e Cuban
INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Page 5
"
CUBAN' TJE?EL>OHltTfl
Fidel Castro 10
care of doctor*, but
the oxt4nt of him llluejs i s
tH ff* rflHAifiS t h e
duDDt o th.
RrolutioD t o the CwtAB a u s t a ,
PAftT I
PART I t
OJT
MOTE5 ftJTO
has
j t o ds-pOnd r ibd should
-health ' dictate th*t In
Uttp jovn,
l
i d l t
r would
PCB
to
INTEREST
Page o f $
Pago
l of
the Castro
i s faced * i t h y o w i g p
on a nutber of fronta. Thoufih
aeria-d* pfltroleym sSortag** donot ftj>p*ar immtasfttt vajrly proh-
tconoty and
t
niluence in oth*r
of. government. A -ui
BOUTC* *th hifeh
contacts in the regime p
in l a t e July that Guevara bud
replaced Cflst^o1a bodjffuard*
m-lth. his own personal
guard*.
Concern OTer CfcStro1* pre&ent
etatft of mind JB given as the
reason for OneTarawa reported
action, wbich tn fllfect woul4
uk Ca*tfO ft
Scheduled daLiveries on
both Snvi*t and frefl-wprLJ tant-
.it
y
Two oaral
i n r l u e n t i a l fieura i f Fidel
Cietro should, taapoxAt 1 y or
permanently leave
The Argentin* and
in SivanatheuBBlvt* unusually t s t u t e
observers---"are ^Booming convinced
that Castro ia bteo*d in
e, f r i s o r e r . Are
dor Anoedo,
A irsoia*l friend
Of Ctatro H a t reAcfefld that ton
aftor-h*atine on
ordars for
a r r i t of ' ! couaterrtvoltJonarie*'
and investigation of acts of
sabotag** A source with contact?
itt gov*rpment circ-l-fifl reported
tn late Julj that ttie
become LVBI9 0< a
PAhVT I
OF 1HMEDWTB
PART IT
H0TE3
Page
1 of 1&
IHTELlvlGEBCE WEEKLY
I960
PfiBT [
PART I I
HeJtiC0> ceBting t o
harj> clash in th OAS on t h i s
subjectd hia non at least initial
Braallian and Canadian svppoft
for FV Joint *ffort to ^mediate
tho dispute h*t*sfifl, Cuba and
United S t a t e s . " 9uth a.n^ effort
would appea.1 t * some hemtaphere
>jovBrniB.eiitB: uch i s Cnileh but
others---includtnft Araettii]Ar CoT.onbi*.j apdi Peru and. toat $1 the
Central American countriesa.p~
pCAT to support the United States 1
vie* that OAS actl&n 19 nccesaarj
to deal l t h the Cubap
sine* i t 1* nor* than a
US dtp put o ndi iuvolvea. a
challenge to the Inte
w h i c h e,ll QrVS
Of IMMEDIATE WTEftEST
NOTES
e of a
ITL THE
-1
DAILY BRIEF
i,
Lit
t-
6 Aug 60
Page 1
elder Castro, The danger to the regime of euch a pow^r struggle will increase If Fidel Castro^ illness fa prolonged. Neither
Rai>l Catro> Guevara, nor the increasingly Influential President DorUtfofl possesses Fidel C&etrole great popular appeal
among lower income groups, upon which the regime haa come
to depends
Meanwhllej Cuban officials have exhorted delegates to the
Communist-donifnat&d Latin Araerlcaji Youth Congreaa lo carry
the struggle initiated by Cuba for "Latin Amerjcan liberation1'
back to their home countries.
LATE ITEM
:
u
5 Aug 60
5 Ag 60
tr
I:-
DAILY BRIEF
'"SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSA^^^
V/SS;
LATIN AMERICA
10
CO
15
60
DIGEST
Page
PART I
II
1TI
OP
3 oi 11
WOTES
1 of 21
AND PERSPECTIVES
&pri*Li3lyL
Caban
with the Castro r e gime 44 IS September Dd wnnts
to come- to the United. States,
WET J
rHTEREST
OF
Faee 1 Of El
II
PART I I I
Page 4 of LI
/NT>
^.+ h n
CUBAN DEVELOPJHEPTE
r
Pidel Castro a
p
>t the United Mat ions tag
patently whetted his appetite
for International p o l i t i c s Had
Etrengtheaed his vlaw c-i himself us a leader of the peopla r
nQt Only of Latin America, but
of ill underdeveloped countries,
iti their "atRuggle a gains}: imperil, l i s a . " Tfce- vlvtutlKy unqualified id ant if! cat to a O*
Cuba's foreign policy with t t a t
Of the USSB, evident In Cn&tVQ't
UN a.do"r*Et shows signs of heldf playad down and the theue
Of Cuba's PEHV^latiOD With
world neutralist letdera ;
straaijed. Oa hi* re tarn to
Cuba, 1 Castro declared: that
Ghana s rikrunah aay TJ-itit Cuba
t b l s year apd NJ.r may '
t
Hh
Tb? CaEtro refine H which
has triirtD inCre:astng propaganda
support to the Cfiuse of the
TAlgeriaa rfrtClE, is apfareDtly
Cftto act BJ host l i t e r t h i s month
ff a c^bf&ronce econsOTBd by
C l t 1 1
based la Koroccc. The eoraniittea
eaber repr&ei]tiDe
tbo ComBUQists 1 World Fetffi-ratiOn Qf
Trade Unions, bad urged Havana
as the s i t e of the conJer*nCS.
On bis departure Iron
On S3 September, Caatro
that be expected to
return to the United Nfttioo* in
few weeka, and How Tori hotel
mintpora reported oa 3
that CubAna had bean
PART I I
NOTES Alfft
Page. 10 of 27
6 October 1660
Cuban eov-ernment agencies
iearful of the imposition oi controLs on exports to
Cuba, According to- rumars prevalent in Havana, they aTfl
ompiTjtea in the United
to parchnse scarce ttena
tin: indirect shipment to
Instructions have- been
sent by the Katisftal Bank of
CMba t o 2.11 Xm York banks c o n -
cerned to transfer to the United KiaedOni OT Canada, the U l ance.s held lor the acecujit of
Cuban, banlcs,
balances
by Cuban
bants as
ed to be
The amount Of
PAP.T
Pane 11 of 7
fi October I960
OriUote Provincs, Hfttied- R pastoral letter tonStituting the
atrongest anli-COtoHBist s t a t e nent y e t niade by any church, off i c i a l io Cuba. T-be archbisho
*ccorfl*qff to- a higb Church, off i c i a l , Uteuda to folio* up
paatornl 1fitter* about out* a
month, rffgardlC&S of ^ b a t th
Cuban bithop^ da, Alttough tha
is went in Cuba, i t Is in
PAKf 11
a psychologically fnvar*hle
tion in Ori*n.tB to head *uCt A
caBpAiffo b(eauBfl nany priestfi
there ofcrticlpated In the fight
against thfe B*tiata' dictatorEhio h
and the ArCbhlehap himself 1B
credited with Bavinf Fidel CftSt r o ' s 11 fo ta:tS&3 after h.9 hftd
cagtursd. bj
12 o i 37
.'L
i. K. ii t i o n t o
the US
of a p a r t i a l Grabargo on s h i p ments to Cuba, Moscow has
s teppej up i t s propaganda
age of tne Cuban s i t u a t i o n . The
Soviet press now c a r r i e s da
warnings &1 a]leged American
plans for "counterrevolutionary
invasions" from Guatemalan bases
and denunciations of US trade
r e s t r i c t i o n s and of Ambassador
Bonsai's r e c a U ,
On 22 October
Soviet propaganda media gave
f u l l and prominent coverage to
the reception of a Cuban j o u r n a l i s t delegation by Khrushchev
and top Soviet j o u r n a l i s t s , and!
I z v e s t i a ' s front page was donainatedl by r e p o r t s of "Invasion
p r er>p a r a t i o n s organized by t h e
US,
-ju*
and p o l i t i c a l support of
tbe "national liberation s t r u g gle."
ifoscow already hu.s made
considerable and. r e l a t i v e l y
c o s t l y readjustments in i t a s h i p ping operations to accommodate
Cuban petroleum requests and to
siake timely d e l i v e r i e s of such
items as f e r t i l i K o r 5 r wheat, and,
more r e c e n t l y , agricultural
chinery
Havana probably T i l l seek
a d d i t i o n a l economic support from
the b l o c . Hottever, because of
tho nature of i t s i n d u s t r i a l
p l a n t , Cuba may be forced to seels
immediate a l t e r n a t e sources of
supply in n on bloc countries-poss i b l y Canadawhich are better
equipped to supply Cuban Import
needs + Tbis may e*ert further
p r e s s u r e on Cuba's foreign exchange p o s i t i o n .
1r
Page 1
CURREKT INTELLIGENCE
1*85
needs.
TV (ftIt clearly implied
effort* toward the further economic : Integration of Cuba with
the bloc. Se referred to '--.:.
foreign M ccfirid0i n in the Cuban
.^trolUfB, I n s t i t u t e ^who are
K*injj t4 the TJSBH to get ft
Jet"
d Inpllefl tbut bloc
in otfifrr
FART I
II
OF
apjUreatly to
l
of U3 lntentlCDB and Co otinuLite coaa
ti
by ttto n e u t r a l l s t a In the
KBtloiLS wblch ulgbt
put tbo Tfnited Stntea i A An
position h
Soviet propaganda
vFfl
of the
s i t u a t i o n bis been '
d now ibcludea
EUj>fed up
at alleed AaericD
dally
l
JOT opnte
^
s TPith
of US trad* r e s t r i c t
and of AjubnEsador BOQBBL'B r
Page . 4 o f 1 1
1 of 21
27 oc-tober
foa naedn't w o j
PA&r 1
I s ftaj f u t u r e m u l -
OF IKED I ATE
C of
NOTES
1 of
W:
IHTELLICEHCE WEEKLY
27
Tro^lo!
:.. .:
OT
PART I I
6 of 11
TOTES
Pace 1 of 21
a and.NoL4j?Y
- * ;
TliG
KP.VETIS,
i]~3set that
end a goveri.inent.oeiegatitKi to Ciibi on a goodThis group may ba on hand v/hon recqgnition is pub-
-_ I
29O=t60
Page 1
29 Oct GO
Page 4
y
integrate Cuba economically with the bloc. Soviet propaganda
coverage of the Cuban situation has been stepped up and now
includes dally wtrnfngE of
allegedhAmerican plajis for "counter
ft iar
re volutionarr invasion*''i 111
\F
^ denuntUtiona of US trade
T
restrictions ""'
"
'
Oct 60
Page 5
IMTEtfJdEHU WHO*
a\
- CUiWUI
CJie
of Cubit's
tryntam
l a probably
f
of tha country'a
1B scheduled to
go next to
for
similar
to
Ciibn,4^ trade
technical aE^
wltti Covmimlet China
July, Guflv^TL ta
to trovel from Pfripiue to Kortb
P vhna tnnli
economic policies,
rived on 2? Ottofoer tn
tliu second atop
on hift
to five Sin*jSovi*t hloc
L*
In
Cxe-ch-
atop ie to tw
bo al^aad a
0 0 0 c r e d i t to Cuba t o t
j
*
aoa *nd n * E o t l * t e d d a t a 1 La f o r
th cotiln^ jftiir o f a, g
t r a d e agraoBBnt BlgrKid l a s t JUn*.
- ^ Cu Dft
tZftc])
no tnd 1-OJI 11 on
Intends *t tliia
to tr*>*l to the other
bloc countriesPelted,
1B
ffry{
that
1ms
'
And ft
concluded
trade
Amflrlcao (MV*1
* raport that 25
tachnicltne are In Cuba
p the Cubfin
on the
from the
Tb* t
tal nuubAr of auch
will eventually
higher ftffurfi, aod nopo
pnsnt probablg
will be cent t a CuhH. Further
units at thu ubatl ClvLllmh
n i l l t i a aro tielioved to have
byiin Iflsuocl Suvtet 'Jll arniB
durin(t tha weelt ot 30 October,
ported t o bo nefrotintInfi
Wlkoynn^ presumably on tho d e t*ilfl at Cubad-Soviet trade
for ISS1, and h may b t t a h p t
tp ipcraftH* tU* $100,000,1100
credit DAgotlbtad iflSt
r .>.
3 FOR RELEASE
RuiHAnlK^
navu
Cuba haft
s faR tEl^re lu
Btet
l a s t Uarcl) wltn
Genus Stato BanJc
will prpbahly gdek en
dlon during; th,
Th ojcpanded Csnach c r e d i t -f
Is rdportftd ita the Cuban
ta be for th.ft purpa&a of rea c t i v a t i n g " Cubans
Industry and la ta be uned t o
[LQSd IPQx4
ID
.rit-^Pip. Tfl,
\ .
with Cut*n
i octobsropt r e i a i f l e d fay
u n t i l the 2fith t ^b.an Cuban
c h t
fl-n
t-mtnapt invasion njora TOAchini a peakKbru
efrcliGV acA^d attorned b i s r e l u c t a n c e t o ba draYD i p t o
a reiteration
tf his fl July
I" * r*ply to a r e q^b
t o comnsnt OU- Pt(ttant
that tho warains was purely
he raid Ja*
Aotioirr
IBI*
TIBS
VOlujftU o f COBBrtDt Od
the
thft COUBla
v on A virtual wir
n t i c 1 p*tion of what
ernB9dt repeatedly
plns for UP
at Cuba by US'Spport*(l "COUJBl t
On
3D ottotwRi the
torate of th*
militia.
c a l l e d on a l l "Hi*
in ttiA Efl-Vallft- a reft t-n
- t de^iB13*1*^ points AB, part o
C "national mflbi1iJ*tican t o
meat the invaders.
Eomfl mili t i a unlt vera ptfnt flran tliare* t o Other points In
j ..
^ :
a
J
A pdflSibla indication at
Cuban t a c t i c s with r%apeet t o ttta 113 HfcV*l Base ftt
Guuntariano Hay caiaa tn &b t n t
via w BVOH by Pidel C a a t r o t o
a UAH nawKi-ltn* I I s quoted
as jaayihtf thfit Cubapa are n o t
euch idlDta th aa t o t r y t o
th* baao by force- I n ..., Cuba Will despaBd
LTlited Httiana that
JH1.^re
bafl \H
CUBAN CEVELOPHEHTS
Che
, p
of guha'* banking
e probfchiy the
ot the country's
economic J^O1IC1BB A
on 29 October in
the iflcond stop on his
to five Sino-EOvitt
oslovakia.^
PART 1
II
PART H i
OP
IHTEEEET
MOTES
PATTERNS ASJ> PEHSPECTI.V53
Page 3 of 11
1 of 21
I of 13
;9 Novauher
apprMioit*l7
40 percent ot
Cubah ST36SH? t i p o r t e which thn
bloc i^altea-dy ccmnltttd to
if *chedul*d to
go nest to p a i p l n j , DrtEumably
for neeetition* Similar to
those Jn 150*60^. Cuta.'E trad*
chnical JtsslBtanc9 agrflwith Convunist China lrere
l a s t July. Guev*rft lq
to travftl frou Pelplnff t i North
where trade and coopor*Te^ma-cits &re ejiffl-a ted
to he cone luded h Cuevim's
last step it to he in East
Germany; he signed . pnt-^aT
last uarrch with the
<j*TTiian State Bank and
mill proha-fcly *eeli
during the
ia no indication
that GutTara Intends a t t h i s
to travel to the other
rjouhtriflaPola.nd, HunRumatia, and Bulgaria
that ha.vo -.coneliidlSdl' t^ade
apreeuenEs * i t s the CaitrO
regime <
CU1)*B
r
announcing such a
Havana suggefltfld t h a t
comunlqud be
on 1.5 ifoveiabflr+ At
Quiftea 1B the only nonbloc nation to irhleh a. North VietnamflbftttAdoi Is aco red itat)
frill View establishment
of lte fixJt dlplcB^tic post
In the pesters henlcphflre as
a Bttjor hraaltthrcugh. in ttt
i
(or t**at*r
acceptance.
tuts l i t t l *
to offer Cuba econcmJLCAllyr and
the *Btablifihment o# d.lpLo u t i c r e l a t i o n s wltn. thft.t t i t e l l i t e i s lo.Oortant chie-flj as
a, furtieir Bto^fl by Cubft toward;
COlidnrlty with t h e Blno-Sovis
bloc. Cuba already t i e d i p l e M.tlC rel*rtioaa with a l l other
bloc countries but Albania t
M l i
and & o t Germany,
diplomatic recognition of
the i t i t may be lm
The AoBrlcan naval
has racaivad Jt1 jraport t t a t 25
Czech technician^ a r e in Cuba
v,vtctag the Cubaji uiiJltaJCy
CH t b * weapons already delivered
frojfl the Soviet b l o c , th* t o t a l nLuibe.r ol si^ch. ttchn ic ia na
probably will eventually reach
a much higher figure<H a.nd more
mi l i t A. r r equipment probably
w i l l be sent to Cub*, Further
u n i t e of the Cuban c i v i l i a n
mllltifl ar* believed to tive
been lssudd Soviet bloo aruq
the week of 30 Octobar
Meanwhile, In h i s i n t e r view with Cuban j o u r n a l i s t s
on 34 Octobernot released by
TASS u n t i l the 2tb, vhCQ Cuban
chftrgBH of an Imhlno-at i h -
Hion were reaching a petit Kbroehchev again shoved hia reluctance to be drawn /.lcto \. too
precise a re i t s * * 11 Ot orof bis fi ju,iv
OF IMMEDIATE IKTEBEST
PART- II
t e seel
AHD
P*t* 4 of
I Of
threat,
la * reply to a r e quest to comment an frtmtenttitt
that the wimlne was Prely
ht said, he- 'Vould
tfich Statements
t s bfr
really symbolicFM For t h i s ,
be jsddo-d, i t is essential t h a t
" imperial is
t a ' t h r e a t of i n ter wept ionH1 wot oateriftliB*.
"Then tberewill be no &ee"d. t o
t e s t th* reality vt our s t a t e ment
"
a
units lere
uegr&*s of a l e r t .
on
of the- aray nayT **d
t i r force ord.*red sttyntiifl r e port* e?ary three hour?, h&d
a i r afid anvtl patrols were ins t i t u t e d in Tarious arenaT StAof th* iatfrroal military
network mere ordered, on 34-Dour duty. Rec.&anAissADce fllghtE irtre sadv on
27 and 28 Oetofte-r froa. Cuba over
the Swan IElands asd the Caatettilan. CA^ihhfraD
coastare^a
where the 1hlQvasi(Min forces t r e
assembled.
Although tha
Soviet
press his Taalntalnad a large
volime of -coanuent on alleged
U-3 plans for as invasion of
Cuba,
i t has Tilled h i l
on1 c l t a t t c m Jf ro
official
townentary. The- US
in Hofic-u-w saggtsta ttiis
r*f leet a wLsh not t o a
t h t Soviet public uniuly +
A possible ifi4it*ttoQ
- Cubaa. t a c t i c *
respe-ct to the US Naval &.sa at
<rMm.bta.DEH.iaoi Q>.y cams in in taterTiew fivtn by Fidel Castra to
m, UAH ne-wfliMrt. ffe- i s quoted
as saying Chat Cub^fe* ure u^t
such "idiots" as to t r y to
*eia;e< the base by force, mAtead, Cuba w i l l demand througH
tbe halted Nations
bean; tstillau.ninL.CD4atAl
on the Isle of Pises,
rr
III
. >
- .
OP IMMEDIATE IhTERCST
NOTES
PATTERNS
Pit* 1 0-f 21
AMERICA
Arni3
To Guatemalan Leftists
The Castro regime is giving financial assistance and!
intends to provide weapons to
the Guatemalan ComauniBt party
and, a Communist-infiltrated
Guatemalan revolutionary group,
according to a usually reliable
source with contacts among hig&
Cuban officials. "Che" Guevara,
with the approval of Fidel and
Ravi Castro, is eaid to have
given the Guatfllnajan groups
$15,000 last month On the condi
tion that the Guat^ma-LjLn Communists play the leading role
in the revolution -
t
r
t.
*
*
t
t
t
4 Hov 60
DIGEST
Page
1997
CUBA* DEVELOPMENTS
Observances in Havana Of
four more Soviet
tbo Analversiry of ft>e
l e f t &. Soviet port
Revolution include-fl a Special
otti 26 October for Cuba aboard
reception for tha- 5a*let nbasi- the freighter Arkhan(eiHk. Cuba
sador fiven by tha- frovernaantreceived perhaps
cOntrolled labor can Itderation
u n y as ten such helicopta-ra P
Had attended by high Cuban off A c A a LB . Amba a ea.doi' Jfv d ryavtseY
cohflrm ea.rpledged Soviet "aid and
for the Cubm revoluguns tivvt* beea. issuefl
tion, 1 '
to units of th* Cuban Arm jr.
Che Guevara, 04 the Moscow
leg Of his flve-aati&n Sino-Sovlet bloc economic passion, i s fued. a atateaent for the 7 November f estlvitief in whicb. heinplied a si*ili*jLty between
tbe early ptst-ruvolytiOnary1
4trog[ls
of the Soviet people,
n
the f i r s t in the ivorld to
fake
powerh in their own ba.mds^11 tad
Ciita jj Current fliperi^acea, hTe
addd thfct the Soviet
"supported us by your
t o th.* inpfiriBliBta^ thus 4t
t h e i r mach.ifia.ticjjj
Cub* . " Itosqov pr*J<
oi a reoflpt a>:b by
Dortlcoa auggegt* ft
Cubmq-Sovlet decision Co cLJL
t h a t Cutan nQbillaatioa &bd. the
Soviet rockt t h r e a t have so
far averted t h * ''imperialist
apfregsiob" t h a t A week aijo was:
decla red itnul nn t .
Ea.at
Iff I s Prague.
PAHfT 1
o r IMMEDIATE IPTI:RST
II
AND
Pag? 4 of
1 of 20
S November 1SC0
Grobart, si
cld veteran: of tba
Cdnjnun i * t UD'VHneiitj llvfiO i n
PART I
PART" II
sudden resurjjfrnco of
l e f t i s t influeqt* in El Salvador
a f t e r tb* 3Q oet^twr coup could
lead to a. aitu&ticn eaailr *rploited by tfifl Cuban* and Qou:ld
become a serious tbrht to
Gudtiulan t,Qd othr Central
overn**" f s <
Co*tii Rle* reported, t o Pre-sit Sftraoza that an officer at
t o t Cuban Embassy in C*5tn Rioa
had premised military ai4 to
the Nic^raguaa revolutionary
movementr
Cuban p r o t e a n da media flouto attack Venezuelan Prevident Setaaccurt, aa4 to stippot-t
extreme l e f t i s t and.
opposition t kia
CotHhuniat and,
PArtiea ao<t ttt<
la Braailj Arfftu.tina> (
otii*r countrteii hay* publielj
declared th.#ir Support for Caatro
IMMEDIATE IHTEREST
NOTES
5 Of 0
1 Of 20
CURRENT IttlELLiriENCS
1390
the
civilian militia, on the pretext Of ptopftring for an &ttncfc
by " imperiii 1 ist-baclted
couaterrevolutionnrlea. 11 A usually
reliable eOurce resident in the
cf Santiago revert* that
"
PART }
PART If
CoBBiunist penetration ot
tb.3 ullltia.^ nyobftbl
io adjutant ai a nilitAry dist r l c t Instructed a 4ubdrdinate
m i l i t i a in hf zone, he snould:
Tartioufl military and
lndRH, Includ.ia.ff leadera ot th* Popular Sociallat
)
OF IMMEDIATE 3HTE&EST
NOTES fl.tfD CUHirtTT4T5
Pas* 6 of S
1 of
GENERAL
^*^^
L^L
_|V
^F u
JU
j^_
14 Nov 60
::
I
, - ' . - - .
' < -
'
1997
THE CMSAS
A* the CfcBtro
tlnuej to strragthtn And
It* police t*t control, i t i s
th.t on* of Ltt
i* tb* ntlitia.j, a
of soak* JJ(J j. iiCi(J "voiunbeing orgiinlzed with l a ffi?ianicy throughout
the Island. Organizationally
d i s t i n c t fron tha regulftr hntfdl
force>, this militiJt ia equiv-
FAflT I I
. Ill
on a population tM-lll to
a 5>600>000-nian
organiaa-d. a?to*
g
CoiBBaoist urjing late lust year,,
the ailitift bAs gRoin BhTkedly
in rACftnt weeks I.B ft rcult of
the officially inspired "war
s p i r i t " of lute October, l i e
threat Of An "iBBlnent i
Page $ o)t 13
1 af IX
INTELLIGENCE tKEUT
1S60
fr&m t h e tfnttod S t a t e s wa* used
t o J u s t i f y a. n a t i o n w i d e uphill
satioaandaa Intensive train lap
prOfric to *repare "tha people."
fa r e s i s t "imp?riiiList agr*Bion." Altbouffh the ao t i l 1 t*.t ion
aad "the defenso of our resolu- r
tion by tha &cniJ,a.liBt count rl**'
not art credited *ltli barlny
{?t the inmedlj-t* threat
ttn) prennLutlan of a. a
l e syaonyBUHLS with "the
ol th* p e o p l e ^ ,n obje
Co*auU*t And p r o thraughout Latin
i s a aecesttkry
ji
of a Bucc43sfol jftvolutioa
d
oust be accoapanlen by the deEtructt&n of the regular
d
f
i
tub* a MlLltla
t HOTJB o f the:
t Ifloa oetwot-t.
Caban
i n orgftpiifttl&a Abd
to
that of Corauulet Cfa
1*
not
only A force for police
but A Bane of Subject lac a.
pumber of Ciiftapj to llita.rr
di9clplln Rnd p o l U l c t l lndoctrisatlOfi. the militia Also
provide^ the reside vitb A cbep
labor force mTbilei It reduces the
threat of Bilitlcil
HtBBiniine ffOB Cuba's
serious unemployment p
It could also trove valuahla
the lees
penetration is
at all revels of tb,
In COmpqMDlBt
PART I I
Aim
Raj* fl of
CRET
August
sc NO
Copy No,
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
REVIEW
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
OFFICE O f CLWHtNT
B*CT
v///////////////////^^^^
W'%7.Sift//
,;
TOPJ&ctfET Diptffr
C1TRHBHT HTrfiLUGBPCE "VBELY
1BB4EIL
ud.den resignation of
d
fron th* Br*Blllaa
on 20 Aufuat ha* precipitated a constitutional .
CTllim because o* the td***nt
Oppoaltion of far Mid later
Vvnja nd other military leaders
to the assiim.pt ioa of QuadroB1
power by l e f t l e t Vies hPresident
Jofto tioulart. Gaulart B right
to succession h u U*ftn supported
Od constitutional frouitdB by
nest political Leaders and a
aLnority of the UitAry, partfc:ularl_ lower *! Minister Lott
&Ud Uw cQBmUEidor of t i * 1powertvl third krmj in aoutiem - Bra-
H i . On 31 August,
l l
the
lutioa to
lato
tb* or*loffice
form at
ltb , prime
ty
* period of
tanaloa with tha
ovet
hti policy/ of cloaar
With bloc countvte*, And fen
DutbuTHt of public Criticlas
for btvlsg ffiveq Brazil's
> latest decoration to Chs
0uv*r. The prec].
tloaB of -bis Impulsive
E
tttto B.r*3 however, a t l i l unclear'
if hv ins counting on
being w*pt bftck rruickly into
the prea^deocr 'by a wave of
public protect, h* froatljr
iajudged public opinion.
There were a auaber of Initial
expressloaa of diaaa7h bjjt the*idepretld aubaequent reaction
Criticism, at Quid
TOM f.Or :i
.ct ing lrraaponalbl} 1 in the
f*CB_of admitted JiffJCultieH.
ros
An effort t*
publ1c
opinion
la bia faror j
iitinpr1 h-i* rflflifnation to Us
pressure. Such 1
night; toCS off intl-TTS
31 Jtu& Cl
P*E* S of 30
ffEEKLT BBVlBft
CURREHT
31
61
Moreoverh the
Constitution provides that if
bath tbe presidency and the
Tice presidency ahouLd be vAchted
during tbe first half of * presidential term, tltctlons must be
held1 within SO tfys, *hile auch
elections would normally appeal to
many of Brazil 1 * political leadtrt
most of the apibitious nen with a
food chance at U10 to-p post now
hold poatu which would bar the*
froa tHcopLins; presidential candidates within the next several
Constitutional precisions bar
from. casdida.cy those who have been
governors or cabinet ministers
within six mohth* of the electiond
as we LI as "a President who u y
blue ejeercited the office for any
time in the terra immediately
preceding.V "
React ioria Atroad
is
4l4nwd by
ave 4 pronounced
vffect in Jtcuadoi- 1)*C#TOBQ of the
1TKKLT KETI -
Papa 10 o f 3p
OPJEdtET
Dj/NAR
political-military
la tin* two countries,
The Argentine Government, which
recently confronted sharpljr
adverse reaction* from, its
Military leaders wHfrri Cuba's
economic czar Che G
visited President Fr
iauried lately after hi a
mith. Quadros in Brazil,
maintained, a. cnutlo.ua reserve
on the Brazilian situation.
One official characterized
retirement and its
as prlaftrily an
internal Brazilian ffair,
Th+ Mexican qoveRiiMnt, which
alonf with Ecuador and Brazil
baa followed policies ; favorable
to the C**tro reglm.*.
United it* comments o
zilianflcvtiL-opnentBto
lity
A H thret
l l presumably
their Cutn-liiflplrefl
p J
to B&diato the "Cuban1*3 piFDbleii'1a pRoject which.. I
n u
Cutsion alnc#.rly June r
r
TOP
3i
Au*
ei
RETIEW
Pare
11 of 30
E3VED m BHIKE1994
CIA HISTQRE^i l?e.EW PROOUM
TITLE:
Counterintelligenca In Counter-Guerrilla
Operations
VOLUME:
H. H.
ISSUE:
Surraner
YEAR:
1963
STUDIES
INTELLIGENCE
A comedian of articles on the historical, operational, doclrinal. and Ihcorehcal asped* oi
COUKXERHNTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-GUERRT1I
VL H.
If one b to become proficient la counter-guerrUU open- 1
tknu,1 on* must prepare by learning TOTythlng there Id to
knew about guerrilla openUnm. it foUom that If on* Ifl to
bftpoow knewiedgeabto Id the ipeclalt? et countHimemgue
in oDunter-guetrfliA opemtloru, ooe must know tbt olsjtlves,
organlietlonii p&ttatis, and m^du* cpenndl at tjpitnl guerrilli Intelligence. X% will be comforting to thn coujqterguerrtlJa lnteLL%Ke offlcer to know something also of the
c4tuit#rjjiteU!gno meUiodlg employed Is^ guerrlllu, io the tWnt ,tl4ftt they have a methodlaii counterlntfllil|emt
Intelligence
Intelligence needstheir Essantlfl) Elements of Infarmirtion-^differ from those of
fQECU?
C1 m
-t..f
r-
a ^
CGW
CGW
MI CGW
mutton nor contact Mtb the guerrillas, Tbe stcond Is a cnusire application of normal potlce/cotintertntelllgenct prowdures-^delectlng and Identifying the people that supply Inforamttan to gucmUajH their guerrilla contact?, and their
couriers, courier routes, letter drops, or other means of commtuilcatlcm, and then taking eJtiVr the defensive steps of appreh*rj,dingr interrogfctlng, n d Imprisoning these people or the
la
tbe
thfl
not
Cf m CGW
fcrfll undoubtedly continue to be situations when relocation la *n essential step in counter-guerrilla action. Some
of It* aspects are completely outride the competence of untericteULgEnce (oreesthe construction of housing for the
people the prevm of food and water, sanitation and medical care, and schools, the mounting of Indoctrination programs to change the loyalties of the people, the stationing ot
-
- '.r.
O fa CGW
Cl rn COW
a ^ ccw
Uxuea with tbeir iettTe Arid anlbi ID C*mtr*J Luxan. Twnl
Hitf courier, uuj vrffe bo tad from MinUt
tor
Cf to CGW
of the
li
wt
.'-
a
thtj cwinat exelud* the Agent nullify U*e orfc ni the*
uuld*.
Ttt objtt 01 rtandlut control! I* bj * process 4f
to tflrow Into relief intLfliUts or penans ifttt aeon to be
and to m**t thun tbt nbjeot of inTeriJtHioa,
trained, MCiuitjr mtod*d pcnoiuiel will not onlr
f
:
eHlprt.
Since Uie fortgoln^ is tae omjy netlon In this IDKUUEI dtvoied to the ubjt of counteriatelllctaHp ltd writertt n i dently oomslfXend uuntGrlnteUJgtnce a purely (WELS1T mat(*Tr This would n all probatLJty not have been the case \t
either tba Special Brunch of the Malayan C m or MI-6 eouia.terplonage people bad written It Toe offensive counterLntdlifence operations which ewi t * employed against
rUJas Include penetrationa, provacfttlonx, doubl* genti,
in pl*caall of the clusfc devkes of counterr Of these, the jowt tfftctlve is undoubtedly peneEven Communist fuerriUa foreeij *rw u e pnitoiftf
mow euilty-tnindl ttian most others, are always under
pruauie to build up thtlr atrenjjtli; tnejr aJways are
for additional men. It If extremely difficult for
with ttieli requirement for Uw htgnext degret of mobflJty, to
build up tDuntermteHlgenc* record* bod mafntotn them, m d
they a r t tbenfore hampered ia matlinr th* JOORDSI security
check on new recruit* who rfwv up or are brought la by old
members.
FenctrnttoDj i n n used by both the Abwthr and the Gestapo
Of tbe Hazt fctwa In Europe Awttis World War U with
degrees of nusoess, depending In p u t on the country
they were empioje^t Their succeas v u especially gnat In
France against tfce "Free F^rencb" Oaulllst resistance
forces, which were cOisssallj lacking In security caEuclousneas,
but also agaliui tbe ooDapftrtmented sabotage gKupa
11
in CtiW
t tin time ot bis flmt nernltm*iit Into 8OT tnt* <venf prorom rtcmlted by the Oerutuu later. Two other Alftwho b*d bllowed * patten muth lite thmt of Ortiid, Cttrocnt,
i n n MTCStBd In Pmria *BtT the llhettBOi^ flin a
triaJ, tod ihot. Tbey had been ncnilted. Into Mb SOB Ht
group opttmtlnf o c u tbe Bwlti border fend h*4 tbawn #aeh
Uut tliBj wc flown to Enehftd foe tnUUfit and fttttmed to Uu
(ranp M U n t e a u l And rftdld openlot nspectlvdr. Puflnf tt
^
J
b
f
^
up . Dumber Of m-eifJalwrlflS snttpa which, In
6IHp*nmttlt4tkiD practice, bad bad c*nt*ct with Uib OK
left It tttlEtlr t t e * . 1fh| luummltr M t o u lunstlttUan
And tbc DUt-Uhenthn arrtrtt TBje coafaadoo* at the two men,
eBUbllsbed Ihtt toey h*d been atfenft BrwMarnvn, but tt
not be determined whether thW wen tnilnna at Qnnd
*T, , Bcvram, "Obnmtlou ata tlje Dmhlc titsatT SVwtttt VI I,
p. M.
12
in CGW
What agency should Undertake the oountetintelngence *frt far the couater-guerrillb foreesf B?ery eountrv has Mine
kind of police Joree, at well as its military /orces, in dScfi state
of being: *nd Jt ennnot be dvubted Uitt in most ttnintifo the
pollM, vhateTer their type or orgaoiatloa, will b# closer to
the people, will know local oaaiMons, wlu more eaauy be able
to oreaniia. normally In r&ct will already I w e orULlzed> Infunu&tkt nets, and win therefore prove mote eflLcacknu In the
collection of cantlntal%er,ce Information tor this type of
vATfore than Hgentfea of the armed forces would
Th* opimem that police will always b* superfcir to ftnul
forces In c^unter-tnaureency cpen.tlons was rectntlj expressed b? ELaiko R BJemu, chief of ttaJT to Oenexn] MlhalLwb In TupalftW* during World War XL1* Th*r can produce toteUigHjja better thsn the pjmed ^
ha said, because they Bet It b u n tbe people everywhere; Uw amud
forces cBonot get inteLUccnce (ram the front because then
Is no front. He referred to Che experience In Mftlajm. wbetc
tbe polk* were nivays kept on top In the opttitJoos, sud the
at* I4o Hesdersoo wllh PMtro OrwHUTt, T h e Huat far
(Landxm, IKS), trrlHWHl In SlWter m 1, p. 1ST.
tmech berare Uiejolat Uin.tMj R c w n n s l b a l CtA,
J U now elTllbm offljcUl In OK DOM of tb TTA
Wutkn
a in
->'
tha twnptlfn la
Tbt TMPi*lDUity Jl
Itorce U Ibe
with tft* Civil Owetzuxubt, Tl
of CWl Auth.Drt.ly
inadTunrrat tot tbe m
In th current Btawrpntr. tbfl Anud Vtaroet b i n bert
m tft uppoit Ibe CirM Pover In l(c tuk fft KeUnf flllt lad
Inf anafd Cnnummljt termilia. En tddltlDD, t. Horn* OuLrd b u
1i*ai formed.
(EJ
POUM
a in
attd. BO foRuta1 them toto thft open v h t n they; could better lie1
'
cfeMt with tar the BT<
The roles of police and military forces as described *lse*here In Chapter H I t n worth study u a model of the
Idea] orEanlzfrtlon wnerwef counter-Insurgency or counteroperations have to be carried <mtr The phUosophv
which ihtse wits vte based b ciunined up in tbt second
. of the chapter (3OV5 on "Intelligence^;
StiH ttrttt Ix DO 9 U U c( wr In
for QtnULutii| bur nd order Is itLD that Of the FWICR, In Ihfl
u m war tr-.c rtspo nsl hliitj for producUH laitUlsencB 1U1 rub)
witfaj UL etwcLsJ Brmnch ( Ihe POUH. In Tlew ol th* itoe ad
InporUzice 4f the pnMttn. howeret, jpedkl tntclUsne OfftnicatUm h u been huilt ur*.
in CGW
grace Job than the local military fortes, but &l because
when the emergency situation Is over the Ametfcim will bar*
left behind the foundation* of & better governmental and: Intemal security structure.
It is unlikely ttut V-Sr forces win themselves e n r be doing
flu cauhtcr^grarriUi Job In any country; their role will be to
local forces to do it competently. Anjj
^4g|j^ r en^^d^^
On Guerrilla
Warfntt.
Ernesto "Cbt" Guevara., newly touted V a guarrUla authority, does Include In his recent book ft section on Intelligence,
u (allows:
Tfaunr yountU and your ttwiny (Uid you Mil be able 1* win
* hundred tattlu." Nothlnf bejpi th* combat ftm* bion U i u
Ccurtte Batillljep**. But b+ i u n to wrt fact fro& fletfen. A*
soon u part offlus tiki, mall dillteries e*o be tot up within th*
ittu, try to gel tattlUfflnce (tent t h t i r a r , tft* wnsuo
in."--
rtitBMi'imd m
cotJuJdkn jtad
This paraprt|jhp with Its remarkahl* Instruction on the subject f lnteUlgence communications, Is the unajdiig totality ol
Quarafm h*j> to smj on the iubjt of podtlva intelllIn the field of countiiAtelllgenceh however, h* apparently had o% iJtarttoHJghtA, In Appendix 4H pages 66
to Cfl^h
r*c*nt popuUr moTtmtnia h**f nirervd frew lsadepreptraUon. ftequeqtljr, the Jecrtt BtrrlCfl of the EUveraLof
ruler* laant* About ptotuud conspiracy*. Ahsolbh tic5 It
tnuclaj. Tbfr hufflftn materiMl nrnxt bt thnaen with are. At ttaiei.
thla jwjuan l> ffcij; at othtrfl. entrctnelj difnrulL One h u to
da *)th thoie Thfl are inUtNt-*UltJ and
14 Jain !EL tba flfhl for MbfrAUoD, There U ao
a p p v u t u . Tet than Is co rnui* ftor
ftntmy, even It thtffmairUl*oifanlnlloin t** been
UuUtnttd by ipiea, for DO u o n tbin &ni or two pertlns Hhcmld
be familiar with prepuAlory plMU. Keep nrw TOlbnteert awaj
from fcej pltcflj.
volM>dK Bitft IWJTL attythiin beynnd hln unottdlate
He*nr dlscun plait! with ajajoat. CHeck lncotnlug HAd
bull. KtrtiF *b*t eontHii evcta number turn. Work
lit* In U%nu> n*r ixuUrUtutUr' TTUCt M onn bejnmd the
ptciallj Ddt mMiea, "nw eHtny via toudoubtadlF tty
ta M*r vaaen: for Mpiomn*. Th* revoIuUonuy *rtKy pi-epbrinr
tjr Wmr mint b* an MCttlc ud ptrtncUj dbdplliKd. ADJOEW *HO
Oea t i * arden of hl# nptilorf *o& mtttt cmttct
vomea mod QUKT oiitalderi, bnmnet baDDcvoUi miut IK
imaidiatelr 'Cr vioUUaa of rrfOlatlaiurr
, - r O( CDBiKt tll*w * DO
Of HO men, tut tbae $00 mnrt t e apllt up, bKBUH (! to
4 group U bound to i.ttn.et tttentipri, u d tb) la cue of
the eaUn tmcc otmld be
KU
Ottmra
JH*KU-
17
r.-
^ i
' '
O In CGW
O in CGW
sections of the Viet Mirth document also contain Instmctlon In intelUfe n aspects of opexatloiuj
S a l o n DdluitEiai J unbuA operation, you miuft
ttvdr your ljinta' i*pcrtfl. on the Eltu&tiirtL imOotf the
in tb* tie*, b p e d m r ttttfly the ramie* "hr whJdi and the
t t wtoct enemy, troopa mcrfi ihlOV^b the Uh. HOT Urge U t
tbMC etKnr fOTt; tw fast do they mnn; what weapon* do
&MT7' D they h*T DUCMlU fUiUT II
b f
tkmF IE U ewntlal that tha ruemf be tisamt* Ot ear
Only the commaiider Rfid UU Agent* ihovld knav that tht*e thtD*
ue
The discussion of amhudui which icttim tnciutot tuaay Iteffta
of Intelligence Impart And. ptita emphtada on the eflect of inttUlttact on pbuu and tactics. The aame ! true ot the sectloiu eotltled "Raids an Enemy B U H , " ^'Gkneral Opexmtlnp
Frtrtdples.'* and HlEiti.Dli8hlng Your Ba**,'h In the l u t
on buUcaUOa Is gtitn ot A acuneirtiat more ADphlstlcated
of th# problem ad wamunlcaUan with
tbui Uuit dltplayd by Srr Ou*vart: ". . . or-
in CCYf
ont*rintelllBenjce 1 upectvtfDdnt of floesiv ttterqplj & peoaUr*t* lie eu^riSSnt own arfinUatToa. To utlstj tbatt K<ralr*torats. gserlllu mvBi blTt tbtlx irtm tactical [nltUlgra
hitUke tbe ottuprtnt tnr-^ther will U H hmto ta r r
Ob ttu 1ml pairalmn, who a tUfn will h*T fq ptutnta
^ B#CUTHJ KTflCU to obtain the nHHJrr lnfiniiuJHjL
If the esemv * n muDM ta ubtAla iqUtQfUM ibout
the tuerULu throutll tht IOCBJ papuIaUonh tlwy a thesudTO
U baudJcsppad in thUx counter-nalitBiiiCt uQvttlH. It
thtnion, axtremeij Important that the local pejHilaJttQQ. tre
y BrtUata hanl^trT Of Dcftac* (London, 19VT1,
20
CGW
nurxu
7
Oaenctoi
Alllad.
.!
mi
to * TO?
i
extent Do
u ih*
It Ktou not*woithy (hat enen this tnort iophl$tlaited effort to Wsntify principles dot* not reacb to concrete partkuI a n on cubjecU like means of coUeetlng lnlannAtlon (except
to strws rtHan on tht population) T rneana of
tng ccllected Informatbn to guerrilla headqu&rtarj or
ge.nc sfr?nomF uid the yftem for tJH4UJgence processing
within the headquarters.
Brig. Qenttftl GsfiiUel B. Griffith, bi hh LtitroductJon to the
tnuutatlon of Mao Tst-tun^, covers the subject
more completely, both for positive LnteUiijeciM ind for
the decMTfl
1B
inerrtttn 4Pntfciu,
Vhwtt il the ebtflajf? In what ttnofUif What don fai
to tfQf Wht ta the ftLte of blA equlpmentt btt mpprj4 hjj
An Ml h4entateHl^icrll,bold* tad lutliuav h rtimld u d
btt troop* tou|h, tfidrmt, KHJ vail dtftelpmurl. or
T*1M
mor* diUJlkd
"
'
"
a in ccw
ability to gel lnfonn*UAn m i m constant comphlnl ol ttu
[innfJUte diuinc tht nrel tour Qupprejaloo. Onxpaltns. U Lt
later of tht Jipmtt* la China m i f the French In bath.
IndKhifaa md Algal*, Thti ll a caancterlstk fmtu of all
(rutrrUU wui, The enemy 4tu4* u m ft llfbtai tUgc; from
toe Mrtauu around bim tbauuadA of iuve& ey Intently
hii erery mottj ht* etiry gctiue. fftjtb h4 itrikca out, he
the tit, hl4 tmttfoiilJti i n tatubtaltalr M Ini
Oftdnj; betsoH flf JUjml
COndJUoat C( Uudr ^
eJ terninH UKT i n kbit tu PM It to tcelr 4dTUUia *nd
. . .
^#fc.
The Departmtnt of the Arnty Field Munutl 31-21, "Onierrllla Warfare and S^WCIAI Forcai Opertloru'h (September
1561) Is authorllatlTf with respect to the intetUgtncs netda of
the U.a Army Special Force*, ibe units designed to create
guerrilla*. It covers the EEI for a BpecUl Force team before
It Is launched Into an area to orgtnlze ^UBrrUlu and also ha* fc
good lilt u( EEI within the juatrUla Area after irrlvai of tbe
teua, Tbe reader is referred to Chapter S, "tbeater 3uppcrt^" 3ctlon H, HHIntel%enoe," and Chapter 7h '^Orguilutton and Developmtn.t of the Area CotQinAH<1/h Stctlon IV, "Intelligence in Guerrilla Warfare OpemUcm*l Art#&." The
muiua] ftUs fix cbort, however, with rMpect to Inftructlnn
tn tbe organization of collection mewM and in tjie modus
oper&ndl, organization, sod opemtlon ef tntcttlpDce production liAUlUa *t guerrtliB. bases or heodquuteri, ft also db-
in CGW
, - . >
COM
.fc-:
CENTRAt
I NTELLIGENCE
I.
.J
APPIOVEDfODRLLLASE
UTLJU1II7
IbKil
IbXt)
ITI
THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA
fofmari on os of 0600
26 October 1962
AGENCY
26 October
SC No. 08181/62
CONTENTS
I,
Surveillance of BS October shows that the construction of IBBM and MREM bases in Cuba is proceeding
largely on schedule; now level photography confirms that
the JD3BM bases will use the 1,020-nautlcal-nile &S-4 nlssile. Vo additional sites, launchers or ulsslles have
been located> but there is road construction around Hemedic-s which suggests the fourth IRBJH sit* we have been
expecting there, We estimate ,tnat it would cast the USSR
bore than twice as much and take considerably 'longer to
add to its ICB1I strike capability from the USSR as great
an increment as the potential salvo froa Cuban launching
sites*
II,
Only two Soviet freightersand five tankers,
one of then already past the quarantine lineat111 are
headed for Cuba, The BELOVODSK, with twelY* M - 4 helicopters, is inthe North Atlantic; the PUGACHEV appears to
have slowed or stopped several days west of the Fanaaa
Canal. A total of 16 dry cargo ships DOW are carried as
having turned back toward the USSR on 23 October.
Two Soviet civil air flights are scheduled for Havana
with passengers; cargot if any, is not known. One bay be
turned back by Guinea today. A TU-114 is scheduled via
Senegal to reach Havana 1 Poveubar,
III,
There are further Indications that sons Soviet
and satellite elements, particularly air and ground element a In Eastern Europe and European Russia, are on I D
alert or readiness status. No major deployments have
been detectedf however,|
15 some
have bees placed on five-minute
alert ID East Germany, where two Areas along the West German border have been closed off for exercises.
Moscow highlights Khrushchev"a Acceptand* of V TbaDt's
appeal in a bid to start US-Soviet negotiations Peiping,
however, is irritated that the Soviet response to VS action
is not stronger. The GoBununlsts still deny there are any
offensive weapons in Cuba.
IV*
There Is no major change or significant new development in non-bloc Teaction to the crisis. Host of the GAS
nations have offered to participate la some form In the
quarantine, and NATO embers have agreed with ainor reservations to deny Landing and overflight rights to Soviet
planes bound for Cuba.
TO^SECRET
> It
SAN
f4t.UA COMFUX
Jl'
26 October 1962
I.
Photography of 25 October sh3*B continued rapid const ruction activity at each of four URDU sitefl, The us* of
camouflage and canvas to cover critical equipment At these
sites continues*
ITo niw missile sites bave been identified, but road
construction activity in tbe Remedies area suggests plans
to locate the expected second IttBH sit* there.
Low level photography clearly indicates that tbe URDU
sites are for the E3^4 (SANDAL) 1,0200-nautical mile ballistic bisslle system, Photography of 03 October shows cables at two HRBH Bites running iron missile-ready tents into tb* woods where generators probably are located. Ttiis
strongly suggests tbat missiles are being checked out In
the tents.
It now is estimated that San Cristobal Site 2 will
achieve a full operational capability on 26 October instead
of 25 October Heavy rain has recently fallen on this site.
Tae four Soviet cargo ships originally en route to Cuba
which were suspected to be delivering ballistic Missiles
are continuing their eastward course towards the USSR.
1-1
Military traffic is heavy on most of the country's highways, and! several roads and beach areas have been closed to
all civilian use. Press reports from Havana state that the
city is bristling with gun emplacements and other evidences
of military readiness* Che Guevara reportedly has established
a military command post at the iotfD of Corral de la Palna in
Plnar del Rio Province, and Raul Castro is alleged to nave
gone to Orients province--his usual post during previous military alerts. Fidel reportedly remains ID Havana.
I beneath
tha surface calm regime officials are apprehensive over possibilities of Internal uprisings and/or and Invasion, Suspected dissidents are being rounded up "
s
moblii-
, tranquilltyj
capital or L&s Villas Province, reported drastic new consumption controls on gasoline
and motor oilj similar measures nay have been instituted
elsewhere. The broadcast also described reports of food
and fuel shortages as "rumors spread by the counterrevolution at the service of Tanlcee imperialism.17 The broadcast
was presumably aimed at discouraging acara buying, which
has been reported from several Cuban cities.
1-2
II.
11-1
26 October 1962
III.
MILITARY
We have noted the following Soviet military developments; an assessment of tbeir significance will be ie
sued Inter this morning by thD US IB Watch Committee.
III-l
B.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
TOP
The East Gera&n regling has decreed an operational readiness alert for selected party officials, who hive been authorized to carry firearms and instructed to maintain legs
shoving the whereabouts of those of their Subordinates who
occupy key positions In the district and county-Level party
apparatus. In addition, the regime has called for daily reports on the state of popular norale.
In the only Baet European consent thus far on developments at the UN, the East German news agency described the
President's reply to U Taunt as "a noncommittal US propaganda maneuver jtl adding that the announcement that the
quarantine would continue "conjfirtwd that; US President Kennedy is not prepared to accept the proposals qf. U Thant
and N. 3, Khrushchev,..."
Hungarian and Bulgarian authorities may have Interfered
with connunicatlous between tbe US Legations in Budapest
and Sofia and the Department of State. Both legations use
local, national-owned circuits, communicating with Washington via Vienna or Frankfurt* The Legation In Sofia reported
the telex circuit out of operation during the night of 234 October and the circuit fron the Legation la Budapest
was subject to frequent interruptions during the day on 24
October. The US Charge" protested to Hungarian Foreign IHnistry officials, who assured hint that there would be no
further difficulty.
AntI-Amerlean demonstrations of varying scale have
been staged In four of the five East European satellite
capitals where there are US missions, A Hungarian news
agency reported that 10h000 Inhabitants of Budapest had protested in front of the VS Legation on 24 October, but
reports "the local scene is quiet*"
The sane day sone 500 students at Warsaw Polytechnic
Institute organized a protest rally hut returned to class
when extra police hurriedly were stationed around the Embassy, The Gonulka regime reportedly does not intend to
permit demonstrations or conduct an internal propaganda
campaign for fear of sparking a war scare and: a run on food
which are already low.
Also on 24 October, a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry official assured the US Minister that "if a demonstration was
organizedt protection also would be organized!*" Three hours
latex, tbe arrival of a strong police guard at the Legation
dampened preparations for a demonstration, and a crowd of
youths dispersed.
I1I-4
TCT
TO
Yesterday, Ih000 feecba pulled down the flag and
smashed windows at tne US Embassy in Prague. Police earlier refused to clear a path through the demonstrators
for ftn embassy ear returning the Charg6 Iron in official
luncheon.
The Ulbricht regim has called for "solidarity deuoagtrations." YesterdAy Baet Gerqtm police directed a US
Army pitnsl Into A street wherw eucb A rally was underway,
The car was beat upop and lost radio contact with US headquarters in Vest Berlin before breaking free and returning
to West Berlin+
m-s
* NON-BLOC
The UN Security Council baa suspended Its debate on
the Cuban crisis lode finitely following: tba announcement
by Acting Secretary General U Thant that he would consult
privately with representatives of the US, TJ3SH, and Cuba.
Fending; tta& outcoua of these consultations, the flnon-Aligned
grqup" has also halted Its plans for spansoring a resolution in the Council.
Except for some reduction In the nervousness of the
Vast Gernfui press^ there Is little reflection in Don-bloc
comment of the turnaround of Soviet ships and the US and
Soviet responses to rJ ThantTs proposals for avoiding a
confrontation on the high seas,
?
are continuing instances of demonstrations in
Asian, European and Latin American countriesT but participation is limited largely tn Communist and avowedly pacifist elements, At this hour none seems likely to assume
massive proportions.
Tha Shah of Iran has not commented publicly, but Foreign Minister Aram told Ambassador H O I B & B on 24 October
that the Iranian delegation at tbe UK was being instructed
to give full support to the US progr-an, Including extensive lobbying among the Afro-Asians with an eye toward
possible General Assembly consideration of tbe
ippre
aqua'
Turkey and Soviet installations in Cuba may lead to Communist pressures on Turkey Foreign Minister Erkin told Ambassador Hare on 24 October that it is essential for Turkey
to receive needed military equipment quickly. A general
mobilisation order has been issued by the defense and Interior ministries instructing security forces to work jointly
to combat subversion and sabotage.
g
Premier Ben Bella, grunting an appoibtuent
to charge Porter only after two-day delay, expressed hope
for continued US economic aid, but reiterated his conviction that as a matter of principle "Cuba unfit be supported*"
Be charged the US violated the ON charter by resorting to
unilateral military action. The Moroccan acting foreign
minister concedes tLe U Taint plan for a moratorium en military shipments to Cuba 1B unrealietic without
t
Foreign Affairs secretary Dlallo of Guinea has assured
Ambassador Attwood that his country has no intention of grantIng- the DS3B landing or overflight rights for air movements
to Cuba. He stated that Guinea had refused a Soviet request
for this purpose in
Asian reaction* remains In low key, partly because of
preoccupation with the SibO-Indian border clashes. Cambodia, however, bas announced its decision to establish
diplomatic relations with Cuba,
Uruguay has now joined the other members in support of
the QAS resolution. All OAS members except Brazil, Bolivia,
Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay have offered to participate in
some way in tfifr quarantine.
Tne two Argentine destroyers to be used id the quarantine will sail OIL 2S October. The Argentine Ambassador to
the OAS has been instructed to urge that a joint command be
set up under the OAS for naval quarantine operation rather
than unified US commands. Venezuela has already urged a
meeting of the Inter-American Defense Board+
Mexico, traditionaly against intervention, has somewhat reluctantly agreed to support whatever measures the
OAS adopts. TheTe has been no Indication whether this support would Include active participation in the use of force,
but president Lop*** Uateos has said that any action should
be under the control of international organizations+
Socialist presidential aspirant Senator ALlende of
Chile is reportedly unhappy about the effect of the blockade on Chilean politics because be believes the firm US
stand has changed the public nood against the leftist coalltionF FHAP. Allende's chances of being elected in 1964
have been considered food but bis pro-Castro stand now may
work Against him.
IV-2
Brazil sees Itself as a peacemaker I D the Cuban situation, proposing that the UN undertake denuclearization of
Latin America. Rio feels this would permit Cuba and the
Soviet UDlon to Save face, thus diminishing the danger of
confrontat* an.
IT-3
TO
..I
*
Canada placed itself Golldly in support of the US action with strong speeches in ConHrons on 25 October by Prime
Minister Dlefenbaker and Libergl leader Pearson. While
stressing the need to find ft peaceful solution, Diefenbaker
said that Cuban missiles were a "direct and immediate manace to Canada," and he brushed away arguments about the
legality of the quarantine with the comment that they were
largely "sterile and Irrelevant," He announced: that Canadian Narad forced now BTB on the same readiness footing BB
US units.
Noweglan Foreign Minister Langed addressing parliament
on 25 OctoberT expressed support only for direct negotiation
between the US and USSR. The Undersecretary In the Norwegian
Foreign Ministry, however, told the Yugoslav amoa'ssador that
the Soviet action in Cuba was like placing an armed aircraft
carrier off US shores.
