Bagabuyo vs COMELEC

Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But

in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a
bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law
was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law
and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the
COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections.
Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created
without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case
at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA
9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in
this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place;
and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan
de Oros territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two
legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12
city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts,
each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing
250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services only
250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
SENATOR BENIGNO
ELECTIONS

C.

AQUINO

III

V.

COMMISSION

ON

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district
for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities
of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district
Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards

that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty

thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population
of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.
HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
constitution states that: Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement
of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to
at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about
the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Sema v COMELEC
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City
is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of
ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative
districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City
and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act
and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities,
cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of
the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato
City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially
stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City
(because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that
status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes
of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a
decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as
a legislative district (or part of any).

Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the

legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1 st district).
Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a
separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should
be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival
Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he
won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province
automatically gains legislative representation and since S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is
being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there
and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the
legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether
or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local
government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units
province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of
the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of
the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a
population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created,
should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note
further that in order to have a legislative district, there must
at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did
not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is
untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the
province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative
district. But this can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At

most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13
parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House
of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were
party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at
least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the partylist seats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution
vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In
the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives
= #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first
party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of
concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional
seats for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat
limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to
ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This
intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed
bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with
the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from
the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups
which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and
which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to
"the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be

determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the
public and the private respondents, as well as the members of
this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating
parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received.
Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes
by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes
are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be
referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats
the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute
that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the
most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of
additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation.
Bantay vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for
certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain
issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14,
2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary
manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic
Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UPLR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify,
seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2
letters to the Director of the Comelecs Law Department
requesting a list of that groups nominees. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of
Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007
virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in
net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request.
Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list
nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts
of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the
Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and
that party list elections must not be personality oriented
according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents
Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming partylist elections without simultaneously determining whether or
not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List
System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta
Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan
Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UPLR have the additional prayers that the 33 private

respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to

participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be
enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating
in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the
Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their
petition on the ground that these groups and their respective
nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has
violated the right to information and free access to documents
as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the
Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein.
However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to
disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list
groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the partylist groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners
BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the
grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would
require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter
which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special
civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is
not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be
decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function
of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include
a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note
that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined
simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the
nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A.
7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly
not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing
through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people
have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an
informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list
elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be
a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would
hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes
in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release

the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in

the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right
where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens
to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however,
the right to information and its companion right of access to
official records are not absolute. The peoples right to know is
limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national
security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list
of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the
non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the
pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners
elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

1.
2.
3.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party
list elections.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding
the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is
one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in
case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it
justiciable.
2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in
the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law
pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to
determine proportional representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in
relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid
desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the
inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was
beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of
facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully
the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court
decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court

ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to

determine compliance by the party lists.
Torayno vs Comelec
Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis
Oriental for three terms until 1995 election and his certificate
of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he
executed a voter registration record in Cagayan de Oro City
which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming
20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the said
city and stated that his residence for the preceding two years
and five months was in the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed
petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the
residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and
proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for annulment of election of
Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional
residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed.
Emano was the overwhelming choice of the people of
Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle
that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the
ballot be given the fullest effect. Emano was actually and
physically residing in CDO while discharging his duties as
governor and even paid his community tax certificate in the
same. The residency requirement intends to prevent the
possibility of a stranger unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of the community from seeing an elective office to
serve that community.

NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs

COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats
this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even
if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is
void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it
mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to
fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house.
BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate,
questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA
7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or
is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in
the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

for

party-list

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for
every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be
one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the
1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more
than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also
allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives,
hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives
0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives

Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of
the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further,
the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to
attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose
there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every
party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat,
and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less
than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall

no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System
less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the twopercenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of
seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from
the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 partylists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats
available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used
in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at
least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the
20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and
multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional
number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit
rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total
vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x
(remaining seats) = number of additional seat

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there
is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941
against major political parties from participating in the partylist elections as the word party was not qualified and that
even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations
deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred
by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people
defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely
because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure
that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition
for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied
the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited
certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also
stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to
public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts
are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its
Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this
instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as
it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79
remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed
and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists
and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,
etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does

not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed
on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs
field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of
the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on
moral and legal grounds.
Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong

Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELECen banc

issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting
several party-list groups or organizations from the list of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations
or coalitions.Among the party-list organizations affected was
PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections.PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but
likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad
cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. The COMELEC
denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law

shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality
in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the nonestablishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and
the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted
that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought
to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric
of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations
of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any
act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not
a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest.
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI),
represented by its Secretary-General GEORGE FGBF
GEORGE DULDULAO, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
BRION,J.:
FACTS:

HELD:

COMELEC's

decision

is

annulled.

POLITICAL LAW: delisting of any national, regional or

sectoral
party
The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a)fails
to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections;or(b)fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of
one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies,as
a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two
separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be
mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two
preceding elections should now be understood to mean failure
to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.This is how Section
6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied.
PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to
garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did
not participate in the preceding election is something that is
not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941.From this perspective,
it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a
matter for Congress to address.The Court cannot and do not
address matters over which full discretionary authority is
given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will
offend the principle of separation of powers.If a gap indeed
exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the
legislatures
notice.
On the due process issue, PGBI's right to due process was not
violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did
seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679.The essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied
to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity
to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.A formal
or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential.The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side
of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute

lack of notice and hearing. PGBI was not denied due

process.In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI
has no longer any cause for complaint on due process
grounds.
The petition for review is GRANTED.
Atong Paglaum vs Comelec
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by
the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified
as
representatives
for
marginalized
or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against
COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set
in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani andBANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as
the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must
use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system:
(1) national
parties
or
organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in welldefined political constituencies. It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack welldefined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or

organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack welldefined political constituencies, either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as
has always been the practice, from participating in the partylist elections. But, since theres really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit
indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to
work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack
well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in
order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that
the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers;
and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved
for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list
system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The
common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they
do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to
field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they
can acquire the needed votes in a national election system
like the party-list system of elections.
If
the
party-list
system
is
only
reserved
for
marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat
in the lower house.

As
explained
by
the
Supreme
Court,
party-list
representation should not be understood to include only labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature areeconomically at the
margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of
Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for
sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not
per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-

defined political constituencies as they are ideologically

marginalized.