Abend - 2007 - The Meaning of Theory

The Meaning of 'Theory'
Author(s): Gabriel Abend

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jun., 2008), pp. 173-199
Published by: American Sociological Association
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The Meaning
of 'Theory'*
GABRIEL ABEND
Northwestern
University
'Theory' is one of themost importantwords in the lexicon of contemporary so
ciology. Yet, theirubiquity notwithstanding, it is quite unclear what sociologists
mean by thewords 'theory,' 'theoretical,' and 'theorize.' I argue that confusions
about themeaning of 'theory' have brought about undesirable consequences, in
cluding conceptual muddles and even downrightmiscommunication. In thispaper
I tackle two questions: (a) what does 'theory'mean in the sociological language?;
and (b) what ought 'theory' to mean in the sociological language? I proceed in
five stages. First, I explain why one should ask a semantic question about 'theory.'
Second, I lexicographically identifyseven differentsenses of theword, which I dis
tinguishby means of subscripts.Third, I show some difficulties that the current
lack of semantic clarity has led sociology to. Fourth, I articulate the question,
'what ought "theory" to mean?,' which I dub the 'semantic predicament' (SP),
and I consider what one can learn about it from the theory literature.Fifth, I
recommend a 'semantic therapy' for sociology, and advance two arguments about
SP: (a) the principle of practical reason-SP is to a large extent a political issue,
which should be addressed with the help of political mechanisms; and (b) the
principle of ontological and epistemological pluralism-the solution to SP should
not be too ontologically and epistemologically demanding.
1. INTRODUCTION
'Theory' is one of themost important words in the lexicon of contemporary sociol
ogy. I am not referring only-in
to the subfield of sociological
fact, not principally
The words 'theory,''theoretical,'

and 'theorize'are constantlyand consequen
theory.
tially used by all sociologists. For instance, one way of describing what sociologists
of social movements do is to say that they develop 'theories' about social movements.
What sociologists of the family do is to develop 'theories' about the family.And so
on. Moreover,
it is a widespread belief that empirical sociological research should
be driven or informed by 'theory.' Thus, sociology journals tend to reject 'atheoret
ical' and
'undertheorized'
papers, as well as papers
that fail to make
'theoretical
*
to: Gabriel Abend, Department
Direct
of Sociology, Northwestern
1810
correspondence
University,
IL 60208 (g-abend@northwestern.edu).
The origins of this paper lie in an in
Chicago Ave., Evanston,
vitation to reflect on the present and future of sociological
theory. I am thankful to the organizers of
the Junior Theorists Symposium
2005?Mathieu
and Neil Gross?for
this in
Deflem, Marion
Fourcade,
I also benefited from conversations with fellow "junior
vitation, and to my discussant, Charles Camic.
theorists" Pierre Kremp,
Simone Polillo,
Isaac Reed, Erika Summers-Ef?ler,
Jonathan VanAntwerpen,
and Robb Willer.
I presented a slightly different version of the argument at the 2005 Annual Retreat
of the Society for Comparative
hosted by Central European
Research,
University. At this conference I
as well as from Carsten Schneider and
received useful suggestions from my discussant,
Jack Goldstone,
Robin Stryker. Finally, I am indebted to Sareeta Amrute, Charles Camic, Mathieu Deflem, Marion
Four
cade, Neil Gross, Carol Heimer, Adam Kissel, Donald
Levine, Richard Morales, Michael
Sauder, Arthur
B. Terhune, and the Sociological
Stinchcombe, Devin
Theory editors and reviewers for their comments
and criticisms on earlier drafts of this paper.
Sociological
Theory 26:2
C) American
Sociological
June 2008
Association.
1430 K
Street NW, Washington,
DC
20005

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
174
inequality,education,
contribution'to the literature(be the paper's subject-matter
gender,or culture).Sociologists'business is to 'theorize'about social things.Indeed,
thatsociologyoffers'theories'about social thingsis arguablywhat makes itcount
it fromtheaccountsof societythatlaypersons,
as a social science(and differentiates
poets, and journalistsoffer).
But what exactlydo sociologistsmean by thewords 'theory,''theoretical,'and
we shall see that it is quite unclearwhat
Their ubiquitynotwithstanding,
'theorize'?
we shall also see
thesewordsmean in the sociological language.More importantly,
that this is not at all an abstractphilosophicalproblem,unrelated to the actual
semanticconfusionsabout the
productionof sociologicalknowledge.Unfortunately,
word 'theory'have led tomuchmiscommunication,insideand outside thesubfieldof
Rather thanan abstractphilosophicalproblem,thisis a practical
sociologicaltheory.
problem,which insofaras agreed-uponlogicaland semanticbases are a prerequisite
forany sortof epistemicprogress sociologycannot neglect.
mean in
Thus, in thispaper I tackle twomain questions: (a) what does 'theory'
in
to
mean
the
and
what
sociological
ought
'theory'
the sociological language?;
(b)
language?
I proceed
in five stages. First, I very briefly explain why it is a good
idea
what 'theory'and
to ask a semanticquestion about 'theory.'Second, I investigate
sociologistsin different
some of its inflectedformsare taken tomean by different
sociologicalcontexts.I findseven sensesof theword,which I distinguishbymeans
of subscripts(theory,,theory2,theory3,
etc.).Third, I considerwhetherthepolysemy
of 'theory' is a good or a bad thing. As this introductory section suggests, I believe

the latter to be the case, so section 4 brings out some difficulties that the current
stateof semanticaffairshas gottensociologistsinto.Up to thatpoint, theargument

is that the extensionand intensionof theword 'theory'are unclear,and that this
has broughtabout undesirableconsequences.The fourthstageofmy argumentis to
ask what
is to be done about
this problem. How
ought sociologists
to use the word
This iswhat I dub the 'semanticpredicament'(SP). Then I considerwhat

'theory'?
learn from the theory literature, both in terms of missteps to be avoided

and insights to be built on. Fifth, I recommend a 'semantic therapy' for sociology,
SP is to
and advance two arguments about SP: (a) the principle of practical reason
a large extent a political issue, which should be addressed with the help of political
one can
mechanisms;and (b) theprincipleof ontologicaland epistemologicalpluralism the

demanding.
solution to SP shouldnot be too ontologicallyand epistemologically
2. A MATTER
OF MEANING?
'What is theory?' 'What is a good theory?' 'What is theory for?' These are three
questions to which sociologists have certainly given a lot of thought. Let us call them,
the ontologicalquestion, the evaluativequestion, and the teleological

respectively,
like to raise an apparently more basic and apparently simpler

question. I would
one: 'what does "theory" mean?'1 Let us call this the 'semantic, question' (SQ). I
say that SQ seems to be a more basic question, because the other three presuppose
some stance on it. SQ
seems to be a simpler question
as well. Unlike
the ontological
*I follow John Lyons's (1977) typographical conventions, although making a few modifications:
(i) single
rather than used); 2. for the
1. for lexemes and expressions
(when they are mentioned
quotation marks:
marks
within
double
citation of sentences; 3. instead of double quotation
(ii) double
quotation marks;
from other authors; 3. for titles of articles; 4. instead
1. for meanings;
2. for quotations
quotation marks:
of single quotation marks within single quotation marks;
(iii) italics: 1. for emphasis; 2. for titles of books
and journals; 3. for words in languages other than English.

THE MEANING OF 'THEORY'
175
essences,being,and
question,itdoes not forceus to thinkaboutmetaphysics,reality,
the like.Unlike theevaluativequestion, itdoes not involvethe tricky
predicate '(be)
good.' Unlike the teleologicalquestion, it does not appear to require thatwe are
clear about thenatureand aims of sociologyRather,consideringthatsociologists
frequently use the word
'theory,' SQ just asks what
paper or stringof sounds.
In order to show why it is a good
it ismeant
by thatmark on the
idea to raise SQ and what one may
learn from
it, letme propose a thoughtexperiment.

Suppose a personnamed Jonesutteredthe
You can have eitherof two
words: 'It neversnows inChicago in January.'
following
reactions to this statement. One
actually
is to think that Jones has a false belief. Since you have

you know all too well that it does snow there
lived a few years in Chicago,
in January.
ProbablyJonesgot thatpiece of information
froman unreliablesource,
which shemistakenlytook to be a reliableone. In all likelihood,shehas never lived
A secondpossible reactionis to thinkthatJonesis confusedabout the
thereherself.
meaning of thewords she is using (forexample,youmay speculatethatherEnglish
isbad). Perhapswhat she intendsto assert is, 'It oftensnows inChicago in January,'
but has confoundedthe adverbsof frequency'never'and 'often.'If thiswere the
then Jones would have a true belief. Or, she might have intended to affirm
in July,' but got the English names of the months
that 'it never snows in Chicago
case,
wrong. Similarly,theproblemmight lie inwhat theword 'Chicago' is takento refer

to. If by 'Chicago' Jonesis referring
to the largestcity in theU.S. stateof Illinois,
whose mayor isRichardM. Daley, etc., thenher statementis patentlyfalse.But
to a small townsomewhereinSouthAmerica, also named
maybe Jonesis referring
'Chicago,'where itneversnows in January.
The generalpoint is that,as Donald Davidson (1984:142)puts it, '[i]fall we have
to go on is thefactof honestutterance,
we cannot inferthebeliefwithoutknowing
themeaning,
and have no chance of inferring themeaning without
the belief.' So, as
whetherJoneshas an untrueunderstanding
thingsstand,it is impossibletodetermine
of Chicago's weatheror an untrueunderstanding
ofwhat theEnglishword 'never'
means. To put itwithout bringingepistemicprivilegesintoplay, it is impossibleto
determinewhether thedisagreementbetweenJonesand you is one ofmeaning or
belief. And
if the former is the case, any discussion
you have with Jones about
the
will be futile,and probablyfrustrating.

occurrenceof snow inChicago in January
I thinkthatsomethinglike this is at thebottomof sociologists'unremitting
dis
agreements about
'theory.' Sociology
has been plagued by disputes over what a good
where theoryshouldgo,whether
theoryis,what constitutesa theoretical
contribution,
has
made
theoretical
which
theoretical
progress,
sociology
paradigm should be fa
vored, what the functions of theory are, what it is for a paper to be an atheoretical
one, and so on. These disputes have been framed as being about the nature, features,
and futureof a certainentitythat theword 'theory'is supposed to pick

functions,
out, not as being about what exactly it is that theword
'theory' picks out. This fram
ing ismisguided. I argue thatbeforeany progresscan be made on those important

questions,certainconfusionsabout ourwords and conceptsmust be clearedup.
For example, suppose
that A, B, and C are three sociologists, and they engage in a
discussionabout thequestion, 'how should theorybe judged?'Now, when A speaks

of 'theory'shemainly thinksof an ongoingdialoguewith someclassic texts.
When B
of propositionsof theform
speaksof 'theory'shemainly thinksof theconstruction
'ifp then q.' And when C speaks of 'theory' she mainly thinks of the development
of lexica and schemata with which to talk about the social world. Not surprisingly,
A, B, and C find it impossibleto come to an agreementabout thequestionunder