Ip Italy: Prime Minister Faafanl's somewhat equivocal
line grows out of his fear of upsetting the delicate balance
In the center-left government, We now have reports that
Nennl's Socialist party will tafce a line sympathetic
to Cuba rather than the US, although one spokeBASH earlier said
that In any showdown fi majority of Socialists would side with
the Teat.
Officials In Spain and Portugal ere supporting the US,
A strong statement is expected from The Hague. The Belgian
reaction is "better tban expected," and official* are Surprised that the US hfl$ not yet put Cuba on the COCOU list.
In the British House of Commons on 25 October, Labor
leader Gaiteke 11 expressed sympathy for the US, but also
anxiety over possible Soviet retaliation, KTacnlllan endorsed
the President's action and said the missiles were unquestionably offensive, Any Cuban settlement, he said, would have to
Include an accurate check on their removal, after which the
world leaders should try for "wider negotiations."
At their 23 October meeting, the EEC Foreign Ministers
showed "striking unanimity of support and understanding" for
the US position, but felt that heneefor h it will be difficult
to Separate the Cuban and Berlin problems. There was considerable dissatisfaction with the Berlin contingency plans, and
Spaak felt that the fruitless East"Vest "soundings" should be
replaced by a "serious" conversation.
In. West Gen-anr, where there Apparently Is panic buying,
Defense Minister Strauss told the US HAAG chief on 25 October
IV-5
I I .
i.
^ . -
'-:
.'.*..
;. <
"
.. v
r"
C E N T R A L
1N T E L L I G E N C E
A G E N C Y
''
.';.:::.
.'./..-
.':
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.
. .
EO 12953 6.1Cc)>2SYrs
TOPSE
1.1-1
. . . .
. - .
f
'
This
ieosrifcy of
, TJE Cuffc T
J i L ^ in anv jnanuer to
nei [JrejuclLfJaE
e benefit of any
ED
(l)>25Yrs
- -
rtJ.i .J __+_
iLi-L-Hl
TOP
SO
16 December 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM:
EO
TOP
TOP
appear still active. These boats are
operated by mixed Soviet-Cuban crewsH
BO 12953 3.4(b)(1)>2
.3.
EO 12956 3.HbHM>25Tra
{3}
BO 12953 3,4(b)(l)>25Yrs
(SJ
TOP
ED 12956 3.4(bHl)>5T:r.B
3.4i
IT. The source offers Information on the Soviet missile buildup In Cuba, but on this subject he appears to
rely largely on secondary sources. Be doubts that all the
strategic missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba, but
bases this oa having learned of more missiles coming Into
Cuba during the buildup period than he has beard of departing the Island. In describing the various concentrations of Soviet military personnel in Cuba he repeatedly
states that he does not know the precise Dumbers. or functions of the personnel in these places: since no Cubans
permitted In ttoe sites,
lfl.
I THIS
is
3.fl(bMl>>253Trs
-4-
TO
EO
(3)
EO
(S)
-5-
BO 12358 3,4
iS
4)
-
1 April
PRESENT!
Tho President
State Department: Secretary Husk,
Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under
Secretary Johnson, and Vr, Ralph Burton
Defense Department: Secrotary
,
Deputy Secretary Vance, General Taylor
and: General O'to
White House Staff: JHeasrs, Bundy,
Moyors, and Beedy
CIA:
Wv.
APPROVED rORIEUASt
DfiTE:MU?<OZ
3. Secretary Husk referred to & trleak" the
ovening before regardinp the Movement of a Naval
task force to the area of southern Brazil. (General
Taylor said that tJtere was not actually n leak tout
that it appeared to be a deduction by newsmen ba&ed
on knowledge that a special meeting at the Joint
Chiefs toofe place,) It wftfi Agreed that newspaper
queries concerning the Naval movement would be
treated roirtineljr and that it trould not be shown
as a contingency move having ta do with Brazil,
(C)
.;.-A>::W':i-
IP
IP
-.
v . .-
I'V**
- >
^m&
^pfeT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION1
Current Situation
Economic Outlook
,,.,
Security Machinery
Outlook
LI
,
.13
Current Situation
Oudoolt
[I
1J
,,
r_fl
Jjg
17
V. FOREIGN POLICIES
...
17
19
,,
. . . 20
,30
CUBA
- -
',.
VLF OF X
4-T
'
"
. :
r.T
C A R I B B E A N
S*ikr
S E A .
^ 1
'
'
'
'4 '
i H f Baarr J J i l i
'
^-1
^pET
SITUATION AND
PECTS EN CUBA
THE PfiO&LEM
To assess, the Cuban situation and the outlook over the P**E year
OK
CO INCLUSIONS
8, 14-16)
C- Depressed lewis of consumption, the imposition oi worfc normsH
and forced labor and jectiritv duties will tend to narrow the regime's
popular support. However, the huge security apparatus will almost
certainly prevent popular dissatis faction from bringing down the
regime-- We think it likelv that a number of military officers have
lost sympathy with certain of its policies, but we doubt that there is
57-38)
J. Castro's efforts to foment revolution in Latin America have suffered setbacks during the past year. He is probably somewhat less
sanguine about the chances for quiet success. Nevertheless, be will
almost certainly continue to provide aid and subversive training to
potential revolutionaries. He may pr^s tot early aggressive action
by some Castroist groups, even though their immediate chancts seem
ptK)rt hoping that their repression \would eventually produce conditions
more favorable for exploitation. (Faras. 59-62)
DJSCUSSFQN
I. EN TROD LJC NO N
L TEic appeal of CiittTOi revijjcjjtion u wearing thinner, thnugh fits
On the instruments; of [[w^er remains firm L>nrJngg the year
since oar List
y
assessment of Cub,!.1 the Castro regime has itnd Trwne s^th^ks than
accomplishments, more nribtrujn ion tftin triumph. The economic dtfficijUie.s hate
been pdrtK-utarlv evident; these | u i ' * orO^ht & Further narnJwing in popular
iuppoft and tfiejeailng resort to methods ai iejneiin\i and. tSir^ar. The hope*
ui the Cuban Leaden For raped %&int by sympathetic rc^TiLur ioniiry- "roup^ ehcin L i t i n Artierica- were dealt serichti ^jEoivs,
and! hy the Ur,iii]ian r-rvnJution in April.
1. On the other lund. Lhcie hJvc bttn some impOrMnt
forcrs have cOnSide^aMy jmrwoved the:f ovfii^U cjpyh:iiria!, Lifg;*ly throug.h the
accjutsil ir?n f>( nvaia Soviet "L'jpOns j n d ^telpDn iystems. The regime^
scaJe eEort in technii[, vcH^tiofiiL. an<J general eduction h i t moved
though i t some expense to the qua!ity nf education nn the praftssL-nflal
The pjogiam nf training and indOrtr(natin subversives irom o-ther oountrics
has cantinucd. On- the economic $ide. suhjt^flti^l Soviet aid is coatinuin^ and
Jii*h ^vor3d jjfLtfa permitted gtwd earnings from a sm-LlL 1964 sug^r crop, aiduij
Cvba"> effort to ejcpand imports oF ciiticallv needed cquipmciir from
suppliers.
Ik THE
Currtril
3. There were canti'iitJn^ aspects ic Cuba's KOnomic perrJornmncc in
Hegjftted as a whole, it as another bad year: totJtJ jiroducdciii was Ltelow that
of 1362 and CraJi N'itJPn^t Frodu (CNP) remainrd substantially bcln^v that
of 1933, the !a*r nietevoltatianary year. On the positke jitfeh however, the rat*
of WQdOtTiEc decline, which has been rapid \n recent tears, seems to ha^e slowed
or teveJled oE. D^ti to i*t afatlabfe suggest [hat stAEjnation at a low ltve(
continue thrtnijh 1964: flight 3in; in LndustrijJ output a/e likeJv, hctt
will probably be offset by tQfn* dedirt* in the- agriculture sector.
4. W e estimate Cuban sugar output in JSfrJ i t AppTQ^rtUttk (he s4m.c
as in 19633,3 sniliifln metric tonsthe smatteit crcp in IS years-.- The
regime had hoped For * I S T ^ T harvest, atid. the Tcplftnlinrf of cane- Fi4tJrtikeci
in 196S and 1G63 reii^rit ha.ve. made, this passible. Hwever, Flurricaruc Flora
damaged some cane and intended transport and supply difficulties. The
regime's nationalisation ^ (niddle-siied firms IA October \ the Second Agrarian
H
3
T b * L962 CTOp " * i i >l.B mkltion tnoj, crflpi in lilt |>je-Ciitra yean WETE
5 rruJLkm
El I; mwdl tiDting th*t liie Cdtvui econdmie pbn [{jf 3M4 calll :ar aalv 4 t.3 pert*nt
creue ewtr WSJ [n the lOtiL irnmuil of food, i^iihblf for nnfitmpcio^ Inqliiing ifnforb,
tE thil ggn3 li fulfilledind (he- Cu.ba.nt h^'E H5(J<J*TI met pllrt gaals in ttw purit
not b* -ewHgh (P1 lep ilp wih. lh* SdnuaL pijjiuljriGn growth, arvi per npLu p w
c-irt, In Frbrtliry DE "iiij year, ddnjijirf the UTii/nprrtiLi-fl p*r=acnLnc* fff 4 c
during L383 uid. tn cilll^g far nsw ctiurb, laid, ^V-e carinrtt rat oci DUI
irtdtrftriaE lJlli it? tlnv that tiey an ran enou^k t-5 rest on, *0t e ^ n 50 [ t one fiflger
on. Wfl must il l j t o*SW pmc IKIKIJ. That S nuc "jjt."
'The LBS1 rjjde- li-Jijrtt ire taJurn Fpjra J m*n.Jt aLT|Gij*d ttacunicnt. TTiij. WUTCC a
aswratr UL rnajiv aE lU deui!j r and w ; axn ^Urjed M give it mOrtf cnod*nrt "Jtgiv DUX
pntfcitlgu. Ttwrt* prDJecti^n; ^BPT, rHvertheufij. tosed npftfl. j cara^kr^ble Ewd*1
d*riee-; thoy plural C*jhiD eipOrtS gt S-lTo rsidLJim atnl ^ a r t i ar J73O million Far
Fuirirtf ]Ljht will t s throvrft oq th* isiu* ivhen Sa^iei p j j-titiiiifi tw (inf >*ir ice
bu( thli wi3L IHtlK fir j niDarK ot ja.
since 155E. This incre,1>t ^-J? Lilmnst entirely i.i imports br>m
the Communist countries ilnt; nrueE1, of it wai deliveries of rrudi(P-?rv ;ind equipment financed by devdopinenc credits. For 1964 thtf value of Cuban exports will
again incrtSS^ largely because of the high ivgai prices which prevailed when
mo4t of the crop was sold Impends as a whole nay go up skg.hiLy in 1&&4.
a Hsft LJI imports from the FTCS U u *ld is Likely On be largely offset by a
In imports from tin; Cuiiimunist counirits. "fhe 3evl gf Soviet ossiiMn
1964 'q]] probably oe appreiiJbiy l>elahv the S350 million level of 1963.
CUBAN FOfi]GM TRADE
(in LiidliQftf o^ JDILITIJ
IMS
WJ5
I960
MSl
IMI
19B3
( prelimtnirvj
_ Zmorts [rDB J
Fw* ^^"orW
Totnl
tn
..
40
SD5
15
T.30
[a
fii5
LM
JTO
4J0
1J5
JD5
l!i
350
L95
3JU
230
415-
T53
9*3
62D
S25
5^0
S-I5
600
. . oejl.
negl.
SM
IWijl.
730
[3=
4M"
JLJ
190
6-14
120*
"05
1M"
...W
650
T5fi
515
T05
730*
S33*
S35
launched *m slUunsidcret pro^rcm uf forred-drnfr ind^trijiiziHiOn d agritt^HL-aL dmirsificition: the nios< ;mportajii remit of this waj to undermine the
t3ijJis:Led tjsis tv su5.11 production. *(>" the :<inie Ins complied rha
circle: sugir i i :15a in i i i * ^aiL-LiwW :iftd tlw *Oiu for iT0 is 10 niiJlion tons.
nded calcte ppj^Ltction For food and jriJustfEjl suppl-.- ia iLtiQthci p r i m a l
at lh# administration. FoJIon-Lng T*Liid niitinnatoalion of the grtat b l k
i i
of Che island1;; :onomic activity, the r ^ i m * adoptcti a ddocirinaiw
Marxist
npproiich toward the rndiugernL fctu-tinn: in iri puiscil of
more and more economic fciWii!imenlS ^^t^^f mjd part of Ur 3 e JL
"oonsolidatcd z^-H^i^.~
wLtli .ill ^ L [ o r def!3i:i-!iii:ifcEng ,uitnonty .
in Havnnil. But so Hine-cOiMminS und: hiitCiiupMtic h^i the diiim-mafcEnij
process beenmti that Ciwl*o himself l^s damiwd tJ^e system itdd catted for decentralization iind Che ewrcise 0^ much more reirwniLbLlJh- .it local '
1 ' Cuban affiriali have teen frank to u y that lhw ecanomit slarnties
Tioraccurale enough for sOvnd pUnnirtgbut (hey pLin and f J ^ i n d p
The Loss through defection, of skilled Ubor Ltnd m,nU^e^Lil Lilent has
a cumuLatLv* *d\er S = effect Not many of the nc^v- managers srem (0 be enst
rjorucjous: <Juruig 1963 ttw ilste LnduSCrLit * n t c r p r j fe!i short by almost 2oO
million p^sos Or the. 6ST miKn p*s that they rtere supposed to turn over * B I
rheif incomw to the Cuban budget. P h i p 5 mo^r Sibus nF all :s die re-iise t
candnumg hilitfe to provide m^inu^fuL m ^ L i l iac^hves for .vorkr Jnd
farmerJ- T I I B impoiitioft of work norms an(3 ^ t^rt(*ed work w k have, con
tributed to the decline in Ulr
t
Economic Outlook
11 The latest irl the r e j i g s series 0? effortJ W improve administration of
the KOnomv i i the s u m p t i o n by P f s i d ^ t Etafticos of the rales of Economic
Minister and director QF planning But Cwha's problems of inept management
Srtd low Labor morale are not r^lv
soLvabic: they represent a ^ r y biifit
limiting factor on the performance at the ccanomy ^ ^ H short-run futiue at
Icait. *Alsr> oJ prime tmportaeiM Ln appfaiiin- o^-*rtlt prosprCtS for the nefl
twfl years is the owtlool; Cubiin eafnin^s from sugar iwporti.
14 Recent rbwp dLLn^9 in su^Sf futures tnil^e praspcCfcf midch less pr^misEni! For 1965, and probably rV 19Bfl as welL World spot prices, which, bad
hft a pe*k of A3 M t l t 3 H p 0 " ^ * U t t ] G x '* r a - m ' fl?c acH* w e r e E d te
^ l i oeflts l i i t NovcmW, are n^v bel^v 5 nta : rugSr fvryres for 1955 indicate
a further dedinc. Assucnin^ pric on this jert^ral LvB| lot aales to norn
Communiit rtuntries, the Caitrff regime would have 0 aspanri sygflr prodLLCtini
bv about 20 pcrrtflt to eirn as much > 1963 LH ifi 1964; rt0cvcr, it would
hive bo Mil the entiro incre^c to the Bloc ,nt the asreed price- oF 6 certli per
pound.*
DurirtC C a M ' j vUdL to the USSR laH Jrtn^a.-y. irrt Savicl*, in elfat. =Tl=ndrri B W O
tik wnmiHHnt a Tr,Dd-L965 to pi? 1 W .^nft p*r pcund for Cuban ^
T ^ Jammy
l
19H.
L7. 4 million tacu; l'SflS-l^Tn, 5 rtiJlifln r
15, Such an expansion or output <i pflSSife^e : j^t niiLkely. Although the
regime Ls moving jraduallv ahead wltEi its program nf cc^atin^ additional \ami
to cane produced, iL prab-abl^ "ill not be able Co Overcome th serious labor
s h o r t y Which has charactered i n * last three harvests. The regtme- j p p t n r t
now to be ronvjncthi thai JL aolutEon can be found only through m;ch;i niznd
harvesting techniques. Soviet machinery thus (nr h^s been H fttsappomtment.
Cuban vte ft harvesting equipment it still at the ?=cp<jrii!iLiitaL sfagtf. and we
doubt that mcchiniwtiQn ^ElL provide more thin mar^uiat relief duTiflg the
next
16. During the at of 1*4 and the first part of 1963, tEur CastrQ
aLmoit ccrtainlv obtain additional crcdEts frnni U'tstern European firms
contracting to iypply equipment Co Cuba. There^fwr thu jvatiHjjj]:cy &F such
crrdits i^iH depend, to a jrtiidf!Ti b k degree M C^lan ffl^nin^s ffom the: IBS5
guga^ crap and on t h * picsptcts for exports in 1966. The outlook for bath
is unfavorable, aod there wLll prabablv be Some decJJ!ke in (he (QtiL vialui
oi Cuban esporta. i"n thLs case,, iiflpOffj would. aJma^t certainly decline also,
pecLatlV rram the FrM World:, as Cuba's suppliers b c ^ m to have cloubfi itwu.t
Cuba's (Trrdit'worlhifltfss. At least bv 1966, JnA p t r h i p i aj ea/Ly as 1965, Cuban
foreign trade is likely to he below the-1964 level. However. v>e believe ( h i l
the Soviets and Other Communist countries will pjovide Cuba sufficient credit
to prevent a serioujly dartuigJng drop En total imports.
17. The outlook for development ai the industrial and MrtiOfucttOn 3tors
of the economy i& do*elv reLated to die prospects For [mports. With tntal
Imports likety to be iw higherand perhaps low^ithan in 1964, there vrill
be little opportunity to increue i t t p p t i of building material*., irtdmtria] raw
mal^fials, spare parts, ?fld fuels. .\ny increases in industrial production and:
construction Ln 1965 and 1966 are Lkelj- tfl be
lfi. Tbe regime') emphasis on techniml edvtition in the
and universities m i l tcrwi, over the [ong term, to aid gro^tri, especially En the
iridustriaE sector. This fairtor is not likely to have 1 major impact during, the
next t*TJ v*4J), however, Thft pgTffl 1* still relatively new, the shortage
of trw'ued EeachejH is serious, and the regime has so far succeeded in
Out only port of its planned massive shaft of ftud<nll M technical
13. In JUDI, we hetievfl that (he Cubn economy v J ! opefate at a lav level
for the next two yeaxi. Because of population growth, the individual
standard Is LJtely tn hecoiflc- ilighdy ^vnrsc. Shortages of foodifuJfs,
trtd fnany tvpes of consumer goods "dJl persist. The regime's prolonged failure
to deliver the economic benefit it pFomiMd, together with its probable need
[JO introduce additional belC-tightieninj nrcasttres, will be likcjy to
its base of popular
tion proews1. tt has practatmed three new ta^-s in Hit piut year: die Second
Agrarian B^arm, the Wort Norm and Whge ClJihiii^aliori L,iw, and the Ob]igatory Military S^n'ice Law.-. Jf fully impCem^utcd. the tt-jye Liwi wil! h;ive a
proFavnd effect an practically i l l CUUSITIS- Thcv itriLc not anW i t thr interests
of those aEready dEscn^lsanrcJ with the regime uut ilso at the p^ftKurts and
itudent!. who make up much of Castro's ytron^Kt supporr.
21. The Second A.g?ariiirt ftcform oi October IU63 espropriated moat farms
ovei? 193 JtrcE. Some 7.000-3,000 F M ^ S have been nHtcted, and Jtatc Q^TICTihip * f agrfcultuml line! has increased trunn appen\imitely -W perrtnl to "0
pcrterit. This, in itself, was a rremtndous bluw to Culw's mnservalive rural
jector: inoreovief, many Emali^i1 farmers JIV con^ipCtfd. that their turn w i l l com*;
aoon, despite Fidel r i Tcpeated isfturanccS to the con.t:;^J. The re^inrt his been
attempting to fore* the tmall fiifticrs to sell a]3 their ptfoductj to the government
wlJection agertties: but black rtUfLetEnJ mntinu-cs ori a considerable scile.
Within the East Few wajks, the party fieufjpfliwr ffory has warned peasant!
who work on state farms that they muil no [ongcr >*ep txn^i or ^ruw vegetable
gajdens o theif own.
2. Thffwwl; norrrL and svaje Kale s^steriL cun-ently being Lnnrad-uced throughout Cuba wEI Apply to agricultural as WPLL as injustrisl Labor. The reginie
has bc*n moving cautiously in thit Geld, jeeki[Lg to stritij a. bslincc between the
poLitkal ddlrability of keeping ^arfcers rcaionabU iitis6*d and the roonomic
iuMd to ifiaeai? output and reduM cost through deallocation of urorkers on a
mafor scale,, and -tKraugh impreivemrnt oE the p c r f o m u n ai the individual
Tic- reginw [aunched its work norm program an an csperimcp.ta.1 bajis
than 18 nwnths ago, and. it has beta sharply eipsnicd this. yr- VVarlirrs:
arc Vasng Etted into right salary ctassificitiyris. The norrna themselves are not
high, but those who Fill bclo^v them will [ e pay Mid the re^itfle p]a<kS graduallyto riiae nortJis. Already the trpdltiOtia] Chrtitmas arid vacaticm bonuses have
been eLLmLni-ted, the typical w-nrlt week has been t r e n d e d from -W w -S4 hoiurs.
and some holidays have been aboLijhed. Re^imSfitatioo of tlrt Lahflr force lias
been increased bv the LJivance of work cards to employed j f l d upemploy*d.
23. The. Obligatory Military Service Law is d e s i r e d In part to provide a chedp
Force- ivhich the regime can use ^-hcrijvcr ;t i s fit Populjr rejction has
;ET
JO adverse [h$\ the re-^i^e hiitf l>**ii forced uito a pubik
to assuage angry Cuban mothers. A number oi prospective draftee*
defected; a few have prabably- |Qmsd ulaurg-snt groups- T"^ uetLii]ty For
dodging is jtiff""*3 r n t d l as sis yeaia in prison. The regime has
announced, that students, perhaps the mast pri^ile^ed class in Cuba, n vill no
longer be exempt frflm the draft. A further SQuice of resentment qn thti pj*t
of many yuunj people Li a reMflt decree specifying that students must participate r e g u l a r in -jrnduclive '.v-urb:, iz wail as keep up with clicir
5.4. Antipathy betwraen the "otd" Cnmmijnisrs (members at (ha g
p
prior to Castro's revolution) and the "new"" Cfltnmvntjts (wtw arc FEdflisLTi
revclutionaries firtt Srtd Communists second.) has persisted JIVIK the days of the
revaitttDanary Gghtingwhen the "old" Communists, in Fidel's own words,
"hid under the bed." Th-ii behind-the-scents conflict fliW into the Open onus
again in March of this year ui die t r i j l of Marcos Rodriguez; several important
"rid Cnrrununists were aCCuil of jhietding for yens A member of the regfulir
C&mmuniSt P&rlv who h a a betraved nnn-Cnmmuntst icvoEutiodujy studertt Jesdfiij
to Batista. Castjo himself had! Co intervene directJy in the trial; in the name oF
unity and do preserve same batartts behvaeft the two groupings, hi pJpefed
Over the dispute- Bvt the quarrel remains viery much alive, and. the rucent
appo[n.tmen.t do second-echeLon govemmeg.E potts of i*^ - frli l o ^ l FkleluOs who
had been ounsi^iiid to obscurity by "aluT Communist lend-crs suggests that the
btter hive (oJt grovnd1.
25. Infighting of this sort has been One of the rtUOnS that C t 0 n i United
Party nf the Socialist Revolution (FURS} has been so tang in the pjocess of
formation. He originaJly saJd it was CG be completed by early 19631, but by
February 1SSJ it claimed leas than 33.WQ of a profecteti 55,000 memtwrthip.
and formation at the Erst PUBS celt iii the armed forces did not occur tmtiJ IS
December 1963- Progress has also been flowed bv th? difficulty oF triining
prospective mcinhers hrom thfl t*0f]y-educated c]ass and by diSerenoes ai
opinion between teadtuyg Ggures in the nsw party and some 0v*mmcnC bureau
CrStJ about who ts to exercise what powert. But prflbabty the moa-t unportant
impediment has been Fidel1* Q^m mtsgivinjs about his ability to buiJd die kind
nf party he cOuM t n t He is acutely aivant t t i t the PUP5, Price hAly ionned.
wilt mtain a potential to challenge his OWfl higblv-p^rjonalLzcd rule. Thus
be is movia^ floaty -ifld cautiously hokling the pirtty. formed: PTJF5 la^getv
to l a idviiory lot*, while he retains tbe pd^er to mate a]] important decisions.
36. Castro has also retained close control over the militarv and! Ov^r the
appointment oF offifrefJ to key alignments, A Few members of the miEitoiy have
oVeotedl and: others, among them officsj, have aJmajt certainty ]oit sympathy
with certain of the regime'* policies, though they are not w\l\in% to take the Hik
oF overt Opposition at this time. We, nevertheless, doubt that there is military
dijafiection on a scale sufficient to threaten the regime.
3^. Castro has not been able lQ put an end. to insurgent activity. Small
guerrilla, bands continue (Q operate fiom the mountainous areas oF Pinir del Hiu.
to
Las Villas, Cjma^iLev1. and Orients piovftLCifi. The regime aecmi part icuJiifh
concern^ rMl an txp-nnsiOn of o-^rriiLa activities :n con junction u i i h .1 successful [ilnJ^ig b<-- Cuban a.tiles cnuld incite elements of tin; population to revolt.
We do not bclie-.'e that the present capabilities ai the e.\iles fultify thi* (*.ir.
but w do tliink the Fear is real. Indeed, it UMS almost rerttfinK- tlie primary
reason fof the extensive Cuhan military j l t r t urtd mobiJi^tLan that took pldci1
in
28. The very Fact that the regime is ncTvaua i n d has mo^ied during
rt'L^ tn arrest iind diL ruthtciily wilJi amiiJ] numbtrs of nup*cted agents and
other opponents has probably inctemrd its jhort-temi j*curEty. The Inrgr Und
iniiflasing number of potential appOrlfia(3 Qi til* regime within t h * caunLry has
never had much oppartunity to o r f i n i i e For \utv unintd action. Tlu: e]ahcT,itt;
internet secttrity m*chiner\' which now *wits jnakes dLEEiden.t
j
l
activity e>cn iOfe difficult
Security Machinery
39. Cistro'j Cuba remninJ A polJ state. The principal suevrih- and counterinte!liffence arganLntion, the Deparhnent of State Security, with au esiimS^u.
personnel strength of about LO.000, mauitJiLnj units thnougliout the cOuntrji- and
*ppircntly has be*n efftrctiirt in-infiltrating and exposing wuntei-revnlution,irv
groLips, Et works dowly with all the Othef security agencies and especially
ivith the huge Itid ubiquitouj OT^aniza-tion of ^loluntrrr inFi>rrnanrjthe Committees For the Defense of the Revolution. Throughout the country, in ruriit
area* Si weU as in Almost every city block these informants report to the l o n l
committee t h * results of spytflg on their neighbort, Committee membership if
claimed to be aJmKt a million and 4 half- Local committees dilbribvre food
rationing cards, hand out propaganda, and orpntze "voluntary" iyork
wmmitteci i t higher echelons assist the jeewity agencies In maintaining
of all ISpecta of private lift. Parallel informant roles are played by the L'niun
of Towig CominMnists. the Federation of Un iv-erjity 5tuaents, and the Frdifration of Cu.bn Wnmen,
30. The potice arganliatinnsthe Bureau of PutJic Order, the Technical Investigation Department, and (tie N'atioruil Identifieitiort DepartmTnta
ehafgFd with ordinary 1*# enrdrccment dvtiei: they have * t c t i l of ai least
I0?000 personnel, nearly haU in the Havana area. The Popular Defense Fora;
cOfflprises absut l00r000 dviljafl workers, men and ^vomen, who serve, part
time. They come primarily from the old. miittia icservc. Except in case of
emirrjeticy, their miasion is (JO help police and security fences maintain onier1.
31. The, Cuban foreign inteHigence aervice, the C*nal Directorate of [nlelligencc (TXrl), with * Jtafi af about 500, maintains Geld itations in every
county with, ^vhich Cuba has diobmattc reEations and. has representatives
distributed throughout Europe and Latin America. In tht Western
its mtssion is "erpOi't of the revolution" pfgniatibn ni revolutionary
11
33. In -Jitw of the tjctensiveness und fwrvistxeness -of; this security apparatus.
the chances appear verv small (hat under present circvnilacicfts papuiir d u j
niffTctJOn ^ i t h the jegtme- ^vill be transFormfd iotP an effective rffort I* bring
Jt dfl^vn. Cjscrai has demonstrated a remajkatle ability to pnrs*T-.e a worbaole
degree of unity JrtWnJ the disparate groups involved id the regime. H-c hlJ
twen tbh ta make the great buEfc of the po^vJatton acceptwithout active
Oippasitionthe. *OCiaJi(iori and regimentation. oF hh rr-a]uU0r1^4. The Abititv of the regime to suj*vive mayr of course, be lessened bv 3
major deterioration in the- btfJiX internal situation. Acrifinoflv and disajreemen-t
within the govrmmrnt. P^er such matters at Hit expert of revolution or the
advantages I n d disadvantages of rapprochement ^iLh the US. could lead to a
power struggle among rejinw leaders that would jerioujty weaken the- gonemment and reduce the -effectiveness oF t h * security organizations. AnoUief pqssibilitv which might ehangt the odds fqr survival watild be m.rtiwi'ei so oppressive
as to precipitate large-scale demanstratjonB, and! 10- gefLerally unpopular thai;
etemenU tn tha securitv Force) and military Forces ould refuse tc- intenitnc
or might even iide with die people, Ho^vevef, changes ai this nature- extensive
enough 10 urtdermina Cutro's power rKHLtign would be [iLely to tak* same years.
