ICFAI BUS sees PUNE Google’s HR Dilemma Case study Reference no 406-018-1 This case was written by Mridu Verma, under the direction of Kaushik Mukef ICFAI Business School, Pune.t is intended to be used as the basis for class discussion rather than to ilustrate either effective or ineffective handling of @ management situation. The case wes compiled from published sources. © 2006, ICFAI Business School, Pune. No part of this publication may be copied, stored, transmit or distributed in any form or medium whatsoever witho of the copyright owner, PS} ive cseoriearning Wioterred Vifeavses — Cagnaieaas406-018-1 Google’s HR Dilemma Introduction In 2005, Google, widely recognized as the "Worla's Best Search Engine" was the fastest growing internet search company in the world. Google’s revenues had more than doubled every year since its inception in 1998, Google recorded revenues worth $ 3.2 billion in 2004, twice the $ 1.46 billion revenue recorded in 2003. In June 2004, Google's share of U.S. searches hit 45% and was expected to cross 50% soon. Google's very success, though, was creating new challenges. As the company expanded, it risked losing the dynamic feel of an intimate team. Meanwhile, when Google decided to go publie in August 2004, analysts feared that it might suffer from new employees envying the older ones, some of whom had stock options worth millions. Talented Google veterans could cash out their stock options and retire early. Google's reputation for technology innovation was well known. Could the fast growing company also develop an inventive streak in human resources as it competed for an increasingly tight supply of search-programming talent? Background In 1995, 24-year-old Lamy Page (Larry) and 23 year old Sergy Brin (Brin) teamed to write a paper on crafting a better search engine. Most search engines at the time based their results on how often a certain word appeared in any website. Brin and Page figured that the relevance of a site and how many other web pages linked to it were more important. As the popularity of the search engine grew, it attracted several investors. Google was registered in September 1998. It had less than 20 employees and was answering 10,000 search queries each day. A year later, the number increased to 60 million queries a day. Till 1999, Google had no system for generating significant revenues. The company made some money by licensing the search service to other sites. “In the early days Larry and Sergey spent more time talking about how they weren't going to make money--no user registration, no blast e-mails, no banner advertising--than how they were,” recalled an ex employee.' Under pressure from the board to get professional help, the founders recruited Eric Schmidt (Schmidt) in early 2001. Schmidt a Ph.D. in computer science hhad worked as the CEO of networking pioneer Novell and as CTO, Sun Microsystems. In February 2002, Google unveiled Adwords, a product that allowed users’ search terms to trigger relevant fext ads to appear next to the search results, The ad businesses led to phenomenal growth at Google. Schmidt was surprised to discover that every Friday the founders shared Google's progress with all the employees and on occasions they included a detailed financial review. He requested Brin and Page to discontinue the practice but soon realized that the meetings were ingrained in Google's culture and united the staff. In a 10-person management meeting to discuss ways to generate revenues, Schmidt found that each person had a viewpoint backed by plenty of data. Schmidt realized that Google employees loved to talk it out, jettisoning hierarchy, business silos and layers of management for a flatter, ‘networked! structure where the guy with the best data won. Analysts wondered about Schmidts status and authority in the organization, The founders agreed that Google would be run as a triumvirate where dissentions were solved through majority votes (two out of three), though Scmidt had the power of overruling the decision of the founders. “If its a particularly egregious disagreement and it's important enough, I'l override them and "Fred Vogelstein and Jemay Mero, "Can Google Grow Up? Fortine, 12 August 2003, Vol, 148 love 12, 38-43, 6p i406-018-1 they'll be mad at me for a while. They have the final trump, but they'd never use it-then they wouldn't get to see all the people they've gotten used to eating lunch with,” Schmidt recalled. There were two levels of employees at Google. On one hand there were engineers from Ivy League schools and top engineering college, who enjoyed benefits, stock options and were privy to internal discussions. Then there were contractors, who worked alongside full-timers~yet without benefits, stock options, or access to the company intranet, not to mention meetings or social events. Brin and Page continued to keep a hand in all the hiring, from executives to ‘administrative assistants. Applicant’s school mattered more than work experience to them. Schmidt admitted, “Lamy and Sergey have been far more disciplined about