Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152894

August 17, 2007

CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C. PALAD, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 12 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.
The Facts
On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad)
as "fish cleaner" at petitioners tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997
an apprenticeship agreement3 with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance
of P138.75 daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for
approval to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA
approved petitioners apprenticeship program.4
According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November
1997, where petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or "needs improvement" since she
scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to
the performance evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a
consequence, petitioner issued a termination notice5 dated 22 November 1997 to
Palad, informing her of her termination effective at the close of business hours of 28
November 1997.
Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.
On 25 February 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but
ordered petitioner to pay Palad her last salary and her pro-rated 13th month pay. The
dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by the complainant against the respondents in the
above-entitled case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. However,
the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of ONE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P1,632.00), representing her last
salary and the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT
(P7,228.00) PESOS representing her prorated 13th month pay.
All other issues are likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
Page 1 of 68

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification
the Labor Arbiters decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25 February
1999 is hereby MODIFIED in that, in addition, respondents are ordered to pay
complainants backwages for two (2) months in the amount of P7,176.00 (P138.75 x 26
x 2 mos.). All other dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the dispositive portion of
his decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
Upon denial of Palads motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 12 November 2001, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned decision of the NLRC is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new one entered, to wit:
(a) finding the dismissal of petitioner to be illegal;
(b) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner her underpayment in wages;
(c) ordering private respondent to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss
of seniority rights and to pay her full backwages computed from the time compensation
was withheld from her up to the time of her reinstatement;
(d) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%)
per cent of the monetary award herein; and
(e) ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was
not valid and binding because it was executed more than two months before the TESDA
approved petitioners apprenticeship program. The Court of Appeals cited Nitto
Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,9 where it was held that prior
approval by the DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a condition sine qua
non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of the
required standard of performance. The Court of Appeals likewise held that Palad was
not afforded due process because petitioner did not comply with the twin requirements
of notice and hearing.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE; and

Page 2 of 68

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE
OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.10
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Registration and Approval by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program Required Before
Hiring of Apprentices
The Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written
apprenticeship agreement with an employer.11 One of the objectives of Title II (Training
and Employment of Special Workers) of the Labor Code is to establish apprenticeship
standards for the protection of apprentices.12 In line with this objective, Articles 60 and
61 of the Labor Code provide:
ART. 60. Employment of apprentices. Only employers in the highly technical
industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations approved by
the Minister of Labor and Employment. (Emphasis supplied)
ART. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements. Apprenticeship agreements,
including the wage rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the
Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six
months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum
wage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the applicable minimum wage,
may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly approved by
the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model
programs of apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied)
In Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,13 the Court cited Article
61 of the Labor Code and held that an apprenticeship program should first be approved
by the DOLE before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise the person hired will be
considered a regular employee. The Court held:
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an
apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship
program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and
Employment. However, the apprenticeship agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990.
Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment,
the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the
law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and
apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly
approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed
apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship
agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not
instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.

Page 3 of 68

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national
apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and
government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards
for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior
approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition
sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role
of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent
has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved
by the DOLE, private respondents assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but
as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be
considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor
Code x x x. (Emphasis supplied)14
Republic Act No. 779615 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred the
authority over apprenticeship programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of the
DOLE to the TESDA.16 RA 7796 emphasizes TESDAs approval of the apprenticeship
program as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. Such intent is clear under
Section 4 of RA 7796:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
xxx
j) "Apprenticeship" training within employment with compulsory related theoretical
instructions involving a contract between an apprentice and an employer on an
approved apprenticeable occupation;
k) "Apprentice" is a person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable
occupation during an established period assured by an apprenticeship agreement;
l) "Apprentice Agreement" is a contract wherein a prospective employer binds himself to
train the apprentice who in turn accepts the terms of training for a recognized
apprenticeable occupation emphasizing the rights, duties and responsibilities of each
party;
m) "Apprenticeable Occupation" is an occupation officially endorsed by a tripartite body
and approved for apprenticeship by the Authority [TESDA]; (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties before
petitioner filed its apprenticeship program with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and
Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein it was stated
that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end approximately in December
1997.17 On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for approval its apprenticeship program,
which the TESDA subsequently approved on 26 September 1997.18 Clearly, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before the TESDA approved petitioners
apprenticeship program. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked
prior approval from the TESDA.
The TESDAs approval of the employers apprenticeship program is required before the
employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is necessary to
ensure that only employers in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices
and only in apprenticeable occupations.19 Thus, under RA 7796, employers can only
hire apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be officially endorsed by a
tripartite body and approved for apprenticeship by the TESDA.1avvphil This is to ensure
the protection of apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by prospective employers
Page 4 of 68

who may want to take advantage of the lower wage rates for apprentices and
circumvent the right of the employees to be secure in their employment.
The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of
apprentices was further emphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of Department
Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004. Department Order No. 68-04, which provides the
guidelines in the implementation of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program of the
government, specifically states that no enterprise shall be allowed to hire apprentices
unless its apprenticeship program is registered and approved by TESDA.20
Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement
was enforced before the TESDAs approval of petitioners apprenticeship program,
Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job of a "fish cleaner." Clearly, the
job of a "fish cleaner" is necessary in petitioners business as a tuna and sardines
factory. Under Article 28021 of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
Illegal Termination of Palad
We shall now resolve whether petitioner illegally dismissed Palad.
Under Article 27922 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an
employee for just causes23 or for authorized causes.24 Furthermore, under Article
277(b)25 of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is about to be
terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and must give the
employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid
dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a
just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself.26
In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for habitual
absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of
the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of
performance are among the valid causes for which the employer may terminate the
apprenticeship agreement after the probationary period.
However, the NLRC reversed the finding of the Labor Arbiter on the issue of the legality
of Palads termination:
As to the validity of complainants dismissal in her status as an apprentice, suffice to
state that the findings of the Arbiter that complainant was dismissed due to failure to
meet the standards is nebulous. What clearly appears is that complainant already
passed the probationary status of the apprenticeship agreement of 200 hours at the
time she was terminated on 28 November 1997 which was already the fourth month of
the apprenticeship period of 1000 hours. As such, under the Code, she can only be
dismissed for cause, in this case, for poor efficiency of performance on the job or in the
classroom for a prolonged period despite warnings duly given to the apprentice.
We noted that no clear and sufficient evidence exist to warrant her dismissal as an
apprentice during the agreed period. Besides the absence of any written warnings given
to complainant reminding her of "poor performance," respondents evidence in this
respect consisted of an indecipherable or unauthenticated xerox of the performance
evaluation allegedly conducted on complainant. This is of doubtful authenticity and/or
credibility, being not only incomplete in the sense that appearing thereon is a signature
(not that of complainant) side by side with a date indicated as "1/16/98". From the looks
of it, this signature is close to and appertains to the typewritten position of
Page 5 of 68

"Division/Department Head", which is below the signature of complainants immediate

superior who made the evaluation indicated as "11-15-97."
The only conclusion We can infer is that this evaluation was made belatedly, specifically,
after the filing of the case and during the progress thereof in the Arbitral level, as shown
that nothing thereon indicate that complainant was notified of the results. Its authenticity
therefor, is a big question mark, and hence lacks any credibility. Evidence, to be
admissible in administrative proceedings, must at least have a modicum of authenticity.
This, respondents failed to comply with. As such, complainant is entitled to the payment
of her wages for the remaining two (2) months of her apprenticeship agreement.27
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, it appears that the Labor Arbiters conclusion that petitioner validly terminated
Palad was based mainly on the performance evaluation allegedly conducted by
petitioner. However, Palad alleges that she had no knowledge of the performance
evaluation conducted and that she was not even informed of the result of the alleged
performance evaluation. Palad also claims she did not receive a notice of dismissal, nor
was she given the chance to explain. According to petitioner, Palad did not receive the
termination notice because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work after being
informed of the result of the evaluation.
Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the employer has the burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause.28 Petitioner failed to substantiate its
claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the NLRC found that
petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance evaluation which petitioner
claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad received a performance rating of only
27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the performance evaluation to prove Palads
inefficiency. It was likewise not shown that petitioner ever apprised Palad of the
performance standards set by the company. When the alleged valid cause for the
termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the
matter a case of illegal dismissal.29
Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a
performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor
performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance evaluation
conducted and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive
the notice of termination30 because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work. The
records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to
explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in
this case.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution
dated 5 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Page 6 of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 114337

September 29, 1995

NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
respondents.

COMMISSION

and

ROBERTO

CAPILI,

KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
decision 1 rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum
products, hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist,
molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2 for a period of
six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of
P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of
glass which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary
who was treated at a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within
the office premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power
press machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner
spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads:
August 2, 1990
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung
papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang
paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay
pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot
ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:
Emergency and doctor fee P715.00
Medecines (sic) and others
317.04

Page 7 of 68

Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal

ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng
Agosto, 1990.
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang
kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon,
kasama ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.

Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking

pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.
(Sgd.) Roberto Capili
Roberto Capili
On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of
petitioner for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. 4
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the
NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of other monetary benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of
private respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The
dispositive portion of the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the
money claims dismissed for lack of merit.
The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as
financial assistance.
SO ORDERED. 5
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of
Roberto Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice
violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in
the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent
had shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the
handling of machines without authority and proper training. 6
On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing
the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby
directed to reinstate complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed
from the time his wages were withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The
Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear complainant's money claims and to
dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED. 7
Page 8 of 68

The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by
ruling thus:
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an
apprenticeship agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990
could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that the complainant was
hired by respondent as a plain "apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the
complainant was respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code,
as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section
3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon
respondent, pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al.
(G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of
complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the
complainant was illegally dismissed. 8
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private
respondent's representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the
Writ, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto
Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon,
Metro Manila or at any other places where their properties are located and effect the
reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option
of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called
for in the dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper
disposition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
The issues raised before us are the following:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN
APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN
THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot
plainly be considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed
and approved at the time the agreement was executed.
Page 9 of 68

Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already
established an employer-apprentice relationship.
Petitioner's argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements, including the
main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship
agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case
shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into
only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor
and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of
apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an
apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship
program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and
Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990.
Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment,
the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the
law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and
apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly
approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed
apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship
agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not
instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national
apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and
government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards
for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior
approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition
sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role
of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent
has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved
by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but
as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be
considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor
Code:
Art. 280.
Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
Page 10 of 68

trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare." 9
Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private
respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of
due process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal
exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process. This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity
to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal
representation. 11
As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12
The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with
two (2) written notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice
which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal
is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the
requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, in the
absence of which, any judgment reached by management is void and in existent
(Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168
SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only
three days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such
resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery
boy ("kargador" or "pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner
made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. 13
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating
the latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A
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judicious examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's

part.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Page 12 of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187320

