Ive ic ey Y's Inthe Denver police force of the 1950s and 1960s, there were two groups: the Good Group and the Bad Group. Ifan officer was in the Good Group, it was okay; no one was going to pressure him into joining the Bad Group. However, there was just one rule for being in the Good Group: an officer must never reveal what he knew about the Bad Group, ‘The Bad Group was comprised of the thieves and safe crackers of the police squad. The officers involved committed burglaries on businesses on their beats, and so when it came time for the police to investigate those crimes scenes, they were never able to find the culprit. The crime circle started with just the odd robbery. From there it grew into a highly organized and calculated burglary ring, that involved multiple officers working as a team at cach burglary site. According to the Colorado Governor Steven McNichols, “In most instances, police reports were made out by the same officers who participated in the jobs. The same officers who pulled the jobs investigated their own robberies and removed ‘ncriminating evidence and fingerprints from the scene ofthe crime.”t All the patrolmen, and even some of the Captains, ofthe Denver Police Department knew thefthad been going on for years, but that’s just the way it was; theft was a “work perk’ Ina 1962 interview with Patrolman Bobbie G. Whaley, an expert safe-cracker, Whaley said, “Don't let them kid you; it wasn’t a matter of a few bad apples’. The Denver Police Department made it easy to go sour-too easy.”? For the Denver police robbery gang, TagLTeY Bob, "Expose of Police Burglaries Marked City’s Year of Shame! The Denver Post, December 26, 1961, “Whales, Bobbie G."I Was a Burglar with a Badge” Saturday Evening Post, Februaty 10, 1962:86.90,this tradition of theft came to an end in the 1960s with the first arrest of an offieer for * burglary, Patrolman Lilly was arvested after the safe he had stolen from a local coffee shop fell out ofthe back of his car onto the road, infront of a pursuing police patrol car From there, several other policemen were arrested. In the end, forty-seven policemen were convicted of police misconduct and sentenced to years of jail time, The scandal had an immediate impact upon the organization of the Denver Police Department. The lace (International Association of Chiefs of Police) were called into conduct a full-scale investigation into how the Denver chiefs ran their precincts. Essentially the IACP were called in to access what went wrong and what needed to be corrected in order to avoid this mess of police corruption in the future, Denver needed to improve its standing in society. “The 1ACP went on to publish a plethora of documents addressing why Denver's policemen had fallen into alife of crime. However, the reasons they cited did not match the explanations the officers themselves were giving when thelr conduct was investigated. In addition, the police chiefs did not believe the findings of the IACP were going to solve the problems of misconduct. Everyone understood the causes of the corruption differently. overall, the Denver police burglary scandal did not have the momentous impact Upon the police department that the reformers hoped it would. Bach individual group involved saw different reasons for how the police became burglars and so, because ofthis lack of unity in tdeas on the origin of corruption, the reforms ofthe IACP were not able to change the structure of the Denver police department.The 1960s reexamination of the Police Department was a moment in American History, Issues of crime and justice became the focal point of a national crisis According to Professor Samuel Walker of Ohio State University there were three main factors that Contributed to this crisis. Walker suggests that the civil rights movement, a series of controversial Supreme Court decisions and a dramatic increase in crime rate, all attributed to the unprecedented reexamination of the criminal justice system in the early 1960s.* At the forefront of all these factors, was the misconduct of individual officers within the police force. Therefore, reform that was centralized on the lowest ranking officers, the patrolmen, was key to making positive changes in the American Justice System overall. Denver was not unique in its attempt to solve the problem of badly behaved Patrolmen. In this era, police reform was taking place all over the country, predominantly in big cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles and Kansas City. 5 Most notably social change was one of the leading factors behind the need for reform, In cities like Los Angeles and Detroit for example, the predominant need for change came after huge race riots that had overwhelmed the officers involved, took place in the early 1960s, Following the riots, many departments tried to turn ordinary groups of officers into “highly centralized and tightly disciplined” control units.6 The reformers of the 1960s were not willing to put up with the low status of the American Police Force, thus their goal was to put an end to the widespread incompetence, corruption and lawlessness that pervaded the American Police peialket, Samuel Taming the system, the control of discretion in criminal ustice, 1950-1990, Cary, NC; Oxford University Press, USA, 1994, { Walker, Samuel. Taming the system, the control of discretion in criminal justice, 1950-1990. Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, USA, 1994, 5 Fogelson, Robert M, Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, © Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978,force as a whole.” These objectives inspired the efforts to develop the autonomy, raise the quality, and increase the skill-level of police in the big cities. These efforts had an enormous impact upon the structure, personnel and over all function of American policing for the rest of the century.® Reorganization was at the forefront of reforms during this period. According to Robert Fogelson, author of the book Big-City Police, “At the insistence of the reformers most departments set up planning and research units, which were supposed to cut down on the opportunities for outside interference.” In this statement, Fogelson means that the planning and research units would be autonomous in planning strategies forthe police. ‘These strategies would hopefully eliminate the temptation for interference from temptation of outside vices, such as theft. Most departments reorganized thelr forces along functional lines, a step that was intended to clarify the divisions of responsibility between the precincts and squads of the police department. Instead however, the reorganizations simply shifted the outside influences from the precincts to the squads. As Robert Fogelson notes, “It was hardly surprising that the squads replaced the precincts as the primary source of police corruption in New Orleans, New York and most other big cities after World War Il10 On the advice of many of these reformers, most city police departments formed special investigation units that were aimed to make sure the patrolmen knew they were being accounted for at every moment, Most departments throughout the country already had an established unit known as the Internal Affairs Bureau whose job was to keep eye on the policemen and watch for any inner corruption or misconduct. However, the reformers —_— 7 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978. & Fogolson, Robert M. Big-City Police, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978. Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978 18 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1978,of the period decided that the Internal Affairs Bureau was clearly not doing its job correctly and thus another bureau of investigation needed to be created just to investigate internal police corruption. As Fogelson notes, "On the advice of the reformers most departments formed special inspectional units, which were suppose to reduce the amount of outside interference by keeping close watch over the rank-and -file and letting the chiefs know which of their men were not on the job."!4 However, the results were often disappointing. The units were comprised of only a small number of officers, who were greatly held back by several factors. Some of these factors included: the officers concern for the reputation of their departments, the unwillingness of the civilians to file complaints against the police, and the reluctance of most officers to testify against one another.12 The lack of success with the implementation of an extra Investigations Bureau demonstrated how disconnected the reformers were from the police departments they were trying to reform in the 1960s, ‘Another large focus of the 1960s police reform was the campaign to raise the caliber of big-city police. Luckily for the reformers this campaign was somewhat successful. Most, departments were able to “weed out” the unqualified applicants.*3 A large bulk of the focus was put on turning away those who could not meet the age or education requirements. If the candidate made it past the initial application process, then they were subjected to physical/medical exams, character checks, civil service checks and some form of psychological screening that would occasionally extend to polygraph tests. The goal of the reformers was to attract most recruits in their twenties or at the most in their early thirties with a high school degree, no debilitating diseases and no criminal record. The policy of 1 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, 12 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, 48 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-ity Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, 14 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-ity Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978,employing men at a younger age, twenty-one-to-thirty years old, also had an extra benefit. ‘As Fogelson points out, “ Since the new officers did not owe their jobs to the local politicians and could not count on them to protect their interests, most recruits were not inclined to give their primary loyalty to the old-line machines or follow their orders when they ran counter to instructions from headquarters."!5 This essentially gave the police chiefs a team of officers who were more obedient to the chiefs than in previous eras. Unfortunately for reformers however, there was still one major issue in the ‘campaign for better candidates to the police force. Policing was just simply in a poor position to compete with career paths such as medicine and law that attracted the upper- middle-class with college degrees. Thus the highly qualified and educated young men that the police force wanted to attract felt no draw to a career in policing that didn’t pay well and was not particularly prestigious. “During the 1950s and 1960s the New York City police drew the great majority of their recruits from the lower middle class; so did the Portland police.” claims Fogelson.¢ Only a very small number of the recruits at the time were college graduates ~ about two percent in Portland and six percent in Los Angeles. ‘These low statistics were reflected by the fact that most of the recruits to the police force in the 1960s went into the force for a concern in their own safety, not because of a higher calling to protect their fellow man.27 Most departments around the country also had a hard time turning any capable young men into competent policemen. Authorities went along with the reformers proposals to insulate rank-and-file policies from the influence of politicians, however in the 15 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978. 18 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978. 17 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978.face of strong opposition police departments had to turn down the reformers proposals to Increase the chief’s discretion and downgrade the importance of seniority and written tests.18 However, departments realised the need to follow the reformers demands when it came to curbing police corruption. Specifically, police departments around the country gave into the demands to forbid any officers from holding an outside job and engage in any other activities that were deemed inconsistent with their professional statue. As per reformers suggestions, rank-and-file (in this case regular patrolmen) rewards were also forbidden, Unfortunately, this led to a few unintended consequences that eventually defeated the whole purpose of the reforms in the first place. According to Robert Fogelson, “The restrictions on moonlighting infuriated the rank-and-file, who badly needed the extra income and, not that they were forbidden to take rewards, knew of no other legitimate way of earning it."!? The regular patrolmen were incensed by the demands that they subject themselves to almost unconstitutional measures such as polygraph tests and income probes to find out whether or not they were violating the restrictions put on them. The overall argument made by most policemen was, if they were supposed to behave like professionals why were they paid little more than laborers and treated almost like common criminals. In the absence of any answers, many officers began to feel that they were in fact not professionals after all and no more than just workers. The result of this was a general feeling among patrolmen of separation from the reformers and police chiefs alike. This feeling of separation perpetuated the lack of loyalty the policemen felt to anyone but 1 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, 1 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978. 29 Fogelson, Robert M. Big-City Police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978,themselves, resulting in a continuation of the problems that the reformers were brought in to correct in the first place. ‘Burglars in Blue’ The Denver Police Department scandal got very messy, very quickly. Each newspaper reported a different variation of the facts. The scandal was reported as being exposed at different times, with a few different officers named as the “tipsters.” The lower- level patrolmen claimed their superiors knew all about what was taking place. The chiefs said it was just a few “bad apples” who were responsible for bringing the rest of the men down. Essentially the scandal came into the public arena in August 1960 with the arrest of Patrolman Walter Lilly. On the night of April 14, 1960 Officer Lilly was caught red-handed by downtown Denver policemen stealing a safe from a local cafe when it fell out of the back of his patrol car onto the road.2! Not only did it fall back onto the road, but it fell in front of the police car following Officer Lilly. The patrolmen in the pursuing car took the safe into headquarters and identified that it had just been stolen from the coffee shop Lilly and his accomplice had emerged from. Three months and a full investigation later, Lilly was arrested. Immediately, the news hit the papers? Denver Safety Manager? John Schooley was asked by District Attorney Bert Keating to call a special grand jury to investigate the reports of criminal conduct among the officers of the Denver Police Department. Keating 2 Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974. 