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RepublicofthePhilippines

SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L47799May21,1943
AdministrationoftheestateofAgripinoNeriyChavez.ELEUTERIONERI,ETAL.,
petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIAAKUTINANDHERCHILDREN,respondents.
OzamisandCapistranoforpetitioners.
Gullas,Leuterio,TannerandLaputforrespondents.
MORAN,J.:
Thisisacasewherethetestatorinhiswillleftallhispropertybyuniversaltitletothe
childrenbyhissecondmarriage,thehereinrespondents,withpreteritionofthechildrenbyhis
firstmarriage,thehereinpetitioner.ThisCourtannulledtheinstitutionofheirsanddeclareda
totalintestacy.
Amotionforreconsiderationhasbeenfiledbytherespondentsontheground(1)thatthereis
nopreteritionastothechildrenofthefirstmarriagewhohavereceivedtheirsharesinthe
propertyleftbythetestator,and(2)that,evenassumingthattherehasbeenapreterition,the
effectwouldnotbetheannulmentoftheinstitutionofheirsbutsimplythereductionofthe
bequestmadetothem.
1.ThefindingsofthetrialcourtandthoseoftheCourtofAppealsarecontraryto
respondents'firstcontention.ThechildrenofthefirstmarriageareEleuterio,Agripino,
Agapita,Getulia(whodiedalittlelessthaneightyearsbeforethedeathofherfatherAgripino
Neri,leavingsevenchildren),RosarioandCelerina.
AstoEleuterio,thetrialcourtsaidthat"itisnot,therefore,clearthatEleuteriohasreceived
hisshareoutofthepropertiesleftbyhisfather."ItistruethatEleuterioappearstohave
received,asadonationfromhisfather,parceloflandNo.4,butthequestionofwhetherthere
hasbeenadonationornotisapparentlyleftfordecisioninanindependentaction,andtothat
effectIgnaciaAkutinhasbeenappointedspecialadministratrixforthepurposeofinstituting
suchaction.
WithrespecttoAgripinoandAgapita,theparcelsoflandwhichtheyhaveoccupied,
accordingtothetrialCourt,"areapartofpubliclandwhichhadbeenoccupiedbyAgripino
NeriChaves,and,therefore,werenotapartoftheestateofthelatter."
ConcerningGetuliawhodiedabouteightyearsbeforethedeathofherfatherAgripinoNeri,
thetrialCourtfoundthat"neitherGetulianorherheirsreceivedanyshareoftheproperties."

AndwithrespecttoRosarioandCelerina,thetrialCourtsaidthat"itdoesnotappearclear,
therefore,thatCelerinaandRosarioreceivedtheirsharesintheestateleftbytheirfather
AgripinoNeriChaves."
Thisisinconnectionwiththeproperty,realorpersonal,leftbythedeceased.Astomoney
advances,thetrialCourtfound:
Itiscontented,furthermore,thatthechildrenofAgripinoNeriChavesinhisfirst
marriagereceivedmoneyfromtheirfather.ItappearsthatNemesioChavesis
indebtedintheamountofP1,000;Agripino,intheamountofP500asappearsin
Exhibits14and15;Getulia,intheamountofP155asappearsinExhibit16,17,and
18;CelerinaintheamountofP120asappearsinExhibit19,19Aand19B.
FromthesefindingsofthetrialCourtitisclearthatAgapita,Rosarioandthechildrenof
Getuliahadreceivedfromthetestatornopropertywhatsoever,personal,realorincash.
Butclause8ofthewillisinvokedwhereinthetestatormadethestatementthatthechildren
byhisfirstmarriagehadalreadyreceivedtheirsharesinhispropertyexcludingwhathehad
giventhemasaidduringtheirfinancialtroublesandthemoneytheyhadborrowedfromhim
whichhecondonedinthewill.Since,however,thisisanissueoffacttriedbytheCourtof
FirstInstance,andwearereviewingthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsuponaquestionof
lawregardingthatissue,wecanrelyonlyuponthefindingsoffactmadebythelatterCourt,
whichareasfollows:
SincealltheparcelsthatcorrespondedtoAgripinoNeriyChavesarenowinthe
administrator'spossession,asappearsintheinventoryfiledincourt,itisclearthatthe
propertyofthedeceasedhasremainedintactandthatnoportionthereofhasbeen
giventothechildrenofthefirstmarriage.
xxxxxxxxx
Itisstatedbythecourtandpracticallyadmittedbytheappellantsthatachildofthe
firstmarriagenamedGetulia,orherheirsafterherdeath,didnotreceiveanyshareof
thepropertyofherfather.
ItistruethatinthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsthereisalsothefollowingparagraphs:
AsregardsthatlargeparceloflandadjoiningparcelNo.1,itiscontendedthatafter
thecourthaddeniedtheregistrationthereof.AgripinoNeriyChavesabandonedthe
saidlandandthatlateronsomeofthechildrenofthefirstmarriagepossessedit,
therebyacquiringtitleandinterestthereinbyvirtueofoccupationandnotthrough
inheritance.Itisnottruethatthisparcelcontaining182.6373hectaresisnowassessed
inthenamesofsomeofthechildrenofthefirstmarriage,forasshownonTax
DeclarationNo.9395,Exhibit11g,theownersofthepropertyareAgapitaNeride
ChavesyHermanos.Apparently,thesaidlandisstillclaimedtobethepropertynot
onlyofthechildrenofthefirstmarriagebutalsoofthoseofthesecondmarriage.
ThisparagraphisbutacorroborationofthefindingmadebytheCourtofAppealsthatno
propertyhaseverbeenadvancedbythetestatortothechildrenbyhisfirstmarriage.Thelarge
parceloflandadjoiningparcelNo.1wasallegedbythechildrenofthesecondmarriageto
havebeenadvancedbythetestatortothechildrenbyhisfirstmarriage;buttheCourtof
Appealsbeliedthisclaim."Itisnottrue,"saysthatCourt,"thatthisparcelcontaining

182.6373hectaresisnowassessedinthenamesofsomeofthechildrenofthefirstmarriage,
forasshownonTaxDeclarationNo.9395,Exhibit11g,theownersofthepropertyare
AgapitaNerideChavesyHermanos,"thatis,thechildrenofbothmarriages.AndtheCourt
ofAppealsaddedthat"apparently,thesaidlandisstillclaimedtobethepropertynotonlyof
thechildrenofthefirstmarriagebutalsoofthoseofthesecondmarriage,"whichisanother
wayofstatingthatthepropertycouldnothavebeenadvancedbythetestatortothechildren
bythefirstmarriagewouldnotlayaclaimonit.
Weconclude,therefore,thataccordingtothefindingsoffactmadebytheCourtofAppeals,
thetestatorleftallhispropertybyuniversaltitletothechildrenbyhissecondmarriage,and
thatwithoutexpresslydisinheritingthechildrenbyhisfirstmarriage,heleftallhisproperty
byuniversaltitletothechildrenbyhissecondmarriage,heleftnothingtothemor,atleast,
someofthem.Thisis,accordingly,acaseofpreteritiongovernedbyarticle814oftheCivil
Code,whichprovidesthattheinstitutionofheirsshallbeannulledandintestatesuccession
shouldbedeclaredopen.
2.Uponthesecondquestionpropoundedinthemotionforreconsideration,respondentsseem
toagreethatarticle814oftheCivilCodeisthelawapplicablebut,intheirdiscussionasto
theeffectofpreterition,theyconfusearticle814witharticles817and851andotherarticles
oftheCivilCode.Thesethreearticlesread:
ART.814.Thepreteritionofoneorofalloftheforcedheirsinthedirectline,
whetherlivingattheexecutionofthewillorbornafterthedeathofthetestator,shall
annultheinstitutionofheirs;butthelegaciesandbettermentsshallbevalidinsofar
astheyarenotinofficious.
Thepreteritionofthewidowerorwidowdoesnotannultheinstitution;buttheperson
omittedshallretainalltherightsgrantedtohimbyarticles834,835,836,and837of
thisCode.
ART.817.Testamentarydispositionswhichdiminishthelegitimateoftheforced
heirsshallbereducedonpetitionofthesameinsofarastheyareinofficiousor
excessive.
ART.851.Disinheritancemadewithoutastatementofthecause,orforacausethe
truthofwhich,ifcontested,isnotshown,orwhichisnotoneofthosestatedinthe
fourfollowingarticles,shallannultheinstitutionofheirsinsofarasitisprejudicial
tothedisinheritedperson;butthelegacies,betterments,andothertestamentary
dispositionsshallbevalidinsofarastheyarenotprejudicialtosaidlegitime.
Thefollowingexamplewillmakethequestionclearer:Thetestatorhastwolegitimatesons,A
andB,andinhiswillheleavesallhispropertytoA,withtotalpreteritionofB.Uponthese
facts,shallweannulentirelytheinstitutionofheirinfavorofAanddeclareatotalintestacy,
orshallwemerelyrefusethebequestleftA,givinghimtwothirds,thatisonethirdoffree
disposalandonethirdofbetterments,plusonehalfoftheotherthirdasstrictlegitime,and
awardingBonlytheremainingonehalfofthestrictlegitime?Ifwedothefirst,weapply
article814;ifthesecond,weapplyarticles851or817.Butarticle851appliesonlyincases
ofunfoundeddisinheritance,andallareagreedthatthepresentcaseisnotoneof
disinheritancebutofpreterition.Article817ismerelyageneralruleinapplicabletospecific
casesprovidedbylaw,suchasthatofpreteritionordisinheritance.Themeaningofarticles
814and851,theirdifferenceandphilosophy,andtheirrelationtoarticle817,arelucidly
explainedbyManresainthefollowingmanner:

Cuandolalegitimanoesusufructuria,comoocurreenlosdemascasos,lapretericion
nopuedemenosdealteraresencialmentelainstituciondeheredero.Estahade
anularse,peroentodooenparte,estoes,soloencuantoperjudiqueelderechodel
legitimariopreterido?Elarticulo814optaporlaprimersolucion,yaquehemosde
atenermosestrictmentealtestodelaley;mientrasqueelarticulo851,encasos
anlogos,optaporlasegunda.
Enefecto;ladesheredacionsinjustacausanoproduceelefectodedesheredar.El
herederoconservaderechoasulegitima,peronadamasqueasulegitima.Los
legados,lasmerjoras,silashay,yaunlainstituciondeheredero,sonvalidasen
cuantonoperjudiquenalherederoforzoso.
Ladiferenciasenotaraperfectamenteconunejemplo.Unsolteron,sindecendientes
niascendienteslegitimos,hacetestamentoinstituyendoporherederoaunpariente
lejano.Despuesreconoceunhijonatural,osecasaytienedescendencia,ymueresin
modificarsudisposiciontestamentaria.Asumuerte,elhijonatural,oloslegitimos,
fundadoseenlanulidadtotaldelainstitucion,conarregloalarticulo814,pidentoda
laherencia.Enelcasodelarticulo851solopodrianpodrianpedirsulegitima.
Preterdos,adquierenderechoatodo;desheredados,sololescorrespondeuntercioo
dostercios,segunelcaso.
Enelfondolacuestionesindentica.Eltestadorpuedesiempredisponerasuarbitrio
delapartelibre.Ellegitimario,contralavoluntadexpresadeltestdor,solotiene
derechoasulegitima.Preteridoodesheredadosinjustacausalalegitima.Preteridoo
desheredadosinjustacausalalegitmaessuya.Desheredadoopreterido,laporcion
librenolecorresponde,cuandoeltestadorlaasignaaotro.Logicamentenocabeque
ellegitmario,encasodepretericion,recibatodoslosbienescuandoeltestadorhaya
dispuestodeellosatitulodeherencia,ynocuandohayadispuestodelterciolebrea
titulodelegado.
Cualeslarazondeestadifferencia?Enlageneralidaddeloscasospuedefundarseel
preceptoenlapresuntavoluntaddeltestador.Este,aldesheredar,revelaqueexiste
algunarazonamotivoqueleimpulsaaobrarasi;podranoserbastanteparaprivaral
herederodesulegitima,perosiemprehadeestimarsesufficienteparaprivarledel
restodelaherencia,puessobreestanopuedepretenderningunderechoel
desheredad.Elherederopreteridonohasidoprivadoexpresamentedenada;el
testador,enloscasosnormales,obrasipordescuidooporerror.Hemosvistoun
testamentoenelquenoseinstitulaherederaaunahijamonja,porcreerlatestadora
quenopodiaheredar.Enotroscaosseignoralaexistenciadeundescendienteodeun
ascendiente.Cuandoelpreteridoesunapersonaquehanacidodespuesdemuertoel
testadorodespuesdehechoeltestamento,larazonesaunmasclara;laomisionhade
presumirseinvoluntaria;eltestadordebesuponersequehubierainstituidoherederoa
esapersonasihubieraexistidoalotorgarseeltestamento,ynosoloencuantoala
legitima,sinoentodalaherencia,casodenohaberotrosherederosforzosos,yen
igualesterminosquelosdemasherederosnomejoradosdeunmodeexpreso.
Laopinioncontrariapuedetambiendefederse,suponiendoquelaleyanulaeltitulo
deheredero,masnoenabsolutolaparticipacionenelcaudal;queasicomoal
exceptuarlamejoraserefiereatodoelterciooalapartedeelquehayadistribuidoel
causante,alexceptuarloslegadosserefiersealapartelibredequehayadispuestoel
mismotestador,considerandocomounsimplelegatariodeesaporcionalapersonaa
quieneltestadordesignocomoheredero.Abonariaestasolucionelarticulo817,al

