Araneta v Dinglasan Digest

Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:
Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue
of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of
emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate
rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix
the duration of its effectivity.
2.
EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the
provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.
3.
EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma.
Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar
Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of
shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground
that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.
4.
EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes
was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to
restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of
this EO.
5.
Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in
connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio
Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount
or any part of it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
YES.
1.
The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became
inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular session on
May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority
of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and
not the first special session after it.
2.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and
lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225
and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation

of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second
appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore
declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed
and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This
is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted
the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature
was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes
brought on by the war.
Rodriguez v. Gella Digest
Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C.J.:
Facts:
1.
Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546
issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500
for urgent and essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods,
droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
2.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war
or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of
war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which
involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in
section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency,
to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry
out the national policy declared in section 1."
3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was
vetoed by the President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent
resolution of the Congress to formally declare the termination of the
emergency powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative
NO.
1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The
Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating
funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others
purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must

be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself

and to withdraw the same from the President.
2.
CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be
assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited
period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and
such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to
the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may
never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so,
the President may wield his veto.
3.
If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general
appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations;
otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides,
it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President
to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is
doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new
appropriations.

4.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general
power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable
the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its
authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven
years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every
conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act,
would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were
careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a
limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus
entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any
national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide
because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our
democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and
unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the
Constitution.
Rubi vs. Provincial Board Digest
Rubi v. Provincial Board
39 Phil 660
Facts:

The Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a resolution which required all

Mangyans to stay in one permanent settlement. The said resolution was
approved by the Secretary of Interior as required under Sec. 2145 of the
Revised Administrative Code. This provision authorized the establishment of
non-Christian sites to be selected by the provincial governor. Sec. 2145 of
the RAC is now herein assailed on ground that it is an unlawful delegation of
legislative power to the provincial officials.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 of the RAC is valid
The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is
permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on matters
that are of purely local concerns.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Ex

MUNICIPALITY OFCARDONA,
plaintiff, vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN, ET AL.,defendants.

Rel.

THE

Facts:This action by the municipality of Cardona to prohibit the municipality

of Binangonanfrom exercising municipal authority over the barrios of Tatala,
Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo,ahabang !arang, Nagsulo, and Bonot. unicipality
of Binangonan claims authority onthe basis of "xecutive #rder No. $$, series
of %&%', issued by the (overnor)(eneral of the !hilippine *slands on the %st
day of +uly, %&%'. The plaintiff further alleges that theexecutive order
referred to and above uoted and the -ct under hich it as issued
are/unconstitutional/ in that said -ct confers on the (overnor)(eneral
legislative authority.municipality of Cardona also claims that the "# is void
because it does not contain astatement that the change in the division line
beteen the said municipalities asreuired by the public good0 and that it
does not appear in said order itself that thereas a present urgency
reuiring the promulgation of such an order.
Issue: 1hether the said "xecutive #rder of the (overnor (eneral confers an
authority to fixthe boundary line of a certain municipality2
Held: 4es. "very -ct of the legislature is presumed to be constituted until the
contrary isclearly shon0 and no shoing of unconstitutionality having been
made in this case, theob5ection to the order of the (overnor)(eneral based on
that ground must be overruled.The other to ob5ections are frivolous.
-lthough it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the (overnor)(eneral
ought not to make such an order unless the publicgood reuires it, that fact
need not be stated in the order. The same may be said ithregard to its
urgency. The (overnor)(eneral having full authority to promulgate such
anorder this court ill assume, if it should act on the matter at all, that there

as publicnecessity therefor and that the matter as of such urgency as

properly to evoke actionby the Chief "xecutive.
Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission
GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940
FACTS: This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner
Pangasinan Transportation Co.Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been
engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting
passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and
Zambales. OnAugust 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service
Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC
granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply
also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration
with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then
filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service
Commission:- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitationconstitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD: The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid
and constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so
called Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the
growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the
Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to
carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the
promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.The Certificate
of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property
rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for
the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to
amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the
facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never
heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.In addition,
the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the
party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public
interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.
Calalang vs Williams
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the
resolution
aforementioned
in
pursuance
of
the
provisions
of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the
approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval

of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the

constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to
the greatest number.
CERVANTES vs. AUDITOR GENERAL Case Digest
CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL
(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)

FACTS
This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners
claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other
Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of
P15,000.00
NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner
amounting to P1,650 for 1949.
This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the
government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon
recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general
on two grounds:
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under
R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is
Constitutional.
DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of
legislative power to the executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for
the President to streamline GOCCs operation. Executive Order 93 is valid
because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for
review DISMISSED with costs
Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569

15 SCRA 569 Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and

Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any
municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special
civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly

repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be

created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios
were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt
from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios.
He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios
to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate
to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec.
68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public
welfare may require which would mean that the President may exercise
such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not
replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first
place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the
text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the
President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is
essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not
executive).
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 11 SCRA
317 (1964)

FACTS: In an alleged letter-petition, petitioner was charged with black

market of electric meters and that its meters were installed in bad faith to
register excessive rates. Petitioner received a communication from General
Auditing Office (GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued subsequently a
subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce before PSC, during a
conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain book of accounts. Petitioner
moved to quash such subpoena. The conference was postponed twice until it
was finally cancelled. In May 1962, PSC issued an order, which after finding
that petitioner had an excess of revenues by 18%, lowered the present meter
rates of petitioner. Hence, this petition for certiorari is instituted.
ISSUE: WON notice and hearing is required
RULING: Yes.
In support to its special defense, respondent PSC maintains that rate-fixing is
a legislative function; that legislative or rule-making powers may
constitutionally be exercised without previous notice or hearing. Although the
rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may
partake of legislative character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Here, the order exclusively applies to petitioner. What is
more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact, whether the petitioner is
making a profit more than 12% of its invested capital which is denied by the
petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of the
said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof
and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusions
drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of
fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character,
the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.
Indeed, Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of CA No. 146, explicitly require notice and
hearing.
Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order
complained of partakes the nature of quasi-judicial function and that, having
been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly
violative of the due process clause, and hence, null and void.