Analysis: The grim reality of Pak-Afghan

relations
Torkham border tensions are not mere symptoms of an ensuing
infection but a reminder of a forgotten malignancy. For centuries,
Afghanistan has embodied chaos, hallucinated pride and backwardness.
It is a fallacy to believe that prior Soviet invasion, the rugged country
was a model nation-state with co-existence and human development as
its core focus. It was a culturally conservative country with liberal vibes
emitting from multi-ethnic and multicultural Kabul. In fact, it neither
enjoyed good relations with Iran nor Pakistan as both were associated
to the Capitalist Bloc. Hence, Pakistans outpouring generosity behind
letting refugees in or the skirmishes on Torkham or elsewhere in
Afghanistan has a bitter historical context, which must be read in
terminology of the realpolitik.
The Pak-Afghan conflict

Historically, Afghanistan is known to have existed as a mere

geographical region than a nation-state until 1919 when Amir
Amanullah could finally get a fairly satisfactory agreement with the
British. Bloody conflicts were common in the region for centuries, as
the Afghan leader decided to carve his countrys northern border. He
first negotiated with the Khan of Ferghana Valley, located in todays
Uzbekistan, but later had to deal with the Soviet Red Army present in
the valley. Abandoning his plans for Islamic central Asia, Amanullah
struck a peace deal with the Bolsheviks in 1923. The year marked the
opening of Russian and then British embassies in Afghanistan, followed
by the rest.
The king, with ambitions to reform the tribal jigsaw, faced stiff
resistance from other smaller but significant political powerhouses. On

the other hand, with the British help, Kabul experienced a bandit as its
ruler in 1929, who the Soviets saw as a British puppet. Mohammed
Nadir Shah took over the country the same year but only to rule for five
years before being assassinated. His reign was relatively of internal
stability, although he annexed and integrated Herat in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, Peshawar served as a key British cantonment dealing with
Afghan affairs, diplomatically and militarily. None of the Amirs wanted
to establish a well-trained, formal military mainly for internal political
reasons until the Turks sent mission arrived in 1937 and formed
command structure, regional commands and brigade, etcetera. Though
it joined the United Nations (UN), it retained its isolationist posture.
However, in 1947, the regions most primitive country had a rude
awakening. The British had to leave Hindustan, creating Pakistan and
India. Afghanistan not only refused to accept Pakistan as a sovereign
country but also tried to block its entry in UN. Kabul, on the other
hand, claimed the entire North Western Frontier Province (now
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), Balochistan and some parts of Punjab. It also
refused to accept the status of Durand Line agreement signed to
formalize Afghanistans frontier with the British-ruled Hindustan.
On July 26, 1949, Kabul formally termed the Durand Line as an
imaginary line, revoking all previous agreements unilaterally. The world
had moved on from the 18th century and the claims largely went unnoticed. In practice too, Afghanistan did not violate the Durand Line,
respecting its existence while issuing visa and in matters of taxes, trade
and transit. But during this period, the Soviet-backed Pashtun
nationalist movement never abandoned Afghans denial of Pakistans
legitimacy on its vast expenses. Moreover, India supported Afghanistan
and maintained ties with nationalist movement. Globally, however, the

legal wizard insisted Kabul could not unilaterally change its borders
with its post-colonial neighbor.
Afghans fantasies nonetheless, in its internal matters, remained far
from being resolved. While the Soviets maintained enormous influence
on its military, Kabul was never written off by the western powers.
In the early 1970, Balochistan suffered a rebellion followed by
annexation of power by the Communists in Afghanistan. Islamabad
formally alleged its western neighbour of instigating and executing the
Baloch uprising, which it had quashed with the help of Pakistans great
friend the Shah of Iran. As a result, Kabul suffered severed diplomatic
relations with Pakistan in 1973, which were only restored four years
later when Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto released Ghaffar Khan of
Pashtunistan movement.
But General Zia was not a fan of left-leaning Mohammed Daoud regime
in Afghanistan, thus bitterness persisted. The Afghan leader fell out of
favour with his Soviet master, resulting in the return of the countrys
signature anarchy. On December 27, 1979, the USSR troops entered
Afghanistan to change the country forever in the years to follow.
A lack of goodwill

The history neither began with the Soviet invasion nor Pakistans
babysitting of Taliban. Oversimplification that marred understanding of
the bilateral ties has not only misled Pakistani and Afghanis but also the
western capitals. The two nations did not enjoy any brotherhood. There
was a lack of trust and multi-layered animosity, with seeds in the
creation of Pakistan.

Todays Afghan government, which can hardly establish its writ over
Kabuls secure zone has been hell-bent in denying Islamabad the right
for managing border traffic of people and goods. The mind-set of 1940s
has not faded away. The hallucinated self-image of a regional power still
exists, while the game has moved on from horse, rifles and daggers to
power manifestation tools far more sophisticated and far-reaching.
While the controversial concept of strategic depth was laid to rest in
1984, when Pakistan acquired nuclear deterrence, a similar reality
check about Afghans Durand Line fantasies has not been realized yet.
Kabul has also denied opening talks at the foreign minister or advisor to
National Security levels, on the lack of a leader in its National Unity
Government. Moreover, Abdullah Abdullah lives in the past while
President Ghani has other more important issues to weigh in for.
Panama Papers-tainted Nawaz Sharif has also long maintained an eerily
silence on the national security matters. But if the issues are left for the
regional military command to deal with, the conflict may have an
explosive risk of igniting a limited war on the Pak-Afghan border.