January 26, 2011

ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, Petitioners,

vs.
APRILITO R. SEBOLINO, KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V. ALMOITE, and JOSEPH S.
SAGUN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For resolution is the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 and the
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered on November 4, 2008 and March 25,
2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 99340.4
The Antecedents
The facts are summarized below.
In the months of February and March 2005, complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, Khim V.
Costales, Alvin V. Almoite, Joseph S. Sagun, Agosto D. Zao, Domingo S. Alegria, Jr.,
Ronie Ramos, Edgar Villagomez, Melvin Pedregoza, Teofanes B. Chiong, Jr., Leonardo
L. dela Cruz, Arnold A. Magalang, and Saturnino M. Mabanag filed several complaints
for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other
money claims, as well as claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
against the petitioners Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and Chief
Operating Officer Robert Chan. Atlanta is a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture of steel pipes.
The complaints were consolidated and were raffled to Labor Arbiter Daniel Cajilig, but
were later transferred to Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.
The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to
work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported
apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They claimed that they
were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization
and to their money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a
government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as
regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of
the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in
the list of employees (Master List)5 prior to their engagement as apprentices.
On May 24, 2005, dela Cruz, Magalang, Zao and Chiong executed a Pagtalikod at
Pagwawalang Saysay before Labor Arbiter Cajilig.
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
On April 24, 2006, Labor Arbiter Medroso dismissed the complaint with respect to dela
Cruz, Magalang, Zao and Chiong, but found the termination of service of the remaining
Page 13 of 68

nine to be illegal.6 Consequently, the arbiter awarded the dismissed workers

backwages, wage differentials, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay amounting
to P1,389,044.57 in the aggregate.
Atlanta appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In the meantime,
or on October 10, 2006, Ramos, Alegria, Villagomez, Costales and Almoite allegedly
entered into a compromise agreement with Atlanta.7 The agreement provided that
except for Ramos, Atlanta agreed to pay the workers a specified amount as settlement,
and to acknowledge them at the same time as regular employees.
On December 29, 2006,8 the NLRC rendered a decision, on appeal, modifying the
ruling of the labor arbiter, as follows: (1) withdrawing the illegal dismissal finding with
respect to Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and Pedregoza; (2) affirming the dismissal of the
complaints of dela Cruz, Zao, Magalang and Chiong; (3) approving the compromise
agreement entered into by Costales, Ramos, Villagomez, Almoite and Alegria, and (4)
denying all other claims.
Sebolino, Costales, Almoite and Sagun moved for the reconsideration of the decision,
but the NLRC denied the motion in its March 30, 20079 resolution. The four then sought
relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
They charged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) failing to
recognize their prior employment with Atlanta; (2) declaring the second apprenticeship
agreement valid; (3) holding that the dismissal of Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and Melvin
Pedregoza is legal; and (4) upholding the compromise agreement involving Costales,
Ramos, Villagomez, Almoite and Alegria.
The CA Decision
The CA granted the petition based on the following findings:10
1. The respondents were already employees of the company before they entered into
the first and second apprenticeship agreements Almoite and Costales were employed
as early as December 2003 and, subsequently, entered into a first apprenticeship
agreement from May 13, 2004 to October 12, 2004; before this first agreement expired,
a second apprenticeship agreement, from October 9, 2004 to March 8, 2005 was
executed. The same is true with Sebolino and Sagun, who were employed by Atlanta as
early as March 3, 2004. Sebolino entered into his first apprenticeship agreement with
the company from March 20, 2004 to August 19, 2004, and his second apprenticeship
agreement from August 20, 2004 to January 19, 2005. Sagun, on the other hand,
entered into his first agreement from May 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004, and the second
agreement from October 9, 2004 to March 8, 2005.
2. The first and second apprenticeship agreements were defective as they were
executed in violation of the law and the rules.11 The agreements did not indicate the
trade or occupation in which the apprentice would be trained; neither was the
apprenticeship program approved by the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA).
3. The positions occupied by the respondents machine operator, extruder operator
and scaleman are usually necessary and desirable in the manufacture of plastic
building materials, the companys main business. Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and
Sagun were, therefore, regular employees whose dismissals were illegal for lack of a
just or authorized cause and notice.
4. The compromise agreement entered into by Costales and Almoite, together with
Ramos, Villagomez and Alegria, was not binding on Costales and Almoite because they
did not sign the agreement.
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The petitioners themselves admitted that Costales and Almoite were initially planned to
be a part of the compromise agreement, but their employment has been regularized as
early as January 11, 2006; hence, the company did not pursue their inclusion in the
compromise agreement.12
The CA faulted the NLRC for failing to appreciate the evidence regarding the
respondents prior employment with Atlanta. The NLRC recognized the prior
employment of Costales and Almoite on Atlantas monthly report for December 2003 for
the CPS Department/Section dated January 6, 2004.13 This record shows that Costales
and Almoite were assigned to the companys first shift from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. The
NLRC ignored Sebolino and Saguns prior employment under the companys Production
and Work Schedule for March 7 to 12, 2005 dated March 3, 2004,14 as they had been
Atlantas employees as early as March 3, 2004, with Sebolino scheduled to work on
March 7-12, 2005 at 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., while Sagun was scheduled to work for the
same period but from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. The CA noted that Atlanta failed to
challenge the authenticity of the two documents before it and the labor authorities.
Atlanta and Chan moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in a
resolution rendered on March 25, 2009.15 Hence, the present petition.
The Petition
Atlanta seeks a reversal of the CA decision, contending that the appellate court erred in
(1) concluding that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were employed by Atlanta
before they were engaged as apprentices; (2) ruling that a second apprenticeship
agreement is invalid; (3) declaring that the respondents were illegally dismissed; and (4)
disregarding the compromise agreement executed by Costales and Almoite. It submits
the following arguments:
First. The CAs conclusion that the respondent workers were company employees
before they were engaged as apprentices was primarily based on the Monthly Report16
and the Production and Work Schedule for March 7-12, 2005,17 in total disregard of the
Master List18 prepared by the company accountant, Emelita M. Bernardo. The names
of Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun do not appear as employees in the Master
List which "contained the names of all the persons who were employed by and at
petitioner."19
Atlanta faults the CA for relying on the Production and Work Schedule and the Monthly
Report which were not sworn to, and in disregarding the Master List whose veracity was
sworn to by Bernardo and by Alex Go who headed the companys accounting division. It
maintains that the CA should have given more credence to the Master List.
Second. In declaring invalid the apprenticeship agreements it entered into with the
respondent workers, the CA failed to recognize the rationale behind the law on
apprenticeship. It submits that under the law,20 apprenticeship agreements are valid,
provided they do not exceed six (6) months and the apprentices are paid the
appropriate wages of at least 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
The respondents initially executed a five-month apprenticeship program with Atlanta, at
the end of which, they "voluntarily and willingly entered into another apprenticeship
agreement with the petitioner for the training of a second skill"21 for five months; thus,
the petitioners committed no violation of the apprenticeship period laid down by the law.
Further, the apprenticeship agreements, entered into by the parties, complied with the
requisites under Article 62 of the Labor Code; the companys authorized representative
and the respondents signed the agreements and these were ratified by the companys
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apprenticeship committee. The apprenticeship program itself was approved and

certified by the TESDA.22 The CA, thus, erred in overturning the NLRCs finding that
the apprenticeship agreements were valid.
Third. There was no illegal dismissal as the respondent workers tenure ended with the
expiration of the apprenticeship agreement they entered into. There was, therefore, no
regular employer-employee relationship between Atlanta and the respondent workers.
The Case for Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun
In a Comment filed on August 6, 2009,23 Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun pray
for a denial of the petition for being procedurally defective and for lack of merit.
The respondent workers contend that the petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which requires that the petition be accompanied by supporting
material portions of the records. The petitioners failed to attach to the petition a copy of
the Production and Work Schedule despite their submission that the CA relied heavily
on the document in finding the respondent workers prior employment with Atlanta. They
also did not attach a copy of the compromise agreement purportedly executed by
Costales and Almoite. For this reason, the respondent workers submit that the petition
should be dismissed.
The respondents posit that the CA committed no error in holding that they were already
Atlantas employees before they were engaged as apprentices, as confirmed by the
companys Production and Work Schedule.24 They maintain that the Production and
Work Schedule meets the requirement of substantial evidence as the petitioners failed
to question its authenticity. They point out that the schedule was prepared by Rose A.
Quirit and approved by Adolfo R. Lope, head of the companys PE/Spiral Section. They
argue that it was highly unlikely that the head of a production section of the company
would prepare and assign work to the complainants if the latter had not been company
employees.
The respondent workers reiterate their mistrust of the Master List25 as evidence that
they were not employees of the company at the time they became apprentices. They
label the Master List as "self-serving, dubious and even if considered as authentic, its
content contradicts a lot of petitioners claim and allegations,"26 thus 1. Aside from the fact that the Master List is not legible, it contains only the names of
inactive employees. Even those found by the NLRC to have been employed in the
company (such as Almoite, Costales and Sagun) do not appear in the list. If Costales
and Almoite had been employed with Atlanta since January 11, 2006, as the company
claimed,27 their names would have been in the list, considering that the Master List
accounts for all employees "as of May 2006" the notation carried on top of each page
of the document.
2. There were no entries of employees hired or resigned in the years 2005 and 2006
despite the "as of May 2006" notation; several pages making up the Master List contain
names of employees for the years 1999 - 2004.
3. The fact that Atlanta presented the purported Master List instead of the payroll raised
serious doubts on the authenticity of the list.
In sum, the respondent workers posit that the presentation of the Master List revealed
the "intention of the herein petitioner[s] to perpetually hide the fact of [their] prior
employment."28

Page 16 of 68

On the supposed apprenticeship agreements they entered into, Costales, Almoite,

Sebolino and Sagun refuse to accept the agreements validity, contending that the
companys apprenticeship program is merely a ploy "to continually deprive [them] of
their rightful wages and benefits which are due them as regular employees."29 They
submit the following "indubitable facts and ratiocinations:"30
1. The apprenticeship agreements were submitted to TESDA only in 2005 (with dates of
receipt on "1/4/05" & "2/22/05"31 ), when the agreements were supposed to have been
executed in April or May 2004. Thus, the submission was made long after the starting
date of the workers apprenticeship or even beyond the agreements
completion/termination date, in violation of Section 23, Rule VI, Book II of the Labor
Code.
2. The respondent workers were made to undergo apprenticeship for occupations
different from those allegedly approved by TESDA. TESDA approved Atlantas
apprenticeship program on "Plastic Molder"32 and not for extrusion molding process,
engineering, pelletizing process and mixing process.
3. The respondents were already skilled workers prior to the apprenticeship program as
they had been employed and made to work in the different job positions where they had
undergone training. Sagun and Sebolino, together with Mabanag, Pedregoza, dela
Cruz, Chiong, Magalang and Alegria were even given production assignments and work
schedule at the PE/Spiral Section from May 11, 2004 to March 23, 2005, and some of
them were even assigned to the 3:00 p.m. 11:00 p.m. and graveyard shifts (11:00 p.m.
7:00 a.m.) during the period.33
4. The respondent workers were required to continue as apprentices beyond six
months. The TESDA certificate of completion indicates that the workers apprenticeship
had been completed after six months. Yet, they were suffered to work as apprentices
beyond that period.
Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun resolutely maintain that they were illegally
dismissed, as the reason for the termination of their employment notice of the
completion of the second apprenticeship agreement did not constitute either a just or
authorized cause under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code.
Finally, Costales and Almoite refuse to be bound by the compromise agreement34 that
Atlanta presented to defeat the two workers cause of action. They claim that the
supposed agreement is invalid as against them, principally because they did not sign it.
The Courts Ruling
The procedural issue
The respondent workers ask that the petition be dismissed outright for the petitioners
failure to attach to the petition a copy of the Production and Work Schedule and a copy
of the compromise agreement Costales and Almoite allegedly entered into material
portions of the record that should accompany and support the petition, pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In Mariners Polytechnic Colleges Foundation, Inc. v. Arturo J. Garchitorena35 where the
Court addressed essentially the same issue arising from Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court,36 we held that the phrase "of the pleadings and other material portions
of the record xxx as would support the allegation of the petition clearly contemplates the
exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are
deemed to be relevant to the petition. The crucial issue to consider then is whether or
Page 17 of 68

not the documents accompanying the petition sufficiently supported the allegations
therein."37
As in Mariners, we find that the documents attached to the petition sufficiently support
the petitioners allegations. The accompanying CA decision38 and resolution,39 as well
as those of the labor arbiter40 and the NLRC,41 referred to the parties position papers
and even to their replies and rejoinders. Significantly, the CA decision narrates the
factual antecedents, defines the complainants cause of action, and cites the arguments,
including the evidence the parties adduced. If any, the defect in the petition lies in the
petitioners failure to provide legible copies of some of the material documents
mentioned, especially several pages in the decisions of the labor arbiter and of the
NLRC. This defect, however, is not fatal as the challenged CA decision clearly
summarized the labor tribunals rulings. We, thus, find no procedural obstacle in
resolving the petition on the merits.
The merits of the case
We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying the
NLRC decision42 and in affirming the labor arbiters ruling,43 as it applies to Costales,
Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that the four were
illegally dismissed because (1) they were already employees when they were required
to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements were invalid.
The following considerations support the CA ruling.
First. Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite,
Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company as employees
before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself recognized the
respondents status through relevant operational records in the case of Costales and
Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December 200344 which the NLRC relied upon
and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work schedule for March 7 to 12,
200545 cited by the CA.
Under the CPS monthly report, Atlanta assigned Costales and Almoite to the first shift
(7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) of the Sections work. The Production and Work Schedules, in
addition to the one noted by the CA, showed that Sebolino and Sagun were scheduled
on different shifts vis--vis the production and work of the companys PE/Spiral Section
for the periods July 5-10, 2004;46 October 25-31, 2004;47 November 8-14, 2004;48
November 16-22, 2004;49 January 3-9, 2005;50 January 10-15, 2005;51 March 7-12,
200552 and March 17-23, 2005.53
We stress that the CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational
documents, for the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against these documents
before the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. The appellate court, thus, found the
said documents sufficient to establish the employment of the respondents before their
engagement as apprentices.
Second. The Master List54 (of employees) that the petitioners heavily rely upon as
proof of their position that the respondents were not Atlantas employees, at the time
they were engaged as apprentices, is unreliable and does not inspire belief.
The list, consisting of several pages, is hardly legible. It requires extreme effort to sort
out the names of the employees listed, as well as the other data contained in the list.
For this reason alone, the list deserves little or no consideration. As the respondents
also pointed out, the list itself contradicts a lot of Atlantas claims and allegations, thus: it
lists only the names of inactive employees; even the names of those the NLRC found to
have been employed by Atlanta, like Costales and Almoite, and those who even Atlanta
Page 18 of 68

