DUE PROCESS OF LAW- Reasonableness Test

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov

1978] En Banc, Fernandez (J)
Facts:
On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it
unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be
employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind
of trade, business or occupation within the City of Manila without
first securing an employment permit from the mayor of Manila; and
for other purposes) was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila
and signed by Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968.
The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in the
City of Manila without the requisite mayors permit; but excepting
persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign
countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the
Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious
orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid
monetarily or in kind. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is
imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or both. On 4
May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila,
filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil
Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the implementation of the
ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare the ordinance null and void.
On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued
the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17 September 1968, the
Judge rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void,
and the preliminary injunction is made permanent. Mayor Villegas
filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI.
Issue:
Whether the Ordinance is REASONABLE.
Held:
The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being
applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life,
liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person,
before he can be employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of
Manila, who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to

denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to

engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the
due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted powers. The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise
money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens
who have been cleared for employment.
The amount is
unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider differences
in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual,
permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.

Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7

March 1919]
Facts:
On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted
Resolution 25 creating a reservation / permanent settlement for
Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only
solicit homesteads on the reservation provided that said
homestead applications be previously recommended by the
provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the Secretary of Interior
approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the provincial
governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all
Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and
the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts
of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation
on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December
1917, and penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply with the
order with imprisonment of not exceeding 60 days, in accordance
with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rubi and
those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within
the reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with
section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos,
was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of
Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the
reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro
applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes
are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials
of that province.
Issue:
Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the
Manguianes liberty, either on their
confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due to violation
of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.
Held:

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law. The meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under
the protection of the general rules which govern society." To
constitute "due process of law," a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not
requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to
the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and blind
sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised
in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the
public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty
and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Due process of
law" means simply that "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in
harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of
the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its
operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies
with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation. The pledge
that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is
not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The
classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely
arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that the liberty of the
citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that
due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
There exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section
2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes are not unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.

Dispositive:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared the
Administrative Order null and void.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
(a) Whether the implementation of A.O. No. 308 insidiously
lays the groundwork for a system which will violate the bill
of rights enshrined in the Constitution.
(b) Whether the establishment of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System requires a Legislative Act.
The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines is, therefore, an unconstitutional
usurpation of the Legislative Powers of the Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines.

DUE PROCESS-RIGHT TO PRIVACY

GR. No. 127685
| July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, et al, respondents
Facts
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two,
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone
of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general

circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are
charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April
8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
its implementation.

SUPREME COURT RULING

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.
RATIO:
Right to Privacy
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has
always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast,
a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of
the individual--has become increasingly important as modern
society has developed. All the forces of a technological age
--industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society.'"

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in

our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters
and
other
private
communications. The
Revised
Penal
Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the AntiWiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act and the
Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information.

can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual
through
his
PRN
.

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the

right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that
A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and
social
security
providers
and
other
government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No.
308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
over breadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government

agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to
guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the
control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an
intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the
data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls
short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O.
No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may
also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it
may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights
seeks
to
prevent.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for
a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference
number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through
the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application
designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further
look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is
limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In
fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of
population data for development planning." This is an admission
that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the
generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be

recorded whether it be in the computer or in the documentary
file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions
for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The
more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building
a huge and formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to
resist.

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened

rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate
from various sources-- governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving

information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate

delivery of basic services.
In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police
power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities,
his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the
individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of
honesty
in
the
public
service.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to
privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right
is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest
justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions
Need for Legislative Act
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying
out
the
legislative
policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct
of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules
and
regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves
a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order.
An
administrative
order
is:
"Sec. 3.
Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance
of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative
orders."
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to
issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of

identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and

liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly,
violates
their
right
to
privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on
the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring
of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to
make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will
disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed.
Due Process
G.R. No. 148560

November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea
in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause
of
the
accusation
against
him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
by
himself
AND/OR
in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL

POSITION,
AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION,
OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
criminal
acts,
OR
SIMILAR
SCHEMES
OR
MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS
AND
FIFTY
CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
'JOSE VELARDE'
Issues:
Whether R.A. No. 7080 Plunder Law is unconstitutional on the
following
grounds:
1. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
2. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED
TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM
Held:
1.No. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will,
and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will
not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that

the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to

those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following
commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and
"series:"
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship
as
to
obscure
individual
characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive
meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken
greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for
"pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9
that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1,
par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern'
consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the
public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general
plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public
officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the
aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a
conspiracy
to
attain
a
common
goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or

mathematical

exactitude,

as

petitioner

seems

to

suggest.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give
a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-forvagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to
the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define
the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute.
2. No. On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly
stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the
immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal
acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in
this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always
has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability
lies,
the
accused
is
entitled
to
an
acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the
accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and
excitement, when the desire to do justice is tarnished by anger and
vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections
accorded
an
accused
may
be
taken
away.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no
arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law which
deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other
procedures leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the

law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated.

Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal
injection or life imprisonment for an offense understood only after
judicial construction takes over where Congress left off, and
interpretation
supplies
its
meaning.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due
process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due
process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and
uncertain. More explicitly That the terms of a penal statute. . .
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions
of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process.
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a
governmental
purpose
to
control
or
prevent
activities
constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area
of
protected
freedoms.
9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be
definite to be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of
the due process clause, where its language does not convey
sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the
prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the
criminal intent is an important element of the criminal acts. Under
the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed. Equally
disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away
with the requirement that each and every component of the
criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself to proving
only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only
on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with
the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are
concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation

of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact

necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law
requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful
scheme
or
conspiracy.
I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court
may allow the specifications of details in an information to validate
a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot rise
higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the
construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous
provision can supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law.
The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care
with which a complaint or information should be drafted. However,
the clarity and particularity required of an information should also
be present in the law upon which the charges are based. If the
penal law is vague, any particularity in the information will come
from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of
Congress.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise
known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL ARROYO

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the country celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of EDSA People Power I, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017)
declaring a state of national emergency. On the same day, she also
issued General Order No. 5 (GO 5), implementing the proclamation.
A week later, after these seven Petitions had been filed before
the Supreme Court, she lifted PP 1017 and declared that the
national emergency had ceased to exist. The factual bases of PP
1017 and GO 5, according to respondents, comprised a conspiracy
to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
It was allegedly
hatched by some military officers, leftist insurgents, and
members of the political opposition. Respondents justified their
moves by saying that the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and to take over the reigns of government had
posed a clear and present danger. Following the issuance of
PP 1017 and GO 5, the Office of the President announced
the cancellation of all programs and activities related to
the 20th anniversary celebration of EDSA People Power I and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by local
governments.
Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor
further announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities,
including media, can already be implemented.
Nevertheless, members of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the
National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLUKMU) marched from various parts of Metro Manila towards the
EDSA shrine in Mandaluyong. Several groups of protesters at
various sites were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Arrested
without any warrant were Petitioner Randolf S. David, a University
of the Philippines professor and newspaper columnist; and Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. Early in the morning on
February 25, 2006, on the basis of PP 1017 and GO 5, operatives
of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG)
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news
stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.

Police officers were stationed inside and outside the offices of the
newspaper, as well as the premises of another pro-opposition
paper, Malaya; and its sister publication, Abante.

ISSUES: (There are many issues in this landmark case. We focus on

the issue of the constitutionality of the PP 1017 and GO7 on its
Substantive Aspect)
Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
HELD: (Party Constitutional, Partly Unconstitutional)
On Facial Challenge:
1. Overbreadth.
On petitioners facial challenge of PP 1017, the Court held that a
review of the issuance through the use of the overbreadth doctrine
was uncalled for. First , that doctrine was an analytical tool
developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech
cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 showed that it was not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It was actually
a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence. Second, the facial invalidation of laws was considered a
manifestly strong Medicine to be used sparingly and only as a
last resort, and was generally disfavored. A challenge using the
overbreadth doctrine would require the Court to examine PP 1017
to pinpoint flaws or defects, not on the basis of its actual effect
upon petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that it might
cause others who are not before the Court
to refrain from
exercising free speech or expression. Third, in a facial challenge on
the ground of overbreadth, a petitioner is required to establish that
there can be no instance when the assailed law might be valid.
Petitioners did not even attempt to show whether that situation
existed.
2. Void for Vagueness.