33. If CiJrjC were to die or be removed frocn the scene during the n*^t year
Of two, the immediate TpOdie of the tegime, including the. military, Tivould
probably be- * raHviflg together to tjy to bo-Id tKe popuLace in line and to defend
a"ain1t a. feared US intervention- There is, ho^vie\Tr, no Cuban On the scene
who appears to ha^e sufficient persona! power acid popular support to
13
p
f&r operations <i jraiftst LIU uterus And eicil-c landings,
transport a i i c n f i are being yswt in cOiiital patr-st
50
F i d d ArtilJEry u n d Antitank G u r u
L_JO>
Culi-
900
..
Sites
a
.21,500
^
Sit*J
'.
(TL*JI dJiou ? lb
Jet Fl^h
M[C-13 ( FARMER)
(FlSHfiEDJ
Bents. [SO
50-L SubdoMni . .
Torpedo Boate f Pf/F_)
$
3|
39. Mcsc of the increase \n Cuban miEilan? eapabUiciej avtr the past IS
mnnths has resumed riqm t!ve detivery of -additEanat Soviet ^'eipons and from
the acquuirion i f i*Teapon systemi formerly u.n^4r Soviet control. The SOT-W^
delivered taoty, patrol craftr MIG Gjhters, artd tame additions] 5AM
and nussiles since the 1962 missile crisis and have tUnifcrrrrf DD the
Cubans the cruige and surfjee-ta-air mrssiJiij tyjtfms. KOMAR cALULk bdatsr
1 Jrt Sghters. and ground fdrces weapani. inctudins FROC focti^tJ.
forS sr< we|]-c^u[ppcd to Wtfnbat inrcmaS resEslacic* j n d to repe3
siifltt of 4 L T * US [ntcrventian. bvt tick erperience in the use DF
of the newly acquired Soviet weapons. Although Cuban forces are e*'
perierjced Ln small tinit operations, they stiitE suffer from tacli of braining in
large-scale exercise* or in jnint operarioris necessary for more rEective]y QQjn*
bating mart time raids and! intemat insurgency, DtEc:enci in trinsportaLion
and logistical jupprjrt also hinder mLlitary readiness and operations.
40. In the e\-*nt of US invasion. Cuban plans evident]}- envdsjve a i t r t n ^
resiitiTicie at the poirit oF attick, fottowed by ,i defsnst of pre-selected
posittQnf and, finilLy, bv gucmUa warfare. Only a small proportion of
Cuban forces, however, would be lito:ly to cam- on prolonged guerrilla opcri(1- The Cuban Navy and Sir Force ;ire defrnsi^ly etfoipptd, trained, and
oriented, \either force his fnfct ch,nn a LEmited offensive capability: the Na
14
SECRET
: ^
*^
CUBA
SAM ir*
. .
XLO . I r
Biurrm^L
3IB
am...
for sample. Licks Undine craft. The ALT FQJCC. whiJe capable of p
jsOroe Support to guerrillas m " [ i p C<iribbeiin ,ire:L. tacl:r the :urhft
more 'turn a very smaJ!
43. The ^-onscjmtian km- u-ent [nta c-ffect in December 19S3. nnd the first
conscripts u-ere called up ,it the end of March,. The Law cecuir.es all Cu(wn
mates between [he ;L^S o 17 ;Ltid -15 to roister and most to participate Ln full
r part-time military service, and It extends Hie ,urtLve duty service from two
to three yean. 1 One effect of the dr&t'c is liitfLy to 1)6 Jin initial drop in the level
of (nin big and efficiency at the units to which the draftees am aisE^ncd. Over
time, the mast important military results; wi[[ be to establish A mucu toiler
trained reserve arul j iufpty selected [Wrsonnel tm opefacion and main ten unce
of the recently acquired nid^-anced
. A fee* an initia] increase Ln the size nf the active armed forces, discharges
probabiy keep the CNIOTI m i I iUry tlb[i4hrneeH dose -0 it* present strength.
And following the temporary drop in the levei of training and efficiency, training i|] prcbitbJy become -mune advanced, to include combmed Operat:MJ and
more rechnJcaJ initruction. Military organization may heca^ie somewhat more
standardized. Nonetheless, Cuban forces~n]] probably cantinue to dispby most
of the same Shortcomings and vulnerabilities that (Jiev ha^-e in (he past. Lack
of eorrtbat e^periertce add dependence on tJie USSR for advanced Crauning and
material support ivi]] continue to be tn-<i nf the mort serious.
The Sowitt MiliTory
44, The Soviets have continued to- ivithdraiv military personnel during J9S3and I9W aj they have gradually completed training of Cubsuis on various modem weapon systems and turned these systems over, ane after jnothcr, to Cuban
control. Soviet withdrawalj have been paralleled by ctslf-enrt to Cuba of a
variety of items of military equipment and supplies, primarily, it appears, for
the purpose of bringing Cubin twtdinjj in mine of the systems up to full
Jbrength- Tba 5AM system has been turned over to the Cubans, aftd they almost certainly have fuE[ dpcranrana3 candol. Thusr the Cubans almost certoinCy
hive the capafciiLEy to shoal down, a U - i 3
+5. There we aJrnost certainty no RussLan combat units still present gn the
island. Almost all of the Soviet pcrscmnrt who jnanncd the SAM and early
LTJUIET the nn Li^r, injtlucic<i TCCELT-C K ^ H peiGi per month inxtrid
e flH &J peso pay, Usu wiil prttuhly m u l l t i i divmg DF jbriKi' 9Q mdtiDn JHBOH per
Todmictma ctiuch n m d r f by the Cuban twjony will b aain*J. A bjgo and clwjp
Fflrtfl will he cccibed hit nicli jpbu oi jiddnj. in jupsr !hir,-L;. FiuLJy, Lhimj^Ei Te;iitntmn of QIE=[ idult3 r CiiCrO lt^a J ! I 1 W ^ m*thj(liWH to ^iJ in
l
(h* pOfitlluOB.
*Xhie SA-i surf ace-1* nil muddr ij - itnn hjJ in riluintud nia.tiniam p
about Js rnuCirj] rtlil aild 1 maumum elfwijie jltitlrfe tapibi)ii>' oF itU!
17
By the end of 1904. Ctinununisi ertKlomic usiiuciee Esr^niiLTUftf tn Cuba IWLI[ jmotitiT
to ffima $650 milJl4Q. T t m t ciptTKlitijrci hart b t i apfiTOxiirutECv ox F-j||i>v*: L98 L330
JuiiliOS; 1262S33a miliarj; l^flOabout SJ50 mdliw
\ ' < ^ auili^l in
10 be at Itaut S500
SMlff
viet prestige is cnrnmittet: in the t-ire uf iictli t;-.e US asd Cniu.nEst CIi;n.L.
For, de>p>ite ?JJ their1 difficulties widi him, Cuba tinder Ciistru rep^^t* iliw
best vEctarv for llx Soviet ;jmD iTi (li^ ^st several i-cars ;ind r.rieir' (u^r bie-ikthrough in the Western Hemisphere.
ap-rf?r
matter, if lie obtains ra satisfaction from the US- it Jiis ompaiijn does not
succeed, there ia considerable danger that, u a last rewrt, he would order a
ttioptdown, calculating that the U5 ^OTJ]<3 not refiEiat-e in force or that, if it
did. the f eiuJtkng hue and rry would bricig overflights Co 4ti end- In the interim,
there will he a possibility oi an impulsive reaction by Castro, There is aim
the chance of an unauthorised shontdDwn. but in view oE the [apor&io'rt to
Castro of thts mltler, the d # n c of su.cn an action s^em (o us to bV small.
Toward tha US
57. KJwishchev, In supporting Cuba's position on ovprfhghrs. may igain have
urf*ed CasCrO to explore the possibilities fw a noa-m*LLiatiDai of relations ^vith
the US, Castro probah3y cotitidws such an effort useful -to build a record of
Cuban reasonableness ind ftfiKibilirj- in preparation For Cuba1* appeal to the
UN. In my case, \v be-licvr (ii*t Castro has A serious interest in impTfl^n;;
reTariortt with tile V. Ths U5 -economic -deruat prrjgram has hurt Cuba and
TVII! corttinue to do so, Moreover, *j partial reirOluttGnE Fail to rmaterialurfr in
Latin America, he ii increasingtv forced to give up the notion that relations
with tNe US ire a short-term prablnn dKtined to be rwpL away by tha tide
of Iwmisphefic revolution. Furthermore, th* 3on*ef a US-Soviet atmosphefe cf
detent* persists, the- more hs must eonrn himself with 4 possible Lack of support
frftm his pibron in A crisis.
SS. Hii interest ifl stabiJizin^ reiaU-nnJ with the US wars with elements in
Castrohj bempeftttient, with hla strong revoEutionary bent, and w^th his recumrtg
cOilvictiDUi that th* US price for rrOfmaJijJtion v^oyld be TiOtninj [tt% than his
own dilappeannce- Ha cltwly coniiders US acceptance of his regime to be
a Inog-rangc uid chancy prospect to which be cannot commit his polifles.
Neverrlueless, he has made various overtures tx7W*rd. t i e US from time to time,
We expect future efforts, perhaps including SOJTbB moderation of his conduct,
intended Do (often US resistance M * rapproctwment. Wp think there it virtually
no chance, howEvet, that he wtfl accede *t any varly dile to the cortditiflns which
the US has stated.12
Latin American Policies
59. Castro ts first o all a revotiidonary tnd has expended much energy and
effort encouraging violent revolution elsewhere.3* He bas provided asiistaftce.
tu an assortment of Communist tnd Dun-Commufist reroWaionariES, Frimarily
this has taken it* focm -oi prarjasjadda, limited rinandal aid, political iodocbiDatioa, and training in fMbvenive tecbxuqves and guerrilla warfan, (In 1S63
" OD * J d f L9S4 * St*tt Deputmedt fpdkmuaiv reiunted die loagftflndiii US p
Chat tiwi* *r* tvra rltrncnti in (be- Cuban iinaitiim whlrfi rt list ncptabkr "Cirtm'i tiff
orf dffpiDOeocj- wtfli tfce USSB whJcb. art tantajoouaf ra Ja44t 4nmmiD4[i flrf the crjime *nd
(he- HBEiiintfCt of CaHKl1! pnwwHiia ef pdrvertbon ebawlvera iiL Uw aeEnisph^rt."
11
Fw 4 detailed, Wltutiy.by-r^uiitr' aSmatt fll Cfttmnunitt Uid CartrOdlt f teengjcfas,
najfl h ami eppgrtnnitiEi, tt* NIE Bu/90-44, ""CaoumnuH Poterutution ID Latui
ll
for TJElB fiOOlidentiAn In Anpirt 1SS4, Sfflrt.
SH0R
^-100 Latin Americas tripled to C-j]jn: several hundred cf the^n probablv
ived training In terrors and g.T;fi^rs:Ea m-Sthods while there.) Tine Castro
j
has und^rtakcri cli/sct supply or JOcne arms to extremist groups {eg ,
the Cttfaan arms cache discovered [n Veft*zutLi last November) but prefers to
p w i d e funds fof the purcLuise- of weapons [YQCTL other sources.
0, Although these effort h:me helped strengthen extreme Leftist
in J number of Latin .American countries, there have brtm na
y
revolutions and, erc+pt Ln Venezuela and Guatemala, viay little violent revolutionary activity. Fndscd. Castro mvtt view develo-pTflents avtr the past y&n
i!i duappQ-intinff. In VcnezucL.T_ lodg the pfto-ritv- target in Casira's revolutionarv
pLans. the Communist andi Caitroist graups failed dismally in their terrorist
attempts to disrupt the DecwnbrT election acid prevent an orderly suctessinn
of government, In Panam.-i, the ctimjte cA opinion which Citrie Lnta being with
the rtti-US riats irt januin- swmed t& oficr A special opportuniti.- fat aggressive
violent action, by the CiStjoists J gainst 3 ^-ulnerablc, olig-Lrchic rejuae, Havana
imm.*dLabelv ujgecE this court*, but (he Castrois-is in Pan*cfta preferred to givij
priority tfl tactics aimed at gradually increasing their influcrtce within the
established political system. In Bnri!h the removal of Coulart in April dimtned
tht prospects of the extreme- LeFt foe escrtinj and rjpandin; political EnSuciice;
the CisteJlo Branco soMemmWthis broken reLations with Cuba, leftiits have
brtii rrrnOvied Erom. Emportant Eritllian ^ovijrtimenc jobs, and the variaus lotat
Communists und CaiCroist group* are in disarray. In aurrt, Castro'j revalutionaiv
linp*i have suffeced notable setbacks during the pist yeai, some of them
*ccurrulg despite circum5tinces which h apparent ly tnaught ptopttitjus for
i
SI, These development! have ska Leaded to stiffen th* anti-CjstrO position
of most of the fticmber ganemmtnts of the Organization nt American States.
The OAS arfoptijon on 26 Jjuly of diplomatic, trade, and shipping utictkins againit
Cuba is primary iniportant in its psydiu-log,tt7a I ;adrer thjn LLJ economic iiapactr
But Cutro obnoojsly feeJs that Cuba's political isolitiofl in tfic henusphcre is
rfg^g
to his cause; he will try to impede impEerruentatiOn ai the sanctions as
aj other actions which u.-rjuld reinfnTicc this isoLation.
fi, We believe that Ctstro and his nevoiutionarv theorist. Che Cuevjj-i, have
become somewhat [eil Ean-gqHAC about their diances1 fcjr o^uick rtvfltutionary
In their spereheS and piopiganda on the subject, thev will probably
bot or cold at various times 33 they have irt the p u t . " but they almost
certainly will continue ta aid and &-ain porentiat revqlutioTiaries. They
may prtw for early aggrcss?v action on the part af CJifroist groups in. some
Latin American countries, even though the immediate c^anon of these groups
seem powi here, their primary hope would be that the jovemmenr/s ccujnteraJitaganLie larjef segments of the population., eventually producing
" In a nujm ipeecfc ca 3 July 1964. Cwtro one* apin dclivcfea a gmtttl ipped
[FvofutiDa in- Latin America, aiding 1 Ee1*- -nfWdl D enMmj-gHiier.t for "ftc hflu;
(i5Dariei~ af Vitzturli ind (hrt
2\
S^?ET
22
%mRE\
ftnr and
9(W of
0* p
m t i u 4indtr tid_[>frHatoWn P*t
Ifcr ihajnfcrmotinft n u VH gJ.i}ieV*3prtnr
p=i*rti
tfpa t e m He ad a pti? r p
AriTE-CrUVEHMlEHT ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA
Guerrilla activity in Bol i v i a ^ Santa Cms &&partm*nt
and unrest aaang tin miners continue to plague President
t h e ared f o r c * s ftave
Over tti* c o u n t e r i n s u r ^ a n e y frffort in the troubled San Ignaci
Sin Simon reeirjn of Santa Cruz
Department from tne national
polices Police units failed to
wipe out the guerrillas in
Augusti encountered t*o
and created additional antigovernient fietltinent by pillaging.
Army eojmanders ar* optimistic
about crushing the <ltggidentsh
but the efficiency and coupetent
leadership of tha eurrilla
sugE#Bt the campaign may b# a
long one.
subversive- groups re also operating
in other
"and personnel in
bean threatened by
claiming: 10 be FSB
flue
Antlgovernment
tions and violence erupted la
the mine areas Last irtefc lq protent against th# beatttiff of Lacliiri by Pai1 political police.
Communist and Falangist pine
leader^ again caLltd for
inaurrectinfij and deaaqded
a popular government beaded by"
Lech i n , SOPO 2,500
turned out for an
f
daaonfitration in La Fix on 13
Augusttbe largest niuuber oppos i t i o n leaders have been able to
muster for sojne
i s also having bin
troubles witJiiFt trie party
go ve mtoe n t , Pro-Pa x forces won
by only a very narrow margin ia
the 4 August election of; o f f i cers for Congress against a s u r prising degree of united opposition.
Party leaderst opposed to
a break with Cuba t banaged to
PK into a difficult
regarding tin ing of the
formal announcement, Paz1 inplication in the Leebin beating
and the attempted assassination
of Vice President Birrientos on
14 Augustthe fifth attempt
within a year--has created: public ressntnent against POE and
other {orernnent offietalE. BarTient&a feels tttat unless tbe
lawlessness is quickly stopped,
i t could gfrofl^ into a serious
situation.
Page
1
BOLIVIAN GOVERJfJiENT IMPOSES STRICT COHTROLS OVER OPPOSITION
The 'HplotM to overthrow
Victor Piz Egtenss
weekend appears to hive
been fabricated by the
nant i s an excuse to cracK
on the opposition 4nd
law and order under a st^te of
*isgs*
25 Sept 4
INTEL
Circtmstancas
the reported atteant to agasslaatfl Vice President Sarrlentoe On
20 Sept*sb*rthe seventh t r y in
a jearare unclear.
It say
be part of t cappaiEU designed to
drive hiai qvt of the countrr^cr.
Barrientos nay himself buve> aliged the
bombing to twister bis public
iipaffe and s/tren^tJi^ Many people
nonetheless bltne the govern
crettnff gtc/wia^ resentaeat
against P K . flarrlsntoa has
steadily gained povtr ltd
g
since the elections, and is cur-*
rently engaged with Pax ta a
struggle for control of peasants
iq La Pax Department Pe% has
nad ropaated attempts to reaov*
Barrieatos Iro& the political
cen by fiff*rimf him foreign
diplomatic posts, bwt so far he
has refused.
It &*** onXy *
matter of^ipe before a
WISELY SUMMARY
Page
21
Hemisphere
B0LT7IAN DEUOHSTRATlOlfS HOST SERIOUS TV- FOTJTtTEES TEAHS
The v i o l e n t antigovErnise
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s that have e r u p t e d
ID every major c i t y in Bolivia
since 21 October represent the
t t challenge to political
Utr in tlw fourte*n-year
rul* of the Nationalist Revolutionary itov*meiit Clftt)
Both r i g h t i s t and l e f t i s t
opposition parties re behind
the outbreaks, but they have
used thedr followers in the universities and second a ry schools
to spearhead t n e i r demonstrations. At the outset the prisary grievance uaa press cefleorship ipposed by th sovtrniiftQt
under a atat*-of-attffe declaration iaaued en 20 September,
However, the ^mpaasiq b
to protests against th*
eot'a repreg*lv# measures: which
have cmifltd *V*T*1 deaths. The
govErfintent has granted sqe concessions to th* students,, including the revocation of censoruhlp, but enough uomentun hid
already been gathered tv turn
the tfepongtrations into derandg
that President PIE relinquish
control ot the government,
Is apparently determined to stand his ground
d
30 Oct 64
Pig*
L8
7
Western HealsphereTUHMOIL IN BOLIVIA
The military Leaders who
President Pii ste.nasoro an 4 Uovembar nave H O T yet
formed a government although
radiobroadcasts continually refer to i military junta, Genera L Alfredo Ov&ndo Candid, the
codMande-r in chief of the Bolivian ar*ed forc#t, supposedly
neida tha "Junta.1* General Hugo
Su.ii1*>! Guzaan the commanding
general of tha a m y , his announced that he will be a member
of the junta, but his status is
unclearH
Vice President Barrtentos,
the- hey fijfura in the flutter of
Paa, was scheduled to confer with
Ovando ao 9 Hovftdber repardipg
the jfom of government to b eatablij
Pn Eitcnnn
Kov 6 4
CURRENT IKTEL
KDV
G4
REVIEW
30
Western
BOLIVIAN JUHTA STILL Iff
flour u i l l
unions
/proved for"-'-
"."J
13 Nov
20
Western Hemisphere
BOLIVIAN JUHTA MOVES TO ffIN PUBLIC SUPPOflT
at the> Bolivian
junta were busy- this week bringing order to their chaotic ministries and junta president
Qentral HeDe Barrientos traveled
outside La P*s in search of papular support*
Leebin and t h e C
appear to Lav* th J,unp on other
p a r t i e s aa they a l l vifl f o r c o n t r o l Of peasant and labor
izBtlans XP. and around La
that wore foraarly- undr thacontrol of Pax Esteussora* 1
fB
CUHREKT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
17
ituJnn.Lt,
Shu*
D.
Ttiij
( th*
itartid to itEM Pit .QI hit
m i * n *pin fliih
Th[i kCni of fiini[fen tnd
A*Hy totmtr tlia Ku.HL.Ei tpj the
[.:
M*
cluht, ^ 4 Stlwr
, until
tiiSfpjQF^^
H rtU
,i
>-i-
MinnM
| r
FhfcmlH-dhi a-#*ra
rialaiuJ
Eli*
^
,
GirUVuL FoLiilbd, utiQrfi ifw DT5*d(iid Iff P I E la l J . i l j v g <
t u t 1 fcmc^qni n t J nj [|u h.xt,ppnr lfcli C-3ntT?L
1
Chi b
Jp*Tiiib, C i v i l U*F F vlw m i ^ b i t * 1B
t n l r , * i U, EIW VfSx, PEOB ]W? t * 1J1+, I M h+d [r,
^itl
iuiH A I ElM 4pi* u m Lb
-i
" "r
'
- ,/.-:;
"
t : -:-.^
.:<
n n tn tni[.ib ah*
pd
h.*J
V-:
be
"'. V H ^ ( I
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1398.
Hemisphere
POLITICKING IN BOLIVIA
e ID anticipation
of *lctlou at eone future <tate
fs now in full swing1 in Bolivia,
Junta president a* r r i en t os
self, tfeapitfr his public
cl&iner on ig Mavemb#r of presidential Ambitions, is acting1
like a candidate. He continues
to stump the countryside drumming up popular support, and he
is making efforts to crear* hi*
own political organization.
i SpeicLjlatlon that
BirricctQ3 will resign from the
junta just before the elections
atid riiD for president iKli thesupport of the Bolivian Sociali s t FBlanpe (FSB) and several
minor r i g h t i s t parties. He
also rumored see It In? in
*ttb the Left.
64
Page 17
'Ui-rci Sjtdl.vldluflJ.n
j>d tre n r y pawr Ihunet-j- Bi*J *rt Cftr tha n4tt part Antlmni KrAlli like t * t u ^ c n t * iritis tho IB,, tTot*Kiy wllji Ihrj
l*t*iYlJvi WE J3Dd JufQ lJcJii.ii DmijmrlD'a frcirp, FHlM, i*
Dltbmiflji the airr *HKrtirJl*d th*ij? jreltYiticH
frtiL
fh* iej't vr*Tfl4inH th* H!H*lvtlort #* restfli^tHio", AA Bit
3.
CM
(K4
lieli or rtu-t
5 All trvn. U
ppt*=ntljf h u
Uic pcLLticil prcupu i n
(1 c t i l l *iH/iht of
A-a
i
1
fi-T**"
XZt
TT
lti
p
^
In *.IL-3 Altipliwa icutfi of
Hi* priKijt Iii^h Qjitii^/ v r l t * >rta PiiMtfil Xn 4
l L h t
l
Ul
tH H
U run
^ ^ V V
firm in ttiia fic-ii
6,
h / i f .H..T-H .Tr
Hemisphere
BOLIVIAN JUNTA LEADER PREPARES
TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT
Junta President
Hen* Harrientos, during one of
his weekly t?*p3 to the- provinces, declared that ha would
M
cc<nsenlhh to be a. coKpronise
presidential candidate ID the
elections scheduled for 30 Hay,
15 Jan 65
CURREWT
Cerira.L Barrientos
to b growing acre t?alfuaured
and seeas confident that he can
flonp*te tmcceaaftilly with the
professional nollticiani* + Apparent Ljr he ia workinf we LI ith
the coaaander of the
forces, general
~E WEEKLY
Page 16
Barrientos i s
minad. ta stay on as president
of the BoHvlan Junta in spit*
pi his presidential candidacy
in tie national a u c t i o n s now
Sch*duLed for 2fi Sept saber, Bar
rientos feirB that should ha
i*esiefl from in* junta, hla prob
able successor, commander of
the armed forces General Ovando
wouLd annul, the elections and
a a i l i t a r y dictatorship.
Barr1ent oe' r * sLgnat ion
was requested in a cabinet oeet
ing Last ponth, protiblr on th*
basis of a constitutional requireaent that candidatea tor
eiectii^d resign ttaa public office L80 days before the #Lecti date. It is likely t h u
tnis Legal issue nasked th.*
feellnp ol certain offic*r tb*
the nilltarT shdtiLd stay out of
politics. Barrientoa refused
to resign, and nia stand ha*
sine* been lvi3 a legal and
public blessiDE in a press a r ticle bya prominent
tlt
tivnal l
Tb roLationsbip
add Oenartl Ovando
rbains cordial an the surrace
On tho other hand both m*a are
aabltl4M4 for tho presidency,
and th*lr cooperation Is baaed
mainly on th* reep*ct of each
for th* Ather'9 assets, nawly
popul^ritv with
population and
standing vLtd tbe arowd farces
as a reapsctftd co^aander,
Division within ttfl armed
forces over the two Lea4>r4
do*s not ertst ta yet, bat there
ia U t t l * dcubt that oplnloo
groups have developed ov** certain ieffti&e. In sQn*T*lt the
debate ia over the role of the
arsed forces in tbe l i f e of tbe
nation. Ovtodo la believed to
be aiDlu'g at a condition there
the alLitary viLL be the final
arbiter in Bolivlaa affairs.
A Barrlentos gortrnseDt would
probably depend nor* upon c i v i l ians in the deci9ion-flaking
process.
With reR*fd to th* p o l i t i cal partita, Barrtentos a t i l l l a tends to seek allgnfliit with
tbe left-center forces* Hi h i i
broken itfi the riffbtlst Bolivian
SociaLldt Falany* <JFEB)
L2 Feb
Page
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
GROWING FOH BOLIYIAJS JUNTA CHIEF'S RESIGNATION
i s increasing pres,
sure on General Barrientas to
r<Jrn the junta ht now
heads by 26 Birch Li rie intends
co r.eain a candidate far th*
^Jfcf?,;.i-^1- *>
Mar
IMTELLIOENCE WEEJO.Y
26 liar
sm
P*BO
22
Kepisphere
DIFFICULTIES OF BOLIVIA
The difficulties of General
H
Barrientos 1 military government are intensifying a time
parses nd HO solutions are found
for Bolivia's acuts political
and economic problems. KoreOVer , Barri*ntos ' uncertain
leadership givs no assurance
that prospects for stability
Till soon improve.
Barrientos' aabition to
as a popularly elected president
has been an important factor
behind his government's insecurity
Although well lilted by
most Bolivians, tie has been unable to secure much support for
his candidacy froa the political
parti.es. Korov*r, he Is unwilling to pitf* up the junta
presidency despite legalities
n^ candidates to resign
public olfice ISO days before elections* As a result
tjt this impafiS]*, BsrrientO'S ^ith.
drew his candidacy on 30 April
but then naved Last week to
postpone indefinitely tne presidential
elections scheduled
lor 31 Oct&ber. Barrientos
probably engineered the poetpon*dent to gain time to consi
another strategy by which he
Plight becone a constitutional
president, Tbls latest B O V
has brought him under renewed
critlci^B froia most politictl
parties, but his general popularity seems unaffected.
s economic problftas
are closely tied to the political, situation. Vben the junta
first took power last Novembert
it characterized itself as an
interim government and promised
Page
MILITARY
refoTHE a^
well i s a quick return to cons t i t u t i o n a l government. However h i t snon discovered that
i t Lacked the competent;* to
cope effectively with complex
economic problem*,
The most pressing of tbe?er
inherited from the Faz regime,
is the uply situation prevailing in Bolivia's v i t a l tioBininj industry. The tin-atining
areas are c*ntis of extrea*
l e f t i s t and Cop-mnlat influence
which have v-ot been controlled
by any gtivftrnmsQt since 1952.
COHIBOL. the state
corporatioiij i s burdened
with managerial irresponsibility
as well as unruly labor, and
i s cla^a to bankruptcy.
Internationa 1 deficit
financing has been obtained,
but further assistance is predicated on a wide-ranging reform
of present nine labor practices
whicb inordinately; favor the
miners at the expense of efficient production. All attempted reforms have teen strongly
resisted by the miners acting
under their extremist leadership*
Barrlentos is aware that
the miners can be brought under
control only by Military action,
Ha has. indicated Chat his government Is willing to undertake
such an operation, but is Moving
with deliberation because he 1&
also aware that the miners; will
probably put up a stubborn de>fens*. The Miners are armed,
they are fierce fighters, and
they are jjnder determined leadership.