claims attained regular status on January 11, 2006,55 do not appear in the list when it
was supposed to account for all employees "as of May 6, 2006." Despite the "May 6,
2006" cut off date, the list contains no entries of employees who were hired or who
resigned in 2005 and 2006. We note that the list contains the names of employees from
1999 to 2004.
We cannot fault the CA for ignoring the Master List even if Bernardo, its head office
accountant, swore to its correctness and authenticity.56 Its substantive unreliability
gives it very minimal probative value. Atlanta would have been better served, in terms of
reliable evidence, if true copies of the payroll (on which the list was based, among
others, as Bernardo claimed in her affidavit) were presented instead.1wphi1
Third. The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering
service to the company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship (as
established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as
the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted by the CA finding that the respondents
occupied positions such as machine operator, scaleman and extruder operator - tasks
that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlantas usual business or trade as
manufacturer of plastic building materials.57 These tasks and their nature characterized
the four as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Thus, when they
were dismissed without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the
opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.58
Even if we recognize the companys need to train its employees through apprenticeship,
we can only consider the first apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the
expiration of the first agreement and the retention of the employees, Atlanta had, to all
intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their training and their acquisition of
a regular employee status. To foist upon them the second apprenticeship agreement for
a second skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself,59 is a violation of
the Labor Codes implementing rules60 and is an act manifestly unfair to the
employees, to say the least. This we cannot allow.
Fourth. The compromise agreement61 allegedly entered into by Costales and Almoite,
together with Ramos, Villagomez and Alegria, purportedly in settlement of the case
before the NLRC, is not binding on Costales and Almoite because they did not sign it.
The company itself admitted62 that while Costales and Almoite were initially intended to
be a part of the agreement, it did not pursue their inclusion "due to their regularization
as early as January 11, 2006."63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of
merit.1wphi1 The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner Atlanta Industries, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Page 19 of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 169295-96

November 20, 2006

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA CASTANEDA, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Remington Industrial
Sales Corporation to reverse and set aside the Decision2 of the Fourth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64577 and 68477, dated January 31, 2005, which
dismissed petitioners consolidated petitions for certiorari, and its subsequent
Resolution,3 dated August 11, 2005, which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The present controversy began when private respondent, Erlinda Castaneda ("Erlinda")
instituted on March 2, 1998 a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages,
non-payment of overtime services, non-payment of service incentive leave pay and nonpayment of 13th month pay against Remington before the NLRC, National Capital
Region, Quezon City. The complaint impleaded Mr. Antonio Tan in his capacity as the
Managing Director of Remington.
Erlinda alleged that she started working in August 1983 as company cook with a salary
of Php 4,000.00 for Remington, a corporation engaged in the trading business; that she
worked for six (6) days a week, starting as early as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do the
marketing and would end at around 5:30 p.m., or even later, after most of the
employees, if not all, had left the company premises; that she continuously worked with
Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when
Remington transferred to a new site in Edsa, Caloocan City. She averred that she
reported for work at the new site in Caloocan City on January 15, 1998, only to be
informed that Remington no longer needed her services. Erlinda believed that her
dismissal was illegal because she was not given the notices required by law; hence, she
filed her complaint for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, salary differentials,
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and 10% attorneys fees.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a
domestic helper, not a regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had
nothing to do with Remingtons business of trading in construction or hardware
materials, steel plates and wire rope products. It also contended that contrary to
Erlindas allegations that the (sic) she worked for eight (8) hours a day, Erlindas duty
was merely to cook lunch and "merienda", after which her time was hers to spend as
she pleased. Remington also maintained that it did not exercise any degree of control
and/or supervision over Erlindas work as her only concern was to ensure that the
employees lunch and "merienda" were available and served at the designated time.
Remington likewise belied Erlindas assertion that her work extended beyond 5:00 p.m.
as she could only leave after all the employees had gone. The truth, according to
Remington, is that Erlinda did not have to punch any time card in the way that other
Page 20 of 68

employees of Remington did; she was free to roam around the company premises, read
magazines, and to even nap when not doing her assigned chores. Remington averred
that the illegal dismissal complaint lacked factual and legal bases. Allegedly, it was
Erlinda who refused to report for work when Remington moved to a new location in
Caloocan City.
In a Decision4 dated January 19, 1999, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint and
ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under the personal service of Antonio
Tan, finding that her work as a cook was not usually necessary and desirable in the
ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, which operated as a
trading company, and that the latter did not exercise control over her functions. On the
issue of illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the respondent who refused
to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the corporation transferred office and that,
therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.
Upon appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a Decision,5
dated November 23, 2000, reversing the labor arbiter, ruling, viz:
We are not inclined to uphold the declaration below that complainant is a domestic
helper of the family of Antonio Tan. There was no allegation by respondent that
complainant had ever worked in the residence of Mr. Tan. What is clear from the facts
narrated by the parties is that complainant continuously did her job as a cook in the
office of respondent serving the needed food for lunch and merienda of the employees.
Thus, her work as cook inured not for the benefit of the family members of Mr. Tan but
solely for the individual employees of respondent.
Complainant as an employee of respondent company is even bolstered by no less than
the certification dated May 23, 1997 issued by the corporate secretary of the company
certifying that complainant is their bonafide employee. This is a solid evidence which the
Labor Arbiter simply brushed aside. But, such error would not be committed here as it
would be at the height of injustice if we are to declare that complainant is a domestic
helper.
Complainants work schedule and being paid a monthly salary of P4,000.00 are clear
indication that she is a company employee who had been employed to cater to the food
needed by the employees which were being provided by respondent to form part of the
benefit granted them.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, we believe that there is more reason to
believe that complainant was not dismissed because allegedly she was the one who
refused to work in the new office of respondent. However, complainants refusal to join
the workforce due to poor eyesight could not be considered abandonment of work or
voluntary resignation from employment.
Under the Labor Code as amended, an employee who reaches the age of sixty years
old (60 years) has the option to retire or to separate from the service with payment of
separation pay/retirement benefit.
In this case, we notice that complainant was already 60 years old at the time she filed
the complaint praying for separation pay or retirement benefit and some money claims.
Based on Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended, complainant is entitled to be paid
her separation pay/retirement benefit equivalent to one-half (1/2) month for every year
of service. The amount of separation pay would be based on the prescribed minimum
wage at the time of dismissal since she was then underpaid. In as much as complainant
is underpaid of her wages, it behooves that she should be paid her salary differential for
the last three years prior to separation/retirement.
Page 21 of 68

xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby, SET ASIDE, and
a new one is hereby entered ordering respondents to pay complainant the following:
1. Salary differential - P12,021.12 2. Service Incentive Leave Pay - 2,650.00 3. 13th
Month Pay differential - 1,001.76 4. Separation Pay/retirement benefit - 36,075.00
Total - P51,747.88
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved to reconsider this decision but the NLRC denied the motion. This
denial of its motion prompted petitioner to file a Petition for Certiorari6 with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64577, on May 4, 2001, imputing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in (1)
reversing in toto the decision of the labor arbiter, and (2) awarding in favor of
respondent salary differential, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay differential
and separation benefits in the total sum of P51,747.88.
While the petition was pending with the Court of Appeals, the NLRC rendered another
Decision7 in the same case on August 29, 2001. How and why another decision was
rendered is explained in that decision as follows:
On May 17, 2001, complainant filed a Manifestation praying for a resolution of her
Motion for Reconsideration and, in support thereof, alleges that, sometime December
18, 2000, she mailed her Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration registered as
Registered Certificate No. 188844; and that the said mail was received by the NLRC,
through a certain Roland Hernandez, on December 26, 2000. Certifications to this effect
was issued by the Postmaster of the Sta. Mesa Post Office bearing the date May 11,
2001 (Annexes A and B, Complainants Manifestation).
Evidence in support of complainants having actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration
within the reglementary period having been sufficiently established, a determination of
its merits is thus, in order.
On the merits, the NLRC found respondents motion for reconsideration meritorious
leading to the issuance of its second decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated November 23, 2000, is
MODIFIED by increasing the award of retirement pay due the complainant in the total
amount of SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 50/100
(P62,437.50). All other monetary relief so adjudged therein are maintained and likewise
made payable to the complainant.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner challenged the second decision of the NLRC, including the resolution denying
its motion for reconsideration, through a second Petition for Certiorari8 filed with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68477 and dated January 8, 2002, this
time imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the NLRC in (1) issuing the second decision despite losing its jurisdiction due
to the pendency of the first petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and (2)
assuming it still had jurisdiction to issue the second decision notwithstanding the
pendency of the first petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, that its second
decision has no basis in law since respondents motion for reconsideration, which was
Page 22 of 68

made the basis of the second decision, was not filed under oath in violation of Section
14, Rule VII9 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and that it contained no
certification as to why respondents motion for reconsideration was not decided on time
as also required by Section 10, Rule VI10 and Section 15, Rule VII11 of the
aforementioned rules.
Upon petitioners motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the consolidation of the two (2)
petitions, on January 24, 2002, pursuant to Section 7, par. b(3), Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of the Court of Appeals. It summarized the principal issues raised in the
consolidated petitions as follows:
1. Whether respondent is petitioners regular employee or a domestic helper;
2. Whether respondent was illegally dismissed; and
3. Whether the second NLRC decision promulgated during the pendency of the first
petition for certiorari has basis in law.
On January 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed the consolidated petitions for lack
of merit, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in issuing the
assailed decisions.
On the first issue, it upheld the ruling of the NLRC that respondent was a regular
employee of the petitioner since the former worked at the company premises and
catered not only to the personal comfort and enjoyment of Mr. Tan and his family, but
also to that of the employees of the latter. It agreed that petitioner enjoys the prerogative
to control respondents conduct in undertaking her assigned work, particularly the
nature and situs of her work in relation to the petitioners workforce, thereby establishing
the existence of an employer-employee relationship between them.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, it ruled that respondent has attained the status of a
regular employee in her service with the company. It noted that the NLRC found that no
less than the companys corporate secretary certified that respondent is a bonafide
company employee and that she had a fixed schedule and routine of work and was paid
a monthly salary of P4,000.00; that she served with petitioner for 15 years starting in
1983, buying and cooking food served to company employees at lunch and merienda;
and that this work was usually necessary and desirable in the regular business of the
petitioner. It held that as a regular employee, she enjoys the constitutionally guaranteed
right to security of tenure and that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving
that her dismissal on January 15, 1998 was for a just or authorized cause and that the
manner of dismissal complied with the requirements under the law.
Finally, on petitioners other arguments relating to the alleged irregularity of the second
NLRC decision, i.e., the fact that respondents motion for reconsideration was not under
oath and had no certification explaining why it was not resolved within the prescribed
period, it held that such violations relate to procedural and non-jurisdictional matters that
cannot assume primacy over the substantive merits of the case and that they do not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that
would nullify the second NLRC decision.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners contention that the NLRC lost its jurisdiction to
issue the second decision when it received the order indicating the Court of Appeals
initial action on the first petition for certiorari that it filed. It ruled that the NLRCs action
of issuing a decision in installments was not prohibited by its own rules and that the
need for a second decision was justified by the fact that respondents own motion for
reconsideration remained unresolved in the first decision. Furthermore, it held that
under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,12 the filing of a petition for
Page 23 of 68

certiorari does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding with the case.
From this decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on February 22, 2005,
which the Court of Appeals denied through a resolution dated August 11, 2005.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The petitioner raises the following errors of law: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the NLRCs ruling that the respondent was petitioners regular employee and
not a domestic helper; (2) the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner was guilty
of illegal dismissal; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the issuance of
the second NLRC decision is proper.
The petition must fail. We affirm that respondent was a regular employee of the
petitioner and that the latter was guilty of illegal dismissal.
Before going into the substantive merits of the present controversy, we shall first resolve
the propriety of the issuance of the second NLRC decision.
The petitioner contends that the respondents motion for reconsideration, upon which
the second NLRC decision was based, was not under oath and did not contain a
certification as to why it was not decided on time as required under the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC.13 Furthermore, the former also raises for the first time the
contention that respondents motion was filed beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period
required under the same Rules,14 since the latter received a copy of the first NLRC
decision on December 6, 2000, and respondent filed her motion only on December 18,
2000. Thus, according to petitioner, the respondents motion for reconsideration was a
mere scrap of paper and the second NLRC decision has no basis in law.
We do not agree.
It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to
serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases.15 Labor cases
must be decided according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the
controversy.16 Rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice.17 Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided.18
This Court has consistently held that the requirement of verification is formal, and not
jurisdictional. Such requirement is merely a condition affecting the form of the pleading,
non-compliance with which does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Verification is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith.19 The court may order the correction of the pleading if
verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.20
Anent the argument that respondents motion for reconsideration, on which the NLRCs
second decision was based, was filed out of time, such issue was only brought up for
the first time in the instant petition where no new issues may be raised by a party in his
pleadings without offending the right to due process of the opposing party.

