The Transportation of

Liquefied Gas
An Overview of Some
Methods Used for Mitigating
the Risks
Marc Hopkins & Ann Hayward Walker

MEMAC Focus

Regional co-operation in protecting the

marine environment from pollution
Combating pollution by oil and other
hazardous substances in emergency
situations
Concern rapid increase of marine
transportation of liquefied petroleum gas

This Presentation
Describes potential hazards of LNG
and LPG
Summarizes various techniques to
minimize their risks

On the Vessels
At Terminals and Jetties
Combined Operating Practices and
Procedures
Contingency Planning

Liquefied Gases in the

Middle East

Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)

Long history in the Gulf over last 30 years

24 million tonnes exported in 1999
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and UAE

Liquefied natural gas (LNG)

Past - only Abu Dhabi for over 25 years

Until recently 2.5 million tonnes a year.
Now approx. 20 million tonnes a year
UAE, plus new producers in Qatar and Oman
World wide demand to double in the next decade.
Much of demand to be met from the Middle East

History and Safety Record

Marine Transportation

LPG started before WW2

Pressurised containment in small quantities

LNG started in 1959

Converted cargo ship - 5000m3
Slowly ships became larger

Present day ~ 1060 gas carriers

~200 greater than 60,000m3

LPG fully refrigerated - up to 100,000m3
LNG fully refrigerated - up to 138,000m3

Future
LNG to increase rapidly from 113 to over 200 in
next 10 years

SIGTTO,
WITH
The Safety Record
To
date
exemplary
ITSNoINDUSTRY
loss of containment
MEMBERS,
ISover
No
loss of a liquid gas carrier
5,000 cubic metres
WORKING
TO of
This
despite a limited number
incidents
KEEP IT THAT
WAY!!

What are Liquefied Gases?

Defined in International Gas Carrier Codes
published by International Maritime
Organization
Products having a vapour pressure exceeding
2.8 bar absolute at a temperature of 37.8 C
and other products shown in Chapter 19 of
the Code, when carried in bulk.

(A gas at atmospheric pressure and ambient

temperature)

Properties of LNG

Petroleum hydrocarbon (C1)

Flammable gas
Flammable limits in air: 5.3% - 14.0%
Floats and boils on water
Flammable, visible vapour cloud

Vapour approximately 600 times

volume of liquid
Aquatic & wildlife toxicity, food chain
concentration potential none

Properties of LPG

Petroleum hydrocarbon (C3+C4)

Flammable gas

Propane flammable limits in air: 2.2% - 9.5%

Butane flammable limits in air: 1.8% - 8.4%
Floats and boils on water
Flammable, visible vapour cloud

Vapour approximately 250 times volume of

liquid
Aquatic & wildlife toxicity, food chain
concentration potential none

Major Hazards of Liquefied

Gases

The major hazard of liquefied gases is

not in liquefied form - it is the vapour
from a release
The associated heat from an a vapour
cloud that is subsequently ignited
This could be remote from the point of
liquid release
Detonation of a vapour cloud of LPG (has
been simulated).

Detonation of LNG cloud has not been found

to be possible

Hazards to the Marine

Environment

Not a water pollutant neither toxic nor

persistent
Explosion hazard

Acutely lethal effects to marine organisms in

the vicinity of underwater explosion

Less of a widespread, persistent, chronic

environmental hazard than a crude oil
spill
Contact with cold liquid will damage
tissues, especially with LNG

MOMSI

Other Hazards of LPG and

LNG
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Vapour Cloud
Explosion) occurs when pressurised
LPG containment becomes over
pressured and fails catastrophically
RPT (Rapid Phase Transition) can
only occur with LNG when correct
mixing with Water

Differences LPG and LNG

Vapour

LPG

vapour cloud is heavier than air, cloud

dispersion is at low level and LFL and
UFL is reached slowly

LNG
vapour becomes rapidly (over -100
deg. C) lighter than air, increasing
cloud dispersion and thus LFL and UFL
is reached quickly

LNG/LPG Accidental
Release Behavior

When liquefied gas is released it vaporizes,

begin warmed by mixing with diluting air,
cooling the surrounding air
Some distance before diluted below the flammable
limits
Spreads rapidly until vaporization is complete
Vapour cloud, of LNG, is generally visible due to air
temperature being lowered below ambient dew
point.

On Land vaporization initially rapid until the

ground cools; can take hours to evaporate
On Water generally rapid throughout as
water transmits heat.

