Title of the Case: Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.

203335, February
11, 2014
Nature: a
Abad, J.
Keywords:Cybercrime law
Summary:Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act
(R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Facts: Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional
rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably
put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
attacks on the system.
Issue:
Ratio:
Ruling:
Justice Abad delivered the Courts opinion.
The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for
the purpose of regulating access to and use of cyberspace. Several sections of the
law define relevant cyber crimes and enable the government to track down and
penalize violators.
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of
the Act as unconstitutional.
Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic
communications, commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer
for sale of products and services unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or
when the purpose of the communication is for service or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, or when the following
conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a
simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further
commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The
commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic communication does not

purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in order to

induce the recipients to read the message.
The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to
both nuisance and trespass because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of
using online services and that they enter the recipients domain without prior
permission.
The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which does
not receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms
of expression ,but is nonetheless entitled to protection. It ruled that the
prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.
Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant to
collect or record traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system. Traffic data under this Section
includes the origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the
communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.
The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their civil liberties
and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the government. They also claimed
that this provision violates the right to privacy and protection from the
governments intrusion into online communications.
According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private
communications, it must survive the rational basis standard of whether it is
narrowly tailored towards serving a governments compelling interest. The Court
found that the government did have a compelling interest in preventing cyber
crimes by monitoring real-time traffic data.
As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized
that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as the right not to
have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance
and intrusion. In determining whether a communication is entitled to the right of
privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right
has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication, and (2) whether
his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society.
The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of
privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not find the
expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet

does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the
sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not
enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data
may reveal the personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the
Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in fishing expedition,
choosing whatever specified communication they want.
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness
as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a
computer data found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this
section also violated the right to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property,
entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the
Philippines Constitution requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant
when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a form of expression.
Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it
unconstitutional.

Doctrine: