Jayson James B.

Bentayao

August 22, 2015

Philo 501 Methods of Research

Dr. Renante Pilapil
Changing the Unchangeable
Our society right now has been bombarded with issues like killings, corruption,
poverty, poor educational system, racial discrimination, gender inequality and the like.
We commonly shout and want reformation of the governmental policies and system
since we think that it is the only solution to the issues that we are facing.
Along those mentioned issues that we have right now, sometimes, we cannot
blame ourselves to really blame ourselves. For after all, we are the main actors of these
issues and we therefore realized that in order to change the system, we need to change
ourselves first. However, is this possible? If yes, then what would be the possible
actions that we can do? If no, then are we just going to accept solely the situation that
we have right now? As what we can see, the concern now is not the system but
ourselves.
Speaking of change, Aristotles Nicomachean ethics discusses about those
people who have vices which he called as the self-indulgent person. These kind of
people are incorrigible or unable to be corrected. At first glance, we might think that
people with vices or self-indulgent are not capable of change, but is this really what
Aristotle means?

The only constant thing in this world is change. But is this always true especially
to the people with established character? Is change possible with people who are
considered as sinners, immoral and hopeless? Are they domed to their vices
eternally?
In line with this, I am studying the commentaries of Bondeson and De Muzio
about Nicomachean ethics which discusses the capability of the self-indulgent person to
reform his character because I want to examine the ideas that they are alike as well as
their differences in order for me to come up with an evaluation of their ideas. We need
to study this so that we can have a better understanding about the nature of character
change and to give hope to those people who we think that are in a hopeless case.
Both primary and secondary sources will be used for this paper. The sources that
I am going to use are: Nicomachean ethics, which is the primary source and some of its
commentaries by the different philosophers as well as some journal articles which are
the secondary sources. Thus, the deal is very Aristotelian.
This paper will proceed into four parts. First, I will discuss what the argument of
Bondeson is all about. The second part will be dedicated to the ideas of De Muzio.
Along with the discussions of the former and the latter commentators, I will also try to
present my critiques and open ended questions regarding with their commentaries. The
third part would be my recommendation of their commentaries. The last part would be
the summary and bibliography.

Bondeson: We are responsible with our character.

He started everything with the discussion of voluntariness and involuntariness of
character and action using the book three chapters one to five of Nicomachean ethics
as a source. Voluntary actions or character can only be called as praise worthy and
blame worthy according to Aristotle, thus men are held to be responsible for his actions
and character since it is something that can be controlled due to its voluntariness.
Since actions and characters are both voluntary or can be controlled, questions
arise like, is it possible to act contrary to an established character? Is it possible to
constitute an act by performing an action contrary to an established character? Or moral
reform is possible? These questions are actually the center point of Bondesons article.
To answer such questions as a whole, he uses the book two of Nicomachean
ethics. Character change is possible, this is what Aristotle trying to say implicitly
according to Bondeson1. "It is also plain that none of the moral virtues arise in us by
nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature". (1103 a
19-20, Ross trans.)2. Nature, therefore is equivalent to permanency, and for Bondenson,
1 Bondeson, William. "Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character and the Possibility of

Character Change." Phronesis, 1974, 59-65.Ross, W. D. Aristotle: Selections. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1955.
2

Ross, W. D. Aristotle: Selections. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955.

Aristotle is trying to say that moral virtues is not something natural or permanent in us,
thus, implicitly stated, it can be subject to change. Aristotle also supported this idea that
if something is natural, it cannot go contrary to its habit or nature.
Another supporting source of Bondeson to his stand is in the Categories at 13a
23-31. A bad person can still change if he is being brought to good life and change in
this case, is a gradual process. However in the book three chapter five of Nicomachean
ethics, the latter is seemed to be contradicted. As Aristotle says:
"We may suppose a case in which (a man) is ill voluntarily through living
incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In that case it was then open to him not
to be ill, but not now, when he has thrown away his chance, just as when you let
a stone go, it is too late to recover it; but yet it was in your power to throw it, since
the moving principle was in you. So, too, to the unjust and to the self-indulgent
man it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they
are unjust and self- indulgent voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is
not possible for them not to be so." (1114 a 15-22, Ross trans.)
It seems to be that the ill person is not able to change himself since just like a
stone that has been thrown away, there is no way that it can be recovered. Their power
to choose in the beginning will dictate of what kind of person they are in the future.
Thus, it is now something permanent.
Upon refuting such, Bondeson uses the argument of F.A. Siegler that the stone
analogy is misleading. According to Siegler, Aristotle is only concern with the acts done