2 Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974, 15. 2 The Department of Safety is subjected to the supervision and control ofthe Mayor. Its in full charge and ‘control ofthe departments of fire and police. The Manager of Safety isthe officer in full charge of both departments and answers only to the Mayor. The Manager isthe civilian authority over the Denver Police, Fire and Sheriff Departments. The Manager also issue special police commissions and, as de-facto sheriff for the City and County of Denver, issues concealed weapons permits. Denver Government, ‘Department of Safety.” Last modified 2011. Accessed April 20, 2012, http://www denvergov.org/Portals/338 /documents/MOSDuties pdf.also asked Schooley to assure the Denver public that Lilly was the only officer who was suspected of any unlawful behavior. In fact, in a newspaper article, Schooley even went so far as to claim, “If there were any others, they would be in jail right now.”2* This claim could not have been further from the truth, As early as 1949, there had been hints within the police force that the level of corruption was getting out of hand.25 On June 1, 1949 John F. 0’Donnell took over as police chief and immediately authorized a series of great changes. In an effort to try and break up some of the men who were acting in burglary rings, fourteen of the eighteen police captains were re-assigned by O'Donnell to different departments. O'Donnell also put tighter restrictions on off-duty employment and the entire traffic bureau was eliminated, all in the effort to try and move officers around to lessen the inner corruption of the police force. ‘The Denver police department was then divided into three different units: uniform, detective and special unit2” Unfortunately, it may have been too little, too late as the rumors of corruption were already spreading, It didn’t help matters that in 1985 Bud Johnson, a soft-spoken, friendly and very popular man with the patrolmen, took over as police chief; he was a little too popular with the officers, some said.2# Not long after Johnson took over as chief, patrolman John W. Ford Jr. was arrested for burglarizing a downtown tavern. At the first hearing, the jury of seven women and five men deliberated for little ‘more than three hours before being locked up for the night by the bailif£.29 Overnight, Judge 2Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974, 15, 2 Hazlett, William. “Step By Step Account of Denver Cop Scandal." Rocky Mountain News, August 2, 1961, 43- 46. % Whearley, Bob. "Corruption Rumors Go Back to '49." The Denver Post, January 16, 1961, 1-2. 27 Whearley, Bob. "Corruption Rumors Go Back to'49." The Denver Post, January 16, 1961, 1-2. 2 Whearley, Bob. “Corruption Rumors Go Back to "49." The Denver Post, January 16, 1961, 1-2. 7 "Suspended Officer Found Guilty of Burglary, Larceny.” The Rocky Mountain News, March 26, 1955.10 Keating permitted Ford to remain free on bond as he stated he had known Ford's parents for so many years. Favoritism of this sort was not paid to the majority of the other officers. When Ford's case went to trial, The Rocky Mountain News reported that, “The officer repeatedly replied ‘I don’t remember, or ‘I don’t recall’ when pressed for details of his admitted burglaries.”2 Ford went to prison facing a one- to- ten year sentence. While in prison, he told stories of other officers turning to a life of crime while on duty. Yet his admissions went unnoticed by police officials. Instead, Ford was told by other members of the Denver police department to, “Either shut up, or give us some ironclad evidence to back up your story.”2! In fact, other policemen even began to openly discuss which officers they suspected of burglary. An article from the Denver Post dated January 16, 1961 stated that, “The rumors were forgotten in the ebb and flow of other crises: Charges of brutality, insubordination, campaigns for another pay rise.”3? Mayor Batterton and Governor Steve McNichols wanted to keep the scandal small and controlled; both hoped the whole fiasco would end quickly and quietly. According to a magazine article published during the controversy, "Batterton and Schooley, under increased pressure from the publicity, tried even harder to minimize reports of more police crime." Lack of an authority that the patrolmen could trust and respect, pushed them to only trust each other. In July 1955, George T. Shank, took over as Safety Manager. He tried to bring brutality charges against multiple officers that would have had the officers taken off of the force. Ironically, it was Shank himself who soon faced charges of brutality when. several members of the public tried to bring cases against him. Shank’s answer to the 3 "Suspended Officer Found Guilty of Burglary, Larceny.” The Rocky Mountain News, March 26, 1955. 31 Whaley, Bobbie G. "I Was a Burglar with a Badge.” Saturday Evening Post, February 10, 1962:86-90. Whearley, Bob. "Corruption Rumors Go Back to '49." The Denver Post, January 16, 1961, 1-2. 55"*Denver’s Burglars With Badges.” Argosy Magazine, 1962, 116-122.nn charges was simply that, “Communists or persons closely allied with Communists were behind the charges.” He was a harsh disciplinarian who was also later fined $100 for not letting a lawyer see his own client while in jail; Shank later refused to pay the fine. Shank lasted only four months as Safety Manager and resigned in October 1955.5 With officials like Shank to answer to, ited to distrust of authority among the patrolmen. In the eyes of the patrolmen their loyalty had to be firmly placed in the protection of themselves, not the protection of the public. As punished police burglar, Art Winstanley, put it in his auto biography, “No officer wants to be labeled a ‘snitch’”36 In a 1962 interview with convicted Police- burglar, Bobbie G. Whaley, Whaley outright stated, “I found myself accepting the unwritten law of the department: A cop's first loyalty is to other cops, and the public be damned. A rookie just has to accept that law. A couple of bad reports on him during probation, no matter how pony they might be and he'd be dropped without even being told why.’s7 Once the scandal had been exposed, State Investigators AS Heder and Eugene M. Brace noted in their official report that the key confessions had come from ex-policemen who refused to talk about what they knew in front of command officers or personnel of the department *#More than anything, this was due to the fear surrounding the consequences for any officer who dared to speak out. Bobbie Whaley was one of the main ringleaders of the operation and had a good insight to its origins. Whaley, a high school drop-out, was twenty-three and fresh out of the military when he signed up to be a Denver policeman in 1953, He claimed the oath he took % "Ex-Safety Manager Shank Dies at 82 in Seattle, Wash." The Denver Post, April 22, 1975. 