Amigable v.

Cuenca- August 15, 1974

Facts: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues. Amigable's counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of theportion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed tothe Auditor
General, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable
filed in thecourt a quo a complaint, against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca(Commissioner of Public Highways) for
the recovery of ownership and possession of her lot.
On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent, that it had neither
original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff's claim for
compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government;
and that it had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said
claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Issue: Can the appellant sue the government?
Ruling: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government
appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As
registered owner, she could bring an action to recover
possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is
neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and
has been used for road purposes, the only relief available isfor
the government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation
for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the
time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the
form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken
up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition,
the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which
should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
(NOTE: The owner does not need to file the usual claim for recovery of
just compensation with the Commission on Audit if the government
takes over his property and devotes it to public use without the benefit
of expropriation. He may immediately file a complaint with the proper
court for payment of his property as the arbitrary action of the
government shall be deemed a waiver of its immunity from suit.)
VMPSI VS CA (SEPTEMBER 25, 1992)
FACTS: A suit was filed against the PC Chief for failure to act on the
request by petitioner seeking to set aside the findings of PADPAO and
considering its application for renewal of its license even without a
certificate of membership from PADPAO. A Motion to Dismiss was filed
invoking that it is a suit against the State w/c had not given its consent.

March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the RTC-Makati for the
issuance of temporary restraining order & writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the defendants from committing acts that would result in the
cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSIs license;
-declaring null and void Sec 17 of RA No. 5487 which provides for the
issuance of rules and regulations in consultation with PADPAO;
-declaring null and void the February 1, 1982 directive of Col. Sabas V.
Edada requiring all private security agencies/security forces to join
PADPAO as a prerequisite to secure/renew their licenses;
-ordering the defendants to pay to VMPSI the sum of P1,000,000.00 as
actual & compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages, & P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
-VMPSI alleges that the provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, and tend to
favor and institutionalize the PADPAO which is monopolistic because it
has an interest in more than one security agency.

-May 12, 1986 - a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by

PADPAO & the PC Chief, w/c fixed the minimum monthly contract rate
per guard for 8hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 w/in
Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
-June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with
PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its
contract rate for security services and charging them lower than the
standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement.
-PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition and
recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the
cancellation of its license to operate a security agency.
-The PC-SUSIA made similar findings.
-PADPAO refused to issue a certificate of membership to VMPSI.
-VMPSI wrote the PC Chief requesting him to consider VMPSIs application for
renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO.

-VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati on March 28,
1988 against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA.
-The court issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief and PCSUSIA "from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or
non-renewal of VMPSIs license".
-The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to
the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the
Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds that the case is against
the State which had not given consent thereto.
-the lower court denied VMPSIs application for a writ of preliminary
injunction for being premature because it "has up to May 31, 1988
within which to file its application for renewal.
-May 23, 1988, VMPSI reiterated its application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment
of the penalty for its failure to submit its application for renewal of its
license within the prescribed period.
-the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
defendants from cancelling/denying renewal of VMPSIs license, until
further orders from the court.
-The PC Chief & PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied
-then PC Chief & PC-SUSIA filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
-CA granted the petition ordering the RTC-Makati to dismiss the
complaint filed by VMPSI for lack of jurisdiction and dissolved the writ
of preliminary injunction issued.
-VMPSI filed petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is
a suit against the State without its consent.
HELD: Yes.
-Respondent invoked Art 16, Sec 3 of 1987 Constitution that the State
may not be sued without its consent, that being instrumentalities of the
national government exercising a primarily governmental function of
regulating the organization and operation of private detective, or
security guard agencies, PC Chief & PC-SUSIA may not be sued
without the Governments consent.
-In Shauf v. CA:
"While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties.
-A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or
private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction
-However, since the acts performed by PC Chief & PC-SUSIA were
part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad
faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
-The Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and
PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to
standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates
of security services, clearly, a governmental function.
-The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum.
Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the public respondents.
-The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and
the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment
appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
FESTEJO VS. FERNANDO-1954
FACTS: Plaintiff Carmen Festejo, owner of a sugar land, filed an action
in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur against defendant Isaias