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
176
of thissituationis not thatA, B,

discussion.Yet themost reasonableinterpretation
and C have a substantivedisagreementabout how theoryshould be judged, but
things.
That theyare indeed talkingabout
ratherthat theyare talkingaboutdifferent
different
thingsshouldnot be obscuredby thefactthattheyhappen to use thesame
Englishword (or, to be more precise,thatnearly identicalphonemes come out of
their
mouths).
A, B, and C illustratethekindof problemthatmany argumentsand debatesabout
'theory'have sufferedfrom: theybypass SQ, and startdirectlywith ontological,
evaluative,or teleologicalquestionsabout the 'object'everyoneis purportedlyrefer
Very
of SQ has broughtaboutmuchmiscommunication.
ringto.The circumvention
word
use
the
same
who
paradigms,
under
different
working
much like scientists
concepts (Kuhn 1970), oftentimessociologistsliter
e.g., 'mass' to expressdifferent
ally talk past one another. In a snowball
fashion, it has also brought about further
semanticand conceptualconfusions,as 'theory'(howeverconceived) is at theheart

of severalother sociologicalproblems,debates,projects,and institutions.
In brief,thereare threereasonswhy sociologyneeds a semanticanalysisof 'theory.'
withoutwhich therecan be
and communication,
First, itwill improveunderstanding
discussion.Second, itwill prevent
no productive(indeed,no meaningful)substantive
I call in section 4 the 'Socratic error': the belief that theory is an object out
there that our concepts or language can track down. As we shall see, A, B, and C
what
will neverfindoutwhose definitionreallyrefersand whose definitionfails to refer,

for 'theory.'
Consequently(third),itwill
because thereisno realor objectivereferent
show that how one ought to use the word
'theory' is to a great extent a political or
practical-reasonproblem.
In thenext section I identifysevendifferentsenses of theword 'theory'in the
sociological
language. Yet before moving
on to this task, I would
like to add an
importantcaveat.The problemssociology is interestedin can be neithersolvednor

dissolvedbymeans of conceptualor linguisticanalysis.For theseare genuineprob
lems, not mere
linguistic puzzles. What
I argue
is just that they would
be much
more profitablyaddressed ifour words and conceptswere clearer.Let me illustrate

the point. Consider an imaginary world in which an omnipotent tyrant could force
A, B, and C to eliminate the word 'theory' from their vocabularies. From now on,
the word
she would declare, in sociology the word 'theory' shall be meaningless;
'gavagai' shall mean "ongoing dialogue with some classic texts"; the word 'ravagai'
shall mean "construction of propositions of the form 'ifp then q' "; and the word
'savagai' shall mean "development of lexica and schemata with which to talk about
the social world." In some respects this decree would make things better: A, B, and
with more precisionwhat it is

will identify
C will have fewermisunderstandings,
conversationsabout theseissues
thattheydisagreeabout, and will havemore fruitful
most of thefundamentalproblemswill remainuntouched.
of discord.Nevertheless,
not have made any progress at all on questions such

as: Is gavagai (ravagai, savagai, tavagai) beneficial, useful, important, necessary, etc.?
If it turns out that all of them are legitimate parts of the discipline, how do they
fit together? How should they be weighed? Nor would one have made any progress
at all on questions internal to each of these parts, such as: What is a good gavagai
(ravagai, savagai, tavagai)? What is gavagai for?What gavagais are true, valid, plau
sible, 'warrantedly assertible,' etc.? How does one tell a true from a false gavagai?
Who are the classics of sociological gavagai? These problems are not an artifact of
First and foremost, one would
our linguistic practices, rules, and conventions, and hence cannot be settled by any
clarificationofwhat wordsmean or what thingsare called.

177

3. THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF 'THEORY'
I would likenow to distinguishsevendifferentthingsthat sociologistsmay mean

My task in thissection is not evaluativebut de
when theyuse theword 'theory.'
Iwant to givean empiricalaccountof different
Like thelexicographer,
scriptive.
ways
in which a particular word
is used by competent speakers of a certain language
(see
Allan 2001; Cruse 1986;Landau 2001; Sager 2000). Each of thesesenses is used by
some reasonablylargenumberof peoplewhom one can reasonablycall 'sociologists.'
However,each of themmay be consideredsemanticallyinaccurateor even incorrect
by someotherpeople,whom one can reasonablycall 'sociologists'as well. Still, these
people will probablynot say that itdoes notmake any sense, that theutteranceis
that thespeakerknowsnothingabout sociology,or thatshe is out of
unintelligible,
hermind.
It is crucial to realize thedifferences
betweenmy lexicographicexerciseand the
usual attemptsto distinguish
kinds,types,or formsof theory,theoretical
approaches,
etc.These attemptsaddress themselvesto theontologicalques
ways of theorizing,
But thisquestionpresupposesan un
kindsof theory?'
tion, 'whatare thedifferent
kinds to be found.For example,you
of
of
there
are
derlyingconcept theory, which
thedifferent'theoretical
schools' thatexist in sociology,and
may setout to identify
come to the conclusion
that there are four of them: SI, S2, S3, and S4. However, you
are committinga petitioprincipiihere:while it is quite clearwhat it is about these

four thingsthatmakes them 'schools,'you are begging thequestion of what it is
thatmakes
them 'theoretical' ones in the first place.
of theory what allows you to tell what
is and what
It is your own, a priori concept

is not a theory or a theoretical
school. In addition,you are performatively

making a strongnormativeclaim.You
are indeedtakingsides in theverydispute these 'theoreticalschools'have overwhat
theory is. In all probability, SI does not see any theory at all in the projects carried
out by S2, S3, and S4 (and vice versa). But you disagree: according to you, S2, S3, and
S4 are genuine theoreticalschools-that iswhy theyare includedin your typology.

By contrast,
my semanticapproachdoes not presupposea conceptof theory.It does
notmake any ontologicalcommitments
or normativeclaims. It just reportson what
mean
seem
to
when theyuse thewords 'theory,''theoretical,'
different
sociologists
and 'theorize.'
Theory,.
If you use
the word
'theory' in the sense of theory,, what you mean
systemof generalpropositions,
by it is a generalproposition,or logically-connected
which establishesa relationship
betweentwoormore variables.As an example,letus
consider the 'mass societyversion'of the 'breakdowntheory'of socialmovements:
"Individualsaremost likelyto join socialmovementswhen theyhave fewpersonal
ties within a community and a weak
sense of identification with
that community"
betweenthevariables 'like
(Useem 1980:357).This theoryestablishesa relationship
lihoodof joiningsocialmovements,''numberof personal tieswithina certaincom
of senseof identification
with a certaincommunity.'
But what
munity,'and 'strength
I would
like to stress is that if the theory were put in symbolic form, itwould
have
to be universallyquantified.The subjectof the sentenceis not 'some individuals,'

'latenineteenth-century
The theoryestablishes
individuals,'or 'Chineseindividuals.'
a relationship
between those threevariables ingeneral,independently
of thingslike
time and place.
Likewise,when it is said that 'empiricalinvestigations

shouldmake a theoretical
what is usuallymeant is that 'empiricalinvestigations
shouldmake a
contribution,'
contribution.'
For instance,supposeyouwrite a paper about two social
theoretical1

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
178
movements
that arose during the May
Revolution
of 1810 in Buenos
Aires. For
it
to be accepted forpublication in a mainstream sociologyjournal, some conclusion
about
social movements
in general must
have been drawn. Or,
it using a
to put
must have
euphemism,the empirical investigation
ubiquitous and highly-revealing
If
a
the
there
is
no
such
conclusion,
some
conclusion.
more general
'suggested'
benignly,
or,
more
would probablypointout thatthepaper is 'atheoretical'
reviewers
that it is 'undertheorized.'
In this
Theory2. A theory2 is an explanation of a particular social phenomenon.
sense, if you say that you have a 'theory' about the demise of the Valois dynasty in
late-sixteenth-century France, what you mean is that you can offer an explanation
a numberof 'factors'or 'conditions,'

which
of it.This explanationshould identify
individuallyshould pass some sortof counterfactualtestforcausal relevance,and
whose interactioneffectsshould be somehow taken intoaccount. (A theory2could
be an explanation of some other kind; I consider only causal explanations because of
their hegemony in contemporary sociology.) So, for example, a theory2 of the concept
of the self tells one why at a certain point in history such a concept came into being.
A
theory2 of the stock market
crash of October
1929
tells one what
brought
about. A theory2 of the victory of theWhite

in Uruguay tells one why it is that itwon.
Party in the 1860 presidential
the aims of theory2, some of which would
see theory, as a misguided
it
elections
of social explanationare compatiblewith

Several epistemologicalunderstandings
project. By
model of explanationposits a special relation

contrast,the deductive-nomological
As Hempel (1965:240) puts it, "in empiricalscience,
between theory,and theory2.
the explanation of a phenomenon consists in subsuming it under general empirical

laws." In this view, then, one or more theories, logically entail a certain theory2.
For instance, in order to explain why the Uruguayan White Party won in 1860, it
is necessary (and sufficient) to appeal to one or more general propositions about
voting behavior, electoral politics, party systems, and so on. What is important from
my point of view, however, is that even for the deductive-nomological model, theory,
and theory2remaindistinctentities.
Theory3. Like theory, and theory2, themain goal of a theory3 is to say something
in the social world. However, the main questions that
about empirical phenomena
theory3 sets out to answer are not of the type 'what x causes y?' Rather, given a
certain phenomenon P (or a certain fact, relation, process, trend), it asks: 'what does
itmean that P?,' 'is it significant that P?,' 'is it really the case that P?,' 'what is P
all about?,' or 'how can we make sense of or shed light on P?' Thus, one can think
of theory3 as a hermeneutical task, even if theorists3 interpret social reality rather
inclinations of the
than texts, and they do not necessarily share the philosophical
hermeneutical tradition. To put it another way, what theories3 offer is an original
'interpretation,' 'reading,' or 'way of making sense' of a certain slice of the empirical
world. They may shed new light on an empirical problem, help one understand some
social process, or reveal what 'really' went on in a certain conjuncture. Unlike theoryi,
theory3 does not view P as the value of a variable y, which in turn is related to other
variables in such a way that can be described by a function y = F(xl, X2,.
X).
Unlike theory2, theory3 may or may not causally explain P.
For example, that you have a theory3 of corruption in twentieth-century Latin
American politics does not mean that you have identified its causes. Nor does it
mean
that you know how this case fits into a system of social laws about poli
tics, corruption, the law, and morality, which specifies the 'conditions under which'
corruptionoccurs.Rather,youmay mean thatyour theoryhelps understandwhat

