Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Property Set 3
Property Set 3
Property Set 3
1982, caused the annotation thereof on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No.
83188.
Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject parcel of land was held on
24 September 1982, at which respondent Republic submitted its bid
for P3,500, which is the amount of the judgment on the bond. Hence, on that
same day, a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale 3 was issued in favor of the Republic
as the winning bidder.
On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was registered and
annotated on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83793, thereby giving the
spouses Calacala a period of one (1) year therefrom within which to redeem
their property. Unfortunately, they never did up to the time of their respective
deaths on 13 January 1988 and 8 January 1994.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the deceased
spouses, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court at Rosales,
Pangasinan a complaint4 for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of
Encumbrance on TCT No. T-21204 against respondents Republic and Sheriff
Juan C. Marquez. In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1239-R and
raffled to Branch 53 of the court, petitioners prayed, inter alia, for the
cancellation of Entries No. 83188 and 83793 on TCT No. T-21204 or the
declaration of said entries as null and void.
To the complaint, respondent Republic interposed a Motion to
Dismiss5 grounded on the (1) complaints failure to state a cause of action
and (2) prescription of petitioners right to redeem.
In their Opposition,6 petitioners contend that when respondent Republic
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, it
thereby hypothetically admitted all the allegations therein, specifically the
averment that despite the lapse of nineteen (19) years, respondent did not
secure the necessary Certificate of Final Sale and Writ of Possession and
failed to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Petitioners thus
submit that the Republics rights over the land in question had either
prescribed, been abandoned or waived. They add that by filing a motion to
dismiss, respondent Republic likewise admitted the allegation in the same
complaint that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous possession of the subject land and paying the realty taxes
thereon.
In the herein assailed resolution 7 dated 31 October 2001, the trial court
granted the Republics motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed
petitioners complaint. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their
motion was denied by the same court in its equally challenged order 8 of 2
July 2002.
As we see it, the only question which commends itself for our resolution is
whether the trial courts dismissal of petitioners complaint for Quieting of
Title was proper. It thus behooves us to determine if, in the first place,
petitioners have a cause of action in their complaint.
We rule for respondent Republic.
Hence, petitioners present recourse, it being their contentions that I. THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND
CANCELLATION OF ENCUMBRANCE ON TCT NO. T-21204, FILED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, RGIONAL [sic] TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 53,
ROSALES, PANGASINAN WAS THE PROPER REMEDY.
II. THE COMPLAINT STATES SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION.
III. THE CASE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.
IV. AND THE RESPONDENT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS NOT
PERFECTED ITS TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION.
In the main, it is petitioners submission that their complaint a quo sufficiently
states a cause of action because they are still the owners of the subject
parcel of land despite their failure to redeem it within the 1-year redemption
period. They premise their argument on the Republics failure to secure the
Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
and obtain a writ of possession over the same property within ten (10) years
from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on 5 October 1982. Prescinding
therefrom, they thus argue that the Republics right over the property in
question has already prescribed or has been abandoned and waived, citing,
in support thereof, Article 1142 of the Civil Code. In short, it is petitioners
thesis that respondent Republic failed to perfect its title.
On the other hand, it is respondents posture that its rights and title as owner
of the same property are already perfected by the mere failure of petitioners
and/or their predecessors-in-interest to redeem the same within one (1) year
from the registration/annotation of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale on TCT No.
T-21204, in accordance with Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an
action to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the
real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in
possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the
plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real
property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA,10 we ruled:
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of
the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being
alleged as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.
To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of
any independent writing in their favor but simply and solely on respondent
Republics failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit
of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the
property in dispute within ten (10) years from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale.
Petitioners reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or inactions of respondent
Republic cannot stand.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners predecessors-in-interest lost
whatever right they had over land in question from the very moment they
failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the
Republics failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten
(10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way,
operate to restore whatever rights petitioners predecessors-in-interest had
over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or
rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the
failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale,
execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of
possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to
him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold. As correctly
observed by the trial court, the Republics failure to do anything within ten
(10) years or more following the registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale
cannot give rise to a presumption that it has thereby waived or abandoned its
right of ownership or that it has prescribed, "for prescription does not lie
against the government", nor could it "be bound or estopped by the
negligence or mistakes of its officials and employees".
Quite the contrary, Section 33, 11 Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly provides that "[u]pon the expiration of the right of redemption, the
purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights,
title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time
of the levy".
Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was yet inexistent when the
facts of this case transpired. Even then, the application thereof to this case is
justified by our pronouncement in Lascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co.,
Inc., et al.,12 to wit:
Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of
procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights
because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period
forecloses the obligors right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes
absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere
formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the
purchaser. As this Court has said inManuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et
al.:13
Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of
that one-year period forecloses the owners right to redeem, thus making the
sheriffs sale absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale
becomes a mere formality, an act merely confirmatory of the title that is
already in the purchaser and constituting official evidence of that fact.
(Emphasis supplied)
With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the
property subject of this case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon,
the very first requisite of an action to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject matter of the action, is miserably wanting in this case.
For another, and worse, petitioners never put in issue, as in fact they admit in
their pleadings, the validity of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale duly registered
on 5 October 1982. On this score, the second requisite of an action to quiet
title, namely, that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding alleged to
cast cloud on a plaintiff's title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, is likewise absent herein.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolution
and order of the trial court AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
this order, nor even inform her of the developments in her case. Petitioner
not having filed any pleading with the RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court
affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the MeTC.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property.
On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the
sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners house
without any special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999
petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve
as the houses toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with
the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel
who failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum. However the RTC
denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.1wphi1 On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January
2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the socalled extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other
tribunals or agencies the acts of which for some reason or other are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional
Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the
procurement of the writ must be presented. However, this Court must be
convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to
a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course
to this petition as there are matters that require immediate resolution on the
merits to effect substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their
object of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
or proceeding.4
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the
courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before
them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice. 5 Litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities. 6
Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be deemed as
negligence of petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who
appears to have been unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as
notice to his client.7 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears
from the records that counsel was negligent in not adequately protecting his
clients interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules.
The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals - 8
This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its
operation where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case
owing to appellants failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason
would this Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court
has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to
relax procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of
compliance, such as the period to appeal has been invoked and granted in a
considerable number of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of the
court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance,
one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a
notice to his clients.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or coowner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has
is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or
thing.17
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the
property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest.
He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of
the other co-owners.18 But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right
over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.19
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: coownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of
Appeals, the notion of co-ownership11 was not sufficiently dealt with. We
attempt to address this controversy in the interest of substantial justice.
Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as "the right of common dominion
which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or
physically divided.12 Manresa defines it as the "manifestation of the private
right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an
exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more
owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the
same."13
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the
co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a
single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which
binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines
the rights and obligations of the co-owners.14
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by
agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for
the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
interest of his co-owners.15
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in coownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the
properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee
for the others.16
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and
bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to
the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners,
her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be
effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the
boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to
the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of
the lot under dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002
in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the
questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly
licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are
ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City
to effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the
1/6 portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be
RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
October 8, 2003
rental and to vacate the premises in question (Exh. D & E). Defendant
refused to deliver possession and also to pay the rentals due. In anticipation,
however, that defendant will vacate the fishpond, plaintiff, on December 21,
1983 entered into a two year "Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with
Ruperto C. Villarico for a consideration of P50,000.00 (Exh. G). This contract,
despite its execution and even already notarized, had to be cancelled and
the amount of P50,000.00 returned by plaintiff to Villarico when the defendant
did not heed the demand to vacate the fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual as
well as moral and exemplary damages, plaintiff asks payment
of P450,000.00 and P20,000.00 attorneys fees.
