ULTRA VILLA FOOD HAUS, and/or ROSIE TIO petitioners, vs.

RENATO
GENISTON,
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
PRESIDING COMMISSIONER (4th DIVISION), respondents.

Facts:
During the elections of May 11, 1992, private respondent acted as a Poll Watcher for
the National Union of Christian Democrats. The counting of votes lasted until 3:00 p.m.
the next day, May 12. Private respondent did not report for work on both days on
account of his poll-watching.
Upon arriving home on May 12, private respondent discovered that Tio had phoned
his mother that morning. Tio allegedly gave his mother an inscrutable verbal lashing,
and informed the latter was dismissed from work. The following day the private
respondent went to Tios residence to plead his case only to be subjected to a brow
beating by Tio who even attempted to force him to sign a resignation letter.
Private respondent filed a complaint before the commissioners and prayed that
petitioner Tio pay him overtime pay, premium pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, salary differential and 13th month pay. He likewise prayed for reinstatement plus
backwages or, in the alternative, separation pay, as well as moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
Petitioner Rosie Tio, on the other hand, maintained that private respondent was her
personal driver, not an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus. In which he was required
to report for work at 7:00 a.m. to drive petitioner to Mandaue City where petitioner
worked as the Manager of the CFC Corporation. Private respondent was likewise given
increase on his salary, free meals as well as 13th month pay at the end of the
year. Petitioner denied dismissing private respondent whom she claimed abandoned his
job.
Though well aware that May 12, 1992 was a holiday, petitioner called up private
respondent that day to ask him to report for work as she had some important matters to
attend to. Private respondents wife, however, coldly told petitioner that private
respondent was helping in the counting of ballots. Petitioner was thus forced to hire
another driver to replace private respondent. Private respondent came back a week after
but only to collect his salary.
The Labor Arbiter found that private respondent was indeed petitioners personal
driver and concluded that private respondent, being a personal driver, was not entitled
to overtime pay, premium pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Private
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respondents claim for salary differential was likewise denied since he received a daily
salary of P90.00 which is more than that set by law neither to be awarded separation
pay. While the hiring of a substitute driver amounted to a constructive dismissal, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that the same was justified in view of petitioners dire need for the
services of a driver. The Labor Arbiter, however, noted that petitioner failed to comply
with procedural due process in dismissing private respondent and thus ordered the
former to indemnify the latter the amount of P1,000.00.
Both parties appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) wherein it found private respondents arguments
meritorious, and ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondent and to pay him the
sum of P45,311.55 in backwages, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest days,
13th month pay, and service incentive pay.
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant his overtime pay, holiday
pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave
covering the period from October 28, 1990 to May 10, 1992.

ISSUE:
(I) Whether private respondent was an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus or the
personal driver of petitioner; and (II) Whether private respondent was illegally
dismissed from employment.

HELD:
I
The Solicitor General, in his Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment, agrees
with petitioners submission that private respondent was her personal driver. [6]
We find that private respondent was indeed the personal driver of petitioner, and
not an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus. There is substantial evidence to support
such conclusion and situatons such as:
Renato Geniston usually drive[s] Mrs. Tio from her residence to the
office. Thereafter, Mr. Geniston will wait for Mrs. Tio in her car. Most of the time,
Renato Geniston slept in the car of Mrs. Tio and will be awakened only when the latter
will leave the office for lunch.