179
corruptionin twentieth-century
LatinAmericanpolitics 'is all about'; thatitprovides
Latin American politics;
a 'betterinterpretation'
of corruptionin twentieth-century
or thatit tellsa storyabout corruptionin twentieth-century
LatinAmericanpolitics
that is illuminating,
instructive,
helpful,or edifying.
Now, theexact natureof these
'interpretations'
is difficultto establisha priori,codify,and standardize.Therefore,
theory3
may strikeone as conceptuallyvague,methodologicallyproblematic,or just
While theyare rarerinU.S. sociology,theories3are a stapleof some
unscientific.
Latin American and European sociologicaltraditions(cf.Abend 2006).
Theory4.The word 'theory'and someof itsderivativesare sometimesused to refer
to the study of and
the students of the writings of authors
such as Marx, Weber,
Durkheim, Simmel,Parsons,Habermas, or Bourdieu. These 'studies'are variously

describedas 'interpretations,'
'analyses,''critiques,''hermeneutical
reconstructions,'
or 'exegeses.'
They ofteninvolvethestudyof 'meaning,'ineitherof thetwofollowing
of 'meaning.' First, theymay ask what the author of a text 'really' meant,
that is,what she wanted to say when she wrote a particular passage (or essay, book,
meanings
oeuvre).Most of the authorswith which theory4concerns itselfput forwardvery

which theyput forwardin a very complex style.Thus, their
complex arguments,
todiscussionaboutwhat exactlytheargumentis.In addition
writingslend themselves
to thesediscussions,one can reconstructthe logicof thesearguments,identify
how
thequestion is framedand how thisframingaffectsthe rangeof possible answers,
most of
spell out assumptions,crucial concepts,borrowed ideas,etc. Furthermore,
theseauthorshave produced a largebody of work, so theory4
may also consider
how theirthinkingevolved,and,more generally,
how theyrelateto theirancestors
and contemporaries.
theory4 may ask what
Second,
themeaning
of a certain text is
in anothersense,namely,what is its significance,

what was or
relevance,usefulness,
is original about
it, how it has been drawn upon, etc.
Most U.S. departmentsof sociologyhave on theirfacultyone or more persons

who are said tobe 'theorists.'
coursestheyteachare
The graduateand undergraduate
called 'sociologicaltheory,''social theory,''classicaltheory,''contemporary
typically
theory,'or somethinglike that.By saying 'theorists'and 'theorycourses' in these
means theorists4
contextsone generally
and theory4courses.Finally,note thatyou
can say that you:
'are' a theorist4; 'do' theory4; work
in the field of theory4; teach
a theory4class; havewrittena theory4

paper; or thatone of your scholarlyinterests
is theory4. In fact, in most
of these contexts
it is likely that the word
'theory' be
takentomean theory4.
However,you cannot have,have developed,or put forwarda
or 'putforward
theory4.If theexpressions'havea theory,''havedevelopeda theory,'
a theory' occur
in a sentence, the word
'theory' is not being used
in the sense of
Strangely,thepredicate '(be) a theory4'cannotbe applied to thecontentof

theory4.
a theory4 paper, to the product of the activity of doing theory4, or to the work of a
theorist4.
Theorys.A theory5is a Weltanschauung,
thatis,an overallperspectivefromwhich
one seesand interprets
and theories3,theories5
theworld.Unlike theories1,theories2,
are not about
the social world
itself, but about how to look at, grasp, and represent
it.That is, theories5focuson our conceptualand linguistic

equipment forexample,
the nature of the location from which we look at the social world, the lexicon and
syntax by means of which we talk about it, the nature of our conceptual scheme,
the categories into which we group things, and the logical relations that there can
be betweenconcepts.Obviously, these 'conceptual'and 'linguistic'choices entail,

are associated with, or are predicated upon many more general epistemological
and
ontologicalviews,which theorists5
may ormay not explicitly
articulate.
To name but

180
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
a few: what can be known, what
is worth knowing, what kind of questions
can be
asked,what countsas good evidence,

whom arewe talkingto,what thesocialworld
ismade of,what propertiescan theseentitieshave,how theyfittogether,
and so on.
In its ideal-typicalform,thecore of a theory5does not have truth-values.
While
its actualmanifestationsoften include theories,and theories2,this is not logically
necessary.For the thrustof theory5is, so to speak, syntacticratherthan semantic.
In otherwords, theories5(again, in theirideal-typicalform)do not offerproposi
tionsaboutwhat the socialworld is like (e.g., 'Education is correlatedwith political
participation'
or 'The main
crisis'). Rather,
cause of the fall of the Roman Empire was an economic

they offer a way of looking at it or a way of talking about it (e.g.,
'Societycan be thoughtof as a system'or 'The social world can be understood

as containingobjectswith propertiesand variableswith values').2 Indeed, thereare
betweentheory5andKant's categoriesof understanding.
The
interesting
similarities
ory5 can be seen as providing one with an a priori framework (scheme, grid, map,
net, plan), a frameworkthat is independentfromexperience,logicallyprior to any

contactwith the social world. Thus, itwould provide the conditionsfor the very
theconditionsforthe intelligibility
possibilityof experience(or,more conservatively,
of experience).
When one speaks of 'postmoderntheory,''poststructuralist
theory,''feministthe
ory,' 'queertheory,''criticaltheory,''Marxisttheory,''structural-functionalist
theory,'
'networkexchange theory,''game theory,'and 'rationalchoice theory,'one is often
using the word
'theory' in this sense. Theory5
can also occur as an adjective
in ex
pressionssuch as 'theoretical
school,' 'theoretical
framework,'
approach,' 'theoretical
'theoretical
perspective,''theoreticaltradition,''theoretical
viewpoint,''orientingthe
oretical strategy,' and 'theoretical paradigm.'
This last one, of course, draws a parallel
betweenthefieldof sociologicaltheoryandKuhn's accountof thehistoryof science

which is
(Ritzer 1980).Another common example is the expression 'theory-laden,'
oftenpredicatedof 'observation'or 'perception.'
Theory6.Lexicographerstracetheetymologyof theword 'theory'to the lateLatin
noun 'theoria,'and theGreek noun 'theoria'and verb 'theorein'(usuallytranslatedas
"to look at," "to observe," "to see," or "to contemplate").
The connotations
of these
and vision.This etymology

words includedetachment,spectatorship,
contemplation,
notwithstanding,
some people use theword 'theory'to referto accounts thathave
a fundamentalnormativecomponent.This usage I identify
as theory6.For exam
ple, thecontemporary
projectsof 'criticaltheory,''feminist
theory,'and 'postcolonial
theory'are explicitlynormativeones,which usually rejectthefact/valuedichotomy,
and hence the supposedly value-neutral sociological
theory. The same is true of a
good deal of 'Marxist theory' and 'neo-Marxist theory,' which draw inspiration from
Marx's elevenththesison Feuerbach. Indeed, theexpression'social theory' as op

At least, self-defined
posed to 'sociologicaltheory'-can have similarconnotations.
'social
theorists' are more
formy purposes
likely to do theory6 than, say, theory,. The basic point

is that the word 'theory' can be used to refer to a normative, and
indeedpolitical,account-a farcry fromother sensesof it. (The expression 'social

theory'transcendsthe disciplineof sociologyand has close connectionswith the
humanities
see, e.g., Christian
1988; de Man
1986; Jay 1996; Knapp
and Michaels
about what the social world

these statements are presented as propositions
is like (e.g.,
2Sometimes
is a variable,'
'Social life is sl theatrical performance').
'Society is a system,' 'Society is a text,' 'Education
I take these formulations to be ellipses of 'Society can be (profitably) thought of as a system,' 'Society can
be (profitably) thought of as a text,' etc. For how could the truth-value of 'Society is a text' or 'Education
is a variable' be determined?

181
1982. In fact, 'social theorists'deliberatelytryto transcenddisciplinaryboundaries.

Not surprisingly,
'social theory'has been used in a numberof different
ways.More
between 'sociologicaltheory'and 'so
over,theseusages, as well as therelationships
cial theory,'have considerablychanged over time thinkof 'social theory'as used
by Stinchcombe[1968],
Merton [1949,1968],Goode [1973],or Coleman [1990].Un
fortunately, I cannot carry out a thorough analysis of 'social theory' in this paper
[seeSeidman and Alexander (2001)].)

Theory7.Many sociologistshavewrittenabout issues such as the 'micro-macro
problem,' the 'problemof structureand agency,'or 'theproblemof social order.'
This typeofwork isusually thoughtto fallwithin thedomain of sociologicaltheory.
One may also use the word
'theory' to refer to discussions
about the ways
in which
statusof sociology(value freedom,the

'reality'is 'sociallyconstructed';thescientific
idea of a social law, the relationsbetweenexplanationand prediction,explanation
and understanding,reasonsand causes, and the like);or the 'relativity'
ofmorality.
In theseexamples theword 'theory'assumesa distinct
meaning,which I distinguish
as theory7.
Theory7projectsoften includetheory4elements(for instance,a reconstruction
of
whatMarx, Weber, and Durkheim said about theproblemunder consideration,or
what
they would
have said had
they considered
it). Moreover,
as a matter of fact,
are oftentheorists4
as well. Yet, whateveritsusefulnessor reasonableness,
theorists7
thiscorrelationis not necessarybut contingent.Theory7 and theory4remain two
while therecan be relationsbetweentheory5
and theory7,
different
projects.Similarly,
occasionallyeven relationsof necessity,themeaningof thetwotermsremainsdistinct.
a way of lookingat or
Theory7does not referto an overarching
Weltanschauung,
thesocialworld.Rather,it refersto thestudyof certainspecialproblems
representing
thatsociologyhas encountered.
Even thoughit isbecause of itsbeing in thebusiness
of empiricallyinvestigating
societythat sociologyhas encounteredtheseproblems,
are
not
they
empiricalproblems themselves(forexample, theycannot be resolved
bymeans of empirical
methods).Theymay be describedas 'philosophical'problems,
insofaras theycall forreflection
upon thenatureof knowledge,language,and reality,
and some sort of conceptual
analysis. In fact,most of these problems have been taken
up inphilosophyas well, usuallyunderdifferent

rubrics,in a different
voice,and in
isolationfromthesociologicalliterature.
To concludewith a reflexive
note, thepresent
paper might be said to be a 'theory' paper mostly
in the sense of theory7.
4. THE PROBLEMS OF POLYSEMY

