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Ress08 - LNG
Ress08 - LNG
Ress08 - LNG
discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/223190585
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4 authors, including:
Erik Vanem
Pedro Anto
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ARTICLE IN PRESS
Abstract
This paper presents a generic, high-level risk assessment of the global operation of ocean-going liqueed natural gas (LNG) carriers.
The analysis collects and combines information from several sources such as an initial hazid, a thorough review of historic LNG
accidents, review of previous studies, published damage statistics and expert judgement, and develops modular risk models for critical
accident scenarios. In accordance with these risk models, available information from different sources has been structured in the form of
event trees for different generic accident categories. In this way, high-risk areas pertaining to LNG shipping operations have been
identied. The major contributions to the risk associated with LNG shipping are found to stem from ve generic accident categories, i.e.
collision, grounding, contact, re and explosion, and events occurring while loading or unloading LNG at the terminal. Of these,
collision risk was found to be the highest. According to the risk analysis presented in this paper, both the individual and the societal risk
level associated with LNG carrier operations lie within the As Low As Reasonable Practicable (ALARP) area, meaning that further risk
reduction should be required only if available cost-effective risk control options could be identied. This paper also includes a critical
review of the various components of the risk models and hence identies areas of improvements and suggests topics for further research.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: LNG carriers; Marine transportation; Risk analysis; Maritime safety; Gas tankers; Formal safety assessment; Liqueed natural gas
0951-8320/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ress.2007.07.007
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E. Vanem et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 13281344
1329
250
200
150
100
50
0
1965
1975
1985
1995
2005
Year
Preparatory steps
Identication of hazards
Risk analysis
Identifying risk control options
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1330
Fig. 2. Main types of LNG carriers: moss spherical tankers (top) and membrane tankers (bottom).
4. Costbenet assessment
5. Recommendations for decision-making.
The study presented in this paper corresponds to the
second steprisk analysisof an ongoing FSA on LNG
tankers.
2. Dening the scope of study
This paper describes a high-level, generic risk analysis of
LNG carriers, and the scope of the study is the whole eet
of ocean-going LNG carriers. A generic LNG carrier is
assumed representative for the various types of LNG
vessels. Historic accident experience indicates that the risk
level of the main types of LNG carriers is comparable, so
this assumption seems valid up to a certain level of detail. It
is noted that membrane tanks have experienced cargo tank
leakage through its primary barrier, and are also believed
to be more vulnerable to effects of dynamic loads and
sloshing of LNG cargo, but risk contributions from such
scenarios are assumed small in comparison with the main
accident scenarios investigated in this study. Therefore,
detailed studies of specic ships as well as specic trades
and port environments are dened out of scope.
However, a particular reference vessel will be used where
needed. For the purpose of this generic analysis, a
138,000 m3 membrane LNG vessel currently under construction at Navantia was chosen. The cargo capacity of
this reference vessel is within the main range of LNG
carriers and its speed is typical for this type of vessels. It
has a reversible geared, cross-compound steam-driven
28,000 kW 83 RPM main turbine and a 5-blade xed
pitch-type propeller. The main characteristics of the
reference vessel are given in Table 1.
Only the shipping phase of the LNG chain is considered,
covering loading at the export terminal, the actual voyage
and unloading at the receiving terminal. Risks pertaining
to exploration, production, liquefaction, storage and
regasication of natural gas are considered out of scope.
Furthermore, only the operational phase of an LNG vessel
is considered, and risks associated with construction,
repairs in dock and scrapping of LNG vessels are out of
scope.
Table 1
Main characteristics of reference vessel
Length overall
Length between perpendiculars
Breadth (moulded)
Depth to main deck (moulded)
Depth to trunk deck (moulded)
Draft design (moulded) under keel
Draft scantling (moulded)
Double-bottom depth
Double-side width
Total displacement
Total cargo tank capacity
Total insulation thickness
Service speed at design moulded draft
Accommodation capacity
a
284.40 m
271.00 m
42.50 m
25.40 m
32.20 m
11.40 m
12.30 m
2.9 m
2.32 m
98,500 t
138,000 m3
0.530 m
19.50 knotsa
40 personsb
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Vanem et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 13281344
1331
DC
,
DR
(1)
NCAF
DC DB
.