hiring than anyone I've ever met. The result has been that they have a company where fewer people can do a lot more. Google hited many people in its middle ranks and gave most of them the same title~project ‘manager--and “no one could figure out who was in charge or even what Google's licensing policy was.” People who worked at or did business with Google worried that the company had become too disorganized. A CEO who was negotiating a contract with Google recalled, “Typically half the people show up 20 minutes late, so you have to repeat your presentation; another couple leave ten minutes early, Most of the time they're not paying attention anyway, but messaging cach other and their friends on BlackBerrys and Danger hiptop machines. My take is that they are crumbling under the weight of their own success a bit." Brin and Page mandated that employees spend 20% of their time on self-directed projects and another 20% interviewing outside job candidates. Getting ready for meetings (or showing up on time) did not always take priority. “It’s ‘a penalty we pay for making that deliberate choice,” mentioned Brin*, While Google co-founders were orchestrating their initial public offering, financial advisers engaged by the firm advised its employees to sell. Google allowed its staffers to sell 5% of holdings after 15 days, 10% more after 90 days and all after six months. Apart from having a steadying influence on the share price, the move was expected to check an exodus of new millionaires from the firm. Hiring al: Google realized that it needed to attract and hire talent to maintain its growth momentum, as this had a direct impact on its ability to innovate. The company was known to be elitist about its hiring. "Great engineering is the foundation upon which we built Google,” mentioned CFO George Reyes.° Google billed itself as a place where tech professionals would simultaneously find challenging work and change the world. “You won't find any bored engineers at Google. ‘You will find friendly colleagues, fascinating projects and the opportunity to make life better for tens of millions of people every day,” the company's Web site stated.” Google remained vigilant about seeking out top technical talent. The company’s recruiting methods included coding contests, mysterious billboards and an aptitude test with questions like “Write a haiku describing possible methods for predicting search traffic seasonality”. Some applicants were asked to start with one of Google's famous, though difficult exams.* Prospects endured eight or more interviews. Each interviewer ranked them on a I-to-4 scale; a 4 meant “I would hire this person, and I will argue why,” while a 3 meant “Inclined to hire, but can be argued out of it.” A panel of cight Googlers reviewed the scores. Later annual regression analyses compated performance with initial ratings. Such comparisons often threw up interesting findings. ® Quentin Hardy, "Google Thinks Small”, Forbes Its November 2005, Val, 17 Isue 10, 198.202 2 Fred Vogelstein and Jenny Mero, "Can Google Grow Up? Fortine, 12" August 2003, Vol, 148 Issue 12, 938-43, Sibi 5 iit ' Bea Elgin, "Google Proves Its Moca!”, Business Week Online, 22% uly 2005 wo geogle cor " Find the fst tend priome number inthe mathematical constant called‘406-018-1 ‘An anomaly surfaced showing that women with weaker scores were performing better than ‘women with all 4s, Candidates normally went through a recruitment process that could last months -- and, at the end of it, they were more likely to be rejected than hired. Once deemed Google-worthy, new hires got bid on by managers across the company. Some brilliant prospects did not get hired, as background checks showed that they were difficult to work with, “It takes discipline not to hire some of these people, they are so smart. But it also doesn't take much for a single person to subtract 10% from everyone else. Very quickly, that reduces your total output,” mentioned @ senior Google employee.” The recruitment process was later streamlined to a seven-stage process. A team of nearly 50 recruiters divided on the basis of speciality combed through résumés, which applicants were required to submit online, The résumés were then fed into a programme that routed those selected for interviews to the proper hiring committee and discarded the rest in the electronic trash Interviewing was a gruelling process that could take months. Every opening had a hiring committee of seven to nine Googlers who were required to meet the applicant. Engineers were asked to write software or debug a program on the spot. Marketers were often required to take a writing test. No matter how long the applicant had been out of school, they had to submit their transcripts for consideration. Google also staged Code Jams in the U.S and later in Asia, to attract the best talents. Participants were tested on aptitude in problem solving, on designing and writing code, and on testing peer- written work. Finalists were asked to create and test software for unique Web searches and design very complex