Many natural languagewords have severaldifferent
meanings.To take twoexamples
fromSpanish,one of homonymyand one of polysemy:'aguja' canmean "needle"or
"hand of a clock";
'banco' can mean
"bank"
or "bench." Yet Spanish
speakers have
no problemunderstandingone another.By consideringits syntactic,semantic,and

pragmaticcontexts,theytypicallycan discernwhetherany given tokenof 'banco'
"bank" or "bench." More generally, they are aware of and know how to
deal with this feature of the lexical semantics of their language.3 In fact, for certain
means
3Typical English examples of polysemy and homonymy are, respectively, 'paper' and 'fluke.' As two
are etymologically
to
unrelated words
that happen
linguists explain, "[s]trictly speaking, homographs
be represented by the same string of letters in a language. For example, bass the fish is derived from
are
Old English bar se (perch) while bass the voice is derived from Italian basso. Conversely, polysemes
etymologically and therefore semantically related, and typically originate from metaphorical
usage"
(Ravin
and Leacock
italics in original).
2000:2;

182
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
purposespolysemyisnot a liability
but a greatasset (Levine 1985a).Then whymight
themultiplemeanings of theword 'theory'constitutea problemforthesociological
languageand sociologyin general?
One possible answerwould stressthedifferences
betweenthesociologicallanguage
and natural languages.Natural languages let one and, arguably,must let one
expressone's feelings,tell jokes, be ironic,do thingswith words, persuade, speak
without saying too much, tell stories,lie, affirmone's identity,
and talk of love.
By contrast,thisargumentgoes, sociologistsaremainly concernedwith giving true
which are thensubjected
accountsof thesocialworld. They put forwardarguments,
Their claims aremeant to be as precise as possible.Given these
to public scrutiny.
aims, the sociological languageought not to be polysemous all potential sources
of ambiguityand fuzzinessought to be eliminated.This is, of course, a version
of the classic logicalpositivistposition (e.g.,Nagel 1961), and I do not mean to
deny that in this context there is something to it. On
the other hand,
it is clear that
speakers of natural languages do a very good job of dealing with cases of homonymy
and polysemy.In strictsemantic terms,words and utterancesmay sometimesbe

do not seem
ambiguous.Yet, generallyspeaking,comprehensionand communication
to be impaired.
My argumentis thatin thecase of 'theory'theproblemsstemfromtheerroneous
belief thatthereis something indeed,one thing out therefortheword 'theory'to
reallycorrespondto.Then, ifone used theword to referto anythingbut thatobject,
whatever it turned out to be, one would be mistaken. I want to call this the 'Socratic
error.' In many of Plato's dialogues, Socrates sets out to answer a question of the
form, 'what is X?' (see Robinson
1980). For example, in the Republic he asks 'what
is justice?'; in theEuthyphro'what is piety?';and in theLaches 'what is courage?'

(otherexamples are friendship,
virtue,knowledge,and temperance).Socrates' aim
is not to find out what
about
things are just, what
justice, or what people mean
sort of thing justice is, what is good

by justice,' but what justice really is. Similarly,
sensesof the
sociologistsdo not take theory,,theory2,theory3,etc., to be different
sensesof theword 'paper,''bass,'or 'fluke.'
word 'theory,'to be treatedlikedifferent
Rather,
they take them to be competing views about what
theory (that is, the thing)
reallyis,and hence competingviews about the truemeaning of 'theory.'4
Here lies the crux of thematter. Many sociologists have said that there are differ
to the point, many have said
ent 'understandings' or 'conceptions' of theory.More
means differentthingsto different

thingslike 'theory
people' or 'different
people
definitionsof "theory".'Yet most sociologistshave failed to draw the
have different
necessaryimplicationsof thissemanticfact.Thus, theystillgo on to ask Socratic
questionsabout theory,theobject (whichtheword 'theory'supposedlypicks out, or
should pick out). But recognizing "bank"
'banco' has important consequences
word
and "bench" as two senses of the Spanish

for the sort of questions that one can ask.
sense against the background

of Plato's metaphysics?for
4This view makes
him, justice (and piety,
can discover. But I take it that
courage, etc.) has an essence (Form, Idea,
'eidos'), which philosophy
seem
a
to
most
this would
contemporary
ontological
assumption
sociologists?e.g.,
quite implausible
if found, would
settle
that sociological
theory, which,
theory has an essence, the Idea of sociological
the controversy about what sociological
(1980:121)
points out, there are "several
theory is. As Robinson
if Socrates' question
that must be made
[what is X?] is to be a legitimate question admitting
assumptions
of a true answer. First, we must assume that the word X is univocal.
Second, we must assume that the
some sort of realist assumption
about the ontological
thing X has an 'essence.' Third, we must make
status of this 'essence.' And, fourth, we must assume that this 'essence' is not a 'primary element' but has
a structure that can be explicated; for otherwise we must already know what X is in asking the question
in Socrates'
sense."

183
to by thesameword-form,
benchesand banks are
While inSpanish theyare referred
twoverydifferent
thingsindeed.Therefore,only ifone keeps thesesensesapart,can
one sensibly ask questions
such as: what
is a good banco?; how many kinds of bancos
are there?; what are bancos useful for?; or what
is a banco? Likewise, we have seen
thattheword 'theory'in thesociologicallanguagehas severalsenses,each ofwhich

between thesethings e.g.,
triestopick out a different
thing.In fact,thedifference
as
thedifference
between the
and
theory4
might
be
almost
as
significant
theory,
conceptof a bank and theconceptof a bench.Consequently,sociologists'arguments
about 'theory' that is,about theoryin general;about itsnature,methods,quality,
as theyshould be. And,
aims,and possibilities-are neitheras clear nor as fruitful
as onemight expect,thisstateof affairscan lead to unfortunate
misunderstandings.
Let me mention two importantexamples.Can small-Nstudies(e.g.,ethnographic
and historical
studies) yield 'theoretical' gains? The
literature is as vast as it is dis
On a practical level,one oftenhears ethnographers

and
cordantand inconclusive.5
historicalsociologistscomplainabout theway inwhich their
manuscriptsare judged
bymainstreamsociologyjournals.Probably themost common situationis the fol
lowing:one or more refereessay that themanuscript fails tomake a 'theoretical
contribution'or to 'advance theory,'oftenon thegrounds that ifyour numberof
cases is one you cannotderive 'theoretical
conclusions.'Ethnographersand historical
sociologists
respond that you can, and that the idea that you cannot
reflects a bias
in favorof quantitativesociology.
And so on. But ifmy argumentis correct,thereis
here. If yournumberof cases is one, you obviouslycannot
no genuinedisagreement
derive theoretical, conclusions. It is even dubious that a single case can 'suggest' (as
is
we saw above, a very common way of putting it) theoretical, conclusions. What
more, if it is accepted that a theory, establishes a probabilistic rather than a deter
a singlecase cannot even disprove it (Lieberson 1991, 1992).

ministic relationship,
But froman ethnographicor historicalstudyyou obviouslycan derive theoretical2
and theoretical3
conclusions.In fact,sometimesitmightbe thebest or theonlyway
to obtain such 'theories.'
between 'so
Similarly,sociologistshave longquarreledover theproperrelationship
ciologicaltheory'and 'empiricalresearch'(forinstance,'SociologicalTheoryand Em
of theTheorySectionof
piricalResearch'was thethemeof the2002mini-conference
theASA
[Fine 2001]). Some of them argue that 'theory' ought to be 'based on,'
'close
relatedto' empirical
to,' 'linkedto,' 'derivedfrom,''indialoguewith,' or 'intimately
research or empirical data. Some others argue that this is not so, or not necessarily so.
Again, it is clear that theory,, theory2, and theory3, ought to be based on empirical
data. On what other bases could one possibly make an argument about the condi
tionsunderwhich ethnicminoritiestendto assimilate?

How else could onework out
an explanation of the rise and triumph of capitalism? However, the same is not true
of other senses of 'theory'-for example, if one's aim is to rid a sociological concept
of somemuddles,propose a new standpointfromwhich to look at social relations,

or explore theconnectionsbetweenAdam
unveila writer'sgeneralpresuppositions,
Smith'swell-knownpoliticaleconomyand his lesswell-knownmoral philosophy.
At any rate,themost obvious sign thatsomethingis goingwronghere is, I think,
that sociologydoes not seem to be any clearerabout theontological,teleological,
5To take the case of historical sociology, recent reflections on its relations
1998; Goldstone
Clemens, and Orloff 2005; Calhoun
1998; Kiser and Hechter
and Rueschemeyer
1992; Mahoney
2004; Mahoney
2003; Paige 1999; Quadagno
and Somers
1980; Somers 1998.
to 'theory' include: Adams,

1991, 1998; Lieberson
1991,
and Knapp
1992; Skocpol

184
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
and evaluative questions
than itwas
50 or 60 years ago. It is not just that many of
thequestions about thenatureof theoryraised in the 1940s and 1950s by people

likeRobertMerton are stillbeing debated today.6
What is trulypuzzling is that
theyare being debated in analogous terms,startingfromanalogous points,making
analogous assumptions,encountering
analogous difficulties,
provokinganalogous ob
jections,and bringingabout analogous factions.And, as then,consensus is not in
sight. Indeed, not only is consensusnot in sight it is hard to see what kind of
argumentcould possiblysettlethedisagreements
aboutwhat theoryis,what a good
theorylooks like,why theoryis important
or useful,how theoryis relatedto empir
ical research,
whether thereis theoreticalprogress,and so on. In fact,my claim is
that,as thingsstand,no argumentcould do that.One cannot findout or establish
what theoryreallyis because theoryis not an object out therethatour conceptsor
language could
track down. As a result, 'what "theory" really means'
is not the kind
of thingone can findout or establish.Differently

put: thislengthy
stagnationshould
suggestthatperhaps it is thequestionwhat isdefective;thatperhapsanswersdo not
seem adequate because thequestion needs to be reformulated.
This is preciselyone
of the aims of the present paper.
5. THE SEMANTIC PREDICAMENT

We have thus far seen that the word
'theory' in the sociological
language
is rifewith
lexicalambiguities,and that thisbringsabout undesirableconsequences,including

pseudo-disagreements,
conceptualmuddles, and even downright
miscommunication.
I want
now
to consider what
is to be done
about
this situation. How
can
it be
How can theseundesirableconsequencesbe avoided?How oughtsociolo

improved?
gists to use thewords 'theory,''theoretical,'
and 'theorize'?Let us referto this last
question as the 'semanticpredicament'(SP).
I propose twomain argumentsregardingSP, which I referto as the 'principle
of practical reason' and the 'principleof ontologicaland epistemologicalpluralism.'
First,SP is a practical/political
problem,which calls forpractical/political
methods
and solutions. A solution to SP must
discussion and negotiation, which would
be the outcome of a collective process of

look more like a community coming up with
a politicaldecision, thana physicist,

mathematician,or philosophercomingup with
a solution
to an intellectual problem. Second,
a solution
to SP should make
as few
ontologicaland epistemologicaldemands as possible. In otherwords, themeaning of