declararquelasdisposicionestestamentariaquemenguanlalegitimadelosherederos
forzososhandereducirseencuantofuereninoficiosas,puesamparadoeneste
articuloelherederovoluntario,puedepretenderqueladisposicionasufavorsea
respetadaencuatonoperjudiquealaslegitimas.
Lajurisprudencianoharesueltodefrenteestacuestion,porquenoselehapresentado
enlosterminospropuestos;perohademonstradosucriterio.
HemoscitadolasResolucionesdelaDireccionde30deoctubrede1896yde20de
mayode1893.Enlaprimerasedecideconvalentia,conarregloaltextoexpresodel
articulo814;lainstituciondeherederoseanulaenabsoluto,yseabreparatodala
herencialasuccesionintestada.Enlasegundaserehuyelacuestion,fundandoseen
circunstanciassecundarias.Enelarticulosiguienteexaminaremoslasentenciade16
deenerode1895.
Lainterpretacionquerectamentesedeprendedelart814,esladequesolovalen,y
esoencuantonoseaninoficiosas,lasdisposicioneshechasatitulodelegadoa
mejora.Encuantoalainstituciondeheredero,seanula.Loqueseanuladejade
existir,entodo,oenparte?Noseaadelimitacionalguna,comoenelarticulo851,
enelqueseexpresaqueseanularaainstituciondeherederoencuantoperjudiqueala
legitimadeldesheredado.Debe,pues,entendersequelaanulacionescompletao
total,yqueestearticulo,comoespecialenelcasoquelemotiva,rigecon
preferenciaal817.(6Manresa,3.aed.,pags.351353.)(Emphasissupplied).
ThefollowingopinionofSanchezRomanistothesameeffectanddispelsallpossibledoubt
onthematter:
Laconsecuenciadelaanulaciononulidaddelainstituciondeherederopor
pretericiondeuno,variosotodoslosforzososenlinearecta,eslaaperturadela
sucesionentestada,totaloparcial.Seratotal,cuandoeltestadorquecometela
pretericion,hubieredispuestodetodoslosbienesportitulouniversaldeherenciaen
favordeloshrederosinstituidos,cuyainstitucionseanula,porqueasiloexigela
generalidaddelpreceptolegaldelarticulo814,aldeterminar,comoefectodela
pretericion,eldeque"anularialainstituciondeheredero".Ciertoesquelapreericion
estaintorducida,comoremediojuridico,porsusefectos,ennombreyparagarantia
delaintergridaddelalegitimadelosherederosforzososycomoconsecuenciadel
preceptodel813,deque"eltestadornopodraprivaralosherederosdesulegitima,
sinoenloscasosexpresamentedeterminadosporlaley",quesonlosde
desheredacionconjustacausa.
Ciertoes,tambien,queenladesheredacionesmuyotroelcriteriodelCodigoyque
suformulalegal,encuantoasusefectos,esdealcancemaslimitado,puestoque,
conformealarticulo851,ladesheredacionhechasincondicionesdevalidez,"anulara
lainstituciondeheredero",lomismoquelapretericion,perosolo"encuanto
perjudiqueladesheredadodemodoilegaleineficaz;salvedadolimitaciondelos
efectosdenulidaddelainstituciondelosefectosdenulidaddelainstitucionhechaen
eltestmento,quenoexiste,segunsehavistoenel814,porelquesedeclara,en
formageneraleindistinta,queanularalainstituciondeherederosinninguna
atencuacionrespectodequeperjudiqueono,totaloparcialmente,lacuantiadela
legitimadelherederoforzosoenlinearecta,preterido.

Elresultadodeamboscriteriosyformulaslegales,manifestamentedistintas,tiene
quesermuydiverso.Enelcasodelapretericion,propiamentetalototalpuessi
fueraparcialyseladejaraalgoalherederoforzosoporcualquiertitulo,aunquesee
algonofueresuficientealpagodesusderechosdelegitima,noseriacasode
pretericion,reguladoporelarticulo814,sinodecomplemento,regidoporel815yla
institucionnoseanulariasinoquesemodificariaodisminuiriaenlonecesariopara
dichocomplenteodeinstituciondeherederoentodalaherencia,alanularsela
institucion,porefectodelapreteridoopreteridos,respectodetodalaherencia,
tambien;mientrasqeuenelcasodedesheredacionydeinstitucionenlatotalidadde
laherencia,tambien;mientrasqueenelcasodedesheredacionydeinstitucionenla
totalidaddelaherenciaafavordeotrapersona,soloseanularaenparteprecisaprano
perjudicarlalegitimadeldeshersado,queaunsiendoenestecasolalata,sinohubo
mejoras,porquenoseestablecieronoporquelosintituidoseranherederos
voluntarios,dejariasubsistentelainstitucionenlapoartecorrespoondientealtercio
delibredisposicion.Asiesquelospreteridos,enelsupuestoindicado,suceden
abintestatoentodo,enconcurrenciaconlosdemasherederosforzososollamadospro
laleyalabintestato;losdesheredados,unicamenteendosterciosoenunooenuno
tansolo,enlahipotesisdehaberseordernadomejoras.
Encambio,niporladesheredacionniporlapretericionpierdesufuerzael
testamento,encuantoadichoterciolibre,issetratadedescendientes;olamitad,sise
tratadeascendientes,yadesheredados,yapreteridos,proque,niporelunoniporel
otromedio,seanulamasquelainstituciondeheredero,engeneral,ytotalmentepor
lapretericion,ysoloencuantoperjudiquealalegitimadeldesheredadoporla
desheredacion;perosubsistiendo,enamboscasos,todasacquellasotrasdisposiciones
quenoserefeirenalainstituciondeherederoysehallendentrodellimite
cuantitativodeltercioomitaddelibredisposicion,segunquesetratede
descendientesoascendientes,preteridosodesheredados.
Lainvocaciondelarticulo817paramodificarestosefectosdelapretericion,
procurandolimitarlaanulaciondelainstituciondeherederossoloencuanto
perjudiquealalegitima,fundadoseenquedichoarticuloestableceque"las
disposicionestestamentariasquemenguanlalegitmadelosherederosforzososse
reduciran,apeticiondeestos,enloquefuereninoficiosasoexcesivas,"noes
aceptablenipuedevariaracquellosresultados,porqueesunpreceptodecaracter
generalentodaotraclasededsiposicionestestamentariasqueproduzcanelefectode
menguarlalegitima,quenopuedeanteponerse,ensuaplicacion,alasdeindole
especialparasealarlosefectosdelapretericionodeladesheredacion,regulados
privativayrespectivamenteporlosarticulos814y851.
Noobstantelapretericion,"valdranlasmandasylegadosencuantonosean
inoficiosas."Eltextoesterminanteynonecesitamayorexplicacion,despuesdelo
dicho,quesupropialetra,anoserparaobservarqueconstituyeunaconfimacion
indudabledelosefectosdelapretericion,encuantoalcanzansolo,perototalmente,a
laanulaciondelainstituciondeheredero,peronoaladelasmandasymejorasen
cuantonoseanpreteridos;calficativodetales,comosinonimolegaldeexcessivas,
queenotrosarticulos,comoel817,establecelaley.(6SanchezRoman,Volumen2.o
pags.11401141.)
Thesecommentsshouldbereadwithcareifwearetoavoidmisunderstanding.Manresa,for
instance,startsexpoundingthemeaningofthelawwithanillustration.Hesaysthatincaseof
preterition(article814).thenullityoftheinstitutionofheirsistotal,whereasincaseof

disinheritance(article851),thenullityispartial,thatis,insofarastheinstitutionaffectsthe
legitimeofthedisinheritedheirs."Preteridos,adquierenderechoatodo;desheredados,solo
lescorrespondeuntercioodostercios,segunelcaso."Hethenproceedstocommentuponthe
wisdomofthedistinctionmadebylaw,givingtwoviewsthereon.Hefirstlaystheview
contrarytothedistinctionmadebylaw,thentheargumentsinsupportofthedistinction,and
lastlyapossibledefenseagainstsaidarguments.AndafterstatingthattheSpanish
jurisprudencehasnotasyetdecidedsquarelythequestion,withanallusion]totwo
resolutionsoftheSpanishAdministrativeDirection,oneinfavorofarticle814andanother
evasive,heconcludesthattheconstructionwhichmayrightlybegiventoarticle814isthatin
caseofpreterition,theinstitutionofheirsisnullintotowhereasincaseofdisinheritancethe
nullityislimitedtothatportionofthelegitimeofwhichthedisinheritedheirshavebeen
illegallydeprived.Hefurthermakesitclearthatincasesofpreterition,theproperty
bequeathedbyuniversaltitledtotheinstitutedheirsshouldnotbemerelyreducedaccording
toarticle817,butinstead,intestatesuccessionshouldbeopenedinconnectiontherewith
underarticle814,thereasonbeingthatarticle814,"comoespecialenelcasoquelemotiva,
rigeconpreferenciaal817."SanchezRomanisofthesameopinionwhenhesaid:"La
invocaciondelarticulo817paramodificarestosefectosdelapretecion,procurandolimitarla
anulaciondelainstituciondeherederosoloencuantoperjudquealalegitima,fundandoseen
quedichoarticuloestableceque"lasdisposicionestestmentariasquemenguanlalegitimade
losherederosforzosossefuereninoficisosasoexcesivas,"noesaceptablenipuedevariar
aquellosresultados,porqueesunpreceptodecaractergeneralentodaotraclasede
disposicionestestmentariasqueproduzcanelefectodemenguarlalegitima,quenopuede
anteponerse,ensuaplicacion,alasdeindoleespecialparasealarlosefectosdelapretericon
odeladesheredacion,reguladosprivativayrespectivamenteporlosarticulos814y851.
Ofcourse,theannulmentoftheinstitutionofheirsincasesofpreteritiondoesnotalways
carrywithittheineffectivenessofthewholewill.NeitherManresanorSanchezRomannor
thisCourthaseversaidso.If,asidefromtheinstitutionofheirs,thereareinthewill
provisionsleavingtotheheirssoinstitutedortootherpersonssomespecificpropertiesinthe
formoflegaciesormejoras,suchtestamentaryprovisionsshallbeeffectiveandthelegacies
andmejorasshallberespectedinsofarastheyarenotinofficiousorexcessive,accordingto
article814.Intheinstantcase,however,nolegaciesormejorasareprovidedinthewill,the
wholepropertyofthedeceasedhavingbeenleftbyuniversaltitletothechildrenofthe
secondmarriage.Theeffect,therefore,ofannullingtheinstitutionofheirswillbenecessarily
theopeningofatotalintestacy.
Butthetheoryisadvancedthatthebequestmadebyuniversaltitledinfavorofthechildren
bythesecondmarriageshouldbetreatedaslegadoandmejoraand,accordingly,itmustnot
beentirelyannulledbutmerelyreduced.Thistheory,ifadopted,willresultinacomplete
abrogationofarticles814and851oftheCivilCode.Ifeverycaseofinstitutionofheirsmay
bemadetofallintotheconceptoflegaciesandbettermentsreducingthebequestaccordingly,
thentheprovisionsofarticles814and851regardingtotalorpartialnullityoftheinstitution,
wouldbeabsolutelymeaninglessandwillneverhaveanyapplicationatall.Andthe
remainingprovisionscontainedinsaidarticleconcerningthereductionofinofficiouslegacies
orbettermentswouldbeasurplusagebecausetheywouldbeabsorbedbyarticle817.Thus,
insteadofconstruing,wewouldbedestroyingintegralprovisionsoftheCivilCode.
Thedestructiveeffectofthetheorythusadvancedisduemainlytoafailuretodistinguish
institutionofheirsfromlegaciesandbetterments,andageneralfromaspecialprovision.
Withreferencetoarticle814,whichistheonlyprovisionmaterialtothedispositionofthis
case,itmustbeobservedthattheinstitutionofheirsisthereindealtwithasathingofseparate
anddistinctfromlegaciesorbetterment.Andtheyareseparateanddistinctnotonlybecause