Fernando, Director of Bureau of Public Works for unlawfully taking

possession of portions of her three parcels of land and causing the
construction of irrigation canal without obtaining right of way and
without her consent or knowledge. Petitioner demands that the land be
restored to its former condition however said land cannot be returned
to the plaintiff, then seeks the payment of the defendant the sum of
P19,343.20 as value of the portions of the said land.

necessary precaution in traversing the track. It was shown that the bus
driver took the necessary precautions in traversing the track.
The bus driver had stopped before traversing the track and asked the
conductor to alight and made a "Look and Listen" before proceeding;
the conductor had done just that and made a signal to proceed when
he did not see any oncoming train.
-It was evidenced that the train was running fast; train was an express train.
Moreover, there was a slight rainfall at the time of the collision; because

The defendant, through the Atty General, filed a motion to dismiss the
lawsuit on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction on the case,
since the case is a case against the State.
The lower court dismissed the lawsuit.
Festejo appealed and claimed that the case is a case personally
directed against Fernando and that the law does not exempt him from
responsibility for committing excesses in the performance of his duty.
Fernando invoked his being a public officer of the government of the
Philippines and thus, enjoys immunity from suit and should be
absolved from liability for damages.
ISSUE: May defendant invoke immunity from suit?
HELD: NO.
The Court held that the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant
committed acts outside the scope of his authority.
That there was actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's land as a
dumping place for the rock to be removed from the additional
appropriated right of way, defendant planned, approved, and ratified
what was done by his subordinates.
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally
liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen.
-If an officer, even while acting under his duties, exceeds the power
conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that
he is a public agent.
ART. 32 of the Civil Code: Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(6)The right against deprivation of property without due process of law.

of the condition of the weather, the train engineer should have foreseen that
danger of collision lurked because of poor visibility of slippery road.

--the appealed order is repealed and the continued processing of the

applicant is ordered under the regulations provide.
PNR & Honorio Cabardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court &
Baliwag Transit Inc. - January 22, 1993
FACTS:
The passenger express train of PNR & a passenger bus of Baliwag
Transit Inc., bound for Manila from San Fernando, La Union collided at
the railroad crossing at Calumpit Bulacan at 1:30 in the afternoon of
August 10, 1947 causing damage to the bus & its passengers, 18 of
whom died & 53 suffered physical injuries.
-Plaintiff alleges that the collision was due to the negligence and
imprudence of PNR and its engineer Honorio Cabardo in operating
w/out any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman.
-Defendants alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, &
imprudence of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
-Baliwag Transit is a duly constituted corporation registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission engaged in the business of
transportation and operating public utility buses for the public.
-PNR is a government owned and controlled corporation duly
registered and existing virtue of Presidential Decree No. 741, with
capacity to sue and be sued, engaged in transporting passengers and
cargoes by trains and buses.
-Chief of Police of Calumpit, Bulacan, filed a criminal case of Reckless
Imprudence Causing Multiple Homicide with Multiple Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property against Romeo Hughes, driver of the Baliuag
Transit bus; while Cabardo was not included as an accused in said
case, although his train No. 73 was the one that hit and bumped the
right rear portion of the said bus;
-That the train No. 73 driven by Cabardo stopped after passing the
railroad crossing at a distance of about 50 meters from the said
intersection. That the Train No.73 expected arrival at Calumpit,
Bulacan was 1:41 P.M. with no stop at Calumpit, Bulacan.

-There was no crossing bar at the railroad intersection at Calumpit,

Bulacan at the time of collision; there were no signal lights,
semaphores, flagman or switchman thereat; the absence of such
devices, the plaintiff argues constitute negligence on the part of the
Philippine National Railways.
-in Lilius vs. MRR case, a railroad company has been adjudged guilty
of negligence & civilly liable for damages when it failed to install
semaphores, or where it does not see to it that its flagman or
switchman comply with their duties faithfully, to motorist injured by a
crossing train as long as he had crossed w/out negligence on his part.
-On the aspect of whether the Philippine National Railways enjoys
immunity from suit, By the doctrine of implied powers, the power to sue
and be sued is implicit from the faculty to transact private business.
-The court characterized the railroad company as a private entity
created not to discharge a governmental function but to operate a
transport service w/c is essentially a business concern, and thus
barred from invoking immunity from suit.
-PNR is not exercising govtal powers and not immune from suit.
Farolan vs CTA
Facts:
-S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived at the Port of
Manila carrying 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls consigned to
Bagong BuhayTrading.
-The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of the Tariff
and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem.
-BB paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00.
-Re-examination of the shipment was conducted and it turns out that
the shipment is made of synthetic woven fabric at 100% ad valorem,
assessed P272,600 as duties and taxes due of BB.
-The shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value.
-Thus, Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the govt.
-BB filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Commissioner of
Customs. Commissioner affirmed the decision of Collector of Customs.
Filed a motion for recon denied.
-Private respondent filed a petition for the release of the questioned good.