DR
(2)
1.E-01
1.E-02
Intolerable
1.E-03
ALARP
1.E-04
1.E-05
Negligible
1.E-06
1
10
N - number of fatalities
100
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Vanem et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 13281344
1332
Unknown
11 %
1%
Spherical
51 %
Membrane
37 %
Unknown
2%
Spherical
33 %
Membrane
61 %
Fig. 4. Breakdown of LNG accidents based on ship type: since the start of LNG shipping (top) and for 1985 and later (bottom).
4. Accident scenarios
4.2. Generic accident categories
4.1. Operational experience with LNG tankers
Marine transportation of LNG has gradually increased
since the rst LNG cargo was transported by an LNG
tanker in 1959 and the rst purpose-built LNG tanker was
engaged in commercial trade in 1964. Thus, more than 40
years of operational experience with LNG carriers has
accumulated over the years.
A literature survey on the history of LNG shipping
reveals information of 182 events, with or without LNG
spillage, involving LNG carriers larger than 6000 GRT
[17]. Of these, 24 occurred to ships out of regular service
(e.g. in yard during construction or repair or while in tow
or during sea trials) and are considered out of scope. Thus,
previous experience amounts to 158 known relevant
accidents involving LNG carriers. The breakdown of
LNG events on ship types according to these accidents is
illustrated in Fig. 4. It is emphasized that this only
illustrates the total number of accidents without consider-
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Vanem et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 13281344
Table 3
Distribution of historic LNG accidents on categories
Accident category
Collision risk
Accidents
(#)
Collision
Grounding
Contact
Fire and explosion
Equipment and machinery failure
Heavy weather
Events while loading/unloading cargo
Failure of cargo containment system
Total
Frequency
(per shipyear)
19
8
8
10
55
9
22
27
6.7 103
2.8 103
2.8 103
3.5 103
1.9 102
3.2 103
7.8 103
9.5 103
158
5.6 102
Table 4
Breakdown of historic accident data based on accident categories and
periods of time
Exposure (accumulated
shipyears)
Collision
Grounding
Contact
Fire and explosion
Equipment and
machinery failure
Heavy weather
Events while loading/
unloading cargo
Failure of cargo
containment system
Total
6475
116
7685
585
8695
770
9605
1367
6405
2838
1
1
10
6
4
5
39
4
1
4
3
9
19
8
8
10
55
6
13
3
3
9
22
15
27
15
98
22
23
158
1333
Collision
Grounding
Contact3
Fire or explosion
Incidents while loading/unloading of cargo
Grounding risk
Total risk
Contact risk
Fire/explosion risk
Loading/Unloading risk
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1334
Initial frequency
(per shipyear)
Collision
Grounding
Contact
Fire and explosion
Leakage of LNG while loading/unloading
6.7 103
2.8 103
2.8 103
1.8 103
3.2 103
Collision
frequency
Collision frequency
Loading
condition model
Damage extent
model
Cargo leakage
frequency
LNG hazard
model
Probability distribution of
LNG hazards materializing
Survivability
model
Third parties
model
Probability of
sinking
Evacuation
model
Number of
fatalities, LNG
Number of
fatalities, other
vessel
Consequence
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Vanem et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 13281344
Grounding /contact
frequency model
1335
Loading
condition model
Damage extent
model
Cargo leakage
frequency
LNG hazard
model
Probability distribution of
LNG hazards materializing
Survivability
model
Probability of
sinking
Evacuation
model
Number of
fatalities, LNG
Consequence
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1336
Fire/explosion frequency
Loading
condition model
Fire protection
model
Cargo leakage
model
Probability of cargo
release
LNG hazard
model
Probability
distribution of LNG
hazards materializing
Probability of
sinking
Survivability
model
Evacuation
model
Number of
fatalities
Consequence
Loading/unloading
spill frequency model
Spillage extent
model
LNG hazard
model
Probability distribution of
LNG hazards materializing
Accident model
Consequence
Fig. 9. Risk model for spill events during loading or unloading of LNG carriers.
information were exploited. The event trees were quantied accordingly, as illustrated in Fig. 11 (grounding) and
Fig. 12 (contact).
