SECOND DIVISION

Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

G.R. NO. L-30061, February 27, 1974

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the abovementioned Officials as claimed
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital),
Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the
validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People
vs. Mapa.[1]
The Complaint filed against the accused reads:
"That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the
poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with
one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the
necessary permit or license to possess the same."
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty,
after which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the
revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license
or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he
had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial
Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC

by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10,
1962, reads:
"Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will
be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and
order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of
trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of
the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have
qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally
of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in
this province and to make report thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered
sufficient ground for the automatice cancellation of your appointment and immediate
separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.
"By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by
taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: ROHM-Revolver
Make: German

SN:
64
Cal: .22"
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information

firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the

maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from

regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and

other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas
province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess an ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 Sn-64, for his personal protection while
in the performance of officials duties.

the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,

We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use
of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose
of the battalion commander and must be deemed incident to or necessarily included
in the duty and power of said military commander to effect the capture of a Huk
leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by
implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the
following ground:
"The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, 'it shall be
unlawful for any person to x x x possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition.' (Sec. 878, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section
provides that 'firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,' are not
covered 'when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants
for use in the performance of their official duties.' (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative
Code.)

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the
firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of
the Supreme Court's decisions in People vs. Macarandang[2] and People vs. Lucero.[3]
The trial court, while conceding that on the basis of the evidence of record the
accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively,
with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint,
nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally
liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the
rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed
and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating
circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People vs. Macarandang, supra, People vs. Lucero,
supra, and People vs. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he
was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he
had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold
and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We there held that while it is true that
the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless,
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess

"The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he
is not exempt. x x x."
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Governor in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964,
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People vs.
Macarandang (1959) and People vs. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People vs.
Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this
appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang
and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the

Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first
view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system ***." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis
vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It
is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant was conferred his appointments
as Secret Agent and Confidential agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant
to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the
absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly,
appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not
to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is
acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Zaldivar, (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez, and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-8759, May 25, 1956

SEVERINO UNABIA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE
HONORABLE CITY MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY AUDITOR AND
THE CITY ENGINEER, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering respondents
to reinstate petitioner as foreman (capataz), Garbage Disposal, Office of the City
Engineer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day from the date of his removal.
The case was submitted to the court for decision on a stipulation of facts the most
pertinent of which are as follows: Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office
of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day On June 16, 1953, the City
Mayor removed him from the service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana,
and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division,
including personnel, was transferred from the City Health Department to the Office
of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, petitioner sought to be reinstated but his petition
was not headed by the respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that
petitioner is a person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified
service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his removal
from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code
and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution. The court further held that the notation
at the bottom of petitioner's appointment to the effect that his appointment is
"temporary pending report from the Government Service Insurance System as to the
appointee's physical and medical examination" did not make his appointment merely
temporary.
First error assigned on this appeal is the failure to include in the complaint, the
names of the persons holding the Offices of City Mayor, City Treasurer, City Auditor

and City Engineer, all of Cebu City, they being designated only by their official
positions. This is no reason for a reversal of the proceedings and of the judgment. As
said persons were sued in their official capacity, it is sufficient that they be
designated by their official positions.

abandoned the office to which he is entitled to he reinstated. These defenses are valid
defenses to an action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of
Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided November 22, 1955. In that case we
cited with approval Nicolas vs. United States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following ruling
therein contained:

It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words "Civil Service" in section 1
and 4 of Article XII of the Constitution and the use of small letters for the same
words, "civil service," in section 670, Revised Administrative Code, indicates that
only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the above-mentioned
sections of the Constitution. We see no validity in this argument. Capital "C" and "S"
in the words "Civil Service" were used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No
capitals are used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see
no difference between the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in the
latter. There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from the
benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are expressly
declared to belong to the Civil Service; hence, the same rights and priviliges should
be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are so designated because the
nature of their work and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not
true of those appointed to the classified service. This can not be a valid reason for
denying previleges to the former that are granted the latter.

"A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the
obligation to take steps for his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable
length of time, acquiesce to the order of removal * * * and then sue to recover the
salary attached to the position. In case of unreasonable delay he may be held to have
abandoned title to the office and any right to recover its emoluments." (Mesias vs.
Jover, supra.)

There is, however, an, additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the
memorandum submitted by the attorneys for the respondents in lieu of oral
argument. This is the fact that as petitioner was removed on June 16, 1953 and only
filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15 days, petitioner
should no longer be allowed to claim the remedy, he being considered as having
abandoned his office.

Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any
period which may be deemed to be considered as an abandonment of office. In the
abovecited case decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States, 11
months was considered an unreasonable delay amounting to abandonment of office
and of the right to recover its emoluments. H6wever, we note that in actions of quo
warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period
of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been
originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Proceedure (Act No. 190). We
find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons
claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a
period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that
demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in
the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may be
unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must
be discouraged. The following considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice
Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees in the civil service:

We can not or should not overlook this objection. If an employee is illegally

dismissed, he may conform to such illegal dismissal or acquiesce therein, or by his
inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered as having

"Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the
officer for one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which
no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime

As the removal of petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void and petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from
which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778)

he pleases. "And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper
that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the
peoples' interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as
practicable." (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off.Gaz., 18], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person
claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another
actually holding it, so 1&at title Government may not be faced with the predicament
of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office,
although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although
entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the policy of the State contained in the law
fixing the period of one year within which actions for quo warranto may be
instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be
required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise
he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the
objection as to the delay in filing the action is raised, for the first time in this Court,
not having been raised in the court below. The above circumstance (belated
objection) would bar the consideration if it were a defense merely. However, we
consider it to be essential to the petitioner's right of action that the same is filed
within a year from the illegal removal. The delay is not merely a defense which may
be interposed against it subject to waiver. It is essential: to petitioner's cause of action
and may be considered even at this stage of the action.

July 1, 1956, or after a period of one year, he is deemed: to have abandoned his right
to his former position and is not entitled to reinstatement therein by mandamus.
Without costs. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Reyes, J. B., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

DISSENTING:
CONCEPCION, J.,
I dissent. Delay in bringing an action can have no more effect than that of
prescription of action or laches. It affects merely the "enforcement" of a right of
action, not the existence thereof. The period of one year for the commencement of
the auction in quo warranto proceedings is prescribed in the Rules of Court which
would be unconstitutional if the same should seek to affect the cause of action, for
then they would impair substantive rights.

"We would go farther by holding: that the period fixed in the rule is a condition
precedent to the existence of the cause, of action, with the result that, if a complaint
is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the
answer or motion to dismiss." (Abeto vs. Hodas, 46 Off. Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a cause of action is not waived by failure to raise same
as a defense (section 10, Rule 9),
For all the foregoing considerations, we hold that as petitioner was dismissed on
June 16, 1953 and did not file his petition for mandamus for his reinstatement until

G.R. No. 22945, March 03, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND
APPELLEE, VS. JOVITA V. BUENVIAJE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act, the information
alleging "that on or about the first day of June, 1923, and for some time prior to said
date, the said accused without having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners
the corresponding certificate of registration for the practice of medicine in the
Philippine Islands, voluntarily, illegally and criminally and for compensation,
practiced medicine in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, assisting, treating and
manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of curing him of
the ailments, diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretended to suffer,
and advertising and offering her services as a physician, by means of cards which she
distributed and by letterheads and signs which she exposed on the door of her office,
situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, and in newspapers which are published and
circulated in the City of Manila, in which cards, letterheads, signs and advertising
she added and prefixed to her name the letters 'Dra.,' which is the abbreviation of the
word 'doctor,' for the purpose of causing the public to believe that she, the said
defendant, had received the corresponding title of doctor."
To this information the defendant demurred in the court below on the grounds: (1)
That it stated more than one offense, and (2) that it was not drawn in accordance with
the form prescribed by law. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant pleaded
not guilty.
At the trial of the case the defendant made the following admissions: "That on the
first of June, 1923, she had no certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners
authorizing her to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands; that on that day she
treated and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble in order to cure him of
ailments from which he pretended to suffer, the treatment consisting in a 'thrust' by

means of the application of the hand to the spinal column; that she for such treatment
received and collected from said Regino Noble the sum of P1; that the said treatment
took place in her office situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, District of Binondo, City
of Manila, Philippine Islands; that she on or about the first day of June, 1923, and for
some time prior to that date, advertised herself as a 'doctor of chiropractic,' in said
City of Manila, said advertisement appearing upon her business cards and in the
newspaper 'El Debate,' in its issue of April 29, 1923, edited and published in Manila
and in which cards and newspaper advertisement the defendant prefixed the
abbreviation 'Dra.' to her name; that she was graduated a doctor in chiropractic on
the 13th day of August, 1919, as evidenced by a certificate marked Exhibit I and
issued by the American University School of Chiropractic of Chicago, Illinois."
Upon this admission .and some other evidence to the same effect, the trial court
found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and, in accordance with
section 2678 of the Administrative Code, sentenced her to pay a fine of P300, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. From this
judgment the defendant appeals to this court and presents four assignments of error.
I.