'theory'shouldnot have toomuch built-inontologicaland epistemologicalbaggage.
I proceed
as follows. In section 5, I show that the theory literature has generally
been at odds with thisontologicaland epistemologicalpluralism,partlybecause of

itsneglectof thesemanticsof 'theory'and itsresulting
Socraticerrors.In particular,
I criticizetheargumentsof 'scientifictheorists'and the 'typesof theory'argument.
In order to articulate
understanding
of
the principles of practical reason and pluralism, a different

'theory' is needed, which I find in the writings of Levine and
AJS article "Sociological

6See Merton's
(1945), later included as "The Bearing of Sociological
Theory"
on Empirical Research"
in the first edition of Social Theory and Social Structure (1949); and his
"On the History and Systematics of Sociological
and "On Sociological
Theories
of the
Theory"
as chapters in the 1968 edition of the book. See also the following
Range," which first appeared
in the ASR: Theodore
Abel's
articles, all of which were published
(1952) "The Present Status of Social
isWrong
with Social Theory?";
Herbert Blumer's
Howard
P. Becker's
(1954) "What
(1954)
Theory";
in Social Research"
and Parsons's
"The Role of Theory
(1938), "The
"Vitalizing Sociological
Theory";
Position of Sociological
(1948), and "The Prospects of Sociological
Theory"
Theory"
(1950).
Theory
papers
Middle

185

Alexander.
Building
on these insights, in section 6 I go on to put forward my two
principles.
5.1 ScientificTheory
A groupof sociologists,sometimesreferred
to as 'scientific
theorists,'
unambiguously
rejectontologicaland epistemologicalpluralism.For them,a sociological theoryis
a scientificexplanation.If a given thingis not a scientificexplanation,then it is
not a sociological theory.
This is how the argumentgoes. Sociology is the science
of society.It applies the scientific
method to social phenomena.Like any science,
it offersobjectiveaccounts of what theworld is like.And itdoes so bymeans of
scientificlaws (see, e.g.,Braithwaite1959:1).Then, sociologicaltheorycannotbe an
ongoing
some classic
dialogue with
texts or a story that makes
sense of a bit of
do not 'makesense'of things-theyestablishgeneral

thesocialworld. For scientists
in
to
and
laws order explain
predictthem.Scientistsdo not enterintodialogueswith
classic textssuch as Aristotle'sPhysicsorNewton's Principia-thatwould be utterly
useless.As Merton (1948:165) famously
put it longago, "[s]choolsofmedicinedo not
confusethehistoryofmedicinewith currenttheory,
nor do departmentsof biology
identify
thehistoryof biologywith theviable theorynow employedin guidingand
research.Once said, thisseems so obvious as to be embarrassing."
interpreting
Or,
to take the case of economics,
economic
theory is definitely not the study of what
Smith,Ricardo, orKeynes said ormeant. The 'theory'publishedineconomic theory

journals (e.g., theJournalof EconomicTheory) is filledwithGreek letters,lemmata
and theorems,
notwith longquotationsand long footnotes.In brief,theargumentis
that insofar as sociology
is a science, the theories of sociology must be analogous
to
the theoriesof other,presumably'moremature' or 'moredeveloped,' sciences.That

iswhat theoryis.
take a classic example, George Homans had no doubt about what theory was
and what kind of thing was not a theory but something else. As he put it in his ASA
To
PresidentialAddress:
The explanation of a phenomenon
is the theory of the phenomenon.
is nothing-it
is not a theory unless it is an explanation.
theory
One may define properties and categories, and one still has no theory. One may
state that there are relations between the properties, and one still has no theory.
One may state that a change in one property will produce a definite change in
another property, and one still has no theory.Not until one has properties, and
propositionsstatingthe relationsbetween them,and thepropositionsforma
deductive system-not until one has all three does one have a theory.Most of
our arguments about theory would fall to the ground, ifwe first asked whether
we had a theory to argue about. (Homans 1964a:812; emphasis in original; see
also Homans 1964b, 1967, 1974, 1987)
Thus, accordingtoHomans (1964a:811;emphasisadded), "we should stop talking

to our students about
sociological
theory until we have taught them what a theory
is."Along comparable lines,JonathanTurnerbelieves that"'theorists'in sociology

rarelytheorize"(1985:24; see also Turner 1987, 1992, 2001, 2004). In otherwords,
so-called
'theorists' are not in fact theorists. For
instance, making
a case for "laws"
thatare simplistic,
abstract,and unconcerned
with causality,Turner says that"these

186
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
are thecharacteristics
of theoryas opposed to currentempiricaldescriptionsthat
masqueradeas theory"(Turner1979: 440; emphasisadded). Likewise, in sociology
we are typicallygiven a causal model, often completewith statisticalrazzle
dazzle, on some substantivearea. [...] [T]hereis nothinginherently
wrongwith
refinedefforts
at empiricaldescription.
suchmodels per se; indeed,theyrepresent
The problemcomes onlywhen sociologistsbegin to believe thatsuchmodels are
because theyare tied to classes
theory.They are not and cannotbecome theory,
of observablesin specifictimesand places.Theorymust bemore abstract,for it
must transcendparticulartimesand places. (Turner1979:451;emphasisadded)
So, theory is or must be X;
theory is not or cannot be Y. X
is a "true theory";
Y is a "masquerade" of theory(see also Turner 1985:25).Yet thereis an obvious

here.How does one know and find
epistemologicaland methodological difficulty
outwhat theoryreally is?How does one justifyan ontologicalclaim of this sort?
What objectivereasonscan one give to someonewho claims thattheoryreallyisZ?
Scientific theorists argue that the method
is simple. One
just has
to look at what
natural science theoryis and what natural scientists

mean by 'theory.'
That iswhat
theoryin sociologyis andwhat sociologistsought tomean by 'theory'(e.g.,Homans
1987:68).
Accordingly,one mightwant to replace thephrase 'sociologicaltheory'with the
of sociologicaltheory'
when referring
to analysesand exegesesof clas
phrase 'history
sic texts(asMerton [1948,1968a] and othershaveproposed).Or, likeRandall Collins
(1998:7), one might argue that"there is no sharpdividinglinebetween theoryand
empiricalresearch:if the researchis importantenough, itgets called theory."Push
one might repudiatethe existenceof a theoryspecialty,
ing this logic even further,
journals,universitycourses,and ASA section,since "substantiverelevanttheoreti
cal ideas ...
should be and often are thoroughly incorporated
into our substantive
classes,publicationorgans,and section interests"(Chafetz1993:1-2; see also Reed

1952:166).
Is the scientifictheorists'argumentpersuasive?Let us firstnote that theyoften
make
the Socratic
error. But
this is not an insurmountable
problem, because
their
argumentcould be consistentlyrecastas being aboutwhat theword 'theory'ought

to mean
(rather than about what
theory really is). However,
there is a second, more
with scientific
seriousproblemwith theirequationof sociologicaltheory
explanation.
It is obviouslynotmy taskhere to take sides in theendlessepistemologicaldispute
overwhether the social sciencesshould be modeled afterthenatural sciences.And
this is preciselywhy I disagreewith the scientifictheorists'solution to SP.
According to theirreasoning,a stanceon thatepistemological
dispute is thecrucial
from which a conclusion on the meaning of 'theory' is drawn. Now,
turned out to be true that sociology must be all about coming up with general
premise
if it
laws
would be
that look as much as possible likephysical laws, thenscientifictheorists
the answer to 'what ought "theory" to mean?'

the right track. Undoubtedly,
cannot be divorced from the answer to 'what is sociology?', 'what is the business
of sociology?' or 'what is sociology all about?' Unfortunately, we still cannot agree
upon what sociology is all about. This is partly why there are so many competing
understandings of theory and uses of theword 'theory' in sociology in thefirst place.
on
So the scientific theorists' argument turns out to be circular! If one could convince
all sociologists about what the true business of sociology is, SP would not be a major
issue.The realchallengeis to propose a well-foundedsolutionto SP,which does not

THE MEANING
OF
'THEORY'
187
depend on havinga prior agreed-uponunderstanding

about thenatureof sociology.
as possible fromthatotherverythornyissue.7
This solutionshouldbe as independent
It isperhaps ironicthat,forall theiraversionto 'intractable''philosophical'issues,the
of or orthogonalto them.On
scientifictheorists'argumentisnot at all independent
thecontrary,it is logicallydependenton a definite(and not particularly
moderate)
stanceon one traditionalphilosophicalissue:what kind of knowledgeabout human
beings it is possible to attain.
5.2 Typesof Theory
One staple of the theoryliterature-aswell as of theorysyllabi,conferences,and
textbooks is the 'typesof theory'argument.In bypassingthesemanticsof 'theory,'
this argument makes
a different sort of mistake:
it does allow for a certain kind of
pluralism,yet at theunacceptablecost of conceptual incoherence.

This is how the
argumentgoes.There existseveral 'types,''kinds,''styles,'or 'varieties'of theoryand
of theorizing
or 'approaches').
(or theoretical'perspectives,'
'paradigms,''viewpoints,'
That
is, theory comes
inmany varieties, in the same sense that tables come inmany
varieties:glass coffeetables,pool tables,solid oak dining tables,and so on. Still,

all of these objects can be correctly described
as articles of furniture having a flat
horizontalsurfacesupportedby one or more vertical legs.Likewise, 'theory'is a

legitimateclass or (non-natural)kind. Theories1, theories2,etc. are in someways
but theystillshare some important
The word 'theory'refersto
different,
properties.
all theobjects thatshare theseimportant
These
properties.
propertiesallow one not
only to tell whether
any given thing belongs to the class, but also to compare the
worth of those that do, even when one has to compare the worth of, say, a theory,
vis-'a-vis a theory5.
The problemwith thisargumentis thatit isunclearwhat thoseimportant

common
propertiesare.How do thesepurportedtypeshang together?
What exactly is that
thing they are types of? Let us try to define 'theory' in such a way that we can
refer to when they use the word. That is, this
capture all of the things sociologists
definition
must be such that itwould be semanticallycorrectto say thatsomeone
who attempts to figure out what Marx
really meant, someone who tries to resolve
the problem of structure and agency, and someone who wants to state the conditions
underwhich revolutions
occur,are engaged in thesame activity.
Or, to put it slightly
an articulation of the relations between
differently, that a commentary on Marx,
structure and agency, and a law-like statement about revolutions, are all members of
the same class, or instances of the same concept.
Is it possible to pull off such a definition? I do not think so. In contrast to the case
of 'table,' the definiens would
be so broad
as to both sound empty and be of little
use. For example: 'sociologicaltheoryis thatwhich sheds lighton human behavior

and social relations,'or 'sociologicaltheoryis thatwhich helps one betterunder
stand, make sense of, etc. empirical data or the empirical world.' Not only do these
two broad definientia sound a bit empty; they are in fact not broad enough, as they
still leave out some of the seven meanings of 'theory' identified above. As an exam
ple, considerMartin Albrow's (1999:41) statement:"[n]o researchcan workwithout

theory,evenwhen it denies ithas any.For theorysimplymeans theconnectionof
70bviously,one cannot see thesetwo issuesas completelyorthogonal.If it turnedout thatthe subject
matterof sociologyis thebehaviorof thefairiesthatultimately
cause social action,and itsmethod turned
out to be introspection,
the solutionswe are currently
prepared to suggestwould become completely
implausible.