14 May
A turbulent week ia E
opened with a drive by the government to assert itg authority over
the
Cdmnnnist-dominated1
t i n miners
acid soded with Junta chief Barrientos acting to save his regime from.
threats posed by the personal ambitions of hlg principal r*vaLr
armed forces commander Genera l
Ovando,
The military campaign got off
to a food1 s t a r t on Monday,
Before
the day was 5>v*r, miner resistance
had heeh reduced to a number of1
strc-ngholds. Desperate mine labor
leaders attenpted to avert m i l i tary accupjtiort of the Bines and
preserve their personal power by
asking the spripathetJLe student
organization to obtain a truce.
General Crvandodfor reasons nat yet
clear, u n i l a t e r a l l y concluded1 an
a(Te*nent which provided both for
a cease-fire and an end1 t o the
LnersV strike. The agreement
coat the government the i n i t i a t i v e
in that i t also provided t h a t , by
29 Kay, government forces would be
withdrawn from the mi nee they had
occ-upied . Sporadic s t r e e t fighting, however, continued in La Pas
as late as Thursday,
may have l o a t b i g
Skillful political
Ing by Barrlentos averted a coup
attfnpt this week. Be arranged
the appointment of Ovancfo as junti
co-p^esldeot and then had himself
appointed c<?-commander of the armed
forces, Qla a,ip Is t o neutralise
Ovandg by bind log1 him HOre closely
to the ^overoment and forclag him
t a share authority over the military.
The reconciliation is hypoc r i t i c a l and probably lapermanect
but ha? eased tensions is military
and c i v i l i a n sectors T A final
showdovn eeeas iDevitabl# T however,
and may only have freeo postponed
for a short time.
otrv*
_ It is more
probable, hoirever h that he acted1
to underlain* Barrlentos and thus
his own ambitionaT A d t victory over the unruly
N wto for years have been
the cope of Bolivia "a economic
*od poLlti^al problems, would
have jrentLy enhanced Barrientos '
power
art*s.
Paffe
WEEKLY 5UHMAR
May
AGiNCT
CENTlJU
-^"^
INFO.
15 Xl^J
r 7 T T 3 3 OF THS
Ef LATH
OlA
>RMV/4CSJ
NAVY
AJR
SECQH
KSJ,
CXA/taffiC
HIE
IAIA
FBI
OHf
OCR
Mt
PAGE :
JDIS5EHJ
OF
..
15
JU3JECT:
1963
1.
In a lengthy statement released on 15 September
cor J. Vfillijui Jfulbrigtit developed primarily two majathenes concerning the role of the US in the Dominican
rebellion:
a.
The US intervened for the purpose ol the
preventing: victory by a revolutionary forte judged to be
cowBitinist doainateO- 3a said that "There is no doubt tjac
::ie Ji'saL of ionaiLifiisjii rather than danger to American lives
vas Liia (Ajabassaeor Bennett 1 s) prinary or sole reason for
rec&Eiiaending .aiiitary action,
b. At no time did the
cosiawniBts control tiie rebellion prior to the lanoiQg of
UZ ^fti-ines,
'i'lieir participation was to have been expected.
IVe analyze below' these two themes and include as annexes
s on subsidiary points made by the Senator.
2.
Our analysis o; the f i r s t theme shows that'jby
1 2S Santo Domingo \\s,a in a s t a t e of anarchy.
It is
true that o f i i c i a l s of the Embassy in Santo Eoningo as well
as government officials in flashing-ton were concerned, with
growing Communist influence In the Dominican Republic and
the^ alnost immediate rale that some communist a c t i v i s t s
too--: a= e^rly as \;he second day of the r e v o l t .
However,
the trigger ^vhich sent U3 troops ashore was the raortal
threat to the lives of Americans and many other nationals
in a city where law and order had collapsed.
Unruly groups
hati entered the Hatal Embajador on two occasions, once i^L
search of an American citizen; and had fired indiscrirainateljinto rootus tiad corziiors. The premises of several embassies
were iuv&det, and the British vice consul reported to the
U ambassador on the afternoon of BS April that the downtown
slttia-iion was "horrible" and thai nobs of S00-3OG were
saclcins hones in the residential area of Arroyo Hondo where
saany rtiiiei-leans Hveci.
APPROVED POtRRElEtfZ
* SEP
3.
The collapse of the local police forces was almost
complete by April 25, Police Chief Uespradel told the
American public Safety Adviser on that day that his men
were not trained to fight against th& heavy weapons being
used by the r&bals. Some police were in hiding, some were
hiding tn.ej_r uniforms and mixing with the mobs, some were
already the victims of a t r o c i t i e s .
4, By the la.te afternoon of April 2U as Ambassador
Bennett talked to "Jashington shots could toe heard against
the Embassy building r
I t was in this context of anarchy
that the junta leader Colonel BsnOit informed the US
ambassador that tie could no longer guarantee the safety of
foreign nationals. The following day the Papal KunciOj who
had been most active in trying to convince both sides to
lay down their arias, described the marines as
f
i
1h
a humanitarian purpose in protecting lives.
5. Senator rultrright 's second theme develops the
point that at no tine did the cOKraUtiisfs control the rebellion
prior to the landing oi US marines. Our view i s that taken
by i t s e l f t h i s statement i s correct.
The point i s , however,
that by the evening at April 27 the moderate FBE leaders
ot the rebellion, hitherto in shaky control at the aoveuenti
l o s t their nerve ano began abandoning cLieir posts* The
Molina Urena government f e l l and many of ins principal
figures went into asylum. One of '^iia jsost prorainent of
these, Jose ?Stia Gorues; acjinittfld that die coni^unists who
joined the robfll force had in*ilti-(:ev into positions of
inuortance anti that i t TW*IS very aifL J icjlt \o stop theTn.
For his part d woin.n^ Jr^nn Js rsportac to have said on
Jlay 3 tEiat be; wanted to .jet the tru^ii of comnunist infiltr&itio
of the rebellion across to ihe \?&z-lt but thac he cuuld not
ace 'urt^ier jeopardising i*,is own ant! his f sraily' s
b
(See Tab B, idaQorntitjUKi, l1J?iie
by doin so.
hI
in ihe "^Onirtican 3evolt , 7 liay
3. There was then no one in ef:active leadership.
It Is perhaps siyrnificant that the French arn.tassacJor in
Santo Uonin^o describee events there iras following the
c l a s s i c comrauniat oattei'ii," Ho concludes "ha.t his British,
Tab At
Tab 3 :
Tab C:
Tab It:
CENTRAL
A0EHCY
DAtEOF
3 KAY 1965
3WKJ.
5UUECT
ABOUT THE SITUATION Itf TSE
AMD ITS DELATION TO CUBA
PUCE 4
DATE
1+
OK 6
1965
J\.
B.
COASTS.
I S VERY EABGEHCUS TOR CUBA BECAUSE AN ATTACX ACiClST CJHA CCJLlr RESULT WITHOUT THE UXITED STATES ASSUMING SOLS RSPOSEIBELirJ" YOU I T .
T i l * BUi-hrlkl
1 * . UJI.E
JECRCT
CIA/NMCC
APPROVEDF0RELEASE i
nl vfefcfc. 1M KIT
*" u M
SECRET
D,
CRISISt
CQUNTEIES.
^ ^ _ _ ^
COliHENT:
2.
MmSGEU:
OF HESBLACE
'SECRET
CENTRAL
IKTELLEGENCE
AGENCY
M a n d a t o r y R-:-v^
Casa P NL J_3
PATE OF
a MAY 19&S
JWO.
OOOHSBH:
# 4 -
Pont
19&5
62705
REFOET NCX
1*
^ H B
COMMENT:
COMJECTURE OVER
PRESS
t w t i h t Eafarmulen
DIA
AEMTTUC5I
ALVCI~2
HAVT
.CIA/HM^C
.ID/RR
IHJt NIC
1 , AD/S[ 2
U
N
L
O
A
D
E
D
, H | ^ H M B H H H I
THE U
N
f
T
E
D
STATES WAS UNAWARE OF WHAT EQUIPMENT THE CUBAN ARMY AGAJN HAS-)
COMMENT:
5,
MO DOU&T"THE ABOVE
WITH
END OF MESSAGE
SHOULD BE VIEWED
LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory S e ^
NLJ J ^
1G July
SUBJECT:
T SEP
JW6
4. T-ie ?olics Post at the Palace of Justice in
towi Santo PoniugQ was overrun by Communist-led rebels at
about 10;30 am LET on the 2Gth and the rebels obtainedmore
arms ana police uniforms* The American Embassy ^ H V s V
^ I ^ H I during Host of the day had little first-hand
information as to what was goine on n the do\mtown areast
but did receive numerous reports of killings. Sporadic
sniping was uccierway in the residential areas where most
of "the American colony lived. Also, there was growing
pervou5i)ess n the diplomatic corps since the promises of
n:ore than one embassy were invaded by armed taobs. These
induced the embassies of itexico, Guatemalat Peru, Ecuadorh
ano 31 Salvador, The nobs were under no control during
rouen of the day and looting- and sacking took place in many
parts of the city, Soiae of the mob actionst however, were
inspired by the rebel-controlled radio stationH Hadio
broaocELsters &ave the aedresses of homes of air foresofficers and otheTraili-taryofficers vho were on the loyalist
side and incite*7 t;ie nobs to sack tlis houses. The is/ives and
chilcr&n of loyalist officers were seized and taken to the
Euarte Bridge and e-tiler targets o* loyalist military action.
5. Th*re were a number of reports reaching the
on the 2th Ji reb&l atrocities. Although these have not
een confirmed j.n detail they undoubtedly reflect an accurate
general picture, A USIS Staff member reported, on 2S April,
for instance, that twelve policemen or soldiers had been
seen bein& summarily shotH The victins had been marched
along; the street, with the mobs crying "pirdon," Then
they wore linec up against a wall and executed+ The
Colonel Calderonr who served under Juan Bosch as chief of
the presidential guard, also met his death under these
circumstances.
6.
LSJ LIBRARY
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
1965
2& APRIL
J h ARREST OF MILITARY PERSC*J4EL IW O3MS0LACIDH DEL SUR
3 , RPOftTED WJLLIKflNESS OF REBEL ARMY OFFICERS TO KELP
IN SANTO CCMIN&Q
PLAC
PATE ACQ.
IN 57073
5QUKC1
AND
APPSIAI5AL
!>
H M H ^ H v - ^ M
1-Stc)
TblT ^QAilfriAl CDDCAJCS LSjzrSB^IkS iff^-i'rp tlffl ^3^1w|i.J JJ^fc^fC i)i t^f "UtadlCd SlatC4 V^^^ft "the T^ujnmp Qf tbt
I jijit TliJtf l l h L7rC i s a , 753 u d 75^. >** irmtminMii oc prvriaLJ^o of ^hfrti nr #ny nrtn-npy u an
by lawT-
OIA
AWFACH
A&/CI 3
NAVY
Wt
JCS
CIA/W1CC
SCDCf
NSA
ME
Ffl!
UHA o a
1NS
ONE o a
TREASURY
EXO
IN 57073
GECRCT
TO GIVE HELP TO SANTO DOMINGO, IF ASKED.
DtSSW:
COMKWESTFOR, CINCSO,
flTJO OF MESSAGE
3TATEMEJ7T - FACT
Statement ! Senator Fulhright nns said that i t is entirely possible, if not likely, tbat if the military xs allowed
to retain its power i t will overthrow any future government
that displeases i t " and at the saae tise said that the military
"must be substantially reduced In size and sons of tne more
irresponsible generals pensioned ofi or sent on lengthy diplomatic holidays abroad".
Fact; Military reform was one of the aajor object!vas ol
the Seld government and Hector Garcia Godoy tins consistently
stated tbat he feels railitary reforms must be initiated under
his retritte. The US country team has recoinmendetf that v/e press
Garcia Godoy "energetically to initiate feasible reductions
and reforms". Garcia Godoy has already taltan the major step
of removing General TJessin iroai command because o insubordination, thus asserting civilian supremacy over the military,
The 3eld regiiae tool: some very important stops to eliminate
corruption in the military and General insert exiled ei^ht top
r u l i n g officers who ^/ers anons the aost venal. Garcia Godoy
S s endorsed this lattor action and has prohibited the reentry
of these officers into the uominican Republic.
At t h e saao time both Garcia Godoy and t h e U"
y
team are c a r i o u s of the fact that military reform SbflU Jjt
be pusbed too rapidly for two major reasons. First the nfl-^
cutback in military sti**ftsth votild severely sha^e the AraeU
Forces confidence in the net? re-tEe. In this connection It
be noted that the Dominican nilitfiry leadership is
an awareness of the need Jor ohanSe and is reportedly
on plans for roforra. Second, the new regime needs a
corapetent military force that will be prepared to combat the
ejected ipsargent activities of the e^trenists wLO have used
thl revolution to eqaip and train themselves for p i c m U *
warfare
?or these reasons the country team has recommended
a gradual cutbac!: in tne military to about 60% of their pre^
crisis strength.
APPZQVEb FOff
19D1
2.
Senator Fulbright said the U3 acted: "unil a t e r a l l y and i l l e g a l l y " and the OAE acted "after the fact"
Senator Fulbright further said that intervention should not
liave been undertaken "without the advance consent of out Latin
American a l l i e s . "
Tact: The dangerous situation cave loped i& the
He-public so quickly that thsre was l i t t l e time to obtain the
support of I^tin nations before taking action.
On 2G April
i t rapidly became- clear that the lives and property of U3 and
other foreign nationals in the Dominican Republic Were in
danger. The incident on the morning of. 27 April at the Hotel
dor demonstrated that US lives could have been lost at
moiaent. That none tfere i s oply a tribute to the spa ad
v/itli viiich US .Marines could ranch the embattled TJ3 citizens.
I t has frequently been noted by students of the O&E that ooe
o$ the organisations najor l i a b i l i t i e s is the slovr pace with
whicii i t "-^OrilS. Ambassadors niist be convened; receive an
i n i t i a l request or action; consult their governments, deliver
long speeches outlining the positions of their home countries,
and1 then finally act.
I t is highly improbable, given this
scenario, that the CAii v/ould have been able to act on 3 Aprijt
President Johnson did f in iaat, nanage to consult with most
Latin American Ambassadors that night and explain why v/e f e l t
i t necessary to tai:e action so quickly* I t should be noted,
in t h i s contort, that a l l n^jor steps taken since then have
been done as CAZ actions. This includes the establishment o:?
tSte intGr-Auerican ?e[ice Force, the extension of economic
5id to pay U:e salaries of public eaploye-es during tho revolution, anc the lon^ t arduous negotiations that recently culninatsd ir: the i n s t a l l a t i o n or the Ejector Garcia Godoy s
FACT
See Tab A
/nc.o
IS October
No. 3533/65
Copy-No,
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
No. 2333/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
D i r e c t o r a t e of I n t e l l i g e n c e
IS October 1955
INTELLIGENCE
The F a l l _of Cha Guevara and t h e Changing Face
the "Cuban fievbltttion
Summary .1 + Fidel Castro's willingness to drop Ernesto
'Che" Guevara confirms the shift in Cuban policies
that has been under way for about the past year.
Guevara's fall from pow*r apparently resulted, from
his persists tit opposition to the practical policies
recommended fay the Soviet Union. His views on Cuba's
economic development and foreign policyreflecting
his general opposition to Soviet advicefoots, seem
to have played, a rolet
r
-5-
-e-
-7-
-S-
25r flith this realignment, already strained relations with China, tfill probably deteriorate further,,
Last November at a meeting' OJP Latin AmericaQ Comiaunist Party delegates in Havana, Cuba agreed to support
the orthodox parties rather than Peking-oriented! *
militant groups. Relations vi.th China, deteriorated almost imnect lately after the Havana conference,, Guevara
visited JPeklng In February apparently in an attempt to
explain the Cuban position, only to be sharply rebuked
by the CbinesG* After resuming his African trip lie
continued to vent his ''dogmatic" views, xrhich generally
reflected Chinese positions*
2Gt
In any case Chini now has clear Justification
for attacking Cuba as a "revisionist '* regimea charge
it has never publicly Hade, ffith the fall of Guevara
and the general acceptance of Soviet advice in domes**
tic and foreign policies, the Cuban revolution has
entered a neip piiase. The shift In Cuban foreign policy
vhich baa teen en train si nee 1964 now is confirmed;
with Guevara's fall.
-9-
ROUTINE
i -
J
IHFORMATIOM PIPORT. Jf*oi f kHALLY EVAtU^TCO
^SFPTKKlMffl
1966
ABOUT "CUE"
AMERICA
-HSOURCE
IN THB NOT
OF
MM
Dste
-01024
SOF 2
L
WITH GUEVARA*
T H E
T W 1 I T SKCKKCY B K I N G
PMCW
'
4,
FIELD DISSBM:
[Cl
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian
Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966
March 1967
Wo. 0627/67
This
g th^ natieuul
thv mt:nnin^ of Titk-
(Mi-use of
I6 h H-ttJCHin 103 a m i
its rnflitvmEEsicHi or JV\<:];iDn
iy (in
lo or n>
"
'V
38
FOREWORD
ffo
SK
ED 12951
SHSKiiT
C O N T E N T S
FOREWORD
.,.*
* * * > * - - . * . * * , . . . . . * . . , , , , .
INTRODUCTIOEJ
, .
....,
,*<*....*,**.,_...
,-..,.,.
12
jr_ 4
1?
+1+
tttt
IV.
vii
III*
,,*.,,.
ASSESSMENT,.*.....,.,..,... 11
*.,.,,.
ANNEX A:
15
2
24
29
111
Illustrating
Tablei
Map
14
16
AND CONCLUSIONS
The years 1957-19GS offer; a special opportunity to 3tudy foreign and domestic influences
on the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) because
the period covers both the rise of the Blno-Soviet
dispute and an era when the chief question for the
party domestically vas whether a policy of violence
or
of orthodox political activitythe via
o r the:
via pacificaprovided
the most
ro
p
most promTiT
d to
t power. With
i h the overthrow of dictator
Gustavo Hojas Pinilla in May 19 57, the PCC found
itself in circumstances seemingly conducive to
growth, Lite its fellow Communist party in
Venezuela (PCV) the following year, it regained
legality after a prolonged; period of suppression;
it enjoyed a reputation of consistent opposition
to the despised dictatorship; and it faced bright
prospect3 of advancing its national political status
through orthodox political activity, In August 1966
the part/, although still legal, was politically
ostracizedregarded generally as obstructive at
test and subversive at w<?ret. Its national organisation was largely intact and retained at least the
nominal backing of the principal Communist rural and
paramilitary forces; but a pro-Peking faction had
formally broken away in 1964, and raUoh of the party's
youth following 11had been drained away to this and
-other "ultreleft factions advocating the via armada*
After regaining legal status in 1957, the PCC had
firmly adhered to a program which placed primary
emphasis on the via pacifica or mass struggle. The
party refused to alter this "soft line" in ite fundamentals j despite its long and pragmatic experience
with guerrilla warfare and other rural violence in
Colombia and! despite its influence over a number of
active paramilitary forces in tho countryside. The
party did make some adjustments after 1964 to enhance
the role of the "armed, struggle" in Colombia in an
attempt to answer the criticism of th "ultraleft,"
assume a more militant facade, and undercut the diesi deuce within its own ranks. These modifications,
which gave a stronger endorsement of the Communistinfluenced paramilitary bands, were probably more a
ET
TET
No
I.
INTRODUCTION
EI1?IH*jU.in>?BTn
]
i
,
i
I
*
Liberal
with
-6-
In its personal characteristics the CCP leadership had; little to attract help from anyone outside
the party who might b& interested in disrupting the
National Front. At least to the Colombian public,
the Communist leaders were notably lacking in dynamismt
iBiacrination and. political opportunism! they seemed contant to receive their modest stipends* occasional
junkets bo the bloc countries* and such limit eel foreign subsidies and other support as might fall to
their lot.
The. principal Colombian Communist policy was
a firm and unconditional advocacy of the primacy
of the via pacifica, or parliamentary struggle. The
party did accept the aimed struggle under appropriate
circumstances in designated local areas, but during the late '50B and early 'CDs it insisted that
the political consciousness of the worker class
had not matured to the requisite level for launching a general revolution.
As the principal action for developing the party's
mass strength, the PCC has on more than one occasion
since 1957 called for the organization of a "great
patriotic front of national liberation*1' At the time
the party reacquired legal status in 1957* Vieira insisted that Communists would, nave to emerge frcnn their
cooson of. isolationr cast <? their dogmatic orientation, and work with any group opposed to the National
Front. At the 9th Congress in 1961 F the party identified the MEL as the principal vehicle for this purpose.
On tha critical issue of armed struggle the party's statements up to 196 5 wore ambiguous and essentially semantic modifications of its traditional theme
of "selfdefense" by the peasant masae-s where justified; by the oppressive actions of the oligarchic" security forces. - In 196 5, however, the PCC formulated
what it claimed to be a unique policy which it hoped,
would satisfy those-who were clamoring for action and
yet not risfc the party's legal status. The political
resolution of the party's Tenth Congress in January
1966
In Colombia thejr-e: is opening an original Revolutionary way, based on the use of all methods
RET
Ho Foreig
-15Sft>
ET
"
The MRL f Which had reached its high point in national influence in the congressional and presidential
elections: of 1962, fared, very badly in ths slections
of early 1966'reflecting in part its internal dissension. The majority Lopez faction of the MRL therofore seriously considered returning to the regular
Liberal partyr a move which would strengthen the National Front and the Liberal administration of Carlos
Lieras Restrepo, inaugurated in August 1966* Since
the Communist via parliament-aria was directly tied:
to the destinies of the MRE. ae an opposition party,
the PCC prospects wera similarly reduced to a nev lov
by the 19*16 election resultsa decline which had
been under way during the previous two years + The
FCC apparently had only limited influence remaining
-11-
aurr
!to POPS;
sent
ET
EPSHI ,
^^
COMMUNIST:. ORGAN
its inepiration and: ideology wero largely influenced by China, After the Havana Conference of
Latin American parties in late 19 64, at which Castro
implicitly abandoned; hi& Hlneutralism" in the SinoSovlst disputeF the PCC-tM, turned hostile toward; the
Cuban regime* It alleged that the Cuban leader had
fallen pr*y to the "revisionists,Hl and had trans f a m
himself into an enemy of "the working class and the
Chinese people.,.and hence of the Communist parties
of the world.lh
Even the timing of the rift wag tied to the- debate over armed struggle. In one cf its initial publi
cations, the PCC-ML denounced the old guard, central
committee leaders for not adequately supporting a
major bastion of Communist guerrilla strength in
Marquetalia, after the gcvernwejat forces launched a
sizable campaign there in May 19Si to eradicate subversion. The FCC-ML insisted that
Marque tali & must be the beginning off the
war of liberation in Colombia..., It is
necessary to substitute the revolutionary
principle of active guerrillas for the false
and conservative principle of fself-defense**
*..any peaceful method, as a principal form
of taking power^ is definitely out of the
question in Colombia; parliamentary and
legal resources, together with other forms
of mass struggle, can only be used as secondary and complementary aspects of the principal
form of strugglethe use of armT The national leadership [of the PCCj is miBtaken in
its
i
The top leaders of the Pec closed. r$t\ks in the
face of the party revolt, and. admitted that the ideological roots of their problems "originated in the
aubjectiva concessioro which the party has been making to thos-e extremist tendencies of the eo-called
left-" They denouncad local extremists and openly
accused Pefcing of bfling the inspiration and major
cause of diasengion within the party* But even though
the split had come largely on the issue of the lucha
-15DiB6im
armada, of tfhich Castro wag the test known Latin American practitioner, the FCC leaders nat only refrained
from condemning the Castro regime for promoting revolutionary adventurism of trie left, tut actually praised
the Cuban socialist experiment and its significance
for the Communist movement in the hemispherer although
they were rather noncommittal when relating; th& Cuban
revolution to the armed struggle in Colombia. This
propaganda treatment of Cuba derived from the FCC
leaders' consciousness of Castro's ties with Moscow
and of hia appeal to various leftist elements in
Colombia rather than from any possible enthusiasm of
their own for imitating his rise to power.
The PCC f s extensive experience with guerrilla warfare and the phenomenon Of rural violence {la violonciaj ,
and Its involvement in various attempts to combine
scattered qitierrilla groups into a coordinated movement probably led. to an awareness amon$ tha FCC leadership that Cagtro's guerrilla success wag a product
of unique conditions and circumstances rather than a
universally applicable experience, The decimation of
the resources of the Venezuelan ComircuniEt Party and
the Movement of the Revolutionary ^eft wae additional
confirmation of its b l i f
PCC antagonism toward the ultraleft promoters
of the lucha armada was expressed frequently both
before and after tho party aplit. While the FCC-iML
was a-linking epithets at the old Guard, soch as
"^hrughciieviat revisionists"and raising Castro to
the ranlt of "No, 1 Khrushchevist"the PCC tag denouncing the pro-Chinese as "anti-Soviet divisionifits
The verbal conflict aesumed scomo of the features of
the Sino-Soviot dispute in a teapot, but was limited
to the issue of armed struggle and particularly
guerrilla warfare,
The 10th Congress of the PCC in early 196 6
formally stigmatised the PCC-ML as "traitors who
have deserted th* great party and who pretend to
carry out a revolution without a party r a revolution
without Marxism-Leninism." A key resolution of the
Congress stated:
-17-
SECRET
iio
Foreign
-19-
ET
lie Foreign
-21-
Mo i
-24-
PEWO VASQUEZ
^ ^ . ^ r^i9 1nThe PCC_Ml_t ihl
addled
> a
&jn
Although the FCC attempted to prohibit the dissemination of Chineae propaganda in Colombia after 1962 and
expelled the pro-Chinese NCNA employees from the
party, the latter still retain their agency positions and. apparently a till receive the small monthly
payments, Thare ie some ground for. considering the
PCC-ML to be a poorly disciplined party, not in close
touch with Peking, since its two factlong have contended for control of the flCNA agency and the agency
has remained independent of both,
3 B prom i a eg to its sympathizers in Colombia
for propaganda support, scholarships, paramilitary
training, and other assistance have probably been far
more lavish than the actual cash outlays. Pelting has
disseminated, sporadic propaganda in support of the P C C ML r branding the "orthodox" l&aders "revisionists" and
endorsing the nrrevolutionary struggle bo seize power
through a patriotic anti-imperiali&t poptilai
revolution.*" The Chinese hava also financed guerrilla
warfare training and "scholarship" programs, reportedly
in Worth Korea and Vietnam as well as in China.
The PCC response to Chinese collaboration with
its enemies has been sharp. Top central committee manbers, well aware of the travels to Peking of such
"traitors" as Pedro flbella (and the purpose of such
pilgrimages}, are known to have discussed in early 1964
the pressuree and problems which such activities were
placing on. the party. Besides trying to stop Chinese
propaganda emanating from the HCHA ofifice in BogotaT the
PCC also attempted to stifle party dii sense ion of the
Chinese line and of Peking's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute* Chinese sympathizes were threatened
with expulsion.
Whether Vieira and his colleagues exaggerated
the Chinese responsibility for che PCC's internal problems Is debatable, but they certainly sought to link
the pro-Chinese dissidents with the "ultraleft aharlatana" who insisted on irameciiate revolution in Colortbia.
Vieira wrote in 19 65 that such groups had seized upon
the false and misleading Chinese position to attack the
PCC and its program.
-26-
tt&
SECRET
ET
snt
LV. ASSESSMENT
During the period under review (Kay 19 57 August 1966) ttie PCC managed to maintain its legal
status and the unity of the old-line loaders headed.
by Vielra. it kept the party organization intact
and retained, the loyalty of the majority of the
rank and. file membership as wall as Its influence
over traditional rural enclaves and the principal
pro-Communist paramilitary loaders in the countryside* The close ties with the Soviet party were
challenged only by a few defectors*
Balanced against these accomplishments, which
were largely holding operations, axe the substantial
reverses to Communist strength and potential in comparison to the party's outlook as late as 19fi2. The
program failed to prevent an internal split or to
satisfy the demands: of the radical leftist groups
who were inclined to pursue the armed struggleF
During this period r foreign and domestic influence a on tho party were intertwined and, of courset
reacted on each other No firm conclusions are possible about their relative weights. Neverthelesst
the developments rehearsed in this paper do suggest
certain very tentative generalizations on how these
influences have operated in the case of the Colombian
party.