The Court held that a facial review on the ground of vagueness

was likewise unwarranted. The void for vagueness doctrine holds
that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. The petitioner must show that the statute is vague in
all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not attempt to
show that PP 1017 was vague in all its applications, and that
persons of common intelligence could understand its meaning
and application.
Operative Portion of PP 1017
In establishing the constitutional basis of PP 1017, this Court
divided
the operative portion of
PP 1017 into these three
important provisions:
First provision:
[B]y virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII
x x x [I] do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
any act of insurrection
or rebellion
Second provision:
and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and
to
all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;
Third provision:
as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution [ I ]
do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.
First Provision: Calling-Out Power:
The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the Court held that Section
18 of Article VII of the Constitution granted the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers.
From the most to the least benign, these were the calling-out
power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. Owing to
the vast intelligence network of her office, the President was
in the best position to determine the actual condition of the

country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may
summon the armed forces to aid her in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion through ordinary police action.
But every act beyond the Presidents calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires. There is a distinction between the
authority to declare a state of rebellion and the authority to
proclaim a state of national emergency. The first emanates from
the Presidents powers as Chief Executive, as provided under
Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Administrative Code of
1987. President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion
was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest. In declaring a state of national emergency, the
President did not rely only on Section 18 of Article VII of the
Constitution; but likewise on Section 17 of Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take over any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Certainly, PP 1017 called for the exercise of an awesome
power; thus, it could not be deemed harmless, without legal
significance, or not written, as in the case of
Sanlakas.
Nonetheless, the Court stressed that PP 1017 was not a declaration
of martial law. Hence, it could not be used to justify acts that could
be done only under a valid declaration of martial law, such as (1)
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants, (2) ban on public
assemblies, (3) press censorship and takeover of news media
and agencies, and (4) issuance of presidential decrees.
Second provision: Faithful Execution of Laws
The second provision pertained to the power of the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, as provided in
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. The enabling clause,
however, provides that the President may enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction. he Court ruled that
President Arroyo could not issue decrees similar to those of former
President Ferdinand Marcos under martial law. Her ordinance
power was limited under Chapter 2, Book III of
Executive
Order No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987). On the other
hand, presidential decrees were laws that were of the same
category and binding force as statutes, because they were issued
in the exercise of the Presidents legislative power during the
period of martial law under the 1973 Constitution. Under our
present Constitution, legislative power specifically belongs to
Congress. Neither martial law nor a state of rebellion or of

emergency could justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative

power through the issuance of decrees. With respect to laws, the
President could order the military to enforce only laws pertinent to
its duty to suppress lawless violence, but not civil laws,
customs laws, and the like.
Third Provision: State of National Emergency
No Takeover of Privately Owned Utilities. Section 17 of Article XII
of
the Constitution provides for the takeover or direction of the
operation of
any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Section 23 of Article VI, however,
limits the exercise of those acts thus:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses
in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the
sole power to declare the existence of a state of war
.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency , the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon thenext adjournment
thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the exercise of emergency powers, such as the takeover of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, requires a delegation from Congress. Section 17
of Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause generally reposed upon Congress. Whether the
President may exercise this power is dependent on whether
Congress would delegate it to the Chief Executive through a law
prescribing reasonable terms. Emergency, as a generic term,
connotes the existence of
conditions suddenly intensifying
existing danger to life or well-being beyond the degree that is
accepted as normal. As contemplated in our Constitution, these
conditions may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or
epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of
nationwide proportions or effect. The Court emphasized that while
the President alone could declare a state of national emergency
without legislation, she had no power to take over a privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

The Chief
Executive could not decide whether exceptional
circumstances existed that would warrant the takeover of
private facilities affected with public interest.
Neither could
she determine when those exceptional circumstances had ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President had no power to
determine what types of business affected with public interest
should be taken over.
Void-as-Applied Doctrine
Finally, on the challenge that PP 1017 was void as applied, the
Court asked,Does the illegal implementation of a law render it
unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes invalid, although those statutes may have been abused
and misabused or may have afforded an opportunity for abuse
in the manner of
application.
PP 1017 was merely an
invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose
was to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
But nothing in it allowed the police,
expressly or impliedly, to conduct an illegal arrest or to search or
violate the citizens constitutional rights.

Constitutionality of GO 5 and Acts of Terrorism (Emphasis

here since due process is discussed here)
President Arroyo issued GO 5 to carry into effect the provisions of
PP 1017. The order mandated the AFP and the PNP to carry out
immediately the necessary and
appropriate
actions
and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence.
The term lawless violence is unarguably extant in our
statutes and Constitution. The term is invariably associated
with invasion, insurrection or rebellion. On the other hand,
Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing
acts of terrorism.
It must be remembered that an
act can only be considered crime if there is a law
defining it as such and imposing the corresponding penalty.
Since there is no law defining acts of
terrorism,
President Arroyo alone, under GO 5, has the discretion
to determine what acts constitute terrorism.
Her
judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restriction.
Consequently, upon the invocation of GO 5, there can be

indiscriminate arrests without warrant, incidents of

breaking into offices and residences, takeover of
media enterprises, and prohibition and dispersal of all
assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration.
These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the
President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause
of the Constitution.
Thus, the Court declared that the
acts of terrorism portion of GO 5 was unconstitutional.

of The Daily Tribune offices was illegal, because the act violated
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which had laid down the steps in
the conduct of a valid search and seizure. Moreover, the search
violated
petitioners freedom of the press. The search and seizure of
materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the
vicinity of the Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of
government officials to media, were plain censorship.