Page 24 of 68

Nonetheless, the petitioner asserts that the respondent received a copy of the NLRCs
first decision on December 6, 2000, and the motion for reconsideration was filed only on
December 18, 2000, or two (2) days beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period
requirement under the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and should not be
allowed.21
This contention must fail.
Under Article 22322 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from the receipt thereof by the parties.
While it is an established rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to
perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory, it is
equally settled that the NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse where there is an
acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of the appeal.23 Among the
acceptable reasons recognized by this Court are (a) counsel's reliance on the footnote
of the notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter that "the aggrieved party may appeal. . .
within ten (10) working days";24 (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice;25
(c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy
appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an
earlier final decision;26 and (d) special circumstances of the case combined with its
legal merits27 or the amount and the issue involved.28
We hold that the particular circumstances in the case at bar, in accordance with
substantial justice, call for a liberalization of the application of this rule. Notably,
respondents last day for filing her motion for reconsideration fell on December 16,
2000, which was a Saturday. In a number of cases,29 we have ruled that if the tenth
day for perfecting an appeal fell on a Saturday, the appeal shall be made on the next
working day. The reason for this ruling is that on Saturdays, the office of the NLRC and
certain post offices are closed. With all the more reason should this doctrine apply to
respondents filing of the motion for reconsideration of her cause, which the NLRC itself
found to be impressed with merit. Indeed, technicality should not be permitted to stand
in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties
for the ends of justice are reached not only through the speedy disposal of cases but,
more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the merits of a
case.
Finally, as to petitioners argument that the NLRC had already lost its jurisdiction to
decide the case when it filed its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals upon the
denial of its motion for reconsideration, suffice it to state that under Section 7 of Rule
6530 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. Thus,
the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, in connection with a pending
case in a lower court, does not interrupt the course of the latter if there is no writ of
injunction.31 Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
issuing its second decision which modified the first, especially since it failed to consider
the respondents motion for reconsideration when it issued its first decision.
Having resolved the procedural matters, we shall now delve into the merits of the
petition to determine whether respondent is a domestic helper or a regular employee of
the petitioner, and whether the latter is guilty of illegal dismissal.
Petitioner relies heavily on the affidavit of a certain Mr. Antonio Tan and contends that
respondent is the latters domestic helper and not a regular employee of the company
since Mr. Tan has a separate and distinct personality from the petitioner. It maintains
Page 25 of 68

that it did not exercise control and supervision over her functions; and that it operates as
a trading company and does not engage in the restaurant business, and therefore
respondents work as a cook, which was not usually necessary or desirable to its usual
line of business or trade, could not make her its regular employee.
This contention fails to impress.
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC,32 this Court held that a househelper in the staff
houses of an industrial company was a regular employee of the said firm. We
ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
"The term househelper as used herein is synonymous to the term domestic servant
and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and
about the employers home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for
the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal
comfort and enjoyment of the employers family."
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant
who is employed in the employers home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employers family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic
servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar househelps.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the
home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse
may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former
instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a
corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the
company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned
to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic
servant may be considered as such an employee. The Court finds no merit in making
any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working
within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection
with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and
should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of
the Labor Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper33 that respondent
worked at the company premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees
lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as the nature of respondents work as a
cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of the
petitioners employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular
employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works within
company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of
Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioners right of control
Page 26 of 68

over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the existence of an employeremployee relationship.
Moreover, it is wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the employer's
business, then the person performing such work could not be considered an employee
of the latter. The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship is
defined by law according to the facts of each case, regardless of the nature of the
activities involved.34 Indeed, it would be the height of injustice if we were to hold that
despite the fact that respondent was made to cook lunch and merienda for the
petitioners employees, which work ultimately redounded to the benefit of the petitioner
corporation, she was merely a domestic worker of the family of Mr. Tan.
We note the findings of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that no less than
the companys corporate secretary has certified that respondent is a bonafide company
employee;35 she had a fixed schedule and routine of work and was paid a monthly
salary of P4,000.00;36 she served with the company for 15 years starting in 1983,
buying and cooking food served to company employees at lunch and merienda, and
that this service was a regular feature of employment with the company.37
Indubitably, the Court of Appeals, as well as the NLRC, correctly held that based on the
given circumstances, the respondent is a regular employee of the petitioner.1wphi1
Having determined that the respondent is petitioners regular employee, we now
proceed to ascertain the legality of her dismissal from employment.
Petitioner contends that there was abandonment on respondents part when she
refused to report for work when the corporation transferred to a new location in
Caloocan City, claiming that her poor eyesight would make long distance travel a
problem. Thus, it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner relocated, she was
no longer called for duty and that when she tried to report for work, she was told that her
services were no longer needed. She contends that the petitioner dismissed her without
a just or authorized cause and that she was not given prior notice, hence rendering the
dismissal illegal.
We rule for the respondent.
As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article
27938 of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a just39 or authorized40
cause, otherwise the dismissal becomes illegal and the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld
up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment.41 It is a form of neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of
employment by the employer under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which enumerates
the just causes for termination by the employer.42 For a valid finding of abandonment,
these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by
overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to
work.43 The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
was deliberate and unjustified.44 This, the petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.
Alongside the petitioners contention that it was the respondent who quit her
employment and refused to return to work, greater stock may be taken of the
Page 27 of 68

respondents immediate filing of her complaint with the NLRC. Indeed, an employee
who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have
abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for
illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return to
work, thus, negating the employers charge of abandonment.45
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal.46 The employers case succeeds or fails on the strength of its
evidence and not on the weakness of the employees defense.47 If doubt exists
between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.48
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated January 31, 2005, and the Resolution dated August 11, 2005, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64577 and 68477 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

Page 28 of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 94951

April 22, 1991

APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO,
respondents.
Bernabe B. Alabastro for petitioner.
Angel Fernandez for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a
regular employee of the said firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company,
Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara,
Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However,
on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was
ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was
hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported
the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer,
Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her
work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the
amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to
quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not
allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the
Department of Labor and Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers
as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter
rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, Conformably With The Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to pay
the complainant, to wit:
1

Salary

Differential
2.

P16,289.20

Emergency Living

Allowance
3.

12,430.00

13th Month Pay

Differential

1,322.32
Page 29 of 68

4.

Separation Pay

(One-month for
every year of
service [1973-19881)

25,119.30

or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND
42/100 (P55,161.42).
SO ORDERED.1
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered by the
Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and
affirming the appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a
resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appopriately should be a
special civil action for certiorari, and which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as
such.2 The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent should be treated as a
mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant"
and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and
about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for
the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal
comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant
who is employed in the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic
servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in
staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's
guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be
considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the
company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the
meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the
home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse
may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former
instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a
corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the
Page 30 of 68

company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular

employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned
to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic
servant may be considered as such as employee. The Court finds no merit in making
any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working
within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection
with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and
should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of
the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that
respondent abandoned her work.1wphi1 This argument notwithstanding, there is
enough evidence to show that because of an accident which took place while private
respondent was performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was
ultimately separated from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as
a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be
interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to
her is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of
public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Page 31 of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198012

April 22, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO AND VICENTA LAPIZ y MEDINA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 17, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02366, which denied the appeal brought therewith and affirmed the
May 31, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila Branch 40 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 99176598 and 99-176599 to 603. The RTC convicted Angel
Mateo y Jacinto (Mateo) and Vicenta Lapiz y Medina (Lapiz) a.k.a. ''Vicky Mateo"
(appellants) of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Republic Act No.
8042 (RA 8042), otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, and of five counts of estafa.
Factual Antecedents
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five private complainants,
namely, Abel E. Balane (Abel), Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D. Flordeliza
(Victorio), Manuel Oledan (Manuel) and Virgilio N. Concepcion (Virgilio), met appellants
on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for overseas
employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some
Japanese firms, promised them employment in Japan as conversion mechanics,
welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants also promised that they could facilitate private
complainants employment as direct hires and assured their departure within three
weeks. However, after the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from
P18,555.00 to P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for
them. Appellants likewise failed to return private complainants money. This prompted
Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where he
was issued a Certification3 stating that appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants
for overseas employment. Thereupon, the private complainants filed their Complaint
and executed their respective affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The NBI referred the charges to the Department of Justice which subsequently found
probable cause against appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa4 and
accordingly filed the corresponding Informations5 for the same before the RTC of
Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate car
importer and not a recruiter. Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the private
complainants whom she claimed to have met for the first time at the Prosecutors Office.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC disposed of the cases in its Decision6 rendered on May 31, 2006 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment, this Court finds
both accused ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ y MADINA a.k.a.
"VICKY MATEO" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale
Page 32 of 68

and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment and to pay P500,000.00 fine
each as well as to indemnify private complainants (1) Manuel Oledan the sum of
P25,000.00, and (2) Emilio A. Cariaga, (3) Abel E. Balane, (4) Virgilio N. Concepcion
and (5) Victorio D. Flordeliza the sum of P18,555.00 each.
This Court finds both accused also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases
Nos. 99-176599,99-176600, 99-176601,99-176602 and 99-176603 for five (5) counts of
Estafa and each accused is hereby sentenced in each case to an indeterminate penalty
of from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
The [Philippine] Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA) shall be furnished
with certified copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially claimed that the prosecution failed
to prove the elements of the crimes for which they were charged. They contended that
Abel has not shown any receipt to prove that they received money from him; that there
is likewise no proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which money
he, in turn, gave to them; that the testimony of Emilio that appellants were holding office
inside the van of Abel cannot be easily accepted; and that their transactions with
Manuel and Victorio were limited to the processing of their travel documents.
The CA, however, denied appellants appeal in its Decision8 dated February 17, 2011,
viz: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
40, dated May 31, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the present appeal.
Per Resolution10 dated September 19, 2011, the Court required both parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. Appellants filed their Supplemental Brief,11 while
appellee People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opted not
to file any and just adopted the appellees brief it filed before the CA.12
The Courts Ruling
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the
person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA
8042; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more
persons individually or as a group.13 These elements are obtaining in this case. First,
the RTC found appellants to have undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised
private complainants employment in Japan for a fee. This factual finding was affirmed
by the CA. "The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial
judge."14 And when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are
generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.15 Second, the Certification
issued by the POEA unmistakably reveals that appellants neither have a license nor
authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. Notably, appellants never
Page 33 of 68

assailed this Certification. Third, it was established that there were five complainants.
Clearly, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved
by the prosecution.
Appellants argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private
complainants deserves no credence.1wphi1 Suffice it to say that money is not material
to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of "illegal
recruitment" under the law includes the phrase "whether for profit or not." Besides, even
if there is no receipt for the money given by the private complainants to appellants, the
formers respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latters involvement in
the prohibited recruitment.16
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the [law] may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa are: (1)
the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2)
the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation."17 All these elements are likewise present in this case. As aptly held by the
CA:
Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit against the private
complainants by making it appear as though they had the authority and resources to
send them to Japan for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Japan for
which they would be hired although, in truth, there were none; and, that by reason or on
the strength of such assurance, the private complainants parted with their money in
payment of the placement fee, documentation and hotel accommodations. All these
representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the apellants must be
made liable under par2(a), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.18
With this ratiocination, Lapiz's defense of not knowing any of the complainants must
necessarily fail. As noted by the RTC and the CA, she was present in all of the
transactions, serving as runner of Mateo and was even the one keeping the money
entrusted by the private complainants to appellants. She would also often pacify the
private complainants' uneasiness about the absence of receipts for each of the amounts
given and repeatedly assure them they would be deployed to Japan. In short, she was
an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of Mateo in the illegal recruitment
of the private complaintants.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the lower courts' conviction of appellants for
the crimes charged.
It must be noted, however, that both the RTC and the CA failed to award interest on the
money judgment in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment in. Large
Scale. Following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court, therefore, imposes interest at the
rate of 6% per annum on each of the amounts awarded from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
February 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02366 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the amounts ordered restituted in Criminal Case No. 99176598 shall each earn an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195668