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Mr. Geniston will again drive Mrs. Tio to the office at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and thereafter the former will again wait for Mrs. Tio at the latter's car
until Mrs. Tio will again leave the office to make her rounds at our branch office at the
downtown area.
In contrast, private respondent has not presented any evidence other than his selfserving allegation to show that he was employed in the Ultra Villa Food Haus. On this
issue, therefore, the evidence weighs heavily in petitioners favor. The Labor Arbiter thus
correctly ruled that private respondent was petitioners personal driver and not an
employee of the subject establishment.
Accordingly, the terms and conditions of private respondents employment are
governed by Chapter III, Title III, Book III of the Labor Code as well as by the pertinent
provisions of the labor code which is Nevertheless, it just to award private respondent
13th month pay in view of petitioners practice of according private respondent such
benefit. Indeed, petitioner admitted that she gave private respondent 13th month pay
every December.
II
We do not agree. To constitute abandonment, two requisites must concur: (1) the
failure to report to work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts,
with the second requisite as the more determinative factor. The burden of proving
abandonment as a just cause for dismissal is on the employer. Petitioner failed to
discharge this burden. The only evidence adduced by petitioner to prove abandonment
is her affidavit.
It is quite unbelievable that private respondent would leave a stable and relatively
well paying job as petitioners family driver to work as an election watcher. Though the
latter may pay more in a day, elections in this country are so far in between that it is
unlikely that any person would abandon his job to embark on a career as an election
watcher, the functions of which are seasonal and temporary in nature. Consequently, we
do not find private respondent to have abandoned his job. Petitioner likewise concedes
that she failed to comply with due process in dismissing private respondent since private
respondent had already abandoned his job. As we have shown earlier however,
petitioners theory of abandonment has no leg to stand on, and with it, her attempts to
justify her failure to accord due process must also fall.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is

hereby REVERSED and a new one entered declaring:

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(1) Private respondent Renato Geniston, the personal driver of petitioner Rosie Tio,
and not an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus;
(2) The dismissal of private respondent to be without a valid cause and without due
process. Accordingly, petitioner Rosie Tio is ordered to pay private respondent:
(a) Thirteenth Month Pay to be computed in accordance with the Rules and Regulations,
and the Revised Guidelines, Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851;
(b) Indemnity equal to 15 days of his salary as personal driver at the time of his unjust
dismissal; and
(c) Indemnity in the sum of P1,000.00.

VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6BS TRUCKING CORPORATION, and

SBT1 TRUCKING CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT, respondents.
Facts:
Sometime in 1958, private respondent Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for
petitioners family-owned trucking business named Vicente Sy Trucking. In 1965, he
became a truck driver of the same family business, renamed T. Paulino Trucking
Service, later 6Bs Trucking Corporation in 1985, and thereafter known as SBT Trucking
Corporation since 1994. Throughout all these changes in names and for 36 years, private
respondent continuously served the trucking business of petitioners.
In April 1994, Sahot was already 59 years old. He had been incurring absences as he was
suffering from various ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which
greatly affected the performance of his task as a driver. He inquired about his medical
and retirement benefits with the Social Security System (SSS) on April 25, 1994, but
discovered that his premium payments had not been remitted by his employer.
Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. On May 27th, he was
medically examined and treated for EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G II
.
HPM, UTI, Osteoarthritis and heart enlargement. On said grounds, Belen Paulino of
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the SBT Trucking Service management told him to file a formal request for extension of
his leave. At the end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave
for the whole month of June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners allegedly
threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to work.
At this point, Sahot found himself in a dilemma. He was facing dismissal if he refused to
work, But he could not retire on pension because petitioners never paid his correct SSS
premiums. The fact remained he could no longer work as his left thigh hurt abominably.
Petitioners ended his dilemma. They carried out their threat and dismissed him from
work, effective June 30, 1994. He ended up sick, jobless and penniless.
On September 1994, Sahot filed with the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, a complaint for
illegal dismissal, He prayed for the recovery of separation pay and attorneys fees against
petitioners.
Petitioners admitted they had a trucking business in the 1950s but denied employing
helpers and drivers. They contend that private respondent was not illegally dismissed as
a driver because he was in fact petitioners industrial partner. They add that it was not
until the year 1994, when SBT Trucking Corporation was established, and only then did
respondent Sahot become an employee of the company, with a monthly salary that
reached P4,160.00 at the time of his separation.
Petitioners further claimed that sometime prior to June 1, 1994, Sahot went on leave
and was not able to report for work for almost seven days. On June 1, 1994, Sahot asked
permission to extend his leave of absence until June 30, 1994. It appeared that from the
expiration of his leave, private respondent never reported back to work nor did he file an
extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the
trucking company and its owners.
Petitioners add that due to Sahots refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized
leave of absence, he should be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his work. They
contended that Sahot had all the time to extend his leave or at least inform petitioners of
his health condition.
The NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, through Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, ruled
that there was no illegal dismissal in Sahots case. Private respondent had failed to
report to work. Moreover, said the Labor Arbiter, petitioners and private respondent
were industrial partners before January 1994. The Labor Arbiter concluded by ordering
petitioners to pay "financial assistance" of P15,000 to Sahot for having served the
company as a regular employee since January 1994 only.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission modified the judgment of the
Labor Arbiter. It declared that private respondent was an employee, not an industrial
partner, since the start. Private respondent Sahot did not abandon his job but his
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employment was terminated on account of his illness, pursuant to Article 284 of the
Labor Code. Accordingly, the NLRC ordered petitioners to pay private respondent
separation pay in the amount of P60,320.00, at the rate of P2,080.00 per year for 29
years of service.
Petitioners assailed the decision of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals. In its decision
dated February 29, 2000, the appellate court affirmed with modification the judgment
of the NLRC. It held that private respondent was indeed an employee of petitioners
since 1958. It also increased the amount of separation pay awarded to private
respondent to P74,880, computed at the rate of P2,080 per year for 36 years of service
from 1958 to 1994.