On the other hand, defendants evidence tends to show that the entire
fishpond with an area of 79,200 sq. m. was leased to him by the heirs of
Primitiva Lejano. Subsequently, defendant became the absolute owner of
one half of the undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs
ownership of the other half as void and fraudulent. As to the area pertaining
to plaintiff, defendant claimed that he introduced improvements
worth P500,000 and being in good faith, he asked that he should be
reimbursed by plaintiff. In his pre-trial brief, however, defendant raised the
only issue which is the amount of damages plaintiff is entitled to in the form
of rental. Hence, the thrust of the testimonies of defendants witnesses
particularly Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea was the amount
of rental of fishponds in the same locality as the fishpond in question at a
given time. However, the documentary evidence (Exhs. 1 and 2) in support of
their testimony were not offered as evidence.8
The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant and hereby orders that:
1. Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff one half undivided
portion of the 79,200 sq. m. fishpond who shall enjoy the benefits
and fruits in equal share with the defendant effective immediately
until such time that partition of the property is effected;
2. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount of P262,500.00 by way
of actual or compensatory damages;
The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA
vacate and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJOs undivided share in
the FISHPOND. The trial court explained that DE GUIAs sublease contract
expired in 1979 and ABEJO acquired his fathers share in 1983. However,
the trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence of the
judicial or extra-judicial partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the
specific area pertaining to ABEJO and his co-owner is vital in an action to
recover possession of real property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared
that pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a reasonable
amount as rental for the use of ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND. DE GUIA
admitted this obligation when he raised as sole issue in his pre-trial brief how
much rent he should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA even proposed P300,000 as the
reasonable amount but under certain conditions which ABEJO found
unacceptable.
In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial court considered
the Lease Contract between ABEJO and a certain Ruperto C. Villarico which
provided for a yearly rent of P25,000 for undivided portion of the
FISHPOND. The trial court declared that the total amount of rent due
is P212,500, computed from November 1983 when ABEJO became a coowner of the FISHPOND up to 199113 or a period of eight and one half years.
The trial court further ordered DE GUIA to pay an additional P50,000 which
represents the amount ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico when they
cancelled the Lease Contract between them due to DE GUIAs refusal to
vacate the FISHPOND.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner has the
right to possess the FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in the benefits
from the FISHPOND effective immediately. Until there is a partition, and while
there is no contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership shall
govern the rights of the parties.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals
debunked DE GUIAs claim that partition and not recovery of possession was
the proper remedy under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed
out that DE GUIAs failure to respect ABEJOs right over his undivided
share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of possession. The
trial courts decision effectively enforces ABEJOs right over the property
had not yet been clearly defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an
order to pay damages in the form of rent is premature before partition.
We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the
other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his
exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. 24 Hence, if the subject is
a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective
families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the
entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no
lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of
rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the coowners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or
agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these options, they must bear
the consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent
after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property.25
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a coowner cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent. 26 Moreover,
where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the
exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the
accessions of the property and should share in its net profits. 27
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to
DE GUIA. After DE GUIAs lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the
entire FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using
the entire FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice ABEJOs right to
receive rent, which would have accrued to his share in the FISHPOND had
it been leased to others.28 Since ABEJO acquired his undivided share in
the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO
reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJOs portion beginning
from that date. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per year awarded to
ABEJO is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the leased property,29 considering the circumstances at
that time. DE GUIA shall continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent ofP25,000
corresponding to ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. However,
ABEJO has the option either to exercise an equal right to occupy the
FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial court to fix a new rental
rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20 years.1a\^/phi1.net
ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27
November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn interest
at 6% per annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision
pursuant to Article 220930 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, the interest rate is
12% per annum from finality of this decision until full payment. 31
Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award of Compensatory
Damages
FISHPOND. Indeed, being a question of fact, it is for the trial and appellate
courts to decide and this Court will not disturb their findings unless clearly
baseless or irrational. The exception does not obtain in this case.
Fourth Issue: Attorneys Fees
The trial court did not err in imposing attorneys fees of P20,000. Attorneys
fees can be awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code specifically:
xxx
(2) Where the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have given credence to
the testimonies of his witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo ("Camargo") and
Marta Fernando Pea ("Pea") that rentals of fishponds in the same vicinity
are for much lesser considerations.
DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not
take exclusive possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA offered
to settle the case out of court, such offer was made under conditions not
acceptable to ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary
expense and trouble to protect his interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208
of the Civil Code.
This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law in
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered
in the proceedings below.32 More so in the instant case, where the Court of
Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. 33
It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies of Camargo and
Pea because DE GUIA failed to present documentary evidence to support
their testimonies. Actually, the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies
of Camargo and Pea unconvincing. Judges cannot be expected to rely on
the testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine
who are credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence
before them.34
We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts
evaluation of the witnesses testimonies. We likewise find reasonable
the P25,000 yearly compensation for ABEJOs undivided share in the
xxx
After the death of his first wife, Leocadio contracted a second marriage with
Miguela Cario. Their union bore four children, herein co-petitioners, namely:
Venancio, Leonila, Antonio and Cecilia, all surnamed Medrano.
Upon the death of Leocadio on March 19, 1945, the surviving heirs agreed
that Sixto should manage and administer the subject property.
Sixto died on May 17, 1974. It was only after his death that petitioners heard
rumors that Sixto had, in fact, sold significant portions of the estate of
Leocadio. It appears that on September 7, 1953, Sixto, without the
knowledge and consent of the petitioners, executed an Affidavit of Transfer of
Real Property stating therein that he was the only heir of Leocadio. 5 Sixto
declared that Leocadio died on September 16, 1949, instead of the actual
date of his death on March 19, 1945. With the use of said affidavit and a
survey plan,6 Tax Declaration No. 40105 in the name of Leocadio was
cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 44984 was issued in the name of
Sixto.7 On August 29, 1957, Sixto sold to Maria Bacong a 160- square meter
portion of the subject land.8 On September 28, 1959, Sixto sold to Tiburcio
Balitaan a 1,695 square meter portion of the same land. 9 Sometime in
November 1967, Maria Bacong sold her property to Rosendo Bacong. 10
Petitioners demanded the reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but
Tiburcio Balitaan, Maria Bacong and Rosendo Bacong refused to do so.
Hence, petitioners filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas (Branch 2), a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Partition, Malicious Prosecution and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
202.11
In their Answer, Maria Bacong and Rosendo Bacong contend that petitioners
have no cause of action because they acquired their property thru a valid
deed of sale dated August 29, 1957, executed by Sixto and, alternatively,
petitioners' cause of action, if any, was barred by prescription and laches. 12
In his Answer, Tiburcio Balitaan contends that petitioners have no cause of
action since petitioners were well-aware of the sale of the property to him by
Sixto; and that he was an innocent purchaser for value, in possession and
enjoyment of the land in the concept of absolute owner, peacefully and
publicly. He further echoed the contention of Maria and Rosendo Bacong that
any cause of action petitioners may have was barred by prescription and
laches.13
Maria Bacong died during the pendency of the suit in the trial court and she
was substituted by her surviving heirs, namely, Lorenza, Elena, Felipa,
Manuel, Marilou, Ricardo, Medel, Monchito and Milag, all surnamed
Medrano.14 Tiburcio Balitaan also died and was substituted by his heirs,
herein private respondents, namely: his wife, Maria Rosales and their four
children: Elias, Jose, Arsenia and Rogelio, all surnamed Balitaan. 15
On July 28, 1989, petitioners and Rosendo Bacong, for himself and as
attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Maria Bacong, entered into a compromise
agreement to settle the case between them.16 The compromise agreement,
as approved by the trial court, provided that Rosendo Bacong and the heirs
of Maria Bacong agreed to payP30,000.00 to petitioners in recognition of
petitioners' ownership of a 269-square meter portion 17 and in consideration of
which, petitioners recognized the full ownership, rights, interest and
participation of the former over said land. 18 The area of the subject land is
thus reduced to 2,342 square meters (2,611 square meters minus 269
square meters).