theyaredistinctlyandseparatelytreatedinsaidarticlebutbecausetheyareinthemselves
different.Institutionofheirsisabequestbyuniversaltitleofpropertythatisundetermined.
Legacyreferstospecificpropertybequeathedbyaparticularorspecialtitle.Thefirstisalso
differentfromabettermentwhichshouldbemadeexpresslyassuch(article828).Theonly
instanceofimpliedbettermentrecognizedbylawiswherelegaciesaremadewhichcannotbe
includedinthefreeportion(article828).Butagainaninstitutionofheirscannotbetakenasa
legacy.
Itisclear,therefore,thatarticle814referstotwodifferentthingswhicharethetwodifferent
objectsofitstwodifferentprovisions.Oneoftheseobjectscannotbemadetomergeinthe
otherwithoutmutilatingthewholearticlewithallitsmultifariousconnectionswithagreat
numberofprovisionsspreadthroughouttheCivilCodeonthematterofsuccession.Itshould
beborneinmind,further,thatalthougharticle814containswhodifferentprovisions,its
specialpurposeistoestablishaspecificruleconcerningaspecifictestamentaryprovision,
namely,theinstitutionofheirsinacaseofpreterition.Itsotherprovisionregardingthe
validityoflegaciesandbettermentsifnotinofficiousisamerereiterationofthegeneralrule
containedinotherprovisions(articles815and817)andsignifiesmerelythatitalsoappliesin
casesofpreterition.Asregardstestamentarydispositionsingeneral,thegeneralruleisthatall
"testamentarydispositionwhichdiminishthelegitimeoftheforcedheirsshallbereducedon
petitionofthesameinsofarastheyareinofficousorexcessive"(article817).Butthis
generalruledoesnotapplytothespecificinstanceofatestamentarydispositioncontainingan
institutionofheirsinacaseofpreterition,whichismadethemainandspecificsubjectof
article814.Insuchinstance,accordingtoarticle814,thetestamentarydispositioncontaining
theinstitutionofheirsshouldbenotonlyreducedbutannulledinitsentiretyandallthe
forcedheirs,includingtheomittedones,areentitledtoinheritinaccordancewiththelawof
intestatesuccession.Itisthusevidentthat,if,inconstruingarticle814,theinstitutionofheirs
thereindealtwithistobetreatedaslegaciesorbetterments,thespecialobjectofsaidarticle
wouldbedestroyed,itsspecificpurposecompletelydefeated,andinthatwisethespecialrule
thereinestablishedwouldberenderednugatory.Andthisiscontrarytothemostelementary
ruleofstatutoryconstruction.Inconstruingseveralprovisionsofaparticularstatute,such
constructionshallbeadoptedaswillgiveeffecttoall,andwhengeneralandparticular
provisionsareinconsistent,thelattershallprevailovertheformer.(ActNo.190,secs.287
and288.)
ThequestionhereinpropoundedhasbeensquarelydecidedbytheSupremeCourtofSpainin
acasewhereinabequestbyuniversaltitlewasmadewithpreteritionofheirsandthetheory
wasadvancedthattheinstitutedheirsshouldbetreatedaslegatarios.TheSupremeCourtof
Spainsaid:
Elarticulo814,quepreceptuaentalescasosdepretericionlanulidaddelainstitucion
deheredero,noconsienteinterpretacionalgunafavorablealapersonainstituidaenel
sentidoantesexpuesto,auncuandoparezca,yenalguncasopudieraser,masomenos
equitativa,porqueunanulidadnosignificaenDerechosinolasuposiciondequeel
hechooelactonoseharealizado,debiendo,porlotanto,procedersesobretalbaseo
supuesto,yconsiguientemente,enuntestmentodondefatelainstitucion,esobligado
llamaralosherederosforzososentodocaso,comohabriaquellamaralosdeotra
clase,cuandoeltestadornohubiesedistribuidotodossusbienesenlegados,siendo
tantomasobligadaestaconsecuencialegalcuantoque,enmateriadetestamentos,
sabidoes,seguntienedeclaradolajurisprudencia,conrepeticion,quenobastaque
seaconocidalavoluntaddequeintestasiestavoluntadnoapareceenlaformayen
lascondicionesquelaleyhaexigidoparaqueseavalidoyeficaz,porloque
constituiriaunainterpertacionarbitraria,dentrodelderechopositivo,reputarcomo

legatarioaunherederocuyainstitucionfueseanuladaconpretextodequeestose
acomodabamejoralavoluntaddeltestador,puesauncuandoasifuese,seraesto
razonparamodificarlaley,peoquenoautorizaaunainterpretacioncontrariaasus
terminosyalosprincipiosqueinformanlatestamnetificaion,puesnoporqueparezca
mejorunacosaenelterrenodelDerechoconstituyente,hayrasonparaconvertireste
juicoenregladeinterpretacion,desvirtuandoyanulandoporesteprocedimientolo
queellegislatorquiereestablecer.(6SanchezRoman,Volumen2.o,p.1138.)
Itismaintainedthattheword"heredero"undertheCivilCode,isnotsynonymouswiththe
term"heir"undertheCodeofCivilProcedure,andthatthe"heir"underthelatterCodeisno
longerpersonallyliableforthedebtsofthedeceasedaswasthe"heredero"undertheCivil
Code,shouldhisacceptancebepureandsimple,andfromallthesetheconclusionisdrawn
thattheprovisionsofarticle814oftheCivilCoderegardingthetotalnullityoftheinstitution
ofheirshasbecomeobsolete.Thisconclusioniserroneous.Itconfusesformwithsubstance.
Itmustbeobserved,inthisconnection,thatinconstruingandapplyingaprovisionofthe
CivilCode,suchmeaningofitswordsandphrasesashasbeenintendedbytheframers
thereofshallbeadopted.IfthusconstrueditisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheCodeof
CivilProcedure,thenitshallbedeemedrepealed;otherwiseitisinforce.Repealsby
implicationarenotfavoredbythecourtsandwhentherearetwoactsuponthesamesubject,
effectshouldbegiventobothifpossible(Posadasvs.NationalCityBank,296U.S.,497).
Theword"heir"asusedinarticle814oftheCivilCodemaynothavethemeaningthatithas
undertheCodeofCivilProcedure,butthisinnowisecanpreventabequestfrombeingmade
byuniversaltitleasisinsubstancethesubjectmatterofarticle814oftheCivilCode.Again,
itmayalsobetruethatheirsundertheCodeofCivilProceduremayreceivethatbequestonly
afterpaymentofdebtsleftbythedeceasedandnotbeforeasundertheCivilCode,butthis
mayhaveabearingonlyuponthequestionastowhensuccessionbecomeseffectiveandcan
innowaydestroythefactthatsuccessionmaystillbebyuniversalorspecialtitle.Sincea
bequestmaystillbemadebyuniversaltitleandwithpreteritionofforcedheirs,itsnullityas
providedinarticle814stillappliestherebeingnothinginconsistentwithitintheCodeof
CivilProcedure.Whatisimportantandisthebasisforitsnullityisthenatureandeffectofthe
bequestandnotitspossiblenamenorthemomentofitseffectivenessundertheCodeofCivil
Procedure.
Furthermore,therewereintheCodeofCivilProceduresectionsNos.755and756which
read:
SEC.755.Shareofchildbornaftermakingwill.Whenachildofatestatorisborn
afterthemakingofawill,andnoprovisionisthereinmadeforhim,suchchildshall
havethesameshareintheestateofthetestatorasifhehaddiedintestate;andshare
ofsuchchildshallbeassignedtohimasincasesofintestateestates,unlessitis
apparentfromthewillthatitwastheintentionofthetestatorthatnoprovisionshould
bemadeforsuchchild.
SEC.756.Shareofchildorissueofchildomittedfromwill.Whenatestatoromits
toprovideinhiswillforanyofhischildren,orforissueofadeceasedchild,andit
appearsthatsuchomissionwasmadebymistake,oraccident,suchchild,ortheissue
ofsuchchild,shallhavethesameshareintheestateofthetestatorasifhehaddied
intestate,tobeassignedtohimasinthecaseofintestateestates.
ItistheseprovisionsoftheCodeofCivilProcedurethathaveaffectedsubstantiallyarticles
814and851oftheCivilCode,buttheyhavebeenexpresslyrepealedbyActNo.2141,
section1ofwhichreadasfollows:

Sectionssevenhundredandfiftyfive,sevenhundredandfiftysix,sevenhundredand
fiftyseven,sevenhundredandfiftyeight,andsevenhundredandsixtyofAct
NumberedOnehundredandninety,entitled`AnActprovidingaCodeofProcedure
inCivilActionsandSpecialProceedingsinthePhilippineIslandsareherebyrepealed
andsuchprovisionsoftheCivilCodeasmayhavebeenamendedorrepealedbysaid
sectionsareherebyrestoredtofullforceandeffects.(Emphasisours.)
AmongtheprovisionsoftheCivilCodewhicharethusexpresslyrestoredtofullforceare
undoubtedlyarticles814and851.Therecanbenopossibledoubt,therefore,thatthosetwo
articlesareinforce.
Article1080oftheCivilCodethatisalsoinvokeddeservesnoconsiderationexceptforthe
observationthatithasnorelevancyintheinstantcase.
OurattentionisdirectedtothecaseofEscuinvs.Escuin(11Phil.,332).Wehaveneverlost
sightoftherulinglaiddowninthatcasewhichhasbeenreiteratedinEleazarvs.Eleazar(37
Off.Gaz.,p.1782).IntheEscuincase,thedeceasedleftallhispropertytohisnaturalfather
(notaforcedheir)andhiswifewithtotalpreteritionofhisfatherandwife.Without
reconsideringthecorrectnessoftherulinglaiddowninthesetwocases,wewillnotethatthe
doctrinestandsonfactswhicharedifferentfromthefactsinthepresentcase.Thereis
certainlyadifferencebetweenacaseofpreteritioninwhichthewholepropertyislefttoa
merefriendandacaseofpreteritioninwhichthewholepropertyislefttooneorsomeforced
heirs.Ifthetestamentarydispositionbeannulledtotallyinthefirstcase,theeffectwouldbea
totaldeprivationofthefriendofhisshareintheinheritance.Andthisiscontrarytothe
manifestintentionofthetestator.Itmayfairlybepresumedthat,undersuchcircumstances,
thetestatorwouldatleavegivehisfriendtheportionoffreedisposal.Inthesecondcase,the
totalnullityofthetestamentarydispositionwouldhavetheeffect,notofdeprivingtotallythe
institutedheirofhisshareintheinheritance,butofplacinghimandtheotherforcedheirs
uponthebasisofequality.Thisisalsoinconsonancewiththepresumptiveintentionofthe
testator.Preterition,generallyspeaking,isduemerelytomistakeorinadvertencewithout
whichthetestatormaybepresumedtotreatalikeallhischildren.
Andspeciallyisthistrueintheinstantcasewherethetestatoromittedthechildrenbyhisfirst
marriageupontheerroneousbeliefthathehadgiventhemalreadymoresharesinhisproperty
thanthosegiventothechildrenbyhissecondmarriage.Itwas,therefore,thethoughtofthe
testatorthatthechildrenbyhisfirstmarriageshouldnotreceivelessthanthechildrenbyhis
secondmarriage,andtothateffectisthedecisionofthisCourtsoughttobereconsidered.
Motionforreconsiderationisherebydenied.
Yulo,C.J.,Iconcurintheresult.
Generoso,J.,concurs.

SeparateOpinions
OZAETA,J.,concurring:
IconcurinthemajorityopinionaftermaturereflectiononthetwopointsdiscussedinJustice
Bocobo'sdissent.

