Walang facts. Ruling lng.

Doctrine: the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may

validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the
Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were
assumed as a certainty. [as distinguished from Sanidad case]
Facts: the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.
The petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The
MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying
an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in
effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes
another violation of its authority.
Issue: Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines would be binding itself to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws
to conform to the MOA?
May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that
would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be
restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this
question requires a discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct
peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to
declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution. The Court held thus:
"the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return
of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the
President's

. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of

executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos,
for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the
main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws
strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in
her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the
President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commanderin-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict
will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution.
Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's
constitutional structure is required.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she
considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them
pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In
particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of
the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people,
call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may
be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional
change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of
constituent powers.

In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of
directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing
the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with
the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never
convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act,
holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the agent of
the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose
constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma
vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the
point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not
disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the
President may directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum,
implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action
along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and
coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments
of government, defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the
manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been
granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows
that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional
amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim
National Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of
constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider
implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but
she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or
act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty .
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly
propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also
submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted
on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their
independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being
formally proposed through initiative.

These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's
suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the
Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only
initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As
the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's voice.' However,
the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the
verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its
unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria MacapagalArroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their
people's' initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent
President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of
incantations of people's voice' or sovereign will' in the present initiative."
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only
to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes
and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her
mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new legislation is
not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to
propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually
done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress.
Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget
prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new
legislation coming from the President.
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed
standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional
amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof
which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force
upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes
to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive
condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a
question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected,
but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows,
for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due
regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes
to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include
constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that,
By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted
among the "prior agreements" from which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the
implementing details for these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for
effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of
the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual
guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will
certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOAAD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal
framework" will be put in place