(4) Sixto Medrano - 399.42 square meters only which he had the
right to dispose of in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan and Maria
Rosales.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment dated April 28,
1992, ruling that private respondents did not dispute, by any evidence, the
falsity of the Affidavit of Transfer, as well as the fact that Sixto had co-owners
to the property. It found that private respondents' affirmative defense of
laches and/or prescription are unavailing against a property held in coownership as long as the state of co-ownership is recognized. Consequently,
the trial court upheld the sale made by Sixto in favor of private respondents
only to the extent that Sixto is entitled to by virtue of his being a co-owner.19
In determining the area that Sixto could have validly sold to private
respondents, the trial court, in its decision, provided for the manner of
partition among the parties, based on the memorandum submitted by
petitioners, thus:
For the four (4) children of the first marriage, namely:
(1) Gertrudes, who is already dead represented by her children
Tefesforo, Reynaldo, Remedios, Alfredo and Belen, all surnamed
Aguirre - 399.42 square meters;
The above consist of undivided interest, shares and participations from the
inheritance or succession to the conjugal estate of Leocadio Medrano and
Emiliana Narito.
For the children of the second marriage their shares in the inheritance from
the property of Leocadio Medrano are as follows:
(1) To Venancio Medrano - 138.32 square meters
(2) To Leonila Medrano - 138.32 square meters
(3) To Antonio Medrano - 138.32 square meters
(4) To Cecilia Medrano - 138.32 square meters
with all the above consisting of undivided shares, interest and participation in
the estate.
For the defendants Maria Rosales, surviving spouse of the deceased
Tiburcio Balitaan and their Children, an area of 399.42 square meters, the
only area and extent which Sixto Medrano could have legally dispensed of in
their favor.20
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:
...
Plaintiffs did not at all inquire as to the status of their property all this time
and thus have been remiss of their duties as owners of the property. Plaintiffs
waited until Sixto's death to learn more about their property. Even though the
co-ownership is to be preserved in accordance with the wishes of the
deceased, the plaintiffs should have taken it upon themselves to look into the
status of the property once in a while, to assure themselves that it is
managed well and that they are receiving what is due them as co-owners of
the parcel of land or to at least manifest their continued interest in the
property as normal owners would do. But the plaintiffs did not show any
interest in the way Sixto Medrano was managing the property which in effect
gave the latter carte blanche powers over the same. Such passivity is
aggravated by the fact that one of the plaintiffs resides a mere 600 meters
away from the disputed property (TSN, April 17, 1991, p. 13). By not showing
any interest, the plaintiffs have, in fact, slept on their rights and thus, cannot
now exercise a stale right.23
Petitioners sought reconsideration24 but the appellate court denied it in a
Resolution dated October 5, 1995.25
In their present recourse, petitioners take exception from the appellate court's
findings that respondents have been in possession, in the concept of owner
of the entire parcel of land sold to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for
seventeen years (1958-1975), relying on the Affidavit of Transfer and Tax
Declaration No. 51038 in the name of Sixto; and that Tiburcio acquired
ownership of the whole property from Sixto through ordinary prescription for
ten years.
Petitioners submit that Tiburcio Balitaan was not a purchaser in good faith
and for value since there are enough circumstances which should have put
him on guard and prompted him to be more circumspect and inquire further
about the true status of Sixto Medrano's ownership; that during his lifetime,
Tiburcio was a neighbor of petitioners and was well-aware that Sixto had
other siblings but Tiburcio chose to rely on the Affidavit of Transfer executed
by Sixto Medrano declaring that he was the only heir of Leocadio; that the
Court of Appeals should not have faulted them for failing to inquire about the
status of the disputed property until after the death of Sixto Medrano; that
they are not guilty of laches.
It is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Supreme Court.26 The exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.27 Exceptions (4), (7), (10) and (11) are present in the instant
case.1wphi1
Article 1130 of the Civil Code states that the "title for prescription must be
true and valid." In Doliendo vs. Biarnesa,34 we elucidated on this provision,
thus:
We find the petition meritorious.28 We agree with the petitioners that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in upholding the claim of
petitioners that they acquired ownership of the subject property through
prescription.
he is the sole surviving heir of Leocadio. A purchaser cannot close his eyes
to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim
that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor.37
Since the disputed property is an unregistered land, Tiburcio as buyer thereof
did so at his peril. Private respondents' claim that Tiburcio bought the land in
good faith, that is, without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in the property, would not protect them if it turns out, as it actually did
in this case, that the seller, Sixto Medrano, did not own the entire property at
the time of the sale, but only an undivided portion of the land as a co-owner.
Private respondents failed to show that the petitioners were notified of the
subject sale or that respondents gave their consent to the sale. Not being in
"good faith", the ten-year period required for ordinary acquisitive prescription
does not apply.
Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive prescription has
not been met in this case. Private respondents claim to have been in
possession, in the concept of owner, of the entire parcel of land sold to
Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for only seventeen years (1958-1975).
In addition, as we have enunciated in Salvador vs. Court of Appeals,38 to wit:
This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee
and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as
beneficial to all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to
strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are
concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of
rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and
fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes,
cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by
clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which
unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other
co-owners.
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must
concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence
thereon must be clear and convincing.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Tested against these guidelines, respondents failed to present competent
evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiated the existing
co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano.
Private respondents' reliance on the tax declaration in the name of Sixto
Medrano is unworthy of credit since we have held on several occasions that
tax declarations by themselves do not conclusively prove title to
land.40Further, private respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed
by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was
known or made known to the other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.
Neither can we subscribe to the appellate court's view that petitioners are
guilty of laches. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 41 It does not involve mere lapse or
passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances
inequitable or unfair to permit.42 The rule that each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the common property implies that an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. 43
We have consistently held that if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale.44 Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
It clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the seller's
share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his
grantor's share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a coowner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void;
only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.45 Accordingly, we held in Bailon-Casilao vs.
Court of Appeals:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one-co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain
in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered
it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well
as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither
recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant
buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the
common property claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].46
It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto Medrano in favor
of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid conveyance only insofar as the share of Sixto
Medrano in the co-ownership is concerned. Thus, the respondent court erred
in declaring the ownership of the entire 1,695-square meter property sold by
Sixto, in favor of the private respondents.
The next question is what is the area of the pro indiviso share pertaining to
Sixto Medrano that was sold to private respondents? The trial court
endeavored to determine the same by ascertaining the inheritance of each of
the heirs of Leocadio. However, the manner of partition as set out by the trial
court in the text of its decision needs to be amended so as to conform to the
laws on intestate succession under the Old Civil Code absent any allegation
or showing that Leocadio left any last will and testament.
Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No. RO-8376 in the name of
Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35979 in
Donato's name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale
over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. 5
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091
was forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of
Negros Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land was
executed by the Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of
Negros Occidental. 6
On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09. 7
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual
Paulmitan filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental a Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties
plus damages.
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as
an affirmative defense, contending that the Complaint was filed more than
eleven years after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato
Paulmitan over the land as consequence of the registration with the Register
of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot
No. 757. As regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her
Answer to the Complaint that she acquired exclusive ownership thereof not
only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor by her father,
petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to
Lot No. 757, the trial court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing
the complaint as to the said property upon finding merit in petitioners'
affirmative defense. This order, which is not the object of the present petition,
has become final after respondents' failure to appeal therefrom.
Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20,
1977, the trial court decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091.
ones." 11 Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit
from Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent
passing away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased." 12 Donato and
Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their
mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the
respondents, succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property.
Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided portion of the
property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death,
became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent
estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of
two transactions, namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato
Paulmitan; and (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial of Negros
Occidental after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter
Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he
could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of
the co-ownership. 13 The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to
one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from their
father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but
transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property 14 and
consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned.
InBailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court, through Justice Irene R.
Cortes, outlined the effects of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of
all the co-owners, thus:
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in
Article 493 of the Civil Code, Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the
co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607).
But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right
to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by
virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to
reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until
reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property for the amount due
her. 17
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of
Appeals affirmed, for them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year
from 1966 until the partition of the estate which represents the share of
private respondents in the fruits of the land. According to petitioners, the land
is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only. This assigned error, however
raises a factual question. The settled rule is that only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule, findings of fact made by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot
be reviewed on appeal. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other coowners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or
right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses
and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of coownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code,
"may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality
February 1, 2001
4/16
Consorcia Bornales
4/16
Alfredo Bornales
2/16
Maria Bornales
2/16
Jose Bornales
1/16
Quirico Bornales
1/16
Rosalia Bornales
1/16
Julita Bornales
1/16
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00
to Soledad Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Salome and two
other co-owners, Consorcia and Alfredo, the portion of Lot 162 sold to
Soledad was described as having more or less the following measurements:
63-1/2 meters from point "9" to "10", 35 meters from point "10" to
point "11", 30 meters from point "11" to a certain point parallel to a
line drawn from points "9" to "10"; and then from this "Certain Point"
to point "9" and as shown in the accompanying sketch, and made an
integral part of this deed, to SOLEDAD DAYNOLO, her heirs and
assigns.1
Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land
described above and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and
her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as
security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This transaction was
evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage 2 dated May 1, 1947.