programmes. Code Jam served as a short cut through Google’s hiring regime. Much of that screening was set aside for Code Jam winners. Google also hired laterally from other companies as well as directly from universities. By 2005, it was hiring 25 new people a week. Once deemed Google-worthy, new hires were bid on by managers across the company. Since 2003, Google had hired most of the top one-third of the search classes of various universities. Google developed an innovative way for attracting talent as it competed for an increasingly tight supply of high-IQ engineers. The results page for enquiries about names of ‘many top academics and even rival’s star employees in search sported employment ads for Google. Some industry observers saw it as a bold move to snatch away top talent from competitors and academia. But such Google ads also tumed up alongside queries for big-name Google engineers, like Adam Bosworth and Rob Pike. That indicated Google was less interested in going after these particular individuals than in attracting folks who had an interest in the oft- cited computing gurus. Google also opened a research lab in Bangalore, India where it could pick up an engineer just out of school for $5,000 to $10,000 a year. Apart from low salary levels, abundance of talent made India a very attractive place. During its first year in India, Google concentrated on hiring and building a nucleus of senior researchers and managers. Apart from the high demand both in the domestic and the international market for Indian technologists, Google’s exacting hiring standards made hiring large numbers difficult in India, Google had hoped to hire 100 researchers before the end of 2004, but it could just recruit a couple of dozen. In the contest held in Bangalore to hire new recruits, participants were tested on aptitude in problem solving, on designing and writing code, and on testing peer-written work. Finalists were asked to create and test software for unique Web searches and to get from point A to B in a city with a minimum * Quentin Hardy, “Google Thinks Smal”, Forbes 14th November 2008, Vo. 176 Isue 10, p198-202406-018-1 number of turns. "The skill sets we're lockit mentioned Google's chief scientist in India," i for are hard to come by in senior people,’ One of Google's brightest spots was its ability to attract and retain talent. It hired Louis Monier, former research director at eBay and Kai-Fu Lee, a longtime top scientist and vice-president at Microsoft in 2005. Microsoft filed a suit against both Google and Lee, which was later dismissed In 2004, Google opened an office in Kirkland, Washington, just down the road from Microsof’s headquarters in Redmond. Industry observers pointed out that the sole reason for opening the new office was to poach Microsoft workers. When over 230 Microsoft employees joined Google in the second quarter of 2005 alone, industry observers pointed out that they had been attracted to the riches promised by Google's soaring stock. It was later found that employees preferred Google's less bureaucratic work culture, where new products did not have to worry about encroaching upon or being incompatible with Google’s existing products In its early days, Google was described by critics as a “disorganized madhouse run by people too arrogant to be interested in fixing the problems”. A CEO recalled how in 2003 Google had made him and his negotiating team start over and over with nearly half-a-dozen new engineering reps. “The guy across the table would work with us for two months and then get swapped out for a new guy who didn't have any knowledge of the deal, so we'd have to keep starting from scratch.” " As the company grew in size, it became more structured. In 2005, there was one person in charge of his account, and issues got dealt with immediately and professionally. In 2005, Google had a head of human resources and three levels of management instead of one; it had divided the organization into teams organized by product or function. “It has scaled [up] pretty well,” mentioned Schmidt."? With size came recruitment. As Google hired receptionists, attorneys, software engineers and sales coordinators, it was swamped with job applications. In December 2005, Google was getting more than 1,500 resumes per day. “Google is definitely the company that people are interested in,” mentioned an official with a technology recruiter in Silicon Valley."