Due to its relatively small eet, sufcient data on LNG
carrier res are not readily available. In the accident
statistics for LNG carriers only ve res were reported
(disregarding vent riser res), and, of these, 3 started in the
machinery spaces. This would correspond to 60% of the
res originating in the engine rooms, but it is realised that
0.0067
Collision
Yes
0.00159
3rd party
0.144
0.05
0.95
0.856
0.65
0.35
0.086
0.05
0.95
0.1
0.9
0.11
0.89
No pool
fire
No drifting
No cryogenic
vapour
No leakage
damage to
cloud
of LNG
hull
ignition
Cargo
leakage
model
0.914
0.5
0.65
0.35
0.5
0.5
0.5
critical
damage
Damage
In ballast outside
(no LNG) cargo area
only
TOTAL RISK
No
0.5
0.5
Striking
ship
Loading
condition
model
A crew of 30 is assumed
Collision frequency
model
0.989
0.989
0.978
0
0.978
0
0.978
0
0.978
16
16
12.9
12.9
12.9
12.9
Probability of
fatalities
# fatalities
among crew
Evacuation model
0.98
0.98
0.98
Probability
of fatalities
on other
vessel
3.11
62.7
627
0.97
0.03
627
0.03
0.13
62.7
0.87
3.11
0.97
627
0.03
0.87
62.7
0.13
3.11
0.97
# fatalities
on other
vessel
0.13
20.000 GRT)
Not large
passenger
ship (
0.87
Other
vessel not
passenger
vessel
Surviving
Survivability
model
Frequency
Risk
Sum Risk
1.535E-05 0.00024561
16 1.5506E-05 0.00024809
16
627
62.7
3.11
627
62.7
3.11
627
62.7
Risk
0.00159049
3rd party
5.992E-08 3.7571E-05
1.937E-06 0.00012148
1.337E-05 4.1572E-05
5.932E-08 3.7195E-05
1.918E-06 0.00012026
1.323E-05 4.1156E-05
4.8E-07 0.00030094
1.552E-05 0.00097304
0.0001071 0.00033299
Frequency
Third parties
3.11
Consequence
Risk contribution
Consequence
LNG crew
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1338
A crew of 30 is assumed
Grounding
frequency
model
Grounding
In ballast
(no LNG)
Cargo
leakage
model
Damage
outside
cargo area
only
0.5
0.3
0.7
0.3
0.7
No cryogenic No drifting
No leakage
No pool
damage to
vapour cloud
of LNG
fire
hull
ignition
Probabilities of
fatalities among
crew
Surviving
0.924
0.076
# fatalities
Consequence
Frequency
Risk
contribution
0.978
12.9
12.9
12.9
0.989
16
16 5.9002E-05 0.000944036
0.989
16
16 7.2924E-06 0.000116679
0.989
16
16 7.3661E-06 0.000117857
0.924
0.076
0
1
0.978
0
0.924
0.076
0
1
0.978
0.924
0.076
0.9
0.89
1
Yes
Evacuation m odel
0
1
No
1
0.11
0
1
0.1
0
1
0
1
Sum Risk
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0.5
critical damage
Survivability
model
0.0028
Loading
condition
model
A crew of 30 is assumed
Grounding
frequency
model
Contact
In ballast
(no LNG)
Cargo
leakage
model
Damage
outside
cargo area
only
0.5
0.3
0.7
0.3
0.7
No
No leakage cryogenic
of LNG
damage to
hull
No drifting
vapour
No pool
cloud
fire
ignition
Evacuation model
Probabilities
of fatalities # fatalities
among crew
Surviving
0.962
0.038
0
1
0.978
12.9
12.9
12.9
0.989
16
16 2.9501E-05 0.00047202
0.989
16
16 3.6462E-06 5.8339E-05
0.989
16
16
0.038
0
1
0.978
0
0.962
0.038
0.038
0
1
Risk
contribution
Frequency
0.962
0.962
Consequence
0.978
0
0.9
0.89
0.11
0
1
1
Yes
No
1
0.1
0
1
0
1
Sum Risk
3.683E-06 5.8929E-05
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0.5
critical damage
Survivability
model
0.0028
Loading
condition
model
1339
1340
A crew of 30 is assumed
Loading condition
model
Compressor room
0.03
Probability of
fatalities
# fatalities
among crew
Surviving
Consequence
Frequency
Risk
contribution
0.1
0.85
0.15
0.37
1.4985E-07
1.4985E-07
0.9
0.85
0.37
7.6424E-06
7.64235E-06
0.15
0.37
1.3487E-06
1.34865E-06
0.85
0.37
8.4915E-07
8.4915E-07
0.9
0.37
1.4985E-07
1.4985E-07
0.1
0.989
4.0055E-08
3.20436E-07
0.1
0.15
Evacuation model
0.9
0.37
8.4915E-07
Yes
8.4915E-07
No
0.85
0.37
7.6424E-06
7.64235E-06
0.15
0.9
0.37
1.3487E-06
1.34865E-06
0.1
0.989
16
16
3.6049E-07
5.76785E-06
0.0018
0
1
Machinery space
0.81
0.37
1 0.00053946
0.00053946
0.37
1 0.00010656
0.00010656
Accommodation area
0.16
Sum Risk
0.000672088
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0.5
Survivability
model
Fire Fighting
No leakage no pool
systems
of LNG
fire
successful
In ballast
at port
(no LNG)
0.5
LNG
Hazard
model
Cargo
leakage
model
Fire /
Explosion
Fire
protection
model
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Vanem et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 13281344
6. Risk summation
The risk modelling outlined in the previous sections
results in the contributions from the various scenarios to
the total potential loss of lives per shipyear from LNG
shipping operations. This is presented in Table 6.