On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically,
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to
Jose Regalado, Sr.
On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since
died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot
162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of
Discharge of Mortgage3 in favor of Soledads heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo,
Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs
sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the
spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.1wphi1.nt
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original
Certificate of Title No. 18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541 initially
reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162. However, title was
transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property
into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name. One of these
small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of 11,732 square meters which
was registered on February 24, 1977 under TCT No. 14566.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint
for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of the now
deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of
1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously
included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that
they occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they
purchased the property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They also
declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.
The lower courts reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot
defeat the right of a holder of a registeredTorrens title over property is
misplaced, considering that petitioners were deprived of their dominical rights
over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the part of
Regalado. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual
physical possession by another person during registration proceedings
constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a
fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 17 In this
case, we are convinced that Regalado knew of the fact that he did not have a
title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validly registered the same
in his name alone because he was aware of petitioners possession of the
subject portion as well as the sale between Salome and Soledad.
That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot 162 was
under claim of ownership by petitioners and the latters predecessor is
beyond question. Records show that the particular area subject of this case
was mortgaged by Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado, Sr. as early
as May 1, 1947 or one year prior to the alienation of the whole lot in favor of
the latter. Regalado never questioned the ownership of the lot given by
Soledad as security for the P400.00 debt and he must have at least known
that Soledad bought the subject portion from Salome since he could not have
reasonably accepted the lot as security for the mortgage debt if such were
not the case. By accepting the said portion of Lot 162 as security for the
mortgage obligation, Regalado had in fact recognized Soledads ownership
of this definite portion of Lot 162. Regalado could not have been ignorant of
the fact that the disputed portion is being claimed by Soledad and
subsequently, by petitioners, since Regalado even executed a Release of
Mortgage on May 4, 1951, three years after the entire property was
supposedly sold to him. It would certainly be illogical for any mortgagee to
accept property as security, purchase the mortgaged property and,
thereafter, claim the very same property as his own while the mortgage was
still subsisting.
Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the
subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage
executed between Regalado and petitioners predecessor-in-interest. As
petitioners correctly contend, respondents are barred from making this
assertion under the equitable principle ofestoppel by deed, whereby a party
to a deed and his privies are precluded from asserting as against the other
and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the
truth of any material fact asserted in it. 18 A perusal of the documents
evidencing the mortgage would readily reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor,
had declared herself absolute owner of the piece of land now being litigated.
This declaration of fact was accepted by Regalado as mortgagee and
accordingly, his heirs cannot now be permitted to deny it.
Said spouses owned a small parcel of land with an area of 165 square
meters situated along Pres. Quezon St., in the Poblacion of Aparri, Cagayan.
Sometime in 1944, Basilia Garcia died intestate, leaving her husband,
Macario Villanueva and children (herein petitioners) as her sole and only
legitimate heirs.
On May 13, 1964, the surviving spouse, Macario, without the subject lot
having been partitioned, sold in favor of Erlinda Vallangca, the wife of
respondent Concepcion Villanueva, one-half or 82.5 square meters of the
aforementioned lot, particularly the western portion thereof, measuring 15-
meters by 15 meters, for P1,100.00, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale marked
as Exhibit "3". 2 Having been informed of the sale, petitioners signified their
intention to redeem the lot in question but respondent vendee refused to
allow such redemption contending that she is the wife of one of the legal
heirs and therefore redemption will not lie against her because she is not the
"third party" or "stranger" contemplated in the law.
Petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of sale and legal redemption of the
portion sold to Vallangca. The trial court, on July 14, 1970, rendered a
decision ordering among other things, the reformation of the Deed of Sale
and declaring the vendee the absolute owner of the subject lot.
Petitioners now submit 3 that the lower court erred
The antecedent facts of the case are narrated in the assailed CA Decision as
follows:
"An 8,209-square meter fishpond situated at Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City is
disputed by [Respondents] Carlos Tarun and Narcisa Zareno, and
[Petitioners] Corazon Cabal vda. de Fernandez and her children Oscar, Gil
and Armando, all surnamed Fernandez.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right of redemption may be exercised by a co-owner, only when part of
the community property is sold to a stranger. When the portion is sold to a
co-owner, the right does not arise because a new participant is not added to
the co-ownership.
The Case
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us challenges the July 7, 2000
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) 1in CA-GR CV No. 55264, which
reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City (Branch 44) in Civil
Case No. D-3815.2 The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and a NEW ONE is
entered:
"1. Ordering the partition of Lot 2991 in the proportion stated in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24440, that is: Angel Fernandez,
married to Corazon Cabal 7,114.46 sqm; spouses Carlos Tarun
and Narcisa Zareno 1094.54 sqm.
"The costs of the subdivision shall be equitably shared by plaintiffsappellants and defendants-appellees.
"2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to issue a
separate transfer certificate of title each to plaintiffs-appellants and
defendants-appellees corresponding to their respective shares upon
completion of the partition."3
The Facts
"The property is known as Lot No. 2991 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan.
It was originally covered by OCT No. 43099, subsequently cancelled by TCT
No. 24440. The brothers Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel Fernandez,
together with their uncle Armando, co-owned this property to the extent of 1/6
thereof.4 It was subsequently increased to 1/5 on account of the 1/6 share of
Armando, who died single and without issue, which accrued in favor of the
five remaining co-owners.
"On June 4, 1967, Antonio Fernandez sold his share of about 547.27 square
meters to [the Spouses] Tarun (Exh. I).5 On June 18, 1967, Demetria
Fernandez, also sold her share on the same fishpond consisting of 547.27
square meters to [respondents].6 Thus, the total area sold to [respondents] is
1094.54 square meters, more or less. The two sales were registered and
annotated on OCT No. 43099.
"On November 14, 1969, the co-owners of the subject fishpond and another
fishpond covered by TCT No. 10944 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition of two parcels of registered land with exchange of shares. Among
the parties to the deed are Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel, all
surnamed Fernandez.
"It was stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and respect the sale
of a portion of Lot 2991 consisting of 1094.54 square meters previously sold
by Antonio and Demetria Fernandez in favor of [respondents]. This portion
was excluded in the partition.
"Likewise, by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Angel B. Fernandez
exchanged his share on the other fishpond covered by TCT No. 10944 to the
shares of his co-owners on the remaining portion of [L]ot No. 2991 covered
by TCT No. 10945, making Angel B. Fernandez and [respondents] as coowners of Lot No. 2991.
"By virtue of the terms and conditions set forth in the Deed, TCT No. 24440
of the Registry of Deed[s] of Dagupan City, (Exh. A) was issued in favor of
Angel B. Fernandez and [respondents]. From the time the latter bought the
1094.54-square meter portion of the fishpond, they had been paying the
realty taxes thereon. However, it was Angel B. Fernandez and later on his
heirs, [petitioners], who remained in possession of the entire fishpond.
"When Angel B. Fernandez was still alive, [respondents] sought the partition
of the property and their share of its income. Angel Fernandez refused to
heed their demand. After the death of Angel Fernandez, [respondents] wrote
[petitioners] of their desire for partition but this was rejected by [petitioners].
Hence, this suit for partition and damages."7
Ruling of the RTC
On August 1, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, ruling
that, under Articles 1620 and 1621 of the Civil Code, they were entitled to
redeem the property that they had sold to respondents. It further held that the
sale was highly iniquitous and void for respondents failure to comply with
Article 1623 of the same code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that petitioners were not entitled to redeem
the controversial property for several reasons. First, it was Angel Fernandez
who was its co-owner at the time of the sale; hence, he was the one entitled
to receive notice and to redeem the property, but he did not choose to
exercise that right. Second, the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition was a substantial compliance with the notice requirement under that
law. Finally, it was too late in the day to declare the exchange highly
iniquitous, when Angel Fernandez had not complained about it. As his
successors-in-interest, petitioners were bound by the terms of the
agreement.