In the first assignment of error counsel contends that the demurrer

to the information should have been sustained on the ground that
said information charged more than one offense. The Medical Law
is contained in sections 758 to 783 of the Administrative Code and
it is argued that inasmuch as some of the illegal acts with which
the defendant is charged are prohibited by section 770 of the Code
and others by section 783, the defendant is in reality accused of
two separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal practice of
medicine and illegally representing oneself as a doctor.
We cannot accept this view. It may be noted that the Medical Law
itself, as it appears in the Administrative Code, does not declare
any of the therein prohibited acts penal offenses. The penal
provisions relating thereto are contained in section 2678 of the
Code, which reads as follows:

"Sec. 2678. Violation of Medical Law.A person violating any

provision of the Medical Law shall, upon conviction, be punished
by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos or by imprisonment
for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the

In the case of United States vs. Douglass (2 Phil., 461), the court
said:

court."

by the use of different means, to charge, in the alternative, the

various means by which the crime may have been committed. (U.
S. vs. Potter, 27 Fed. Cases, 604; Bishop's New Criminal
Procedure, sec. 434.)"

"It is not objectionable, when a single offense may be committed

The offense here penalized is "violation of the Medical Law." The

statute makes no distinction between illegal practice of medicine
and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. Both are in violation
of the Medical Law and carry the same penalty. They are merely
different ways or means of committing the same offense and both
of these means are closely related to each other and usually
employed together.
In these circumstances and where, as alleged in the information in
the present case, the various violations have taken place
simultaneously, we do not think it was the intention of the
legislator that each single act should be regarded as a separate
offense and separate informations presented for ea6h. The
language of this court in the case of United States vs. Poh Chi (20
Phil., 140), in regard to the Opium Law, is opposite to the present
case.
"It is true that the Commission has provided a certain punishment
for the possession of a pipe used in the smoking of opium, for the
smoking of opium, as well as a punishment for the illegal
possession of opium, but it is not believed that it was the intention
of the legislature to have separate complaints filed against a person
who was found in the illegal possession of opium and a pipe at the
same time. If that were true then every person who was found to
be smoking opium could be charged in three different complaints:
First, with the illegal possession of the pipe; second, the illegal
possession of the opium; and third, for smoking the opium.
Certainly the legislature did not intend any such consequences."

The same rule was followed in the case of United States vs. Dorr
(2 Phil., 332); United States vs. Tolentino (5 Phil., 682); and
United States vs. Gustilo (19 Phil., 208) and is in harmony with
the views of the courts in other jurisdictions. That the various
means of committing the offense is described in more than one
section of the statute does not necessarily effect the general
principle involved; the subdivision of a statute into section is
merely a matter of convenience and while it sometimes may be of
some aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, it is, of course, not
conclusive thereof.
II.

Under the second assignment of error the appellant argues in

substance that chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and
that the practice of that profession can therefore not be regarded as
practice of medicine. There is no merit whatever in this
contention. Assuming without conceding that chiropractic does not
fall within the term "practice of medicine" in its ordinary
acceptation, we have the statutory definition contained in section
770 of the Administrative Code and which clearly includes the
manipulations employed in chiropractic. The statutory definition
necessarily prevails over the ordinary one.
Under the same assignment of error the defendant also argues that
the examination prescribed by section 776 of the Administrative
Code for admission to the practice of medicine, embraces subjects
which have no connection with chiropractic and that to require

chiropractors to take that examination is unreasonable and, in

effect amounts to prohibition of the practice of their profession
and therefore violates the constitutional principle that all men have
the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and are

one subject. There is no merit in this contention. The title of Act

No. 3111 reads as follows:

entitled to the equal protection of the law.

hundred and sixty, seven hundred and sixty-one, seven hundred

and sixty-two, seven hundred and sixty-five, seven hundred and
sixty-seven, seven hundred and seventy, seven hundred and
seventy-four, seven hundred and seventy-five, seven hundred and
seventy-six, seven hundred and seventy-eight, seven hundred and
eighty, seven hundred and eighty-two, seven hundred and eightythree, and twenty-six hundred and seventy-eight of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative
Code, increasing the number of the members of the Board of
Medical Examiners, conferring upon the same certain additional
powers and responsibilities and for other purposes."

There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an

examination is required by section 778 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, relate to matters of which a
thorough knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of
diseases of the human body and it is within the police power of the
State to require that persons who devote themselves to the curing
of human ills should possess such knowledge. (State vs. Edmunds,
127 Iowa, 333; 69 L. R. A., 504; Underwood vs. Scott, 43 Kan.,
714; People vs. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 111., 370; State vs.
Mylod, 20 R. I., 632; 41 L. R. A., 428; Stewart vs. Raab, 55 Minn.,
20; Matthei vs. Wooley, 69 111. App., 654; State vs. Buswell, 40
Neb., 158; 24 L. R. A., 68; O'Connor vs. State, 46 Neb., 157; U. S.
vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)
III.

IV.

The third assignment of error is closely related to the foregoing.

The appellant contends that the prohibition in section 783 against
the unauthorized use of the title "doctor" must be understood to
refer to "Doctor of Medicine" and has no application to doctors of
chiropractic. Under different circumstances that might possibly be
so, but where, as here, chiropractic is by statute made a form of the
practice of medicine, it necessarily follows that a person holding
himself out as a doctor of chiropractic in legal effect represents
himself as a doctor of medicine.
In her fourth assignment of error the appellant attacks the
constitutionality of Act No. 3111, amending section 770 of the
Administrative Code, on the ground that the subject of the Act is
not sufficiently expressed in its title and that it embraces more than

"An Act to amend sections seven hundred and fifty-nine, seven

All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted relate to the same
general subject, namely, defining and regulating the practice of
medicine, and section 770 is expressly mentioned as one of the
sections amended.
This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions similar to ours
the general rule is that a title which declares the amendatory
statute to be an act to amend a designated section or the like of a
specified Code is sufficient and the precise nature of the
amendatory Act need not be further stated. (Ross vs. Aguirre, 191
U. S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 507; McGuire
vs. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs. County
Commissioners of Somerset County, 73 Md., 105; Tabor vs. State,
34 Tex. Crim., 631; Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., 762.) For a full and
authoritative discussion of this subject, see Note to Lewis vs.
Dunne, 55 L. R. A., 833. See also Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan and Roman Catholic Bishop
of Nueva Segovia (32 Phil., 634) and Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (p.
385, ante).