The FCC was ran throughout this period by an
g
leadership whose own inclinationsparticularly
on the Jiey issue of the armed struggleeeem to have
accorded fairly well with the Moscow line, if Moscow
had favored intensifying the armed struggle, there
might have been some test of their allegiance* The
party's formal split in 1964 over the Sino-3oviet
dispute o course reflected Its previous support of
Moscow's side in international Communist meetings,
as contrasted with the "neutralist1* position taken
by the Venezuelan Cominunist party; hut t also probably reflected somewhat less flexibility in the FCC
leadership at dealing witJi party dissension, The FCV,
-29Dies dirt
SEC
No F e r W d n Di-
KJ*
RK
No
-31-
4EC
So '
ANUEX A
THE COLOMBIAN CQMMTJHIET PARTY (PCCJ
AMD THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY
A COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCES SINCE 195JJ
FCC
PCV
X. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS
AND INFLUENCES
Legal statue
Party outlawedr
regained legal statue
after ouGter of dictator
Rojaa Pinilla,
May 1957?
retained1 legal status
throughout period
Outlawed 1950-5S;
regained legal status
after ouster o dictator
Perez Jimenez r January 1958; the government suspended
political activity
of party and principal ally r Movement of
the Revolutionary
Left (Hip), 1962.
Highly favorable;
party had considerable public credit
for contributing to
ouster of Perez
Jimenez; strong leftist orientation of
all political groups;
united front in labor,
movement; potential
close allies for P C V
in factions of Democratic Action Party
fAD) and Democratic
Republican Union
A-l
SBKRET
Ho Fa+ei$n
PCV
FCC
Party program
Consistently
primacy of via pacificaj
rejected lucha armada ~g
principal form for entir
country; certain modifications to defend
Commufnist
forces
Via
until
with increaaing
of violence;
f
Serious divisions
over lu-cha armada;
leadters shifted in
attitude over the periodr tout no overt
split; MIR ally split
Alliances
informal cooperation
with MKL for political
and electoral actionj
HKL factionalism reduced effectiveness
front tactic after
Ma rxis t r pro-Cast ro
Mlfl; pro-Castro elements of UKD? 3ympathy or nisolidarity" from other leftist elements.
Potential for
conducting
guerrilla war
Negligible) peasant
support limited; no
trained leaders In
guerrilla warfare and:
no experience with
this form of subversion
Program impact on
top
i
resuits
. : -
PCC
FCV
Pro-Soviet
Fro-Soviet
Position on
Sino-Soviet
disput*
Cuban impact
Party r
and attitudes
toward
Publicly eulogistic;
privately resentful and
critical
Cuban aid
Ineffectual
approach to radical
leftists favoring
guerrilla warfare and
violence; 3. challenge
to the FCC program of
via paciflca; Cuban
propaganda in part a
criticism of party
leaders
Substantial training,
propagandar and other
aid? assistance
granted, PCV allies
provoked no resentment in party
Chineeft
influence
to party
Split into pro-Soviet
and pro-Chinese organizations in 1964; party
blamed. Chinese for its
troubles with the ultraleft
hDissem
No
Forei-grt
Err
PCC
Chinese
aid
PCV
Party relations
with Poking
Hostile
Friendlyi occasional
liaison
Party relations
with Moscow
completely servila
to Moscow throughout
period; reciprocal ap^
proval from CPSU
PCC-PCV relations
Party absorbed in
its own problems and
hence little cooperation with PCC? borrowed from Colombian
"self-defense" theory
to justify guerrilla
warfare; radical MIB
elements conducted;
liaison with pro-Chinese faction and
other lucha.
leftists in Colombia
A-4
WJfflflw,
CONTENTS
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
1
r., T
L TI-1E INSURGENCY
,4
v. THE oprosnroN
__ U
S
r .,
9
9
, . 10
C 1
n
BRAZIL
mTY
-
^BRAZIL
P A ttAG U A Y
1.aW
ca
THE PROBLEM
B, Over the next year or so, there is little chance that tho insurgents
will be able to bring about the overthrow of tho Bairientos regime,
but it is also unlikely that the regime will be able to stamp out the
insurgency,
C A prolongation and expansion of the insurgency would impose
severe financial and psychological strains on Bolivia, greatly hindering
the economic development and social amelioration that are essential
to the achievement ol stability in that country. Defense costs for a
protracted guerrilla war would add heavily to the already serious deficit
in die- national budget, would further limit public investment, and
would threaten, the govenunent's stabilization program. | ^
C 3
DISCUSSION
I. THE INSURGENCY
' L. Armed resiitancu to central Authority has long been commonplace In the
BoUWjn hinberlamd. Concern regarding thft present itWUf gency is a consequence
of conclusive evidence that it is organized and supported by Cubfl. From tllii
source the insurgents have received leadership and training, modern automatic
and a body of TEvnluLiarjary doctrine. [
E. In March 19CT A Bolivian army pitiol clashed with a guexriUa. bftnd north
af Camirih in southeastern Bolivia (see map); A month, later jutes Regis Dehray,
a French intellectuaEh and Cif0 Rnherta BuStOS, an Argentine Cnmmunisth vere
captured in the [tt3 area. Debriy is a friend o Fidel Custro and a publicist
for his revolutionary theories^ his airest tn itself ensured, worldwide publicity
Inr the Csjnki hand, Debray and BusWs added to- the SGnsatinn by declaring
thai the leader of (lie guerrilla mOveuMTit hi Bolivia, ivas none Other than liracstn
('Che") Guevara.
S, "Ehz" disappEaicd in March IMS under circmnsCaTices which raised some
doubt that he WttS itiU ahvc Sinte t W there have been SCMS of confheting
iud UTicon&nned reports and rumors'as to Jiis whcneabouls. Somewhat stronger
evidence has recently become available: it suggests Guevara's present* In Bolivia
at some time during the past year. But whetherr or not "Che" is in. PolEvia, it
is claar that th* Camiri gucrTiHas ara lad by someone who keeps in contact with
Cuba Jew! who is well versed in the Cueuarii doctrine nf revolution.
A, A- main thertie of the Castro-Gevara-Dehrfly docfrina is that city-hred
"revolutionary" parties cannot effect a real revolulin-nthat, its in Cuka* the
revolution must originate as a gutixUli gwwv*men* in the remote- binrerlarid.
By ils survival ftfid continuing deGance, such a jjueiiriflii movfiment will demonstrate the poweilessness of tlie regLrrue and Will draw to itself true- revolutionary
spirits- Eventually the guerrilla movement wi]] win the 5jnnpthy and support
Of Ul oppressed pcpulatiue and will itself constitute the basii for the development af the truly lev&lutiocxarjf pohticaE party- Tins theory is, oi course, A
recapitulation of the Cuban experience from the Castroist point of view.
5, The available evidence irtdLMtP-S that the CainH bat*d numbers only about
100 men. Although the nominal ccunmaiida- is a Uolfvian, it is evjdenl Ull
tlR cadrt is composed of Cubans and & Bolivians txiicX*4ii Cu-ba- [
1 It appears that the
p had planned to spend more time in rccniitmeTiTflDd training, that it
discovered before it was ready to begin active Opertttions, and that its
leaders rtflUw that its. consequent dependence on its Cuban cadre mftv prove
politica!3)f disadvantsgeous by prdvotdiig a nationftlitric floljvifln reaction.
fl, Since thejr discovery these gucrrutas have operated in an area extending
from Cnmiri northward for 150 milts to Samaipata
on the Cochabamba-Santa
p
hh
highway (see map). This area lies in the fifteen fonthUls of the
^
til* elEvation varies from L.SOO to 9,000 feeL J.I is ipUrsrly populated^ the
availability a supplies, especially food, is meager. A a is limited by the
nwtb-aoutll pattern of the ridgclines. Moreover, thick fmlage on the slopes
provides concealment fox the gnerrilki. they arc we]] protected from observation u.a& Attack from the air. Aimy patrols approachiog on foot up rugged
strEamheds arc highly vulnerable to being ambushed,
7, Couahergucnilla operations in Such terrain would be e
difficult fee
, we31-br&incdF and well-motivated forces, T
The
g
times managed Co amtuah aroiy patrols', innidirjF
ties Tvithout permitting tli-a aijiiy unit* bo closer ThE guerrilla^, howecrr have
hcen compelled to abandon their hase campj ^nd the Bolivian army has recently killed or capLiured z, few of them,
fi. The Bolivian army numbers about 15d000 men, o whom only about 5,000
in MAT""Supported units arc reasonably well-equipped,1 Its cffectiveneRS is
limated: by the fact that its conscripts serve only a one-year tour of dutyh leaving
a minunal period of service after the completion of hasic training. The army
])*? eommiLted ttiQfQ than 2^000 men to containing (he 100 CHmiri guerrQIa?,
but feu> of (hem are Erom MAP-suppoiied: units,
In addition, ilwre tiv 2,400 men in UM air fa BJKI L,M m to* ifver tunl lntt navnl fotaa.
*S*c -rJK* tabk Cup- a an& 7 ) f w brief deatripHJOdi al JOUJGCJ orgsnCEatloiM ID
n
movement
Ujn short, the guerrilla* arc quite willing to accept local Communist assisthi!f Vis and ^ b e n it suits their own plans, but are careful not to
identify themselves ^ith or subordinate thcmsclvns to any local CwmwnLSt
party, ' In accordance with Cuban doctrine, they expect to organizQ the true
revolutionary party on the basis cf the guerrilla movement itself.
11, It is unclear whether the guerrillas have won the sympathy of the ^sarse
rural population In the areas in which they Operate, although it is notable
that they have paid well for the food supplies they have taken and have provided msdteal services to Lhe V^]&ges lliey have entered- Their greatest potential .source of rEcruits is the large number of unepnnlcyed afwJ bitterly disalfCcted
till mijiefsN but the miners r* getleratty reluctant to leave the Albiplano and
no far only a small number of them have actually Ireen. reovJt^d- The distance
of (he guerrilla ToCmc from urban centers discourages the particlpalioti of dlaafifecLed students.
EL
pxudurt
thereby to gain the means to carry out its other intended reforms. It freed the
Indian from the control of absentee landlords, gave him. land and cha vote, and
sought to give trim education. Bur. the nationalized tin mines produced deficits
instead of profits * and agricultural production iel\. Tliese factors, cn-mtined wfEii
.fiscal and managerial irreEpcinsLl>itHy, produced a staggering Jnflaiion. The government's, eiforts to control inflation and to rationalize tin production were bitterly resisted by the miners, whe virhmlfy cantroiied the uiLiicSb as well a s b y a
Jeft-wlMg fiction at tha MNH vnder Juan LecFiFn Oquendo. J ~ ^
y running for n. third presidential term fa
drove a sizable factEoiTolHiC MNE (including former President licrnan
: Suazo, L9S&-19S0 J inEio opposition. Forced thereby to seek military support,
Ffli grudgtngiy accepted the Air Force comrfiaTidfflf, General Rnua BamctUo*
Ortuno, as his running mate. Mutual suspicion grew between the twuN and Paz,
unable, to control increasing resistance to his rule, was finally ousted by the
rrdHtary lEad!ershlp In N&vcmbex lOoJ.
111. THE BARRIENTOS REGIME
15r Although the discredited MNH lcadershjp was tbkrown out, the military
Icaderi who Coot cotlUol plftd^cd enntinuance of thje MNR rcvoluiion. The twn
main figures in the provisional government wcra General BanienfOS and Cental.
Alfredo Qwtftdo GandiB, who became co-presidents. Barrientos fin]"oyed rnsidlcrable populai-ity, based largely on the bnld hearing he had shown in the face
of several previous attempts to assassinate him. Ha prepared for election to
the coonstitotionfll presidency by presenting tjLmSeLT as an advocate of ChrJLstiAn
democracy and by fortttJflg a coalition at misoellatieoyg political fragments called
the Bolivian Revalutionai-y Front (FEB) see Labla. In the election held on 3
JyJy 1966 Bftrrientos woo 61 percent of dirt votfr- This impressive victory WAS fa
much -a- tribute to his skillful manipulation of disparate politicaJ forces as it was
to his popular appeal.
and mrruprtoju fa p
UM miMt tott 51 flullran
POLITICAL PARTIES
{FR3)
The
July 1W7)
This parly * tr*n!ed t y BflnHcntW n? hu pcrmnJ
h ] f-W Mie 1BBB prcstlanbla] eJ&dtlOfl. It it
of Lit fHifliJWil fgDpwien without Emtch. g
ID ideology.: Ha pOpuJu Sijppflrt b dfflwn aLinniE a tluaivdy JfiXJtn tlw ^mn^EHnAi of (t* CcHibabtritba *rst,
PopuJai Christian
(MFC}
Authentic.
Puity
Ltft
Party of the
(HRJ
Party
Cian, by
(PSD)
Itj
mcmhcriln lx citimitad to be
1
(FSB)
DadftflwtOc Fsit/
AJOW l o g g e d
In
r 3
BOLIVIAN t&LJnCAL. PAitTIES
Faxty (J
ovj"et")
(Outlnwed ui
(Outlawed in lBffTJ
IT DT/fccri
(OudAWEdrn 1BFTJ
.*
16. The electoral arravigeimeTit between Barrieifltos and the FRB pr&vcd to
be no i(iHB tnan a temporary expedient. BftrritntOS' sure victory gave, patronage
and Second wirtd K) parties hitherto destined to oblivion, fjn retutn he was given
political respectability and legitimacy, Despite constant avowals of support for
the Front Barrientos stowed little subsequent interest in it. He prefers to rule
as a sort of constitutional caudLLlo. Opposition parties, on occasion, have negotiated with him about joining thfl gavjBunrnGnr, but he has ra}ected ovrjrture
both the Bolivian Socialist Fiinnge (FSB) And the Andnide faction of ths
As bLs mosl eruuia] ^unport enmes from the TniUtaiy, Eh* u r ^ t u p of the Front
in July USftT and the reshuffling uf lihe cabinet in Aagust xvere o-f little real impoiftr
The iuiEviJual parties of the former coalition c o n d ^ * to be flligncJ with the
BarrieriEos government and their more important lcadWj are in the pew h
IV. THE MILITARY
IS. E*lb BartiintOS add the military 1 ealizfi that they depend On each other.
B&rrienCQA could mat have become president and could not remain, in office without the united Support of thfl military. The mtlEtary, Jfor their parth doubt that
they could control tba couxrtiy without such political arid popular Support as
B?JTJextos is able to contribute to (hi p&rltl*f !hipr Both the milttfliy leaders Odd
BarriEQuDa realise thai a split within UM military would spe]l disaster, BoLh are
therefore careful to avoid provoking Such A Jplit.
IS.
L 3
L
2CJ.1
V. THE OPPOSITION
Sir Cut off from patronage and influence, Bolivian opposition parties WW frflgmEnbcd and powerless. They reprw&nt regional Or Special interests and find caOpeffttion with other parties difBcult, ven the KIN ft Is now divided, ItadcrIE99, and wjLh IsUle Influence in impurtant scctOis of the popuJatiDiL Pax Is En
Peru, Lcchin in Chile, and Siles tn
5J&, Opposition parties have sought to take advantage c l the government^ unpopu3arity aniong students and m'lLitrt 4S well S its inability to end the [nsui. Elements of the FSB have from buna to time attempted to form
and PEIN
3. The Bolivian Communists are as frag(iient*d as the- nOn-Communist oppusilicin-, During the MtiR era the PCB maintained a live and [et live reJatiOnshlp with the Paz Adminiitfation. |
Ifr behaved
i to maintaJa its legal
2^
1964 coup caught the. PCE just as it was about to split JntO ^fO-Sovit find
"^wo-Chiriese* 'itctkins- A furtue* blow was ^kaJt bo the party in May 1&65I, when
the government neeupied the mirjes and arrested Communist and luftist labor
Jaadnrs.
VJ. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS
5A. The revolution In 165& was followed l>y fl prOnrdCt&d period o eDaDom^c.
deteriaratioii and a raging inflation. Since lSGi, however, ihe: economy's growth
rate his averaged Over five percent annually, prices have been reEatively stable,
and international reserves have climbed from i low of $4 nnUion in t9S2 to t3rf
million in June: 1967, For the- mast part, this recaveify has been SJHuCTed by substantial growth of imports and exports, increased domestic and foreign private'
Investment, and large Inflows nf eeonomtc
C 3
L
5. High Cm prices have contributed to this improvement, but so lias the gpvemtnent^s economic po]Jcyr Eardcntns has pledged bis government to a progfim of stfibihzatLon and development and has Instituted ^ s c a ' policies1 tiaat Seek
Co bring public ^venues in approximate balance with public expenditures. He
hftS fllso Iftkcn advantage of his freedom bom doctrimure political commitments1
to seek new foreign private investment, A heresy to most Bolivian politicians.
, Nowhere has this effort to impiora the. economy baati more evident than
arrieDW
policy toward the State cnterprisea. Prior to the. LQB4 coup these
in
enterprises: constituted a major drain on. the economy1.* Now their efiLrierjcy
has been increased, and In the case of tin has combined with higher world prices
Over the JasL three yeais- to produce an operating surplus which has been aitti
for pubEc investment. On the other hand, the overall tscal situation has
weakened Stnce 1S64 because of tlie growing hudgetflry deficits of the central
g&vcnunBiiL These- deficits have, had to be financed Increajbgly by die central
bank aincc the aLminatlon at TJS direct budget SuppciTt This Inflationary form
oi financing his risen from Tesj th*n One percent of ccntreil guvamment expenditures in 1664 to 1.0 percent in 19fl5 and1 about IS percent Ifl }$Q&, t u t has no* yt
had a marked effect an n J
27. For mtwt Bolivians, however^ stabilization and deve-bprnent programs hftve
little meaning. The LB52 revolution raised expect atinns, but did not permanently
improve the standard of living Ear many. Impatience over the lack of progress
in folElhiig its goals has -abated pockets oi resentment in urban area* and among
students *n<i mineri. The 1&B4 eoyp not only ended the domination &f labor
over mine management but tha goven-wiSnfs subsequent efl&ria to achieve dnCiencv threw hundreds of mtoexs Out of work nd cut wagea drjiticallv-. Although B&rrieniOS has subscquandy raised miners' wages, their political emASculatifln by him his left deep hatreds. While it iucccaded Ir\ forcing the miners
bacfc to wonVh the govenuneriE's decisive and ruthless iupprassion of demonstrations in May and June his intensiEed the miners' disg^ection.
Vf[. THE OLfTLOOK
SIS- The CastiO jicgimc, during the aessicrn of the Lfltin AmerJcan Solidarity
Organisation. In Havana in Jnly and August 1667, once again pun!id=t3 its
determinatiOfi to encourage: violent revolutions in L^(in America, Fidel Castro
piabably regards the crpportuTretiefi fnr tnt iasurgenta In Bolivia as more favorable
(at l e o s ^ i the lonj run) tEiAO is- the case wi5l Qtbex active insurgency movemeiitfr*^
IConseqyemJy 'we believe
ha wiU'maTce special efforts to sustain tha guerriJlfl operatiorij In Bolivia through
finnncial and Cechnical aid. Ttlis does1 not imply substantied
J
rm 19W, (dd erjMria occoirnted far TS pmtflJli *A fnrrigD chaBge eSiUulS tmra
=rpnrti. Ttic average VNXM price Etn BnlivJau tin m w from S l , l 3 m 1B63 to +1JW Oi 1984,
readied afaJgbof tlJti Ln lBSS, O.T4 diflppcd to ijl.tll tn I98fl jind tn abotil ^LSO in mld-^F7,
*lB fldditlOQ 1)0 CQM1BOL, ti*e ramt impgrUtnt pubUf enterprise* aT Ac NaUCanl PttraIfioni CorpOrntiDn, [be BflHrtaO DewelflpiftMiit Cftparatibn, jinj OH BolEri&n NIUODBJ
10
C 3
n 3
LBJ LIBRARY
MT61LHJENCE__ACE.
Mandatory
JWTINli
. r
Information Cable
IN
FAGf ! OF 2
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I'ENKZUELA/CUBfr
301:
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STATES
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12 FES 1397
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SANITIZED
SANITIZED'
bfonnatibn CaBte
u&s&iStFss: -. u % m
B.0,
f OST 1 7 OCTDBER
CUBA/USSR
TO HAVAHA
2,
ACQ
PREMIER FtDEL
OCTOBER
{SUMMARY;
HESEECT
TO THE
DUKXNC
POLICY.
COBA EVALUATED
-731*0
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IN THE EftLL OF I 3 e 6
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MGE 3 OF 6 PAGES
'"SOCIALIST" COUHTRtES,
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4 ore
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BUT IMPORTANT REASON FOR SEE TttEP *A3 TO DISCUSS WI1H CASTRO THE
SUBJECT OF COBAN RBttJLBTttJHAltY ACTIVITY IK LATIN AHEHICA.
EOSKJTJT REP^^ 1 '*^ THE
TC2W THAT CASTEO WAS HflRttlHG TEE CaMHDKlST CAVSB TEEOUGH HIS
SJKJNEOREHIP
tEE
TEE
GOPV
IN -73140
FACE 5 &e
WJJ
WGE5
CASTRO TEEtf
ATSQ ADDED THAT CUBA DID NOT AGBEH WITS THE. SOVIET
EE
ACCUSED THE USSR OF HAVING TOT9ED ITS BACK UPON ITS OW HEV0LUTIO1TAHY
TRADITION AKD OF fiAVIHG UOTOD TO A POINT 1HERE IT WOULD HEFOSE TO
SUPPOET ANY REVOLUTiOlTAST HOTSUEltr UKLESS THE ACTIONS OF THE
LATTER COHTRIBUTED TO TEE ACHIEVEMENT OP SOVIET OBJECTIVES,
AS COKTHASTEU TO IMTEBNATIOKAL COJtHUIIIBT OBJECTIVES,
CASTRO SLA ID
TEAT Iti EECEJtfT YEAES TEE SOVIET UNION SAD HOT EOHOHED TEE
PRINCIPAL AIM OF TBUE OOiaiflNISH, I . E ^ THE LIBERATION OF MANKIND
THHOUGHOUT THE TORLD, CASTRO COHCLTJDED BY STATING TETAT HEGARDLES3
OF THE ATTITUDES 0$ THE SOVIET GNIGN, CUBA TODLH SUPPORT ANY
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT flHJCH I T CONSIDERED WA COHTniBUTHJG TO
TEE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIYE*
6,
1.3(a)(
COPY
IN -73140
PAGE 6 Of 6
MILIT^BY AID ERQH THE SOVIET UHlOIf TO CUBA 1EHB HELD IN AK AMICABLE
ATMQSPHEKE*
TO SUPPLY CUBA WITH COKSTJJERABLE AMOUNTS OP ECOHOUIC AID AKD T5AT THE
MILITARY AID PfiOGHAMS, ESPECIALLY THOSE CO2iCE2HED t r i m TEE
OF TEE OmAH A3KED fOBCES, KOUU) BE
7.
3
S
I
7
*$*"
HHHH
CJBA
Mhich
ti L ^ ! L f r f t ^
trave
tethsw uaS . t i l !
our yoiffig amy-and at the n0Heiit u& considorcd the posaUiUt
. a= bt did , * , left rapidly to bvlnf back tite r
this elicited
n fr
39 October 1JG7
1IHHK
CUBA
Che u&s an unbeatable Soldier, cornea Oder* Vrota a. alli.tary standpoint Che
an extraordinarily capable mm, extraordinarily brsve, ctra.ardijiarll7
If he had an achilles heel as a guerrilla, that schilleo heel uns his excessive
aggressiveness. It has his absolute scorn for danger. The *ntfiles try to
ion; about ha death. Che vat A caster* of
"Che was an artist in guerrilla warfare* He. demonstrated this an, infinite
or tines f but above- i l l in two extraordinary exploits. One of the* WAS th*
Invasion, t t the head of a column, a ctilixan which v* pursued by thousands of
*QIdlers through territory that Vis. absolutely open and wiknora* fle a ceoapl
Catdlo a formidable P U i t ary
But, In addition, he demonstrated i t in Ms b r i l l i a n t campaign In Las Villas, iml
ha demonstrated It above a l l In hla daring attach on the city of Santa Clara,
entering a city defended by tanks, art i l l err* and several thousand Infantry
with a column of barely JOG oen<
two exploits nark hln ad an extraordinarily *cle chief* a taster, an
or revolutionary warfare* Neirerth.elest after his- htroit and glorious
death they attract to deny the vfcracity or worth of Jits guerrilla contepts and
The artist can die, particularly when he is an art l i t tn such a dangerous
as the revolutionary struggle, but vrhst cannot 4ie under any circumstances
is the art to which he dedicated AS life and to uhith he dedicated his Intelligence
Why Is it so Strange that thl= artist aJwUd die in a battier It is auch
extraordinary that on -the suny accaslons that he risked his lire he was not
during 50&C battl1e,: L Han; vere the tlces in which It was necefar/ to talte action
to prevent htn from Getting killed, in actions of nlnor Importance, And so In a
, til one of the nan? battles that he wagedj ho lost his life,, Ue do not
enough evidence to toake u. Judcnent i s to a l l the circumstances
battle, as to the decree In which he cay have acted in an overly
nanner, but we repeat that if is a jgutrpilla iie had an achilles heel # that achlij.es
heel Wat his excea^ive aggressiventts t his absolute contempt for
That Uai where i t was difficult to agree pith hijq^ because tre understand
his l i f e , his experiencer\hia ability ZA a veteran chief r his presttgfrj
*verythLis that he signified In l i f e , were much core, incomparably Boft
than he perhaps realized hltaself. *ftit idea that nen have a fealative value; L ._
In history nay have profoundly Infltitn ed his conduct; the idea that causes cannot
be defeated when nen f a l l and that the un;entatnaW. march of history does not stop
nor will It stop because the coaoanderj fall F Jui<l this Is certain, this cannot
doubted. This shows hli faith In mankSnd, hs faith lr\ Ideas t his faith tn
an
Vet, as I ialA t fev dafs a^o> I would: have wholthearttdly ulshed tc have & ten
s the Bolder of victories, molding voider his leadership f nolding under his
directicnT^* victor lea* because wen of hi* experience, of his caliber, of his
singular ability ire uncoonon nen. (fe re able to appreciate a l l the value of
his ejtanple and we haire the post absolute conviction that this exaaple
serve a& enrulation tnd will serve tc?itplns aen similar to hljn J*roa tlie
the peoples.
1,HH ,
19 octet*.- IS(!T
* "
*"
te his.
pen like ^.ici,
- ssr-s.-r.rM str
r
te
ita
a a
l i i B I e I r tB
u .
Solidarity
*"*
but nlllions
ear
\F
ur>
S p n s
19
I t is not th&t we think tlut in the practical orcer of revolutlocar-jr
his dcatfi Is to have irsnediate reparation*, i t is that El Che, iipa
up aras a^ain, vas not thinking about an inMdiate victory, he Pas not
about a. SKift victory against the forces of the oligarchies and of laperlaltan
His experience cuerrIlia nintf was trairteS for * long s t r a i t of 5. 10, 15,
or 20 years if necessary*
And he vas ready to s t r i d e &, 10, 15* 20 years, his vhoie l i f t , i f iwo
and It Is with this MP& perspective thst bis death**hIs example, I ou^ht to
y - v i l l have a tremendous repercussion, utXl have an iwinclbje i n f l n c e
In vain they try to deny his ability as a eoursandEr *ft4 hit experience,
thai* who ellns to the stroke or Iticlc* Che vas a military eowaander vho was
tx*raordir.arilj- capable, but when we recenber El Che, "hea we think ab&ut
El Ctw* we are not thinking basically abfraS his nllitar? virtues* Jfo, for war
t* a nepna to and end, war i s a tool of Fvalut1onarles. V?hat io lrportartt
evslutiODj t^at Is important i s tJ) revolutionary cause, the revolutionary
s*the rcvoltitlonary objectives* the revolutionary sentinent^ tJti; r e v f l l t i
vlrrjffi.*,*Artd i t in llCthl* + ^ l d i *n-the field of ideas, in the field or
in tEie fieid of revolutionary virtues, in the field of irstelligcnce+ aside
his nilitary v i r t u e s , ttiat ve feel th toenendotts ioss HOP the nsTtHutlona
scvencm;, becsust Che^ in bis extraordinary jJersonaH^, had virtues
rarely apptar tocetfter, Ke Mas outstanding as an incotnparabl- aan of
Clse va; net on5y art incoaparable nfift of aetifln, but a Jaaft of profound"int*lleet
of v i s iff nary intelliaemce, a nan of prcf/iufld culture- I tiean to say he was
a man of Ideas and a Han of action*
-r
i t i s nat Just that he Uas bath a ban of prc-f?unri iifras m^t it nan
of action, btit tliat as a revolutionary he had the virtares vhlch could lie
defined as the cost full-necked: ej:prt*iicji of the virtues of a revolutionary,
and integral tasn in the fullest ser.stf of the word, a nan of supreme honesty,
of absolute sincerity, a Kin of stole and Spartan l i f e , a can in vhrae conduct
practically no fault can be found:, Bccau&fr QC his virtues he yas yhat ian be
called a true tod el (>?' a >evolutior.ary, * Speeches can be niade when n*ji die^ virtues
csibe painted eut but few are the tl^eA vhen^ as vn thla D^easlon# vhat ve
about; Che* wht Has a trut esatipl^ of riTOlittionary virtues, can be said uith
r-e justicej more
Xn additior., he had ane-ther quality ub^h i s n<st A quality of ttie intellect, uhich i s r.at a quality of viU F vhicti la not a quality derived fcroo
BtrnggJ*, btit a quality of heart. He uajt an extraordinarily humane
extraordinarily sensitive* Tnat Is Hbff we aay that, vhen w# think ibout his
l i f e , when We think about his eoniuet, this vss the case of a rery rare nan*
because lie was able to bl*nd dti his personality not only the characteristics of
of a nqtt of 3ticn nut a Is a these of a thinking pan, a can of -shining revolutionary
virtues a-id extraordinary huo$n sensitivity' tXended. with a character of iron*
a *rcl vl-ll, and Indomitable
Is vhy he has willed to future generations not only his experience, his
d
j outitarp^RC^soidlei1, but alsfl the vork of bis ttitelli^enet*
ile nr-Ptc #lth the -virtuousity sr a classicist cf the itngiutGe* Hia Jnarrations
of the var are unfurpassaVlt, The profurvdity or his thinking i s impressive*
Me *l=5olutfrly never vrat* on ah/thlns without e^traerbinary seirlomn^ts, without
profundity.