June 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA DIALA,
and BERNA M. PAULINO, Accused,
MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The several accused in illegal recruitment committed in large scale against whom the
State establishes a conspiracy are each equally criminally and civilly liable. It follows,
therefore, that as far as civil liability is concerned each is solidarily liable to the victims of
the illegal recruitment for the reimbursement of the sums collected from them,
regardless of the extent of the participation of the accused in the illegal recruitment.
The Case
Accused-appellant Maricar B. Inovero seeks the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on August 26, 2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her
conviction for illegal recruitment committed in large scale amounting to economic
sabotage under the judgment rendered on January 14, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 133, in Makati City.2
Antecedents
On March 17, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the RTC two
informations3 charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and
Berna Paulino with illegal recruitment as defined and penalized under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act of 1995), and 11 informations4 charging
the same accused with estafa as defined and penalized under Article315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, the other
accused having remained at large.
Six cases charging estafa (Criminal Case No. 04-1565, Criminal Case No. 1568,
Criminal Case No. 1570, Criminal Case No. 1571 and Criminal Case No. 1572 and
Criminal Case No. 1573) and one of the two charging illegal recruitment (Criminal Case
No. 04-1563) were provisionally dismissed because of the failure of the complainants to
prosecute.5 The seven cases were later permanently dismissed after the complainants
did not revive them within two years, as provided in Section 8,6 Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.
Trial on the merits ensued as to the remaining cases (Criminal Case No. 04-1562, for
illegal recruitment; and Criminal Case No. 04-1564; Criminal Case No. 04-1566;
Criminal Case No. 04-1567; Criminal Case No. 1569 and Criminal Case No. 04-1574,
for estafa).7
The CA recounted the transactions between the complainants and the accused,
including Inovero, in the following manner:
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Regarding Criminal Case No. 04-1562, the prosecution presented the five (5) private
complainants as witnesses to prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment, namely: Novesa
Baful ("Baful"), Danilo Brizuela ("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre ("Aguirre"), Annaliza
Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella ("Marbella"), and Mildred Versoza ("Versoza")
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA").
Baful testified that on May 20, 2003 she, together with her sister-in-law, went to Harvel
International Talent Management and Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit 509 Cityland
Condominium, Makati City upon learning that recruitment for caregivers to Japan was
on-going there. On said date, she allegedly met Inovero; Velasco, and Diala, and saw
Inovero conducting a briefing on the applicants. She also testified that Diala, the alleged
talent manager, directed her to submit certain documents, and to pay Two Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as training fee, as well as Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as placement and processing fees. Diala also advised her to undergo
physical examination.
On June 6, 2003, after complying with the aforesaid requirements and after paying Diala
the amounts of Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) and Ten Thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), Baful was promised deployment within two (2) to three (3) months. She
likewise testified that Inovero briefed her and her co-applicants on what to wear on the
day of their departure. However, she was never deployed. Finally, she testified that she
found out that HARVEL was not licensed to deploy workers for overseas employment.
Brizuela, another complainant, testified that he went to HARVELs office in Makati on
February 7, 2003 to inquire on the requirements and hiring procedure for a caregiver in
Japan. There, Diala told him the amount required as processing fee and the documents
to be submitted. And when he submitted on March 7, 2003 the required documents and
payments, it was, this time, Paulino who received them. He claimed that he underwent
training and medical examination; he likewise attended an orientation conducted by
Inovero at which time, he and his batchmates were advised what clothes to wear on the
day of their departure; he was assured of deployment on the first week of June 2003,
however, on the eve of his supposed "pre-departure orientation seminar," Paulino texted
him that the seminar was cancelled because Inovero, who had the applicants money,
did not show up. He testified that he was not deployed. Neither was his money returned,
as promised.
On cross-examination, Brizuela testified that Inovero was the one who conducted the
orientation, and represented to all the applicants that most of the time, she was in the
Japanese Embassy expediting the applicants visa.
Aguirre, the third complainant to testify, alleged that she went to HARVEL on May 22,
2003, to apply as caregiver in Japan; there, Diala informed her that Inovero was oneof
the owners of HARVEL and Velasco was its President; she paid Thirty Five Thousand
Pesos (P35,000.00), and submitted her documents, receipt of which was acknowledged
by Diala; despite her undergoing medical examination and several training seminars,
she was however not deployed to Japan. Worse, she found out that HARVEL was not
licensed to recruit workers.
Amoyo, the fourth complainant, testified that she went to HARVELs office on May 28,
2003 to apply as caregiver in Japan, and Diala required her to submit certain
documents, to undergo training and medical examination, and to pay Thirty Five
Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as placement and processing fees. However, after
complying with said requirements, she was never deployed as promised.
Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged that she applied for the
position of janitress at HARVEL sometime in December 2002; just like the rest of the
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complainants, she was required to submit certain documents and to pay a total amount
of Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as processing fee; after paying said fee, Diala
and Inovero promised her and the other applicants that they will be deployed in three (3)
months or in June 2003; however, the promised deployment never materialized; she
later found out that HARVEL was not even licensed to recruit workers.
[Mildred] Versoza, on the other hand, is a Labor and Employment Officer at the POEA
Licensing Branch. She testified that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither
HARVEL nor Inovero was authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as per
records at their office.
In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations hurled against her. As summarized in the
assailed Decision, she claimed that she is the niece of accused Velasco, the owner of
HARVEL, but denied working there. Explaining her presence in HARVEL, she alleged
that she worked for her uncle, Velascos husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at
least two or three times a week, she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her
uncle. She also testified that her alleged errands mainly consisted of serving food and
refreshments during orientations at HARVEL. Inovero likewise denied receiving any
money from the complainants, nor issuing receipts therefor.8
Judgment of the RTC
On January 14, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five counts of
estafabut convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-1562 of illegal recruitment committed
in large scale as defined and penalized by Section 6 and Section 7 of Republic Act No.
8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforestated cases as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 04-1562, accused Maricar Inovero is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale defined and
penalized under Sections 6 and 7, II, of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment. She is likewise ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Criminal Case No. 04-1563 also for illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby ordered
dismissed to its finality for failure of complainants Alvin De Leon, Roderick Acuna,
Agosto Vale and Marina Viernes to revive said case despite the lapse of two years from
its provisional dismissal.
Criminal Cases No. 04-1564, 1566, 1567, 1569, 1571 and 1574 are hereby ordered
DISMISSED for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence to prove all the
elements of the said offense.
Criminal Cases Nos. 1565, 1568, 1570, 1572 and 1573 also for estafa [are] hereby
ordered dismissed to its finality for failure of complainants Agosto Vale, Alvin De Leon,
Roselyn Saruyda, Roderick Acuna and Marina Viernes to revive said cases despite the
lapse of two (2) years from its provisional dismissal.
Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, she shall be credited in the service
of her sentence with the full time during which she has undergone preventive
imprisonment if she agrees voluntarily to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, with four-fifths thereof.
Meanwhile, considering that the accused Ma. Harleta B. Velasco, Marissa Diala and
Berna Paulino are still at large, let alias warrants of arrest be issued against them. In the
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meantime, let the cases filed against them be archived, which shall be revived upon
their apprehension.
SO ORDERED.9
Decision of the CA
Inovero appealed, contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH [HER] GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.10
On August 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The January 14, 2008 Decision of the
RTC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Issue
In this appeal, Inovero insists that the CA erred in affirming her conviction by the RTC
because she had not been an employee of Harvel at any time; that she could be faulted
only for her association with the supposed illegal recruiters; that in all stages of the
complainants recruitment for overseas employment by Harvel, they had transacted only
and directly with Diala; and that the certification from the POEA to the effect she was not
a licensed recruiter was not a positive proof that she engaged in illegal recruitment.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of the RTC, stating:
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the
accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the
same Code; (2) that the accused had not complied with the guidelines issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a license
or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that the accused committed the
unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is
committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression
that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. In Our
view, despite Inoveros protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the
following circumstances contrarily convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment.
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero was the
one who conducted orientations/briefings on them; informed them, among others, on
how much their salary would be as caregivers in Japan; and what to wear when they
finally will be deployed. Second, when Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private
complainant Amoyo as one of the owners of HARVEL, Inovero did not bother to correct
said representation. Inoveros silence is clearly an implied acquiescence to said
representation.

Page 38 of 68

Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant Brizuela,

represented herself as the one expediting the release of applicants working visa for
Japan.
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEAs Versoza Inovero had no
license nor authority to recruit for overseas employment.
Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly found that
Inovero committed illegal recruitment in large scale by giving private complainants the
impression that she can send them abroad for employment purposes, despite the fact
that she had no license or authority to do so.12
It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on the findings
of fact by the trial court which are conclusive and binding once affirmed by the CA on
intermediate review. The bindingness of the trial courts factual findings is by virtue of its
direct access to the evidence. The direct access affords the trial court the unique
advantage to observe the witnesses demeanor while testifying, and the personal
opportunity to test the accuracy and reliability of their recollections of past events, both
of which are very decisive in a litigation like this criminal prosecution for the serious
crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale where the parties have disagreed
on the material facts. The Court leaves its confined precinct of dealing only with legal
issues in order to deal with factual ones only when the appellant persuasively
demonstrates a clear error in the appreciation of the evidence by both the trial and the
appellate courts. This demonstration was not done herein by the appellant. Hence, the
Court upholds the CAs affirmance of the factual findings by the trial court.
All that Inoveros appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal
recruitment of the complainants. But the complainants credibly described and affirmed
her specific acts during the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Their positive
assertions were far trustworthier than her mere denial.
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of
the fact.1wphi1 Thus, courts both trial and appellate have generally viewed the
defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with outright
rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the recognition that denial is inherently weak
and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty
to make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and selfserving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.13 It is
no different here.
We concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the illegal
recruitment charged against her. Strong and positive evidence demonstrated beyond
reasonable doubt her having conspired with her co-accused in the recruitment of the
complainants. The decision of the CA amply recounted her overt part in the conspiracy.
Under the law, there is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it.14
The complainants paid varying sums for placement, training and processing fees,
respectively as follows: (a) Baful P28,500.00; (b) Brizuela P38,600.00; (c) Aguirre
P38,600.00; (d) Amoyo P39,000.00; and (e) Marbella P20,250.00. However, the
RTC and the CA did not adjudicate Inoveros personal liability for them in their
judgments. Their omission needs to be corrected, notwithstanding that the complainants
did not appeal, for not doing so would be patently unjust and contrary to law. The Court,
being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to
correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal
Page 39 of 68

law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.15 Civil liability includes
restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.16 To enforce the civil liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to be instituted
with the criminal action the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged unless the offended party waives the civil action, or reserves the right
to institute the civil action separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.17 Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer
of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability
should include the return of the amounts paid as placement, training and processing
fees.18 Hence, Inovero and her co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants
for all the sums paid.
That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the CA was
not disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People19 that it was "imperative that
the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine
the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of
the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," because:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was
of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to
be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived."
Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as
tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to
correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of
such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering
justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order
to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate
actions has been reserved or waived.20
What was the extent of Inoveros civil liability?
The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime
requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation.21 As
a co-conspirator, then, Inoveros civil liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor
under the rules of the civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of
a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.22 They are also
referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent
Page 40 of 68

of each other, unite in causing a single injury.23 Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code,
joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint
tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as
if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. As regards the extent of their
respective liabilities, the Court expressed in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals:24
x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to
all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible
persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them
was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same.
No actors negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other acts. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result
and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since both
of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole injury. x x x
It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her individual
participation in the wrong was insignificant as compared to those of the others.25 Joint
tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them,
except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of
each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole
amount.26 Hence, Inoveros liability towards the victims of their illegal recruitment was
solidary, regardless of whether she actually received the amounts paid or not, and
notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped arrest until now, have remained
untried.
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, interest as part of the damages may be
adjudicated in criminal proceedings in the discretion of the court. The Court believes
and holds that such liability for interest attached to Inovero as a measure of fairness to
the complainants. Thus, Inovero should pay interest of 6% per annum on the sums paid
by the complainants to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full
payment.27
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26, 2010,
subject to the MODIFICATION that appellant Maricar B. Inovero is ordered to pay by
way of actual damages to each of the complainants the amounts paid by them for
placement, training and processing fees, respectively as follows:
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Page 41 of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208686