Hence, this Petition.8
Issues
In their Memorandum,9 petitioners raise the following issues:
"The right is not applicable to adjacent lands which are separated by brooks,
drains, ravines, roads and other apparent servitudes for the benefit of other
estates.
"If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise the right of redemption at
the same time, the owner of the adjoining land of smaller area shall be
preferred; and should both lands have the same area, the one who first
requested the redemption."
xxx
xxx
xxx
benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what
might be a disagreeable or [an] inconvenient association into which he has
been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th. Ed., 317.) It is intended to minimize coownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of
redemption when the shares of the other owners are sold to a third
person."14 There is no legal redemption, either in case of a mere lease 15 and
if the purchaser is also a tenant.16
Equally unavailing is petitioners contention that the sale was void, because
the vendor had not sent any notice in writing to the other co-owners as
required under Article 1625 of the Code. Indeed, the Code merely provides
that a deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit that a written notice has been given to all
possible redemptioners. However, it does not state that, by reason of such
lack of notice, the sale shall become void.
Jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the subject
of varying interpretations. Conejero v. Court of Appeals 17 held that a written
notice was still required, even if the redemptioner had actual prior knowledge
of the sale. However, in Distrito v. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court ruled that
written notice was not necessary, if the co-owner was actually aware of the
sale. While the law requires that the notice must be in writing, it does not
prescribe any particular form, so long as the reasons for a written notice are
satisfied otherwise.19 Thus, in a civil case for collection of a share in the
rentals by an alleged buyer of a co-owned property, the receipt of a
summons by a co-owner has been held to constitute actual knowledge of the
sale. On that basis, the co-owner may exercise the right of redemption within
30 days from the finality of the decision.20
Applying the presently prevailing principles discussed above, petitioners
predecessor -- Angel Fernandez -- is deemed to have been given notice of
the sale to respondents by the execution and signing of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Exchange of Shares. As correctly held by the CA,
the law does not require any specific form of written notice to the
redemptioner.21 From such time, he had 30 days within which to redeem the
property sold under Article 1623. The Deed was executed November 4,
1969; hence, the period to redeem expired on December 4, 1969.
Consequently, the right to redeem was deemed waived, and petitioners are
bound by such inaction of their predecessor. The former cannot now be
allowed to exercise the right and adopt a stance contrary to that taken by the
latter. Otherwise stated, the right to redeem had long expired during the
lifetime of the predecessor and may no longer be exercised by petitioners
who are his successors-in-interest.
Petitioners also assail the partition as lopsided and iniquitous. They argue
that their predecessor stood to lose 5,498.14 square meters under the
extrajudicial partition.
We are not convinced. It is a long-established doctrine that the law will not
relieve parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous agreement
they entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of
what they were doing. Courts have no power to relieve them from obligations
they voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be
disastrous deals or unwise investments. 27 Neither the law nor the courts will
extricate them from an unwise or undesirable contract which they entered
into with all the required formalities and with full knowledge of its
consequences.28 On the other hand, petitioners herein are bound by the
extrajudicial partition, because contracts not only take effect between the
parties, but also extend to their assigns and heirs. 29
Petitioners contend that the sale was only an equitable mortgage because
(1) the price was grossly inadequate, and (2) the vendors remained in
possession of the land and enjoyed its fruits. Since the property is situated
primely within the city proper, the price of P7,662 for 1,094.54 square meters
is supposedly unconscionable. Moreover, since June 4, 1967 up to the
present, the vendees (or herein respondents) have allegedly never been in
actual possession of the land.
The contention is untenable. On its face, a document is considered a
contract of equitable mortgage when the circumstances enumerated in Article
1602 of the Civil Code are manifest, as follows: (a) when the price of the sale
with the right to repurchase is unusually inadequate, 22 and (b) when the
vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise. 23Although it is
undisputed that Angel Fernandez was in actual possession of the property, it
is important to note that he did not sell it to respondents. The sellers were his
co-owners -- Antonio and Demetria Fernandez -- who, however, are not
claiming that the sale between them was an equitable mortgage. For the
presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, one must first satisfy the
requirement that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a
contract of sale, and that their intention was to secure an existing debt by
way of mortgage.24
Furthermore, mere alleged inadequacy of the price does not necessarily void
a contract of sale, although the inadequacy may indicate that there was a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation,
mortgage, or some other act or contract. 25 Finally, unless the price is grossly
inadequate or shocking to the conscience, 26 a sale is not set aside. In this
case, petitioners failed to establish the fair market value of the property when
it was sold in 1967. Hence, there is no basis to conclude that the price was
grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience.
Third Issue: Validity of the Extrajudicial Partition
Petitioners claim that they are entitled to P50,000 as attorneys fees and
damages deserves scant consideration. It has been clearly established that
respondents are co-owners of the subject property. Under Article 494 of the
Civil Code, each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common. Hence, respondents action for partition was not an
unfounded suit. Verily, it was founded on a right given by law.
Fifth Issue: Factual Findings of the CA
Petitioners insist that the CA made some factual findings that were neither in
conformity with those of the RTC nor borne by the evidence on record. They
assert that the appellate court erred in ruling that the extrajudicial partition
had been freely and willfully entered into when, in fact, Angel B. Fernandez
had been shortchanged by 5,498.14 square meters. They also contend that
the registration of the two Deeds of Sale in favor of respondents was not
valid, because it was not accompanied by an affidavit that written notice had
been served to all possible redemptioners.
We are not persuaded. We do not find any factual or legal basis to conclude
that the extrajudicial partition was iniquitous, and that the sale of Antonio and
Demetrias share in Lot no. 2991 is void. Factual findings of the CA
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding, 34 unless they
fall under the exceptions in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals35 and similar cases.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after
Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his
"vale" of P300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondentsspouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of Sale
provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and
belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still
minors upon the execution of this instrument are held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon
reaching the age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued
Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names
of respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an
affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount
of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21
considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of
petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the
redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his "vale" ofP300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt
of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the
formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back
to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from
his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified
his intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation
process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their
respective shares in subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note ("vale")
from Dr. Corrompido in the amount ofP300.00.
before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for
redemption of the subject land plus damages.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6)
children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito,
survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that
"[i]f a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
children." Verily, the seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property.
Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelsons father, inherited in their own
rights and with equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation of
law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were transferred
to his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the
rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and coowners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their proindiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his
share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his
heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show
that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased
for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not
subrogated to Albertos or his heirs rights to the property when she
repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals, 3 we held that a co-owner who redeemed
the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The property
remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide
for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. 4 But the one who redeemed had
the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed,
holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due. 5 Necessarily,
when Saturnina redeemed for Albertos heirs who had then acquired his proindiviso share in subject property, it did not vest in her ownership over the
pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But she had the right to be reimbursed for
the redemption price and held a lien upon the property for the amount due
until reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and
his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to
respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were
then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the
proceeds were held in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered
to them upon reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held
by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code 6 state
that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of
the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond
subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the childs
property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules
of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental
authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of
the child does not exceed two thousand pesos.7 Corollary to this, Rule 93,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case,
automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without
need of any judicial appointment in case the latters property does not
exceed two thousand pesos,8 thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian x x x x9
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of
court appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh
of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos.
However, Rule 96, Sec. 110 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian appointed shall
have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of
his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The
guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the
estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in
which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the
minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs
judicial authority.11 Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito,
sold the latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal
authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito
was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it.
This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was
void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the
other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided
share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the
others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they
only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature,
is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. x x
xx
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In
doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth,"
to give effect to the lawmakers will.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that
matter)14 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the
sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day
period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to
begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only
a day or two.1awph!1
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years
after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that
petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless,
the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was
informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the
appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993
and he signified his intention to redeem subject property during a barangay
conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and
damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from learning
about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance
of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice
of the sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of
knowledge thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose,
i.e., the notification of redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner
Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after
petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem his
property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for
legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had
already expired.