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
188
But if 'theory'
means "the connectionof ideas," the
ideas.Even countingis theory."
classwould be excessivelylargeand theconceptnot reallyuseful.According to this
definition,'theory'can be applied to anymeaningfulsequenceofwordswhatsoever;
indeed, 'atheoretical
argument'is analyticallycontradictory.
set of necessaryand
It seems, then,that thereis no reasonableand informative
sufficient
conditionsfor theapplicationof theword 'theory'(nor is therea 'proto
type' inRosch's sense [Lakoff1987;MacLaury 1991]).Nevertheless,thereis a more
versionof thissortof argument,based onWittgenstein's(1953) notion
sophisticated
of 'familyresemblance.'
Camic and Gross (1998:455), facedwith the taskofwriting
chose to take thisroute.
an AnnualReviewof Sociologypiece on sociological theory,
In discussingcontemporarysociological theory,
we consideran area with noto
whatworks fallwithin theseboundaries,
riouslyfuzzyboundaries.In identifying
we borrowWittgenstein'snotion of "familyresemblances"... It is such family
sim
resemblancesthatconstitutethecontemporarytheoryfield:criss-crossing
ilaritiesin termsof analytical issues and problems,intellectualancestoryand
(call
points of departure,vocabularyand styleof argument,self-identification
membership (belongingto theory
ing one's own work "theory"),institutional
sectionsof sociologicalassociations),group adoption (havingone's contribution
andmore.No fixedclusterof thesetraitsdefinesa fam
embracedby theorists),
distant
ilymember nor makes it possible to trackdown all the stepchildren,
cousins,and black sheep.Nonetheless,afterone has spent some timeamong
branches of the
familymembers, it is not difficultto recognizethe different
familytree.
The notion of 'familyresemblance'has been the subjectofmuch debate, and is
clearlynotwithout itsproblems(see, e.g.,Baker and Hacker 1980). For example, it
makes it a bit mysterious how one can correctly use words (and, even more, how one
can learn to correctly use words), whose rules of use cannot be fully articulated. To
put it in Camic and Gross's terms, how exactly is it that after spending "some time
among family members," the task becomes "not difficult"?What exactly happens to
one after some time has passed? (Of course, the answer here cannot be that you have
learnedto imitateyourmentors,so thatyou now knowunderwhich conditionsyour
making
certain noises will not elicit puzzled
looks. For
this answer would make
the
notionof 'familyresemblance'pointless.)Furthermore,itmight be argued that,say,

cannot be convincingly
said to resembleone another,exceptfor
theory,and theory7
theirlinguisticisomorphism.
More
importantly, from the point of view of SP Camic
and Gross's
strategy is not
veryhelpful.For thenotion of 'familyresemblance'only perpetuatesthe fuzziness

around theuse of 'theory.'Indeed,perpetuatingthesekinds of fuzzinessis precisely
conditionsfor theapplicationof
itspoint! If one knew thenecessaryand sufficient
a term, there would be no need for such a notion. Sometimes itmight be useful to
hold things together in this fashion. Sometimes itmight be the only way of making
sense of ordinary language (or, for that matter, of the sociological
language). Yet
some other times "for [some] special purpose," as Wittgenstein(1953:?69) says
one may need to draw a more precise boundary. Thus,
in order to avoid the above
and dead-end discussions,the extension

misunderstandings,
mentioned confusions,
and intension of 'theory' should be more precisely specified. To put it another way:
theWittgensteinian's
typical argument is that one need not worry about the concept
of a game, its logicalstructure

or correctanalysis.English speakersknow how to use


the word,
they understand
189
one another, and that is all there is to it. But
in our case
this is not so.Ours is a case of a languagegone awry.Speakers of the sociological

languagehave significant
about theuse of theword 'theory.'
disagreements
Yet, at
the same time, all of them are members
a form of life. So theWittgensteinian
of the community; they all, as itwere, share

cannot help one here.
5.3 TakingSemanticsSeriously
Unlike theprevious twoarguments,
Levine andAlexander can provide thebasis for
a satisfactory
articulationof theprinciplesof practical reason and ontologicaland
epistemologicalpluralism.Unlike the scientifictheoristsand other Socratic views,
theytake thesemanticsof 'theory'seriously.
Thus, theydo not tryto authoritatively
imposeone or anothermeaning as the trueone, nor do theytryto establishwhat
theoryreally is.Unlike the typesof theoryargument,theydo not presuppose the
existenceof theoryas a kind.
In fact,Levine has already offereda properly-semantic
analysis of 'theory.'In
"Social Theory as a Vocation," he disambiguates"the fourdistinct
meaningsof the
term"(1997:2; emphasis added), and, as customaryfor a semanticanalysis,uses
numbers(subscripts)to distinguishbetween its senses:
The most common associations to the termtheoryreflectfourdistinctmean
ingsof the term.The termcan be construedin the senseof theory1-abstract
or rational,as contrastedwith empirical;theory2 general,as contrastedwith
as contrastedwith practical.There is
particular;and theory3 contemplative,
also a function(theory4)thatmight be termedexegetical,as contrastedwith
heuristic.
We might takea big step towardclarificationsimplyby insistingthat
thesemeanings be keptdistinct... (Levine 1997:2; emphasis in original)
Even toughsocial scienceconceptsare essentiallycontested(1985b:17; 1997:4; cf.
Gallie 1964),Levine stillbelieves that"[c]riticalexplorationof themeanings of key
termsand theirimplicationsoffer[s]a ... commendableroute toward intellectual
sophistication and clear thinking"; indeed, the "codification of the plurality of stan
dard meanings can itself be a boon" (1997:4). This iswhat Levine began to do, even
though briefly, concerning themeaning of 'theory'; and this is also what he had done
at more lengthconcerningthemeaning of 'rationality'(1985c; see also 1965:5-11,

15-17; 1985a; 1985b; 1995).The presentpaper takeup thistask, followinghis sug
gestion thatkeeping themeanings of 'theory'distinctwould be "a big step toward
clarification."
Now, we have seen that many sociologists argue as though theory were an ob
ject out there that our concepts or language could track down. But the principles
of practical reason and ontologicaland epistemologicalpluralismrequirethat this

Socraticpositionbe transcended.In his four-volume
work, TheoreticalLogic inSo
the
Alexander forcefully
Socratic
ciology,
rejects
ontologybymeans of an essentially
semanticunderstanding
of 'theory.'
In thefirstvolume,Positivism,
and CurrentControversies,
Presuppositions,
Alexan
der presents a diagram
This diagram
clarifies ...
that represents 'the scientific continuum and its components.'
the relative character
of the theory/data
split. That
"data"
is a
thoroughlyrelativeformulationcan be illustratedby the fact that as social

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
190
Empirical
environment
Metaphysical
environment
4.
0
-~~~
oI
0~S
+--
U)C
C
U,
CU~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U
-~~~
(.CU~~~~~~~~
CU
*
toU4
0
0
U)
CU 0
CU
S
0
CE
-~~~~~~~~~~~~C
Figure 1. The Scientific

Continuumand itsComponents
Source:Alexander (1982a:3).
we continuallytreatas data themore general "scientific"formulation
scientists
of those around us others' propositions,models, classifications,and general
assumptions
about
the empirical world. But
it is also clear that "theory"
is just
as much a designationalconvenience.(Alexander1982a:2-3)
'Theory'and 'data' note Alexander's use of quotationmarks are just relative

Moreover, 'theory'and 'data' are not quali
and convenientlinguisticformulations.
tativebut quantitativedistinctions.Indeed,his decisiveclaim is thatgivena certain
point in the continuum, one applies
the word
'theory' to whatever is on its left and
theword 'data' towhateveris on its right.

Although data and theoryare, thus,commonlyequatedwith qualitativeposi
tions on the more
specific and general
sides of the scientific continuum,
it is
more correct to understand themas quantitativedistinctions:every formula

tion "leftward" of any given point of focus is called
"rightward" of that point is claimed as data.
theory and every statement
they
[...] If theseelementsactuallywere completelyqualitativelydifferentiated,
distinc
would represent"concrete"distinctions.
are,
"analytic"
They
instead,
tions, separations
established
for the convenience
of scientific discourse, made
to facilitate
communication
and not to establishontologicalqualities.(Alexander
1982a:3-4)
Thus,Alexander explicitlyrejectstheSocratic ontologyand makes an essentially
semantic point. It is a mistake to think of 'theory' and 'data' as if they were ontolog
ical qualities, which are part of the fabric of the world and hence one can pin down
and refer to once and for all. Rather, this is just a convenient analytic distinction
that facilitates communication. There is nothing for theory to really be. 'Theory' is a
relative term, which can be more or less analytically useful, which can cause more
or less confusions, which can result in better or worse communication, etc.
This point is also evident in another key feature of Alexander's diagram, whose
value can be better appreciated vis-'a-vis Merton's typology in his article "Sociological
Theory." Merton writes: "The phrase 'sociological theory' has been used to refer to
at least six types of analysis which differ significantly in their bearings on empirical

191
research.These are methodology,general orientations,conceptual analysis,post

factuminterpretations,
empiricalgeneralizations,and sociological theory"(Merton
1945:462; see also Merton 1945:462-63, 1968b:39).At firstglance, this statement
Merton speaks of linguisticel
appears to take the semanticsof 'theory'seriously.
ementssuch as 'phrase' (and, lateron, 'term'),linguisticrelationssuch as 'usage'
and 'reference,'
puts quotationmarks around 'sociologicaltheory'to indicatemen
tionratherthanuse, and seemsto implythattheexpression'sociologicaltheory'has
several senses.However,Merton quickly forgetsabout word meanings and senses,
and goes on to show that some of these 'six types of analysis'
are not really the
ory.For example,speakingof the firstand second types-'methodology'and 'gen

eral orientations'-he says: "we should distinguishclearlybetweensociological the
ory,which has for its subjectmatter certainaspectsof the interaction
ofmen and
is hence substantive,and methodology,or the logic of scientificprocedure";and
"[m]uchofwhat is describedin textbooksas sociological theoryconsistsof general
orientationstowardsubstantive
materials" (Merton1945:463,464).Most revealingly,
Merton refersto thelastof his six typesas 'sociologicaltheory.'So, sociologistshave
used the term'sociologicaltheory'to referto sixdifferent
thingsonlyone ofwhich
turnsout to be sociological theory(withoutquotationmarks)!
The contrastwithAlexander could not be greater.There are 10 termsinAlexan
der's continuum ('ideological orientations' is added in Alexander 1982a:40 and
1987:7). Remarkably,the term 'theory'is not one of them.Because of its being
a relativeratherthanan ontologicalquality, 'theory'cannot be preciselylocatedon
the continuum.
Instead,
the use of the word
'theory' is a function of the particu
lar point of referencechosen, theparticular interestsand goals of the enterprise,

and so on. Furthermore-and this is crucial formy argumentbelow Theoretical
Logic makes a strongcase forontologicaland epistemologicalpluralism.Alexander
believes thatgeneralpresuppositionsare of theutmost importance,
he showswhy
this is so, and he chooses
to focus on them in the subsequent
three volumes
on
Marx and Durkheim,Weber, and Parsons.But he does not believe thatitwould be

wrong to apply theword 'theory'tomodels, classifications,
or laws, let alone that
those things are not really theory. In fact, the tendency "to reduce
theoretical argument to one or another particular set of nonempirical
to 'conflate'
commitments"
is one of themain antagonistsof thewhole project (Alexander1982b:xviii;see also

1982b:373).
6. SEMANTICS, POLITICS, AND PLURALISM
Armedwith theselessonsfromLevine andAlexander and awareof themisstepsof
otherwriters I am now in a betterposition to address the semanticpredicament
(SP).What ought theword 'theory'to referto in the sociological language?
More
generally, by what criteria is this to be determined?8 I argue that, while prima facie
this may appear to be a technical semantic issue, here sociology is faced with a
practical/political
problem.This is theprincipleof practical reason.Then I argue
fortheabove-mentioned
principleof ontologicaland epistemologicalpluralism.Yet
the question
is by what criteria one determines what any given word ought to refer
8Methodologically,
to in a language like the sociological
is the extension of 'revolution,'
'social movement,'
language. What
or 'ethnicity' (i.e., to which objects can you correctly apply these terms)? How
about
'rational action,'
'globalization,''status,'or 'moralvalue'?How are semanticdisagreementsto be adjudicated?These are

criticalmethodologicalquestions,which sociology is farfromhavingan adequate answerto.

192
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
beforepresentingthesetwoprinciples,Imake thepracticalsuggestionthatsociology
needs a semantictherapyin order to clarifysome of itsconceptualconfusions.
6.1 SemanticTherapeutics
Ifmy argumentup to thispoint is correct,the firstthingsociologyneeds is some
All sociologistsshould be fullyaware that theirdisagree
sortof semantictherapy.
ments about theoryhave a semanticdimension,which has importanteffectson the
kinds of arguments.If thispoint be
appropriatenessand forcefulness
of different
came common sociologicalwisdom, thatwould surelyamount to a step forward.
For instance,no theorydiscussionwould forgetthat therearemany sensesof the
or truemeaning; that themany thingsthat the
word 'theory'and no real referent
word 'theory'is used to expressare quite differentindeed;or that theontological,
evaluative,and teleologicalquestions in theircustomaryformare problematic.Full
consciousnessof thesefactswould just dissolvenumerousproblemsand disputes
namely,those thatare ultimatelycaused by semanticvagueness.Further,itwould
clarifythose(also numerous)problemsand disputes thatwould stillpersist,pinpoint
withmore precisionwhat thedispute is about,make discussioneasier,and ultimately
make substantiveprogresspossible.
Therefore,first,I suggestthata semantictherapyregardingthemeaning of 'theory'
should be part of universitycourses called 'sociological theory,'theorytextbooks,
certainTheory Section activities,and other appropriateforums.Second, I propose
thateach timesociologistsengage in a debate about 'theory' indeed,each timethey
make itclearwhether
use theword 'theory'in a potentiallyconfusingcontext they
if
a
etc.
For
instance,
journal refereerejects
theymean theory,,theory2,theory3,
or that it needs 'more theory,'
a paper on thegrounds that it is 'undertheorized,'
she should unambiguouslysay if shemeans theory2,theory4,or theory7(rather
Authors should indicatewhethertheir
thanhidingbehind thissemanticambiguity).
or theory5(ratherthanambiguously
projectsmake a contributionto theory1,theory3,
claiming that they are 'very theoretical' or 'driven by theory' as a badge of epistemic
significance).
Unfortunately, this is only a first step forward toward making things better. For,
as sociologistsknow fullwell, words are sitesof power (e.g.,Bourdieu 2001). The

relatedto very real institutional
resources,careers,
meaning of 'theory'is intimately
funding,prestige,statussystems,sociology'spublic relevance,and so on.Moreover,
'theory'and 'theoretical'are 'thick'terms(Williams1978, 1985), that is, theycan
do descriptiveand evaluativework. Specifically,innumerouscontexts
simultaneously
by theory,'and
applyingtheexpressions'theoretical,''relevantfortheory,''informed
'theory-driven' to a paper, project, scholar, or line of research is not just to say that
they are of a certain nature, but also implies a favorable judgment. While there is
only one sign, one English word-form 'theory,' there are many people who want to
use it in different ways, and who have a practical interest in doing so. There is only
one TheorySection in theASA, whose practical interestis to enlargeitsmembership
and ascendancy.9 Useful and necessary as it is, no semantic therapy will do by itself.
For I want to argue that SP is to a large extent a political problem.
Theory, a fact that was patent in a recent debate

9Likewise, there is only one journal called Sociological
in the pages of the newsletter Perspectives
2006a, 2006b;
(Adams 2006; Kidd 2006; Perrin 2006; Sanderson
Wilkes
2006).

193
6.2 The Principleof PracticalReason

The lexicalsemanticsof a completelyformallanguageis determinedby its inventor.
As Hilary Putnam (1975:55; emphasis in original)puts it,"[a] formallanguagehas,
after all, an inventor, and like any human being, he can give commands. Among the
he can issue are ones to the effect that 'If you want to speak my language,
then do thus and so'." Putnam's point is that if you do not do thus and so, then
commands
you may be speaking some other language, but you are not speaking mine. Suppose
the question arises, 'whatdoes theword "malabia2614"mean in your language?'

The method to answer thisquestion does not involveargumentation,
discussion,
and negotiation. The
correct answer can be found in the dictionary
I wrote formy
language.That iswhat 'malabia2614'reallymeans.

The lexicalsemanticsof natural languagesdoes not derive froma process of ex
Nor can itbe establishedby
plicitargumentation,
discussion,and negotiationeither.
an authority such as the OED,
a summit of linguists, or philosophical
analysis. To
what it is to followa rule (linguisticor otherwise)is

put it inWittgenstein'sterms,
fixedby social practice.It cannotbe fixed'privately.'
This iswhyHumptyDumpty's
stance is preposterous.
Rather,wordmeanings derive fromtheverycomplex social
and linguistic
processesstudiedby historicallexicology,lexicography,
and semantics
(Brintonand Traugott 2005; Keller 1994; Labov 1994, 2001). The question, 'what
does theword
"paper" mean
in the English
language?,'
is an empirical one. Lexicog
raphershave empiricallyestablishedthatat presenttheword 'paper'has a certain

numberof senses.Those are the thingsyou can correctlyreferto by using theword
'paper.' That
per" to mean
is what
'paper' really means. The question, 'what ought the word

in the English language?,' just does not make sense.
"pa
By contrast,thenatureof the sociological language(and othercomparablesemi

formal languages)
is such that the meaning
of its terms is partially
fixed by the
social practices thatoccurwithin a relativelysmall and self-contained

community
of speakers.
In our case,
the community of speakers of the sociological
language
has a relativeautonomyto agreeupon what it is to followthis linguisticrule (i.e.,

underwhich conditionsit is semanticallyappropriateto use theword 'theory').Its
autonomy is relativebecause thereare externallinguistic,social, and institutional
constraints on what can count as a reasonable
agreement
for instance, a linguistic
constraintis themeaning of 'theory'in theEnglish language.Presently,though,

the use of 'theory' in the sociological
language
is not constant across users. Then,
thequestion becomes how to establishstandardsof validityandmeritfor arguments,

methods,and evidencethataim at settlingthissemanticdivergence.
We have, then, a community, which has a relative autonomy to make a semantic
choice and come to a semantic agreement. While it is not the case that any answer is
as good as any other, there is no one true or correct answer either. This choice has to
be made
in a particular
social context. Moreover,
it has not only epistemic but also
institutional
and economic consequences.Thus, we have a communityfacedwith
a typicallypolitical or practical-reasonproblem.On my account, the six defining
characteristics of SP as a political problem are the following:
(1) There are severalparties,which differin theirpreferences,

desires, interests,
values,beliefs,and practices.(For example,somepeople use theword 'theory'
in such-and-sucha way, some people have such-and-suchconceptionof what
sociologyisall about, somepeople likeand somepeople dislikepostmodernism,
rationalchoice,etc.).

194
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
(2) These preferences,

desires, interests,
values, beliefs,and practicesare subject
to public scrutinyand rationalappraisal.One can demonstratethata party's
stance is false,unreasonable,confused,pernicious,or insane in such a way
thatany rationalpersonought to accept it. (For instance,ifsomeone said that
'theory'ought to be roughlysynonymous
with 'method'or with 'cheesecake';
or that 'whatdoes "theory"mean?' is a question fora quantumphysicist.)
(3) However, there is no one singlecorrect set of preferences,
desires, interests,
values,beliefs,and practices.There can be legitimate
differences
here.Crucially,
if thesedifferences
lead to practicalconflicts,thesecannot be arbitratedfrom
outside thepolitical field(as one could do in thecase of a disagreementover
whetherthefirst
nameof thecurrentPresidentofUruguay isTabare orNestor).
(4) The problemhas a set of factual initialconditions,whichmust be taken into
of power,status,and resources;certainexisting
account: a certaindistribution
coursescalled 'SociologicalTheory' and theory
institutions
(such as university
and a
journals); thehistoriesof the relevantconcepts,ideas,and institutions;
host of otherempiricalfactsabout sociologyand its social context.
(5) Procedurally,a satisfactory
solutionmust be arrivedat throughcharacteristi
callypoliticalmechanisms.These can includerationalargumentation
and dis
cussion,persuasion,aggregationandweightingof preferences,
etc.Unlike those
countriesthathave constitutions,
thesemechanismsare not already inplace in
the relevantcommunity(the speakersof the sociological language).Therefore,
be the subjectof a political conversation.Thought ex
theymust themselves
perimentssuch as ideal-speechsituations,social contracts,or veilsof ignorance
are presumablyexcluded,because SP is an effectively
practicalproblem that
calls foran effectively
practicalsolution.
(6) Substantively,a satisfactorysolutionmust take all the differentlegitimate
stancesintoaccount.Again, ifa politicalmechanismgenerateda solutionthat
excludes
all but one point of view, one should be able to reject the outcome
fromoutside thepolitical field.The solutionmust both depend on internal

and externalstandardsof reasonableness,
politicalconsiderations,
acceptability,
and the like.These standardsare an
justice,fairness,
effectiveness,
applicability,
externalcheck on theoutcomeof thepoliticalprocess.
Thus, my argument
is that SP
is in the domain
of 'practical reason'
(as opposed
to 'theoreticalreason,' as these termsare typicallyunderstood in philosophy see

Audi 1989).The centralaim of practical reason is to guide action. Its chiefconcern
is not what
the world
is like but with what one
is to do. However,
the notion of
practicalreasonbringsto theforetheroleof reasonin thiskindof situations.