by the careless person which is also ignorant 3. Thus, the action (which is the throwing of
stone) done by the man in the stone analogy of Aristotle in Nicomachean ethics is just a
careless action and done due to ignorance; and since the said action is done out of
ignorance, this only means that the action is involuntary, but he is to blame with the
consequences of his action that he has done.
The power of action to change and establish a character as an item of knowledge
Bondesons greatest weapon, should I say upon defending his stand is along the
1114a 9-11 of the Nicomachean ethics which states that:
"Now not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular
objects that states of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly
senseless person." (1114a9-1114a11 Ross trans.) 4
According to Bondeson, this is an additional point that the other commentators
failed to recognize about the understanding on how men can be responsible to their
character and that the repetitive activities or actions can produced character and this
actions is what he meant for the knowledge 5. But how about the senseless person?
What does Aristotle trying to say about this? Perhaps Aristotle might means that it is
something related to those who have poor sensing. Poor of sensing or unawareness of
the basic truth about this certain item of knowledge, a knowledge which can be
3

Siegler, Frederick Adrian. "Voluntary and Involuntary." Monist: 268-87.

4 Ross, W. D. Aristotle: Selections. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955.

5 Bondeson, William. "Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character and the Possibility of

Character Change." Phronesis, 1974, 59-65.Ross, W. D. Aristotle: Selections. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1955.
5

exhibited through actions. Thus, this knowledge must be transformed into an action.
This kind of knowledge must be common to us in a form of common sense. But there
are some people who are not able to know this which accused by Aristotle as deficient
and cannot be counted as moral agents.
Things left unanswered
The article of Bondeson all started with the discussion of voluntariness and in
voluntariness of an action or character. Since action and character can be voluntary or
involuntary, does it mean that there are some certain actions and character are unable
to change since they are involuntary? If yes, then what are these certain action and
character? Or is there any criteria provided by Aristotle on how to distinguish
changeable and unchangeable states of character? If no, isnt it quiet bias not to able to
recognize the existence of involuntary actions? For after all, what Bondeson is trying to
emphasized in his article is all about the voluntariness of the action, and failed to
recognize the otherwise.
De Muzio: Character can be improved
He started with an argument that Aristotle himself argued explicitly in the book
three chapter five of Nicomachean ethics that character is voluntary 6. He supports this
conclusion by pointing out that (1) engaging in the activities of a certain kind produces
corresponding states of character (1114 a 7); and (2) everybody knows that (1) is true

6 Di muzio aristotles on improving ones character

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(1114 a 9-10)7. It is then clear that the routine, which constitutes a character is therefore
a choice of the doer itself which makes the nature of character as voluntary 8.
Aristotle uses the stone analogy to better understand the voluntariness of
character. As stated:
"We may suppose a case in which (a man) is ill voluntarily through living
incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In that case it was then open to him not
to be ill, but not now, when he has thrown away his chance, just as when you let
a stone go, it is too late to recover it; but yet it was in your power to throw it, since
the moving principle was in you. So, too, to the unjust and to the self-indulgent
man it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they
are unjust and self- indulgent voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is
not possible for them not to be so." (1114 a 15-22, Ross trans.)
To those who are choosing to be ill or to be bad, the blame is also theirs and they
cannot escape from the consequences of their actions, now that they forfeit their chance
to be heathy or good. Just like a stone that has been already thrown, it cannot be
recovered anymore. This will only mean two things: first, people with bad character
cannot change themselves subsequently or automatically. Second, a bad person can
only act in the character that he already choose once it is acquired.

7 Di muzio aristotles on improving ones character

8 At this juncture, we can really say that Di Muzio is more direct than Bondeson
regarding with the voluntainess or involuntariness of a character.
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As a hope to the latter propositions of the stone analogy, Di Muzio asserts that
Aristotle himself believes that still, character change is possible although difficult and
the latter principle was defended by Di Muzio using he Categories. As stated:
For the bad man, if led into better ways of living and talking, would
progress, if only a little, towards being better. And if he once made even a little
progress it is clear that he might either change completely or make really great
progress. For however slight the progress he made to begin with, he becomes
ever more easily changed towards virtue, so that he is likely to make still more
progress; and when this keeps happening it brings him over completely into the
contrary state, provided time permits (Categories 13 a 23-31, trans. Ackrill).
We can see here that character change occurs not in a very subsequent way but in a
little by little process. We can also use the formation of a fetus inside the mothers
womb as an example. Its process usually occurs within nine months in a little by little
manner. It all started with the conception of the sperm and the egg cell and then a
zygote will form. Months later, a fetus will form until the body parts will be completed.
Just like character change, it all started with the smallest effort that we could ever
consider, but later, we will be amazed by its blossoming. After all, everything starts with
the small and little things.
Since in the beginning, De Muzio already affirmed that character is really
voluntary. But what does it mean that character is voluntary? Does it mean that
character can be changed by purely wishing it? Or the other way around? In this case,
he wants to clarify that though character is voluntary and therefore can be controlled, it
does not mean that control is equivalent with just merely wishing. For purely wishing or
8