Whetherornottherewaspreteritionofthetestator'ssurvivingchildrenbyhisfirstmarriage,
maynotbeentirelybeyonddispute,becauseitisnotaltogetherimprobablethat,beforethe
testatormadehiswill,saidchildrenofhishadreceivedcashadvancesfromhim,asstatedin
clause8ofthewill.But,tomaymind.therecanbenodoubtthattherewaspreteritionofthe
testator'sgrandchildrenbyhisdaughterGetulia,whodiedlongbeforethetestatormadehis
will.Theselinealdescendantsofthetestator,whoarealsoforcedheirofhis,werecompletely
ignoredandomittedinthewill.Inclauses7and8ofhiswill,thetestatordeclared:
Seventh.Ideclarethatthechildrenbymyfirstwifehavenolongeranyparticipation
inthepropertydescribedabove,astheyalreadyreceivedtheircorrespondingshares
inmyexclusivepropertytoeachofmychildrenbymyfirstwifemustexceedwhat
willcorrespondtoeachofmychildrenbymysecondwife.
Eight.Isupplicatedmychildrenbymyfirstwifethattheyshouldnotcontestthismy
lastwill,astheyhavealreadyreceivedtheirsharesinmyownproperty,muchmore
thanwhatInowgivetothechildrenbymysecondwife,excludingyetwhatIhave
giventothemasaidduringtheirfinancialtroublesandwhattheyhaveborrowed,
whichtheyhavenotyetpaidmeandwhichInowcondonetothem.
BoththetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsfoundineffectthatthesedeclarationsturnedout
tobeunfoundedinfact,atleastinsofarastheyreferredtopropertiesotherthanmoneyalleged
tohavebeenreceivedbythechildrenofthefirstmarriage.Bethatasitmay,Ibelievethe
deceasedGetuliawasnotcomprehendedinsaiddeclarationanyway.Whenthetestatorsaid,
"Ideclarethatthechildrenbymyfirstwifehavenolongeranyparticipationintheproperty
describedabove,"hereferredonlytohischildrenwhowerelivingatthattimeandwho,he
evidentlyexpected,wouldclaimsomeparticipationinthepropertyleftbyhim;Hecouldnot
havereferredtoGetuliaalsobecauseshe,havingpassedaway,couldnolongerhaveorclaim
anyparticipationinhisproperty.NeitherdidherefertoGetulia'schildren,forhedidnot
mentionthematall.Again,whenthetestatorsaid,"Isupplicatedbychildrenbymyfirstwife
thattheyshouldnotcontestthismylastwill,"hecouldnothavehadGetuliainmind,because
heknewthedeceasedcouldnotcontesthiswill;andifhehadintendedtoincludedGetulia's
children,hewouldhavementionedthemashisgrandchildren.Thecondonationofdebtsmade
bythetestatorinclause8ofhiswillreferredtothedebtsofthosechildrenofhiswhomhe
entreatedtorefrainfromcontestinghiswill,andsinceGetuliacouldnothavebeenentreated
byhim,itislogicaltoconcludethatherpettydebtofP155wasnotembracedwithinthat
condonation.Getuliahavingpassedawaylongbeforeherfathermadehiswill,hehad
evidentlyforgottenheraswellasherpettydebt.
TheconclusionthatGetuliaandherchildrenwerenotincludedintheabovequoted
declarationsandthat,therefore,theywereentirelyomittedinthewill,isfurtherstrengthened
bytheundisputedfactthatasidefromthesmallsumofP155borrowedbyherfromhim
duringherlifetime,hehadnotgivenherorherchildrenanyportionofhisproperty.
Therefore,whenthetestatorsolemnlydeclaredinclause7ofhiswillthathischildrenbyhis
firstwifehadalreadyreceivedtheircorrespondingshareinhisexclusivepropertyinexcess
evenofwhatwouldcorrespondtoeachofhischildrenbyhissecondwife,hecouldnothave
hadGetuliaorherchildreninmind,foritisundisputablethathehadnotgivenherany
propertywhatsoever.HecouldnothavehadtheP155inmind(1)becauseithadnotbeen
givenbutonlyloanedtoher,and(2)becauseitwassorelativelytrivialanamountthathe
couldnothaveconsidereditequaltothesharehelefttoeachofhischildrenbyhissecond
wife.HisestatewasassessedbythecommitteeonappraisalsatP18,000,withaclaimagainst
itofonlyP480.

Inurgingthatthechildrenofthefirstmarriagebegivenonlyashareintheshortlegitime,the
minorityopinionsaysthatthetestatorhasmade"aclearandexplicitdeclarationinhiswill
thatthechildrenofthesecondmarriageshallbepreferred."Ontheotherhand,themajority
opinionmaintainsthatthetestatoromittedthechildrenofthefirstmarriageuponthe
erroneousbeliefonhispartthathehadgiventhemagreatershareinhispropertythanthat
lefttothechildrenofthesecondmarriage.Fromthisthemajorityinferthatthetestatordid
notintendtodiscriminateagainsthischildrenbyhisfirstmarriagebygivingthemlessthan
whathelefttohischildrenbyhissecondmarriage.Themajorityviewassumesthatthe
declarationsofthetestatorinclauses7and8ofhiswill,althoerroneous,weremadeingood
faith.Ontheotherhand,theminorityviewsupposesthatthetestatorintendedtopreferhis
childrenbyhissecondwifebyleavingtothemallhispropertysothatthechildrenbythefirst
marriageareentitledonlytotheirshareintheshortlegitimewhichbylawthedecedentcould
nowithholdfromthem.Ithinktheminorityviewisuntenable.Intheabsenceofproofit
cannotbepresumedthatthetestatormadetheabovequoteddeclarationsinbadfaiththat
hemadethemknowingthatitwasnottruethathehadgiveneachofhissurvivingchildrenby
hisfirstwifeatleastanequalifnotagreatershareinhisinheritancethanwhathelefttoeach
ofhischildrenbyhissecondwife.Butifhehadmadethosedeclarationsinbadfaithoras
subterfugetodeprivehischildrenandgrandchildrenbyhisfirstmarriageoftheirlegalshare
inhisinheritance,hecouldonlyhavedonesowiththeintentiontofrustratetheirright.Inthat
casethepreteritionwouldonlyassumeadifferentform,voluntaryinsteadofinvoluntary.But
theresultwouldbethesame.AsstatedbytheSupremeCourtofSpaininitsdecisionofJune
17,1908,thepreteritionofaforcedheir"puedeserdebidaaignoranciadequeexistiera,u
olvidoopropositodeburlarlosderechosquelaleylesreconoce,supuestostodesque
desvirtuanlafuerzayeficaciamoraldeaquellavoluntadyquejustificanlaanulaciondesu
expresion."

BOCOBO,J.,dissenting:
Afteracarefulstudyofthiscase,Iamconstrainedtodissentfromtheresolutionofthe
majoritydenyingthemotionforreconsideration.IbelievethejudgmentoftheCourtof
Appealsshouldbeaffirmedbecause:
First,therehasbeennopreteritionunderarticle814,CivilCode.
Second,evensupposingthattherehasbeenapreterition,thechildrenofthesecondmarriage
are,however,entitledtothethirdforfreedisposalandtothethirdformejora,inadditionto
theirsharesinthestrictorshortlegitime.
I
ThereIsnoPreterition
ThereisnopreteritionbecausethefindingsofboththeCourtofFirstInstanceoftheCourtof
Appealsshowthatallthechildrenofthefirstmarriagehavereceived,inpropertyandincash,
apartoftheirshortlegitime.Oneoftherequisitesofpreteritionisthatoneorsomeofthe
heirsofthedirectlinebetotallydeprivedoftheirlegitime.AsManresasays(Vol.6,pages
356357,4thEd.):
Quelaomisionseacompleta.Estacondicionsededucedelmismoarticulo814,y
resultaconevidenciaalrealcionarestearticuloconel815.Elherederoforzosoa
queineltestadordejaalgoporcualqueirtituloensutestamento,nosehalla

propiamenteomitido,puesselenombrayselereconoceparticipacionenlosbienes
hereditarios.Podriadiscutirseenelarticulo814,sieraononecesarioquese
reconocieselderechodelherederocomotalheredero,peroelarticulo815desvanece
estaduda.Aquelseocupadelaprivacioncompletaototal,tacita;este,dela
privacionpartcial.Losefectosdebenseryson,comoveremos,completamente
distintos.
Astoproperty,EleuterioreceivedparcelNo.4bywayofdonation.Thetrialcourtfoundthat
saidparcel"appearstohavebeendonatedbyAgripinoNeritohissonEleuterio,andwhich
maybebroughttothecommonmass."InthejudgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstance,itis
orderedthatsaidparcelNo.4"shouldbebroughttothecommonmass."
Moreover,thereisalargeparceloflandcontaining182.6373hectareswhich,accordingtoa
findingoftheCourtofAppeals,"isstillclaimedtobethepropertynotonlyofthechildrenof
thefirstmarriagebutalsoofthoseofthesecondmarriage."ThedecisionoftheCourtof
Appealsmakesthesefindingsoffact:
AsregardsthatlargeparceloflandadjointparcelNo.1,itiscontendedthatafterthe
courthaddeniedtheregistrationthereof,AgripinoNeriyChavesabandonedthesaid
landandthatlateronsomeofthechildrenofthefirstmarriagepossessedit,thereby
acquiringtitleandinterestthereinbyvirtueofoccupationandnotthrough
inheritance.Itisnottruethatthisparcelcontaining182.6373hectaresisnowassessed
inthenamesofsomeofthechildrenofthefirstmarriage,forasshownonTax
DeclarationNo.9395,Exhibit11g,theownersofthepropertyareAgapitaNeride
ChavesyHermanos.Apparently,thesaidlandisstillclaimedtobethepropertynot
onlyofthechildrenofthefirstmarriagebutalsoofthoseofthesecondmarriage.
(Emphasisours.)
ItistruethataccordingtotheCourtofAppeals,Getuliaorherheirsdidnotreceiveanyshare
ofthepropertyofherfather,butthetrialcourtfoundthatGetuliawasindebtedtoherfather
intheamountofP155whichdebtiscondonedinclause8ofthewill.
Furthermore,itisunquestionedtatallthechildrenofthefirstmarriage(exceptGetuliawho
debtofP155hasbeencondonedinthewill)hadcertainparcelsintheirnamesfortax
purposes.Thefactthatsaidparcelswereeitherpubliclandoccupiedanddevelopedbythe
testator,ordidnotbelongtohim,cannotsupportthetheoryofpreteritionbecausetheessence
ofpreteritionistheomissionofanydescendantorascendant.Ifhisrightasanheiris
recognizedinanyway,thereisnopreterition,andhisremedyisthatprovidedinarticle815,
whichistohavehissharecompletedincasehereceivedlessthanhislegitime.Inthiscase,
thetestatoradmitsthathischildrenofthefirstmarriagearealsohislawfulheirsbutstates
theyhavealreadyreceivedtheirrespectiveshares.
Asforthecashadvances,thetrialcourtfoundthatthesixchildren,threeAgripino,Getulia
andCelerinawereindebtedtothetestatorintheamountsofP500,P155andP120,
respectively.Withregardtotheotherchildren,EleuterioAgapitaandRosario,clause8ofthe
willsays:
Eight.Isupplicatedmychildrenbymyfirstwifethattheyshouldnotcontestthismy
lastwill,astheyhavealreadyreceivedtheirsharesinmyownproperty,muchmore
thanwhatInowgivetothechildrenbymysecondwife,excludingyetwhatIhave
giventothemasaidduringtheirfinancialtroublesandwhattheyhaveborrowed,
whichtheyhavenotyetpaidmeandwhichInowcondonetothem.(Emphasisours.)

Itwillbenoticedthatthetestatorintheaboveclausespeaksoftwokindsofcashadvancesto
hischildren:(1)aidfromtheirfatherduringtheirfinancialtroubles;and(2)amounts
borrowedbythemfromtheirfather.Intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,itmaybe
presumedthatthetestatorwasreferringtoallhischildrenofthefirstmarriagewhenhe
stated:"excludingyetwhatIhavegiventothemasaidduringtheirfinancialtroubles.."Itis
hardtobelievethatduringthewholelifetimeofthetestator,whowaswelltodo,andlivedto
theadvancedageof86years,anyofhischildrenofthefirstmarriagedidnotreceiveevena
smallfinancialaidfromthefather.
Allthechildrenofthefirstmarriagehavingreceivedapartoftheirshortlegitime,eitherin
propertyorcashorboth,thereinopreterition.Thelawapplicableisnotarticle814but
articles815and817.CivilCode,whichprovide:
ART.815.Elherederoforzosoaquieneltestadorhayadejadoporcualquiertitulo
menosdelalegitimaquelecorresponda,podrapedirelcomplementodelamisma.
ART.817.Lasdispocisionestestmentariasquemenguenlalegitimadelosherederos
forzosos,sereduciran,apeticiondeestos,enloquefuereninoficiosasoexcesivas.
Thesearticlesgovernwheretheheirhasreceived,eitherinthewillorbydonationintervivos,
apartofhislegitime.Commentingonarticle815.Manresasays(Vol.6,page366):
Elespiritudelarticulo815resultaevidente:cuantoelherederoforzosonohassido
olvidadoporeltestandor,cuandohatomadoalgodelosbienesherditarios,solo
puedereclamarqueselecompletesulegitima.Laletradelarticulo,aunqueaplicable
especialmentealasdisposicionestestamentarias,norepugnasuextensionatodoacto
dedisposiciondeltestadorportitulolucrativo.Yademas,elparrafo1.delaritculo
819,eldecirquelasdonacioneshechasaloshijosimputanasulegitimademuestra
queloquelosherederosforzososrecibenenvidadeltestadordeeste,seentiende
comorecibidoporsulegitimaenelmomentodesumuerte,y,porconsiguiente,como
dejadoporeltestadoratitulodeherencia.
Thechildrenofthefirstmarriagenothavingbeenentirelyforgotten,thewillshouldbe
respectedandcarriedout,butthechildrenofthefirstmarriageshouldhavetheirrespective
sharesinthestrictlegitimecompletedaftertakingintoaccounttheamountsalreadyreceived
bythemfromtheirfather.
Asfortheconcurringopinion,Ifinditdifficulttobelievethatthetestatordidnothavein
mindGetuliaorherchildreninclauses7and8ofthewill.Myreasonsarethefollowing:
1.Thetestatorclearlyintendedthathiswillshouldnotbecontested.Whenhesaid"I
supplicatedmychildrenbymyfirstwifethattheyshouldnotcontestthismylastwill,"itis
notventuresometopresumethathealsoreferredtothechildrenofGetuliabecausethey,as
thetestator'sgrandchildren,werealsohisheirsbyrightofrepresentationoftheirmother.Itis
mostunlikelythatthetestatorwouldfrownuponacontestbyhischildrenofthefirstmarriage
butnotuponacontestbysaidgrandchildren.
2.Inhiscondonationofthemoneyadvancestohischildrenofthefirstmarriageinclause8,it
isimprobablethathehadforgottenhisdaughterGetuliaalthoughshehadbeendeadfor
severalyears.Isthememoryofadeceaseddaughterblottedoutinthefather'smindprecisely
atthemomentwhenheissearchinghisownconscienceashemakeshiswill?Moreover,did
notthepresenceofGetulia'schildrenservetoremindthetestatoroftheirmother?

Getulia'sdebtofP155havingbeencondonedinclause8,itfollowsthatarticles815and817
oftheCivilCode,supra,areapplicable.ThechildrenofGetuliaare,therefore,entitledto
havetheirshortlegitimecompletedaccordingtothearticlesaforesaid,buttheymustreturnto
theestate,bywayofcollation,theamountofP155underarticle11038,paragraph1ofthe
CivilCodewhichprovidesthus:
ART.1038.Cuandolosnietossucedanalabueloenrepresentaciondelpadre,
concurriendoconsustiosoprimos,colacionarantodoloquedebieracolacionarel
padresiviviera,aunquenolohayaheredado.
II
TheMandasandMejorasAreValid
Butgrantingthattherewasapreteritionbecauseoneorsomeofthechildrenofthefirst
marriageneverreceived,bydonationintervivosorbywill,anythingfromtheirfather,itis
clearfromthewillinquestionthatthechildrenofthesecondmarriageareentitledtothethird
forfreedisposalandtothethirdformejora(inadditiontotheirshareinthestrictlegitime).
Thatistosay,Ithinkweshouldapplyinthiscasethisprovisionofarticle814onpreterition:
"perovaldranlasmandasymejorasencuantonoseaninoficiosas."
ThemajorityresolutionreliesuponquotationsfromManresaandSanchezRomantosupport
thepropositionthattheannulmentofthe"Instituciondeheredero"entirelyannulsthewill.
However,themajorityislaboringunderamisunderstandingofthe"instituciondeheredero"
undertheSpanishlaw.Itisthatmisconceptionwhichhadledthemajorityintoawrong
interpretationofwhatthosetwoSpanishjuristsmeanwhentheysaythattheannulmentofthe
"instituciondeheredero"istotal.Itistobenoted,atthisjuncture,thatbothauthors,while
statingthatpreteritionentirelyannulsthe"instituciondeheredero,"neverthelessadmitthat
"manda"and"mejoras"whicharenotinofficiousarevalid.SaysManresa(Vol.6,pages359,
360,4thEd.):
Enelfondolacuestionesidentica.Eltestadorpuedesiempredisponerasuarbitrio
delapartelibre.Ellegitimario,contralavoluntadexpresadeltestador,solotiene
derechoasulegitima.Preteridoodesheredadosinjustacausa,lalegitimaessuya.
Desheredadoopreterido,laporcionlibrenolecorresponde,cuandoeltestadorla
asignaaotro.(Italicsours.)
Lainterpretacionquerectamentesedesprendedelarticulo814,esladequesolo
valen,yesoencuantonoseaninoficiosas,lasdisposicioneshechasotitulodelegado
omejora.Encuantoalainstituciondeheredero,seanula.Loqueseanuladejade
existir,entodo,oenparte?Noseaadelimitacionalguna,comoenelarticulo851,
enelqueseexpresaencuantoperjudiquealalegitimadeldesheredado.Debe,pues,
entendersequelaanulacionescompletaototal,yqueestearticulo,comoespecialen
elcasoquelemotiva,rigeconpreferenciaal817.
Todaslasdemasdisposicionestestamentariasreferentesalosbienes,comolos
legadosylasmejoras,ensucaso,continuaransubsistentes,noobstantelapretericion,
siemprequenoseaninoficiosas,estoes,siemprequelasmejorasnoexcedandel
tercio,yloslegadosconlasdonacionesporcausademuerte,ylasdonaciones
colacionables,noexcedandelapardedeherenciadelibredisposicion.Siexcedieren,
sereduciranporlasreglasdelCodigo,hastadejarasalvolalegitima.(Emphasis
ours.)

Furtheron(p.363)Manresaadds:
Estimadalaaccion,yanuladalainstituciondeheredero,seabrelasucesionintestada
respectoalapartedebienesdequeeltestador,dentrodelaporcionlibrenohubiese
dispuestoenvirtuddelegado,mejoraodonacion.
SanchezRomanalsostates:
Encambio,niporladesheredacionniporlapretericionpierdesufuerzael
testamento,encuantoadichoterciolibre,sisetratadedescendientes;olamitad,si
setratadeascendientes,yadesherederos,yapreteridos,porque,niporelunoniporel
otromedio,seanulamasquelainstituciondeheredero,engeneral,ytotalmentepor
lapretericion,ysoloencuantoperjudiquealalegitimadeldesheredadoporla
desheredacion;perosubsistiendo,enamboscasos,todasaquellasotrasdisposiciones
quenoserefierenalainstituciondeherederoysehallendentrodellimite
cuantitativodeltercioomitaddelibredisposicion,segunquesetratede
descendientesoascendientes,preteridosodesheredados.(Emphasisours.)
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Noobstantelapretericion,'valdranlasmandasylegadosencuantonosean
inoficiosas'.Eltextoesterminanteynonecesitamayorexplicacion,despuesdelo
dicho,quesupropialetra,anoserparaobservarqueconstituyeunaconfirmacion
indudabledelosefectosdelapretericion,encuantoalcanzansolo,perototalmente,a
laanulaciondelainstituciondeheredero,peronoaladelasmandasymejorasen
cuantonoseaninoficiosasoperjudiquenalelegitimadelospreteridos;calificativo
detales,comosinonimolegaldeexcesivas,queenotrosarticulos,comoel817,
establecelaley.(6SanchezRoman,Volumen2.o11401141.)
Theseeminglyselfcontradictorystatementsofeachofthesetwoeminentjuristsare
confusing,astheyhaveconfusedthemajority,unlessheexaminesthehistoric
backgroundofthe"instituciondeheredero"intheSpanishCivilCode.
Article764oftheCivilCodeProvides:
Eltestamentoseravalidoaunquenocontengainstituciondeheredero,oestano
comprendalatotalidaddelosbienes,yaunqueelnombradonoacetelaherenciaosea
incapazdeheredar.
Enestoscasossecumpliranlasdisposicionestestamentariashechasconarregloalas
leyes,yelremanentedelosbienespasaraalosherederoslegitimos.
Manresaexplainsthedevelopmentofthe"instituciondeheredero"thus(vol.6,pages8586,
4thEd.):
Lainstituciondeherederoeselactoenvirtuddelcualeltestadordesignalapersonao
personasquehandesucederleensusderechos,accionesyobligaciones;ysu
importanciaenlatestamentifaccionesindiscutible,puestoquedeellasurgela
continuaciondelapersonalidaddeltestador,sibienconlaslimitacionesimpuestas
porelmismo.Enefecto,porvirtuddedichainstitucion,lapersonaopersonas
instituidasporherederassucedenalcausanteenlauniversalidaddesusderechosy
obligaciones,enlosterminosqueexpusimosalcomentarlosarticulos659y660.

Hoyesaimportanciahacedidoalguntanto,aunquenohadesaparecidoporcompleto,
puestoquenoesnecesarialainstituciondeherederosparalavalidezdeladisposicion
mortiscausa;peroenloantiguollegoaserconsideradacomolacabezayraizdel
testamento,dandolugarsufaltaalanulidadeineficaciadelmismo.
Enlasseccionesprecedenteshemosvenidorefiriendonosconrepeticionados
sistemassucesoriosdistintos:unoformalistayrituario,mantenidoconstantemente
porelderechoromanoaunenlostiemposdemayorlaxituddelmismo,yotromas
libreyexpansivo,cuyagenuinarepresentacionsehallaenelOrdenamientideAlcala.
Yesedualismoprofundoqueentoncesobservamosentrelalegislacionromanayla
germana,hubodemanifestarsetambienclaramenteenlamateriarelativaala
instituciondeherederos.
Nohemosderepetiraquiideasexpuestasyaenlareseahistoricaconque
encabezamoslaintroduccionalestudiodeltratadodesucesiones,peroconviene
recordar,paralamejorinteligenciadelareformallevadaacaboennuestrasantiguas
leyes,quelanaturalezadelosprimitivostestamentosromanos,asicomola
organizaciondelafamiliaenaquellapotentenacion,ysuscaracteresdeuniversalidad
yperpetuidad,impusieronlanecesidaddeunherederoquecontinuaselapersonalidad
juridicadelcausante,revistiendoasuvezadichainstituciondelasmismas
condicionesdenecesidad,universalidadyperpetuidad.Eranecesarialainstitucion
comocabezaysolemnidadinternadeltestamento:erauniversal,puestoqueteniaque
serhechasobretodoelpatrimonio,nopermitiendosetestarsobreunapartedeelyno
sobreelresto;yerapor,ultimo,perpetua,porquesiendoelmediodelacontinuacion
ysubsistenciadeltestador,nopodiaserordenadalainstitucionconlimitacionde
tiempo,yelheredero,unavezaceptadalaherencia,nopodiadejardeserlo.
Porelcontrario,nienlalegislacioncastellana,nielelFueroJuzgo,encarnaciondel
elementogodo;nienlosFueronmunicipales,inspiradosenelmismoespiritu;nienel
FueroViejodeCastilla,niaunenelFueroReal,seencuentradisposicionalgunaque
leatribuyadichocaracter,acusandoenelloslainstituciondeherederosunconcepto
completamentediverso,hastaquelasPartidas,sintenerencuentaloselementos
distintosdenuestroderechoyladiferenteorganizaciondelafamiliaespoala,
importodeplanoladoctrinaromana,yconellatodoelcomplicadoorganismodesu
sistemasucesorio.Seguntenemosdichosya,elOrdenamientodeAlcalahizo
desaparecereseregimentanenoposicionconelderechopatrio,asignandoala
institucionloscaracteresdelibertadeindependenciaquehaconservadohastala
publicaciondelCodigo,puestoquelasleyesposterioresadichoOrdenamientono
introdujeronmodificacionalguna,manteniendolalibertaddelainstitucionde
herederos,sinmaslimitacionesqueelrespetoalamoralyalosderechos
legitimarios,asicomomantuvolaindependenciaabsolutaentredichainstitucionyel
testamento,hastaelpuntodeservalidoeste,aunquenohayaherederonosehaya
dispuestoeneldelatotalidaddelaherencia,locualpermitiaqueelcausantemuriese
partetestadoyparteintestado.(Emphasisours.)
Commentingonarticle764,Manresasays(Vol.6,page93):
Siavirtuddeelnoesnecesariayaparalavalidedelostestamentosqueenellos
constelainstituciondeherederos,logicadeducciondedichoprincipioesqueel
testamentonoseinvalideaunquenocontengadichainstituciononocomprendala
totalidaddelosbienes,onoresulteeficazlainstitucion,hecha,yapornoaceptarla
herenciaelinstituido,oporseresteincapaz.