July 1, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALELIE TOLENTINO a.k.a. "Alelie Tolentino y Hernandez," Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is an appeal from the 29 November 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 04558, affirming the trial court's decision, finding appellant Alelie
Tolentino (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa.
The Facts
Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Informations against appellant
read:
CRIM. CASE NO. 02-755
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime
of Illegal Recruitment committed as follows:
That on or about [or sometime in] the last week of August, 2001 and 1st week of
November, 2001 and thereafter, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused jointly with NARCISA
SANTOS did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously advertise for
employment, enlist, contract and promise employment to the following persons:
LEDERLE PANESA, ORLANDO LAYOSO, JIMMY LEJOS, MARCELINO LEJOS and
DONNA MAGBOO for a fee without first securing license and/or permit from the
government agency concerned.
Contrary to law.2
CRIM. CASE NO. 02-756
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime
of Estafa under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
as follows:
That on or about or sometime in the first week of August 2001 and thereafter, in the City
of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one LEDERLE PANESA, in the following manner:
accused represented to the said complainant that she could secure work for the said
complainant at Korea and she is capable of processing the travel visa and other
documents for her travel and employment at Korea and demanded from the said
complainant to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as placement fee; accused well knew that
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such representations were false and made only to induce complainant to part with her
money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the amount of P15,000.00 as partial
payment to the accused; and accused once in possession of the said amount, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the
same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the amount of P15,000.00.
Contrary to law.3
CRIM. CASE NO. 02-757
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime
of Estafa under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
as follows:
That on or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the
City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both
of them mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts
and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, did [then] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one ORLANDO
LAYOSO, in the following manner: accused represented to the said complainant that
she could secure work for the said complainant at Korea and she is capable of
processing the travel visa and other documents for [his] travel and employment at Korea
and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of P80,000.00 as
placement fee; accused well knew that such representations were false and made only
to induce complainant to part with [his] money as in fact complainant gave and delivered
the amount of P35,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in
possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the amount of P35,000.00.
Contrary to law.4
CRIM. CASE NO. 02-758
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime
of Estafa under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
as follows:
That on or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the
City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both
of them mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts
and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, did [then] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one DONNA
MAGBOO, in the following manner: accused represented to the said complainant that
she could secure work for the said complainant at Korea and she is capable of
processing the travel visa and other documents for her travel and employment at Korea
and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of P80,000.00 as
placement fee; accused well knew that such representations were false and made only
to induce complainant to part with her money as in fact complainant gave and delivered
the amount of P35,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in
possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the amount of P35,000.00.
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Contrary to law.5
CRIM. CASE NO. 02-759
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime
of Estafa under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
as follows: That on or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and
thereafter, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring and confederating with
NARCISA SANTOS, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, by
means of deceit, fraudulent acts and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud, did [then] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one JIMMY LEJOS, in the following manner: accused represented to the said
complainant that she could secure work for the said complainant at Korea and she is
capable of processing the travel visa and other documents for [his] travel and
employment at Korea and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of
P80,000.00 as placement fee; accused well knew that such representations were false
and made only to induce complainant to part with [his] money as in fact complainant
gave and delivered the amount of P35,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and
accused once in possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her own personal use
and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the amount of
P35,000.00.
Contrary to law.6
CRIM. CASE NO. 02-760
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ALELIE TOLENTINO of the crime
of Estafa under Art. 315 Par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
as follows:
That on or about or sometime in the first week of November, 2001 and thereafter, in the
City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring and confederating with NARCISA SANTOS, and both
of them mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit, fraudulent acts
and false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, did [then] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one MARCELINO
LEJOS, in the following manner: accused represented to the said complainant that she
could secure work for the said complainant at Korea and she is capable of processing
the travel visa and other documents for [his] travel and employment at Korea and
demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of P80,000.00 as placement
fee; accused well knew that such representations were false and made only to induce
complainant to part with [his] money as in fact complainant gave and delivered the
amount of P20,000.00 as partial payment to the accused; and accused once in
possession of the said amount, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the amount of P20,000.00.
Contrary to law.7
Private complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, Jimmy Lejos, and Marcelino
Lejos8 alleged that sometime in the first week of November 2001, they had a meeting
with appellant Alelie Tolentino (appellant) in her office at the 3rd floor, Arevalo Building,
Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Appellant told them the procedure for overseas employment
and offered them assistance to find work abroad for a fee of P80,000. Appellant showed
them pictures of those she allegedly helped find work abroad and told them that they
Page 44 of 68

would be earning $630 monthly as factory workers in Korea. When asked about her
license to recruit overseas workers, appellant told private complainants that she would
show it to them at some other time. On 14 November 2001, private complainants again
met with appellant at her office and each of them gave appellant P20,000 as partial
payment of the agreed fee, which included expenses for medical examination and
processing of their documents for work in Korea. Appellant promised to secure their
visas and employment contracts within three months.
On 30 January 2002, private complainants met with appellant, who was accompanied
by a certain Narcisa Santos, at Wendys in Arquiza Street, Manila for signing of contract.
However, the names written on the employment contracts were not private
complainants names. Appellant explained that the contracts were supposedly for other
applicants who sought her services but later backed out. Appellant assured them that
original contracts bearing their names would subsequently be provided. Private
complainants signed the contracts and paid P15,000 each as their second partial
payment.
On 7 February 2002, private complainants received information that the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group arrested appellant for illegal recruitment. When
private complainants confronted appellant at the Manila City Hall where she was held,
they demanded the return of their payments amounting to P35,000 each, except for
Marcelino Lejos whose total payment only amounted to P20,000. Appellant denied the
charges against her and promised them that they would get their money back.
Subsequently, private complainants were able to secure a certification from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that appellant was not licensed
to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Another complainant, Lederle Panesa, alleged that in August 2001, she met with
appellant, who offered her work in Korea for a placement fee of P75,000. On 7
September 2001, Panesa gave appellant P15,000 as initial payment. Appellant assured
Panesa that she would be leaving for Korea on the second week of November 2001 and
that the balance of the placement fee could be paid upon her receipt of the visa.
However, after said meeting, Panesa no longer heard from appellant, which prompted
Panesa to visit appellants office. Appellant informed Panesa that there were no job
openings in Korea at that time. Appellant offered Panesa employment in other countries
such as Malaysia and Palau, but Panesa refused the offer and demanded the return of
her money. Nevertheless, appellant was able to persuade Panesa to wait until
December 2001. Appellant never contacted Panesa thereafter. On 7 February
2002,Panesa was informed that appellant was apprehended for illegal recruitment.
Panesa proceeded to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila, but failed to confront
appellant. It was only then that Panesa learned about appellant not being authorized by
the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
For the defense, appellant was presented as the lone witness. Appellant denied the
charges against her. She testified that she was introduced to private complainants by a
certain Cezar Manonson and that the owner of the office she is renting is her relative.
Private complainants allegedly sought her help regarding possible work in Korea and
that she merely explained the procedure for overseas employment to them. She was
hesitant to help them because she does not recruit workers as she herself was also
applying for work as factory worker through Narcisa Santos. She admitted having
received money from private complainants and issuing receipts for the payments, upon
instructions from Narcisa Santos. She confirmed her signature on the petty cash
vouchers she issued to private complainants, evidencing their payments. She testified
that she gave the payments to Narcisa Santos. However, she admitted that she does
not have proof that she indeed turned over the money to Narcisa Santos.

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On 9 June 2010, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alelie (also known as Alelie Tolentino)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of large scale illegal recruitment, which
constitutes economic sabotage in Criminal Case Case No. 02-755 and sentences her to
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and five counts of estafa under
Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the following criminal cases
and sentences her, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 02-756, an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor in
its maximum to four years two months and one day of prision correccional in its
maximum as the maximum period, and to pay the private complainant the amount of
P5,000.00 as and for moral damages. Accused is further ordered to return the amount
of P15,000.00 she illegally collected from the private complainant.
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-757, 02-758 and 02-759, an indeterminate penalty [of] six
months of arresto mayor in its maximum to twelve years of prision mayor in its
maximum, and to pay the private complainants individually each in the amount of
P15,000.00 as and for moral damages. Accused is further ordered to return the amount
of P35,000.00 she illegally collected each from the private complainants.
In Criminal Case No. 02-760, an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor in
its maximum as the minimum period to six years and one day of prision mayor in its
minimum as the maximum period, and to pay the private complainant the amount of
P8,000.00 as and for moral damages. Accused is further ordered to return the amount
of P20,000.00 she illegally collected from the private complainant.
Her full period of preventive imprisonment shall be credited in her favor in accordance
with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.9
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals
held that the prosecution adequately proved that appellant engaged in illegal
recruitment in large scale. The Court of Appeals noted that appellant admitted that she
had no authority or valid license to engage in recruitment and placement of workers.
The testimonies and the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution showed
that appellant led complainants to believe that she had the power or ability to send
private complainants to Korea to work as factory workers and that the latter were
convinced to give their payment to appellant in order to be employed. Appellant even
issued petty cash vouchers acknowledging receipt of private complainants payment
and she made them sign Trainee Agreements, which were purportedly their contract
with their Korean employer. Based on the facts and evidence presented, the Court of
Appeals concluded that appellant clearly engaged in illegal recruitment activities.
Appellants claim that it was Narcisa Santos who recruited the private complainants and
who profited from the illegal transaction was disregarded by the Court of Appeals for
lack of evidence. The Court of Appeals noted that it was appellant who dealt directly
with private complainants.
On the charge of estafa, the Court of Appeals likewise upheld appellants conviction for
said crime. The evidence presented to prove appellants liability for illegal recruitment
also established her liability for estafa. The Court of Appeals ruled that a person may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042
(RA 8042) in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code.
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Hence, this appeal.

The Court's Ruling
We find the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the
ruling of the trial court that the appellants guilt of the crimes she was accused of was
clearly established by the witnesses and the evidence of the prosecution.
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not."
Illegal recruitment, on the other hand is defined under Article 38 of the Labor Code as
follows: ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Department of
Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under
this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
(c) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Secretary shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and
the closure of companies, establishments and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. (Emphases supplied)
Illegal recruitment, as defined under Article 38 of the Labor Code, encompasses
recruitment activities for both local and overseas employment. However, illegal
recruitment under this article is limited to recruitment activities undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority.10 Thus, under the Labor Code, to constitute illegal
recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur:
1. The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Art. 13 (b) or any
prohibited practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
2. He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers.
3. He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.11
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RA 8042,12 otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995," established a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of the
migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress. RA 8042 also
broadened the concept of illegal recruitment for overseas employment and increased
the penalties, especially for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment
Committed by a Syndicate, which are considered offenses involving economic
sabotage.13 Part II of RA 8042 defines and penalizes illegal recruitment for employment
abroad, whether undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority or by a
licensee or holder of authority.
Section 6 of RA 8042 provides for the definition of illegal recruitment, while Section 7
enumerates the penalties therefor, thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad for two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include
the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, nonholder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in
the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a
loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to
recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor
Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in
order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from
oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker
who has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health
or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies,
remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such
other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved
and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual
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signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the
same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or
member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged
directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for
monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code
and its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of
Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault. Illegal recruitment
when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
The persons liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or
direction of their business shall be liable.
SEC. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a
fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed If the person illegally
recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or nonholder of authority. (Emphases supplied)
Unlike illegal recruitment as defined under the Labor Code which is limited to
recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, under
Article 6 of RA 8042, illegal recruitment (for overseas employment) may be committed
not only by non-licensees or non-holders of authority but also by licensees or holders of
authority. Article 6 enumerates thirteen acts or practices [(a) to (m)] which constitute
illegal recruitment, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, nonholder, licensee or holder of authority. Except for the last two acts [(l) and (m)] on the list
under Article 6 of RA8042, the first eleven acts or practices are also listed in Article
3414 of the Labor Code under the heading "Prohibited practices." Thus, under Article 34
of the Labor Code, it is unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee or holder of authority
to engage in any of the enumerated prohibited practices, but such acts or practices do
not constitute illegal recruitment when undertaken by a licensee or holder of authority.
However, under Article 38(A) of the Labor Code, when a non-licensee or non-holder of
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authority undertakes such "prohibited practices," he or she is liable for illegal