We find no error in the judgment appealed from and the same is therefore affirmed,
with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur.
Romualdez, J., dissenting: I believe that the complaint charges more than one
offense, and that the demurrer interposed on that ground should have been sustained.
For that reason I dissent from the opinion of the majority.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

plantation, which said contract, by agreement, was to be converted later into a

right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the
land, and to be binding upon all future owners of the same. In the interim the
execution of said contract and its conversion into a right in rem upon the respondent's
property, said Act No. 2874 became effective. The respondent, while admitting said
contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant thereto, bases her
refusal so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the
petitioner is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands
or of the United States.
It is conceded by the parties that the land involved is private agricultural land, that
is, land which is held and owned by the respondent, for which she holds a Torrens
title.
The defendant answered the petition. To the defendant's answer the petitioner
demurred. From an examination of the petition, the answer and the demurrer, it
appears that the real issue presented is, whether the said Act (No. 2874) is limited in
its application to agricultural lands of the public domain, or whether its provisions
also extend to agricultural lands held in private ownership.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16197

March 12, 1920

CENTRAL CAPIZ, a corporation, petitioner,

vs.
ANA RAMIREZ, respondent.
Williams and Ferrier for petitioner.
Cohn, Fisher and Dewit for respondent.
JOHNSON, J.:

Inasmuch as the wording of certain sections of said Act (secs. 23, 24, 121 and 122)
give rise to a possible construction that private lands are included within its terms,
and inasmuch as said Act specifically provides that any land coming within its
purview cannot be encumbered, alienated or transferred to corporations in which at
least 61 per cent of the capital stock does not belong wholly to citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States, the respondent, while not desiring to evade
her contract, fears to assume the risk of giving effect to her said contract in view of
the drastic penalty prescribed, should her action prove unlawful. The penalty
provided in section 122 of said Act includes not only a nullity of the contract but also
a reversion of the property and its improvements to the Government.

The only question presented is, whether or not said Act No. 2874 is applicable to
agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned.

On behalf of the plaintiff it is argued, first, that the intent of the Legislature, gathered
from a reading of Act No. 2874 in its entirety, is to provide simply for the sale, lease
and other disposition of lands of the public domain; that lands held in private
ownership are not affected thereby; and, second, that even had the Legislature
intended to include private as well as public land within the scope of the Act, this
intent fails because under the Act as entitled such attempt would be in direct
violation of section three of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which provides
that: "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject,
and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

There is not dispute about the facts. They are admitted. The petitioner alleges and
respondent admits that on or about July 1, 1919, the latter contracted with the
petitioner to supply to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her

Examining Act No. 2874 in detail, there can be little question but that it was intended
to apply to and regulate the sale, lease and other disposition of public lands only.
The title of the Act, always indicative of legislative intent, reads: "an Act to amend

This is an original action brought in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an
interpretation and application of the intent, purpose and scope of Act No. 2874 of the
Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it affects
agricultural lands, privately owned.

and compile the laws relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes."
Section one of such act provides: "That short title of this Act shall be 'The public
Land Act.' " Section two, wherein the purpose of the Act is expressly stated, reads: "
The provisions of this Act shall apply to lands of the public domain." Section three
provides:
While title to lands of the public domain remains in the Government, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive
officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, through the
Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.
It cannot be contemplated that these officers, charged "with carrying out the
provisions of the Act," were intended to exercise authority and control over the sale
or other disposition of lands hold in private ownership.
To the same effect are sections four, five, and eighty-seven of the Act, wherein
executive control is vested in the Director of Lands with respect to the survey,
appraisal, classification, etc., of lands of the public domain, with authority to prepare
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, and to receive
all applications filed pursuant thereto, etc.
Sections 105 contains another indication that said Act does not apply to privately
owned agricultural lands. Said section provides: "All patents or certificates for lands
granted under this Act . . . shall issue in the name of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General, countersigned by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." The Legislature certainly did
not intend that all sales, leases, etc. of privately owned agricultural lands should
hereafter be "issued in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands, under
the signature of the Government of the Philippine Islands, under the signature of the
Governor-General," etc.
Section 23, after describing the persons and corporations authorized to purchase any
tract of public agricultural lands "disposable under this Act," proceeds:
Provided, further, That citizens of countries the laws of which grant to
citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire public lands as to
their own citizens, may, while such laws are in force, but not thereafter . . .
purchase any parcel of agricultural land . . . available under this Act.
In other words, it is only necessary for other countries to grant to citizens of the
Philippine Islands the right to acquire "public lands," in order that their citizens may
have the right to acquire any land available under this Act. This provision would be
altogether anomalous had it been the intent to apply Act No. 2874 to lands held in
private ownership.

Referring again to section two of said Act, we find the following:

That nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to
change or modify the government and disposition of the lands commonly
known as "friar lands" and those which, being privately owned, have
reverted to or become the property of the Philippine Government, which
administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in
force or which may hereafter be enacted by the Legislature.
The purpose of said provision is obvious. Inasmuch as these friar estates and other
real property purchased or owned by the Government are subject to its control and
disposition equally with lands of the public domain, it could be reasonably argued
that they should be subject to and governed by the laws applicable to public lands.
Through the insertion of the provision above quoted, however, this construction of
the Act is avoided. If said Act, by express provisions, does not apply to
lands privately owned by the Government, it could hardly have been the intent of the
Legislature to make the Act applicable to lands held in private ownership by
individuals.
The Act nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its terms to
privately owned lands. The doubts of defendant in that regard are caused by
inferences drawn from the language used in sections 24 and 121 of the Act. The first
paragraph of section 24 provides:
No . . . corporation . . . other than those mentioned in the last preceding
section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other
denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes,
that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public
domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such
land and improvement.
Said section as worded, and standing alone, presents come question as to the
character of land sought to be included therein. This doubt is dispelled, however,
when its provisions are read in connection with other sections of the same chapter.
Chapter five, in which section 24 is found, deals with "Sales," and section 25 thereof
specifically provides that: "Lands sold under the provisions of this chapter must be
appraised in accordance with section 114 of this Act." Section 114 confers authority
upon the Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, to appraise lands or improvements subject to concession or
disposition under the provisions of this Act. Inasmuch as the Legislature cannot vest
authority in the Director of Lands to "appraise" or "sell" lands held in private
ownership, it is not presumed it was the intention to include private lands in the Act
or subject them in the manner indicated to any such authority. The same observations

10

and the same conclusions apply to section 121 of the Act, where much the same
language is used as found in section 24 above quoted.
Whatever interpretation said sections 24 and 121 might receive if standing alone, it is
clear they cannot prevail against the general intent of the Act, derived not only from
the language used but from the machinery adopted for giving effect to its provisions.
(See secs. 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 99, 103, 105, and 115.)
We hold, therefore, that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was
and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and that lands held in
private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner
whatsoever thereby.
Even should the holding of the court upon this question of intent be different, it
would not affect the final outcome of the case. Under the Act as entitled, any attempt
by the Legislature to insert provisions in the body thereof relating to lands of private
ownership would be in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law and therefore,
null and void.
It is provided in section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916):
"That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject,
and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Identical provisions to the above are contained in most of the State Constitutions,
and have been repeatedly construed. In the States of Alabama, California, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming, identical provisions are found in the Constitution.
The purpose of this legislative restriction, and the evils sought to be remedied
thereby, are clearly stated by Surtherland in his valuable work on Statutory
Construction. In Section 111 he says that:
In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the
courts have kept steadily in view the correction of the mischief against
which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was
common in all legislative bodies where no such restrictions existed, of
embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each
other or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often
adopted without attracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented
diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the members of the
legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations were
corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the State. Such omnibus bills

sometimes included more than a hundred sections on as many different

subjects, with a title appropriate to the first section, "and for other
purposes."
The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be
accomplished by the legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly
for measures which they would not knowingly have approved; and not only
were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative
provisions were steadily pushed through in the closing hours of a session,
which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious
by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been
seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discussion is
intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of
incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject or object; to
prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be
expressed in the title.
In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329), the Supreme Court of Alabama stated
the proposition as follows citing and quoting from Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations; p. 143:
The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be
remedied by this provision are well known. Legislative assemblies, for the
dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only without requiring
them to be read. A specious title sometimes covers legislation which, if real
character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To
prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this
provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision
the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents.
An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the
blending in one and the same statute of such things as were diverse in their
nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of
each, thus often securing the passage of several measures no one of which
could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his
review of the authorities defining the objects of this provision: "It may
therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First,
to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of
which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and , third, to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in
order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or

11

otherwise if they shall so desire.' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p.

