Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Property Compiled
Property Compiled
Issue:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and
hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.
Held:
YES, The courts have the power of restricting
the exercise of eminent domain. The taking of
private property for any use which is not
required by the necessities or convenience of the
inhabitants of the state is an unreasonable
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and
beyond the power of the legislature to delegate.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be
public or private. The former is a cemetery used
by the general community, or neighborhood, or
church, while the latter is used only by a family,
or a small portion of the community or
neighborhood.
Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public
use and no part of the ground can be taken for
other public uses under a general authority. And
this immunity extends to the unimproved and
unoccupied parts which are held in good faith
for future use.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded
that the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
005 - CUA LAI CHU VS LAQUI
Trivia:
2 parcels of lands are located within the
timberland in Talibon Bohol that is why it is a
forest land.
Patent - grant of government property
012 - SPS. PASCUAL VS SPS. CORONEL
Respondents, spouses Reynaldo and Asuncion
Coronel, are the registered owners of two parcels
of land which they resided on the said property
until sometime in 1969 when they decided to
transfer to a new residence close to their
business operations. They entrusted the
property and the owners copy of TCT to
Asuncions parents who moved into the property
and resided therein. However they moved to
another house and entrusted the whole property
to their son, Dr. Fermin Pascual, Jr. The latter
had a son, petitioner Richard Pascual, who
subsequently occupied the premises together
with his wife. Respondents formally demanded
from the petitioners the immediate surrender of
the premises but the latter failed and refused to
vacate the same. They filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tarlac City a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages[5] against the petitioners on the ground
that the latter are occupying the property
without their consent.
The petitioners contended that the respondents
are no longer the lawful owners of the subject
house and lot because they already sold the same
to Alberta in turn, sold the property to Dr. MeluJean Pascual, petitioner Richards older sister,
through the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Estate. According to the petitioners,
ISSUE:
Who has the better right to an island
that forms in a non-navigable and nonfloatable water, is it the one who has
actual possession or the owner of the
land along the margin nearest the
island? Latter
HELD:
The parcel of land in question is part of
an island that formed in a nonnavigable and non-flotable river;
Note/trivia:
With regard the issue of the RTC that
the State owns it, the SC said that they
were unprepared to rule on this, unlike
the trial court because there was no
documents showing that it belongs to
the State. The State should be the one to
present evidence.
Issues:
(1) W/N the property is conjugal - YES
(2) W/N the dissolution terminated the
conjugal partnership of gains - NO
(3) W/N Metrobank is an innocent
purchaser for value - NO
The property is conjugal in nature as it was
bought in the duration of their marriage. It being
named Florencia Nevalga, married to Nicholson
Pascual does not mean that it is a paraphernal
property of Florencia but merely describes her
marital status.
There were no liquidation proceedings between
the properties of the spouses. Therefore, the
property is still conjugal in nature.
Metrobanks right to the property is only 1/2
(the portion of Florencia only). The bank failed
to observe due diligence.
Petition denied.
023 - PARILLA VS PILAR
Facts:
1. Petitioners spouses and co-petitioner
son, namely; Samuel, Chinita and
Deodato, all surnamed Parilla, as
dealers of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Pilipinas Shell), are in
possession of a parcel of a land located
at the poblacion of Bantay, Ilocos Sur.
Petition denied.
033 - LEONOR B. CRUZ VS TEOFILA M.
CATAPANG
Facts:
Leonor Cruz and Norma Maligaya are
co-owners of a land located at Barangay
Mahabang Ludlod in Batangas. With
Maligayas consent, Teofila Catapang
built a house on a lot adjacent to the
parcel of land which intruded a portion
of the co-owned property.
Leonor visited the property and
discovered that a part of respondents
house intruding unto a portion of the coowned property. She demanded for
demolition and vacate the portion
encroaching the property but responded
disregarded.
Petitioner filed a suit for forcible entry
before the MTC.
MTC- Granted. Consent of only one of the coowners is not sufficient to justify the defendants
construction.
RTC-Affirmed.
CA-Reversed. Consent was given by Maligaya,
therefore cannot be characterized as one made
through strategy or stealth (a cause of action for
forcible entry).
Issue:
Is consent of the co-owner valid in the dismissal
of the forcible entry case?
Held:
No. Entry into the land affected clandestinely
without the knowledge of the other co-owners
could be categorized as possession by stealth.