-64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay. The 16
remaining bales were missing.
-Thus, respondents demand that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to
pay for damages for the 16 bales it actually lost.
Issue:
W/N the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 16 bales
actually lost by the private respondent.
Held:
-Private respondent import entry was based solely on the shipping
documents and it has no knowledge of any flaw in said documents at
the time it was filed.
-The falsity of the documents can only be attributed to BBs foreign
suppliers & shippers.
-It was also found that the shipment was made of polyethylene plastic,
therefore, the Court of Tax Appeals correctly classified the shipment.
-No. Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages for
would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
-Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to
pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall
on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted
technically into a suit against the state.
-The Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit as an unincorporated
govt agency w/out any separate judicial personality of its own.

ISSUES:
1) Who between the petitioner and respondent was negligent?
2) Is PNR immune from suit?

-It is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation.

--As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental
function of collecting revenues. Thus private respondents claim for
damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.

HELD:
-Except the testimony of the train engineer Cabardo, there is no
admissible evidence to show that the bus driver did not take the

BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION (1961)

FACTS: Bureau of Printing Employees Association filed a case against

petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of
the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the
Director of the Bureau of Printing.
-The complaint alleged that Salvador and Ledesma have been
engaging in unfair labor practices by coercing the employees of the
Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the BOPEA in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, and by discriminating in
regard to hiring and tenure of their employment in order to discourage
them from pursuing their union activities.
-Salvador and Ledesma denied the charges, and contended that the
Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued
because it is an agency of the Republic performing govt function.
Petitionersfiledan"OmnibusMotion"askingforapreliminaryhearingonthe
questionofjurisdictionraisedbythemintheiranswerandforsuspensionof
thetrialofthecaseonthemeritspendingthedeterminationofsuch
jurisdictionalquestion.
Themotionwasgranted,butthetrialjudgeoftheIndustrialCourtsustained
thejurisdictionofthecourtonthetheorythatthefunctionsoftheBureauof
Printingare"exclusivelyproprietaryinnature,"
Reconsiderationofthisorderhavingbeenalsodenied
ISSUE: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued?
HELD:NO. As a government office, without any juridical capacity, it
cannot be sued.
The Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality of the government created
by Administrative Code of 1916; it operates under the direct
supervision of the Executive Secretary.
It is designed to meet the printing needs of the government. It is
primarily a service bureau.
It is obviously not engaged in business/occupation for pecuniary profit.
It has no corporate existence.
Therefore, it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the CIR.
Any suit, action or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the government itself.
The government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its
objection.
THE HOLY SEE VS. DEL ROSARIO JR -1994
FACTS: Lot 5-A located in Paranaque is registered under the name of
The Holy See. Holy See exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City
and is represented in the PH by Papal Nuncio.
Lot 5A is contiguous to lots 5-B and 5-D registered in the name of
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
These 3 lots were sold through an agent Msgr. Domingo Cirilos Jr. to
Ramon Licup.
Licup assigned his rights to private respondent Starbright Sales Ent.
Inc. (SSEI), a domestic corp engaged in the real estate business.
Due to refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of eviction and clearing the
land.
Petitioner sold Lot 5A to Tropicana Properties & Devt Crop.
SSEI filed complaint with the RTC of Makati for (1) annulment of sale
of between the petitioner and PRC, (2) reconveyance of the lots in
question, (3) performance of the agreement to sell between it and the
owners of the lots and (4) damages against Msgr. Cirilos, PRC, and
Tropicana.
The petitioner & Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
based on sovereign immunity from suit.
It was denied on the ground that petitioner shed off its sovereign
immunity by entering into the business contract in question.
A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this special civil
action for certiorari.
Petitioner invoked on its own behalf the privilege of sovereign immunity
and on behalf of its official representative, Papal Nuncio.
DFA filed a Motion for Intervention claiming that it has a legal interest in
the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of the
petitioner.
ISSUE: Did the Holy See properly invoke sovereign immunity for its
non- suability?
HELD: YES.
-In Public International Law, when a state or intl agency wishes to
plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests
the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court
that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the United States, the
procedure followed is the process of "suggestion".