143.)
To the same effect, in the case of Lindsay vs. U. S. Say. & Loan Ass'n. (120 Ala., 156
[42 L. R. A., N. S., 783]), the court said:
The purposes of the constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in
mind when it becomes necessary to determine whether there has been
legislative observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge
Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which alike limitation
prevails. (Then follows quotation from Cooley, supra.)
In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) where, in the body of an act, provision
was made for something not included in the title, the Supreme Court of California
said:
At least, then, two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of
which is not expressed in the title, and they cannot be segregated. The title
does not express the objects of legislation embodied in the provisions of the
act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart
that notice of the measures enacted, which the Constitution requires. To
prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional
requirement. 'The practice,' says the Supreme Court of Missouri, 'of
comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antogonistic nature, in order
to combine in their support members who were in favor of particular
measures, but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its
own merits, was found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature
itself, but destructive of the best interests of the State. But this was not more
detrimental than that other pernicious practice, by which, through dexterous
and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses in the
bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles gave no indication,
and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their passage. These things
led to fraud and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in
the shape of a constitutional provision.' (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo.,
590.) This provision has been framed in the constitutions of may of the
States of the Union; and courts, whenever it has come before the, have
liberally construed it as the will of the people in the interests of honest
legislation.
The authorities are to all intents uniform that this constitutional requirement is
mandatory and not directory. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 112,
states the rule correctly as follows:

The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief
which has been pointed out, depends on judicial enforcement; on this
constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with
it essential to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed
notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might be
expected to continue notwithstanding that that obligation is formulated and
emphasized in this constitutional injunction if it be construed as addressed
exclusively to them and only directory. It would in a general sense be a
dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the
constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of
the legislature unless it is clear beyond all question that such was the
intention of the framers of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering
of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it descends to
prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or
disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional
provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated
by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore
habitually disregarded.
In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk. [Tenn.], 504) Nicholson, C. J., referring
to the provision that "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one
subject," said:
This is a direct, positive and imperative limitation upon the power of the
legislature. It matters not that a bill has passed through three readings in
each house on three different days and has received the approval of the
governor, still it is not a law of the State if it embraces more than one
subject.
In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) supra, the court said:
It is the settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us
unanswerable that this provision of the constitution is not a mere rule of
legislative procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is
mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not
conforming to it.
Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179-180) states that
our courts have held, without exception, that such constitutional provision
is mandatory.
As heretofore noted, the title of Act 2874, here under constructions, reads: "An Act
to amend and compile laws relative to lands of the public domain, and for other
purposes."

12

In our interpretation of said Act, the words "and for other purposes" contained in its
title, must be treated as non-existent. Under all the authorities wherein the
requirement "That no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which subject
shall be expressed in the title of the bill" has been considered, the words "and for
other purposes" when found in the title, have been held to be without force or effect
whatsoever and have been altogether discarded in construing the Act.
Upon this point, Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 173 173, states as follows:
One thing, however, is very plain: That the use of the words "other
purposes," which has heretofore been so common in the title to acts, with a
view to cover any and everything whether connect with the main purpose
indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of any avail where these
provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme Court of New York in a case
where these words had been made use of in the title to a local bill: "The
words "for other purposes" must be laid out of consideration. They express
nothing and amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional
requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be
brought in by their aid."
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 122 says:
The phrase "and for other purposes" expresses no specific purpose and
imports indefinitely something different from that which precedes it in the
title. It is, therefore, universally rejected as having no force or effect
wherever this constitutional restriction operates. (Citing numerous cases).
In the case of Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269), an Act was construed by the court
reading: "An Act to provide for the preservation of the Muskegon river
improvements, and for other purposes." Cooley, C. J., who wrote the opinion, said:
The Constitution (of Michigan) provides that no law shall embrace more
than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. We have heretofore
had occasion to consider this section, and have said of it that it ought to be
construed reasonably and not in so narrow and technical a sense as
unnecessarily to embarrass legislation. But the only object mentioned in the
title of this Act is the preservation of the Muskegon River Improvements,
for which purpose the act authorizes tools to be levied and expended.
The payment of Beard's claim is in no way connected with this object and
the title to the act would apprise neither the legislature nor the public that it
covered provisions under which a large sum was to be collected and
disbursed to pay for the original construction of the work. The words "other

purposes" in the title can have no force whatever under the constitutional
provision which has been quoted.
In the case of Board of Education vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232) the title of the Act under
consideration read: "An Act to establish a permanent Board of Education for the City
of Americus and to incorporate the same, and for other purposes." The State
constitution prohibited any law which referred to more than one subject, or contained
matter different from that expressed in the title of the act. The court said:
Does this not close the door to any force and effect being given the words
"for other purposes?" If these words were once necessary to permit the
introduction of matter in the bill, different from what was expressed in the
order portion of the title, would not that every thing show now that the bill
would thereby become obnoxious to the other clause prohibiting more than
one subject matter? The necessity of such words under the provision as it
formerly stood to prevent the bill from containing matter different from the
title could only arise because such matter is something different from what
had already been expressed. It shows that something more than one subjectmatter is intended. If so, although it was allowed under the clause as it was
formerly, it cannot now be done.
Equally may it be said of the Act of the Philippine Legislature here involved, the
addition of the words "and for other purposes," contained in its title, can only be
explained on the theory that something different was to be included therein from that
previously expressed, i. e., "lands of the public domain."
Another case where the same conclusion is forcibly expressed is that of Spier vs.
Baker, (120 Ca., 370). There the court construed an Act reading: "An Act providing
for general primary elections within the State of California and to promote the purity
thereof by regulating the conduct thereof, and to support the privileges of free
suffrage thereat, by prohibiting certain acts and practices in relation thereto, and
providing for the punishment thereof, and for other purposes." the California State
Constitution provides: "Every Act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be
expressed in its title; but, if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not
be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not
be expressed in its title." The court, after citing this constitutional provision, said:
Let us test the title of this act in the crucible furnished by the foregoing
provision of the constitution. The legislature, in framing this title, was
above all things candid. Upon its very face the law-making power
challenged the sound policy of this provision of the constitution, and
avowedly disregarding it, declared that the purpose of the act was the
creation of a primary election law and "other purposes." Under the cloak of
"other purposes," all and every conceivable kind of legislation could hide

13

and thrive in the body of the act, and thus the constitutional provision be set
at naught. In this state, when these words "for other purposes" are found in
the title of an act of the state legislature they accomplish nothing, and in
reading the title our eyes are closed to them. We then have before us, tested
by its title, an act dealing solely with general primary elections, and
providing penalties for violating the law relating thereto. Any matters of
legislation contained in the body of the act not bearing upon primary
elections must go out; the constitutional provision quoted so declares.
Weighing and measuring the legislation found in the act by this test, very
many provisions have no place there. It would seem that the legislature, in
using the words "for other purposes" in the title, used those words
advisedly, and in good faith lived up to them fully. For the legislation found
in section after section of the act can find no justification in its title, save
under these words of boundless meaning, "for other purposes."
The court, after referring to various matters included in the bill but not specified in
the title, said:
Many of these things are totally foreign to any question relating to primary
elections, and others are so remotely connected with that subject as to
clearly come within the prohibition of the constitutional provision. These
matters of legislation, not being embraced within the purview of the
title, are void and fall to the ground.
Applying the doctrine of the above cases to the Act before us for interpretation, its
title must be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and
compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain."
Inasmuch as agricultural lands in the Philippine Islands held in private ownership,
under fee title, constitute no part of "the public domain." they cannot come within the
purview of Act No. 2874 as it is entitled.
The words "public land" are habitually used in our legislation to described such as
are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.
In the case of Wilcox vs. Jackson (13 Peters, 498 [10 L. ed., 264]) the court, in
dealing with the matter of public lands, stated:
Whensoever a tract of land shall have once been legally appropriated to any
purpose, from that moment the land thus appropriated becomes severed
from the mass of public lands; and no subsequent law, or proclamation, or
sale, would be construed to embrace it, or to operate upon it, although no
reservation were made of it.