October 19*37
Hfdffl 6
CUBA
sail* V
have i^s=s sJ tJit dijTic-nsioa of tJ:e l o t s tp the revolutJUmary
tl e:ess, Oils i s the ueil: tde of tJie inperialiat enocj" tolnVlns thst
u:h the p^vsicai nan. I t [125 liquidated his virtues' fcJiinfcins t h o t , alcrcc with tl:e
pJijSiccl c:r.H i t has liquidated liis exs-aple* htiti they do not h e s i t a t e in publishing
in iucii a- Ir.piid*-t tia finer* ^c the pr^st n s t t m l thine in the vsrld, tjie eircuBist;nces*
RO1.' i l s a l ^r.Iversally ncctptedir; wJiicEi ft* trss executed by then after having b*i
seriously t;ounAcd in battle* ?Jiy. h^ve not even reflected on the loathiccveness of the
action. Tfcey have not even rtflect^d: An tjifr inp-adtnee flf thcr adolsslon, And tJiey
Jiave pub 11 t i l e d , as the right of the t!iun, tJifty kavt r*por*ted, c i the ri^Jit of the
and tbfr nerccnsi-les^ tne act of firing at 4 re
jfciomaiy ftglittr who
uojndei. Iftiat la *rrae Is triat Usej' also piii-tt uhy tlwy did I t ,
rJlit i t vould have required anoverulielaine protcsfl t s ti^; ^.JT; claiming t j t i t
would have been topoSSihl* to place such a rtvelutloiury i n the deck ot a court.
only that, they also hive net hesitated In ttcrextng liis remains. And. true
i t Is a fact thit t)je?y announce lisvinc crenattd Jiltf boitr^ thereby
tiieir ft=r # tbtreby defionstratiKg that (?the?y b*liev* thatj V
l i q u i d a t i n g tht piny*lea3 Hf* or t^w fighter, t h e / liquidate his Wests znd liquid*te
exanple*
Che did not f a l l defending an* intermit, dtfendJtsff ar>v causp other titan tht taus*
exploited and the opp^ea^eJ in tjla contlrs^t, Clit did not f a l l defending
other than the cause of r.h* poor, t^c hoiblf, of thin land* And tht
oanner and t3ie j d f l e s s n e t s wl^i/ulijtch he defe^rfrd that caujst Is not even
by his r t i t e s t eneales* BeXore history, the ptn who acted ba h* did, the
do everytnlnc; and >*lve ev^rytliirte for the cavse of the hunblfl, tecosue areaCer wltii
every psialr-C day; ttiey trfcer dper Into the hearts of the pflOplcs with every
day. And the i n p e r i i l i s t trwmles ire a l r ^ i d j beslrjilhi te perceive t h i s - Ttwy will
not la lone to realise that rils dt]j will in tlw Ion run to l i k e a ieed rron vhith
ftmare nany nen deternlned to enulst* hjjn^ .jnany jaen determined .to follcw h i i
And ve arc absolutely convlnetd that the revolutionary cause in tills
continent will recover froa the blow, t>at tlie revolutionary cause In this continent
Will fiot i?t der*t4 by that t j o n .
Kron tne revoXu^ionary fitandpoXftt, froa tJie stsndpsint of our 6uty, licw should
vlc:r Che's exaejple? Do we perhr.ps believe ue have l o s t ]iln7 I t is fcrut that ws
will not =?in ee mv inrltings- I t Is trve that we w i l l not again hear his voice.
3iit Ctie has l e f t t h t uorW a patrimony, J great patrinony. And from that patrijnsny
i/e vho kn(w Jilm so intiflat*Iy can to s considerable degree be his h e i r s . Ke l e f t
us h i s rt'/Dlutitmaiy thaudits. "He l e f t us Ills jrevolutionary yirtnas* He l e f t t= his
for work. In a ifor<V he l e f t us M E
( his w i l l , his tenacity, Ms spirit
AI C1ie: exiaple should ba 3 nodel for our people* d i e ' s eMnpltj ahould
We the Ideal nodel for our peopleI f ut irant t? any how we want our revalutiettfry f i l t e r s f our milltant&j ex:r ften
t o be, Kt should say without iny IiestiCJtion: L*t thtn be Like Che*
If wt want to say hctf tfe Vant tfw w n *>r future neratlciti5 to be> v t shrjulct
Let tl*p be lifco Criet
If we want to say hw we vant our children, to Iw educatedf ve ihovld say
Mu want ttien to t>s educsted in Oier6 s p i r i t .
1967
KHHh o
CUBA
If ue u=rt a nodei of a pan, a pryfcl of a tan who does not belon t e this time, a
of a nan who belortga to future ttaee, from tlie heart, 11. cay that the ticdcl,.
a sineat bleniih in I t s conduct, without a single blemish in i t s a t t i t u d e ,
a ainjle blemish ir. I t s *ttioni-*.that nodtl la die.
If we want t know hotf ve want our children to be, we should cay, witU a l l our
(^revolutionary nLni) aruJ tasart: We want then t o be llkt
Che h i i bitOD* a t o d t l o man not only for our natlot tut for any
nation. CH* r a i t to! revolutionary s t o l c i s a . the s p i r i t of revolutionary sacrifice4
the eosbativeaess/the wcrfcing s p i r i t tf tlie revolutionary to their highcot
Che ptve t];e Ideas of liar^lsh-Lenlrilso thtir freshest, purest, aost
fcr/ t^presslon* Ho nan like him In these titocs bas raised the s p i r i t of
proletarian iftterrtationallsa to i t s highest level* An4 when w e speiki e t a
intcrnatiunallsti iM when one seeVa an ejacple cf a proletarian.
that eKinple, above any csther exatnple, i s the tjatple of
Jn ^;*, a^m: and i n his heart, the flags, the prejudices, th chsuvlnlEas^ the
egoism had Ai5appe2red< He vat will ing to shed en*routly hla blood tcr tht fortune
of 5h^ people, for the cause af any people * He uas ready to the* I t f r t e l y , ready
ta sbe I t instantly * And to his blood V3s hed i n t h i s land vhere lie was: wounded
in various battles. His blood vsa shed in Bolivia for the redemption cf the
exploited ir.A the oppressed, the humble S-rA the poor. That blood j&s shed for a l l
the- exploited, f=r i l l the oppressed * That blood was shed for a l l the peoples of
Anerlca, 2nd I t uTis shed for Vletncn, because he krew t h a t . In figiitJnK
there, he vaz alter iris Vietnam the highest expreaai&n of Tils
I i vhyf cocirsde Indies and sprXlzn+n of the involution, ue should looh t o the
future with firmness si:d dctermination. That Is ujr,' ve should look to the future
^ optlnifiD^ ^nd we trill alvajs *eJr I s p i r i t ion In Clierc example j
atrvgglej inspiration for tenacity^ Inspiration for lntranslEence before
t and Inspiration for internstjonillsm
i s Ui^T ue, &n ttils niglit, after this impressive ertrpo^y* after
ditlebecause of ^t.3 sagnltufl*, discipline, and dtvstionnass
of recognition, wJitch Shflw* that this i s a itr-sitiVe people, which Ah CMS that
I s an appreciative p t o p l t , vhlch fliws that this people knovs how to pay homage to
the ri#Rpry of t];t C0uT3t0S taeft he f i l l in t i t t l e , uhich clicrfs that this people
kr:oH5 how to aclmowledge those who serve I t , which demonstrates how this people
supports the revolutionary etruscle, M thl people raises end v i l l alva/s keep
tht revolutionary tanners and the revolutionary principles-today, at thla
nt of eojtnenoration, vre shall elevate OUT thoughts and, with optimism In tho
^ with absolute cptlnlsa at out the final victory of the, peoples, t * l l die
#ndf Along ultii Mu t the heroes who fought Ltrd f r l l with him; To victory
Fatherland or death, we aha 11 ttlr+!
Ceretioniep
Rtport] Mivana Donestic Television ard Haalo Service* i n Spanl*h tit
O10T CHP on 13 October 19^T bej^Jn. l i v e noverac* of a mass aeetihg in Havana1 a t l a t i d# 1B.
In oemory cf Err*sto die Cuevsra Opening tantro ahtta rficw a larija '
'j
nost of vh.00 re in Dllitar? f^tlsues, gathered vr.&cr the lltfita in tlie
a speaker's platform placed i-t the foot cf the Jose fcirtl Donuueivt.
15 Qct:>lvr 39^7
tJ*c proninest Cuban pt-rsoRalitlca identifiable on the speaker*s plat fora are:
Prine Minister Fidel fesfcro, Deputy Print JUiUster JTiul Castle, President Osvaldo
Dor tic es I, Cvbin Coemmist Rarty Central Coimlttee Organization Secretary Pr Arnando
Jf?rt, Transportation fttnister faurt Chenea, Fcrelrn Kini5t#r Haul Jtoa, Cttaui
's i"s station President: Vilpa Espin, Interior Minister R.;aLra Valdeij Deputy
Forces Minister Jwn AlttelcU, Wlr.itttr Utthout Fortrollo Carlos flaJTl
Cuban Academy of Scier-cta Frejidtjit Antwilb flunes Jjicenez^ and
ACTOA*
Guillen, 'the Cuban poet, open* the prfl/jram ^ith a poeo eulogizing Cuevara +
A pp^jtetion screen or. tJti plaia i5 vfrcd to bJiow a movie on tn unidentified country,
flld f i l clip* of Ciifr Guevara iJit]) Fidel Ca?fro i n t!it Sierra Hacstro t)ien follw*
Tfierc i r e e t i l l sliota of Caniri follcwftd by a f i l n tc^uence or the VBlleerande area
and Bolivian ranstrs witji what jtpp to b* tJ*S* military personnel. The voice of
Guevara i t heard In tit* background vhilff f l l a clips *1ICHS V*S. (jsunteriirsurseney
cperations and $9ll\lti governiDtRt c f f i c U l s . A filled Oucrara tpeech +i:en followa,
the increasiinff victories of tli= pftflplt of Vittnam aga^.nsfc Ya ._e
tht action in Statiltyville, and other Jllberatlcn movejaentt ejfitwher* In
tht
A ttla clip ridlcults the f i r s t five years of the Alliance Fjr ErGeress by
poor Eafcin Aaeriwns, Kasaeint and iws^papcr arijcle* on the return or Che
guerrilla operatloca arc s^ovn. Stejwt tften /olloy of Military and paranil
counfceri^avrgency personnel^ in viriovs countries. Teletype macnlnes and code sound
ar* used to point up the "increasing wave of liberation artrements."
j
t o conclude th* film show are extrtim* closeup*, f i l l i n g the outdoor ecreen,
Che Guevara'* Jfate, the filn ends ^i*li t x c e r p t s of Guevara's speeches being
vjijle the cameras pan t o hufit pbotacurJls o ' Cutvara i l l u m i n a t e d by
TJie eercpoiv continues Wth pan sJtftfi of Jose Jfepti s t a t u e and of the cronvd In the
p l a i e - Siiots of half-aasted Cuban Hflgj are superimpostd on the huge
t^hiic trie crcwd lisfceju to a recorded Ouevara speech.
A fl-un s a l u t e i"aliens and s s the volleys a r e f i r e d Wit canera pans t o the Guevara
p h o t o c t r i l and tJ:en t o tfie uns and t h e i r misale f 2 a s h # i . A trn^ler blows tftps,
P r e a i e r Castro then steps t o the nlerspliarw and. begirjs hia speech a t 014U flt'BP
19 October*
,
*
'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WUHINOrM 2Sb O, C
or rm
LBJ UBR.ARY
Mandatory Revi
34 October 1967
Document *
\EMOB>NDITM FOR: Mr. George Christian
Frad4 &*cr*tory to Th President
The Whit*
qf l1 Chc" C u e v i r a ^ Diary
SUBJECTi
1l
J
; , '
- -
Director
'
INTELLIGENCE
r?,
* JROUTINE
AGR..CY ^
IN
;
OF 2 PAGES
rtAV"f_ A I R J C S
N*A
Kit
AIO
UtlA
OClT
COM
OH"
BCfl
*~-T11U
B NOVEtlBER 1967
COUKTRT
SUBJECT
1)
2}
SOURCE
1.
UNITED STATES M - H s s V - 1 - H H - H - i - B H H
ON H I S AflRIVAL
FftOM FIDEL CASTRO PUS TO TRE BOLIVIAN EX.XLES IH THE UNITED STATES TO
THE EFFEvCT THAT THE BOLIVIAN. CONFLICT WCfiJLD BE REMEWEP.
THE MESSAGE
A1S0 STATED THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HOT ONLY DID WOT PLAN TO CHANGE
I T S PROGRAM OF
COMMENT!
-THIS .11AY
eUEElRILLAS
OvT !ta5
.5
PAGE 2
2,
OF 2 PAGES
4,
3
2
1
FIELD
DISEEMI
CIHCSO.
a
2
I
c
^. .,!
".
;;
i f !>
DERECTORATE OF
INT^LLIGENCJE
--\
Special Report
" iVIEW
. ? - '-
15 December I9C
SC No. 00300/67A
1 2 FEB
af Current Intclfigencn.
COtfrJiFinite^
t h t sifi-rmal
have :it?t
Current
The Special
*^
CO-MROLS
MUST NOT ]JE RELEASED TO FOE1EJCN
ffrfts:S:fin.( (if DCtD L ~. tllC doL-umtllt must be
r .
:-
"1
Attempt ta Export.
The di3ry
v a r a ' 5 II-TIC^:.'" odypsey was a
Croncertftd StteEupt bj- Cuba to Open
the c e n t r a l Ji*ertlar:d oi 5o-Jth
A-erica t o international, o'jcririlla, insur^er.cy , Since the
f i r s t Tri-Csnt.ir.ent; ^onfcrer.ce
in rfavand in Januarv 19t^ , r'i.del
CSBtrc; had DL'tn i n s i s t i n g that
' i t Is the ducy nc evs^v rcvulur^ tu -axe rEvolutian. "
Reais ne^r?1-1 in his P.a^^tnsiVK 'ii-Lthin. r?*vji:iL^n charted
the- Lde-ologieal ihef of C a s t r o ' s
rnilitariL staler, and i t was Left
CO Glievari, presLcnad srevo] Utionarv
P a ere
Dec 67
BRAZIL
CHILE
^ : ^.ARGENTINA "
guerrillas*
Failure! Of: t.nc C-
Tactics
A disciplined, J;oy^l r
ory^nized revolutionary
is the first r0-uuirerr.ert
ir the Castro-G^Cvara-Debray blueprint for ir,surgencv. in Cutfi*y-i i Z.^: ivif.fi^G., Guevara said ^hat
"honogsneity r respect for the
LtidEr, oravery, and
with the terrain" are the -S
t i a l characteristics of the guerrilla- band..
In Bolivia,
t of these basi^ concepts werE
or ignored.
The band
enmanged of Cubj n, Soiiviarij
and Peruvian nationslR, none of
whs^i vas very fa^ii^iar t-ith t h e
i l
eone-
acteT.pted to
these deficiencies. ?.-
SPECIAL
15
67
,-.?
: vr
ir
;
Sometime En 196-7
"i
Morale
Che was particularly digJit-h. the reluctance of the
Bolivians to work with the Cubans,
and on 12 April reminded them
that "the ^irst blond drayr ^
Cuban." On 25 April r Cftpt. E
Reyes Rcdrigue^ (San LuisJ r a member of the central committee of
che Cuban Comnur.ist Party., was
.killed in sronbat. The loss of
Se,r. Luis 'Ji'as a major psychological
blow Co Giievacar who for the first
tiire was unabashedly despondent,
He mourned that San Luis was "the
bftat man in the guerrilla band"
and a cOTT.r a 3 e "since (San Liiis
was) practically a. ^hild."
The 1OS5 of 5a.i Luis was
a tLrninc poin~ that C-aiiSO-d GUCvara to view the ^-'JerS"! 3-las '
char,cta very critically. Iri biis
mor.thly surjr.ary fsr Apr i 1 r he
pessiiiistically enumc:rte at
leait three :rt3i]0C pr^blens ur.dermining his efforts. Fur the
first tine, he discussed in some
O-etaiJ. the is-ol=tion of tr.c band.
He CDir-alair.ed th.dt "h.e 0?Fi9anLs
SPECIAL
15 Dec 67
Page 5
SPECIAL REPOKT
15 Dec
V . '"
L,
."
i'giul
CfHTBAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
OWLY)
FBI
H/NE BDT.
2B DECEMBER 19G7
CONCERNING FIDEL
. OF VEPTEZUELA; AND CUBAN, CHINESE, AND SOVIET
OF
TO SIATE:
TO JJIA;
TO M E C / l ! C :
5
4
TO KSA:
TO F B I :
FOR MR. S . J .
PAPICH
S1THHABY;
5
PAGE 2 O F l l PAGES
CASTRO E EFFORTS
HAVE BEJilN MAHEETi BY FAULTY PLANNING AST POOR EXECUTION AtfD HAVE BEEtt
DAMAGING TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES.
IT
WIW- PARTICIPATE IN TBX 1SS3 ELECTIONS AND HOPES fli.ATEW YEARS TO JOIN A
COALITION GOVERlfflEHT.
WHILE TEE
CEINTSE AND CUBAJi TEJEOHIES OF REVOLUTION BDTK CALL JOR IMMEDIATE ARMED
, THE ^QVI'ET ISEOPY I S MD&E FiJSSlBLE,
3.4[b)(U
PAGE 3 OF
FIEEL CASTRO, CUBAt AND IKE .PROSPECTS FOR ARMED REVOLUTION Iff LATIN
I,
JtEYQI.UTIQN BECOMES AK. APPROPRI ATE FORM OF STRUGGLEt THE COMMUNIST FAHTY
DF YESTEZirELA tPCV) WILL RESORT TO IT.
i ^ ^ ^ i ^ i ^ H . COMMENT: - ^ ^ H E
1.5fe)
3.4(b)t1)
H ^ H H I ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B n H .
OF LATIN AMERICA HAVE JLAJ3E TJG TTECESSAHV ADJUE'XMEKT AKS EAVE SSl^TE:
THE STRUGGLE TO TEE POLITICAL AJIENA.*
SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION ARE. BETTER THAN. ELSEWHEEE, T>UT STILL ARE NOT GOOD,
CHILE IE THE ONLY COUNTRY IK LATIN AMERICA WHERE A COMMUNIST REGIME'COULD
COME TO POWER BY POLITICAL
5
2.
THIS I S PARTLY
1-Sfe)
IN
PAGE 4
XTTCESESTS
TO ADVANCE.
DANGEKOUS TO ALL
REVOLUTION
ifOVEMEMTS.
XSE OVERRIDING
AMERICAN
"IKTEHVEOTIOH"
EY S I S INSISTENCE
CASTRO SEES THS
LEADERS lii EACn COUNTRY MUST CONTROL THEIR MOVEMENTS AKD AHE BEST
TO v^grc DECISIONS,
3,
TAT8G
ANOTHER
5 OF 1 1 PAGES
SROtTLTJ H BE
TTAS
HOT A
THK COHinJNlSTS.
PERRAPS HE "IS
ir
IILREGULAil COiGTUNlST/ 1
TEE FAULTINESE OF CUBAN PLAKNIKG IE ILLUSTRATED FY THE BOLIVIAN
CATASTROPHE_ANH
ARE RESPONSIBLE.
CASTRO
"i
4
j
S
1
r: I.
IK
PACE 6 Or 31 PAGES
DI5S ISE
6,
I^KAUEfi OF TELE
OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
ITEm CQUMLTtflST PASTY OF YSKEZTJEJA (PCV) SEEKS TO PURSUE ITS
IN SHITTING TO TH POLITICAL
ALL PLANS OF
TEE PCV ARE BASED "ON TB mPi'JJAMENTAL ASEESEMEKT THAT THE CUJtHENT GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA IS STABLE AND SUCCESSFULLY REFORMIST IN NATURE
THIS IMPORTANT ^RANSFOJttiATIDN11 HAS CUT TKE G&OlftTO TROM UNDEH THE
COifiTJ^IET ATTEMPTo TO CHANNEL DI&CONTEKT ALONG TEE LIVES OF ARHED
THE PCV PREFERS SUCH A GOVERNMENT TO A MILITARY UlCTATOHEHIP AND
THAT ffJTHlN A FEW YEARS TEEEE I S THE DEFINITE POSSIBILITY TEAT THE
PARTY MAY EJE ABLE TO JOIN A COALITION GOVERNMENT.
PAGE 7
OF
MHIHI^H~
C C M M S H T
'
^ K V I S ILLEGAL AMD
1.5(6)
BRAVO REt>ftEEElTTS
- ^ - ^ - H CO1UIEHT:
ALTHOUGH HE EMPHASIZES
5
i
2
1
PAGES
THEHE I S MO.
VICTORIES THAT
BRAVO ASD HAVANA BECAUSE BRAVO IS WOT 3 0 STRONG AS EE HAS LEO CASTRO
TO 3ELtEY ASH, JH FACT^ IE GETTING WEAKER*
. W M M M i
COMMENT:
4(b)[Tj
'FRICTION
BSTHTEN
H-x.
.^ 1
9 OF
.^ixjrir.
flEAPCKS.
IXPJSJLIENCE.
TEE SOVIET THE DRV OF REVOLUTION CALLS TOR ALL FOftMS AND
HETEOIJS OF STRUGGLE.
TSE SOVIETS DO
THEIR LIKE CHANGES
TO TES PCV AKD A5E KOT DICTATING WHAT .THE FCV POLTCY SEOITLD
UI3CITSSIOS5 BETWEEN" THE PCV A5TJ MOSCOW "'ARE
I T IE BELIEVED
a_4((,)[i)
o
2
4
3
2
1
1-Sfc}
IN
PAGE 2 0
PAGES
SEASCH FOR TEE IB OWJJ SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF REVDLTTION MID HAS
PKOMOTED lm& EfEVELOPlIENT- OF GHEATEH INTJEPENDENCE^
THE S I K O -
THERE I S SOME
OK
5
I
JJ-4(bj(D
\M
PAGES
3.4(bHD
DISSEif:
QWJJT,
CINCLANT
ONLY,
'INFORMATION
thrti/ c ^ i i f l f l r 111
tlu
dj<:i not
ir,d i i lh
pf
A ttf[ee oC prg^ UidcriUlp ami idqininejcCv* n h L l i L j ,
-I-P^ "pjwrt fpf lii" pTtiCitncial ?.p4,fJ.Llart.1.
DJ r Ltn tn' vn.p\tlt,cLf>lc< ayp^PTtfl
r l i
i h i * ca J *.
iH Hi rc*OEniii tH
it" U I J I C for (S* ^n^ipuljr w f f n t " ri^nirtJi ra
H d
INFORMATION
REPORT
INFORMATION
REPORT
TEI
Dart*
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
L
r4O 'ACE1
1.
3.
San
auny iiBM*dd
n i [ Likely La
n.i
Hj.rriAn.LAi
Dr|Jii.Li.*r
pitrLaLie
* f i r * which
It
i n ntinvincni tli*t Bjrritiityit i i um-pt'ELlaiiily
[>( prtiirntit l i f t L i t i hi fh* itgJ*n-t riin.Lcitinm far h.|i
Llii h-tek
It
which
Tt
l
r
>
th*
ind
jr,
fp
In.
lie It
Eh*
ar u n
E.neTi>Ed b i n i ^ i t * >t
14 *^ppO
It unitl*
tit*.
Ill
rut
tfan
itnwbrti
14
, i
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Special Report
WEEKLY REVIEW
Februnry
SC
12 FLB tS97
JfClAL REPORTS j r r Supplements to th- Cuntnt [nte^iWeekliLLs istufJ by the Office of Curtenf
Reaoris arc published separately to- i
'we ircjrmcjii Of 3 Subject. The/ arc prfl^Gtred by
Hie Qffici^V Curie nr [mflHisencc, the Office of bjpnomic Rtsearch, th.L- afcee of Siraiegjc RcseuTdi. and [h,^Lrccioiate of
Scic-mL; iizia T^ijnalogy, Special R^jjo:ts arsreoordincited JS
approprLre ^nionJn.' DirccLuiaces of CIA.Jfcil, except for tlic
riomul iUbstsriMYL! eSCiiail^e with (?t3;cr ipfilti^s at ihc warkin^
l;vcl. luve r.Ot been c t ^ d i n i T f d OUtEid^CJA unicSi specificity
indi^CdJ,
TlicSPtClAL REPORT caffcjidS cTusLfitd information affcmin^ Nic njticn;L? dtfense J H thi UnitcnSSinos. wi^]ijn the miiinins of Tirk Jo, wtii^ns 7^J arid 7 9 4 ^ f t|ic US Cocich ss
ai;wniii-LLi. l i i tr^in5n|tiiion o: iev?lniQ^ orife contents to o^ rcccipl by ^n LinjuL|(Sri2-;<] person is prohLbit^cl
/
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
:
revolution
aa an i n nt.
Once
however, i t
SPECIAL
Feh
t
r
Page 1
II
From l a t e 13 61 t h r o u g h
L963, 'Jhe CllJj an re a; i ne step ced
UD the terr.po of i t s foreign Operations L The ^ost spectacular
ftwr.l: d-jr i Me t h i s period VJas
the discovery ot a cache of
th^ee tQI^-S 0- weapons on a
VenezuElar. beur': in NovenilseIT
19&3. "he weapons included
l i g h t au c DTI a c i c r i las An d
sub ma en me gUTi y d e f i n i t e l y
i d e n t i f i e d as among those
sbipped to Cuba ftOrt BclnilJO
in 1959 and 13-6CI. The^e were
also mortars, bazookas, r e COilless r i z l a s , dnd ajr.-nu n I *i on
Of Ln5 mar.ufaeturt: . The no^or
of a smal.1 Jjoat fgund r.ear the
cache s i t e was one of GCVC^al
Cuba hari e a r l i e r scquired frrcir.
SJECIA1, REPORT
16 P e b $9
seized
by the Venezuelan authorities
shortly a f t s i Tihe discovery of
the Caihe indicated that the
equipment was intended for the
paramilitary arm of the Venezuelan
Party for Plan Caracas
at disrupting the p r e s i dential elections in December u-r
that yearL
Page 3
5 F EC I Air REPORT
16 f e b 6 8
q
assets, Moreover, there
is evidence that Castro has created a special 60-man intelligenc
i s
under way ,
the
bsen developing 6
ir-crSnani sm while they -^ai
a s u i ' ^ b l o opportunity ^^d ade-
DIREOOKATE OF INTELLIGENCE
QtilZI OF THE DIBFCIOIt
JQWF1 HDVliSri
L~^ilrn. J,n|r-E.3 ^ r j
r
IMlEkll
Page 4
SPECIAL RPdJlT
16
x-
"run" hy tJic i l g
"departnent--charged with
collecting informatisn as well
as per.tftr&ting local governments .
The second grou^ is recruited find
d ^ ^ the"department o nal i b s r a t i o n Co guide and
support revolutionary a c t i v i t i e s .
Guerrill?- warfare t r
or the l a t t e r grouo is
Ln ndtiOfia.1 u n i t s ranging in s i z e
from three to Si.
Courses y&uallv
l a s t three to SU months, although
in 5 7?ccia! caFieE- they may l a s t AS
long as a year.
Training covers
a l l asDHCts of g u e r r i l l a warfare,
including weapons hjndLi^g, ejsplosivss , saiiutftse . deir.ul^ t i on ,
m i l i t i r y t a c t i c s \ sor&at er.gmuerand means of cc^ntenr.cj a n t i ^ent a c t i v i t i e s r
At l e a s t
,
Latin Americans ace known
to have gone to Cuba far such
t r a i n i n g since 136i.
Tnis M'-L-rrjer by no nieans
"e:3regftr.'_3 a jnaxiirtTn figure for
the guerxilla potsnti^l.
Many
o: these trdi:ieea, for instance ,
have in ";urn trainu^ others when
they returned to th*ir home counbecame di's i 1.1'JS icne^ I'L^'" the
d i f f i c u l t i e s Q$ i n i t i a t i n g anr.ed
rtVOlmtlOTl r ^nd Le'^ the field
to more enthusiast t i r Cd5 tra.i t e s .