As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant
case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render justice. 15
Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer
redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain co-owners thereof
with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include
them.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23,
2004 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of
Southern Leyte is ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035
and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of
respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and
petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7 portion, pro
indiviso.
SO ORDERED.
repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942 without being able to
redeem and after her death, but during the period of redemption,
herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he
executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be
the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence
that he was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that OCT.
No. 21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his name,
that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise had
failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed present
case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a
trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed,-and this is the
evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria
Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to
vacate that,
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained
defendant in his position that he was and became absolute owner,
he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and also
condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is because of
this that plaintiffs have come here and contend that trial court erred
in:
I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our
responsibility is to give them that relief pursuant to the decree of law.
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion
of the property to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision 2 appealed from:
xxx xxx xxx
... [T]he land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay
located in Legaspi City with an area of some 11,325 sq. m. originally
belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private property; she
married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille, with
whom she had as an only child, herein defendant Rustico Adille; in
her second marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were
herein plaintiffs, now, sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the
property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period of
the petitioner, however, filed a brief, and the private respondents having
failed to file one, we declared the case submitted for decision.
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive
ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute
devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its
redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of
Article 1515 of the old Civil Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the
vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his
share alone. 5 While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the
property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make
him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing
state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to
collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. 6 There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other coowners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or
right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses
and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership.
While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be
compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir
or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over
it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a
retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. 7But the
provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over
the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. While his halfbrothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and
for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to
the property owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of
acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if
there is one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of
the private respondents. The Civil Code states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the
registration of the property. The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole
heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed
preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to
defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the
property. The aforequoted provision therefore applies.
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the
property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had
constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil Code,
or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act
as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article
1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second alternative the petitioner
having asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property and having
acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to have assume
the mere management of the property abandoned by his co-heirs, the
situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the
respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be the same whether it is
one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Private
respondents, his co-heirs.
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription
bars any demand on property (owned in common) held by another (coowner) following the required number of years. In that event, the party in
Trial Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for
the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo
Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant
by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following
are the declared owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla
Friar Lands Estate presently covered by transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth;
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate
court and by the trial court are as follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the TalisayMinglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the
government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three
brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima
and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in
question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of
Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and
the Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and
issue in lieu thereof another title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso
owners.
After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the
heirs of Galileo Delima are ordered to turn a over to the other heirs
their respective shares of the fruits of the lot in question computed at
P170.00 per year up to the present time with legal (interest).
Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are
ordered to petition the lot in question and the defendants are directed
to immediately turn over possession of the shares here awarded to
the respective heirs.
plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed
such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the
deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate
succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate
(Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be
declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of
plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the
action is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status
of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in
the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted
the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs.
Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may
be granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of
plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts
alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is
what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing
Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of
the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private
respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully
married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his)
father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his)
mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig,
Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were
known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was
introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these
facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present
(People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may
be proven. However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely
dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to
use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873,
October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only
two classes of children legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions
among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs.
Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children
may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents.
Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article.
Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was
adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private
respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence
any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed
the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother
Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and
lacking in substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom
their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a
considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the
private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It
should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the
admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the
petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay
pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private
respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and
therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for
recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run
against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition
so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not
SO ORDERED.
In 1974 and 1978, Virgilia Orais' brothers, Rodolfo and Jimmy Orais
went to Cateel, Davao Oriental and confronted the Cabreras of the
latter's alleged encroachment and illegal occupation of their sister's
land, but no concrete action on the matter was pursued by Virgilia
Orais until February 11, 1988 when she filed Civil Case No. 379
against Felicidad Cabrera, now a widow, and her daughter Marykane
Cabrera for "Quieting of Title to Real Property, Damages with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction."
On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants
and against the plaintiff, ruling that the latter can no longer recover the
western portion of Lot 2239 conveyed in 1972 by Felicidad Teokemian in
favor of the late Elano Cabrera and Felicidad Cabrera due to laches. In
support of its findings, the trial court referred to the Court's pronouncements
in Lola vs. Court of Appeals 4, where it was held that although the defense of
prescription is unavailing to the petitioners, because, admittedly, the title to
the subject lot was still registered in the name of the respondent, still the
petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of
laches due to the respondent's failure to assert her claim and ownership for
thirty-two years; and in Republic vs. Court of Appeals 5 that, while it is true
that by themselves tax receipts and declaration of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof
of actual possession of the property; and in Miguel vs. Catalino, 6 that even
granting appellant's proposition that no prescription lies against their fathers'
recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than thirty four years
justifies the defendant appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches
in his own behalf.
2. To find that the plaintiff did not own the said portion and
that they have personal knowledge of the same when the
plaintiff filed and secured the title under the Administrative
Proceeding;
3. Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that
portion only in an implied trust in favor of the real owner;
4. Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the
segregation of the portion at their expense and deliver
formally the said portion to the real owners, the defendants.
5. To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any
instrument or document to finally vest in the Defendants
absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the
portion which the plaintiff holds title in trust in defendant's
favor.
6. To Order the Plaintiff to pay actual damages in the sum of
P2,000.00 as litigation expense and Attorney's fees in the
sum of P5,000.00 in favor of defendants;
7. To direct the plaintiff to account for the share of the real
owner of the portion of land illegally cultivated and planted
by plaintiff to rice in favor of FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN to be
paid thru the Defendants who are the owners, which
consisted in ONE THIRD OF THE RICE HARVEST every
year since the year 1950 to 1972 when the portion was sold
and cultivated by defendant based on the computation of
income by the plaintiff in Paragraph 16, a paragraph in the
Second Cause of Action of the complaint;
First. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 27, 1972 (Exh. 3)
executed by Albertana Teokemian in favor of Elcano Cabrera over
the portion of 55,510 square meters of Lot 2238 which allegedly
pertained to the one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian did not
convey any title to Elcano Cabrera, assuming that Felicidad
Teokemian still owned a one-third portion of Lot 2238 which was
already registered in plaintiffs name, considering that Albertana did
not have any authority from Felicidad Teokemian to effect such
conveyance. Consequently, defendants Felicidad vda. De Cabrera
and Marykane Cabrera had acquired no title upon which to anchor
their claim of ownership over the one-third portion. Such being the
case, plaintiffs cannot be barred by laches from instituting the action
to quiet title against defendants
xxx xxx xxx
Second. There was no allegation, much less proof, that Lot 2239 had
been partitioned among the co-owners Daniel, Albertana, and
Felicidad, all surnamed Teokemian, before the land was sold to
Andres Orais in 1950 when the same was still unregistered. This
being the case, and assuming that Felicidad Teokemian had retained
ownership over an undivided one-third portion of Lot 2239 despite its
being titled in plaintiffs name in 1958, Felicidad Teokemian could only
dispose her undivided interest, not a definite portion described in the
Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1972 (Exh. 3) as "eastern part".
Worse, the supposed vendee, Elcano Cabrera, and her successorsin-interest, defendants Felicidad vda. de Cabrera and Marykane
Cabrera, occupied the western portion of Lot 2239, not the eastern
portion which was the subject of the sale. Their occupation of a
definite portion of an undivided property, without any color of title,
could not have ripened into ownership on the principle of laches.
Third. As testified to by Jimmy Orais, plaintiff's brother, it was only in
1974 when plaintiff came to know that her property was occupied by
Elcano Cabrera. According to Jimmy, he and his elder brother Dr.