Unconstitutional Actions
The warrantless arrest of Petitioner David cannot be justified.
During the inquest for the charges against him (violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 880 and inciting to sedition), all that the
arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some
rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the words Oust Gloria Now
and their erroneous assumption that he was the leader of the
rally. Consequently, the inquest prosecutor ordered Davids
immediate release (after his seven-hour detention) on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence. It was noted that he was not wearing
the subject T-shirt and, even if he were, that fact would have been
an insufficient basis for charging him with inciting to sedition.
Further, it was not even known whether he was the leader of
the rally. The Court likewise considered the dispersal and arrest of
the members of KMU et al. unwarranted. Apparently, the
dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacaangs
arbitrary directive canceling all permits previously issued by
local governments.
The wholesale cancellation of all permits
to rally was a blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of
assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent. Tolerance is the rule and
limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an
assembly presents a clear and present danger may the State
deny the citizens right to exercise it, a fact that respondents
utterly failed to show.

This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional

right, even if the act involves the most defiant of our citizens.
Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of
a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful of the constitutional rights of the citizens and of any
stealthy encroachments on those rights. The motto should always
be Obsta principiis.

Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate

assemblies and rallies is lodged with local governments.
They have the power to issue permits and to revoke those
permits
after due notice and hearing. In this case,
petitioners were not even notified of, much less heard
on, the revocation of their permits. The absence of
notice was a fatal defect as it violates due process.
Cacho-Olivares et al presented another facet of freedom of
speech -- the freedom of the press. The search without a warrant

SUMMATION:
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP
1021 a supervening event would have normally rendered
this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still
operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance
thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar
to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media
reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be
reimposed if the May 1 rallies become unruly and violent.
Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties
should not be evaded; they must now be resolved to prevent
future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar
as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant
jurisprudence
discussed
earlier.
However,
PP
1070s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce
obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and
(3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The
Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot
take over privately- owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order
issued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief
addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP
1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the
military and the police should take only the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence. But the words acts of terrorism found in G.O.
No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said
G.O.
While terrorism has been denounced generally in
media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and
eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority
in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated
earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of
petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal
of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior
restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune
offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication
and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law
and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose
any civil, criminal, or administrative sanctions on the individual
police officers concerned.
They have not been individually
identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or
causes of action and/or relevant criminal Information have not
been presented before this Court. Elementary due process
bars
this
Court
from
making
any
specific
pronouncement of civil, criminal, or administrative
liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and
substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give
the military the power it needs to protect the Republic
without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the
eternal
balancing tasks of a democratic state. During
emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and
intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary
as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who
studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is
possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises
without
surrendering
the
two
vital
principles
of
constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary
power, and political responsibility of the government to the
governed.

Due Process
Republic Act No. 13791
ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
JOSE U. ONG AND NELLY M. ONG, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and
OMBUDSMAN, respondents

OFFICE

OF

THE

G.R. No. 126858

September 16, 2005
Ponente: TINGA, J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari
BRIEF:

1 An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any

Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings
Therefor.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the

resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (denial of petitioners motion to
dismiss the petition for forfeiture and denial of motion for
reconsideration).
FACTS:
Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a complaint-affidavit on
04 February 1992 claiming the petitioner Jose U. Ong, then
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has
amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful
income. The petition alleged that the total value of the questioned
assets is P21,474,585.00 which is grossly disproportionate to Ongs
lawful income from his public employment and other sources
amounting to P1,060,412.50, considering that Nelly Ong,
petitioners wife, has no visible means of income. This circumstance
allegedly gave rise to the presumption under Section 2 of RA 1379
that the questioned properties were unlawfully acquired.
A petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property was
accordingly filed before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic,
through the Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Ombudsmand for
Luzon, against Ong and his wife. In its Order dated 17 November
1993, the Sandiganbayan directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the properties of petitioners.
Petitioners, in turn, presented affirmative defenses.
Both motions to dismiss and for reconsideration of petitioners were
denied by the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the petition for
forfeiture is an action in rem (civil in character) and, thus, the
participation of Nelly Ong is not a mandatory requirement. Further,
the Sandiganbayan directed the Ombudsman to furnish petitioners
with a copy of the resolution to file the forfeiture case and giving
them a period of five days from receipt of the resolution within
which to file a motion for reconsideration.
Instead of waiting for the Ombudsman compliance with the
resolution, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in:
1) Ruling that Nelly Ong is not entitled to preliminary investigation
thereby violating her right to due process;
2) Failing to annul the proceedings taken before the Ombudsman
despite the alleged bias and prejudice exhibited by the latter;