ISSUE: (I) Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between

petitioners and respondent Sahot; (2) Whether or not there was valid dismissal; and (3)
Whether or not respondent Sahot is entitled to separation pay.
HELD:
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the determination of the first issue. For illegal
dismissal to prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established.
A computation of the age of complainant shows that he was only twenty-three (23) years
when he started working with respondent as truck helper. How can we entertain in our
mind that a twenty-three (23) year old man, working as a truck helper, be considered an
industrial partner.
Because the Court of Appeals also found that an employer-employee relationship
existed, petitioners aver that the appellate courts decision gives an "imprimatur" to the
"illegal" finding and conclusion of the NLRC. In which the petitioners argues that the
respondent is a partner.
The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of
dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the employees conduct. The most
important element is the employers control of the employees conduct, not only as to
the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it.
As found by the appellate court, petitioners owned and operated a trucking business
since the 1950s and by their own allegations, they determined private respondents
wages and rest day. Records of the case show that private respondent actually engaged
in work as an employee. During the entire course of his employment he did not have the
freedom to determine where he would go, what he would do, and how he would do it. He
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merely followed instructions of petitioners and was content to do so, as long as he was
paid his wages. Indeed, said the CA, private respondent had worked as a truck helper
and driver of petitioners not for his own pleasure but under the latters control.
On this point, we affirm the findings of the appellate court and the NLRC. Private
respondent Jaime Sahot was not an industrial partner but an employee of petitioners
from 1958 to 1994. The existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a
question of fact and the findings thereon by the NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, deserve not only respect but finality when supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Time and again this Court has said that "if doubt exists between the evidence presented
by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
latter." Here, we entertain no doubt. Private respondent since the beginning was an
employee of, not an industrial partner in, the trucking business.
(2)
Petitioners contend that it was private respondent who refused to go back to work. The
decision of the Labor Arbiter pointed out that during the conciliation proceedings,
petitioners requested respondent Sahot to report back for work. However, in the same
proceedings, Sahot stated that he was no longer fit to continue working, and instead he
demanded separation pay. Petitioners then retorted that if Sahot did not like to work as
a driver anymore, then he could be given a job that was less strenuous, such as working
as a checker. However, Sahot declined that suggestion. Based on the foregoing recitals,
petitioners assert that it is clear that Sahot was not dismissed but it was of his own
volition that he did not report for work anymore.
There is no direct evidence that will prove that complainants illness prevents or
incapacitates him from performing the function of a driver. The fact remains that
complainant suddenly stopped working due to boredom or otherwise when he refused to
work as a checker which certainly is a much less strenuous job than a driver.
But dealing the Labor Arbiter a reversal on this score the NLRC, concurred in by the
Court of Appeals while it was very obvious that complainant did not have any intention
to report back to work due to his illness which incapacitated him to perform his job,
such intention cannot be construed to be an abandonment. Instead, the same should
have been considered as one of those falling under the just causes of terminating an
employment. The insistence of respondent in making complainant work did not change
the scenario.
It is simply to say that the respondent was suffering from various illness triggered by his
work and considering his age. As provided by the Labor Code, a presentation of a
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Medical Certificate is enough to satisfy the requirements that the employee was
seriously having a gravity of illness in which relating in the case at bar, the private
respondent failed to comply with.
Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the
employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a
valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required
certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the
validity of the employees dismissal. It is therefore incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was
not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the
dismissal would be unjustified. In addition, we must likewise determine if the
procedural aspect of due process had been complied with by the employer clearly
appears that procedural due process was not observed in the separation of private
respondent by the management of the trucking company. The employer is required to
furnish an employee with two written notices before the latter is dismissed: (1) the
notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal
is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge; and (2) the notice informing the employee
of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity
to answer and to be heard on his defense. These, the petitioners failed to do, even only
for record purposes. What management did was to threaten the employee with
dismissal, then actually implement the threat when the occasion presented itself
because of private respondents painful left thigh. All told, both the substantive and
procedural aspects of due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahots dismissal is
tainted with invalidity.
On the last issue, as held by the Court of Appeals, respondent Jaime Sahot is entitled to
separation pay. The law is clear on the matter. An employee who is terminated because
of disease is entitled to "separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to onehalf month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater xxx." Following the
formula set in Art. 284 of the Labor Code, his separation pay was computed by the
appellate court at P2,080 times 36 years (1958 to 1994) or P74,880. We agree with the
computation, after noting that his last monthly salary was P4,160.00 so that one-half
thereof is P2,080.00. Finding no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the
part of appellate court, we are constrained to sustain its decision. To avoid further delay
in the payment due the separated worker, whose claim was filed way back in 1994, this
decision is immediately executory. Otherwise, six percent (6%) interest per annum
should be charged thereon, for any delay, pursuant to provisions of the Civil Code.
Wherefore petitioners must pay private respondent Jaime Sahot his separation pay
for 36 years of service at the rate of one-half monthly pay for every year of service,
amounting to P74,880.00, with interest of six per centum (6%) per annum from finality
of this decision until fully paid.
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ALEXANDER VINOYA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, REGENT FOOD CORPORATION AND/OR RICKY SEE
(PRESIDENT), respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Alexander Vinoya claims that he applied and was accepted by RFC as sales
representative on 26 May 1990. On the same date, a company identification card was
issued to him by RFC. Petitioner alleges that he reported daily to the office of RFC, in
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Pasig City, to take the latters van for the delivery of its products. According to petitioner,
during his employ, he was assigned to various supermarkets and grocery stores where
he booked sales orders and collected payments for RFC. For this task, he was required
by RFC to put up a monthly bond of P200.00 as security deposit to guarantee the
performance of his obligation as sales representative. Petitioner contends that he was
under the direct control and supervision of Mr. Dante So and Mr. Sadi Lim, plant
manager and senior salesman of RFC, respectively. He avers that on 1 July 1991, he was
transferred by RFC to Peninsula Manpower Company, Inc. ("PMCI"), an agency which
provides RFC with additional contractual workers pursuant to a contract for the supply
of manpower services (hereinafter referred to as the "Contract of Service"). After his
transfer to PMCI, petitioner was allegedly reassigned to RFC as sales representative.
Subsequently, on 25 November 1991, he was informed by Ms. Susan Chua, personnel
manager of RFC, that his services were terminated and he was asked to surrender his ID
card. Petitioner was told that his dismissal was due to the expiration of the Contract of
Service between RFC and PMCI. Petitioner claims that he was dismissed from
employment despite the absence of any notice or investigation. Consequently, on 3
December 1991, petitioner filed a case against RFC before the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay.
Private respondent Regent Food Corporation, on the other hand, maintains that no
employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and itself. It insists that
petitioner is actually an employee of PMCI, allegedly an independent contractor, which
