Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Due Process of Law Case Digests
Due Process of Law Case Digests
Due Process of Law Case Digests
Woodward
FACTS:
Eleazar Wheelock set up an Indian charity school, with the help
of several established Americans, clothed, maintained and
educated a number of children of the Indian natives, with a view
of carrying the Gospel and spreading the word of God. The
school became reputable among Indians in such a way that a
vast number of Indians would want their children to study in his
institution although his personal finances and estate could no
longer handle the same. Wheelock thought that the undertaking
should be accomplished by collecting funds from well-off
individuals from England. Wheelock requested Reverend
Nathaniel Whitacker for that purpose and gave him a special
power of attorney to solicit from the worthy and generous
contributors for the cause. Eventually, Whitacker appointed
several persons to be trustees for the funds collected through a
deed of trust ratified and executed by Whitacker. Through the
efforts of the trustees alongside Wheelock and Whitacker,
Dartmouth College has been instituted with the Trustees of
Dartmouth College. Any heirs of the Trustees, as granted by the
courts, will be part of the body politic for the furtherance of
Darthmouth College.
[I tried to make a digest but the case was too long, sorry]
Yus defense:
Power of taxation
strongest of all the powers of government, practically
absolute and unlimited
It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within the
control of the legislature. It is the Legislature which must
questions of state necessarily involved in ordering a tax, which
must make all the necessary rules and regulations which are to
be observed in order to produce the desired results, and which
must decide upon the agencies by means of which collections
shall be made
cannot be taken without due process of law, and that they are
entitled to the equal protection of the laws, without regard to
their race
Issue:
1.)
Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the
lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month
employment contract, and not just for a period of three months?
2.)
Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form part of
the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award,
because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into
his contract?
The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of
overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed
the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the
unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine
months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per
month. The subject clause or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with
fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims:
they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause,
illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year
or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap,
whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with
fixed-term employment.
CLAUDIO S. YAP,
Petitioner, vs.
invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels
and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash
up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided
by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
Facts:
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision
was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various
questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request
for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which
subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a
rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court).
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless
otherwise provided.
Held:
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not
have been proved in a court of justice with the accused acquired
the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police
power because the method to confiscate carabaos was
oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied the
right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against
the separation of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during
that time was valid.
HELD: YES.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection
with ones performance of official functions and duties. For
grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained
of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the
law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error
of judgment.
The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a
litigant in a case pending before his sala and telling those
words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis wrongful
intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the
circumstances on record. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability
by shifting the blame to his court personnel. He ought to know
that judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in
their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the
judges responsibility.
The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together,
give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts
amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and
2; Canon 3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.
Notes:
The policy adopted by the Philippine Ports Authority to
allow only one organization to operate the arrastre and
stevedoring services of each port was upheld by the SC as a
valid exercise of police power. For the "one port, one operator"
rule makes possible the better supervision, collection, efficiency
and improvement of services, and prevent cut-throat
competition and non-maximal utilization of equipment and
manpower. However, in the awarding of contracts, the
procedures must allow only the capable operator to get the
franchise.
In this case, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was
issued without notice to the other party. As the TRO was lifted
also without hearing, the person in whose favor it was
originally issued cannot complain of the lifting of the TRO
without prior hearing.
still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became
final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being
filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of
the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied
the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing
the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA
and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to
the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs
favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in
mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, viz: to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural
law that aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution, is impervious to any serious challenge.
This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002,
when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on June
3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context
of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days
counted from service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a
Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June
3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with
Marcos v. Garchitorena
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and
in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's
First Divisiondenying petitioner's motion for leave to travel
abroad for medicaltreatment.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion
for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seekdiagnostic tests and
treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly
because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition"
requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was
denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and
treatment in China. This was supported by several medical
reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US
and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that
the tests were not available here.
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B.
Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and
later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners
motion to leave and denied all of the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to
Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for
Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and
letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be
guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of twenty four
members of the House of Representatives requesting the court
to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied by the
Facts: The nets were the property of the plaintiffs, and were
taken away by the defendant Steele, and destroyed. At the time
of the taking, most of the nets were in the waters of the Black
River bay, being used for fishing purposes, and the residue
were upon the shore of that bay, having recently been used for
the same purpose. The plaintiffs were fishermen, and the
defendant Steele was a state game and fish protector. The
taking and destruction of the nets were claimed to have been
justifiable under the statutes of the state relating to the
protection of game and fish. Plaintiffs claimed there was no
justification under the statutes, and, if they constituted such
justification upon their face, they were unconstitutional.
Defendant Sherman was a state fish commissioner. Defendant
Sargent was president of the Jefferson County Fish & Game
Association. Plaintiffs claimed these defendants to be liable
upon the ground that they instigated, incited, or directed the
taking and destruction of the nets.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed sections of Chapter 591 of,
Laws New York 1880 is valid and constitutional.
Held: YES
It is not easy to draw the line between cases where property
illegally used may be destroyed summarily and where judicial
proceedings are necessary for its condemnation. If the property
were of great value, as, for instance, if it were a vessel
employed for smuggling or other illegal purposes, it would be
putting a dangerous power in the hands of a custom officer to
permit him to sell or destroy it as a public nuisance, and the
owner would have good reason to complain of such act as
depriving him of his property without due process of law. But
where the property is of trifling value, and its destruction is
necessary to effect the object of a certain statute, we think it is
within the power of the legislature to order its summary
abatement. For instance, if the legislature should prohibit the
killing of fish by explosive shells, and should order the cartridges
Facts:
In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of
land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon City
Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of
arcades for commercial buildings to be constructed. At the
outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904
was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code
passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the
construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local
government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city
council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing
the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters
away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not
allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line,
thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect,
property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an
arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own
purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.
Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his
property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be
exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice
Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66,
subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer,
the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure
of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so
demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to
clear obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they sent a
notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion
of his building violated the National Building Code.
Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for
TRO with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the MMDA from
demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30
September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the
questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed
the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters
out of Justice Gancaycos 375 square meters of property were
being taken without compensation for the publics benefit, the
ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that
the ordinance violated owners right to equal protection of laws.
MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went
beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It
further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks,
streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places
in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private
property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed
with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
Issues: (1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS
ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF
ORDINANCE NO. 2904. (2) WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE
NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE
WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A
PUBLIC NUISANCE. (4) WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA
LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE
GANCAYCO.
Ruling:
(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it
made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR,
which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not
commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act.
FACTS:
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines
Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators
and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and
Pabiloa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM
appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as
the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit
himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his
earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM
then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed
the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge
to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of
Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no
provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal
from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that
delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did
not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their
appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted
arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM.
ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozons
finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to
Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that
the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given
due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon
cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case
to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CAs earlier
decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that
Gozons finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o
disturbing due process.
HELD:
The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery
of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In
order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The decision of the
reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be
the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the
2nd decision of the CA.