2=Whearley, Bob. "Corruption Rumors Go Back to 49." The Denver Post, January 16, 1961, 1-2. 3¢ Winstanley, Art. Burglars in Blue. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2009. * Whaley, Bobbie G."I Was a Burglar with a Badge." Saturday Evening Post, February 10, 1962:86-90 * Whearley, Bob. "Police-Burglar Scandal Resounds in Voting Booth.” The Denver Post, April 19, 1963, 7612 that October wasn’t just words to him, but a promise he intended to keep. However, eight years later, Whaley was in court being sentenced to six-to-twenty years in prison for burglary. Whaley’s opinion on how the burglary ring was able to get to be as big as t was, echoed what the majority of the other convicted men thought. When asked why the policemen turned to theft inthe first place, Whaley responded, “A lot of high-priced experts allover the country are trying to figure that one out. I saw what went wrong in Denver." Like many of the other officers, Whaley believed that a lot of different factors entered into the cause of the burglary ring, Overall, he contributed the causes to: a breakdown in discipline, lack of leadership, complacency and stupidity on the part of the brass, low pay ‘and “some detectives who couldn’t find their own shoes if they took them off? Of these causes, low pay and peer pressure were at the top of the list for officers. When Bobbie Whaley joined the force in 1953, starting pay for a rookie cop was $300 a month, and by 1963 had only risen to $400 a month, Whaley stated in his 1962 interview that times were very hard for him and his wife Helen. “My wife Helen and | had one child (two more came later), and we had talked it over and decided we could scrape by until | became a first-grade patrolman.”*! They all needed money, and the thought of making it that easily was too much to resist. The officers were never prepared during training for the temptation side of the job. The only time the possibility of internal corruption was mentioned was when the police chief shouted at the top of his lungs “Remember this, men- don’t take graft! You'll see some of the older men taking handouts, but don’t take graft!" ‘As Bobbie Whaley pointed out, the older men did indeed take graft. During Whaley's 39 Whaley, Bobbie G.“I Was a Burglar with a Badge." Saturday Evening Post, February 10, 1962:86-90 ‘Whaley, Bobbie G. "I Was a Burglar with a Badge." Saturday Evening Post, February 10, 1962:86-90 ‘8 Whaley, Bobbie G. "I Was a Burglar with a Badge." Saturday Bvening Post, February 10, 1962:86-90 s@ Whaley, Bobbie G.I Was a Burglar with a Badge.” Saturday Evening Post, February 10, 1962:86-9013 probationary period, he and his partner went to check on a business whose doors were left open after closing time, Whaley’s partner went straight for the safe, opened it within minutes and took $200 out, justas the sergeant and his driver came walking in. Whaley claimed the sergeant took one look at the money in the officer's hand and said with a grin, “T guess they got away clean huh? Why don't we all meet a little later at Greene's for coffee?" According to Whaley, the four men met up later at which time his partner divided the money between the four of them, $50 each, Whaley was hesitant to take it, at which point Whaley claimed the sergeant said, “Go on, Easters coming up, buy your wife a new hat’. As a young rookie, Whaley felt he had no choice but to follow the command of his sergeant. In the opinion of the patrolmen, peer pressure and the need for money over ruled common sense when it came to why the officers stole in the first place. How the police department functioned as an organization was beginning to change. Safety Manager Edward Geer, who took on the job in 1955 after a disgraced George Shank stepped down, had already had experience being the Manager of Safety. Geer was briefly Manager of Safety from April 1952 to November 1954 before leaving to become a judge. ‘Thus inevitably, having served as Safety Manager when the depths of corruption in the Denver police department were not yet know, Geer brought in yet another opinion on how to discipline the policemen. Geer thought that by tightening up discipline there would be an improvement in efficiency within the police department. Geer issued three direct orders to the police department: all uniformed officers were to start and end work at precisely the hour in their schedule, every captain had to serve at least two tours of duty a month ‘Whaley, Bobbie G, "I Was a Burglar with a Badge.” Saturday Evening Post, February 10, 1962:86-90 “Whaley, Bobbie G. “I Was a Burglar with a Badge.” Saturday Evening Post, February 10, 1962:86-9014 between the hours of 8p.m. and 4a.m, and thirdly, no detail of any bureau was allowed to be commanded by an acting sergeant or other officer below the rank of sergeant. This ‘was the first time that the police had been given the job of looking at their own conduct (or misconduct) and thus were made to look at the individual conduct of each officer.** By enacting these changes, Geer believed that the bulk of misconduct among the policemen could be avoided. New leadership led to the public exposure of the police-burglars. The promotion of Captain Walter G. Nelson to command of the Detective Bureau led to more revelations opening up the case against the police-burglars. Immediately upon taking office in the winter of 1959-1960, Nelson began a quiet investigation of the rumors surrounding the police-driven burglaries.” Patrolman Lilly was the first to be arrested for burglary. The next arrest was of Art Winstanley. Not only did Winstanley experience the same comical incident with a safe falling out of his car on to the road as Lilly had, but money problems led him to commit a solo robbery, something none of the other officers attempted. He was caught with cash when Aurora police pulled him over at a traffic ight. It was significant that Winstanley was caught by Aurora police as it demonstrates the commradery shared between just the Denver police within their own department. To venture into other cops territory, alone was not something any of the other officers had attempted. Winstanley was not offered any of the same protections in Aurora that he would have had in Denver. Winstanley was sentenced to four- to- eight years in prison. Winstanely’s arrest and sentencing proved to be the act that really blew the scandal up. The Winstanley incident 4 "Geer Cracks Down in Police Discipline.” The Denver Post, July 27, 1958, 4s Whearley, Bob, “Corruption Rumors Go Back to'49.” The Denver Post, January 16, 1961, 1-2, “ Whearley, Bob. "Police-Burglar Scandal Resounds in Voting Booth.” The Denver Post, Apri 19, 1963.15 caused the scandal to go from a local issue to a nationwide scandal. From then on, it was all the newspapers could talk about." Once news of the scandal broke out, it was in the hands of the Denver officials to act upon it as quickly as possible. In January 1961, two women and ten men were chosen by District Attorney Bert Keating to sit on the special Grand Jury investigating the police scandal.” At that time, six more officers had been convicted: Bobbie Whaley, George Zellner, Harold Bailey, Keith Hutton, George Sanford and Wayne Weston. Each policeman was charged with burglary, larceny, receiving stolen goods and conspiracy to commit each count" Bobbie Whaley pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six- to- twenty years in prison. The harshness of his sentence, the Denver District Judge George McNamara stated, was due to Whaley’s breach of faith as a police officer and refusal to initially cooperate with the investigation. Whaley went on to receive a concurrent sentence of four -to- eight years in total. However, Whaley spent nearly three years in the State Penitentiary before being released on probation for 35 months. 