had a Contract of Service with RFC. To prove this fact, RFC presents an Employment
Contract signed by petitioner on 1 July 1991, wherein PMCI appears as his employer.
RFC denies that petitioner was ever employed by it prior to 1 July 1991. It avers that
petitioner was issued an ID card so that its clients and customers would recognize him
as a duly authorized representative of RFC. With regard to the P200.00 pesos monthly
bond posted by petitioner, RFC asserts that it was required in order to guarantee the
turnover of his collection since he handled funds of RFC. While RFC admits that it had
control and supervision over petitioner, it argues that such was exercised in
coordination with PMCI. Finally, RFC contends that the termination of its relationship
with petitioner was brought about by the expiration of the Contract of Service between
itself and PMCI and not because petitioner was dismissed from employment.
On 3 December 1991, when petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter, PMCI was initially impleaded as one of the respondents. However,
petitioner thereafter withdrew his charge against PMCI and pursued his claim solely
against RFC. Subsequently, RFC filed a third party complaint against PMCI. After
considering both versions of the parties, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, [8] dated
15 June 1994, in favor of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter concluded that RFC was the true
employer of petitioner for the following reasons: (1) Petitioner was originally with RFC
and was merely transferred to PMCI to be deployed as an agency worker and then
subsequently reassigned to RFC as sales representative; (2) RFC had direct control and
supervision over petitioner; (3) RFC actually paid for the wages of petitioner although
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coursed through PMCI; and, (4) Petitioner was terminated per instruction of RFC. It
was then proved that respondent RFC is hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and
ordered to immediately reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and other benefits and pay him backwages in the amount
of P103,974.00.The claim for 13th month pay is likewise denied
RFC appealed the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, wherein it
reversed the decision of the NLRC. Separate motions for reconsideration of the NLRC
decision were filed by petitioner and PMCI.
ISSUE:
Whether NLRC erred with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of
the Labor Arbiter
HELD:
We hold that an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and RFC.
Proceeding to ascertain the legality of his dismissal from employment.
Since petitioner, due to his length of service, already attained the status of a regular
employee, he is entitled to the security of tenure provided under the labor laws. Hence,
he may only be validly terminated from service upon compliance with the legal
requisites for dismissal. Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful
dismissal of an employee are two-fold, the substantive and the procedural aspects. Not
only must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause, the rudimentary
requirements of due process - notice and hearing must, likewise, be observed before an
employee may be dismissed. Without the concurrence of the two, the termination
would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
As the employer, RFC has the burden of proving that the dismissal of petitioner was for
a cause allowed under the law and that petitioner was afforded procedural due process.
Sad to say, RFC failed to discharge this burden. Indeed, RFC never pointed to any valid
or authorized cause under the Labor Code which allowed it to terminate the services of
petitioner. Its lone allegation that the dismissal was due to the expiration or completion
of contract is not even one of the grounds for termination allowed by law. Neither did
RFC show that petitioner was given ample opportunity to contest the legality of his
dismissal. In fact, no notice of such impending termination was ever given him.
Petitioner was, thus, surprised that he was already terminated from employment
without any inkling as to how and why it came about. Petitioner was definitely denied
due process. Having failed to establish compliance with the requirements on
termination of employment under the Labor Code, the dismissal of petitioner is tainted
with illegality. An employee who has been illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement
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to his former position without loss of seniority rights and to payment of full backwages
corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual
reinstatement. Petitioner is entitled to no less.

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