recruitment. RA 8042 broadened the definition of illegal recruitment for overseas
employment by including thirteen acts or practices which now constitute as illegal
recruitment, whether committed by a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for
overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; and
(2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042. On the
other hand, a licensee or holder of authority is also liable for illegal recruitment for
overseas employment when he or she undertakes any of the thirteen acts or practices
[(a) to (m)] listed under Section 6 of RA 8042. To constitute illegal recruitment in large
scale, the offense of illegal recruitment must be committed against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.
In this case, the prosecution sufficiently proved that appellant engaged in large-scale
illegal recruitment.
First, appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Part of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution is a POEA Certification15 dated 10 March 2003, stating
that appellant is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Appellant admitted that she has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers.
Second, despite the absence of a license or authority to undertake recruitment
activities, appellant gave the impression that she has the power or ability to secure work
for private complainants in Korea. Private complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna
Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos all testified that appellant promised them work as factory
workers in Korea and induced them to pay placement fees, which included the
expenses for medical examination and the processing of their documents for work in
Korea. Appellant even showed pictures of previous applicants, whom she allegedly
helped find work abroad. Appellant also explained to them the procedure for overseas
employment and promised them that she would secure their visas and employment
contracts within three months. The testimonies of Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and
Jimmy Lejos were corroborated by private respondents Marcelino Lejos and Lederle
Panesa, whose Affidavits of Complaint were adopted as their direct testimonies.
This Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to others that he
could send workers abroad for employment, even without the authority or license to do
so, commits illegal recruitment.16
Third, there are at least three victims in this case which makes appellant liable for largescale illegal recruitment.
Appellant denies that she gave private complainants the distinct impression that she
had the power or ability to send them abroad for work. She insists that she herself had
been applying then as a factory worker in Korea through Narcisa Santos, who had
previously deployed her as domestic helper in Hongkong. Although appellant admits
having received payments from private complainants and issuing receipts, she submits
that she did so only upon the instructions of Narcisa Santos, to whom she turned over
the money collected from private complainants.
The Court is not swayed by appellants contentions. As found by the trial court and the
appellate court, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private
complainants: she explained to them the procedure for overseas employment; she
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charged them placement fees to cover their medical examination and the processing of
their travel documents; she issued petty cash vouchers with her signature,
acknowledging receipts of their payments; she promised the eventual release of their
visas and employment contracts; and she made them sign Trainee Agreements,
purportedly their contract with their Korean employer. Clearly, appellant, despite being a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority, engaged in recruitment activities, making her
liable for illegal recruitment.
Well-settled is the rule that the trial court, having the opportunity to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor during the trial, can best assess the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies.17 Appellants mere denial cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants.18 The trial courts findings are
accorded great respect unless the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued some
substantial facts, which if considered might affect the result of the case.19 Furthermore,
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are deemed
binding and conclusive.20
Thus, we affirm the finding of both the trial court and the appellate court that appellant is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale. However, we modify
the penalty imposed.
The penalty imposed by the trial court in this case for large-scale illegal recruitment,
which constitutes economic sabotage, is life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.
Section 7 of RA 8042 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than P500,000 nor more than P1,000,000 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage. Said article further provides that the maximum penalty
shall be imposed if committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Thus, the
proper penalty in this case is life imprisonment and a fine of P1,000,000.
Estafa
We likewise affirm appellants conviction for five counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a)
of the Revised Penal Code. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be
convicted separately for illegal recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and
estafa under Article 315(2)(a)21 of the Revised Penal Code.22
The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.23 In this case, the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant deceived private complainants into believing
that she had the authority and capability to send them to Korea for employment, despite
her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. She
even showed them pictures of past applicants whom she allegedly sent abroad for work.
She also assured them that she would be able to secure their visas and employment
contracts once they pay the placement fee. Because of the assurances given by
appellant, private complainants paid appellant a portion of the agreed placement fee, for
which appellant issued petty cash vouchers24 with her signature, evidencing her receipt
of the payments. Clearly, these acts of appellant constitute estafa punishable under
Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

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1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
xxxx
Thus, when the amount of fraud is over P12,000 but not exceeding P22,000, the penalty
imposed is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, i.e., from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years. Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, which is prision correccional in its minimum
to medium period. The time included in this penalty is from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months.
When the amount of fraud exceeds P22,000, the penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period, and adding one year for every P10,000 in excess of P22,000. But, the
total penalty imposed should not exceed 20 years. The maximum term under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. The range of penalty under Article
315 is composed of only two periods. To compute the maximum period of the
indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included in the two periods should be
divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this
computation, the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty
are:
1. Minimum Period 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days;
2. Medium Period 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days;
3. Maximum Period 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Any incremental penalty, i.e. one year for every P10,000 in excess of P22,000, shall be
added to anywhere from6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the courts
discretion, provided the total penalty does not exceed 20 years.25
We find that the penalty imposed by the trial court, and affirmed by the appellate court,
is not in accord with the penalty prescribed.1wphi1 The trial court erroneously imposed
the minimum period of "six months of arresto mayor in its maximum." Hence, we modify
the penalty imposed on the five counts of estafa and we delete the moral damages
awarded for having no basis in law. Considering the number of victims defrauded, we
find that a minimum period of 2 years of prision correccional is appropriate.
In Criminal Case No. 02-756, where the amount defrauded is P15,000, and in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum term shall be
taken from the medium period of the penalty prescribed (i.e. 5 years, 5 months and 11
days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days). Appellant should be sentenced to 2 years of
prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-757, 02-758, and 02-759, where the amount defrauded is
P35,000 each, the maximum period (anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years) shall be imposed, plus the incremental penalty of one year (additional 1 year
imprisonment for the P10,000 in excess of P22,000). We fix the maximum term at 7
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years of prision mayor. Adding the incremental penalty of 1 year to the maximum term,
appellant should be sentenced in each of these cases to 2 years of prision correccional
as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 02-760, where the amount defrauded is P20,000, appellant should
be sentenced to 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as maximum.
Furthermore, appellant should indemnify private complainants for the amounts paid to
her, with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the time of demand, which
shall be deemed as the same day the Informations were filed against appellant, until the
amounts are fully paid.26 WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the
Decision dated 29 November 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRHC No.
04558 to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 02-755, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting economic sabotage,
as defined and penalized in Section 6 and Section 7(b) of RA 8042. She is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000).
2. In Criminal Case No. 02-756, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. She is
ordered to indemnify private complainant Lederle Panesa in the amount of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum from 28 June 2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
3. In Criminal Case No. 02-757, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Orlando Layoso in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand
Pesos (P35,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from 28 June 2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
4. In Criminal Case No. 02-758,appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Donna Magboo in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand
Pesos (P35,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from 28 June 2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
5. In Criminal Case No. 02-759, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. She is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Jimmy Lejos in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand
Pesos (P35,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from 28 June 2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
6. In Criminal Case No. 02-760, appellant Alelie Tolentino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. She is
Page 53 of 68

ordered to indemnify private complainant Marcelino Lejos in the amount of Twenty

Thousand Pesos (P20,000) as actual damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum from 28 June 2002, until the said amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Page 54 of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152642

November 13, 2012

HON. PATRICIA A. STO.TOMAS, ROSALINDA BALDOZ and LUCITA LAZO,

Petitioners,
vs.
REY SALAC, WILLIE D. ESPIRITU, MARIO MONTENEGRO, DODGIE BELONIO,
LOLIT SALINEL and BUDDY BONNEVIE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152710
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Secretary of Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), HON. ROSALINDA D. BALDOZ, in her capacity as
Administrator, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), and the
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION GOVERNING BOARD,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE G. PANEDA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 220,
Quezon City, ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER, INC.
(ARCOPHIL), for itself and in behalf of its members: WORLDCARE PHILIPPINES
SERVIZO INTERNATIONALE, INC., STEADFAST INTERNATIONAL RECRUITMENT
CORP., VERDANT MANPOWER MOBILIZATION CORP., BRENT OVERSEAS
PERSONNEL,
INC.,
ARL
MANPOWER
SERVICES,
INC.,
DAHLZEN
INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., INTERWORLD PLACEMENT CENTER, INC.,
LAKAS TAO CONTRACT SERVICES LTD. CO., SSC MULTI-SERVICES, DMJ
INTERNATIONAL, and MIP INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, represented
by its proprietress, MARCELINA I. PAGSIBIGAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 167590
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
(DOLE), the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA),
the OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION (OWWA), the LABOR
ARBITERS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), the
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (P ASEI), Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 182978-79
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.

Page 55 of 68

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of daughter,

Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC., and JAIME ORTIZ
(President of White Falcon Services, Inc.), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 184298-99
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of deceased
daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), Petitioners,
vs.
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICES EXPORTER AND
PROMOTION, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995.
The Facts and the Case
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the
Governments policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas
Filipinos in distress.
G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710
(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act1 commanded the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling
the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five
years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).
On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario Montenegro,
Dodgie Belonio, Lolit Salinel, and Buddy Bonnevie (Salac, et al.) filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA
Administrator, and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)
Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96.2
Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA
Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA
from implementing the same and from further issuing rules and regulations that would
regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3)
also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29
and 30 of Republic Act 8042.
On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.s petition and ordered
the government agencies mentioned to deregulate the recruitment and placement of
OFWs.3 The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and all other orders,
Page 56 of 68

circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of deregulation under R.A.
8042.
Prompted by the RTCs above actions, the government officials concerned filed the
present petition in G.R. 152642 seeking to annul the RTCs decision and have the same
enjoined pending action on the petition.
On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. intervened in the
case before the Court, claiming that the RTC March 20, 2002 Decision gravely affected
them since it paralyzed the deployment abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The
Confederated Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA)
intervened for the same purpose.4
On May 23, 2002 the Court5 issued a TRO in the case, enjoining the Quezon City RTC,
Branch 96, from enforcing its decision.
In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002 respondents Asian Recruitment Council
Philippine Chapter, Inc. and others (Arcophil, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against the DOLE
Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General,6 before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 220, to enjoin the latter from implementing the 2002 Rules and
Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to
cease and desist from issuing other orders, circulars, and policies that tend to regulate
the recruitment and placement of OFWs in violation of the policy of deregulation
provided in Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042.
On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an Order, granting the petition and
enjoining the government agencies involved from exercising regulatory functions over
the recruitment and placement of OFWs. This prompted the DOLE Secretary, the POEA
Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General to file the present action in G.R.
152710. As in G.R. 152642, the Court issued on May 23, 2002 a TRO enjoining the
Quezon City RTC, Branch 220 from enforcing its decision.
On December 4, 2008, however, the Republic informed7 the Court that on April 10,
2007 former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. 94228 which
expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 and adopted the policy of close
government regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. R.A. 9422
pertinently provides:
xxxx
SEC. 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the
"Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" is hereby amended to read as
follows:
(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration The Administration shall
regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of
workers by setting up a licensing and registration system. It shall also formulate and
implement, in coordination with appropriate entities concerned, when necessary, a
system for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers
taking into consideration their welfare and the domestic manpower requirements.
In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform migrant workers
not only of their rights as workers but also of their rights as human beings, instruct and
guide the workers how to assert their rights and provide the available mechanism to
redress violation of their rights.
Page 57 of 68

In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the requirements for trained and
competent Filipino workers of foreign governments and their instrumentalities, and such
other employers as public interests may require, the administration shall deploy only to
countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral labor agreements or
arrangements: Provided, That such countries shall guarantee to protect the rights of
Filipino migrant workers; and: Provided, further, That such countries shall observe
and/or comply with the international laws and standards for migrant workers.
SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed.
xxxx
On August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in G.R. 152642 that they
agree9 with the Republics view that the repeal of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042
renders the issues they raised by their action moot and academic. The Court has no
reason to disagree. Consequently, the two cases, G.R. 152642 and 152710, should be
dismissed for being moot and academic.
G.R. 167590
(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
(PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to
annul a portion of Section 10 but the Court will take up this point later together with a
related case.)
Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates the acts constituting
the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for prohibited acts. Thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That such non-license or nonholder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts,
whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority:
xxxx
SEC. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a
fine not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Page 58 of 68

Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally
recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or nonholder of authority.10
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from "illegal
recruitment" before the RTC of the province or city where the offense was committed or
where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the ground that
its definition of "illegal recruitment" is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed
and non-licensed recruiters11 and for that reason gives undue advantage to the nonlicensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with
government licenses or authorities.
But "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary
to the RTCs finding, actually makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed
recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the appropriate government
license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the
wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in
the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government
license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the
wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that its
sweeping application of the penalties failed to make any distinction as to the
seriousness of the act committed for the application of the penalty imposed on such
violation. As an example, said the trial court, the mere failure to render a report under
Section 6(h) or obstructing the inspection by the Labor Department under Section 6(g)
are penalized by imprisonment for six years and one day and a minimum fine of
P200,000.00 but which could unreasonably go even as high as life imprisonment if
committed by at least three persons.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave penalties
upon what it believed were specific acts that were not as condemnable as the others in
the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section
6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally
reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and
deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the
wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in
July 2010 with the enactment of R.A. 1002212 which increased even more the duration
of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of the acts
listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that
OFWs must work outside the countrys borders and beyond its immediate protection.
The law must, therefore, make an effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless
individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out
without clear assurance that their contracted principals would treat such OFWs fairly
and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura,13 the State under its police power "may
prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general
welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and
incapacity as well as of deception and fraud." Police power is "that inherent and plenary
Page 59 of 68

power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society."14
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the
offended parties to file the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the
general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws
and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended
parties violates their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein
shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was
committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated
provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court
at the time of the effectivity of this Act.
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue
for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the venue established by the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows
exceptions provided by laws. Thus:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is,
consistent with that laws declared policy15 of providing a criminal justice system that
protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal recruitment.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,16 and G.R. 184298-9917
(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)
G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases. Respondent spouses
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death and insurance
benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.
(Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) for the death of their daughter
Jasmin Cuaresma while working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the Cuaresmas had
already received insurance benefits arising from their daughters death from the
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The LA also gave due credence to
the findings of the Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed suicide.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found Becmen
and White Falcon jointly and severally liable for Jasmins death and ordered them to pay
the Cuaresmas the amount of US$113,000.00 as actual damages. The NLRC relied on
the Cabanatuan City Health Offices autopsy finding that Jasmin died of criminal
violence and rape.
Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA).18 On June 28, 2006 the CA held Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally
Page 60 of 68

liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages, with Becmen having a right
of reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA
Decision to this Court.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmins death not work-related or work-connected
since her rape and death did not occur while she was on duty at the hospital or doing
acts incidental to her employment. The Court deleted the award of actual damages but
ruled that Becmens corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with their
company for its failure to investigate the true nature of her death. Becmen and White
Falcon abandoned their legal, moral, and social duty to assist the Cuaresmas in
obtaining justice for their daughter. Consequently, the Court held the foreign employer
Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon, Becmen, and the latters corporate directors and
officers jointly and severally liable to the Cuaresmas for: 1) P2,500,000.00 as moral
damages; 2) P2,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3) attorneys fees of 10% of the
total monetary award; and 4) cost of suit.
On July 16, 2009 the corporate directors and officers of Becmen, namely, Eufrocina
Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio and Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.)
filed a motion for leave to Intervene. They questioned the constitutionality of the last
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042 which holds the corporate
directors, officers and partners jointly and solidarily liable with their company for money
claims filed by OFWs against their employers and the recruitment firms. On September
9, 2009 the Court allowed the intervention and admitted Gumabay, et al.s motion for
reconsideration.
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd paragraph of
Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate directors, officers, and partners of
recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims and
damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as unconstitutional the last
sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042. It pointed out that, absent
sufficient proof that the corporate officers and directors of the erring company had
knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them automatically liable
would violate their right to due process of law.
The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. x x x
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and
all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case
may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of
corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily
liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the
affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal
activities.19 In the case of Becmen and White Falcon,20 while there is evidence that
these companies were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmins death, there is
no mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al.,
Page 61 of 68