Mitigation of Risk - Vessel

Techniques
Legislative in nature (IMO)
SOLAS

Basic construction of all shipping,

Gas Codes Specific construction
Equipment
Operations

MARPOL

Mitigation of Risk - Vessel

Techniques

Surveys
Ships surveyed regularly
Against SOLAS & MARPOL
Classification Society Rules
Port State Control

Audit / Inspection by Charterers

and Industry

Mitigation of Risk - Vessel

Techniques

Training (Legislative)

The Standards of Training and

Watchkeeping Convention (STCW95)
Legislative as a minimum requirement for
all seafarers
Specific training requirements for seafarers
serving on gas carriers

Training (non Legislative)

Simulator (On ship or ashore)
Enhanced training specific to vessel

Mitigation of Risk - Vessel

Techniques

Human error(Legislative)

The International Safety Management

(ISM) Code
Introduced for several classes of ship
(including gas carriers - in 1998)
A Quality Management system.

Human Error (non Legislative)

ISM as a minimum ISO 9002 ahead of ISM and improving
their operations by increasing the
scope

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties
No international regulations or
legislation
Some National legislation

NFPA (USA)
Health and Safety Executive(UK)
Japanese Safety Bureau (Japan)
etc.

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

International Recommendations
SIGTTO
PIANC
OCIMF
IAPH
BSI
IMO
etc.

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

Siting and Design Considerations

Basics site selections
Control of traffic near port
Weather conditions
Safe mooring
Secondary mitigation measures
safe distances
Terminal staff training

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

Site Selection
Prime method of risk reduction
LNG controlled by
Gas Fields
Users (Power stations or industry)

LPG controlled by
Refineries
Users (Industry - bottling plant etc.)

Sheltered - deep water

Surrounding Industry & Population

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

Control of traffic
Most accidents happen in or around
port areas or restricted waters
Safe transit to and from the berth
Complete passage has to be planned
and the risk of collision minimised
Use of VTS encouraged
Collision impacts to be taken into
account
Escort tugs / guard boats

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

Weather conditions
Maximum weather conditions for
specific berths and ships must be
Established
Strictly adhered to.

These may vary if circumstances are

not fully as planned

E.G. (Mooring equipment not ideally

suited).

Tug capability is very important

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

Safe Mooring
Prime defense against a liquid spill
during transfer.
Must limit the movement of a vessel
within the design of the transfer arms
Berth must be designed for the size of
ship
Mooring points must be adequately
strong and well positioned
Fenders must ensure that vessel is held
securely

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

Secondary Mitigation Measures

Inter-linked Emergency Shut Down
(ESD) system
ESD 1

stops transfer operation when initiated

from ship or shore

ESD 2

disconnects hard arms by

Closing valves in arm (limits liquid spill to 5
litres)
powering the coupling apart

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

Safe Distances
A very common question

What is the safe distance???

Very difficult to define as the

risks vary from one jetty or
terminal to another.
If an absolutely safe distance
cannot be established other
mitigating steps have to be
considered.

Mitigation Techniques for

Terminals and Jetties

Staff Training
No National or International
Regulations

Training of Terminal Staff involved

with Loading and Discharging
Liquefied Gas Carriers - produced by
SIGTTO

Training scheme based on

document has National recognition
More advanced publication by OCIMF
recently

More Techniques Operating Practices and

Procedures

Risks to gas transportation

constantly changing
Regular review of operating
procedures and practices
New publication on best practices

Safety in Liquefied Gas Marine

Transportation and Terminal
Operations A Guide for SelfAssessment

Contingency Planning
How to minimize risks once an
accident occurs
Increasing response preparedness
Ongoing PROCESS

Develop contingency plans

Train responding personnel
Exercise the plan
Identify lesson learned
Implement lessons learned

Types of Exercises
Facility
Vessel
Pipeline
Area
Government-led
Industry-led

Forms of Exercises

Internal

Notification
Emergency
procedures
Response
management team
Equipment
deployment

Table Top

External
Area exercises
(either industry or
government led)
Government
unannounced
exercises

Field

Exercise Components

Organization
Notifications
Staff mobilization
Management system

Operational Response

Source control
Assessment
Containment/recovery
Protection of sensitive
areas
Disposal

Response Support

Communications
Transportation
Personnel support
Equipment
maintenance and
support
Procurement
Documentation

Sample Exercise Objectives

Exercise the response management team in a

review of:

Knowledge of contingency plan

Proper notifications
Communications system
Ability to access response resources
Internal organization coordination
Transition to more significant levels of response
Ability to access sensitive area information, etc.