Normas consent, allowing the respondent to
stay in the constructed house can be considered
as a strategy. Hence, these causes of action
constitute forcible entry. Moreover, an alteration
was made without a valid consent of the other
co-owner. Alterations may include any act of
strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held
implicitly an act of alteration. In this case, the
construction of a house on the co-owned
property is an act of dominion. There being no
consent from all co-owners, respondent had no
right to construct her house on the co-owned
property.
Art 493:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be alloted to him in
the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
039 - DONATO PAULMITAN, JULIANA
FANESA AND RODOLFO FANESA VS. CA,
ALICIO, ELENA, ABELINO, ADELINA,
ANITA, BAKING AND ANITO ALL
SURNAMED PAULMITAN.
Facts:
1. Agatona Paulmitan was married to
Ciriaco Paulmitan, who begotten 2
children, namely; Pascual and Donato.
Agatona died intestate, leaving 2 parcles
of land located in the province of Negros
Occidental (Lot No. 757 and Lot No.
1091). Shortly after the death of Agatona
(mother), Pascual also died, leaving his
heirs, namely; Alicio, Elena, Abelino,
Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito all
surnamed Paulmitan (respondents).
Donato, on the other hand, had only one
child, Juliana Fanesa who was married
to Rodolfo Fanesa (petitioners).
2. Donato, executed an Affidavit of
Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating
unto himself Lot No 757 on the ground
of being the sole heir of Agatona.
3. For Lot No. 1091, Donato sold it to
Juliana. Because of non-payment of
taxes, said lot was forfeited and sold in a
public auction. Subsequently, the same
Held:
Yes. Respondent is not suing in our courts "for
the recovery of any debt, claim or demand," for
which a license to transact business in the
Philippines is required by Section 69 of the
Corporation Law, subject only to the exception
already noted. Respondent went to the
Philippine Patent Office on a petition for
cancellation of a trademark registered by
petitioner, invoking Section 17(c) in relations to
Section 4(d) of the Trademark Law.
Take note:
Section 17 (c) and Section 4 (d) of the Trademark
Law provide respectively as follows:
SEC. 17. Grounds for cancellation. Any
person, who believes that he is or will be
damaged by the registration of a mark or tradename, may, upon the payment of the prescribed
fee, apply to cancel said registration upon any of
the following grounds:
(c) That the registration was obtained
fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of
section four, Chapter II thereof: ...
HELD:
Yes. The court held under Art. 409 of the 1889
Civil Code that there are two modes to acquire
right to use public waters (1) By administrative
concession (2) 20 year prescription period.
Petitioners alleged the incontestable fact that
from 1913 1959 (46 years) that NAWASA and
its predecessors have openly, publicly and
exclusively appropriated water from Angat river
without protest from anyone.
The Irrigation Law contented by Respondents
with regard to making an application to the
Director of Public Works modifies things in so
far as administrative process and not with
regard to the modes of acquisition.
DOCTRINE:
Article 409 of the 1889 Civil Code: Two different
ways of acquiring the right to the use of public
waters: (1) By Administrative Concession (2)
Prescription for 20 years.
Irrigation Act 2152 Section 14 (claimed by
respondents) :
Any person hereafter desiring to appropriate
any public water shall previously make an
application to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications through the Director of Public
Works
appropriation is effected,
provided he prosecutes his
enterprise to success and with
reasonable diligence.
Explanation of Decision:
The plaintiff and defendant must show
evidence to prove their claim.
Respondent merely contented that
petitioners claim was not sufficient.
Petition granted.
056 - ALINO V HEIRS OF ANGELICA
LORENZO
Issue:
1. WoN defendant acquired the subject
property through his husbands (Rubio)
bad faith?
Ruling: The Court finds it unnecessary to try the
issue of the case.
Article 1957 provides that ownership
and other rights prescribes at 10 years to the
persons present and 20 for those who are
absent. Article 1950 provides that good faith of
the possessor is when he doesnt know the defect
of the title and believes that the one who
acquired the title is the real owner. Article 434
provides that good faith is always presumed. At
the present case, it is clear that defendant have
been occupying and possessing in good faith the
subject land, unless bad faith can be impugn in
her husband. There being no proof of bad faith
on the part of her husband (Rubio), which is of
no consequence to the decision. It is also equally
clear that defendant, having taken possession of
the subject land from Feb. 1896 up to Oct. 17,
1908, defendant is the owner of the parcel of
land by prescription.
058 - DAVIS VS NEYRA
Manufacturing Corporation
(petitioner) filed for a cancellation of
registration no. 56561 in the IPO
against the president if Harvard
University with regard to the Harvard
Shield Symbol for decals, tote bags,
serving trays, sweat shirt, tshirt, and
hat. They alleges that petitioners started
using such in the Philippines in 1982 by
New York Garments.