5! George Sanford was tried seventeen days later and sentenced to four consecutive prison terms totaling ten- to thirty-two years. Judge McNamara, a genial Irishman who had once been a patrolman himself, deplored the conduct of police officers for what was termed hiding behind their badges to commit ccrimes. The judge also warned that heavy sentences would follow for others who defied authorities and failed to cooperate.5? # Simpson, Kevin. ‘Denver Cop and Robber Reconciles his Troubled Past" The Denver Post, February 16, 2010. “ Kostka jr, William. "New Jury Picked to Probe Police" Rocky Mountain News, january 11, 1961, 5. 5° Kostka Jr. William. "New Jury Picked to Probe Police"Rocky Mountain News, January 11,1961, 5. 5 "Police Ringleader in 1960's Theft Dies.” Rocky Mountain News, January 20, 1983, 10. "Police Ringleader in 1960's Theft Dies.” Rocky Mountain News, January 20, 1983, 10.16 More police came forward with confessions. Following MeNamara’s statement, ‘many officers made oral and written statements admitting to their involvement in criminal activity while on duty. These written statements led to a series of more arrests and trials. Governor McNichols announced that the state investigation (meaning the questioning of and interviewing of every patrolman suspected of misconduct in the Denver police department) had turned up an ‘incredible criminal incest’ implicating at least thirty-five Denver policemen. Minutes later fourteen of the suspects were brought to the State Capitol and there stripped of their badges and suspended from the department. The officers were brought to the steps of the State Capitol to be suspended so that the public of Denver could see what was being done about the scandal. It was critical to the Chief of Police, Jim Childers to bring his scandal-ridden department back into the public confidence. Privately however, Chief Childers had heart ina different place. The cops “paraded before their chief, surrendered their equipment, and answered a few brief questions. Tears came to the eyes of Chief Childers as some of the old-timers, men he had served with on patrol, came forward and deposited badges.”** The scandal had taken a toll on the Chief who couldn't bear to see his men so shamed, Less than a week after he had suspended the fourteen officers of their badges, Childers resigned saying his doctor had recommended that he leave for health reasons. 85 Interestingly enough, one key influential group that did not seem to be affected by the scandal was the public. There were no reports of public indignation or outcry. One article that appeared in Argosy Magazine for Men in 1962 even referred to the public as 53 Whearley, Bob. "Expose of Police Burglaries Marked City’s 'Year of Shame’.” The Denver Post, December 26, 1961. 54 "Denver's Burglars With Badges.” Argosy Magazine, 1962, 116-122. 55"Denver’s Burglars With Badges.” Argosy Magazine, 1962, 116-122,a7 “indifferent.*S* In another piece written to the Rocky Mountain Herald on October 14, 1961, a member of the public wrote in to say, “The scandal has produced one worthy development. Police cars are now going to be marked spectacularly so everyone will know them when they see them.”"5” The same writer went on to say that the police should get rid of their “drab clothing” and reserve only a few plain cars for officers in plain clothes; “Cars should look like police cars with gleaming white enamel and authoritative emblems."3® These were truly the only remarks the person had to say. Nothing about the theft was addressed; The member of the public chose to focus in on how the officers were dressed as a big problem. Though this is just one news article, there is very little evidence to suggest that the public were truly outraged by the police-burglars, The IACP ‘The most important reactions to the scandal were those of the reformers, A sweeping reorganization of the department was undertaken by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The reorganization investigations were conducted through the IACP's Field Service Division, headed by ex-FBI official Quinn Tamm. When asked about what the IACP planned to do in Denver, Tamm claimed, "We can't come in and give Denver the best police department in the country in six months, there isn't even a remote possibility of this; the problem built up over many years. But what we can do is put the department in some kind of shape — a solid foundation for the future.”®? By using the term “solid foundation’, Tamm and the IACP meant the organizational structure of the police 5 "Denver's Burglars With Badges.” Argosy Magazine, 1962, 116-122. 57 "Denver's Burglars With Badges." Argosy Magazine, 1962, 116-122. 59"Denver's Burglars With Badges." Argosy Magazine, 1962, 116-122. % Whearley, Hob. “Expose of Police Burglaries Marked City’s ‘Year of Shame.” The Denver Post, December 26, 1961,18 department°'To the IACP, the cause of the corruption had stemmed from the overly complicated line of control the Denver police force operated under. The LACP came into Denver with the mindset that Denver's police structure needed to be completely stripped down and overly simplified. Overall, the [ACP recommended a decrease in the number of police captains, police technicians and patrolmen. It also advised a reduction in the number of police districts. The IACP said reducing the number of police districts was a, “sound, basic principle of modern police administration.”6* According to the organization, to operate from just one district would be the most desirable outcome. Of course, in practice working from just one district is not practical. So the IACP had to look to other avenues of reform for the Denver police. Inthe opinion of reformers, the IACP, one of the main solutions to the problem was division of labor. The IACP advocated for a system in which responsibility was broken down into several smaller units. By changing the current system, argued IACP reports, each person would be certain of exactly what job they were doing, Initially, Mayor Batterton and Safety Manager Schooley did not see the need for the division of power. In an article from the Denver Post, Batterton's office issued a statement saying, “All of us are reluctant to approve ‘paper’ changes until it can be demonstrated that the new functions and new functional relationships will produce effectively.”