Critical Success Factors

Set of things that must go right if an

operation is to succeed
Emergency response operations must minimize
release
Immediate response must mobilize enough
appropriate resources
Organization must be able to communicate and
manage information internally and externally
Response organization must be cohesive, preplan roles/functions, and account for
stakeholder interests
Response organization must be able to sustain
operations
Response organization must be able to meet
realistic and achievable expectations

Incident Command System

(ICS)

FIRESCOPE (Evolved during early 70s)

Firefighting Resources of California Organized
for Potential Emergencies

Evolved to aid in the management of wild

land fires
Local, state and federal agencies involved
As more agencies became involved, the
system needed more flexibility
FIRESCOPE ICS became the National
Interagency Incident Mgmt System
(NIIMS) in 1980

All-Risk / All-Hazard
Management System
Fully developed management
system
New training curriculum developed
in 1994 to make system functional
in all types of incidents
NIIMS ICS consists of:

Training Curriculum
Forms catalogue
Steering Group and Field Operations
Guide (FOG)

ICS Use

US Coast Guard
New York State
Emer. Mgmt.
Office
Fire Departments
everywhere

Industry

Con Edison
ExxonMobil
ChevronPhillips

Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency
Others

Aircraft recovery:
TWA 800 and JFK Jr.
Jr

Principle Features of ICS

Primary Functions
Management by Objectives
Unity and Chain of Command
Transfer/establish Command
Organizational Flexibility
The Incident Action Plan

Principle Features of ICS

(cont.)

Span of Control
Common Terminology
Personnel Accountability
Integrated Communications
Resources Management
Unified Command

Basic ICS Structure and

Management Functions
Incident Commander

Command Staff
(Safety, Information, Liaison)

Operations

Planning

Logistics

Finance
and
Administration

Functional Responsibilities
Function

Responsibility
Responsibilit

Command

= Overall responsibility

Operations

= Direct tactical action

Planning

= Prepare (IAP) - maintain

resource & situation status

Logistics

= Provide support

Finance/
Administration

Cost accounting &

procurements

Incident Management by
Objectives

4 Perform tactical direction

3 Select appropriate strategy
2 Establish incident objectives
1 Understand agency policy and direction

Unity and Chain of

Command
Unity of Command - Have a clear line of supervision

Chain of Command - Orderly ranking of management

positions in line of authority

Possible Organizational
Structures
Large Incident
Command

Small Incident
Organization

Organization

Sections

Command

Branches

Single
Single
Resource Resource

Divisions/Groups
Resources

Multiple layers are added

as needed for span of control

ICS Organization Flexibility

IC

PSC
RES

TIME

F/F
SIT
1

Functions will determine the

Required organization

COM

Incident Action Plan

Always required can be oral or written
Incident

objective(s)
Strategy (one or more)
Tactics
Assignments

Written Incident Action Plans

are Usually Required When:

Two or more
operating
organizations
Incident goes
beyond one
operational
period

Incident response
organization
expands
Government
dictates

Span of Control
Commanding Officer

Commanding Officer

Type name here Type name here

Type title here Type title here

Ineffective

Effective

In ICS, Common
Terminology is applied to:
Organizational Elements
Position Titles
Resources
Facilities

Best Response
A response organization will
effectively, efficiently, and safely
response to a hazardous material
release and will be perceived as a
success
Exxon Valdez did not achieve best
response under this definition

The Goal of Best

Response. . .

Consequence Management
! Minimize

...

! the

! Maximize

Adverse Impacts of
! the Incident
! - and -

...

! Public

Confidence
&
Stakeholder Satisfaction

A Model for Response

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p
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Pe

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Company

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nvi

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e
m

Contractor

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m
no

Ec

Governmt

- a Collaborative Partnership -

What We
Care About

Components
of Response

The Goals . . .

that drive response decisions

Minimize Adverse Impacts:
- Human Health
- Environmental
- Economic

Operations

Maximize Confidence &

Satisfaction:
Satisfaction
- Public
- Stakeholder

Public
Information

Stakeholder
Service &
Support

Organizational Effectiveness through ICS

Media and Community

Relations

The entire LNG industry could be

affected by an incident
LNG project ownership is complex

Several shareholders
Different cultures
Geographically dispersed

Consistent approach to media

Pre-prepared and agreed statements
Quick and accurate response to media

Media and Community

Relations

Issue effective risk communication

messages early to the community

Summary
Liquefied gas is similar to crude oil with
regard to jetty deign and other siting
considerations
BUT they are different in their
PROPERTIES

Invisible, flammable gas; can be toxic =

liquefied gases
Visible, flammable, toxic liquid = crude oil

Summary

AND they are different in the type of

HAZARDS
People and property = liquefied gases
Environmental = crude oil

In spite of the strong industry safety

record, rapid phase transition remains a
major concern for LNG

Summary

Primary techniques to prevent serious

accident
Eliminate human error
Location of facilities

Secondary techniques
Contingency planning
Effective media and community relations

The Transportation of
Liquefied Gas
An Overview of Some
Methods Used for Mitigating
the Risks
Marc Hopkins & Ann Hayward Walker