Theonlypurpose,therefore,ofthe"instituciondeheredero"istohavesomeonecontinuethe
personalityofthetestator,sothattheremaybesomeonewhoshouldbepersonallyliablefor
alltheobligationsofthetestatorandwhosucceedstoalltherightsofthedecedent.Butsuch
"instituciondeheredero"isnolongeressential,sothattheremaybeavalidwill,accordingto
article764,althoughthereisno"instituciondeheredero."AsManresasays,sincethe
OrdenamientodeAcalathereisanabsoluteindependencebetweenthe"institucionde
heredero"andthewill.(Vol.6,page86.)
Therefore,inthecaseunderconsideration,theannulmentofthe"instituciondeheredero"on
accountofpreteritiondoesnotrenderthewillineffective.
Thatthepreteritionunderarticle814doesnotentirelyinvalidatethewillisunanimously
maintainedbytheauthors.
SanchezRoman,supra,saysthattheeffectsofpreterition,"alcanzan,solo,perototalmente,a
laanulaciondelainstituciondeheredero,peronoaladelasmandasymejorasencuantono
seaninofociosasoperjudiquenalalegitimadelospreteridos."
Manresastates(Vol.6,pages362363):
Parapedirlaanulacion,correspondealherederopreteridounaaccion,quesiemprese
hallamadoquerelladeinoficiosotestamento.
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Estimadalaaccion,yanuladalainstituciondeheredero,seabrelasucesionintestada
respectoalapartedebienesdequeeltestador,dentrodelaporcionlibrenohubiese
dispuestoenvirtuddelegado,mejoresodonacion."(Italicsours.)
ScaevolainVol.XIV,page383ofhisworkontheSpanishCivilCodehasthistosay:
AccionesdefensivasdelegitimaPrescripciondelasmismas.Ennuestro
entender,noconviveconelCodigoenmateriadepretericionlatradicionalquerella
deinoficiosotestamento.Apoyamosnuestraopinionendosrazones:primera,no
nombrarlaasielCodigo,nicontenerdoctrinaequivalente,tantoenlaseccionde
legitimas,comoenladeprescripcion;segunda,sostenerdoctrinacontrariaaaquella
dequederivabalasobredichaaccion.
Laquerellaseencaminabaadestruireltestamento,encasodepretericion;elCodigo,
conconocimientodecausa,conconcienciadeladoctrina,precisamenteenoposicion
aella,noautorizataldestruccionencuantoconsignalanulidaddelainstitucion
hereditaria,perolavalidezdelasmandasymejoras.Noexistiendoelantecedente,no
puedeexistirelconsiguiente;derogadoelprincipiodoctrinalquedabavidaala
querelladeinoficiosotestamento,desaparecioestaconel.Hamuertoalsucumbirla
legislaciondelaqueeraelementointegrante,decuyocuerpoformabaparte.
Hoylaaccionseencaminaalanulidaddelainstitucionhereditariacomomediopara
adquirirelherederoforzosolaporcionquelesealalaley.Tratasesencillamentede
unaaccionreal,comunuordinario,devidalegaldetreintaaos."(Italicsours.)

GoyenainhisbookontheProjectof1851,commentingonarticle644ofthesame,which
providesthatpreterition"anulalainstituciondeheredero;perovaldranlasmandasymejoras
encuantonoseaninoficiosas"(theexactwordingofarticle814ofthepresentSpanishCivil
Code)observes(Vol.2,pages9495):
Laley24deToro,u8,titulo6,libro10,NovisimaRecopilacion,dice:'Cuandoel
testamentoserompiereoanulareporcausadepretericionoexheredacion,etc.,nopor
esodejedevalerlamejoriadeltercioyquinto.'Excausaexhaeredationisvel
praeteritionisirritumesttestamentumcuantumadinstituciones,caeteranaumque
firmapermanent.Autentica,titulo28,libro6delCodigo.
Elarticulodemayorclaridadylatituc,oporlomenosfijeza,aestasdisposiciones
PatriayRomana.
ApesardelaleydeToro,senoshaenseadoenlasescuelas,quelapretericion
anulabaenteramenteeltestamento,yquenoestabancorregidasporellalasleyes3,
titulo7,y1,titulo8,Partida6,queasilodeclaraban:enDerechoRomanohemos
aprendidocomoinconcusolocontrariodelaautenticaenelcasodepretenciondeun
herederosuyo;yestoeralocierto,porquelaautenticafuetomadadelaNovela115,
capitulos3y4,enlaquedeintentosetratadeladesheredacionydesuscausas,yde
larescisiondeltestamento,porlaquerelladeinoficioso;deconsiguiente,la
desheredacionhacereferenciaalpadre;lapretericionalamadre,puesrespectode
ellaconstituyeunadesheredaciontacita.
SalaensusInstitucionesRomanoHispanas,parrafo5,titulo13,libro2,estaporlas
leyesdePartida;yensuIlustracion,numero3,titulo5,libro2,sostienelocontrario,
yenapoyodelaleydeTorocitalaautentica.'Loestablecieronasi(dice)lasleyes
Romanas,ylopersuadelaequidad,quenopermitetengalugarlapenamasalladel
particularenqueocurriolaindignidadosinrazonquelamotivo.'
Prescindiendodetodoesto,elarticulohacesencilloyclaroloquehastaahorahasido
embrolladoydudoso.
Finally,Prof.NicasioLopezR.GomezoftheUniversityofValladolidsaysinhisTratado
TeoricoLegaldelDerechodeSucesion,"Vol.I,pages316319:
EnRoma,lavalidezonulidaddelainstituciondeheredero,envolvialadeterminaciondelos
efectosjuridicolegalesdeltestamento,osunegacion,puestoque,sieralasolemnidadinterna
ynecesariadeltestamento,yporconsecuencia,sucabezayfundamento,aquelnopodia
subsistircuandoensuesenciaconcurrieraunviciodenulidad,oestahubierasidoomitida
etsineillanonesttestamentum....Reconocidoelprincipiodelaslegitimasydesenvuelto
conarregloalaclasificaciondelosherederossuyos,suyosynecesariosyvoluntarios,losdos
primeroshabiandesernecesariamenteinstituidosojustamentedesheredados:yporultimola
desheredacionjustaconcausalegalyexpresaprivabadelalegitimaalherederoaquiense
imponia.Ladesheredacioninjustasincausaoconcausafalsanopodiaproduciresteefecto,
dejandocompletamenteasalvoelderechodelegitima,yotorgabaaldesheredadolaaccion
extraordinariaparareclamarcontralainstitucionporinoficiosa,conelefectoabsolutodeno
referirsesolamentealaporcionlegitima,sinoqueanuladalainstitucionquedabannulastodas
lasdemasdisposicionesdeltestamento.
Lapretericiondeunherederoforzosotambienproduciaelmismoefectodenulidad.

LasLeyesdePartidaalreproducirladoctrinaromanacontodosurigorismoy
encadenamientodelasinstitucionessucesorias,importaronennuestralegislaciontodaslas
disposicionesreferentesalaquejadeinoficiosotestamento,sunaturaleza,extension,
personasquepodianejercitarlaenlalinearectaascendenteydescendenteyenlacolateral
cuandolainstitucionrecayeraenpersonatorpopostergandoaloshermanosyporultimoen
cuantoaltiempooplazodesuejercicio.
LaL.de.titulo19delOrdenamientodeAlcala,consuespiritudetransicionregeneradordel
primitivoDerechoEspaol,llevoacabounatransformacioncompletaeimportantisima,pues
aldeclararlaindependenciaabsolutaentrelosejectosdelainstituciondeherederoylosdel
testamento,laextensiondelaquejadelainoficiosidaddeeste,quedolimitadaestrictamentea
reclamarcontralainstitucionencuantofuerainoficiosa,percibiendoeldesheredadoo
preteridolaporcionlegitimaquelecorrespondiera,subsistiendolamismainstitucionen
cuantoalosbienesquetuvieranelconceptodelibres,asicomotodaslasdemasclausulasdel
testamento.
ConsecuenciadeestoydeladeclaraciondelaL.9,deToro,losdescendientesy
ascendientes,injustamentedesheredadosopreteridos,podianentablarlaacciono
querelladeinoficiosotestamentocomoherederosforzososdesucausante,conelsolo
efectodepercepciondesulegitima,sinanulareltestamentoniaunlainstitucionde
herederoqueunicamenteserescindiaencuantoaaquellaporciso;yconrespectoa
loscolateralesohermanos,perdieronelderechodeejercitarlacitadaacciondesdeel
momentoquefueronprivadosdelconceptodeherederosforzosos,quetenainenel
unicocasodeserpostergadosapersonatorpe,porhaberquedadosinefectoeste
calificativoylasdistincionesquehicieronlasleyesromanasydePartidas.
Conestosbrevisimosantecedenteshistoricospodemospasarafijarelverdadero
conceptodelaquejadeinoficiosotestamentoparadespuesexponerladoctrina
vigenteacercadeella.
Seentiendeporquejaoquerelladeinoficiosotestamento,laaccionquecompetealos
herederosforzosospreteridosoinjustamentedesheredadossincausaoconexpresion
deellasiendofalsa,parareclamarlaporciondebienesquecomolegitimales
corresponde.
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Laimpugnaciondelainstitucionhechaentestamento,porelherederodesheredadoo
preteido,puedeefectuarsedelsomaneras:porelejerciciodirectodelaaccioncontra
elinstituidoparaquereconozcayabonelalegitima;oporexcepcion,cuandoel
desheredadosehallareenposesiondelaherenciayelinstituidointerpusieralaaccion
correspondienteparapercibirla.
Elefectoinmediatodelaquejadeinoficiosotestamentoesanularlainstitucionde
herederoencuantoperjudiquelosderechoslegitimariosdelactor.(Emphasisours.)
Applyingtheabovecitations,whatistheeffectofpreteritioninthiscase?Doesitrenderthe
willofAgripinoNeriyChavezentirelyvoid,sothatanintestatesuccessionmustbedeclared
astoallhisproperty?Thenegativeanswerisinescapablebecauseofthetruemeaningof
"instituciondeheredero"asalreadysetforth,andthescopeofthe"quejadeinoficioso
testamento"asexplainedbythewritersabovequoted.