®? The new Chief of Police, James Slavin, disagreed completely with the division of power. He believed that with units of only four men, along with such a great amount of focus being placed on internal policing, the manpower would be far too low. To the Denver Post Slavin said, “It’s the poor victim on the © A copy ofthe original structure of power and the IACP proposed structure are both attached to this document. : "Supervision Shortage Called Key Reason for Police Scandal." The Denver Post, June 14, 1962 © "Formal OK Given 2 New Police Bureaus.” The Denver Post, June 14, 1962.19 street who suffers.”® Yet, despite the initial hesitation of Mayor Batterton and Chief Slavin, the IACP continued to make recommendations based on the idea separation of the officers. Another cause of corruption the IACP pointed to was the direct lack of critical self policing, “This is the area where deficiencies are most shocking and offensive,”** Tamm stated. Tamm and his team saw the great need for a special inspection bureau that some of the larger city police departments already had. This new investigation bureau would be led by the position of an Inspector. The new unit would have clear links to the Internal Affairs Bureau. However, the new investigation bureau the IACP recommended was different to that of the Internal Affairs Bureau set up in 1958, The new investigation bureau “saw that specific ‘things’ were being done properly. The internal affairs bureau had the same responsibility as applied to persons."65 ‘The IACP believed that the position of Inspector should not be chosen by seniority of the officer just because he is older. Clearly, the phrase “older and wiser” hadn't applied before as it was the older officers who trained the younger ones in how to crack safes. Tamm pointed to the fact that the Inspector would have the role of keeping an eye on the whole force. ‘The idea of this field inspection team was for all the officers to work together and in harmony with the other officers. The Inspection Bureau: Prepasition and Official Order report compiled by the IACP stated, “Without an adequate inspection service in the department, the Chief of Police can hope for the best, but he has no certainty that he really know what conditions are. Responsibility is spread too far and resides in too many different individuals, none of whom have the responsibility or the time to scrutinize the © Pearce, Ken. "Denver Police District Consolidation Suggested.” The Denver Post, June 14, 1962. Tamm, Quinn. Inspection Bureau: Preposition and Official Order. Denver: 1962. *5 "Formal OK Given 2 New Police Bureaus.” The Denver Fost, june 14, 1962.20 whole organization.”*° The [ACP recommended about four men be placed in this new unit. ‘The men would be under the watchful eye of the Inspector who would report directly to the Chief of Police. Each subordinate officer needed to have a “high degree of technical knowledge and competence in different fields of police service.”®” Each subordinate officer also needed to create a comprehensive reminder list and check list to make sure that all departments they were responsible for received thorough investigation and were judged by the same scale. That said, the IACP did recommend that these special officers stand out by wearing a uniform and insignia badge different to those of the regular officers. As Tamm put it, these badges and uniforms were needed “in order to add weight and prestige to the function they are performing.”® The badges were to look the same, but have the titles. “Inspector” and “Chief Inspector” in place of where the name of the department would usually be. Effectively, the LACP thought that an additional cause of corruption in Denver was brought on by the lack of internal policing within the department. The IACP did not stop there, however, and went on to publish several volumes worth of recommended changes to the Denver Police Department. In the Master Plan for Reorganization of the Police Department City and County of Denver, the IACP put forth a three- page list totaling thirty-two changes that needed to take place. Some of the most significant changes included evaluating the qualifications of each officer by subjecting them to psychological and polygraph testing. Another recommendation suggested arranging a working week into the traditional five days, forty hours format. Two additional recommendations stated, “Create a Training Advisory Board composed of leading citizens Tamm, Quinn, Inspection Bureau: Preposition and Official Order. Denver: 1962. © Tamm, Quinn. Inspection Bureau: Preposition and Official Order. Denver: 1962. Tamm, Quinn. Inspection Bureau: Preposition and Official Order. Denver: 1962. Tamm, Quinn. Inspection Bureau: Preposition and Official Order. Denver: 1962.a in the community; the members to be appointed by the Mayor” and “Reassign the K-9 Corp to the Field Division and reduce the number of dogs and officers assigned to it."?9 This list, of reforms highlights the fact that the IACP wanted the police department to become more standardized and simplified. By implementing the traditional work week into the police force, the IACP believed that it would be easier for police chiefs to track their officers and know where they were at most times of the day. By creating an Advisory Board of leading Citizens, it allowed for yet another way in which in the policemen’s actions could be watched over and judged. Overall, the [ACP wanted to standardize the police department into a streamlined “machine” with no room for error. ‘The ACP also recognized the fact that it was not just the subordinate officers who had played a part in the demise of the police department. In a study it conducted of the personnel management, the IACP commented that most supervisors believed that improper conduct on the part of their command was a matter for the Internal Affairs Bureau only. But as the LACP pointed out, “To exclude line supervision from the responsibility of the subordinates deprives the department of the benefit of that force which corrects, molds, strengthens and perfects.’”! Essentially stating that the police force needed to be a supportive force that gave subordinate officers the ability to report upon. their superiors if any wrong doing was witnessed. In the opinion of the IACP, it was not up to the Internal Affairs Bureau alone to act on cases of misconduct by any officers. In the eyes of the IACP, all supervisors had been indifferent to “flagrant as well as subtle evidence of misconduct on the part of departmental personnel.” 2Proper discipline was needed if » Kenney, John Paul. Master Plan for Reorganization of the Denver Police Department. Denver: 1962. ‘Tamm, Quinn Appraisal of Personnel Management in the Denver Police. Denver: 1962. 72Tamm, Quinn. Appraisal of Personnel Management in the Denver Police. Denver: 1962,22 the Denver Police Department was ever going to recover from the scandal. The Appraisal claimed, “All supervisors must be made alert to the importance of sound discipline and its attendant benefits. Proper discipline stimulates harmony and efficiency within an organization and facilitates the coordination of effort.” 