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OBLICON Digests - Incomplete
OBLICON Digests - Incomplete
159017-18
March 9, 2011
2.
DECISION
1.
2.
ISSUE:
WON moral damages should be awarded in spite of the
fact that the respondents cause of action is
clearlybased on quasi-delict and the respondents did
not sustain physical injuries to be entitled under Art.
2219 (2), Civil Code.
HELD:
The petition is partially meritorious.
Respondents anchor their claim for damages on
Mendozas negligence, banking on Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
In impleading Lim, on the other hand, respondents
invoke the latters vicarious liability as espoused in
Article 2180 of the same Code:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business of industry.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court Resolves
to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal by certiorari.
a.
FACTS: Spouses, Luigi M. Guanio and Anna HernandezGuanio, booked respondent Makati Shangri-La Hotel for
their wedding reception. However, during the wedding
itself and even during the initial food tasting they
encountered unsatisfactory service from the
employees of the hotel. In that regard, the Guanio
spouses sent a letter-complaint to Makati Shangri-La
wherein the latter responded with an apology. Despite
that, the Guanio spouses still filed a Complaint for
default in the performance of the main obligationpayment of the loan- SSS was never entitled to recover
any penalty. If the demand for the payment of the
penalty was made prior to the extinguishment of the
obligation, Moonwalk would be in delay and therefore
liable for the penalty.
FACTS:
Ernesto V. Santos and Santos Ventura Hocorma
Foundation, Inc. (SVHFI) were plaintiff and defendant,
respectively, in several civil cases. On October 26,
1990, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement
wherein Foundation shall pay Santos P14.5 Million in
the following manner:
a. P1.5 Million immediately upon the execution of this
agreement; and
b. The balance of P13 Million shall be paid, whether in
lump sum or in installments, at thediscretion of the
Foundation, within a period of not more than two (2)
years from the execution of thisagreement.
In compliance, Santos moved for the dismissal of the
cases, while SVHFI paid the initial P1.5 million. After
several demands, SVHFI failed to pay the balance of
P13 million, prompting Santos to apply for the issuance
of a writ of execution of the compromise judgment of
the RTC dated September 30, 1991.
Twice, SVHFIs properties were auctioned and sold to
Riverland, Inc.
On June 2, 1995, Santos and Riverland Inc. filed a
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages alleging
delay on the part of SVHFI in paying the balance. They
further alleged that under the Compromise Agreement,
the obligation became due on October26, 1992, but
payment of the remaining balance was effected only
on November 22, 1994. Thus, respondents prayed that
petitioner be ordered to pay legal interest on the
obligation, penalty, attorney's fees and costs of
litigation. SVHFI alleged that the legal interest on
account of fault or delay was not due and payable,
considering that the obligation had been superseded
by the compromise agreement. Moreover, SVHFI
argued that absent a stipulation, Santos must ask for
judicial intervention for purposes of fixing the period.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
On October of 1991 Polo Pantaleon with his family
joined an escorted tour of Western Europe organized by
Trafalgar Tours of Europe in October of 1991. Upon
arriving in Amsterdam, second to the last day of the
tour, the group failed to engage in sight-seeing, but
agreed to do so the following day.
The following day, the last day of the tour, the group
arrived at the Coster Diamond House
in Amsterdam around 10 minutes before 9:00
a.m. While in the showroom, Mrs. Pantaleon selected a
2.5 karat diamond pendant and chain, all of which
totaled U.S. $13,826.00.
To pay for these purchases, Pantaleon presented his
American Express credit card together with his
passport to the Coster sales clerk. The sales clerk took
the cards imprint, and asked Pantaleon to sign the
charge slip. The charge purchase was then referred
electronically to respondents Amsterdam office at 9:20
a.m.
Ten minutes later, the store clerk informed Pantaleon
that his AmexCard had not yet been approved. After
his son went and informed their departure, the store
manager though asked plaintiff to wait a few more
minutes. After 15 minutes, the store manager informed
Pantaleon that respondent had demanded bank
references. Pantaleon supplied the names of his
depositary banks, then instructed his daughter to
return to the bus and apologize to the tour group for
the delay.
45 minutes after Pantaleon had presented his
AmexCard, and 30 minutes after the tour group was
supposed to have left the store, Coster decided to
release the items even without respondents approval
of the purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned to the
bus. It is alleged that their offers of apology were met
by their tourmates with stony silence.
After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon
family proceeded to the United States before returning
to Manila on 12 November 1992. While in the United
States, Pantaleon continued to use his AmEx card,
several times without hassle or delay, but with two
other incidents similar to the Amsterdam brouhaha.
On 30 October 1991, Pantaleon purchased golf
equipment amounting to US $1,475.00 using his AmEx
card, but he cancelled his credit card purchase and
borrowed money instead from a friend, after more than
30 minutes had transpired without the purchase having
been approved. On 3 November 1991, Pantaleon used
the card to purchase childrens shoes worth $87.00 at a
store in Boston, and it took 20 minutes before this
transaction was approved by respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not American Express committed a breach
of contract.
HELD
Yes. The findings of the trial court, to our mind, amply
established that the tardiness on the part of
respondent in acting on petitioners purchase at Coster
did constitute culpable delay on its part in complying
with its obligation to act promptly on its customers
purchase request, whether such action be favorable or
unfavorable.
The culpable failure of respondent herein is not the
failure to timely approve petitioners purchase, but the
more elemental failure to timely act on the same,
whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that
respondents credit authorizers did not have sufficient
basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason
why respondent could not have promptly informed
petitioner the reason for the delay, and duly advised
him that resolving the same could take some time. In
that way, petitioner would have had informed basis on
whether or not to pursue the transaction at Coster,
given the attending circumstances. Instead, petitioner
was left uncomfortably dangling in the chilly autumn
winds in a foreign land and soon forced to confront the
wrath of foreign folk.
It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner
is entitled to damages is not simply because
respondent incurred delay, but because the delay, for
which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the
particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code
for which moral damages are remunerative. Moral
damages do not avail to soothe the plaints of the
simply impatient, so this decision should not be cause
for relief for those who time the length of their credit
card transactions with a stopwatch. The somewhat
unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at
Coster that there was a deadline for the completion of
that purchase by petitioner before any delay would
redound to the injury of his several traveling
ISSUE:
Whether GLOBE should be liable for the
remainder of the 5 year term.
HELD:
No, GLOBE should not be held liable for such events.
What is contemplated by fortuitous event in Article
1174 of the Civil Code is not those events which could
not have been foreseen. This also include events which
are foreseeable but inevitable and cannot be under the
control of the parties to a contract. The Senates
resolution not to extend such treaty is considered to be
force majeure and cannot be in the control of GLOBE
and PHILCOMSAT. Since the US was only able to
evacuate their personnel and facilities only on
December 31, 1992, it was correctly held by the trial
court and affirmed by the CA that GLOBE is still obliged
to pay until then.
BMMC also filed a complaint against AIDSISA and BMACMA seeking specific performance of milling contract.
It alleges that Gatuslao/AIDSISA violated the contract
Eastern Shipping vs CA
GR No. 97412, 12 July 1994
234 SCRA 78
FACTS
Two fiber drums were shipped owned by Eastern Shipping from Japan. The shipment as insured with a marine
policy. Upon arrival in Manila unto the custody of metro Port Service, which excepted to one drum, said to be in bad
order and which damage was unknown the Mercantile Insurance Company. Allied Brokerage Corporation received the
shipment from Metro, one drum opened and without seal. Allied delivered the shipment to the consignees warehouse.
The latter excepted to one drum which contained spillages while the rest of the contents was adulterated/fake. As
consequence of the loss, the insurance company paid the consignee, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of
action of consignee against the defendants Eastern Shipping, Metro Port and Allied Brokerage. The insurance company
filed before the trial court. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff an ordered defendants to pay the former with
present legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. On appeal by defendants, the
appellate court denied the same and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the applicable rate of legal interest is 12% or 6%.