The above case is quoted and applied in the case of United States vs. Blendoner (122
Feb. Rep., 703, 708). In U. S. vs. Garreston (42 Feb., 22), the court said:
Such lands comprise the general public domain; unappropriated lands; lands
not held back or reserved for any special governmental or public purpose.
In the case of Yakima County vs. Tuller (3 Wash., T., 393), the court said that the term
"public lands" in a grant of public lands for roads, etc., shall be construed to mean
strictly public lands, such as are open to entry and settlement, and not those in which
the rights of the public have passed and which have become subject to some
individual right of a settler.
In the case of Bardon vs. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. (145 U. S., 535), the court said:
. . . It has long been settled . . . that all land to which any claims or rights of
others have attached does not fall within the designation of public lands.
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, in a very elucidated opinion in which
the Attorney-General of the United States agreed, held that "friar lands" purchased
by the Insular Government formed no part of the "public domain" and were not
affected by nor subject to the restrictions of the Act relating to public lands.
Section 2 of the Act before us exempts not only "friar lands" from its operation but
also all lands which have reverted to, or become the property of, the Philippine
Government.
It is clearly evident, therefore, that under no possible construction of the law can the
words "lands of the public domain," used in the title of Act No. 2874, be held to
include, or be authorized to include, lands held in freehold. While this is true
generally, it is peculiarly applicable to lands held and owned under Torrens title as
are the lands of the defendant herein in which all interest of the Government is
expressly eliminated. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496) provides
that such registered title "shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including
the Insular Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it
may concern.' "
The judicial department of the government hesitates to pronounce invalid the Acts of
the legislative department, and will not do so until and unless it is shown that the
same exceed the authority conferred upon said department or contravene some
express or necessarily implied provision of the Organic Law of the state.
(Case vs. Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64;
U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218, 225, 228; Tajanlangit vs. Pearanda, 37 Phil.,
155.)

14

In the interpretation and construction of statutes the court should give them the
meaning and effect which the legislature intended, unless that meaning and effect is
in conflict with the organic law of the land. The question of the validity of the
statutes is first determined by the legislative department of the government, and the
courts will resolved every presumption in its favor. The wisdom or advisability of a
particular statute is within the constitutional powers of the legislature, it will be
sustained, whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the
statute covers a subject not authorized by the fundamental laws of the state, or by the
constitution, then the courts are not only authorized but are justified in pronouncing
the same illegal and void, no matter how wise and beneficent such legislation may
seem to be. The courts are not justified in measuring their opinion with the opinion
of the legislative department of the government, as expressed in statutes, upon the
question of the wisdom, justice and advisability of a particular law. The courts have
no right to dictate what law shall be adopted by the legislative department of the
government, so long as a well defined public policy or an organic act is not violated.
(Case vs.Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil.,
218.)
Our conclusions, therefore, from all of the foregoing are:
1. That it was the purpose and intent of the legislature to comply with the provisions
of the Jones Law and to limit the application of Act No. 2874 to lands of the public
domain;
2. That the phrase "and for other purposes," found in the title of said Act (No. 2874),
by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916
(the Jones Law), cannot be interpreted to include, nor be made applicable to any
lands not public;

6. That whatever right or authority the Government of the Philippine Islands may
have had at any time to assert any right, title, or interest in and to the lands involved
in this proceeding, whether as a part of the "public domain" or otherwise, was
absolutely divested by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496, after
such lands were registered in the court of land registration under the Torrens system.
7. That under said Act (No. 2874) as entitled any provisions or provisions in the body
thereof applicable to lands held under fee title is null and void and of no effect.
8. That inasmuch as said Act (No. 2874) cannot be interpreted to apply to, nor
include, lands held in fee title, the penal provisions thereof cannot be held to apply to
leases, sales, concessions, nor any other transaction by the holders.
9. That by virtue of the provisions of section 127, as well as the general
jurisprudence upon that subject our conclusions herein shall not be held to affect any
of the provisions of said Act No. 2874 except those provisions which relate to private
agricultural lands, or lands held in private ownership, in contradistinction to lands of
the public domain.
Therefore, having demonstrated that said Act No. 2874 does not apply to lands of the
respondent, and there being no objection to the form of the remedy prayed for, the
same is hereby granted, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

3. That eliminating the phrase 'and for other purposes" from the title of said Act, the
same must be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and
compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain;"

Separate Opinions

4. That lands held in freehold or fee title, or private ownership, constitute no part of
the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No.
2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in
nay manner in the title of the Act.

Inasmuch as it does not appear what action or remedy is prayed for and the petition
is only concerned with the interpretation of Act No. 2874, I concur with the
foregoing decision.

TORRES, J., concurring:

Araullo, J., concurs.

5. That it is the uniform holding of the United States Supreme Court, and of other
courts interpreting the phrase "public lands," that once such lands have been "legally
appropriated" by the Government or by individuals, they become segregated from
the mass of public lands, and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued
relating to "public lands" operate upon them.

15

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal
of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.

EN BANC
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS,
NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH
C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T.
DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L.
DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A.
REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO
ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO
BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in
this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17
Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon.
Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with
Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with
"illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the
respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below
an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the
crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under
Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall
resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the
moment.

16

A The Information filed by the People

1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge
Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF
PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN
of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of
Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of
6- inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall
length of 11- inches, which the said accused carried outside of
his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or
implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in
connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the
date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by
Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.CRIM. CASE NO.
29677 VIOL. OF PAR. 3, PD 9 IN REL. TO LOINo. 266 of the
Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a

VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed
and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of
about 8 inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or
implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection
therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the
accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon
involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted
hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus
PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused. CRIM. CASE NO.
933For:ILLEGAL POSSESSION OFDEADLY
WEAPON(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar,
accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD
NO. 9 issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at
Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court,
the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly
weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature
is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to

17

earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a

Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.

and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous
paltik.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)

For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and
wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it
is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who
are inclined to backsliding.

B. The Orders of dismissal

In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the
submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense charged is missing
from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a
bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected
with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or
public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of
bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted
and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically
allege that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the
purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant
criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as
justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not
necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as
it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense
contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under
consideration suffer from this defect.

The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the

heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this
resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the
desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of
L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by
Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order
throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing
premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons
outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable
by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abetssubversion,
insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and
public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously
existing laws that also made the carrying of similar weapons
punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly.
It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain
any repealing clause or provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult
to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court
upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9,
that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so
heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that
could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now
anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object,
available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose,

xxx xxx xxx

The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly
weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any
of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful
and punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the
prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends
in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made

18

unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof,

regardless of the intention of the person carrying such weapon
because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the
prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while
on his way home by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen
knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that
the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in
one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a
severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the
decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be
used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for
use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9
were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that that the
prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the
President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by
some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a
tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx

becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty

imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict
enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the
imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during
martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons
is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as
their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if
necessity would arise specially in going to and from their farm.
(pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment
of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the
accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In all
the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their
immediate release unless held on other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.

It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that

the act which the President intended to make unlawful and
punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by
paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order
dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited
Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be an
allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence
and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a
state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of
wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness
and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of
the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of
lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms,
explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same
would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion

As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal
possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and
NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23,
1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September
21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial
law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General
Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7
dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;

19

WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,

criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid
Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of
firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commanderin-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to
attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081
and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree
that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is
unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or
electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is
attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or
their agents in the performance of their official functions resulting
in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against
persons, property or chastity causing the death of the victim used
in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of
Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:

bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by

percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the compound or
mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly
heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of
producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing
injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall
be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a
Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed
or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo,"
"balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles
are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a
livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any
person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and
3 is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of
committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon
the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty
provided for the particular offenses committed or intended to be
committed.

(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life

imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may
direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;

Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be

imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the
board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or
private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such
firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in
violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.

(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand

grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not
limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire
bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical,
chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible
units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or

President Republic of the Philippines

D. The arguments of the People
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier
joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the
setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced on
the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows
that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act
proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. 1

20

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the
intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the
prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not
only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of
subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate
lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 2
E. Our Ruling on the matter
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires
that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the
designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated
or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a
specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order
of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the
subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act
No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry
concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or
other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction,
be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which
took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than
P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the discretion of
the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would
disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly
weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law
violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and

city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the
circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the
offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city
ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any
repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. 6 This
principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule
are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at
the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city
ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes more
compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential
elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of
oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action a fear
understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial
functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption
as well as in the body of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D.
9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in
question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's
residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool
or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was
either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if
concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above.
In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the
presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or
punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the
act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the
circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and
valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).

21

3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where
a person carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in
the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into
one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is
manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When
ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true
meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes
are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against
the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential
decree in these cases the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent
and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of
this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is
within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9.
These events are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential
decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation
1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well
as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3)
the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and
abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually
introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot
enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed
limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such
explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance
of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts
fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and
spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas"
clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the
makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects

which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."

(West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words
and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may,
when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of
interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or
uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16
N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had
occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration
of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone.
This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or
phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended
and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited application if
read together with other provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or
intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential
decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commanderin-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to
attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081
and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree
that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are
those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer
to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which
refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation
1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted
hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against
our duly constituted government and against our people, and
having committed and are still committing acts of armed

22

insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays,

sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder,
looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and
property, all of which activities have seriously endangered and
continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of
the nation, ...

5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the

consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is
followed.

WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of

anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and
destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between
the forces of our duly constituted government and the New
People's Army and their satellite organizations because of the
unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence,
murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats,
intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and
depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid
lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they
will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless
they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of
forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by
overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See
Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the
Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)

It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the

Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible
abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose
hardship on another, and so on. 10

xxx xxx xxx

It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a
motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of
Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American
Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis
supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to
its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T.
Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis
supplied)

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid

presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and
injurious consequences. 9-a

At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult
to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court
upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9,
that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so
heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that
could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now
anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object,
available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose,
and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous
paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3)
results in absurdity at times. To his example We may add a situation where a lawabiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to
return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away
and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo
being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of
P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such
absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor
of an accused.

23

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of
the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:

Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If
the motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another
information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in
custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such
order is not made or if having been made another information is
not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the
defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is
in custody on some other charge.

Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be
brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor
should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly
so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)

Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint

may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at
any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during
the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the defendant.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not
the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead,
the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
(People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.

xxx xxx xxx

The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the
Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The
sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the
crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations
in these cases, viz:

Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to
quash the complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it
to be unjust, is fatal. 14

First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended
Information to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed
orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed
but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under
Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as
amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the
dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:

In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later
became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed
an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a public offense as
defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15

An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another

prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on
the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this
rule.

G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have
availed itself of other available remedies below.

24

Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is

barred only when the criminal action or liability had been extinguished (Section
2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid.,
[h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the
accused in all these cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter
We need not resolve for the present.

SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting
arm of the government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost
circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case
so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D.
9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This
obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the
offense.

G.R. No. 39085

On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his
letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary,
now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
ANTONIO YABUT, defendant-appellant.

In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so
that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons, specially those
whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities,
may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under
P.D. No. 9. 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of
a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is
within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual
guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation.
We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law,
necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure
an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in
their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders
of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject
however to Our observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision
regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended
Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under
other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.

EN BANC
September 27, 1933

Felipe S. Abeleda for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
convicting the appellant of the crime of murder and assessing the death penalty.
The appellant, Yabut, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the
crime of murder upon the following information:
That on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving
sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city, did then and there, with intent to
kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously, assault, beat and
use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving
sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly
and unexpectedly from behind with a wooden club, without any just cause,
thereby fracturing the skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon him
various other physical injuries on different parts of the body which caused
the death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.

Without costs.

25

That at the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut
was a recidivist, he having previously been convicted twice of the crime of
homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences
rendered by competent tribunals.
Upon arraignment, the accused plead not guilty. The court below made the following
findings of fact which, from an independent examination of the entire testimony, we
are convinced, are supported by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt:
La brigada de presos, conocida como Brigada 8-A Carcel, el 1. de agosto
de 1932, estaba compuesta de unos 150 o mas penados, de largas condenas,
al mando del preso Jose Villafuerte, como Chief Squad Leader, y del preso
Vicente santos, como su auxiliar. forman parte de esta brigada el occiso
Sabas Aseo, o Asayo, el acusado Antonio Yabut y los presos llamados
Apolonio Saulo, Isaias Carreon, Melecio Castro, Mateo Bailon y los moros
Taladie y Hasan.
Entre siete y media y ocho de la noche de la fecha de autos, estando ya
cerrado el pabellon de la brigada, pues se aproximaba la hora del descanso y
silencio dentro de la prision, mientras el jefe bastonero Villafuerte se
hallaba sentado sobre su mesa dentro de la brigada, vio al preso Carreon
cerca de el, y en aquel instante el acusado Yabut, dirigiendose a Carreon, le
dijo que, si no cobrada a uno que la debia, el (Yabut) le abofetearia. El jefe
bastonero Villafuerte trato de imponer silencio y dijo a los que hablaban que
se apaciguaran; pero, entre tanto, el preso Carreon se encaro con el otro
preso Saulo cobrandole dos cajetillas de cigarillos de diez centimos cada
una que le debia. Saulo contesto que ya le pagaria, pero Carreon, por toda
contestacion, pego en la cara a saulo y este quedo desvanecido. En vista de
esto, el jefe bastonero se dirigio a su cama para sacar la porra que estaba
autorizado a llevar. Simultaneamente Villafuerte vio que el preso Yabut
pegaba con un palo (Exhibit C) al otro preso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo,
primeramente en la nuca y despues en la cabeza, mientras estaba de
espaldas el agregido Sabas, quien, al recibir el golpe en la nuca, se inclino
hacia delante, como si se agachara, y en ese momento el acusado Yabut dio
un paso hacia delante y con el palo de madera que portaba dio otro golpe en
la cabeza a Sabas Aseo, quien cayo al suelo.
El jefe bastonero Villafuerte se acerco al agresor Yabut para desarmarle,
pero este le dijo: "No te acerques; de otro modo, moriras." No obstante la
actitud amenazadora de Yabut, Villafuerte se acerco y Yabut quiso darle un
golpe que iba dirigido a la cabeza, pero Villafuerte lo pudo desviar pcon la
porra que Ilevaba. Los dos lucharon y Ilegaron a abrazarse hasta que se le
deslizo a Villafuerte la porra que llevaba. Continuaron luchando ambos y el
acusado Yabut llego a soltar el palo Exhibit C con que acometia a

Villafuerte y habia malherido al preso Sabas Aseo. Despues de aquello,

Yabut consiguio zafarse de Villafuerte y se dirigio al otro extremo de la
brigada, escondiendose dentro del bao y alli fue cogido inmediatamente
despues del suceso por el preso Proceso Carangdang, que desempenaba el
cargo de sargento de los policias de la prision.
We reject, as unworthy of belief, the testimony of Yabut that it was Villafuerte, not
he, who gave the fatal blow to the deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago
Estrada, resident physician of the Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the
Medico Legal Department of the University of the Philippines, clearly establish that
the death of Aseo was caused by subdural and cerebral hemorrhages following the
fracture of the skull resulting from the blow on the head of Aseo. They further
confirm the testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from
behind.
On appeal to this court, the appellant advances the following assignments of error:
1. The lower court erred in applying article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence of the defense are
contradictory and not corroborated.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the crime of murder was established
by appreciating the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
4. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of
murder beyond reasonable doubt.
In connection with the first assignment of error, we quote article 160 of the Revised
Penal Code, in the Spanish text, which is decisive:
Comision de un nuevo delito durante el tiempo de la condena por otro
anterior Pena. Los que comentieren algun delito despues de haber
sino condenados por sentencia firme no empezada a cumpir, o durante el
tiempo de su condena, seran castigados con la pena sealada por la ley para
el nuevo delito, en su grado maximo, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la
regla 5.a del articulo 62.
El penado conprendidoen este articulo se no fuere un delincuente habitual
sera indultado a los setenta aos, si hubiere ya cumplido la condena
primitiva, o cuando llegare a cumplirla despues de la edad sobredicha, a no
ser que por su conducta a por otras circunstancias no fuere digno de la
gracia.