-In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of
its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.
-- Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope
was the monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of
International Law.
-- In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty,
where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign
jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City.
-- The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for
the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible
independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also
in the field of international relations"
- In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an
entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has
an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also
head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State.
-The Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into
transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City,
one can conclude it is the Holy See that is the international person.
- The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957
-- There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity: According
to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis.
-- This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign
state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign
government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers; (2)
the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United
States Naval Station; & (3) the change of employment status of base
employees.
-- If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit.
- Lot 5-A was acquired for the site of petitioners mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. It was acquired as a donation
from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon
the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.
- Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to
dispose off the lot because the squatters living thereon refuse to leave
the premises and made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for
the purpose of the donation.
- the DFA officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt
from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and
immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country.
Wherefore, petition for certiorari is granted and the complaint against
petitioner is dismissed.
KHOSROW MINUCHER, vs. CA and ARTHUR SCALZO
FACTS:
-Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for the
Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to
study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National
Resistance Movement.
-In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation
of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Arthur Scalzo in his
house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized.
-Minucher filed Civil Case before the RTC for damages on the
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
--Scalzo filed extension of time granted. He filed a motion to quash the
summon on the ground that he is not a resident of the PH denied. Motion
for recon denied. petition for review with CA denied. Petition for Review
before the SC denied for failure to comply with SC Circular No 1-88.

--Court a quo issued an order declaring Scalzo in default for his failure
to file an answer and setting the case for the reception of evidence.
--Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the order of default trial court
granted and set the case for pre-trial.

-After 2 years since the institution of Civil Case filed by Minucher,

Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he
was entitled to diplomatic immunity, as a special agent of the US Drug
Enforcement Administration. - denied
-Scalzo filed a petition for review with injunction in this court. the
case was referred to the CA and rendered judgment sustaining the
diplomatic immunity of Scalzo.
-Minucher filed a petition for review (SC) The Court reversed the
decision of the CA and remanded the case to the lower court.
-the trial court sustained the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo but ruled
that he should be liable for the acts complained of committed outside
his official duty.
-Scalzo appealed (CA) reversed RTCs decision.
-Minucher filed an instant petition for review (SC)
-Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity
from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the US Drugs
Enforcement Agency -- as conducting surveillance operations on
suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of
prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S.
ISSUE:
W/N Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity
HELD: YES.
The SC DENIED the petition.
- The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of
centuries-old customary law & its rules of law had long become stable.
- The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to
include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,
(b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states;
and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs
and it provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions.
- Scalzo was an Assistant Attache of the US diplomatic mission and
was accredited as such by the Phil Govt.
-- Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are
administratively under him, but their main function is to observe & analyze
trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country &
submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home govt.

--Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the

executive branch of the government.
-- In United States of America vs. Guinto:
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties.
--A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is
acting within the directives of the sending state.
-The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance
on suspected drug suppliers
-In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the
poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, & then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo cannot
be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
Callado vs IRRI
Facts:
Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the IRRI who figured in an
accident on an official trip to NAIA and back to the IRRI.
-Petitioner was terminated after a preliminary investigation was held and
after submitting his answer. He was charged with (1) driving while on official
duty under the influence of liqouor; (2) serious misconduct for failure to
report to his supervisor that there is something wrong with his vehicle; and
(3) gross and habitual neglect of duties.
-Petitioner filed a complaint with Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
-IRRI wrote to the Labor Arbiter to inform that the Institute enjoys immunity
from legal process as an international organization by virtue of Art 3 of PD
1620.
-The Labor Arbiter admitted IRRIs defense of immunity, but cited an Order
issued by the Institute on to the effect that in all cases of termination,
respondent IRRI waives its immunity, and accordingly, considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
-On appeal, NLRC found out that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered
the decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.
-Hence, this petition.