Rodolfo Orais went to the house of Elcano Cabrera three times in
1974 and in 1979 complaining of the latter's occupancy of their
sister's property. Jimmy further declared that after Elcano Cabrera
was shown plaintiffs title to the property, Elcano Cabrera proposed a
relocation survey of the area to determine whether the premises
occupied by him were included in the plaintiff's title (T.S.N. pp. 39-44,
January 3, 1989). It appears, however, that nothing came out of the
proposal to conduct a relocation survey. From the time plaintiff
became aware of Cabrera's possession of the western portion of Lot
2239, which was in 1974, up to the time she instituted the action for
quieting of title in 1988, only fourteen (14) years had elapsed. This
case, therefore, has no congruency with those cases where the
Supreme Court ruled that the registered owner is barred by laches
from recovering his property. Thus, in Lola vs. Court of Appeals (145
SCRA 439), the petitioners acquired title to the land owned by
respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due,
according to the Supreme Court, to respondent's failure to assert her
claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years.' In Miguel
vs. Catalino (26 SCRA 234), the Supreme Court said that appellants
'passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies
the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches
in his behalf.' In Mejia vs. Gampomana (100 Phil 277), it was held
that "the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the
property and title thereto from the defendant has by the long period
of 37 years and by the patentee's inaction and neglect been
converted into a stale demand."
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by the exercise of
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it (Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 32 SCRA 29). Since imprescriptibility is one of the
basic features of a Torrens title, it is not an ordinary delay in
asserting one's right that will give rise to the application of the
principle of laches, otherwise, registered title can easily be defeated
by prescription. This is precisely the reason why, in the cases cited,
the delay or inaction by the registered owners in asserting their rights
was considered unreasonable and unexplained because it took them
from 32 to 37 years to do so. In contrast, the delay in the case at bar
was only fourteen years.
While possession of defendants Felicidad vda. De Cabrera and
Marykane Cabrera could not have ripened into ownership as already
discussed, they are possessors in good faith of the portion occupied
The bone of the petitioners' contention rests on the alleged waiver of the
plaintiff to recover any interest she had in the one-third portion of the property
inherited by Daniel, Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian from their late father,
Domingo, due to the long period of time which lapsed from the time the
plaintiff's title was registered until the action for quieting of title was instituted.
Code is material to the instant case, such remedy has not yet lapsed, as
erroneously submitted by the plaintiff, and, is thus, a bar to the plaintiff's
action. In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, 15 we
observed that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff
or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if
a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that (a)
the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust, (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust, and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear
and positive. 16
In the case at bar, the defendant Felicidad Teokemian, and thereafter, the
Cabreras, were in actual possession of the property since it was left to
Felicidad Teokemian by her father in 1941, which possession had not been
interrupted, despite the sale of the two-third portion thereof to the plaintiff in
1950, and the latter's procurement of a Certificate of Title over the subject
property in 1957. Until the institution of the present action in 1988, plaintiff,
likewise, had not displayed any unequivocal act of repudiation, which could
be considered as an assertion of adverse interest from the defendants, which
satisfies the above-quoted requisites. Thus, it cannot be argued that the right
of reconveyance on the part of the defendants, and its use as defense in the
present suit, has been lost by prescription.
On the other hand, the action for reconveyance (quieting of title) of the
plaintiff was instituted only in 1988, that is, thirty years from the time the
plaintiff's husband was able to acquire Certificate of Title covering the
has not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored--the
possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio possidentis).
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right
over the portion subject matter in the instant case on the ground that their
right has been lost by laches. In Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells
the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale
(Punzalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil 320 [1923]). This is because under
the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition
affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the things owned in
common (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil 528 [1909]). . . . For Article
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. 22
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 7, 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE. The decision
of the trial court dated April 27, 1989 is hereby REINSTATED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was
allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita,
succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of
his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the coownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first
cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said
area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials
concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts
toward that end, failed.
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against
petitioner spouses.
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo,
Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of
Donation9 transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective
shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to
them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial
partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and
ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by either
Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who
represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated
only through a private document that was never registered in the office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
spouses. It made the following findings:
xxx
xxx
March 9, 2000
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated
intestate proceedings 3 in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was
appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the
estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of partition.
Thus, they filed an action for partition 4 before the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental. The court appointed Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo
Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court rendered a decision
approving the project of partition. However, the records of said case are
missing and although respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to present a
copy of said decision.
March 9, 2000
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1) Lot No.
3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of
coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a)
Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo ChavesRoa; and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872,
all located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and consisting of an
aggregate area of 14 hectares was distributed equally between petitioners
(a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His
share was given to his only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of Salvador's
father. In 1956, the year the partition case was decided and effected, receiver
Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said heirs in accordance
with the above scheme. Subsequently, Concepcion sold her share to Angel,
while Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046
went to Angel and the other half to Amparo.1wphi1.nt
Significantly, Lot No. 5872 was not included in any of the following
documents: (1) the inventory of properties of the estate submitted to the court
in the proceedings for the settlement of said estate; (2) the project of partition
submitted to the court for approval; (3) the properties receiver Hernando Roa
had taken possession of, which he listed in the "Constancia" submitted to the
court; and (4) the court order approving the partition. Decedent Ramon
Chaves acquired Lot No. 5872 from Felomino Bautista, Sr. but he
subsequently delivered it to the spouses Hernando Roa and Amparo
Chaves-Roa. 5 It was thereafter delivered to petitioners during the actual
partition in 1956, and petitioners have been in possession of the same since
then.
As to the omission of Lot No. 5872 in the inventory and project of partition,
the parties offer different explanations. Respondents claim that due to the
series of involving the said lot, the heirs were unsure if it belonged to the
decedents' estate at all. As a result they deferred its inclusion in the inventory
of the properties of the estate as well as its distribution pending the
investigation of its status. In fact, administrator Angel Chaves filed a motion
in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate to include the said lot in
the inventory but the court did not act on it. Petitioners, on the other hand,
insist that the omission was inadvertent and the inaction of the court on the
motion was due to the compromise agreement entered into by the heirs. 6
Petitioners' thesis consists of the existence of an oral partition agreement
entered into by all heirs soon after the death of their parents. The proposed
project of partition was allegedly based on it but the court's order of partition
failed to embody such oral agreement due to the omission of Lot No. 5872.
For some reason, however, the actual partition of the estate conformed to the
alleged oral agreement.
Petitioners claim that they failed to notice the non-inclusion of Lot No. 5872 in
the court's order. They only realized such fact after the death in 1976 of
Silvino Maestrado, the husband of petitioner Josefa. They discovered among
Silvino's belongings, the partition order and found out that Lot No 5872 was
not included therein. 7
In an effort to set things right, petitioners prepared a quitclaim to confirm the
alleged or a agreement. On August 16, 1977, Angel, Concepcion and Ramon
signed a notarized quitclaim in favor of petitioners. Amparo was unable to
sign because she had an accident and had passed away on the following
day. It was her heirs who signed a similarly worded and notarized quitclaim
on September 8, 1977. 8
Respondents dispute the voluntariness of their consent or the consent of
their predecessors-in-interest to the quitclaims. Ramon claims to have been
betrayed by his lawyer, Francisco Velez, who is the son-in-law of petitioner
Josefa Maestrado. He allegedly signed the quitclaim without reading it
because his lawyer had already read it. He believed that since his lawyer
was protecting his interest, it was all right to sign it after hearing no
objections from said lawyer. On the other hand, Angel signed the quitclaim
"out of respect" for petitioners. On the other hand, Concepcion signed
because she was misled by alleged misrepresentations in the "Whereas
Clauses" of the quitclaim to the effect that the lot was inadvertently omitted
and not deliberately omitted due to doubts on its status. 9
Six (6) years after the execution of the quitclaims, respondents discovered
that Lot No. 5872 is still in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and
Rosario Chaves. Thus, on October 14, 1983, respondent Ramon Chaves,
sole heir of Salvador Chaves, and respondent Jesus Roa, son of Amparo
Chaves-Roa, wrote a letter to their uncle Angel Chaves to inform him of that
said property which they claim to belong to the estate of their deceased
grandparents, has not yet been distributed to the concerned heirs. Hence,
they requested Angel Chaves to distribute and deliver it to the heirs. 10 On
October 24, 1983, respondent Natividad Santos, daughter and attorney-infact of Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores, also wrote a similar letter to Angel
Chaves. On December 1, 1983, Angel Chaves transmitted the said letters to
petitioner Carmen Abaya and requested her to respond.
In response, petitioners filed, on December 22, 1983, an action for Quieting
of Title 11 against respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro.