26

The English translation of article 160 is as follows:

Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another
previous offense Penalty. Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article
62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by
final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving
the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual
criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have
already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after
reaching said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he
shall not be worthy of such clemency.

The remaining assignments of error relate to the evidence. We have come to the
conclusion, after a thorough examination of the record, that the findings of the court
below are amply sustained by the evidence, except upon the fact of the existence of
treachery (alevosia). As some members of the court entertain a reasonable doubt that
the existence of treachery (alevosia) was established, it results that the penalty
assessed by the court below must be modified. We find the defendant guilty of
homicide and, applying article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with
article 160 of the same, we sentence the defendant- appellant to the maximum degree
of reclusion temporal, that is to say, to twenty years of confinement and to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Sabas Aseo (alias Sabas Asayo), in the sum of P1,000.
Costs de oficio.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and
Imperial, JJ., concur.

The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English
translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his deduction
from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new crime which is
committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which
he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as the appellant was serving sentence for the crime
of homicide, the appellant contends the court below erred in applying article 160 in
the present case which was a prosecution for murder (involving homicide). While we
do not concede that the appellant is warranted in drawing the deduction mentioned
from the English translation of the caption of article 160, it is clear that no such
deduction could be drawn from the caption. Apart from this, however, there is no
warrant whatever for such a deduction (and we do not understand the appellant to
assert it) from the text itself of article 160. The language is plain and unambiguous.
There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies
only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the former offense
for which the defendant is serving the penalty.
It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or
headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text, especially where such
epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating
the general nature of the text that follows. (Cf. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156,
166.) A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal
that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than
catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each
article. Being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the articles of
the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the
unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to
create doubt.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8848

November 21, 1913

27

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appllee,

vs.
WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and SERVILIANO
NATIVIDAD, defendants-appellants.
Pedro Abad Santos, for appellants Hart and Natividad.
W. H. Booram, for appellant Miller.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. 519,
found guilty, and were each sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Hart and Miller
were further sentenced to a fine of P200, and Natividad to a fine of P100. All
appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that he pleaded
guilty and was convicted on a gambling charge about two or three weeks before his
arrest on the vagrancy charge; that he had been conducting two gambling games, one
in his saloon and the other in another house, for a considerable length of time, the
games running every night. The defense showed that Hart and one Dunn operated a
hotel and saloon at Angeles which did a business, according to the bookkeeper, of
P96,000 during the nineteen months preceding the trial; that Hart was also the sole
proprietor of a saloon in the barrio of Tacondo; that he raised imported hogs which
he sold to the Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg, which business netted him during
the preceding year about P4,000; that he was authorized to sell several hundred
hectares of land owned by one Carrillo in Tacondo; that he administered, under
power of attorney, the same property; and that he furnished a building for and paid
the teacher of the first public school in Tacondo, said school being under
Government supervision.
The evidence of the prosecution as to Miller was that he had the reputation of being a
gambler; that he pleaded guilty and was fined for participating in a gambling game
about two weeks before his arrest on the present charge of vagrancy; and that he was
seen in houses of prostitution and in a public dance hall in Tacondo on various
occasions. The defense showed without contradiction that Miller had been
discharged from the Army about a year previously; that during his term of enlistment
he had been made a sergeant; that he received rating as "excellent" on being
discharged; that since his discharge he had been engaged in the tailoring business
near Camp Stotsenberg under articles of partnership with one Burckerd, Miller
having contributed P1,000 to the partnership; that the business netted each partner

about P300 per month; that Miller attended to business in an efficient manner every
day; and that his work was first class.
The evidence of the prosecution as to Natividad was that he had gambled nearly
every night for a considerable time prior to his arrest on the charge of vagrancy, in
the saloon of one Raymundo, as well as in Hart's saloon; that Natividad sometimes
acted as banker; and that he had pleaded guilty to a charge of gambling and had been
sentenced to pay a fine therefor about two weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy
charge. The defense showed that Natividad was a tailor, married, and had a house of
his own; that he made good clothes, and earned from P80 to P100 per month, which
was sufficient to support his family.
From this evidence it will be noted that each of the defendants was earning a living
at a lawful trade or business, quite sufficient to support himself in comfort, and that
the evidence which the prosecution must rely upon for a conviction consists of their
having spent their evenings in regularly licensed saloons, participating in gambling
games which are expressly made unlawful by the Gambling Act, No. 1757, and that
Miller frequented a dance hall and houses of prostitution.
Section 1 of Act No. 519 is divided into seven clauses, separated by semicolons.
Each clause enumerates a certain class of persons who, within the meaning of this
statute, are to be considered as vagrants. For the purposes of this discussion, we
quote this section below, and number each of these seven clauses.
(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the
physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to
some lawful calling; (2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram
shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country
without visible means of support; (3) every person known to be a
pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or by his
having been convicted of either of said offenses, and having no visible or
lawful means of support when found loitering about any gambling house,
cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute
person or associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about the
country at unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle peron who lodges in
any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than such as is kept for
lodging purposes, without the permission of the owner or person entitled to
the possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute person who lives in and
about houses of ill fame; (7) every common prostitute and common
drunkard, is a vagrant.
It is insisted by the Attorney-General that as visible means of support would not be a
bar to a conviction under any one of the last four clauses of this act, it was not the
intention of the Legislature to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no visible

28

means of support. Relying upon the second clause to sustain the guilt of the
defendants, the Attorney-General then proceeds to argue that "visible means of
support" as used in that clause does not apply to "every person found loitering about
saloons or dram shops or gambling houses," but is confined entirely to "or tramping
or straying through the country." It is insisted that had it been intended for "without
visible means of support" to qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma
after gambling houses would have been ommitted, or else a comma
after country would have been inserted.
When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the
courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
construction of the statute which will give it effect. The construction finally adopted
should be based upon something more substantial than the mere punctuation found in
the printed Act. If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an
additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as
thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive,
and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give to
the Act the effect intended by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect
punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.
The Attorney-General has based his argument upon the proposition that neither
visible means of support nor a lawful calling is a sufficient defense under the last
four paragraphs of the section; hence, not being universally a defense to a charge of
vagrancy, they should not be allowed except where the Legislature has so provided.
He then proceeds to show, by a "mere grammatical criticism" of the second
paragraph, that the Legislature did not intend to allow visible means of support or a
lawful calling to block a prosecution for vagrancy founded on the charge that the
defendant was found loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses.
A most important step in reasoning, necessary to make it sound, is to ascertain the
consequences flowing from such a construction of the law. What is loitering? The
dictionaries say it is idling or wasting one's time. The time spent in saloons, dram
shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything but that. So that under the proposed
construction, practically all who frequent such places commit a crime in so doing, for
which they are liable to punishment under the Vagrancy Law. We cannot believe that
it was the intention of the Legislature to penalize what, in the case of saloons and
dram shops, is under the law's protection. If it be urged that what is true of saloons
and dram shops is not true of gambling houses in this respect, we encounter the
wording of the law, which makes no distinction whatever between loitering around
saloons and dram shops, and loitering around gambling houses.
The offense of vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of
dealing with the habitually idle and harmful parasites of society. While the statutes of

