Marquez vs.

Disierto
G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to
produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to
various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas
Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.
The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman
against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g)
relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and
AMARI.
Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders
without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the
questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank
deposits (R.A. No.1405).
HELD: No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must
be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending
case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case

JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

509 SCRA 190 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum in relation to cases pending before it.
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue
subpoena duces tecum against the Urban Bank relative to the case against
President Joseph Estrada.
Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman
certified copies of manager checks detailed in thesubpoena duces tecum. The
Sandiganbayan granted the same.
However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are
invalid and may not be enforced because the information found therein, given
their extremely detailed character and could only have been obtained by the
Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials.
Ejercito thus contended that, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
the subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the extremely-detailed information
obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous

investigation of the charges against him, such inquiry into his bank accounts
would itself be illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued

to order the production of statement of bank accounts even before a case for
plunder is filed in court
HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and
therefore, the exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The
court also reiterated the ruling in Marquez v. Desierto that before an in camera
inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction.
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a
court of competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an
investigation, he concludes that the information about his bank accounts were
acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent
inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the exclusionary
rule applicable to the instant case fails.
The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that
the bank accounts which where demanded from certain banks even before the
case was filed before the proper court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits of
poisonous tree. This is because the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing
on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four months before Marquez was
promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as
that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of
1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the
rule is not absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures
Inc., v. Court of Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial
interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally
passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal
thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply
to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.

Republic v Judge Eugenio G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008

MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT
Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank
accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial;
namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of
impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and
(4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been
recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of
absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.[
Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an
application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez,
Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138,
presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The application
was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the
Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the
documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati
RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the
authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad,
Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed
p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts, details of
which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal
prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations,
Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS
proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and related web
accounts of the four.[16]
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis VillaIgnacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to
investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved
in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the
bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were
committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special
Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121
Series of 2005,[19] which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to
inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one
maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of
Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum
attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively justif[ying] the
existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities
mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections
3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.
Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.
Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically
legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby
these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government official,
bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2)
in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of
a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and
(4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been
recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of

absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11,
the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in
cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as
defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4
thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,[certain violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations
under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the
AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot
be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under
Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to
the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to
serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such
does not entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA
establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that
the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older
law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential,
and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.

People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]

En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of
La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted
a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of
Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different from the boats
ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao
shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua,
proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite, and observed
that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed,
the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a
multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid
and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms,
became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a
run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from
fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as
police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in
Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he
seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language," motioning with
his hands for the man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and
acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic

packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to

the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not
comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and
escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station, Cid then
"recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to
have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, Cid
ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an
interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping
Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional
rights." When the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to
his obstinate reticence and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San
printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for
laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan
Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann
Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic
packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative
examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos,
to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La
Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua was in
violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal
transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the
amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to
Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in
the Philippines, after its failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign
Affairs). Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags
belong to his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat;
that they decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery;
that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand
movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a
chair; that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the
speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected
opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February
1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the
RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Issue:
Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry
into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when
he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to

and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
constitute "probable cause."
Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home
and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or
incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of
said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches
and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of
Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the
incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched
without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chuas participation in an ongoing criminal
enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive
search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated
mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying
the bagful of shabu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause.
Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles,
Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw
the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not
constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the
same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist
accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the
case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at
Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was
not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the
vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the
area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To
reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by
the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing
but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the
same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chuas conviction.

CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on
apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high
powered firearms were found in his possession:
1.

.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition

2.

M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo

3.

.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo

4.

6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident
modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers.
On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under
PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals
confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to
issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.
Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made
a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for
acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
Issues:
1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently,
the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is
no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se
did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests
are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a)
when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners
warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence
in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
?
Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid
intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in
pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had
the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo:

objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view
are subject to seizure even without a warrant)
?

Search of moving vehicle

?
Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section
12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of
incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched
must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search
contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that
the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and
run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains
more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.
2.
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be
established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute
as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners
possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence
during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the
prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued
under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent courts
incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported
by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the
Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel
or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance
of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms
higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3.
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes
excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866
in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that
respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal
possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866
no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21
years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in
contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the
respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants
commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by

subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply
the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for
applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by
petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal
possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it
should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty
does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The
burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant
which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of
the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently,
the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are
not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution Appellants grievances on
the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are
not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief
Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we
reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining

petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession
of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate
penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as
maximum.

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12 December 1997]

En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 11 concur
Facts: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb
threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District,
Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,
Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store
at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with
each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting

suspiciously with "their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions
positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30
minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as
allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu
saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching
Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist
line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan
from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then
brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for
the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat
was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment
on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of
not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently
arrived in Manila. However, several Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 74 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and
guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw
the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10
February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that
the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a "stop and frisk,"
where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of
the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus
found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under
Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more
than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994,
Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme
Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals
(CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception
of stop and frisk.

Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a
warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid
warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." The
concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must
not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no
valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the
search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk"
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3)
reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to
Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb

Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report
or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that
group. Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could
have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
"moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and
his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the
corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no
ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as to
the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat
was indeed Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 75 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant
violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of
Article III of the Constitution.