7 The Appraisal made of point of highlighting an issue that was widespread throughout the police force; “Supervisors should not be reluctant to contend actively with any situation suggestive of irregular conduct, since hesitance will weaken organizational discipline.’”* The main problem here was that the supervisors of the Denver police were too friendly with their officers; they were friends rather than superiors. Supervisors needed to know that the end result of their laxity with discipline equaled a loss of respect from their men rather than the achievement of personal approval they intended for. Above all, the [ACP recommended that emphasis be put on promoting the positive aspects of discipline and alert supervision at all times to ensure quality of performance over and above the “high standards set for the police service.”?5 To change the makeup of the police department, the IACP thought it needed to address how the viewed each other. The IACP’s Appraisal of Personnel Management contained suggestions on how the officers should view the misconduct of the men they worked with. This aspect of the report was more than likely put forth in order to deter officers from the old standard rule of the “good” group whereby no officer may “tell on” another officer. For any big changes to happen, the IACP knew that the ostracizing of any officer who turned another officer in for misconduct, would have to be completely erased. Officers had to be encouraged by their Captains and Chiefs to keep tabs on one-another. As 73 Tamm, Quinn, Appraisal of Personne! Management in the Denver Police. Denver: 1962. Tamm, Quinn. Appraisal of Personnel Management in the Denver Police. Denver: 1962. "5 Tamm, Quinn. Appraisal of Personnel Management in the Denver Police. Denver: 1962.23 Quinn Tamm stated, “An over-protective attitude towards the nonconforming fellow officer is damaging to all associates.” Therefore, to advance the group's interest, itis best for all policemen that the habit of proper performance be encouraged and derelictions be corrected, since the reputation of the entire force is adversely affected by the behavior ofa few nonconformists.”, stated Quinn Tamm.76 This statement by Tamm re-iterates exactly hhow the IACP viewed the cause of corruption. The IACP believed that the negligent actions of the superiors in the Denver police department allowed corruption to take route and then spread throughout the entire department. Officers had to be on guard of one another and not be afraid to report the misconduct going on around them. The IACP also claimed that the training of new officers needed reorganization, so that corruption could not be bred at the foundation level of the police force. The next main area of focus was training for new recruits, New recruitment and selection techniques were needed to meet the IACP standards of numerical and quality needs in the department. The new recruitment standards called for a change in the ages of entry-level patrolmen. The recommendations stated age twenty-one as the minimum and twenty-seven as the maximum age a man could apply to join the force. This was a change from the current admission policy that allowed men from age twenty-two to thirty-two to join the police force, The LACP stated it was an established that if a man is not set in his career by age ‘twenty-seven he never will be, as its reason for the age requirement changes. In addition the IACP felt that twenty-two years old was too far removed from graduating high school and so the young man would have had chance to establish himself in another career and thus would have something to fall back on if he is inclined to leave the police, However, 76Tamm, Quinn. Appraisal of Personnel Management in the Denver Police. Denver: 1962.24 twenty-one years old was deemed still young enough for cadets to be inclined to stay with the police for their entire lives.” In addition to new age restrictions, psychological testi 8 and character background checks were also recommended. At that time, the department did not concern itself with the emotional character traits of the candidates it hired. Unless concern was taken, Quinn Tamm argued, “There is always a possibility of appointing the psychopathic, neurotic, paranoidal [sic], sadistic or other temperamental misfits and once hired, such persons are a serious liability; vesting them with police authority and equipping them with a lethal weapon is a disaster.””8 It was recommended that the character, childhood and adult history of each candidate be provided in order to gain insight into the candidates ethical and social standards. In short, the ACP advised that much stricter and far more in- depth recruiting methods be put in place so that not just any kid off the street could be hired as a police officer. ‘The Denver Police After the JACP Controversy followed into the years following the IACP reports. Early on, Denver officials had problems with the IACP reform recommendations, One of the biggest sources of dispute was what the exact number of policemen on the force should be. In an interesting turn of events, Mayor Batterton reported to the Rocky Mountain News in June 11962 that, “The IACP did not make any recommendations as the adequacy of the present department strength.’ This statement is false, Although the Denver force was authorized by law to have up to 797 police officers, the JACP recommended that there be 751 men in the department. At the time ofthe investigation, there were 731 officers. Manager of Safety, 77 -Tamm, Quinn, Appraisal of Personne! Management in the Denver Police. Denver: 1962. ve Tamm, Quinn. Appraisal of Personnel Management in the Denver Police, Denver: 1962 > Harding Dell W. “Council Attacks Police Report, Mayor's Action." The Rocky Mountain News, june 12, 1962.25 John Schooley, believed that there should be at least 1,000 officers in the department to meet all the recommended changes of the IACP.® The press at the time was against the idea of 1,000 and reported on Schooley’s ideas in a negative light. The Rocky Mountain News reported that if the city had 1,000 officers on staff, it would cost $1,157,100 in salaries alone. * In the end, the number of 751 suggested by the IACP was never put in place. By 1964, there were 798 officers in the Denver police department. Following the first recommendation from the Master Plan of the IACP, Mayor Richard Batterton and the Denver city council installed James Slavin, chief of the Kalamazoo, Michigan force as the new police chief of Denver. Slavin had done a distinguished job with Kalamazoo force and had earned the respect of his peers. He was offered the Denver job and accepted it, taking over the reins in January 1962.83 Unfortunately for Slavin, he immediately put his foot in his mouth. During the City Club of Denver's luncheon at the Brown Palace Hotel on February 7, 1962, Slavin, the guest of honor, made a statement that many believed the Denver public never forgave him for. ‘Talking about the major changes that Slavin would make happen, he stated, “It is impossible for me to believe that what happened within the department was out of context with the morals of the rest of the community.”