On April 10, 1995, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view of these facts, the court therefore considers the property, Lot
5872 still common property. Consequently, the property must be
divided in six (6) parts, there being six heirs. But since the group of
Jesus Roa already quitclaimed in favor of plaintiffs and the same is
true with Angel Chaves, the defendants Natividad Santos and
Ramon Chaves shall receive one-sixth (1/6) each out of Lot 5872
and the balance will be divided equally by the plaintiffs JosefaChaves-Maestrado represented by her daughters and the other half
to Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
With no other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a Decision,
promulgated on November 28, 1997, sustained the said Decision of the trial
court, in this wise:
SO ORDERED.
On May 29, 1998, petitioner Lourdes Maestrado-Lavina, in substitution of her
deceased mother Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, fled a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court. 12 Petitioner Carmen Chaves-abaya also filed her
own petition for review on certiorari on June 1, 1998. 13 Since the two
petitions involve the same facts and issues, we decided in a Resolution 14 to
consolidate the said cases.
Petitioner Maestrado-Lavina assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL COMMON
PROPERTY, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY NULLIFYING THE VERBAL
PARTITION AGREEMENT REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY
THE CHILDREN/HEIRS OF DECEDENTS RAMON AND ROSARIO
CHAVES WAY BACK IN 1956;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL COMMON
PROPERTY UPON ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE SIGNATURES
OF RESPONDENTS ON THE DULY NOTARIZED QUITCLAIMS
WERE OBTAINED THROUGH FRAUD;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT, ON THE BASIS ALONE OF THE CLAIMS
THAT (A) RAMON CHAVES SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM WITHOUT
READING IT; AND THAT (B) ANGEL CHAVES SIGNED THE
QUITCLAIM OUT OF RESPECT, THERE WAS FRAUD AS WOULD
VITIATE RESPONDENTS CONSENT TO THE QUITCLAIMS;
persons are concerned. Hence, even without registration, the contract is still
valid as between the parties. 29In fact, it has been recently held and reiterated
by this Court that neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a subdivision plan
is essential to the validity of an oral partition. 30
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the
oral partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of
the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition.. No one
among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27)
years.
Final. The said notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs in favor of petitioners
are not vitiated by fraud.1wphi1 Hence, they are valid.
Since the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized quitclaims
confirmed such prior oral agreement as well as the petitioners' title of
ownership over the subject Lot No. 5872. More importantly, independent of
such oral partition, the quitclaims in the instant case are valid contracts of
waiver of property rights.
The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims in the instant
case, is protected by law 31 and the courts are not quick to interfere with such
freedom unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
policy or public order. 32 Quitclaims, being contracts of waiver, involve the
relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of their existence and intent to
relinquish them. 33 The intent to waive rights must be clearly and convincingly
shown. Moreover, when the only proof of intent is the act of a party, such act
should be manifestly consistent and indicative of an intent to voluntarily
relinquish a particular right such that no other reasonable explanation of his
conduct is possible. 34
In the instant case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated August 16, 1977
and September 8, 1977 are clear; and the heirs signatures thereon have no
other significance but their conformity thereto resulting in a valid waiver of
property rights. 35 Herein respondents quite belatedly and vainly attempted to
invoke alleged fraud in the execution of the said quitclaims but we are not
convinced. In other words, the said quitclaims being duly notarized and
acknowledged before a notary public, deserve full credence and are valid
and enforceable in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary. 36 In the case at bench, it is our view and we hold that the execution
of the said quitclaims was not fraudulent.
Fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious machination,
manipulation, concealment or misrepresentation to lead another party into
error. 37 The deceit employed must be serious. It must be sufficient to impress
or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the
circumstances of each case. 38Silence or concealment, by itself, does not
constitute fraud, unless there is a special duty to disclose certain
facts.39 Moreover, the bare existence of confidential relation between the
parties, standing alone, does not raise the presumption of fraud. 40
Dolo causante or fraud which attends the execution of a contract is an
essential cause that vitiates consent and hence, it is a ground for the
annulment of a contract. 41 Fraud is never presumed, otherwise, courts would
be indulging in speculations and surmises. 42 It must be established by clear
and convincing evidence but it was not so in the case at bench. A mere
preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. 43
The instances of fraud allegedly committed in the case at bench are not the
kind of fraud contemplated by law. On the contrary, they constitute mere
carelessness in the conduct of the affairs of the heirs concerned. We have
consistently denied relief to a party who seeks to avoid the performance of
an obligation voluntarily assumed because they turned out to be disastrous
or unwise contracts, even if there was a mistake of law or fact. 44Moreover,
we do not set aside contracts merely because solicitation, importunity,
argument, persuasion or appeal to affection were used to obtain the consent
of the other party. 45
In a nutshell, the quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977 in
the case at bench are valid, duly confirmed and undeniably established the
title of ownership of the petitioners over the subject Lot No. 5872.
DECISION
The factual background of the case is as follows:
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision1 dated March
25, 1994, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolutions 2 dated March 24, 1995
and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 113,
and nullified the sale of the subject lot by the spouses Crisostomo and
Cresenciana Armada to spouses Serafin and Anita Si. The dispositive portion
of the respondent court's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED, and a new one is rendered:
1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana V.
Alejo in favor of Anita Bonode Si.
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the name of Anita
Bonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada, married to
Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R. Armada Jr., single.
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to reconstitute and
revive Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16007 in the names of Jose,
Crisostomo and Severo, Jr.
4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the share
corresponding to the share of Crisostomo Armada within thirty (30)
days from notice in writing by Crisostomo Armada.
The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District, Pasay City, the
property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo
Armada, Sr. This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
(17345) 2460. During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was
transferred to their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued
TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows : "DR.
CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34 Square
Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to Remedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square
Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age,
Filipinos."4Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said title "... by
virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979,
executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO
R. ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor
of ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00,
issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, Reg. Book T102. (Doc. No. 17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary Public of Pasay City,
Manila, Julian Florentino)."5
On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor,
filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title
with Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado
Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale.
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's share by
making it appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-fact of her husband, is a
Filipino citizen, residing with Isada at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy,
Cubao, Quezon City. By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana had
migrated and were already citizens of the United States of America. It also
stated that when petitioners registered the deed of absolute sale they
inserted the phrase "... and that the co-owners are not interested in buying
the same in spite of notice to them.", and that petitioners knew of the
misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the complaint alleged that the other
owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the sale; and that all
upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, private respondents filed a
complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title with damages,
claiming they had a right of redemption.
Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale
(Exh. 'B'), executed by Cresencia Armada in favor of defendants Si, stated
that the portion sold was the 'undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100
(113.34) square meters' of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO. 16007 of
the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, which means that what was sold to
defendants are still undetermined and unidentifiable, as the area sold
remains a portion of the whole.
xxx
Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in the undivided
property is not invalid, but shall not be recorded in the Registry Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the Vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners."8
On August 29, 1994, petitioners' counsel on record, Atty. Roberto B. Yam
received a copy of the CA decision. On October 14, 1994, he filed a motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals on November
21, 1994, for being filed out of time.
On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new trial under
Section 1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court. 9 Petitioners presented new
evidence, TCT No. (17345) 2460, registered in the name of Escolastica de la
Rosa, married to Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back stating that
the cancellation was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor of Escolastica's
sons. On March 24, 1995, respondent court denied the motion, reasoning
that when the motion was filed, the reglementary period had lapsed and the
decision had become final and executory. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was denied.
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance
with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of
Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion. 19 This
we have done in this case. It is our considered view now, that the trial court is
correct when it found that:
"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been
partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor
of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3),
which documents purports to have been registered with the Register of
Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT
No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and
transferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and
with the corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is what we
call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every portion belonging to the three
sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of
Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the
portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada and
Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and identifiable. The fact
that the three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make
said portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable, one from
the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners
exists."20 (citation omitted)
". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did not have
knowledge about the impending sale of this portion. The truth of the matter is
that they were properly notified. Reacting to such knowledge and notification
they wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on February 22, 1979, a
portion of said letter is revealing: 'Well you are the king of yourselves, and
you can sell your share of Levereza."21 (emphasis omitted)
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community
ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each
brother was no longer available.22
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,23 there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is
no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated on August
29, 1989, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.