(2) Whether the payment of legal interest on the award for loss or damage is to be computed from the time the
complaint is filed from the date the decision appealed from is rendered.
HELD
(1)
The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from the decision of the court a quo. When an
obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damaes
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executor, the rate of legal interest shall
be 12% per annum from such finality until satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent
to a forbearance of money.
The interest due shall be 12% PA to be computed fro default, J or EJD.
(2)
From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or EJ but when such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shll begin to run only from the date of judgment
of the court is made.
(3) The Court held that it should be computed from the decision rendered by the court a quo.
6. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R.
CONTRERAS, Petitioners
-versus-
July 01,
By Grace
Facts:
Issues:
Held:
So ordered.
2.
Facts:
Gaite was appointed by Fonacier as attorney-in-fact to contract any party for the exploration and development of
mining claims. Gaite executed a deed of assignment in favor of a single proprietorship owned by him. For some
reasons, Fonacier revoked the agency, which was acceded to by Gaite, subject to certain conditions, one of which
being the transfer of ores extracted from the mineral claims for P75,000, of which P10,000 has already been paid upon
signing of the agreement and the balance to be paid from the first letter of credit for the first local sale of the iron ores.
To secure payment, Fonacier delivered a surety agreement with Larap Mines and some of its stockholders, and another
one with Far Eastern Insurance. When the second surety agreement expired with no sale being made on the ores,
Gaite demanded the P65,000 balance. Defendants contended that the payment was subject to the condition that the
ores will be sold.
Issue:
(1) Whether the sale is conditional or one with a period
(2) Whether there were insufficient tons of ores
Held:
(1) The shipment or local sale of the iron ore is not a condition precedent (or suspensive) to the payment of the
balance of P65,000.00, but was only a suspensive period or term. What characterizes a conditional obligation is the
fact that its efficacy or obligatory force (as distinguished from its demandability) is subordinated to the happening of a
future and uncertain event; so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the
conditional obligation had never existed.
A contract of sale is normally commutative and onerous: not only does each one of the parties assume a correlative
obligation (the seller to deliver and transfer ownership of the thing sold and the buyer to pay the price),but each party
anticipates performance by the other from the very start. While in a sale the obligation of one party can be lawfully
subordinated to an uncertain event, so that the other understands that he assumes the risk of receiving nothing for
what he gives (as in the case of a sale of hopes or expectations,emptio spei), it is not in the usual course of business to
do so; hence, the contingent character of the obligation must clearly appear. Nothing is found in the record to evidence
that Gaite desired or assumed to run the risk of losing his right over the ore without getting paid for it, or that Fonacier
understood that Gaite assumed any such risk. This is proved by the fact that Gaite insisted on a bond a to guarantee
payment of the P65,000.00, an not only upon a bond by Fonacier, the Larap Mines & Smelting Co., and the company's
stockholders, but also on one by a surety company; and the fact that appellants did put up such bonds indicates that
they admitted the definite existence of their obligation to pay the balance of P65,000.00.
The appellant have forfeited the right court below that the appellants have forfeited the right to compel Gaite to wait
for the sale of the ore before receiving payment of the balance of P65,000.00, because of their failure to renew the
bond of the Far Eastern Surety Company or else replace it with an equivalent guarantee. The expiration of the bonding
company's undertaking on December 8, 1955 substantially reduced the security of the vendor's rights as creditor for
the unpaid P65,000.00, a security that Gaite considered essential and upon which he had insisted when he executed
the deed of sale of the ore to Fonacier.
(2) The sale between the parties is a sale of a specific mass or iron ore because no provision was made in their
contract for the measuring or weighing of the ore sold in order to complete or perfect the sale, nor was the price of
P75,000,00 agreed upon by the parties based upon any such measurement.(see Art. 1480, second par., New Civil
Code). The subject matter of the sale is, therefore, a determinate object, the mass, and not the actual number of units
or tons contained therein, so that all that was required of the seller Gaite was to deliver in good faith to his buyer all of
the ore found in the mass, notwithstanding that the quantity delivered is less than the amount estimated by them.
