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Institutions, Such As The PSBA, Are Beyond The Ambit of The Rule in
Institutions, Such As The PSBA, Are Beyond The Ambit of The Rule in
4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M.
MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M.
SORIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA
R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused
the untimely demise of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor
premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit for
damages against the school and its authorities for negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and
methods before, during and after the attack on the victim who
was in his third year when he was stabbed by outsiders.
Petitioners sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since
they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in
the afore-stated article. Trial Court denied their motion to dismiss.
CA further affirmed the lower courts decision. CA anchored its
decision based on the rule on quasi delicts holding the teachers
and heads of the school staff liable unless they proved that they
observed all the diligence to prevent damage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may be held liable for damages
HELD:
The record is bereft of all the material facts. However the courts
disagree with the premises of the CAs ruling. The fact that the
assailants in the case at bar are not students of the PSBA,
- Test: did the defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man
would have used in the same situation?
- Existence of negligence is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation. Take note that,
according to the case, it appeared to him that Picart was not
observing road rules.
- Conduct is considered negligent when a prudent man would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences
- NEGLIGENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE
Statement of Facts
- 30 August 1985: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed to death on the
second floor balcony of PSBA. Bautista was a student in said
school, a junior commerce major. It was established that the
assailants were outsiders, not enrolled nor affiliated with the
school.
o His parents (the private respondents Segunda [?] and Arsenia),
filed suit for damages against the school and the following school
officials: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (VicePresident), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro
Sacro (Chief of Security) and Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of
Security). The last, during the proceedings, resigned from his
position.
- 8 December 1987: The respondent Manila RTC, having overruled
instant petitioners contentions, denies their motion to dismiss the
case.
- 25 January 1988: The RTC dismisses the motion for
reconsideration as well.
- 10 June 1988: The CA affirms the trial courts orders; petitioners
file a motion for reconsideration.
- 22 August 1988: The CA denies the motion for reconsideration.
Applicable Laws:
ART. 1157(5), NCC: OBLIGATIONS ARISE FROM:
(5) QUASI-DELICTS
ART. 1162, NCC: OBLIGATIONS DERIVED FROM QUASI-DELICTS
SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 2, TITLE
XVII OF THIS BOOK, AND BY SPECIAL LAWS.
ART. 2176, NCC: W HOEVER BY ACT OR OMISSION CAUSES DAMAGE
TO ANOTHER, THERE BEING FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE, IS OBLIGED TO
PAY FOR THE DAMAGE DONE. SUCH FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE, IF THERE
IS NO PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTUAL RELATION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES, IS CALLED A QUASI-DELICT AND IS GOVERNED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER.
ART. 2180, PARS. 1, 7, NCC: THE OBLIGATION IMPOSED BY ARTICLE
2176 IS DEMANDABLE NOT ONLY FOR ONE'S OWN ACTS OR
OMISSIONS, BUT ALSO FOR THOSE OF PERSONS FOR WHOM ONE IS
RESPONSIBLE.
XXX
Issues:
1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in affirming the decision of the
RTC not to dismiss the case against PSBA?
Held Rationale:
1. Yes. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court disagrees with the
CAs basis for the decision being anchored on Arts.
2176 and 2180 of the NCC. The SC agrees with the
CA that the case must be remanded to the RTC for
trial on its merits. But the reason provided by the CA,
which is that in light of previous jurisprudence and the
fact that Article 2180 is a holdover from the Spanish
era, the school administrators should be made liable
for damages until they prove themselves absolved of
liability in trial by merits, is erroneous. The SC points
out that Arts 2180 and 2176 establish the rule of in
loco parentis (in place of the parents Mikey) and
that in the discussions provided in the cases cited by
the CA, it was clear that the liability of the school exists
only for the acts performed by students while in school
custody, something which was established to have not
been the case here. Thus the rule on quasi-delicts
does not apply.