3) Disqualification of the Ombudsman from acting both as

prosecutor and judge in the determination of probable cause
against petitioners; and
4) Failing to declare RA 1379 unconstitutional as it is vague and
does not sufficiently define ill-gotten wealth and how it can be
determined in violation of the non-delegation of legislative
power provision, and insofar as it disregards the presumption of
innocence by requiring them to show cause why the properties
in question should not be declared property of the state.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
Office of the Ombudsman: Filed (together with the Special
Prosecutor) before the Sandiganbayan petition for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired property against Ong and his wife.
Sandiganbayan: (1st assailed resolution) Ruled that petition for
forfeiture is an action in rem, civil in character. Conduct of
preliminary investigation as regards Nelly Ong is not required. The
petition sufficiently states a cause of action. (2nd assailed
resolution) Directed the Ombdusman to furnish petitioners with a
copy of the resolution to file the forfeiture case and giving them a
period of five days from receipt of resolution to file a motion for
reconsideration.
SC: PETITION DENIED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of authority.
1) Questioned assets are invariably registered under the names of
both Jose and Nelly Ong owing to their conjugal partnership.
Thus, even as RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the
public officer or employee who has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and other lawful income, the reality that
the application of the law is such that conjugal share of Nelly
Ong stands to be subjected to the penalty of forfeiture grants
her the right, in line with the due process clause of the
Constitution, to a preliminary investigation.
However, there is neither an indication nor pretense that Nelly
Ong had a hand in the acquisition of the properties as Jose Ong
clearly declared that he purchased the properties with his
retirement funds, money market placements, and proceeds
from a bank loan. Whatever defenses which Nelly Ong could
have raised to the sources of funds used in the purchase of the
questioned assets are deemed waived owing to the fact that
they are subsumed in the submissions of her husband. Hence,

even if she is entitled to a preliminary investigation, such an

inquiry would be an empty ceremony. (emphasis provided)
2) Ong was given opportunity to present the documents in his
possession relevant to the approval of the Allied Bank loan, his
receipt of retirement benefits from SGV and money market
placements. Therefore, the Ombudsman did not make any
unwarranted conclusions or proceed with arbitrariness in the
conduct of the preliminary inquiry.
However, Ong should have been notified of the subpoena duces
tecum ad testificandum issued to SGV, Allied Bank and the BIR.
Although there is no indication on record that clarificatory
hearings were conducted pursuant to the subpoenas, Ong is
entitled to be notified of the proceedings and to be present
thereat. The fact that he was not so notified is a denial of
fundamental fairness which taints the preliminary investigation.
The second resolution of the Sandiganbayan has served to cure
the Ombudsmans failure to notify petitioners of the issuance of
subpoenas duces tecum ad testificandum to SGV, Allied Bank
and the BIR.

that which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such

public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and
the income from legitimately acquired property. It also provides
a definition of what is legitimately acquired property. Based on
these parameters, the public is given fair notice of what acts
are proscribed.
Neither is the presumption of innocence clause violated by
Section 2 of RA 1379. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
under the principle of presumption of innocence, it is merely
required of the State to establish a prima facie case, after which
the burden of proof shifts to the accused.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Cost against
petitioners.

By opting to go directly to the High Court, the petitioners

deprived themselves of an avenue of redress with the
Sandiganbayan. They are deemed to have waived their right to
avail of the remedy afforded by the second Resolution.
Therefore, the Court does not find it necessary to direct the
Ombudsman to rectify the errors committed during the
preliminary investigation as it would no longer serve any useful
purpose and would only further delay the proceedings.
Petitioners have been allowed to fully plead their arguments
before the SC.
3) The duality of roles which the Ombudsman exercises does not
necessarily warrant a conclusion that it will be given to making
a finding of probable cause in every case. In Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, the High Court declared that the Ombudsman
has the correlative powers to investigate and initiate proper
action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained
wealth which were amassed after 25 February 1986. There is
therefore no merit in petitioners contention that the absence of
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General taints the
petition for forfeiture with nullity.
4) The law is not vague as is defines with sufficient particularity
unlawfully acquired property of a public officer or employee as

Publication as part of due process

Tanada vs. Tuvera
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. [MABINI], petitioners
vs.

HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the

President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents
GR No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
Ponente: Escolin, J.

through the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the case
contending that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the instant petition. That in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the
alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question
said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. On the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

Nature of the Case:

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

Issue:
Is publication a requirement of due process?

Brief:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.

Held/Ratio:

Facts:

Based on Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication in the Official

Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of law.
The basis of publication is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis
non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or

Petitioners, in their legal capacity as private citizens seek a writ of

mandamus to compel the respondents for the publication of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders in the Official Gazette. Respondents however,

Yes.

Publication of presidential issuances "of public nature" or "of

general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.

otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which

he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 which
reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word
shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people
to be informed on the matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity
SC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

Due Process Hello Garci Tape

GARCILLANO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008

Ponente: NACHURA

Nature of Case:
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
BRIEF
Petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) prayed that the
respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape
recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in
their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further
implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be
ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent
House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.
FACTS
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly
between the Tapes containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high
ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. These tapes referred as the Hello Garci tapes, allegedly
contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject
of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees
of both Houses of Congress.
Petitions were submitted to Court with have different objectives:
the first, raised by petitioner Garcillano, is poised at preventing the
playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in
the committee reports because these were illegally obtained
wiretapped conversation reports, while the second seeks to prohibit
and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation and on his Intervenor Sagge who alleges that it has
violated his right to due process considering that he is summoned
to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of
his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation.

ISSUE/S of the CASE

Whether the tapes can be played in the committee, and whether
Committee order has violated the rights of due process.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the issues raised by petitioner Garcillano for
being moot and academic. The Court notes that the recordings
were already played in the House and heard by its members. There
is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
Hello Garci inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by
these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being
moot and academic.
On the other hand, The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with
the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement. The requisite of publication of the rules
is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the
respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be
issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of
legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

----------G.R. No. 170338 (petition poised at preventing the playing of the

tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee
reports) is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 179275 (petition to prohibit and stop the conduct of the
Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation) is GRANTED.

[G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996]

Brief:

Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the

Decision dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon. Zosimo
Z. Angeles. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 58, in civil Case No.92-158 entitled Remington Industrial
Sales Corporation, et. al. vs. Philippine Industrial Trading
Corporation.

Facts:

PHILIPPINE
petitioners,

INTERNATIONAL

TRADING

CORPORATION,

vs.
HON PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58,
RTC,
MAKATI;
REMINGTON
INDUSTRIAL
SALES
CORPORATION;
AND
FIRESTONE
CERAMIC,
INC.,
respondents.

On 6 August 1973, the Philippine International Trading Corp. was

created as a government owned and controlled corporation under
PD 252. On May 9, 1997 , PD 1071 revised the provisions of PD 252,
where the purposes and powers of the said governmental entity
were enumerated under Sections 5&6 thereof . On 9 August 1976,
the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued a letter of Instruction
444 directing , inter Alia, that trade between the Philippines and
any of the Socialist and Other Centrally Planned EconomyCountries
(SOCPEC), including the Peoples Republic of China shall be
undertaken or coursed through the PITC. After the Edsa revolution,
or more specifically on 27 February 1987, then President Corazon
Aquino promulgated EO 133 reorganizing the DTI empowering the
said president to be the primary coordinative, pro movie, facilitate
and regulatory arm of the government for the countrys trade,
industry and investment activities. The PITC was made one of DTIs
line agencies. Sometime in April 1988, following the state visit of
president Aquino to the People's Republic of China (PROC), the
Philippines and the PROC entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make
joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade and
to strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance
between the value of their imports and exports during the period. .
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and the PROC entered

into a trade protocol for the years 1989,1990,1991, under which

was specified the commodities to be traded between them. On
August 1989, PTC issued Administrative Order ( AO) SOCPEC 89-0801 under which, applications to the PITC for importations from
China ( PROC) must be accompanied by viable and and confirmed
export program of Philippine products to PROC carried out by the
importer himself or through a tie up with a legitimate importer in an
amount equivalent to the value of importation from PROC being
applied for 1:1 ratio. Remington industrial Sales Corp. and
zFirestone Ceramics, both Domestic Corporations, organized and
existing under Philippine laws, individually applied for authority to
import from PROC with PITC. They were granted such authority.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to
submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations ,
further import applications were withheld by PITC from Remington
and Firestone, such that the latter were both barred from importing
goods from PROC. On 20 January 1992, Remington filed a petition
for prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of
Temporary Restraining order and /or writ of Preliminary Injunction
against PITC in the Regional Trial Court (RTC , Makati branch 58). On
January 4, 1993, judge Zozimo R. Angeles (presiding judge) upheld
the petition for prohibition and mandamus of Remington and
Firestone, and declaring PITC AO SOCPEC89-08-01 and its
regulations null, void and unconstitutional. PITC filed the petition
seeking the reversal of the Angeles decision.