The onlv ifttarnation.il mDoeratiun anoncf these trai.-ieas appears
to involve these whose countries
are n
In the le-st year or SO r
has demonstrated an irJfjroved c a p a b i l i t y to
clandestinely with i t s
This a b i l i t y has not
been t r a n s l a t e d irtto a
FLEPORT
IS Pflb 60
i1 age &
SPECIAL REPORT
, he claims that
g u e - r i l l a u n i t s , wbtn hoidly lr.-u.r
can take t o the f i e l d , sustain
znenselves theiti, c
the conditions that will
their eventual success"Chs" Guevara's i l l - f a t e d
efforts in Bolivia and Cuban i n volve nr.ent in the- inGUresnt Landing in Ucf-C?Uu 1 a l a s t year are
excellent examples of Castro's
theories, in accion,
His a^civi= ies during 195'/ And his aic-rwpS^tetS ^J Ledcjes--as recent -as
12 January 13 6 B - - to " i t i J f i l l his
duty DE s o l i d a r i t y " -with revaiuti3nftrit.L!i t.;LrO'jghout tne ^ovLdr
clearly demonstrate niG deterir.inatLon. to Fc-read his ri
Uis declaration o?
Sovamber IE*61 that he -^o'jld not
support vroald-b-E- in a ilif g^nt groups
vhich wetv not UMdsr the control
of the orthodox pro-HciECow Com-TJ^istSr tas^i"= lias CDntinu^d to
^ive r o r a l , natc-riAA, and financ i a l sufioort and. t^aininq to s e lected groups.
r'urth.Ermore , he
r.zde i t c l e a r in. speec^ifts during
LQ7 that he does ncz f e ^ l
nv Z\*i I960 agreement JMd
r.is s s r s i s t = n t thesis -hat v
^svoiut^on is rificessary to
about any meaningf^l aolic
: I
or s o c i a l chanoj.
on z-'
of
i ons he f L ur.c a c c u s A
(i-etrayal ut
Cotnmunist p a r t i e s in Ver.aL an.d Oolonu^icL r ^hich do ."ot
f u l l s u n p o r t to d i s s i d e n t
jue^riLla^.
Ks ippaartd p a r t i c u l a r l y ir!-:ad t h a t a Soviet d e l e g a t i o n had been t r y i n g tc improve
Page
The
SPECIAL REPORT
IS
Cmrr/Snt
for the past y e a ' , thereforej
Havana'a e f f o r t has beCri to lay
Page 3
ering g u e r r i l l a
activities-
X6
t h a t othsr landings took place during 19 67, and a t l e a s t one: irnpartar.'. Landing occurred in JvLy L9 66,
guerrillas are
being hard pressed by gcverri'inent fcrces,
In August, their
urban t e r r o r i s t organization was
paralyzed by vhe arrest and capture of a nunber af 1^5 leaders.
Thera 1=; also in forma t ion indicating tr.at fricLj,on has developed between the Cuban a:Kl
Venezuslr.ntf-C-n&crsof the guerr i l l a groups.
The fjbans ars
s a t i s f i e d with the revolutLO
3nth-Js i a.snft of nOii" Ver,-52-ue 1 an
fOnpa^iiotis r and tha Vsne2uhlans
?CSt.Lr.- ~ha ' ' a d v i c e ' the Cubuns
are gi^i^tj thtir, t:ie same iiype o
f r i c t i o n that developed in Bolivia.
Cuba
Lias b^sn tiviMcj Assict^uce and
guidance ^o c L j s r r i l i a and t a r groupB for; more than thre
recent a m y Opc:ratio^5
againsl. tht; insurganta ar^d lJie
E i
of rightist vigilant
have played havoc with
and are
3 t i l l captble of
attacks
geve r.nineri.t. T
3n GuaceT.s 1 an
en. lf> J a n
uary- c l e a r l y d
trats
the
y
t^merting capasili Si
officials vare also
Havana radio ^uiclcly DL>iicized the shooting incident and
indicated; that lhcha" Guevara's
deach was instrLJJT.&r.taL in un i ting
the Guatenalar. ^uerri L Las . In
oi the scten rentiatcd Cviban
SPECIAL
P a r t y \F-ZZ) i s r e p o r t e d l y t r y i n g
t o c o n v e r t i t s guaxxLlla arm, t h e
Revolutionary Prised f o r c e s (F'AfiC) ,
i n t o inacrivft " a e l f - c e f e n s e - " groups
This fallows a. r e q u e s t frcu-n t h e
&ovj.et Urtion t o avoid any i n c i d e n t s Lhat might complicate i t s
nevlv e s t a b l i s h e d
?eb 63
SECRET
a i v e n an7?le n o t i c e
tjiat i t i rite-ids to c o n t i n u e i t s
a f o ? a rj an da , t r a i n i n g , and
o i a l s u p p o r t cO a e l e c t e J ^f
t i o n a r y g r o u p s - - e s p o c i a 1,1^
i n C Qr Lonb v a , Gua t eina 1 a r and Ve,^fizuela+
Given C a s t f ^ 1 - g a a l of
?agiilO
developing and exploiting- opportunities for further armed violence, plus the vulnerab
that exist in pnar.y Latin
countries, sew outbreaks
Castro-sponsored
violence in Latin Ai
be
e^pectEd,
Such ventures
have
l i t t l e chance of success,
unJLesa th.ey exploit genuinely
popular antigovernment causes
develop a. brO-ao peasant base ar,d
a charismatic indigenous leader,
Giitvars's defeat in Bolivia shows
that despite Cuba's necriariisn for
sponsoring guerrilla groups And
C=is^rOrs willingness to in f i l t r a t e
Vey Cuiian Arm,y officers into selected countries, thesft efforts
will at beat produce only
harassrr.rjnts of the: central
ernflwnts for the fortseeAfcle future r The danger increases, however, iv-, ^.hcise countries -where
p o l i t i c a l and economic development has hftcn marginal, antl wh
a threat af a spLir; jn the usufil
guarantors u S t a b i l i t y - - L . C. ,
the TRilitary or oLigirchyis a
grcwj,n= p o s s i b i i i t y ,
Should triis
occur, what had heen minOf disturbanccs iii the countryside cauls
suddenly mushroCTd inta a p o l i t i cal forrjt out of proportion to
i t s numbers..
fBB#PSBBW^^"W!"BBBGr^
SPECIAL REPORT
16 Feb
r.
GUATEMALA: Arw of GuerriFU Activity
i *
*.
**-:
. JO
FARC-23O/1O&
Si1 !
J .
H -
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
- . < :;
Special Report
15 March 1968
SC No. 00761/6SA
1 Z FEB
REPORTS are supptontnls TO tlic Current Jritej^Wcektiei Lsnued by lufc Office of Current
["he 9^:c]aL Reports a;e pubLiEhcd separably lo |
e trcitrnujit ai u subjud. TKey are pro^bred by
CurrenT Lnt^llisilicc. tin-1 OiTicc df E^tiomic Research, tli d f f i w of SUJti^ii Rraejrck, and tll^Tir-rcCQrate of
5;jcncc and Te\hnelony. SpdCiat Rcporls ir^coordinj(crf ai
sc-Sgjt for tit?
SubstJciTJve ^H_;h^fl^C with QLhcroECilcie&at the working
[eveI, have not b n C^rd]]i3tcd outsidjfClA unlei-j
JSEECIAL
5 PEC IA J.. RFJ'ORT tpffuins Stassified infornialion affeccin^ Elit naijoiijl d?;'er.seyff the L'nirc^Stacci. wiihin thcmeajijni; of Title IS. seciyfti 792 and 'P'Wpi 1 Lh= u s Code, 3s
3mended. Els (:jrtS;un-jiOfl or fcveEaLjon or*ls corlents to or reby un unauUf"1"^^- person ES prohibitt
D[55EMINAT[OM CONTROLS
:.'. S O C I A L REPORT MUST NOT BE
GOVERNMENTS and must be handled!
'^rk af specific dJ5serinination co]itrol pip
1/7.
TO
1
- !
1!''}
*'-
'-;"
The strident bellicosity and adventurism chara c t e r i s t i c of Cuban foreign policy since early 1956
have: obscured a nuMber of modifications in domesticpolicy that have- significantly changed the nature
Of the revolution an d the role of Fidel Castro. With
the gradual instituticnalization of the regime, he is
increasingly dependent on the governing apparatus he
has created to implement his policies.
Castro is s t i l l unquestionably in charge and is
effective in portraying himself as the l i f e force nf
the revolution^ The military and Security forces
are fervejitly loyal, and Castro s t i l l enjoys a large
degree of popular support, especially among the youth,
the peasants, and the poor working c l a s s . Despite
h.ia continued prfi -e cii nen ce , however, Castro has increasingly isolated himself during the past two years.
Meaningful political dialogue has almost ceased, and
the regime has become- considerably more inflexible.
Castro seeTtiB to distrvst the bureaucracy he has created and has surrounded himself with a "Cult Of guerr i l l a heroes" in order to preside over i t b e t t e r .
Castro's contact with the Cuban masses has also
been reducedpartially as a. result of the harriers
imposed h<f the bureaucracy.
He is s t i l l obsessively
messianic, but his direct appeals to the! people: have
decrea&od. In i9f5? he made o-Tily I t major Speeches ,
fewer than in any year since I9fil.
Political discussion has been effectively
s t i f l e d in the bureaucracy and in the press, and the
condemnation Of a dissident "miCrOiactiOn" in January
was fl reminder of the dangers of questioning Castro.
Perhaps realizing that A political vacuum is being
created balnw him, Castro has dramatically emphasised
the importance of a small "cult of guerrila b e r o e s ' - confidants from his original 56th of July Movement
who constitute the second rung of leadership.
SPECIAL REPORT
15 Mar 63
. , *J
..
- L_
."_.
'
v "u -
^-.
_ ri.i
Page 2
SPECIAL REPOHT
IS nar
. t
in.-.-..;-.'
r_~
.'7
' I '-',"!
>i
_;
t'-i.
".
t.
CASTRO
16 and i s viewed as a required
badge of fevolutionary valorParticipation in the anti-Batista
and Bev a* PigfS campaigns are
causes"for adulation, Some c i v i l
ian leaders arc appearing more
y ir? military a t t i r e r
the usOAlW dapper President Sorticoi has begun to con
fatigues irt one of his aux
r f l ] ? s as chief of the m i l i t i a ,
in his spee-Ch on 2 January,
declared !:hat 19 6 6 vjould. he k riown
as ihe "Yeac of the Heroic Guerrilla, "
5PECIAi REPORT
15 Mar
SPECIAL REPORT
Mar 6
I-
1 ^'
'
Kir>i.
:';>
'ik'
i'-
i..
i r
/-
relatively o w n discussions of doHEstic issues. it was T&oat dramatically used in this fashion in
1964 when the dispute between "Che1
Guevara ar.G his opponents was made
public in %ts n
yA.
Page
state
3y the end Ofj llJ^j, thepai'Cy had ente-red its final stages
of organization It had a membership or 55,000 and Ar, elaborate
apparatus etendir.g to all lev-el $ .
Sir.re thenH it has increasingly
taken Command through it a Own organization r throuqh the mags organizations it controls, and
through the state acV.inistration
r Local) T
C4Etru envisions the party
as a foil and overseer lo the
rest: of the burfiaucracy ar.d has
endsavored to Xeep it a small
"vdrL^'jar^" ornjaniza-t-ion , Most of
its important posts are occupied
by 2 of July veterans, and it
has cltarly become the political
of tite "guerrilla heroes,11
It appears that Tneir.befship
will not be expanded significantly
beyond the present 6O r OQQ cr the
nexr. feu years, but eventually the
party will probably absorb a large
portion of the youths in the Union
of Young Couuminists t The first
SPECIAL REPOET
15 Mar 6 3
I- ! '
municipal administrations
lfl^QOD of these representatives
were e-l*cted from the
h
CDft haa served && & r.e
watchdog apparatus s.T\d as the
regime's basic administrative
Outlook
Castro's first priority is
to continue the "revoi'J
process" and to ''prepare" tiie
youth, to join in leadership with
him and the "guerrilla cult,"
In the meantimej there nay
be some "rationalists" in the
bureaucracy who see advantage in
the H1 liberal" econ-om-e and political policies thit are being discussed in some East EuropeaTi Cofltnuntries.
l losing t^ie exnose of the
dissident 'hJdicrofaction" in January, however, they will be even
more reluctant to criticize the
regime. In any casej they re
disorganized and subject co both
party controls an^J the scrutiny
Of the security forces. They pose
no threat to Castro, and with
the- muting of poLiticaL and press
discussions, there is little they
can do to expound their views.
Page
-REPORT
15 Mar
'
'
Seccfet
Diutat
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Latin American GtUfrrifia Today
IEIH31IIMRT
EXENrflDHSEbllll
lull]
IATLJUG ?II1
N!
4<
22 January 1071
No. 0354/71
SPECIAL REPORTS ure Mippl^mcrn.-; to t|ic Current Intelligence Watties Issued by the Office of Current rntc!lience.
TlK-
SU^L-L^J
o Current JnttltiKen^j. the OtTLii of" Econcnnu Research, the Odtict flf Strategtc Rcwsareh, and tho Directwdtc of
Science 3nd Tec3iiiOrCigyr Speciuf Repyrts nit coofJiiuited aa
nppnopriate jfreng the Dtrcetorjtw of CLA but, except for the
nufcLul subsLuntive cxt-hLin.nc wiiSi o t K e r ^ i t L 1 ] ] ^ ^ ^t the
level, how
WARNING
The SPECIAL REPORT contains classificil infornsutioa
ing the national defense of the United StiLies. vriiimi the miRot Title I3 3 section 793 ami 7P4. of the US CoJe: ff5
. Its tunsruiiiiun ur rcvclatlojl oi itiCOslterns to r rcby an u]]jniF5oriiiiiJ i^FSun K [jrpTijr>ited by
J'JtSSEMiNATION CONTROLS
THE 5PECJAL RFPOKT MUST NOT RF. RRLEASED TO
FOREtCN GOVERNMENTS 41 nd must be hiindk-rl within the
frjinewoik of iprLjfit d[sS(?rncnatiun nontrol provisions of
DCID 1/7,
jram
Rapart
2 January 1971
Dissent
Special Report
-2-
22 January 1971
SEC
Special Report
22 January 1971
SECRET
Diaem
Latin America
Btfflps ALl^^i^T.P
POPULATION
- S5C.GM-3GO.toQ
4 6DC.0DC-1j00ft,MQ
e Cwr 1.M0.00&
Sfcial
CCEJH
-4
SECRET
January
SECRET
Diuem
/
Special Report
-e
22 January 1971
4>
SEG*ET
Special Report
22 January 1971
SE!RET
SEC]
n Disism
Special Report
12 January 1971
SECRET
VWo Fa/iigH
sonie time. The baldly Executed Jackson kidnaping shows that the terrorists retain the capability ta carry out complex arid important assaults and that Iha government's refuse] to negotiate arid police dragnets have had onry limited/
results. Immediate Tupamaro objectives and their
full capabilities are not known, hut it i j likaly
that the t&frorists- will remain actfve in th* Coming
months, perhaps building toward a concerted,
large-scale campaign Of urban terrorism to Coincide with the period preceding the presidential
lti
fctrtit
Ditsem
Special Report
1971
SEGRET
Special Report
-9-
SEKET
22 January 1971
SECRET
flfo foreign Dt
An almost immediate reaction to this escaPfldfl was the attempted abduction of a Soviet
diplomat, apparently by right-wing extremists led
by an official of the Argentine Federal Police,
The effort was foiled by the pallca. One af the
most spectacular events of the year was the kidnap and murder of former president Pedro
Aramburu. He was abducted Dn 29 May, and the
kidnapers, who later identified themselves as
Montorwros, said Dn 2 June that he had been
tried and executed for crimes allegedly committed when he.headed a provisional government
from 1955-58. The military government of President Qngania, seriously embarrassed, was ousted
by the armed forces a week later.
Terrorism has continued during the administration of General Levlngston. On 1 July 1970 a
15-man commando group, whose members identify themselves as Montoneros, terrarizecl a small
town near Cordoba. They robbed a hank, occupied the police- station, and severed communica-
Special Report
-10-
SECRET
2 January 1971
SEC
aett
NoFo
/
Bnlivia
Special Report
11 -
SEQRET
2? January L971
SEC
emphasis to urban tactics wilh the help at individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chifean advisers.
Since 1969 the FAR has escalated its activities. In the autumn, guerrillas overran an oil-clrilling camp near the Mexican bordarr occupied a
rural town, temporarily seised farms in gutlying
areas, and increased assassinations in rural areas.,
In December, the FAR launched a particularly
violent but unsuccessful campaign to dfsrupt the
March 1970 presidential election. FAR cadres
killed more than a dozen security officials, the
right-wing candidate for mayor of Guatemala
Special Report
Disstm
12-
SEC
22 January 197]
City, and a highly regarded editor of the country's leading riewipspeT. Fire bombings in downtown Guatemala City caused damage estimated fn
the minions of dollars.
nd rural methods.
Special Report
-13-
RET
22 January 1971
SECRET
/
violence. In August 197Oh for example-, thia party
)Ut>licly commended terrorists In Uruguay who
The upsurge of terrorist activity in November reitJlt&d frt one af iris harshest crackdowns in
memory. On 13 November Preside/it Arana declared a 30-day state of siege thai was extended in
December for another month. Stringent counterinsurgenty measures were adapted that resulted
in the death of a I least one guerrifla leader and
the capture of another. The governmentrS action-5
were so exaggerated that the Air Force mistakenly attacked a ftee-t of Salvadoran shrimp
boats in the Pacific believing they were engaged in
11 Melt activity, Four boats were sunk,, two
S l d
ware killed, and IB wounded.
Right-wing countertenor ists ha also beer
active an a large scale- Their operations were
nesponsibfe for many deaths during the Tecent
State Of Sfage. Piefirderit Arana has admitted1 privately that the government is unable fuJly to
cgntroP counterte-rror, for most of which pa Ike
and WCUrlly officials are responsible. Government
and right-wing sources aTie believed responsible for
the recent murdars of two prominent politicians.
On 15 January congressman Ada If p Mijannasa.
WaN-known intellectual wtio had been confined to
a wheelchair^was killed. On 17 January one of
Guatemalan leading labor officials was machine
gunned. The continuing inclusion of prominent
political figure* on the government's clandestine
assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of
rotributory viole-nce in motion.
Special Report
- 14-
SECRET
22 January 1971
SECRET
a Foretm Diisein
Special Report
- 15-
SECRET
22 January 1971
SEQKET
Special Report
-16-
SEGftET
22 January 1971
Dinem
th&tfftD
Special Report
17
CfKK
SECRET
22 January 1971
Ssferet
Secret
t
jcret
UrRNEOFIRRELUK
DATLJUII2M1
OUTGOING
MESSAGE
jjiJ:..;.;. j . ; | ~ . r ; i
a[ *
0.1F
v i
4G
INFO
F4LE
Irt
Wt4
i ^j
L^J
IKi
-*
**
PMll*
0
COHP
rj
0
0
CL BY;
TMPDET
OUTGOING
MESSAGE
'LJ.
IMAL
rn
our o 0
jt^^art
UAEABll
0 -<*.
0
.NTO; HLC
WM<I
.//
//IN EACH CASE THE ASSAILANTS WERE UNIDENTIFIEDi
PREVIOUSLY UNKKOUN TERRORIST ENTITIES CLAlfTEB RESPOMSIBILITV FOfi
THE ACTION*
BRIGADE {NAMES FOR THE FOUNDER OF THE TUPA(1AROS> TOOK CREDIT FOR
TRAHAL'S ^EXECUTIONi" WHILE THE "CHE GUEVARA INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE"
ma PROCLAIM ITS TRILJDPH IN ELIMINATING ZENTENO-//V
//IT IS POSSIBLE THAT EITHER OR 90TH ACTIONS ARE THE UORK
OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* BASED IN ARGENTINA^ THAT CALLS
ITSELF THE REVOLUTIONARV ORDINATING JUNTA*
THIS CROUP
LED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN BOLIVIA* URUGUAY.
PARAGUAY* CHILEn BRAZIL* AND ARGENTINA AND DEDICATED TO THE VIOLENT
OVERTHROW OF niLlTAflY-BACKED GOVERNHENYS IN THOSE COUNTRIES*
OF BANKING FIRHS IN BUENOS AIRES UHO HAVE BEEN THE VICTlttS OF
TERRORIST KIDNAPING OPERATICNS HAVE SAID PRIVATELY THAT THE RANSOff
MONEY THEY PAID NEVER REACHED LATIN AMERICA^ BUT UAS PAID IN (SOLD
AND DEPOSITED IN BANKS IN BEIRUT* LEBANON AND IN UNflARKED SWISS
DATE;
OJHGr
BXT:
tv
2
CL BY:
IMPDET
OUTGOING
MESSAGE
''T
OJ1F
&*****
CQtV.
FILE
*4MJ
re
PtH
IH ITALY.
//IN
NATIONAL TERRORIST A C T I V I T Y
CL B:
3"3 u-. C
3 June 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy I n s p e c t o r General
SUBJECT:
Statement by C
Tconcerning
"
'
'"
'".
latex thatf
^ ^ G
J*
f
T'&fficer in
charge
training the 2nd
g of^the military"mission
y
i
"
f
J
Ranker Battalion,'
to come to -Santa "Cruz
to meetf.
Jand
Cescarapela.) * C
t111^*.
t doable-actioji aUtomaT-xa* piStolg. EJuring their activities' as inanda<ivisotij Umy .a^sunted the role of Bolivian
'as foreign
, although,
g theyy were kjiovm
j
g advi'soTS to a
i
f
P
I
number of Bolivian officers'*.. P
Isaid that he learned later
that .the American Ambassador Jfad prohibited anyone other" tha.n
he and[
jfron becoming involved in the anti-guerrilla
activities in the field.)
^ Despite thsir apparent status as Bolivian .officers,
Jsaid that they never ^ete given orders by hi^herg Bolivian officers (One exception to this nrule
was the
c
vhich Colonelf
..._3 is sued
tq
.
"]
^^
^Y
^
K
a'^s OKCcuiorij ifT
,_ story 15 to be believed.)
ft. r
^ has a*5i
tJ
J
and the'
Puc^ra, and the-Headquartersof
the dangers "were
were moved toi Puc^r,
q
the Eighth Division were moved
to
Vallegrande.
fj
--J
d
V l l d
fj
J
role,, suggesting
continued in-his
i
n advisory
y
g g g areas for etx^o
l l as the
h d
l t
th InteJUis n c &
deploynent as well
deployment
off the
.teams. On the 8th of October, conta-Ct was ^^tahUshed with
Guevara's remaining forces(At this time[... ^-Jwas' in
1
Vsli^*rand:e andf
{) in ^sp^raniaO 0^ t h e a*> ^ a 3 o r
" Ir&oorted over the radio that "the chief" had. been
captured.
"1 thefl flew av^r the ar^a in a PT-fi carrying;
with him a PRC-lO^adio with which he was able to communicate
vith. the Bolivian forces- He then confirmed that: Guevara-was
lh
the chief" vbo had be^n captured. He returned to Vallegrande
wheres he told/J
Tthat Guevara had been vounded and
captured.
***
.
Jit.
-4-
1:L
*C
^lZ '
3 set
- . , - ,
b.nd Majoy^
Jthen reviewed thd captured
documents andf
jjobtained perinission .from*
1 to
photqarapn a i r the papers^ including Guevaraf s a l a r y y and also
. : iJ permission ta retain the original accommodation
addresses found,
(
fa
13* WhileL
"l^nd all the other Bolivian officers
(with the exception o f a Lieutenantf
J) were 'pnr side of
the village attending to other milir&xy affairs ^ . ^ .
J
Temained in Higueraa as the highest ranking "Bolivia.^ cjfficer1'
In- t h i s capacity he ansvered a call received an-the military
field telephone and answered as Captainf
~\ He was given
the code numbers 500 and GOG as orders flnich. Vere to be
implemented hy coimnand o^ "higher- authorities^... He said that
the connection waa nat cl.ear and he could not recognize the
voice but I t could have b^en that o Major
T In any
casej[
"jsaid that, since i t was a l i n t only available
to the military h.e was confident that i t was order re^
transmitted through military channels- He said that he
that S00 referred to Guevara t oOO to the -word execute and
700 to the preservation-of Guevarra's l i f e . These simple
codes had been identified to hisn
14. .Uponr
Tr<3tUTH,f if-f J t o l { i ^ iil1
ge imdf
.Joo* i t as a f authentic order and
no eflorf tJr have i F confirmed, C PK*- Jasked" if
J
h was J.n
J sympathy
th
th ^
execution.,) ff
Jsaid
that he
vish but
that i t vasSiot in his power to reverse the-order, .
HetoI d r - V Mthat he was well aware of the treatment which
Fidel fed lietid out to Cubans and told him to execute Guevara
in any manner which he might chcos*- f
J s a i d that he
_
'had" %o leave TEOT Yallegrande at lO^D.a^m,11 ait^vouldsend
\
a helicopter back to picl; up Guevara's 'body at 2 p.m., and
'as a friend", asked-- that the body be ready, f
J
^
reiterated his r^qu^st that the order be appealed and
/
agreed to niak* the attempt, aud said ]ie would adv^e i t he .-
vere
IS Failin* a cqunter-mandin"^ of the order and as the
senior "Bolivian officer" left in HisuerasX m
j s a i d he
vas left vlth the implementation'ofthe e^e^ution. After
F
^LeftX
liias^ahi.e.Jto t a l k to Guevara, who
-^
L
i d e n t i f i e d f T\< _ J e i t h e T as a Fuer^O-Iii^aii vy* Cuban .
.'wftvlf-inn for* U.S. irttelliEence. Hti said, he made t h i s judgment
on'the ba^is
o;the questions asfced .and o.nr ^V
J
While r
'i'rv- Vasvith-Guevara., shots vere fired ia
j
^ d f C\
"later determined that these involved the
prisoners. Recognising
execution off two othe? prison
gg these shots .
h
l
G
a
b
l
a
n
c
h e d vhen
vhen
for vhat they were, 'neverthelesss> Guevara-blanched
r \ \ Iconfintied -that he too would l?e execute*j although
r
later c5mi>osing himself.
.
.
16. After
After leaving Guevara,^ v'^
^ --jj^ ^1 41 4aa sergeant
sergeantof
of
the order to execute Guevara. and^er\truse^
the
mission
to
him^ ^
th
i i o
to h
He was told no fire below the r head. The order was given to
the sergeant at 1:00 p-m. and
< { 1 heaxd the shots fired
at Guevara at 1:20 p.m.r At 2:^0 'p + pir, tha helicopter returue
to Kiguera5. A Father
'Jperfarmed the last r i t e s and
Guevara's remains wexe ^ t r a p p ^ to one of the helicopter 1 5
5kid,5 and
' ^accampanied: them to Vallegrande, where
t^iey land^l at zHo p^m. ' \ ' ^"said that he lost: himself
auickly in the crowd gathered at4:he airport, but that
J t o o t charge of the remains and was photographed,
^ a i d that the t i t l e o the photograph, which aoceaved
in the press , gave an incorrect identification of
the nane^
'
Jused,
F T
*fri-r$&^*r<:iijJvnX*t&*L,
-e17 f.
3 s a i d h e reported t h e executions t o Major
Oand t h e h llief of Operations, af^
J
then, was taken bac^ t o i d e n t i f y tfis5"oet7T3-(T^Ehe--tEiT.c.e _..
h
fc
d
S t C
i v t h the
executed guerrillas / ' They
thsn
drov*
no Santa
Cruzviththe
documents films and equipment and then flew-to
La
PHI,
1
vhere^ t l , - . ^contacted n his
cise officer- 'He was taken to
a home where t h e ^
J* d other Americans were briefed, by
"him. Every thing *~w IvicTl he had be&n able tp retain^was turned
injthen to bo carried by a special courier to
_ ^ V,^_ .Chen- fleyr back to Santa. Crui Xere a< i
b / GensTaL Porter,CINC50UTH, was to pict him
w
up for a,"flight to the Caaal Eone- This plaTie arrived with
a f l a t t i r e on the 10th ox l l t l i . r The U.S. tfissijia. a^m-at fr
a C-54, was then flown to Santa Crua .and Tie _ and r
Jf
. were flown ba-ci: to La- Paz. After o^erniEhtiTig therej .atntchei
C-130 1 carried then" to Panama where-^
?wa-s as Iced to
relate his stprv to General Pcrter. After-E weets in Panama,
r
'nanti^
.
^Jwere documented as GS-16s' so that they
, j^oulti board s. over^boolted Eailitary flight to Ch&rlottej
South Carolina, After j;heir arrival there, they jiouxiieyed
to Miami, WhereP
^ b r i e f e d General Cushmau. ^
j
believes that in both Kigh-level briefings he men-Cloned
ovm personal' role in the execution of Guevara,) . ,L