Anularalainstituciondeheredero"doesnotmeanthatthewholewillisofnoeffect.
Itherebynullifiestheclausedesignatingthechildrenofthesecondmarriageasthe
only"herederos"orcontinuersofthetestator'spersonalityandintheplaceofsuch
clause,article814ordersthatallthechildren,ofbothmarriages,shallbesuch
continuersofAgapitoNeri'spersonality.Thisdoesnotmeanthatallthechildrenshall
dividethewholeestateequally,bytherulesofintestacy.Itsimplysignifiesthatthe
childrenofbothmarriagesbecomecontinuersofNeri'spersonality,andassuchliable
personallyforallofNeri'sobligations,sothatunderthesystemsoftheSpanishCivil
Code,whichdistinguishes"herederos"from"legatarios,"allthechildrenareliable
personallyforthedebtsoftheirfather,evenbeyondandinexcessoftheproperty
receivedbyeachofthem.Theyarealsoentitledtoallhisrights,buttheextentof
suchrightsisdeterminedbythewill.Theyareall"residuarylegatees"undertheCode
ofCivilProcedure,sothatifthereisanypropertyundisposedofbyhiswill,allthe
childrenshalldivideitequally.
WithregardtotheSpanishremedyof"quejadeinoficiosotestamento,"theauthoritiesalready
citedlimittheeffectofthesame,incaseofpreterition,undertheCivilCodetotherecovery
ofthelegitimatepertainingtotheheirwhohasbeenomitted.Thisisconformitywitharticle
814whichsaysthatthemandasandmejorasarevalidinsofarastheyarenotinofficious.
Havemandasandmejorasbeengiventothechildrenofthesecondmarriage?Itisplainthat
theintentionofthetestatoristogivetothechildrenofthesecondmarriageallthatremainsof
hisproperty;thechildrenofthefirstmarriagehavingalreadyreceivedfromhimtheirshares,
inadditiontosumsofmoneybywayofaidandloan.Thisbeingso,andinasmuchasthe
greaterincludestheless,hisdispositioninfavorofhisyoungerchildrenshouldbeupheldas
tothetwothirdsofhisremainingproperty,viz:theonethirdforfreedisposalandtheone
thirdformejora(inadditiontotheirshareintheshortlegitimate).
First,astothethirdforfreedisposal.ThedecisionofthisCourtsaysthereisNo"legacy
expresslymadeintheirbehalfconsistingofthethirdavailableforfreedisposal."Ibelieveit
isillogicaltorequireinthiscasethatthewillshouldexpresslymakea"legacy"fromthethird
forfreedisposal.Itisenoughthatthetestatorgivesallhisremainingpropertytohischildren
ofthesecondmarriage;fromthatitshouldnotbehardtodeclarethanitwashisintentionto
givethematleastthethirdforfreedisposal.Inlegalconceptanythinggivenfromthethird
availableforfreedisposalisa"manda"or"legado,"whetheritissonamedornot.
Second,asforthethirdavailableformejora,Iagreewiththedecisionthatthereisnoexpress
mejora.ButIthinkthereisatacitmejora.Now,atacitmejoraiscreatedwhenthetestator
givessomethingtoanyofhischildrenwhichcannotbecontainedinthethirdavailablefor
freedisposal.Article828provides:
ART.828.Lamandaolegadohechoporeltestadoraunodeloshijoso
descendientesnosereputaramejorasinocuandoeltestadorhayadeclarado
expresamenteserestasuvoluntad,ocuandonoquepaenlapartelibre.
Hereagain,weshouldnotrequirethatthisportionshouldbeexpresslycalledbythetestatora
"mejora"ora"manda"becauseitwouldhavebeenillogicalandimpropertospeakof
"mejora"or"manda"whenhewasgivingthewholeofhisremainingpropertytohischildren
ofthesecondmarriage.Article814simplymeansthatincaseofpreterition,alltestamentary
provisionsarevalidinsofarastheydonotimpairthelegitime.Theeffectofthedecisionin
thiscaseistodeclareanintestatesuccessionastotheentireestatewheneverthereisno

expressmejoraandexpresslegacy.Thus,therewouldbetotalintestacy,inspiteofthe
testamentaryprovisionstothecontrary,inthepreteritionunderthefollowingcircumstances:
1.Wherethereisatacitmejora,underarticle828;or
2.Whentherecanproperlybenomejora,expressorimplied,becauseachildordescendantis
institutedasthesoleheirtothewholeestate;or
3.Whentherecanproperlybeneitherexpressmejoranorexpresslegacybecausetwoormore
childrenordescendantsareinstitutedtotakethewholeestateequallyorwithoutexpress
designationofshares.
Suchcouldnothavebeentheintentionofthelegislator,becausethewholeschemeofthe
CivilCodeastosuccessionsistorespecttestamentaryprovisionssolongasthelegitimeis
notdiminished.(Arts.763,764,767,777,782,792,798,813,814,815,817,820,828,1036,
and1037,CivilCode.)
Furthermore,itwouldappeartobeviolativeofthelawtothrowtheentirewilltothescrap
heapanddeclareatotalintestatesuccession,whensuchwillcanandshouldbeenforcedinso
farastheshortlegitimeofthechildrenofthefirstmarriageisnotlessened.True,tosomeit
mightseemmoreequitabletodividetheestateequallyamongallthechildrenofboth
marriages.Butsolongastheshortlegitimeisnotimpaired,thetestatorinthiscasewasfree
todistributehispropertyamonghischildrenashesawfitandfair.(Thisiswhyevenincase
ofpreterition(article814),mandasandmejorasarevalidtotheextentthattheyarenot
inofficious.Ifthisminimumandobligatoryportion(shortlegitime)ofeachchildiskeptintact
inthepartitionunderthewill,thelawdoesnotadmitofanyinterferencewiththetestator's
wishes.Heisthesolejudgeastowhichchildrenshouldgetmorethantheothers.Toholdthat
thereshallbeanequaldivisionofthewholeestateapplyingtherulesofintestacywhen
thetestatorpositivelyandunmistakablystatedthatthereshallbeadifferentdistributionofthe
remainingestate,iscontrarytolaw.Moreover,intestatesuccessionisbaseduponthepresume
intentionofthedeceased.Saving,ofcourse,theshortlegitimeofthechildrenofthefirst
marriage,weshouldnotresorttothatpresumedintentioninthefaceofaclearandexplicit
declarationinhiswillthatthechildrenofthesecondmarriageshallbepreferred.
Butgranting,arguendo,thatstrictlyspeakingthereareno"mandas"and"mejoras"forthe
childrenofthesecondmarriage,yetbytheprincipleofconstructionbyanalogy,theprovision
inarticle814thatmandasandmejorasshallbevalidshouldbeappliedbecausethetestator
clearlyintendedtogiveatleasttwothirdsofhisestatetosuchchildren,inasmuchashewas
givingallofittothem.Andhecoulddisposefreelyofsaidtwothirdsinfavorofsaid
childrenofthesecondmarriage,thatis,onethirdfromtheportion.forfreedisposal,andone
thirdfromtheportionassignedbylawtomejora.Inotherwords,grantingforthesakeof
argumentthattherewasneitheramandanoramejorainthiscase,neverthelessthepresent
situationoffersagap,notspecificallyforeseenbythelawmaker,whichshouldbefilledby
applyingthewords,"valdranlasmandasymejoras"throughtheprincipleofanalogyinorder
nottodefeatthemanifestintentionofthetestator.
Themajorityresolutionlaystressonthesupposeddifferencebetweentheeffectofarticle814
(preterition)andofarticle851(disinheritance).Whatevermaybethedistinctionbetweenthe
twoarticlesintheory,thepracticalresultis,however,thesamebecausebotharticlescontaina
savingclauseinregardtothemandasandmejoraswhichdonotimpairthelegitime.Article
814says:"perovaldranlasmandasymejorasencuantonoseaninoficiosas,"andarticle851
alsoprovides,"perovaldranloslegados,mejorasydemasdisposicionestestamentariasenlo

quenoperjudiquenadichalegitima."Theidentityofideasisplain.True,article851
(disinheritance)annulsthe"instituciondeheredero"insofarasitprejudicestheperson
disinherited,wherearticle814simplysaysthatthepreterition"shallannultheinstitucionde
heredero."However,thelackinarticle814ofthequalifyingwords"insofarastheomitted
personisprejudiced"isfilledandsuppliedbythewords"perovaldranlasmandasymejoras
encuantonoseaninoficiosas,"whichimmediatelyfollow.Infact,thewords"encuanto
perjudiquealdesheredero"inarticle851aresuperfluousandunnecessarybecausethevery
samethoughtisconveyedbythewords"perovaldranloslegados,mejorasydemas
disposicionestestamentariasenloquenoperjudiquenadichalegitima."
UptothispointIhavediscussedarticle814,CivilCode,purelyfromthestandpointofthat
code,withoutreferencetotheCodeofCivilProcedure.Thislattercode,however,has
abolishedthedistinctionbetween"heredero"and"legatario"undertheCivilCode,andhas
changedthebasisofliabilityofpersons,whetherrelatedornottothedeceased,who
receiveanypropertyfromtheestate.AsstatedbythisCourtinthecaseofSuiliong&Co.,v.
ChioTaysan,12Phil.,13(year1908):
Anexaminationmoreespeciallyofsections597,644,727,729,731,733,and749of
theCodeofCivilProcedure,readtogetherwiththeremainingprovisionsforthe
administrationoftheestatesofdeceasedpersons,clearlyindicatesthattheprovisions
ofarticles660and661oftheCivilCodehavebeenabrogated.
Theseprovisionsofthenewcodeclearlydemonstratethatthetermsherederoand
legatario,asdefinedintheCivilCode(article660),arenotsynonymouswiththe
words"heir"and"legatee,"asusedinthenewcode;theword"heir"inthecodebeing
technicallyapplicableonlytoarelativetakingpropertyofanintestatebyvirtueofthe
lawsofdescent,deviseeandlegateebeingreservedforallpersonswhetherrelatives
ornot,takingrespectivelyrealorpersonalpropertybyvirtueofawill;whileheredero
intheCivilCodeasapplicablenotonlytoonewhowouldbecalledan"heir",under
theprovisionsofthenewcode,butalsotoone,whetherrelativeornot,whotook
whatmightbecalled"aresiduaryestateunderawill(elquesucedeatitulo
universal).
Itappearsalsofromanexaminationofthoseprovisionsthatthelegislaturehas
providednomachinerywherebyanabsoluterightonthepartoftheheirtosucceedby
themerefactofdeathtoalltherightsandpropertyofthedeceasedmaybeenforced,
withoutpreviouspaymentorprovisionforthepaymentofthedebts;andontheother
handithasprovidedmachineryfortheenforcementofhedebtsandotherobligations
ofthedeceased,notasdebtsorobligationsoftheheir,butasdebtsorobligationsof
thedeceasedtothepaymentofwhichthepropertyofthedeceasedmaybesubjected
whereveritbefound.Thussection597expresslyprovidesthat,inthosecaseswhere
settlementofanintestateestatemaybemadewithoutlegalproceedings,eitherbya
familycouncil,asknownundertheSpanishlaw,orbyanagreementinwriting
executedbyalltheheirs,therealestateofthedeceasedremainchargedwithliability
tocreditorsofthedeceasedfortwoyearsafterthesettlement,"notwithstandingany
transfersthereofthatmayhavebeenmade";andwethinktheinferenceisclearthat
thelegislatorinthissectionrecognizesandaffirmsthedoctrinethat,priortothedate
ofsuchsettlement,therealestateatleastwaschargedinlikemannerwiththedebts
ofthedeceased.Soitwillbefoundthat,wherelegalproceedingsarehadlookingto
thesettlementoftestateorintestateestates,provisionismadefortherecoveryof
claimsagainstthedeceased,notbyproceedingsdirectedagainsttheheirs,butby
proceedingslookingdirectlytothesubjectionofthepropertyofthedeceasedtothe