Issue:

Whether the Administrative Order SOCPEC 89-08-01 is binding in

the case of Bridgestone and Firestone.

Actions of the Courts:

RTC:
AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 is declared null, void and unconstitutional.
SC:
The assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED,

Rationale:
The PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative orders, as
a valid exercise of power ancillary to legislation. Administrative
Oder SOCPEC 89-08-01 is not, however, a valid exercise of such
quasi legislative power. The original AO issued on 30 August 1989,
under which the respondents filed their applications for
importation, was not published in the official gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The questioned AO , legally , Intel
it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the Civil
Code. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since it's purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation, i.e. pD 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. It was
on March 30, 1992 when the amendments to the said AO where
filed in the UP law center and published in the National
Administrative Register as required by the Administrative a Code of
1987. The fact that the amendments were filed with and published
by the UP law center in the National Administrative Register does
not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order , without force and effect due to lack of publication, thus
cannot exact any obligation from Remington and Firestone,
specifically, charges for the .5% Counter Export Development
Service.

Due Process
Art. 3, Section 1, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Express Telecommunication
Co. Inc.,
GR 147096,
15 January 2002
Ponente: YNARESSANTIAGO, J.:
Nature of Case:
Consolidated petitions for review and certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
BRIEF
Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the Order
reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a
provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a
nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 allocating
frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which
are authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS.NTC filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
147096. Subsequently, Bayantel also filed its petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 147210.
FACTS
On December 29, 1992, International Communications Corporation
(now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an
application with the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to
install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA).
The application was docketed as NTC Case No. 92-486. Shortly
thereafter, or on January 22, 1993, the NTC issued Memorandum
Circular No. 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide
or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the
Commission on or before February 15, 1993, and deferring the

acceptance of any application filed after said date until further

orders.
On May 6, 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing
by the NTC with respect to Bayantel's original application, Bayantel
filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application.3
On May 17, 1993, the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with
respect to this amended application was published in the Manila
Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing
were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were
conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could
complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order
dated December 19, 1993 stating:
In view of the recent grant of two (2) separate Provisional
Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in
the closing out of all available frequencies for the service being
applied for by herein applicant, and in order that this case may not
remain pending for an indefinite period of time, AS PRAYED FOR, let
this case be, as it is, hereby ordered ARCHIVED without prejudice to
its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes
available. On May 17, 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for
CMTS operators, as provided for under Memorandum Circular No. 33-99.
Respondent Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in
NTC Case No. 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application. Extelcom argued
that Bayantel's motion sought the revival of an archived application
filed almost eight (8) years ago. Thus, the documentary evidence
and the allegations of respondent Bayantel in this application are
all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity
for the proposed CMTS service. Moreover, Extelcom alleged that
there was no public need for the service applied for by Bayantel as
the present five CMTS operators --- Extelcom, Globe Telecom, Inc.,
Smart Communication, Inc., Pilipino Telephone Corporation, and Isla
Communication Corporation, Inc. --- more than adequately
addressed the market demand, and all are in the process of
enhancing and expanding their respective networks based on
recent technological developments.
On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of
Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service.
Issue:

1. Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and

Procedure should govern in the approval of Bayantels
application. No.
2. Whether the order of the NCC which revived the application
of respondent Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-486 violated
respondent Extelcom's right to procedural due process of
law. -No.
ACTIONS of the COURT
CA: NTC violated due process of law and declared NTC's Order for
archiving and reviving Bayantel's application null and void.
SC: Reversed decision of CA.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

1. In the regulatory telecommunications industry, the NTC has
the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience
and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and
maintenance of communications facilities and services,
radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph
systems. Such power includes the authority to determine
the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications
services. Specifically, Section 16 of the Public Service Act
authorizes the then PSC, upon notice and hearing, to issue
Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation of public
services within the Philippines "whenever the Commission
finds that the operation of the public service proposed and
the authorization to do business will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner." The procedure
governing the issuance of such authorizations is set forth in
Section 29 of the said Act, the pertinent portion of which
states:
All
hearings
and
investigations
before
the
Commission shall be governed by rules adopted by
the Commission, and in the conduct thereof, the
Commission shall not be bound by the technical rules
of legal evidence. xxx.
In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a
CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules
of Practice and Procedure, which provides:

application, there was clearly no denial of its right to due

process.

Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an application,

complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the Board
may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative,
the relief prayed for, based on the pleading, together with
the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto,
without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the
hearing which shall be called within thirty (30) days from
grant of authority asked for. (underscoring ours) NTC,
through the Secretary of the Commission, issued a
certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised
Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general
circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by
the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still
governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant
of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the
1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on
February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the
Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of
the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that
gives the rules force and effect. Likewise, the requirements
of notice and publication of the application is no longer
necessary inasmuch as the application is a mere revival of
an application which has already been published earlier. At
any rate, the records show that all of the five (5) CMTS
operators in the country were duly notified and were allowed
to raise their respective oppositions to Bayantel's
application through the NTC's Order dated February 1, 2000.
2. It must be noted that NTCs Order referred to a simple
revival of the archived application of Bayantel in NTC Case
No. 92-426. At this stage, it cannot be said that Extelcom's
right to procedural due process was prejudiced. It will still
have the opportunity to be heard during the full-blown
adversarial hearings that will follow. In fact, the records
show that the NTC has scheduled several hearing dates for
this purpose, at which all interested parties shall be allowed
to register their opposition. We have ruled that there is no
denial of due process where full-blown adversarial
proceedings are conducted before an administrative body.34
With Extelcom having fully participated in the proceedings,
and indeed, given the opportunity to file its opposition to the

Extelcom had already entered its appearance as a party and

filed its opposition to the application. It was neither
precluded nor barred from participating in the hearings
thereon. Indeed, nothing, not even the Order reviving the
application, bars or prevents Extelcom and the other
oppositors from participating in the hearings and adducing
evidence in support of their respective oppositions. The
motion to revive could not have possibly caused prejudice to
Extelcom since the motion only sought the revival of the
application. It was merely a preliminary step towards the
resumption of the hearings on the application of Bayantel.
The latter will still have to prove its capability to undertake
the proposed CMTS. Indeed, in its Order dated February 1,
2000, the NTC set several hearing dates precisely intended
for the presentation of evidence on Bayantel's capability and
qualification. Notice of these hearings were sent to all
parties concerned, including Extelcom.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions
are GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 13,
2000 and Resolution dated February 9, 2001 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals is LIFTED. The Orders of the NTC dated February 1, 2000
and May 3, 2000 are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
IMPARTIAL COURT/TRIBUNAL
Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission [GR 70632,
11 February 1986]; also Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition v.
Napocor [ GR L-68474]
Facts:
The Official Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) pamphlet,
entitled "The Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1" was published in
1985 when Commissioners Manuel Eugenio, Quirino Navarro, and
Alejandro Ver Albano had already been appointed to their present
positions. Other pamphlets entitled "Nuclear Power Safe, Clean,
Economical, and Available," and Nuclear Power Plant and

Environmental Safety were issued earlier, but the majority of the

Commissioners even then were already occupying positions of
responsibility in the PAEC. Commissioner Eugenio was Acting Chief
of the PAEC Department on Nuclear Technology and Engineering
from June, 1980 to July, 1984; Commissioner Navarro was PAEC
Chief Science Research Specialist from May, 1980 to September,
1984; and Commissioner Albano was PAEC Deputy Commissioner
from March, 1980 to September, 1984. These pamphlets continued
to be distributed by PAEC as late as March 1985. Their official
distribution continued after the filing of National Power Corporation
(Napocor)'s motion for conversion on 27 June 1984 and even after
PAEC had issued its order dated 26 February 1985 formally
admitting the said motion for conversion. In GR 70632, the
competence of the PAEC Commissioners to pass judgment on the
safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1) was
questioned; (2) the validity of Napocor's motion/application for the
conversion of its construction permit into an operating license for
PNPP-1 was assailed, and (3) PAEC Commissioners were charged
with bias and prejudgment.
Issue:
Whether the PAEC Commissioner may sit in judgment in
determining the safety of PNPP-1.
Held:
The PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in

judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite

objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry
because they already have prejudged the safety of PNPP-1. The
PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility from the official
pamphlets, which clearly indicate the prejudgment that PNPP-1 is
safe. The official distribution of the pamphlets continued when the
Commissioners had already been appointed to their present
positions and and even after PAEC had issued its order dated 26
February 1985 formally admitting Napocors motion for conversion