Agents
The
engage in reasoning,reflection,
deliberation,be it individuallyor collectively.
end-productsof thisprocess courses of action might be more or less reasonable
(or unreasonable), and even more or less rational (or irrational). This reasonableness
or rationality is a function of many factors, the subjective preferences of the actors
being only one of them. Thus, there are better and worse answers to the question,
'what ought "theory" to mean in the sociological
language?' But one should not
expect something like a true and exact solution to a mathematical problem (which a
or
mathematician may resolve in the abstract, on her own, by means of armchair
bathtub
reflection). Rather, one should expect something like a fair and reasonable
for
solution to a political problem, arrived at by means of political mechanisms
collective decision-making. This solution cannot be discovered; itmust be created. An
individualperson cannot (and this 'cannot' is a logicalone) resolve it.Sociology's

195
discussion about SP should be conscious of and not embarrassedby itspolitical

nature.
6.3 The Principle of Ontological
and Epistemological
Pluralism
My second principleconcerns the contentof a solution to SP. Given my claim

about SP's politicalnature,I presentit as an invitationto discussion. I believe that
solution to SP shouldmake as few ontologicaland epistemological
a satisfactory
demands as possible.The set of conditionsunderwhich theword 'theory'can be
correctlyused should not have toomuch built-inontological and epistemological
baggage. I call thisthe 'principleof ontologicaland epistemologicalpluralism.'
The reasonwhy I advocate thisprincipleis,veryroughlyput, the following.Sup
pose
sociologists made
a certain picture of the world
or idea about what
can be
knowna prerequisiteforsomething
being a sociologicaltheoryat all. Consider some
examples. We may demand
that theories be underlain
by the assumption
that "the
socialworld consistsof fixedentitieswith variablesattributes"(Abbott 1988:169).
We may
require that causality be taken to be the cement of the universe, the most
importantrelationthatcan hold between two entities.Or, we could build into the

definitionof 'theory'the idea thatsocial processesare regulatedby lawsof nature.
we may demand thebeliefthatthedistinctionbetweentextand reality
Alternatively,
is misleading, or even the belief that there are no such things as 'reality' and 'ob
jectivity.' Or else, we may demand the assumption that nothing exists but what can
be actuallyobservedor otherwisegrasped by our senses,therebydenyingexistence

to such 'mysterious'thingsas causalityand similar 'underlyingtheoretical
mecha
nisms' (Steinmetz2005). In anyof thesescenarios,only to theextentthatyou shared
the requiredontologyor epistemology,
could you be said to have a theoryof the
socialworld.You could have other thingsabout the socialworld-opinions, views,
beliefs,ideas but not a theory.
By definition,
thatparticularontologyor epistemol
ogy would be obligatory for one to be allowed
to enter a theoretical discussion, make
or theorizeat all.
a theoretical
contribution,
There are twomain problemswith thisapproach. First,whatever 'sociological
theory' turns out
to mean,
itsmeaning
will not be identical with
the meaning
of
'ontologicaltheory'or 'epistemologicaltheory.'In otherwords, it is reasonable to

assume thatsociologists'theoriesdo notmainly concern themselves
withwhat it is
for something to exist and what things actually exist. Arguably,
the kind of stuff that
with is (or,at least, is relatedto) thekind

sociological theoriesconcern themselves
of stuffsociologyisprincipallyinterestedin-society,social relations,social interac
subject-matter.
tion,social change,etc.Ontology and epistemologyhave a different
Naturally, theyalso have theirownmethodological and substantivedebates, some
arguments that are generally seen as defeated and some arguments that are generally
seen as valid,methodological rules,conceptionsof epistemicprogress,and so on.

All of this is outside thejurisdictionand competenceof sociology.Thus, sociology
is not in a position to adjudicate-nor should it be interestedin adjudicating
betweencompetingontologicaland epistemologicalarguments.Insofaras it is not
clear how thesecontroversies
will turnout, sociological theoriesshouldbe cautious
and not commit themselvesto one or another view.And the strongestcommit
ment one can in this respect make
is a semantic one
that the very meaning
of the
word 'theory'carrysuchontologicalor epistemologicalbaggage thatsome 'theories'

turn out not to be theories but misuses
of the word
(as scientific theorists would
have it).

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
196
Second, the consequenceof thispolicy for sociologywould be a very impover

isheddiscussion.This is the typicalargumentforpluralism.Dialogues about society,
social relations,social processes,etc. betweenparties thatdifferin theirontology
and hence one shouldwant thatthey
and epistemologyare potentiallyenlightening,
be conductedwithinthe realmof 'theory.'
Any of thesepartiesmay have thingsto
contributeto thedisciplineof sociologyand the subfieldof sociological theory,so
itwould be unwise to draw a semanticboundary thatexcludesbut one of them.
Let me illustratethispoint.Would itbe correctto apply the (sociological language)
word 'theory'toCharles Taylor's (1989) Sourcesof theSelf?Well, it is easy tomake
a semanticargumentto theeffectthat itwould not. If by 'sociologicaltheory'you
build into themeaning of
mean somethinglike 'naturalscience theory,'and thereby
naturalism'(Steinmetz2005),
'theory'theontologyand epistemologyof 'scientistic
then Taylor does not advance
a theory of the self. In fact, he has been one of the
many
most influential
opponentsof thatsortof views (Taylor 1985).Nevertheless,
sociologistswould find theoutcome of thissemanticargument-namely,thea pri
ori segregationof Sourcesof theSelf fromsociological theoryand sociology both
unfortunate.
highlyimplausibleand terribly
Iwould liketo concludewith threepointsof clarification.
First, I am not objecting
but to any ontologicallyor epis
to anyparticulartypeof ontologyor epistemology,
demandingsolution to SP.My argumentis neitherfornor against the
temologically
naturalism,'or postmodernismsubscribeto. I
metaphysicsthat realism, 'scientistic
my pointusingTaylor'sSourcesof theSelf, but Imight as well haveused,
illustrated
say,Coleman's (1990) Foundationsof Social Theory.Second, individualsociological
arguments(as opposed to sociology itselfor sociological theoryitself)may and
or explicitlyfavor,say,a certainontological
must implicitly
many timeswilly-nilly
conception
about what
the social world
ismade
of. But my point
is that: (a) those
individualsociologicalargumentsshouldnot conceiveof thisas a strongontological

commitment;(b) sociologyor sociological theoryitselfshouldnot have thiskind of
commitments; (c) they definitely should not be built into the very meaning of the
word 'theory' in the sociological
language. Finally, I wrote above that "a satisfac
as
to
SP
should
make
solution
few ontological and epistemological demands as
tory
possible." As the italicized locutions 'as few ... as possible' and (in the following
sentence) 'too much' indicate, my argument is not that one should not make any
ontologicaland epistemologicaldemands.For example,considera worldviewwhich

believes in occult witches who have causal powers over social processes, and which
sees the examination of witchcraft substance as the only path to knowledge. We may
agree that a sensible rule of the sociological language would be something like this:
the application of the word 'theory' is restricted to objects that do not involve this
typeof ontologyand epistemology.
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The Meaning of 'Theory'

Author(s): Gabriel Abend

This content downloaded from 192.43.227.18 on Fri, 30 Aug 2013 01:12:10 AM

The words 'theory,''theoretical,'

papers, as well as papers

that fail to make

Street NW, Washington,

This content downloaded from 192.43.227.18 on Fri, 30 Aug 2013 01:12:10 AM

in five stages. First, I very briefly explain why it is a good

of 'theory' is a good or a bad thing. As this introductory section suggests, I believe

stateof semanticaffairshas gottensociologistsinto.Up to thatpoint, theargument

this problem. How

to use the word

This iswhat I dub the 'semanticpredicament'(SP). Then I considerwhat

learn from the theory literature, both in terms of missteps to be avoided

mechanisms;and (b) theprincipleof ontologicaland epistemologicalpluralism the

the ontologicalquestion, the evaluativequestion, and the teleological

like to raise an apparently more basic and apparently simpler

seems to be a simpler question

This content downloaded from 192.43.227.18 on Fri, 30 Aug 2013 01:12:10 AM

THE MEANING OF 'THEORY'

'theory,' SQ just asks what

paper or stringof sounds.

In order to show why it is a good

idea to raise SQ and what one may

it, letme propose a thoughtexperiment.

is to think that Jones has a false belief. Since you have

lived a few years in Chicago,

wrong. Similarly,theproblemmight lie inwhat theword 'Chicago' is takento refer

and have no chance of inferring themeaning without

the belief.' So, as

if the former is the case, any discussion

you have with Jones about

will be futile,and probablyfrustrating.

has been plagued by disputes over what a good

and futureof a certainentitythat theword 'theory'is supposed to pick

out, not as being about what exactly it is that theword

'theory' picks out. This fram

ing ismisguided. I argue thatbeforeany progresscan be made on those important

that A, B, and C are three sociologists, and they engage in a

discussionabout thequestion, 'how should theorybe judged?'Now, when A speaks

A, B, and C find it impossibleto come to an agreementabout thequestionunder

This content downloaded from 192.43.227.18 on Fri, 30 Aug 2013 01:12:10 AM

of thissituationis not thatA, B,

fashion, it has also brought about further

semanticand conceptualconfusions,as 'theory'(howeverconceived) is at theheart

will neverfindoutwhose definitionreallyrefersand whose definitionfails to refer,

'theory' is to a great extent a political or

language. Yet before moving

on to this task, I would

importantcaveat.The problemssociology is interestedin can be neithersolvednor

linguistic puzzles. What

is just that they would

more profitablyaddressed ifour words and conceptswere clearer.Let me illustrate

with more precisionwhat it is

not have made any progress at all on questions such

clarificationofwhat wordsmean or what thingsare called.

This content downloaded from 192.43.227.18 on Fri, 30 Aug 2013 01:12:10 AM

THE MEANING OF 'THEORY'

I would likenow to distinguishsevendifferentthingsthat sociologistsmay mean

is used by competent speakers of a certain language

are committinga petitioprincipiihere:while it is quite clearwhat it is about these

them 'theoretical' ones in the first place.

of theory what allows you to tell what