-Callado contended that the immunity of the IRRI as an international

organization by Art 3 of PD 1620 may not be invoked in the case because
the Institute waived the privilege by virtue of its Memorandum on Guidelines
on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to PD 1620.
Issue: W/N IRRI expressly waived its immunity from suit.
Held: NO. IRRIs immunity from suit is undisputed
-Art 3 of PD 1620 provides: Immunity from legal process. The institute
shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the DirectorGeneral of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
-The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this
immunity.
-IRRI already wrote to the Labor Arbiter informing him that the Institute will
not waive its diplomatic immunity.
-The Memorandum invoked by petitioner made it clear that in cases
involving dismissed employees, the Institute MAY waive its immunity,
signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.
-The Memorandum cannot be considered an express waiver by the DirGen, and of the fact that the Memorandum was issued by former Dir-Gen
for internal circulation and not as a pledge of waiver in all cases arising from
dismissal of employees.
-Petition for Certiorari is dismissed.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC (1993)

FACTS:
-DA and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services.

-Several guards of the agency filed a complaint for underpayment of

wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay as well as for damages,
before the Regional Arbitration, against the petitioner and the agency.
-The Executive Labor arbiter rendered a decision finding the petitioner
and the agency jointly and severally liable for the payment of the
money claims aggregating P266, 483.91. No appeal was made so the
decision became final and executory.
-The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of execution which resulted in the
property of the petitioner being levied.
-petitioner filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction, prohibition &
mandamus &claimed that the attachment&seizure of its property would
hamper petitionrs govtal functions to the prejudice of the public good.
-NLRC dismissed the petition for injunction,lifted the preliminary
injunction & the Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of 2
mos&ordered petitioner to put up&post sufficient surety & supersedeas
bond equivalent to at least 50% of the total monetary award issued.
-Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari charging NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion and that the NLRC disregarded the rule on
the non-suability of the State.
-Respondents claimed that DA has impliedly waived its immunity from
suit by contracting a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
ISSUE:
W/N the Department of Agriculture be sued under the contract entered
with the agency?
HELD: NO
-Accdg by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit based on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
-The doctrine is cynically called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty"
because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate
claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.
-The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be made through a general law or a special law.
--the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in
Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits
to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil
action between private parties."
--Implied consent is conceded when the State itself commences litigation,
thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.

-In the case, the government is deemed to have descended to the level
of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its
sovereign immunity.
--Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver
of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity.
--sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary act ( jure gestionisis).

-the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its
being a govtal entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor
that it could have performed any act proprietary in character.
-The claims of private respondents arising from the Contract for
Service, clearly constitute money claims.
-Act No.3083 gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express /implied.
-However, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission
on Audit. (Comm Act 327)
--When the State waives its immunity, all it does is to give the other
party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
--The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued
by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the
claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
-WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
-The writ of execution directed against the property of the DA is
nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently
from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution
issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against
said petitioner.
Republic v Feliciano 1987
Facts:
-Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of CamSur against the Rep of the Phils, represented by the
Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership & possession of a parcel
of land consisting of four lots situated in Tinambac, CamSur.
-Feliciano alleged that he bought the property from Victor Gardiola by
virtue of a Contract Sale.
-Gardiola acquired the property by purchased from Francisco
Abrazado whose title to the property was evidenced by an informacion
posesoria.
-Pres Ramon Magsaysay issued Proc No.90 reserving for settlement
purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA),a piece of land situated in
Tinambac&Siruma, CamSur, after w/c the NARRA & the Land Authority
started sub-dividing & distributing the land to the settlers.
-the property in question,located w/in the reservation established under
ProcNo.90, was the private property of plaintiff & should be excluded therefrom.

-The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, defenses lack of

sufficient cause of action and prescription.
-The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No.1 to be the private
property of Feliciano & therefore excluded from the NARRA settlement,
& the rest of the property, Lots 2,3 & 4, reverted to the public domain.
-86 settlers filed of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision
of the trial court alleging that they had been in possession of the land
for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
-The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they
did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence.
-Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled
in favor of Feliciano.
-The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration.
-The case was reopened to allow them to present their evidence. The
case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
--Feliciano filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court but it
was denied.petition for certiorari with IAC - denied
-Settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RP cannot be
sued w/out its consent. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
-trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
-Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the RP filed its opposition, claimed that the dismissal was
proper on the ground of non-suability of the State.
-motion for recon was denied petition for certiorari to the IAC
reversed the order of the trial court and remanded the case to the court
a quo for further proceedings.
-this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner.
Issue/s:
W/N state can be sued for recovery & possession of a parcel of land.
Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,