just wanting a character reformation cannot lead you to change for it requires action
rather than just wishing it. This is actually evident in the Nicomachean ethics specifically
in the 1114a 13-14. As stated: Yet it does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be
unjust and will be just9. Aristotle thus wants to emphasize that the change here will not
just happened due to pure wishing. In his example about how does the ill man chooses
to be ill or the otherwise, he does not emphasized here that change is not possible but
he would like to say that how does the change could happen. And this change will
happen not by just wishing it, but by transforming his wish into an action which is being
illustrated by throwing the stone in the analogy. On the other hand, the ill man who
actually chooses to be like such could actually had a choice of not becoming such, but a
little amount of wishing cannot help him to make his choice a reality.
Perhaps, some of the interpreters has mislead in the analogy of the stone specifically in
the very last sentence. As stated:
But now (my italics) that [the unjust and the self-indulgent man] have
become so it is not possible for them not to be so (1114 a 21).
For some interpreters would say that character change is impossible for it seems
to be like such. But take a look also of the 1114a 15-17 which states that:
We may suppose a case that in which he is ill voluntarily, through living
incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In that case it was then open to him not
to be ill, but now, when he has thrown away his chance, just as when you have
let a stone go it is too late to recover it (my italics).
9 McKeon, Richard. The Basic works of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 1941.
9

As what you can notice, both of them have the word now as being emphasized
using the italics which indicates that though they already had thrown their chances to be
good or healthy, it does not mean that they cannot change themselves in the future.
They cannot just change themselves right now for they already forfeited their chance to
choose to be healthy or good. Thus, the hope of change can still be found in this case.
Now the question has been raised if the vicious men are vicious? Di Muzio
answers it in two ways that other philosophers might possibly answer.
(A) A philosophically sophisticated opponent may object to Aristotle that by
making character voluntary he is in fact asserting that people can change
character at will. But the notion of character is typically associated with
permanence and a certain lack of flexibility. (B) A person inclined towards vice
may use the doctrine of the voluntariness of character to object to all attempts to
convince him to become virtuous10.
Aristotle does not really saying that character is permanently and again, wishing is not
effective in terms of character change. It is not permanent in a sense that he can still
change in the future, though it seems to be that it grips him now, which will make us to
fall on an idea that he cannot change and therefore his present character is something
permanent11.
10 Di Muzio, Gianluca. Aristotle on Improving Ones Character. Brill. 2000. This would
also suggest that Di Muzio is just being sarcastic when he means philosophically
sophisticated opponent. Others might misinterpreted it like, since voluntary
character can only be praiseworthy or blameworthy, they could think that since they
voluntarily chose to become vicious, they are praiseworthy.
11 The idea has been explained in the latter part by explaining what does the word
now really signifies. In the phrase its not easy to break form the grip, just take
note the word easy. Such word does not mean that the break from the grip is not
10

Since wishing is not really something effective in terms of change in character, then
what is effective? Now, at this juncture, Aristotle is offering that character change is
possible through repetitive and consistent actions. Just like in health, recovery could be
faster if the patient will undergo therapy, same as two persons, one can improve his
character by acting was enough to defeat the bad habits 12. But the said process of
improvement is not easy to achieve with a little by little process. Thus character change
is really laborious and time consuming.
Self-indulgent man versus incontinent man
The issue that Di Muzio is trying to emphasize here is that, who is more capable of
change? The self-indulgent person or the incontinent man? According to Aristotle, the
self-indulgent is incorrigible or incurable and the latter is evident in the 1150a 21-22.
Since the self-indulgent man cannot feel any regret unlike the incontinent man, the prior
therefore is unable to change compare to the latter. Though Aristotle accused the selfindulgent man as incorrigible or incurable, does it mean that the word incurable is
equivalent to unable to change? Di Muzio believes that still, change is possible. In his
explanation, change in this case should came from the inside, in- corrigible in a sense.
One of the most effective and powerful change can only occur inside not outside. What
does he meant by this? Changes that are only caused by an external factor such as
mere correction and punishment are not that any more meaningful. Thus, the only
meaningful and effective change is the change that comes from the inside or internal
possible but its not just easy, thus the break from the grip is just hard as we would
thought.
12 Di Muzio, Gianluca. Aristotle on Improving Ones Character. Brill. 2000
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origin, which means that the primary motivation for change is that we really want it and
we are willing to do it whatever it takes. Therefore the real meaning of incorrigible
according to Di Muzio.
Another argument arises, that the incontinent people are not able to change in
comparison with the self-indulgent person. As Di Muzio stated:
The aporia, presented towards the end of Chapter 2 of Book VII, consisted
in the fact that self-indulgent people would seem to be better than incontinent
people13.
This is so since the self-indulgent person can be able to pursue pleasure by choice and
of full of conviction. This only means that the self-indulgent person, in spite of his
shortcomings, is at least able to be rational in terms of his choices to be like such since
his choices are grounded with conviction. Therefore, the self-indulgent man can be
persuaded to let him take the road to reformation, and this can be only true if the matter
of being wrong is about pleasure. In the case of the incontinent man, he cannot be
persuaded since he is under the influence of his urges. Just like a drug addict, it is hard
to persuade a drug addict to leave his vices when he is at the verge or under the control
of drugs.
On the other side, the latter situation is now being reversed since the selfindulgent person is now not able to change while the incontinent man is able to change.
Why is this so? Since the self-indulgent person has already a choice by conviction, it
would be harder for him to change since his ability to understand about the ends has
13 Di Muzio, Gianluca. Aristotle on Improving Ones Character. Brill. 2000
12