paymentofsuchclaims;thepropertybothrealandpersonalbeing,inexpressterms,
madechargeablewiththepaymentofthesedebts,theexecutororadministrator
havingtherighttothepossessionoftherealaswellasthepersonalproperty,tothe
exclusionoftheheirs,solongasmaybenecessaryforthatpurpose(secs.727and
729).
Forpracticalpurposesitmaywellbesaidthatintheeyeofthelaw,wherethereisno
remedytoenforceanallegedrightwhenitisinvaded,theexistenceoftherightmay
safelybedenied;andwherethelawfurnishesaremedywherebyonemayenforcea
claim,thatclaimisarightrecognizedandestablishedbythelaw.ThenewCodeof
Procedurefurnishingnoremedywherebytheprovisionsofarticle661oftheCivil
Codemaybeenforced,insofarastheyimposeupontheheredero(heir)thedutyof
assumingasapersonalobligationallthedebtsofthedeceased,atleasttotheextent
ofthevalueofthepropertyreceivedfromtheestate;orinsofarastheygivetothe
herederothereciprocalrighttoreceivethepropertyofthedeceased,withoutsuch
propertybeingspecificallysubjectedtothepaymentofthedebtsofthedeceasedby
theveryfactofhisdeceased,theseprovisionsofarticle661mayproperlybeheldto
havebeenabrogated;andthenewcodehavingprovidedaremedywherebythe
propertyofthedeceasedmayalwaysbesubjectedtothepaymentofhisdebtsin
whateverhandsitmaybefound,therightofacreditortoalienuponthepropertyof
thedeceased,forthepaymentofthedebtsofthedeceased,createdbythemerefactof
hisdeath,maybesaidtoberecognizedandcreatedbytheprovisionsofthenew
code.(Paviavs.DelaRosa,8Phil.Rep.,70)
Theeffectofsuchabolitionbetween"heredero"and"legatario"undertheSpanishlawisto
renderobsoletethewords"anularalainstituciondeheredero"inarticle814oftheCivilCode,
becauseatpresentalldeviseesandlegatees,whetherdesignatedas"herederos","legatarios,"
"devisees,""legatees,"oranyothernamearetobetreatedalikeinthesensethatnoneofthem
ispersonallyliablefortheobligationsofthetestator,butthepropertyassignedtoeachof
themisburdenedwithalieninfavorofthecreditorsofthedeceased.Inotherwords,the
"instituciondeheredero"undertheSpanishlaw,wherebythe"heredero"continuesthe
personalityofthedeceasedandispersonallyliableforalltheobligationsofthelatterhas
disappearedfromthejuridicalscene.Thatbeingso,thewords"anularalainstitucionde
heredero"inarticle814havebecomeuseless,anomalousandanachronistic,andshouldbe
absolutelydisregarded.Theresultintheinstantcaseisthatthechildrenofthefirstmarriage
shouldbemerelyaddedascoparticipantsintheshortlegitimate,andthewillshallbeinall
otherrespectsenforced.Therefore,theshortlegitimeshouldbedividedequallyamongthe
childrenofbothmarriages,whilethechildrenofthesecondmarriageshall,inaddition,have
themejoraandtheonethirdsetasidebylawforfreedisposal.
Thereisanotherprovisionoflawwhichshouldnotbeoverlooked.Itisarticle1080ofthe
CivilCode,whichprovides:
Laparticionhechaconpretericiondealgunodelosherederosnoserescindira,ano
serquesepruebequehubomalafeodoloporpartedelosotrosinteresados;pero
estostendranlaobligaciondepagaralpreteridolapartequeproporcionalmentela
corresponda.
Itistruethattheabovearticleexpresslyreferstopartitionamongtheheirs,buttheintention
ofthelegislatorisclear,thatinapreterition,thepartitionshouldnotberescindedbutthe
omittedheirshouldgethislawfulshare.Byanalogy,thedistributionmadeinthewillbythe

testatorinthepresentcaseshouldnotbedisturbed,thoughthechildrenofthefirstmarriage
shouldgettheirportionfromtheshortlegitime.
Finally,theprinciplewhichIhereinmaintainhasbeenestablishedbythiscourtintwo
decisions:Escuinvs.Escuin,11Phil.,332(year1908),andEleazarvs.Eleazar,37Off.Gaz.,
1782(year1939).IntheEscuincase,EmilioAntonioEscuindelosSantoswhohadno
legitimatechildren,madeawillinstitutinghisnaturalfather,FranciscoEscuin,andhis
(testator's)wife,MariaTeresaPoncedeLeonashisuniversalheirs,whoshoulddividethe
estateinequalshares.Afterthetestator'sdeath,hisacknowledgednaturalson,EmilioEscuin
yBatac,claimedtheentireestate.However,thisCourtheldthathe,theacknowledgednatural
child,wasonlyentitledtohislegitimateofonethirdoftheestateunderarticle842,andthat
thewillwas"validwithrespecttothetwothirdsofthepropertywhichthetestatorcould
freelydisposeof."Iquotefromthedecisioninthatcase,whichwaspennedbyMr.Justice
Torres:
Withrespecttothequestionwhichformthebasisofthislitigationandrefertothe
secondassignmentoferrors,itshouldbenotedthatthelatetestatordidnotleaveany
legitimatedescendantsorascendants,butdidleavearecognizednaturalchild,the
appellantminor,andawidow;thatthesaidminor,EmilioEscuinyBatac,isthe
generalheirofhisnaturalfather,thesaidtestator,whorecognizedhimwhileliving
(article807,CivilCode),andinthepresentcaseisentitledtoonethirdofhisestate,
whichamountconstitutesthelegalportionofanaturalchild(article842ofthesaid
code);andforthereasonthattheminorwasignoredbyhisnaturalfatherinhiswill,
thedesignationofheirsmadethereinwas,asamatteroffactannulledbyforceof
law,insofarasthelegalportionofthesaidminorwastherebyimpaired.Legacies
andbettermentsshallbevalid,insofarastheyarenotillegal,forthereasonthata
testatorcannotdeprivetheheirsoftheirlegalportions,exceptinthecasesexpressly
indicatedbylaw.(Arts.763,813,814,CivilCode.)
Ashasbeenseen,thetestatorwishedtodisposeofhispropertyinhiswill,
designatingasheirshisnaturalfather,FranciscoEscuin,andhiswife,MariaTeresa
PoncedeLeon,altogetherignoringhisrecognizednaturalchildwhoishisgeneral
heir.Inviewthereof,andforthereasonthatheexceededhisrights,thesaid
designationofheirsbecamevoidinsofarasitimpairedtherightofhisgeneralheir
anddeprivedhimofhislegalportion;thewill,however,isvalidwithrespecttothe
twothirdsofthepropertywhichthetestatorcouldfreelydisposeof.(Arts.763,764,
806,813,842,CivilCode.)
Notwithstandingthefactthatthedesignationofheirsisannulledandthatthelaw
recognizesthetitleoftheminor,EscuinyBatac,toonethirdofthepropertyofhis
naturalfather,ashislawfulandgeneralheir,itisnotpropertoassertthatthelate
EmilioEscuindelosSantosdiedintestateinordertoestablishtheconclusionthat
hisaidnaturalrecognizedchildisentitledtosucceedtotheentireestateunderthe
provisionsofarticle939oftheCivilCode,inasmuchasinaccordancewiththelawa
citizenmaydiepartlytestateandpartlyintestate(article764,CivilCode).Itisclear
andunquestionablethatitwasthewishofthetestatortofavorhisnaturalfatherand
hiswifewithcertainportionsofhispropertywhich,underthelaw,hehadarightto
disposeofbywill,ashehasdone,providedthelegalportionofhisgeneralheirwas
nottherebyimpaired,thetwoformerpersonsbeingconsideredaslegateesunderthe
will.

Theabovementionedwillisneithernull,void,norillegalinsofarasthetestator
leavestwothirdsofhispropertytohisfatherandwife;testamentaryprovisions
impairingthelegalportionsofageneralheirshallbereducedinsofarastheyare
illegalorexcessive.(Art.817,CivilCode.)(Emphasisours.)
Theabovedecisioniscontrollingauthorityforthepropositionthatpreteritionofanheir
annulstheinstitutionofheirsonlyinsofarasthelegitimateoftheomittedheirisimpaired,
andthat,therefore,thewillisvalidwiththatlimitationandnomore.Thedecisionand
resolutionintheinstantcasewhichsetasidetheentirewillanddividetheestateequally
amongallthechildrenonthebasicofintestacyiscontrarytothedoctrineofEscuinvs.
Escuin.
ItwillbenotedthatinsaidcaseofEscuinvs.Escuin,thisCourthadinmindtheintentionof
thetestator,andupheldthewillinsofarasthenaturalchild'slegitimewasnotcurtailed,and
thisCourtdidnotrequirethatthereshouldbeanyexpressmejoraorexpresslegacy,aswas
doneinthedecisionandresolutionintheinstantcase.
IntheEleazarcase,thetestator,FranciscoEleazar,omittedinhiswillhisfatherEusebio
Eleazar,disinheritedhiswife,EulaliaNagar,andinstitutedMiguelaEleazarashisuniversal
heir.ThefathercontendedthattheinstitutionofMiguelaEleazarasuniversalheirshouldbe
annulledandthathe,thefather,shouldbeentitledtoalltheestateofthedeceased.Butthis
courtrejectedthefather'stheory,saying:
Thedeceased,FranciscoEleazar,omittedinhislastwillandtestamenthislegitimate
father,theappellantEusebioEleazar,expresslydisinheritedhislawfulwife,Eulalia
Nagar,andinstitutedtheappelleeherein,MiguelaEleazar,ashisuniversalheir.The
lowercourtadmittedthewilltoprobateandadjudgedappellantandappelleeeach
entitledtoonehalfoftheestate.
Appellantmaintaininhisappealthattheinstitutionoftheappelleeasuniversalheir
shouldbeannulledandthathebedeclaredentitledtoalltheestateofthedeceased.
Thewill,insofarasitdeprivestheappellant,aslegitimatefatherofthedeceased,of
hislegalportion,isnullandvoid,butisvalidwithrespecttotheotherhalfwhichthe
testatorcouldfreelydisposeofandwhichshouldbeconsideredasalegacy.(Escuin
vs.Escuin,11Phil.,332;Arts.814,817,and809,CivilCode.)(Emphasisours.)
ItwillbenotedthatintheEleazarcase,thefreehalfwasconsideredbythiscourt"aslegacy"
infavorofMiguelaEleazaralthoughithadnotbeensoexpresslydesignatedinthewill
becausethewholeestatehadbeengiventoher.Thisispreciselymyviewinthepresentcase,
butthemajoritynowstate,deviatingfromtherulingintheEleazarcase,thatasthewhole
propertyisbequeathedbyuniversaltitletothechildrenofthesecondmarriage,"thisis
inconsistentwiththeideaoflegacywhichessentiallyreferstoaspecificpropertybequeathed
byaparticularorspecialtitle."
Butthemajoritytriestodistinguishthepresentcasefromthetwocasesabovecited,bysaying
thatthereisadifferencebetweenacasewherethewholeestateisgiventoamerefriend,and
acasewherethewholepropertyislefttooneorsomeforcedheirs.Thisattempttolaydown
adistinctionfailswhenitisconsidered:

1.Thatthelawmakesnodifferencebetweenthetwokindsofpreterition.Inbothinstancesof
preterition,therefore,ontheauthorityofEscuinvs.Escuin,andEleazarvs.Eleazar,thewill
shouldbeavoidedonlyinpart.
2.Itistruethatinthecaseofafriend,totalannulmentofthewillwouldentirelydeprivehim
ofashareintheinheritance,andthatinthecaseofsomeforcedheirsbeingthesole
beneficiariesinthewill,theywouldparticipateequallywiththeomittedforcedheirsand
wouldnotbetotallyexcluded.Butinthiscase,itwastheevidentintentionofthetestatorto
givepreferencetohischildrenofthesecondmarriage.Moreover,Icannotsubscribetothe
majority'sreasoningwhenitbelievesthatthetestatorwouldbepresumedtogivetheentire
freethirdasalegacytoafriendbutnottosomeofhischildren.Ifwearetoindulgeinany
presumptionatall,itshouldbethatthefatherwouldbeatleastasdisposedtogivethewhole
freethirdasalegacytosomeofhischildrenwhoarehisownfleshandbloodastoa
friend.
3.Grantingforthesakeofargumentthatthebasisofsuchpreferencewasthemistakenbelief
thatthetestatorhadalreadygiventhechildrenofthefirstmarriagemorethanthesharegiven
inthewilltothechildrenofthesecondmarriage,whatsolutionwouldbewarrantedbylaw?
Certainly,notthescrappingoftheentirewill,becausearticle814positivelyordainsthat
"mandas"and"mejoras"whicharenotinofficiousshallbevalid.Itistoofarfetchedto
assumethathadnotthetestatormadeamistake,hewouldhavedividedhiswholeproperty
equallyamongallhischildren.Whatsupernaturalpowersdoesanycourthavetodivinethe
inwardsentimentsofthetestatortowardeachandeveryoneofhischildren?Indeed,would
notasocalledequaldistributionproducerealandactualinequalityonaccountofthe
differentconditionsofthevariouschildreninrespecttofortune,age,mentalcapacity,moral
character,attitudetowardthefather,andsoforth?Thisistheveryreasonwhythelawallows
thetestatoramplediscretiontodividehisestateamonghischildren,providedthelawonthe
shortlegitimeisobserved.I,forone,amnotreadytoviolatethesanctuaryofthetestator's
conscience,expecttosafeguardtheshortlegitime.Solongasthisportionisrespected,the
testatormaydisposeofthemejoraandthefreethirdinfavorofanyofhischildren.
Inviewoftheforegoing,Ibelievethemotionforreconsiderationshouldbegranted,andthe
willshouldbedisregardedonlyinpart,sothatthechildrenofbothmarriagesshoulddivide
theshortlegitimeequally,buttherestoftheestateshouldgo,inequalshares,tothechildren
ofthesecondmarriage,inaccordancewiththeintentionofthetestatorexpressedinthewill.

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