The SC rules that despite the inapplicability of the rule
on quasi-delicts, the school is still liable because all
academic institutions enter into a contract with all its
Petitioner with companion Heras was driving a car, southbound toward Manila along MacArthur highway; Robert Ha was
driving a jeep from the opposite direction with 7 passengers. A
Philippine Rabbit bus ahead of the jeep swerved into the
petitioners lane to overtake a tricycle, as a result of the sudden
move, petitioner veered his car to the shoulder of the highway to
avoid head-on collision. The car collided with Has jeep damaging
it and causing injuries to its passengers. The Philippine Rabbit
bus sped away. Trial Court held that petitioner was 150 meters
away from the bus, the Supreme Court found through evidence
that the distance is not 150 meters but 150 feet.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Santos had filed several civil cases against Santos Ventura
Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (SVHFI). On October 26, 1990, they
executed a Compromise Agreement which amicably ended all
their pending litigations subject to the following:
that SVHFI shall pay Santos Php14.5 M with Php1.5 M
immediately upon the execution of the agreement and the
balance of Php13 M whether in lump sum or in installments within
a period of not more than 2 years from the execution of the
agreement; provided that in the event that SVHFI does not pay
the whole or any part of the balance, it shall be paid with the land
or real properties of SVHFI which were previously covered by lis
pendens but in no case shall the payment of such balance be
later than 2 years from the date of the agreement.
that immediately upon the execution of the agreement and the
receipt of the Php1.5 M, Santos shall cause the dismissal of Civil
Cases and voluntarily withdraw the appeals from the other civil
cases; provided that in the event that SVHFI shall sell or dispose
any lands previously subject of lis pendens, the proceeds of such
sale may be required and shall be partially devoted to the
payment of the SVHFIs foundations.
Aside: When the debtor knows the amount and period when he is
to pay, interest as damages is allowed as a matter of right. The
complaining party has been deprived of funds to which he is
entitled by virtue of their compromise agreement. The goal of
compensation requires that the complainant be compensated for
the loss of use of those funds. This compensation is in the form
of interest. In the absence of agreement, the legal interest shall
prevail which is 12% per annum to be computed from the
extrajudicial demand.
Tinga, J.:
FACTS: Globe Telecom (formerly Mckay Cable and Radio Corp)
is engaged in the provision of communication facilities in US
military bases in Clark and Subic, Pampanga. In May 1991, it
entered into an Agreement with Philippine Communications
Satellite Corp (Philcomsat) whereby Philcomsat would operate an
IBS Standard B earth station with in Cubi Point for the exclusive
use of two bases. The term of contract was for 60 months (5
years). Globe promised to pay the monthly rentals for each
leased circuit involved. However, in September 1991, the
Philippine Government sent a note to the US Government
signifying the termination of RP-US Military Bases Agreement. In
August 1991, Globe notified Philcomsat of its intention to
discontinue the use of earth station in view of the withdrawal of
US military personnel. Globe invoked as basis for the termination
the clause on non-liability of any party if the failure in the
performance of the obligation results directly or indirectly from
force majeure. Philcomsat demanded payment of its outstanding
obligations under the Agreement amounting to US$4,910,136.00
plus interest and attorneys fees. However, Globe refused to heed
Philcomsats demand. Philcomsat filed with the RTC of Makati
a Complaint against Globe, praying that the latter be ordered to
pay liquidated damages under the Agreement, with legal interest,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
ISSUE: W/N the termination of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement can be considered a fortuitous event which would
exempt Globe from complying with its obligation to pay rentals
HELD: YES. In order that Globe may be exempt from noncompliance with its obligation to pay rentals under Section 8, the
concurrence of the following elements must be established: (1)
the event must be independent of the human will; (2) the
occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation in a normal manner; and (3) the obligor must be free of
participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The
Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the
abovementioned requisites are present in the instant case.
Philcomsat and Globe had no control over the non-renewal of the
term of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement when the same
was no bad faith on the part of NPC and that neither can the
latters negligence be considered gross. In Dee Hua Liong
Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes, (145 SCRA 713, 719) we
ruled:
Neither may private respondent recover exemplary damages
since he is not entitled to moral or compensatory damages, and
again because the petitioner is not shown to have acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless or oppressive manner (Art. 2234,
Civil Code; Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., 2 SCRA 377; Francisco v.
Government Service Insurance System, 7 SCRA 577; Gutierrez v.
Villegas, 8 SCRA 527; Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155;
Pan Pacific (Phil.) v. Phil. Advertising Corp., 23 SCRA 977;
Marchan v. Mendoza, 24 SCRA 888).