been already destroyed. It is something that you are decided to do and its irrevocable.
In the case of the incontinent person, he is able to change since it is not all the time that
he is under his urges. For we can persuade him to reform himself from bad to good
when he is in his right sanity, or should I say, not in the grip of his passion 14.
The role of friendship in character change has been emphasized. This quiet evident in
the Nicomachean ethics which states that:
But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is
seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not
everything can be loved, but only what is good. What is evil neither can nor
should be loved; for it is not ones duty to be a lover of evil, or to become like
what is bad; and we have said that like is dear to like. Must the friendship, then,
be forthwith broken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only when ones friends
are incurable in their wickedness? If they are capable of being reformed, one
should come to the assistance of their character even more than of their property,
inasmuch as character is a better thing and bears a closer relation to friendship.
But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing
strange; for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend
has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up (trans.
Ross, slightly modified)15.

14 The incontinent man then is not impervious to persuasion when he is not in grip
of passion, then he is responsive to guidance.
15

Ross, W. D. The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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The question that has been raised here is that, what would you do if your friend
has a character degeneration or a character that is in astray? What would be your
reaction? According to Aristotles, as friends, we should be there for their assistance.
How can we do this? By influencing him to do good by showing him how to do it. We
can bring our friend that has a character degeneration by being a good example that he
could follow.
Though Aristotle suggested the role of friendship to character change, this does
not mean that this is the sole solution to the degenerated character. Showing to them
virtues and by being a good example is not an assurance they will change their bad
ways, but it will just somehow act as a triggering point that could make them think that
they should or they could change themselves.
Another question now arises. After all the exposure of the ways on how the selfindulgent man can be lead to the ways of reformation, then, what would be the best
motivation that Aristotle could offer to the self-indulgent for him to change, to embrace
the virtuous life than the vicious life instead?
Aristotle, on the other hand, provided some remedy using the Aristotelian moral
psychology. According to his moral psychology, providing a good motivation for change
is hard to find since vice is unconscious of itself and this also shapes the character of
the vicious person. In other words, the vicious man does not know that they are vicious
in themselves and such character will determine their desire. Going back to the
question. What would be their motivation that could make them desire to change from
bad to good? Where their motivation could from?

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In the book nine, chapter 4 of Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle discusses a distinction

between the wicked mans self-hate and the good persons self-love. Let us differentiate
first the good man and the wicked man. The good mans life, should I say, is the most
desirable life for it causes an authentic happiness and it is also quite beneficial. For
instance, if you are a generous person, then this character of yours will be loved by
other people, and this will also cause you to love yourself. Thus, you will be motivated to
be generous and do well.
The wicked mans life is the most wretched life. Since this man is wicked, it is
harder for him to love himself. Why? Because the effects of living a wicked life will only
cause prohibition of happiness and opportunities that may come to your life. For
instance, cheating in an academic discipline. Though cheating in this sense can
somehow make you pass in your subject and perhaps get the highest grade possible,
but the happiness effect will not survive in the long run. For what is the sense of
cheating, if in the first place you never learned the subject matter of your topic? Or you
cant even tell something about it? Thus, the said effect, after all is not good and will
only cause trouble to you in the future. This is what Aristotle means about the wretched
life which is the result of the wicked mans living. Therefore, there is nothing lovable in
him and he cant even love himself because of this. In this sense, this kind of life should
be avoided and therefore our motivation why are we not going to invest on such life. We
can also say that this could be the motivation of the self-indulgent man to change,
provided that he is aware of his characters consequences.
Things left unanswered

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As the title states in the article of Di Muzio, Aristotle on Improving Once

Character, can we say that the word improving already means good? Because if this is
the case, then, how can we know if the man that is in the process of changing is
achieving goodness already? How can we know if he already done enough? It can also
be assumed that if we say he has changed, he already achieved the fullest potential of
character that he wants to change. After all, Aristotle never mentioned what degree of
change wherein we can say that the self-indulgent man is changing for the better and
already reached the fullest potential of goodness that he wants to achieve.

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