the various States of the American Union differ greatly as to the classification of
such persons, their scope is substantially the same. Of those statutes we have had an
opportunity to examine, but two or three contain a provision similar to the second
paragraph of Act No. 519. (Mo. Ann. Stat., sec. 2228; N. D. Rev. Codes, sec. 8952;
N. M. Comp. Laws 1897, sec. 1314.) That the absence of visible means of support or
a lawful calling is necessary under these statutes to a conviction for loitering around
saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not even negatived by the punctuation
employed. In the State of Tennessee, however, we find an exact counterpart for
paragraph 2 of section 1 of our own Act (Code of Tenn., sec. 3023), with the same
punctuation:lawph!1.net
. . . or of any person to be found loitering about saloons or dram shops,
gambling houses, or houses of ill fame, or tramping or strolling through the
country without any visible means of support.
A further thought suggest itself in connection with the punctuation of the paragraph
in question. The section, as stated above, is divided into seven clauses, separated by
semicolons. To say that two classes of vagrants are defined in paragraph 2, as to one
of which visible means of support or a lawful calling is not a good defense, and as to
the other of which such a defense is sufficient, would imply a lack of logical
classification on the part of the legislature of the various classes of vagrants. This we
are not inclined to do.
In the case at bar, all three of the defendants were earning a living by legitimate
methods in a degree of comfort higher that the average. Their sole offense was
gambling, which the legislature deemed advisable to make the subject of a penal law.
The games in which they participated were apparently played openly, in a licensed
public saloon, where the officers of the law could have entered as easily as did the
patrons. It is believed that Act No. 1775 is adequate, if enforced, to supress the
gambling proclivities of any person making a good living at a lawful trade or
business.
For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted, with the costs de oficio.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.
Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur in the result.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-21734, September 05, 1975

29

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

ABELARDO SUBIDO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

WHEREFORE, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is

hereby affirmed at appellant's costs."

DECISION

In due time the case was remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment.

MARTIN, J.:
Appeal on questions of law from the Orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila
in Criminal Case No. 23041. entitled People of the Philippines versus Abelardo
Subido, denying defendant-appellant's motion for the cancellation of his appeal bond
and declaring him to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine
and indemnity.

On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion with the trial court
praying that (1) the court enter of record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals
has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-appellant
argued that although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity prescribed in the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could not be required to serve the amount of
fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said Judgment
did not expressly and specifically provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity
in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

From an adverse decision in said case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libe! and he is
hereby sentenced to three (3) months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties
of the law. to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended
party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum often thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs."
defendant-appellant Abelardo Subido has taken an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
which modified the said judgment in the following tenor:
"However, in the application of the penalty provided for the violation of the libel law,
the courts are given discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment are to
be imposed upon the offender. In the instant case, we believe, considering the
attendant circumstances of the case, that the imposition of the corresponding penalty
should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this reason we impose upon
accused-appellant a fine of P500.00.
Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by appellant to the offended party
is reduced to P5,000.00.

On December 20, 1958, upon motion of the offended party the lowercourt issued a
writ of execution of its judgment. However the writ was returned unsatisfied.
On February 25,1959, the Sheriff of the City of Manila armed with an alias writ of
execution, attached "whatever rights, interests, or participation, if any, defendant
Abelardo Subido may have" in a two-storey building situated at No. 2313 Suter, Sta.
Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54170 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. However, it turned out that the property levied upon by the sheriff
was registered in the name of Agapito Subido who, upon learning of the levy,
immediately filed a Third party claim with the sheriffs office and instituted an action
in the lower court (Civil Case No. 41 73 I) to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila from
proceeding with the sale of his property. In the meantime the lower court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the sale of property levied upon by the
sheriff.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its opposition to accusedappellant's motion for cancellation of appeal bond and asked the lower court to
require accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity of P5,000 00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On December 19, 1959, the lower court issued an order denying the accused-

30

appellant's motion and declared that in accordance with the terms of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case he could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision. Accusedappellant moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied on December 26,

mayor; a fine of P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the sum of

P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of the
costs. On the other hand the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its discretion decided
to eliminate the penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the

1959.

indemnity of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.

Hence this appeal from the lower court's orders of December 19 and 26.

Thus the Court of Appeals resolved:

In his appeal, accused-appellant presses that the lower court erred.

"However in the application of the penalty provided for in the violation of the libel
law, the courts are given discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment are
to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant case we believe considering the
attendant circumstances of the same, that the imposition of the corresponding penalty
should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this reason imposed the accused a
fine of P500.00.

"IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE DECISION OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE TO SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY."

Similarly, the amount of the indemnify to be paid by appellant to the offended party
is reduced to P500.00.

II
WHEREUPON with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is
hereby affirmed at appellant's costs."
"IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
HAS BEEN SATISFIED WITH THE ATTACHMENT SECURED BY THE
OFFENDED PARTY."[1]
The threshold issue in this appeal is whether or not the accused-appellant can be
required to serve the fine and indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Under Article 355
of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means, of writing, printing,
litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correctional in its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to 600
pesos or both in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended
party." It is evident from the foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion
to impose the penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be
noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused: three months of arresto

To Us it is clear that when the Court of Appeals provided in the concluding portion
of its decision:
"WHEREUPON with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is
hereby affirmed at appellant's costs."
the alluded modifications could mean no less than the elimination of the three
months of arresto mayor and the reduction of the indemnity to the offended party,
Mayor Arsenio Lacson from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. All the rest of the punishment
remains including the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Had the Court
wanted to do away with the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency of
accused-appellant to pay the fine and the indemnity it would have so expressly
provided.

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A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial Court reveals that the clause "with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" is separated by a comma (,) from the
preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months of arresto mayor with the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to
indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to
make "the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to nonpayment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.
If the lower court intended to make the phrase "with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency" refer to non-payment of indemnity only and not to the non-payment
of the fine, it would have omitted the comma (,), after the phrase "to indemnify the
offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the amount of P10,000.00 pesos," so that
the decision of the lower court would read:
"From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libel and he is
hereby sentenced to three (3) months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of five hundred
(P500.00) pesos, to indemnify offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum
often thousand (P10,000.00) pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs."
As thus worded and punctuated there would he no doubt that the lower court would
want to make accused-appellant serve the subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment of the indemnity only.
Besides, We see no plausible reason why the lower court would want accusedappellant to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the
indemnity only and not to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of
the fine. Accordingly if according to the lower court's decision, the accused-appellant
should suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine and the
indemnity and the only modifications made by the Court of Appeals are to eliminate
the three (3) months of arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity to the offended
party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00, then by force of logic
and reason, the fine of P500.00, the reduced indemnity of P5,000.00 and the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency should stand.

Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article

39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts
an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his
civil liability.[2]
It is a well known rule of l\\\\\\\\\\\\\\egal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be
strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. [3] In
the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny, and to
construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant.4
Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is favorable to
the accused-appellant, the same should be made applicable to him. It is so provided
in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:
"Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of
a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence."
Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to the accusedappellant, he cannot also be required to serve his civil liability to the offended party
in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is no longer
required by the aforesaid article.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be made to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment because his civil liability has been satisfied with the attachment
secured by the offended party on the property of Agapito Subido, wherein he is
supposed to have an interest. He therefore argues that until the final determinations
of Civil Case No. 7173 1 which Agapito Subido filed to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila
from proceeding with the sale of his property, accused-appellant's liability for
subsidiary imprisonment cannot attach as the determination of whether the accused is
solvent or not is a prejudicial question which must first be determined before
subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed.
We cannot agree. Attachment does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment on

32

civil liability and the accused must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof. Subsidiary imprisonment applies when the offender is insolvent as
shown in the present case. There is nothing in the law that before subsidiary
imprisonment may attach, there must be prior determination of the question of
solvency of the accused. The moment he cannot pay the fine, that means he is
insolvent and he must serve the same in form of subsidiary imprisonment. So
accused-appellant has to choose to pay the fine or serve in jail.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING except with the modification that accusedappellant may no longer be required to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay the indemnity provided for in the judgment below, the Orders of
the lower court dated December 19 and 26, 1959 denying defendant-appellant's
motion for cancellation of appeal bond and sentencing him to suffer the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed by said judgment, are
hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra, and Moz Palma, JJ., concur.

33