Becmens corporate officers and directors, were personally involved in their companys
particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and
abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that
every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot
inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative
Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is
unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for
having become moot and academic.1wphi1
In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
ofManila dated December 8, 2004 and DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act
8042 valid and constitutional.
In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court HOLDS
the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and
constitutional. The Court, however, RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its
Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenors Eufrocina
Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman jointly and
solidarily liable with respondent Becmen Services Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to
spouses Simplicia and Mila Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those cases that such
intervenors had a part in the act or omission imputed to their corporation.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Page 62 of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 196036

October 23, 2013

ELIZABETH M. GAGUI, Petitioner,

vs.
SIMEON DEJERO and TEODORO R. PERMEJO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Rule 45 Petition1 dated 30 March 2011 assailing the Decision2 and
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104292, which affirmed the
Decision4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No.
OCW-RAB-IV-4-392-96-RI, finding petitioner Elizabeth M. Gagui solidarily liable with the
placement agency, PRO Agency Manila, Inc., to pay respondents all the money claims
awarded by virtue of their illegal dismissal.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo filed
separate Complaints5 for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay,
refund of transportation expenses, damages, and attorneys fees against PRO Agency
Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes.
After due proceedings, on 7 May 1997, Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a
Decision,6 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, ALL FOREGOING CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondents Pro Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to jointly
and severally pay complainants, as follows:
a) US$4,130.00 each complainant or a total of US$8,260.00, their unpaid salaries from
July 31, 1992 up to September 1993, less cash advances of total of SR11,000.00, or its
Peso equivalent at the time of payment;
b) US$1,032.00 each complainant for two (2) hours overtime pay for fourteen (14)
months of services rendered or a total of US$2,065.00 or its Peso equivalent at the time
of payment;
c) US$2,950.00 each complainant or a total of US$5,900.00 or its Peso equivalent at
the time of payment, representing the unexpired portion of their contract;
d) Refund of plane ticket of complainants Teodoro Parejo and Simeon Dejero from
Saudi Arabia to the Philippines, in the amount of P15,642.90 and P16,932.00
respectively;
e) Refund of excessive collection of placement fees in the amount of P4,000.00 each
complainant, or a total of P8,000.00;
f) Moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 each complainant, or a
total of P20,000.00;
Page 63 of 68

g) Attorneys fees in the amount of P48,750.00.

SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to this Decision, Labor Arbiter Ramos issued a Writ of Execution7 on 10
October 1997. When the writ was returned unsatisfied,8 an Alias Writ of Execution was
issued, but was also returned unsatisfied.9
On 30 October 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency
Manila, Inc.s Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtors.10 It included
petitioner as the Vice-President/Stockholder/Director of PRO Agency, Manila, Inc.
After due hearing, Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan issued an Order11 on 25
April 2003 granting respondents motion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the motion to implead is hereby granted insofar as Merlita G. Lapuz and
Elizabeth M. Gagui as parties-respondents and accordingly held liable to complainant
jointly and solidarily with the original party-respondent adjudged liable under the
Decision of May 7, 1998. Let 2nd Alias Writ of Execution be issued for the enforcement
of the Decision consistent with the foregoing tenor.
SO ORDERED.
On 10 June 2003, a 2nd Alias Writ of Execution was issued,12 which resulted in the
garnishment of petitioners bank deposit in the amount of P85,430.48.13 However, since
the judgment remained unsatisfied, respondents sought the issuance of a third alias writ
of execution on 26 February 2004.14
On 15 December 2004, Executive Labor Arbiter Lita V. Aglibut issued an Order15
granting respondents motion for a third alias writ. Accordingly, the 3rd Alias Writ of
Execution16 was issued on 6 June 2005, resulting in the levying of two parcels of lot
owned by petitioner located in San Fernando, Pampanga.17
On 14 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 3rd Alias Writ of Execution;18
and on 29 June 2006, a Supplemental Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution.19 In
these motions, petitioner alleged that apart from not being made aware that she was
impleaded as one of the parties to the case,20 the dispositive portion of the 7 May 1997
Decision (1997 Decision) did not hold her liable in any form whatsoever.21 More
importantly, impleading her for the purpose of execution was tantamount to modifying a
decision that had long become final and executory.22
On 26 June 2006, Executive Labor Arbiter Lita V. Aglibut issued an Order23 denying
petitioners motions on the following grounds: (1) records disclosed that despite having
been given sufficient notices to be able to register an opposition, petitioner refused to do
so, effectively waiving her right to be heard;24 and (2) under Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 (R.A. 8042) or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
corporate officers may be held jointly and severally liable with the placement agency for
the judgment award.25
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which rendered a Decision26 in the
following wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of the respondent Elizabeth M. Gagui
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Order of Labor Arbiter Lita V.
Aglibut dated June 26, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
Page 64 of 68

SO ORDERED.
The NLRC ruled that "in so far as overseas migrant workers are concerned, it is R.A.
8042 itself that describes the nature of the liability of the corporation and its officers and
directors. x x x [I]t is not essential that the individual officers and directors be impleaded
as party respondents to the case instituted by the worker. A finding of liability on the part
of the corporation will necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers or
directors."27
Upon appellate review, the CA affirmed the NLRC in a Decision28 promulgated on 15
November 2010:
From the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to hold the NLRC guilty of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the Order of Executive
Labor Arbiter Aglibut which held petitioner solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc.
and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes as adjudged in the May 7, 1997 Decision of Labor
Arbiter Pedro Ramos.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
The CA stated that there was "no need for petitioner to be impleaded x x x because by
express provision of the law, she is made solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc.,
for any and all money claims filed by private respondents."29 The CA further said that
this is not a case in which the liability of the corporate officer must be established
because an allegation of malice must be proven. The general rule is that corporate
officers, directors and stockholders are not liable, except when they are made liable for
their corporate act by a specific provision of law, such as R.A. 8042.30
On 8 and 15 December 2010, petitioner filed two Motions for Reconsideration, but both
were denied in a Resolution31 issued by the CA on 25 February 2011.
Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 March 2011.
On 1 August 2011, respondents filed their Comment,32 alleging that the petition had
been filed 15 days after the prescriptive period of appeal under Section 2, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
On 14 February 2012, petitioner filed a Reply,33 countering that she has a fresh period
of 15 days from 16 March 2011 (the date she received the Resolution of the CA) or up
to 31 March 2011 to file the Petition.
ISSUES
From the foregoing, we reduce the issues to the following:
1. Whether or not this petition was filed on time; and
2. Whether or not petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency
Manila, Inc. in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042, despite not having been
impleaded in the Complaint and named in the Decision.
THE COURTS RULING
Petitioner has a fresh period of 15 days within which to file this petition, in accordance
with the Neypes rule.
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We first address the procedural issue of this case.

In a misleading attempt to discredit this petition, respondents insist that by opting to file
a Motion for Reconsideration instead of directly appealing the CA Decision, petitioner
effectively lost her right to appeal. Hence, she should have sought an extension of time
to file her appeal from the denial of her motion.
This contention, however, deserves scant consideration. We agree with petitioner that
starting from the date she received the Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days within which to appeal to this
Court. The matter has already been settled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,34 as follows:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasijudicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
Since petitioner received the CA Resolution denying her two Motions for
Reconsideration only on 16 March 2011, she had another 15 days within which to file
her Petition, or until 31 March 2011. This Petition, filed on 30 March 2011, fell within the
prescribed 15-day period.
Petitioner may not be held jointly and severally liable, absent a finding that she was
remiss in directing the affairs of the agency.
As to the merits of the case, petitioner argues that while it is true that R.A. 8042 and the
Corporation Code provide for solidary liability, this liability must be so stated in the
decision sought to be implemented.35 Absent this express statement, a corporate
officer may not be impleaded and made to personally answer for the liability of the
corporation.36 Moreover, the 1997 Decision had already been final and executory for
five years and, as such, can no longer be modified.37 If at all, respondents are clearly
guilty of laches for waiting for five years before taking action against petitioner.38
In disposing the issue, the CA cited Section 10 of R.A. 8042, stating that there was "no
need for petitioner to be impleaded x x x because by express provision of the law, she is
made solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc., for any and all money claims filed
by private respondents."39
We reverse the CA.
At the outset, we have declared that "R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to
regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the
injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad."40
The pertinent portion of Section 10, R.A. 8042 reads as follows:

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SEC. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and
all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case
may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sto. Tomas v. Salac,41 we had the opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of
this provision. We have thus maintained:
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd paragraph of
Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate directors, officers, and partners of
recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims and
damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
xxxx
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of
corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily
liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the
affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
In the case of Becmen and White Falcon, while there is evidence that these companies
were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmins death, there is no mention of any
evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al., Becmens corporate
officers and directors, were personally involved in their companys particular actions or
omissions in Jasmins case. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a separate
finding that she was remiss in directing the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal
dismissal of respondents. Examination of the records would reveal that there was no
finding of neglect on the part of the petitioner in directing the affairs of the agency. In
fact, respondents made no mention of any instance when petitioner allegedly failed to
manage the agency in accordance with law, thereby contributing to their illegal
dismissal.
Moreover, petitioner is correct in saying that impleading her for the purpose of execution
is tantamount to modifying a decision that had long become final and executory.42 The
fallo of the 1997 Decision by the NLRC only held "respondents Pro Agency Manila Inc.,
and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to jointly and severally pay complainants x x x."43 By
holding her liable despite not being ordained as such by the decision, both the CA and
NLRC violated the doctrine on immutability of judgments.
In PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,44 we stressed that "respondent's
petitioners obligation is based on the judgment rendered by the trial court. The
dispositive portion or the fallo is its decisive resolution and is thus the subject of
execution. x x x. Hence the execution must conform with that which is ordained or
decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision."
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In JNIMACO v. NLRC,45 we a]so held thus:

None of the parties in the case before the Labor Arbiter appealed the Decision dated
March 10, 1987, hence the same became final and executory. It was, therefore,
removed from the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC to further alter or amend
it. Thus, the proceedings held for the purpose of amending or altering the dispositive
portion of the said decision are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Also, the Alias Writ
of Execution is null and void because it varied the tenor of the judgment in that it sought
to enforce the final judgment against ''Antonio Gonzales/Industrial Management
Development Corp. (INIMACO) and/or Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corp. and Gerardo
Sicat, which makes the liability solidary.
In other words, "once a decision or order becomes final and executory, it is removed
from. the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it.
It thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. An order of exen1tion
which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity."46
While labor laws should be construed liberally in favor of labor, we must be able to
balance this with the equally important right of petitioner to due process. Because the
1997 Decision of Labor Arbiter Ramos was not appealed, it became final and executory
and was therefore removed from his jurisdiction. Modifying the tenor of the judgment via
a motion impleading petitioner and filed only in 2002 runs contrary to settled
jurisprudence, rendering such action a nullity. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is hereby GRANTED The assailed Decision dated 5 November 2010 and
Resolution dated 25 February 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104292
are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

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