except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too
plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte
at any stage of the proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be
inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest
right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent
of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver
of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
HELD: No.
-the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State
has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication.
-The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the RP, represented by the Land Authority, a govtal
agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
-The Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to
be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State
immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
--The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria
under the Spanish Mortgage Law was a means provided by the law
then in force in the Phils prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain
to the US, to record a claimant's actual possession of a piece of land.
--The possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership
after the lapse of 20yrs (later reduced to 10 yrs), upon the fulfillment of
the requisites prescribed in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
-There is no showing that the informacion posesoria had been
converted into a record of ownership.
-The respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act.
-The settlers have been occupying & cultivating the land in question for
more than 20yrs, w/c puts in grave doubt his own claim of possession.
-The informacion posesoria registered was a "reconstituted"
possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate
presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano,"
w/out the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic
or that the original thereof was lost.
-Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original.
-WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting
aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court and
affirming the order of the court a quo dismissing the complaint filed by
Pablo Feliciano against the RP
MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES MAR 21,1916
FACTS: Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was hit by an ambulance
owned by the Philippine General Hospital.
-The plaintiff was severely injured and that he was suffering from a
wound and depression in the left parietal region.
-he had also 1 or more fractures of the skull & his right leg was broken.
- As a contractor, he could no longer climb up ladders & scaffoldings to
reach the highest parts of the building.
-Merritt claimed that the collision was due to the negligence of the
driver of the ambulance.
- Act No. 2457 was enacted authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against
the Govt of the Phils. & authorizing the Attorney-General to appear in
said suit.
-A suit was then filed before the CFI of Manila, which fixed the
responsibility for the collision solely on the ambulance driver and
determined the amount of damages to be awarded to Merritt.
-Both parties appeale, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages
and defendant in rendering the amount against the government.
ISSUE: W/N defendant, Govt of the Phils, waived its immunity from
suit as well as conceded its liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act
No. 2457
HELD: NO.
-In US, it is a well settled rule that the state is not liable for the torts
committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment.
-No claim arises against any govt is favor of an individual, by reason of
the unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents.
-By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit.
-It does not thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff.
-It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense.

-The enactment of the law gives authority to commence suit for the
purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate.
- Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to
any cause not previously recognized.
-The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of their functions, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents.
-therefore, the Govt of the PH is only liable, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents.
-A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official.
-The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent.
-the judgment appealed from must be reversed.
-Whether the Govt intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of
damages, w/c the plaintiff has sustained, the Court is not called upon
to determine.
-This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

***MOBIL PHILS. EXPLORATION, INC. VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE

SERVICE18 SCRA 1120 (1966)
FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to
Mobil Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later delivered to the broker of
the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines
Exploration Inc.filed suit in the CFI against the Customs Arrastre
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered cases plus other damages.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that not being a person under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
After the plaintiff opposed the motion, the court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor
the Bureau of Customs is suable.
ISSUE: Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs
be sued?

of the Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration award of

P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent corporation. After the decision
became final and executory, respondent judge issued an order
directing the sheriff to execute the said decision, and the
corresponding alias writ of execution was thus issued.
Hence the sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks
especially the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient
to cover the amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine
Veterans Bank received such notice. As certified by the AFP
Comptroller, these funds of the AFP with the said banks are public
funds for the pensions, pay, and allowances of its military and civilian
personnel.
The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings, challenges
the validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the decision
final and executory and subsequently issuing an alias writ of execution
directed against the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.
ISSUE:
May the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against
public funds?
HELD:
NO. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by private
parties, there is corollary that public funds cannot be the object of
garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued has been
previously granted and the states liability has been adjudged.
Thus in the case of Commission of Public Highways vs. San Diego,
such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice
Teehankee. The universal rule that where the state gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution and that the power of the courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgment, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific object is
appropriated by law.