® With its quirkiness, technology prowess and commitment to do no ‘evil’, Google had won the trust of both the general public and the developer community. Work Atmosphere Apart from being attracted to the massive, unsolved technical challenges that affected hundreds of millions of people daily, much of Google’s magnetism was also a result of its zany culture perfectly suited to the geck lifestyle. A majority of the people Google hired came right out of college or grad school. So the company went out of its way to re-create the life they had just left. Schmidt pointed out, “If you go to the Stanford computer science building, you'll see two, three, or even four people in an office. That model is familiar to our programmers and us because we ‘were all in those offices too. We know it’s a very productive environment.” Google started meetings at seven minutes after the hour since classes often began at 9:05 or 9:10. Free perks ranged from gourmet meals at the company cafeteria to on-site dental care to free laundry and banking facilites for the staff. The company also continued to sport the atmosphere of a dot-com startup. Brin and Page shared an office. Engineers were encouraged to spend the equivalent of one day per week on their own pet projects. When they were not staring into their computer monitors, Google employees would often gather for roller-hockey games in the underground garage of race remote-control cars through their offices. Visits from luminaries such as Jimmy Carter, Al Gore and Gwyneth Paltrow added to the company’s coolness factor. "Josey Puliyenthunuel, “How Google Searches For Talent”, Business Week, 11® April 200, Ive 3928, p82-52 "Blin, Ben "Revenge ofthe Nerds ~ Apa", Business Week Online, 7/28/2005 "Fred Vogelstein and Doris Burke, "Google @ S165”, Fortune (Eurape), 13° December 2004, Vol. 150 Issue 11, p44-53 "Ea Frauneim, “Wil Google st) as hol a i ava lamps?” , CNET News.com, 27* December 2002 "Fred Vogelstein and Deis Burke, "Gooale @ $165", Fortune (Europe), 13° Decamber 200, Vol. 150 sve 11, pt-S3406-018-1 Very few Google employees had private offices. Even Lee, the brain behind Google's Chinese endeavours shared a cubicle with two other employees. People working on the same projects normally shared an office. Employees could turn and talk to a team member rather than send an ‘mail or schedule a meeting, This made it easier and faster for them to communicate. Google prided itself on hiring only the truly brilliant and believed the crowd always outsmarted anyone inside it, It shared all the information it could with as many employees as possible, encouraging debate but insisting on like-minded cooperation. It also pursued a ‘rapid-fire food- fight’ strategy that tried out ideas as fast as possible, to see what stuck. With 82 million visitors and 2.3 billion searches in a month, Google could try a new user interface or some other variation of an existing product on just 0.1% of its users and get massive feedback, letting it decide a project's fate in weeks. Google believed in tackling most big projects in small, tightly focused teams, setting them up in an instant and breaking them down weeks later without remorse. “Their view is that there is much greater progress if you have many small teams going out at once.” Schmidt observed."® A typical task, from tweaking page designs to doing scientific research, involves six people. With only a few people on each project, information leaks were rare, Google tried to maintain the search company's original culture. In early days movie night meant 100 employees going to the local cinema. By 2005, organizing such an event was a very complex task, but Google tried to continue with it. Despite the founders’ inclination to continue the “Google traditions’ both the founders and the employees were open to change. Marissa Mayer (Mayer), director of consumer products had been entrusted with the task of figuring out and discontinuing formulas when they faltered. For years Google had carried a Top 100 priorities list, which ranked projects by order of importance. But as Google's workforce grew, the list soared to ‘more than 270 projects. In early 2005, Google executives decided that it had run its course, and shut it down. “People don't get attached to the processes themselves at Google. It's very unusual. Even at small companies, people tend to say, “This is the way we do X,” mentioned a senior company employee."® Google believed data was more important than gut instinet or personalities. Employees were encouraged to collect as much data as possible for this meant that they knew more and their decisions were more certain. Mayer mentioned, "Ofien differences of opinion between smart people are differences of data. In meetings people aren't allowed to say ‘I think ... * but instead ‘must say “The data suggest ... ‘”” This ideas-and-data approach let Google use fewer managers one for every 20 line employees, compared with the industry wide norm of one for 7. At one time there was just one manager for 40 employees. Senior management at Google felt that with this equation Google employees might be better braced if Google's stock crashed. Mayer ‘mentioned, “In a downturn you want your people to feel empowered. Fear and suspicion happen when information is hidden.""