®5 Throughout the following months, Slavin, who was not a native of Denver, went on to make statements that perpetuated his ® Pearce, Ken, “Operation of Police Assailed.” The Denver Post, June 14, 1962, Harding, Dell W. "Council Attacks Police Report, Mayor's Action.” The Rocky Mountain News, june 12, 1962. ® Gagnon, William. "Denver Police Make Gains in Dill’s 1st Year." The Rocky Mountain News, July 6, 1964. Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Amo Press, 1974, 32. Established in 1922, the City Club is Colorado's premier public affairs forum. It is a non-partisan and nonprofit organization renowned for its tradition of elevating discourse on local, statewide, national and international topics. It does not take positions on issues. Itis the purpose ofthe Club to provide a vehicle for dispensing information dealing with the growth and development of Denver and the wider community.” The City Club of Denver's History and Purpose, "City Club of Denver.” Accessed April 20, 2012. hitp://wwweitycluboldenver:org/Defaultaspx?pageld=728644. & Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974. 33.26 unpopularity among the general public and the police officers he was in charge of. His statements were seen almost as an attack on the way Denver operated. He made informal remarks to newspapers stating that “inadequate training, lack of experience, anda tendency to sweep dirt under the rug” were the main causes for the burglary scandal. It did not help that Slavin was there only because of IACP recommendation, and not because Denver officials wanted him there. While Slavin was in charge, some of the IACP recommendations were put in place. Slavin turned his attention to the IACP advised of a Planning Bureau. At that time, the Denver Police Force had no formal system for planning, The Planning Bureau essentially analyzed crime patterns, reviewed procedures, and controlled finances. This bureau served as another form of internal policing. Slavin set up a Planning Bureau in Denver almost identical to the one that had worked so well for him in Indianapolis. For several months he worked extremely hard at reorganization. Three new division chiefs were appointed, men were reassigned and technicians were named to staff new departments and establish new functions; Denver was beginning to have a modern police force under Slavin.” However, Slavin's time in office did not last for very long as he was only an intermitten chief, placed in power for three-to-six months under IACP recommendations. In the 1963 Mayor elections, future winner Thomas Currigan was strongly anti-Slavin. Currigan promised his supporters as soon as he was Mayor he would take Slavin out of office. Currigan claimed Slavin was too “mild mannered to do police work effectively, and had shown himself Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974. 34. © Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974. 35.27 incompetent to run the department.” The next day, Slavin announced he would resign effective June 30. Two days later on July 7, 1963 Currigan announce Captain Harold A. Dill would succeed Slavin as Chief of Police.*? ‘The Harold A. Dill idea of how to run a police department without corruption was yet again different from the IACP. Chief Dill was close with his men; He was their friend before their leader. The instant Dill joined the force, the last two years of JACP work and the $20,000 in developments were scrapped. On his dismissal of the IACP recommendations, Chief Dll said, “We don’t need planners, I do all the planning. We need policemen. A big planning staff is fine for propaganda or press realseas, by we cant afford those frills.”" Dill cut the Internal Affairs Bureau from five men to three, with two of these three men assigned additional duties on top of their Internal Affairs work. Dill tooka similar approach to the IACP’s recommendations on training and recruiting. The [ACP had advised that in order to eliminate poor training practices, new men needed to be trained by the finest, hand-picked patrol men on the squad. According to IACP findings, these first-rate patrolmen served as “models of the professional police officer dedicated to the concept of public service,” Chief Dill disagreed.%? According to Dill, the IACP recommendations were not necessary. In his opinion, “A rookie can learn from the stupidest man on the department. You don’t train integrity into people."In all departments, men were reassigned. Twelve of the force's sixteen police captains were put into new jobs, and of the thirty-eight technician appointments made by Slavin to meet [ACP recommendations, ‘8 smith, Ralph Lee, The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974, 36. ‘% Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge, New York: Arno Press, 1974. 36. ® Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge, New York: Arno Press, 1974. 35 t Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974. 35 Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974. 35. #2 Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974. 35.28 twenty-seven were completely abolished because Dill thought they were a waste of timeIn Dill, Denver had found a Police Chief who thought of himself as one of the guys. Chief Dill had no time for bureaucracy or the “soft, fluffy jobs’, as he called them. According to his followers, Dill did want good law enforcement, but in his own words Dill did not believe that could be found in 5 Dill’s jodern criminology and police administratior thinking on how to run a police department was the complete antithesis of the ideas of Slavin and the IACP. Essentially, Dill returned the Denver Police Department to look almost ider | to how it did during the time of the police burglars. After all the investigations, trials and overall humiliation of the police force, Dill disregarded every recommendation and improvement set forth and turned the police force straight back to the ill equipped, poorly trained department it had been before. Conclusion When it came to reforming the Denver police department in the 1960s, there were too many people involved with too many ideas. The patrolmen believed that they were almost forced into becoming burglars by a system that not only condoned theft, but almost promoted it and punished any officer who tried to expose the truth, Mayor Batterton and Manger of Safety John Schooley claimed the theft took place in a few isolated instances. The International Association of Chiefs of Police claimed it was a complete lack of supervision that allowed ill-trained and equipped officers to fall for the temptations surrounding them ona daily basis at work, Finally, the new police chief who took over once the scandal had finally died down, Harold A. Dill, truly believed that reforms were not needed. To Dill, he Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974, 35, °% Smith, Ralph Lee. The Tarnished Badge. New York: Arno Press, 1974, 35,29 knew best what needed to be done in order to stop police misconduct. The reforms of the IACP failed in Denver because there were simply too many officials involved with differing, opinions on how to solve the problem. Thus, the big scandal of the 1960s Burglars in Blue failed to alter to the inner workings of the Denver police department.