6.1. Individual risk
Intuitively, the individual risk for passengers onboard
other vessels is not an issue in this context, and only the
individual risk to LNG crew will be considered. Assuming
a crew of 30 for a typical LNG carrier and a 5050 rotation
scheme (meaning that two complete crews are needed for
continuous operation of the vessel), the individual risk to
crew is assessed to be 1.6 104 per person year.
Compared with the individual risk acceptance criteria
established in this study, it is seen that the individual risk
falls within the ALARP area.
It should be noted, however, that this is the individual
risk from ship accidents, and contributions from occupational accidents are not considered. Occupational accidents
were not considered in the present study, but previous
estimates of occupational fatality risks onboard gas tankers
are presented by Hansen et al. [26] as 2.7 102 fatalities
per 10,000 days onboard. Assuming a 5050 rotation
Table 6
Potential loss of lives from LNG carrier operations per shipyear
Accident category
PLL (crew)
PLL (passengers)
Collision
Grounding
Contact
Fire and explosion
Loading/unloading events
4.42 103
2.93 103
1.46 103
6.72 104
2.64 104
1.59 103
0
0
0
0
Total
9.74 103
1.59 103
Yes
A crew of 30 is assumed
No
L/U incident
frequency
model
Freq of L/U
incident
0.00317
Spillage
LNG Hazard
extent model
model
Accident
model
No cryogenic
No spillage
damage to
near to crew
# fatalities
crew
operation
members
Consequence
0.9167
0.0833
1341
Frequency
0.000264167
Sum Risk
Risk
contribution
0.000264167
0.000264167
Fig. 14. Event tree: spillage during loading or unloading operations of LNG carriers.
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E. Vanem et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 13281344
1342
0.01
0.001
0.0001
0.00001
1
10
100
N - number of fatalities
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
1
10
100
N - Number of fatalities
1000
10000
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E. Vanem et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 13281344
1343
1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1
10
100
N - number of fatalities
Risk level - LNG
Collision
Grounding
Contact
Fire/Explosion
Loading/Unloading
Fig. 17. FN curve for crew, broken down into accident types.
Table 7
Conservative and optimistic assumptions made in the presented study
Assumption
Effect
Relevant scenario
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Optimistic
Optimistic
Optimistic
Optimistic
However, upon further evaluation of the various assumptions, it is believed that the net effect tends to be
conservative, and it is believed that the overall results are
more likely to be conservative than optimistic. Hence, the
risk analysis presented in this paper might be regarded as
somewhat conservative. Table 7 lists some of the assumptions made in this study that might be conservative or
optimistic.
All in all, there are a number of uncertainties associated
with this study, and improvements in any areas would
always be favourable. It is also emphasized that a generic
FSA such as this should be considered as an on-going
process where the results are continuously updated
according to new knowledge, developments in technology,
environment and trading patterns, renements of underlying assumptions, etc. Nevertheless, in spite of the
subjectivity and inherit uncertainties, on a high level, the
results from the current study are believed to be meaningful
and robust for the world eet of LNG carriers.
Even though the risk assessment presented in this paper
is believed to be based on the best available information,
approaches and estimates, parts of the study should
undoubtedly be regarded as somewhat subjective. In some
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1344
Navigational safety
Manoeuvrability
Collision avoidance
Cargo protection
Damage stability
Evacuation arrangements.
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