Harvard then alleged that it is the
lawful owner in 50 countries including
the Philippines. Upon discovery of its
use in 2002 through a website they filed
a complaint against FREDCO for
infringement.
ISSUE:
1. W/N taking under expropriation
commenced with the filing - YES
2. W/N Php 10/sqm is fair just
compensation - NO
HELD:
RE: Taking
Elements of taking for purposes of
eminent domain:
1. Expropriator must enter private
property
o Present. AFP took
possession of the
property by virtue of the
lease agreement.
2. Entrance into the private
property must be for more than
a momentary period/limited
period (not indefinite or
permanent)
o Present. Installations of
permanent nature do
not alter the fact that
entry into the land was
transitory.
o If they intended to
permanently occupy
Castellvis property,
they ought to have
expropriated it from the
beginning instead of
annually renewing the
lease agreement.
3. Entry is under warrant of legal
authority
o Present. Republic
entered as lessee.
4. Property is devoted to public
use.
o Present. It was used by
the air force.
5. Use of the property in such a
way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
o No ousting. Castellvi
remained as owner. The
Republic undertook to
return the property if
the lease was
terminated.
o Castellvi even received
monthly rentals.
So, there was no taking in 1947 under
the lease. Taking should be counted
from the time of the filing of the action
for expropriation.
RE: Compensation
The value of the property being
expropriated cannot be reckoned from
the start of the lease. This is a deceptive
Issue:
WON plaintiff is the rightful owner of Lorcha
property. YES
Held:
The finding contained in the judgment, to the
effect that Luis Rivera was the purchaser of the
lorcha at the public sale, is absolutely
incompatible with them, inasmuch as Agustin
Asensio was the purchaser. The evidence of the
document that proves this sale has not been
rebutted or impugned in any manner.
Admitting that Luis Rivera was in possession of
the lorcha, as in reality he was then it was
attached and sold, the record contains no proof
as to when the said possession commenced and
how it was acquired. In accordance with
paragraph 2 of article 573 of the Code of
Commerce, the ownership of the vessel
may be acquired by possession; such
possession must be in good faith,
continued for three years, and with good
title duly recorded. None of these
requisites been proven in favor of the
possession of Luis Rivera. Therefore, there
are no grounds in law for sustaining the
judgment appealed from, based as it was only on
said possession as the principal foundation.
SC ruled that: It be declare null and void the
attachment and sale of the said lorcha in favor of
the defendant Juan de Leon; that the plaintiff is
the owner and is entitled to the possession of the
same; and that the defendants shall deliver to
the plaintiff the said lorcha in the condition that
it was prior to the attachment and sale, such
delivery to be made in the city of Iloilo where it
was attached and sold.
Note: Lorcha is a type of sailing vessel having a
Chinese junk rig on a Portuguese or other
European style hull. Because of its hull
structure, the vessel is faster and can carry more
cargo than the normal Chinese junk
080 - FILIPINAS INVESTMENT &
FINANCE CORP V RIDAD (1969)
1.
R. Transport Corporation (respondent)
was a holder of a Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) to operate a public utility
bus service within Metro Manila and the
provinces while New Mindoro Transport Classic
(NMTC), which is represented by Alexander
Macasaet (petitioner), operates in Oriental
Mindoro.
2.
Petitioner and respondent entered into a
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage over 4
passenger buses, whereby the former is to pay
P12 million and assume the mortgage obligation
of the latter for the 4 buses in favor of Phil. Hino
Sales Corp. Respondent delivered 2 passenger
buses to petitioner.
3.
Petitioner however failed to pay his
obligation, despite repeated demands, which
prompted respondent to file a complaint for the
issuance of a writ of replevin.
4.
However, before the execution of the
contract, a Special Trip Contract was entered by
the parties, whereby the respondent would lease
the 4 buses to petitioner for the week of Oct 15
up to 22, 1995, in the amount of P10,000 per bus
or a total of P280,000.
5.
On Jan 8, 1996, the RTC issues a writ of
seizure, ordering the sheriff to take possession of
the 3 buses, subject to the complainants bond.
6.
Petitioner answers that he has already
paid the consideration sum of P12 million and
had agreed to assume the mortgage of the 4
buses. Petitioner claims that he was the owner of
the 4 buses (including the 2 buses delivered).
Petitioner also claim that he had remitted
already 12,000 for the mortgage obligation.
Petitioner did admit that he had been earning at
least 7,000 per day on each of the buses.
RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of respondents right
to possess the 2 buses (which was actually
delivered), but dismissed its claim for the
recovery of rentals for the use of the two buses.
CA Ruling: Sustained the respondents right to
possession. It also ruled that the deed of sale was
perfected, and that respondent retained
ownership over the buses. It ordered petitioner
to remit the income from the passenger buses in
the amount of P7k per day, from Oct 16, 1995 to
Jan 16, 1996.
Issue:
a.
WoN there a perfect contract between
petitioner and respondent? Yes.
Ruling:
Respondent claims that the contract was
never consummated for lack of consideration
and the disapproval of the security finance
needed for petitioner to assume the mortgage
obligation. Petitioner on the other hand, claims
ISSUE:
HELD:
Under Art 536:
In no case may possession be acquired
thru force and intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto
He who believes has an action or right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing
Must invoke the aid of the competent
court
Doctrine:
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should only
pay for the easement fee and not the full
value of the property?
Ruling:
No. Easement of a right of way transmits
no rights except the easement itself;
respondent retains full ownership of the
property.
The acquisition of such easement is,
however, not gratis. As held by the CA,
considering the nature and effect of the
installation power lines, the limitations
on the use of the land for an indefinite
period would deprive respondent of
normal use of property.
For this reason, the respondent is
entitled receive just compensation that
is of the monetary equivalent of the
land.
DOCTRINE:
Those in bold letters (ruling part).
Requisites of legal or compulsory easement:
a) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
b) after payment of the proper indemnity;
c) the isolation was not due to the
proprietors own acts; and
the right-of-way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate
103 - WHITE PLAINS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOC v. COURT OF APPEALS (1998)
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether Spouses Valdez are entitled to the right
of way as indicated in the absolute sale?
HELD:
NO, Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that
any transaction involving the sale or disposition
of real property must be in writing. The
stipulation harped upon by Spouses Valdez that
they shall be provided a 2 meters wide road
right-of-way on the western side of their lot but
which is not included in this sale is not a
disposition of real property. The proviso that the
intended grant of right of way is not included in
ISSUE:
Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the
easement of water over Respondents land.
Held:
Yes.
Issue:
Whether or not the court can declare a
compulsory right of way on a property
not subject of a pending case?
Whether or not there was voluntary
easement of right of way
Ruling:
No. The cause of action in the case was
the recognition of easement of right of
way that traversed the northern portion
of the property. The court made no
pronouncement on the nature and
legality of the new pathway. Thus, no
easement was established and their
claim for a right of way on the southern
portion had no basis.
The courts order of removing the fence
did not create a right of way on the basis
of voluntary agreement. There was no
agreement executed by the parties and
there was no payment for proper
indemnity.
Since a right of way is an interest in the
land, any agreement creating it should
be drawn and executed with the same
formalities as a deed of sale and must,
ordinarily, be in writing. No written
instrument was adduced by the parties
in the case.
109 - LAO V. ALBURO (1915)
Facts:
Sps. Lao filed for the a written
application in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of four
parcels of land, together with the
buildings thereon, of which they claimed
to be the absolute owners. All 4 parcels
of and are situated in Binondo.
ISSUE:
Was there an existing easement so as to prohibit
Amor from maintaining his two-storey house?
Castro's argument:
There was a leak the caused the front
portion of her house to be slippery so
she hired workers to see where the leak
was coming from and the workers
started digging
B. Yes.
1. It is quite clear from the terms of the
donation [deed of donation is in Spanish] that
the donor intended to and did dispose of her
properties irrevocably in favor of the donee,
subject only to the conditions therein expressed,
one of which was that the latter would have no
right to the products during the donor's lifetime.
2. This merely indicates a reservation in
herself of the usufruct over said properties,
which usufruct would be consolidated with the
naked ownership of the donee upon the former's
death.
3. The use of the words "se consolidaran"
implied transfer of the naked ownership, with
which the beneficial title would be consolidated
upon arrival of the term thus fixed.
4. By virtue of the donation executed by the
original owner and applicant in favor of Socorro
A. Castro, the latter succeeded to the properties
applied for, and hence registration in the name
of her Intestate Estate, represented in this case
by the petitioner as administrator.
123 - ELEIZEGUI v MANILA LAWN
TENNIS (1903)
HELD:
a) YES, the parties have agreed upon a
term hence Art. 1581 is inapplicable.
ISSUE:
W/N the stock dividend is part of the
capital which should be preserved in
favor of the owners OR an income of
fruits which should be given to and
enjoyed by the life usufructuary Jacinto
as his exclusive property? Latter