Rustan Pulp vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Consumer (D) vs. Supplier
(P)
GR 70789
[T]
Summary: A paper mill started operations and accepted offers to supply raw materials from several suppliers. One
supplier executed a contract with the paper mill with a condition that the paper mill has the right to stop accepting
deliveries whenever the supply was sufficient. The paper mill exercised that right, but continued accepting periodic
deliveries from other suppliers.
Rule of Law: When the fulfillment of the condition depends on the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation
shall be void.
Article 1182, Civil Code.
Facts: When Rustan Pulp & Paper Mills (D) started operations Romeo Lluch (P) offered to supply raw materials. Rustan
Pulp (D) proposed a non-exclusive contract to buy wood pulp from Lluch (P). However, a condition in the contract gave
Rustan Pulp (D) the right to stop accepting deliveries when the supply became sufficient until such time the raw
materials are needed.
During the test run of the pulp mill, major defects on the machinery were discovered prompting the Japanese supplier
of the machinery to recommend the stoppage of the deliveries. The suppliers were informed to stop deliveries, but
were not informed as to the reasons for the stoppage.
Lluch (P) sought to clarify the tenor of the notice as to whether stoppage of delivery or termination of the contract of
sale was intended, but Rustan Pulp (D) failed to reply. This alleged ambiguity notwithstanding, Lluch (P) and the other
suppliers resumed deliveries after a series of talks between Lluch (P) and Romeo Vergara, the manager of Rustan Pulp
(D).
Later, Lluch (P) filed a complaint for breach of contract. The case was dismissed, but at the same time, the court
enjoined Rustan Pulp (D) to honor the contract. On appeal, the court ruled that Rustan Pulp's (D) suspension of
deliveries was not in the lawful exercise of its rights under the contract of sale.
Issues: Is the suspension of deliveries by Rustan (D) a proper exercise of its rights under the contract of sale?
Ruling: No. There is basis for the apprehension on the illusory resumption of deliveries at Rustan Pulp (D) because the
prerogative suggests a condition solely dependent upon its exclusive will. The literal import of contested condition is
that Rustan Pulp (D) can stop delivery of pulp wood from Lluch (P) if the supply at the plant is sufficient as ascertained
by Rustan Pulp (D), subject to re-delivery when the need arises as determined likewise by Rustan Pulp (D).
A purely potestative imposition of this character must be obliterated from the face of the contract without affecting the
rest of the stipulations considering that the condition relates to the fulfillment of an already existing obligation and not
to its inception (Civil Code Annotated, by Padilla, 1987 Edition, Volume 4, Page 160).
A condition which is both potestative (or facultative) and resolutory may be valid, even though the saving clause is left
to the will of the obligor as this Court ruled in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao (43 Phil. 873). But the Taylor case, which allowed
a condition for unilateral cancellation dependent on the arrival of factory machinery, cannot be applied because the
facts relate to the birth of the undertaking and not to the fulfillment of an existing obligation.
Palay Inc. v. Clave
G.R. No. L-56076 September 21, 1983
Facts:
1.
On March 28, 1965, petitioner Palay, Inc.,
through its President, Albert Onstott sold a parcel of
land owned by the corporation to the private
respondent, Nazario Dumpit, by virtue of a Contract to
Sell. The sale price was P23,300.00 with 9% interest
RESCISSION OR TERMINATION
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pryce is entitled to future rentals as
provided in the contract even if PAGCOR contends, as
the CA ruled, that Article 1659 of the Civil Code
governs; hence, PPC is allegedly no longer entitled to
future rentals, because it chose to rescind the
Contract.
(2) Whether or not PAGCOR should be exempt from
complying with its contractual obligations due to
fortuitous events
(3) Whether or not the future rentals constitute a
penalty clause
OTHER NOTES:
(2) PAGCOR is not exempt from complying with the
provisions as rallies and demonstrations are not
considered fortuitous events.