Comments:
Under Art. 1170 of the Civil Code, When those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, delay, or
negligence, or in any manner contravene in the tenor of the
obligation, are liable for damages. What the provision
contemplates is that there is an express obligation between the
obligor and the obligee arising from a contractual obligation that
must be complied with in good faith. And what the aforestated
provision liable for damages is that breach either because of
fraud, delay, or negligence, or contravention to the tenor of
obligation. Hence it should not be applied generally in all cases,
especially in quasi-delict which is treated specifically by law. In
the case at bar, ECI and NPC has no pre-existing obligation
arising from a contract. Although negligence is indubitably present
in the case, there cannot be located from the facts that there is a
prior obligation arising form NPC and ECI. But instead the
applicable law in the case at bar is Art. 2176 which provides,
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fraud or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault of negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter. I should rather say
that the Honorable Supreme Court misplaced the application of
the law.
I should further say that the Act of God Doctrine should be
applied inversely to that
Held:
On the foregoing considerations, respondent court erred in
deleting the award for moral and exemplary damages which may
July 16, 1968, Tiro filed a complaint for failure of the spouses to
pay the remaining balance.Spouses filed their answer arguing
therein the nullity of the deeds and the
return of the payments made by them. It appeared in record that
the Timberwealth Corporation was a non-existent
organization.The trial court dismissed the complaint hence, Tiro
appealed to CA. CA reversed the judgment.
Petition to review filed with SC.
ISSUE:
W/N THE TWO DEEDS ARE NULL AND VOID, THE FORMER
FOR TOTAL ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION AND THE
LATTER FOR NON-FULFILLMENT OF CONDITIONS.
RULING:
Decision Modified.
Petitioners contend that the deed of assignment conveyed to
them the shares of stocks of private respondent in timberwealth
Corporation, as stated in the deed itself. Since said corporation
never came into existence, no share of stocks was ever
transferred to them, hence the said deed is null and void for lack
of cause or consideration.
The true cause or consideration of said deed was the transfer of
the forest concession of private respondent to petitioners for
P120,000.00. This finding is supported by the contemporaneous
and subsequent acts of petitioners and private respondent. It is
settled that the previous and simultaneous and subsequent acts
of the parties are properly
cognizable indicia of their true intention. Their acts reveal that the
cause stated in the questioned deed of assignment is false.
The deed of assignment of February 15, 1966 is a relatively
simulated contract which states a false cause or consideration, or
one where the parties conceal their true agreement. A contract
with a false consideration is not null and void per se. Under Article
1346 of the Civil Code, a relatively simulated contract, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any
purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy binds the
parties to their real agreement.
As to the nullity for the non-fulfilment of the conditions, SC
agrees. The efficacy of said deed of assignment is subject to the
condition that the application of private respondent for an
additional area for forest concession be approved by the Bureau
of Forestry. Since private respondent did not obtain that approval,
said deed produces no effect. When a contract
is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take
place only if and when the event which constitutes the condition
happens or is fulfilled.
Moreover, under the second paragraph of Article 1461 of the Civil
Code, the efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or expectancy is
deemed subject to the condition that the thing will come into
existence. In this case, since private respondent never acquired
any right over the additional area for failure to secure the
approval of the Bureau
of Forestry, the agreement executed therefore, which had for
its object the transfer of said right to petitioners, never
became effective or enforceable.
that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it
actually struck. And even though the typhoon was an act of God
or what we may call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability
because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
damage. As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of
Appeals, (144 SCRA 596, 606-607):
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay
or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape
liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly
requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by
the violence of nature and human agencies are to be excluded
from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When
the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to
be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be
from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is thereby humanized, as it was, and removed
from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris,
pp. 1174-1175).
Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a person
concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is
not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause
of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability
for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by which the loss or
damage may have been occasioned. (Fish & Elective Co. v.
Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan 49 O.G. 4379;
Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594,
604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).
Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion (Philippine Metal Products, Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 90 SCRA 135 [1979]; Police Commission v. Lood, 127
SCRA 757 [1984]; Canete v. WCC, 136 SCRA 302 [1985])
Exemplary Damages