* Google's web site promised a family-friendly work environment but admitted that the pace was intense. A lawsuit filed in early 2004 accused Google of routinely discriminating against employees over the age of 40 in its recruiting, hiring and employment practices, an allegation which Google refuted. After Google’s IPO in May 2004, Page and Brin decided to continue pursuing high-minded, long-term goals and treat their employees well. To ensure the continuance of the Google culture, the founders preserved their power after the IPO, partly through a dual- class stock system, "5 Quentin Handy, "Goople Thinks Small, Forbes 4th November 2005, Vol 176 ese 10, p198.202 "Ben Elgin, “Managing Gang’ Idea Factory, Business Week 3 October 2005 lesue 3853, pk8-00 " Quemin Hardy, "Google Tks Sul”, Forbes th November 2005, Vol, 176 Iesve 10, 198-202 Quentin Hardy, “Google Thinks Smal” Forbes 4th November 2005, Vol, 176 Issue 10, p198.202406-018-1 ‘After the IPO, the much feared jealousies did not affect employees’ interrelationships nor had there been any significant tumover of employees. Google was also offering a flexible work schedule, In 2005, a day care centre was started at Googleplex. The founders believed that giving employees interesting work was the best way to retain them. Google's unique work culture had succeeded in luring the best brians in the industry. Managing innovation One of the key reasons behind Google's success was the belief that good ideas could, and should, come from anywhere, To ensure this, Brin and Page worked towards keeping the organization almost entirely bureaucracy-free, They insisted that all engineers in the company devote one day a week to work on their own pet projects. Workers were asked to spend 20% of their time on something that interested them, away from their main jobs. Companywide, 10% of the time was spent dreaming up blue-sky projects. At Google, no idea was allowed to be called stupid An ideas mailing list was open to anyone at Google who wanted to post a proposal. Every Google employee started the week writing five lines on what he or she did the week before. These were posted on an internal Web site for all to see, New product ideas circulated among thousands of engineers on an ‘ideas mailing list’. An e-mail flew out every time someone posted an idea. The e-mails were half brainstorming, half a search for kindred spirits, inviting others in the crowd to join on the proposed project. Both Gmail and the ambitious plan to digitize thousands of books had resulted from such initiatives. The task had become more complex as Google grew. By 2005, Google had 4,200 employees and revenues of over $ 3.5 billion. Mayer had been entrusted with the job of ensuring that good ideas surfaced and got the requisite attention. Mayer acted as a conduit between Google's legions of engineers and its co-founders. She guided the development of Google's consumer products, from its desktop search to personalized home pages, while also leading efforts to hire and groom scores of product managers. ‘As Google's success attracted competitors aiming to take away a chunk of Google's search traffic, it became imperative for the company to maintain its lead in search through innovations and develop other technologies. Mayer bridged the gap between MBAs and PhDs and helped in deciding when employees’ pet projects were refined enough to be presented to the company's founders. Such decisions were often made through an established process, with Mayer giving ideas a hearing during her open office hours or during brainstorming sessions. Mayer also interacted with programmers informally, during chance meetings in the cafeteria or hallway, and encouraged them to share their ideas. During a casual chat in 2003, a worker told her about the project of an Australian engineer, Steve Lawrence (Lawrence) who was developing a program to track and search the contents of his computer, which ran on the Linux operating system. Knowing Google had to figure out a way for people to find matter on their own computers, Mayer tracked Lawrence down and asked him to develop a version of his software to search any PC. Google introduced its desktop search in October 2004, two months before Microsoft. “Marissa has been very successful as the gatekeeper for a lot of these new products,” mentioned Craig Silverstein, director of technology at Google.” Brin and Page believed that Google had to keep its sense of fearlessness for continued innovation. The idea was to avoid dwelling on one particular failure or success as that could lead to organizational paralysis. Instead, Google intended to take risks and launch products early and often. Hundreds of projects went on at the same time. Most teams tried out new software in six aan Elgin, “Managing Googlé’s Idee Factory” Business Week 3 October 2005 lasue 3953, p88-90406-018-1 ‘weeks or less and looked at how users responded to it hours later. At Google, one success in ten tries was okay and one in five was superb. Everyone from a failed venture moved to another urgent project. Schmidt pointed out, “If something is successful, you work it in, somehow. If it fails, you leave." Meanwhile, without ample guidance or support, some engineers ended up feeling lost in Google's sea of techies. “Things have gotten unwieldy over there, I've seen people have months of man-hours flushed because it wasn't clear what (Google co-founders Larry [Page] and Sergey [Brin] wanted,” a former employee mentioned.” Mayer