HELD:
NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the
national government in the operations of arrastre service, pursuant to
express legislative mandate and a necessary incident of its prime
governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to
the contrary.
The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from that of
the government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing
and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff
and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. To this
function, arrastre is a necessary incident. Although said arrastre
function is deemed proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the
primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to
suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function
without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted
as to the end should not be denied as to the necessary means to that
end.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR54 SCRA 84 (1973)

FACTS:
A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the Republic

PNB VS. PABALAN83 SCRA 595 (1978)

FACTS:
A judgment was rendered against Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution
followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of
respondent PVTA which were deposited with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). PNB objected on the constitutional law doctrine of nonsuability of a state. It alleged that such funds are public in character.
ISSUE: Was the contention of PNB correct?
HELD:
NO. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution,
what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional
law has been set forth in express terms: The State may not be sued
without its consent. If the funds appertained to one of the regular
departments or offices in the government, then, certainly such a
provision would lie a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here.
Garnishment would lie. The Supreme Court, in a case brought by the
same petitioner precisely invoking such doctrine, left no doubt that the
funds of a public corporation could properly be made the object of a

notice of garnishment.

FACTS:

It is well settled that when the government enters into commercial

business, its abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other corporation. (Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila
Hotel Company)

Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers (deceased) were

both employed as game room attendants in the special services
department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA). They were advised that
their employment had been converted from permanent full- time to
permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion and
to institute grievance proceedings. The hearing officer recommended
the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status
plus back wages.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ 136 SCRA 487 (1985)

FACTS:
Petitioner invited the submission of bids for repair of its wharves and
shoreline in the Subic Bay Area. Eligion and Co. responded to the
invitation and submitted bids. Said company was requested by
telegram to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company, and from which it complied.
Later, the United States, through its agents, informed said company
that it was not qualified to receive an award at the project for the poorly
completed projects it awarded to third parties. The company sued
petitioner for specific performance and if no longer possible, for
damages. It also asked for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the defendants from entering into contracts with others.
The United States entered a special appearance for the purpose only
of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of the defendants, the subject matter of the
complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as
agents of the defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign
which has not given its consent to this suit or any other suit for the
cause of action asserted in the complaint.

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Commanding Officer of

Subic Naval Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services Director of
NAVSTA, disagreed with the recommendation and asked for its
rejection.
Moreau, even before the start of the grievance hearings, sent a letter
to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondents status and requested concurrence therewith.
Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that the letters
contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and
had caused them mental anguish, and prejudgment of the grievance
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
They make it clear that petitioners were being sued in their personal
capacity. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was
filed by the petitioner and was denied.
ISSUE: Were the petitioners performing their official duties when they
did the acts for which they are being sued for damages?
HELD:

US filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the writ. The trial court
denied the motion and issued a writ.
ISSUE: Whether the US may be sued?HELD:from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or
No. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State waiver. This
rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because
the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the
United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
(See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207209 [1984].)
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can be thus deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the
Philippines, undisputed a function of the government of the highest
order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes. The correct test for the application of State immunity is
not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of
the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that
case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United
States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued
to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of
the leases had expired, They also asked for increased rentals until the
apartments shall have been vacated.

SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II162 SCRA 88 (1988)

YES. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. Sanders as director of the special
services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its
personnel including the private respondents and had a hand in their
employment, work, assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related
matters. The act of Moreau is deadly official in nature, performed by
him as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to
Naval Personnel in matters involving the special department of
NAVSTA.
U.S.A VS. GUINTO(G.R. NO. 76607 FEBRUARY 26, 1990)
CRUZ, J. FACTS:
In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of
the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the
base.
In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for damages
against private petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air
Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.
In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as a barracks
boy in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S. Air Force
and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He
then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.
In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the private
respondents against the private petitioners, for injuries allegedly
sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed
them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of
their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the
doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the

ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not
consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the
respondent judges.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable
thereby making the State liable
HELD:
NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is
obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength
of the evidence, which have been carefully examined.
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality
of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of
states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the
United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other

state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has

entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity, as in the
cases at bar. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. A State
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
it enters into business contracts.
The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The
argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the
officers are designated "special agents," the United States government
should be liable for their torts.
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and
liability and a misconception that the two terms are synonymous.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it
is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The
government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself
to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. Moreover,
the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if
he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said
provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with
its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government
and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.
The complaints against the petitioners in the court below were aptly
dismissed.