realized that as Google grew in size and strength, maintaining the pace of innovation would also be @ challenge. It would become increasingly difficult to convey a sense of empowerment to Google’s engineers and product managers. Over the years, many of Google's biggest products had bubbled up from the personal pet projects of its engineers. These included everything from Google News to its desktop search product, to Google's social-networking offering, known as Orkut. As Google's ranks swelled, convincing techies that they could have just as big an impact would not be easy. Google was trying to avoid the mistakes made by other fast-growing companies, To maintain its nimbleness, the management ensured that there was litle or no overlap among employees and projects. To avoid this situation, Google redoubled its commitment to very small teams. Google believed in the policy of ‘launching early and often’. ‘Though it had been easy till Google was a small startup, it was becoming increasingly difficult as Google's employee strength and market capitalization grew, with so much more at stake. To ensure it, the recruitment of correct personnel to Google would play an essential role. Mayer pointed out, “We need generalists. Lots of projects and companies grow without doing new things; they just get bigger teams. We want projects to end." Looking Ahead Google recorded revenues worth $ 6 billion in 2005, nearly twice the $ 3.2 billion revenue recorded in 2004. Google which had not been in the list of the 100 most powerful brands in the ‘world in 2004, joined the list straight at the 38" position in 2005”. The survey valued the brand at $ 8.64 billion in 2005. Telent continued to flock to Google which employed 5,000 painstakingly chosen people by then. Google had built a world where a well-chosen elite accommodated flexibility, shifting roles and, above all else, urgency. Schmidt and other insiders believed that they might have found a world-changing way to run a company. Industry observers believed that if Google was able to maintain its position on the crest of innovation, and continue to entice the best brains in the industry, it could lay the foundation for the next generation of corporate labs. Meanwhile as Google hired talented engineers with a wealth of expertise in browsers, operating systems, Wi-Fi Internet access, and mobile devices to operating systems and e-commerce, major tech companies started getting wary as it seemed that Google might be getting to enter the turf of giants like Microsoft (Operating system and browser) eBay, Motorola, Nokia, SBC Communications, and Verizon, Google’s stupendous growth had continued to attract the best talent even after its IPO. If Google continued to grow at this rate, analysts believed that organizational inertia could begin to set in, making new product launches more difficult. Mayer agreed, “People will say, ‘That doesn't live up to Google's standards, But, ultimately, Google's reputation becomes a burden." Could Google maintain its status as ‘the’ place people in the technology world wanted to work even as it continued to grow at this breathtaking pace? Quentin Hardy, “Google Thinks Smal, Forbes 14th November 2005, Vo. 176 Issue 10, 198.202 Fred Vogelstein and Jenny Mero, "Can Google Gow Up?” Fortune, [2° August 2003, Val 148 Issue 12, p38-43 ‘Quensin Hardy, “Google Thinks Small”, Frbes [4th November 2005, Vo 176 ls 10, pi98-202 Business Week Imertrand survey ended in August 2008 and August 2005 » Ben Elgin, "Managing Google's dea Factory”, Business Week 3° October 2005 lesve 3953, p88-90,406-018-1 Exhibit I Google’s Balance Sheet Balance Sheet & Cash Flow Statement Cash & marketable securities Accounts receivable 60 (cys ng ecg AR) Property and equipment, net Total assets Cash flow from operations Copitl expenditures 148,331 51994 a 53673 6B 455285, 718 Full Year 2005 ms HM aw SH NIG 2122287 BNR4 NT 2507288 29K796T TAANNE7 834247 154690 311A GO7STS 371.05 192% SeteIS «eT TE Qe 8 OU oN 3 188,255 STBSI6 SHIT 474809 STBSST DROME HLTH GT1.458 3.319.351 10271813 3885,199 4.497718 SASL 10271813 RSME STTOM 2458422 S962 SUKI MOTAT —B5NAOE {TEAM ABS — GBBT NAST 1STABY TANS TASHA Source-www. google.com406-018-1 Exhibit I Google’s revenue and headcount in 2005 Supplemental Information ful fear 206 m 1 mm Mm 4 2 G ow btlreveruesastattoalrevemes «2% Bh Entng permanent headcount 1p A 56RD GARD] ate Sepeidtestoat povids = Sh HERR Source-www. google.com Exhibit 1 Google’s revenue and headcount in 2004 Supplemental Information Full Year 204 a mB om 6lUlUlUCU Intirevenues es roftolatrevenues 22% OH MOH Ending permanent headcount a ES Seiethestooutgowhrde = 14% 1TH Source: www.google.com406-018-1 Exhibit IV Google’s revenue and headcount in 2003 Supplemental Information Full Year 2003 2002-2003 tt @ @ a Intlrevenuesas% oftotalrevenues 22% «20% = 2% HH HH Ending permanent heedcount 6821828 BES 1154 1,408 1,628, Sequential headcount growth rate 140% 130% HHH 18% Source:www.google.com "406-018-1 Bib! graphy 1. 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