Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Conflicts Prelim Cases
Conflicts Prelim Cases
Conflicts Prelim Cases
REALTY
FACTS:
> Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA
(BANTSA) is an international banking
and financing institution duly licensed to
do business in the Philippines,
organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of
California, United States of America
while private respondent American
Realty Corporation (ARC) is a domestic
corporation.
> Bank of America International Limited
(BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited
liability company organized and existing
under the laws of England.
> BANTSA and BAIL on several
occasions granted three major multimillion United States (US) Dollar loans
to the following corporate borrowers: (1)
Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2)
El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley
Compania Naviera S.A. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as borrowers), all
of which are existing under and by virtue
of the laws of the Republic of Panama
and are foreign affiliates of private
respondent.
> Due to the default in the payment of
the loan amortizations, BANTSA and the
corporate borrowers signed and entered
into restructuring agreements. As
additional security for the restructured
loans, private respondent ARC as third
party mortgagor executed two real
estate mortgages over its parcels of land
including improvements thereon.
> Eventually, the corporate borrowers
defaulted in the payment of the
restructured loans prompting petitioner
BANTSA to file civil actions before
foreign courts for the collection of the
principal loan.
> In the civil suits instituted before the
foreign courts, private respondent ARC,
being a third party mortgagor, was not
impleaded as party-defendant.
> Petitioner BANTSA filed before the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff of
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners act
of filing a collection suit against the
principal debtors for the recovery of the
loan before foreign courts constituted a
waiver of the remedy of foreclosure?
RULING:
YES. First, as to the issue of
availability of remedies, petitioner
submits that a waiver of the remedy of
foreclosure requires the concurrence of
1
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court has
jurisdiction to hear and try the case
based on Article 21 of the New Civil
Code since the proper law applicable is
the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
inasmuch as this case involves what is
known in private international law as a
conflicts problem?
RULING:
YES.
Under
the
factual
antecedents obtaining in this case, there
is no dispute that the interplay of events
occurred in two states, the Philippines
and Saudi Arabia.
Where
the
factual
antecedents
satisfactorily establish the existence of a
foreign element, we agree with petitioner
that the problem herein could present a
conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the
diverse laws of two or more states is
said to contain a foreign element. The
presence of a foreign element is
PNB vs CABANSAG
FACTS:
> Respondent Florence Cabansag]
arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She
applied for employment, with the
Singapore Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, a private banking
corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, with
principal offices at Manila. At the time,
the Branch Office had two (2) types of
employees: (a) expatriates or the regular
employees, hired in Manila and
assigned abroad including Singapore,
and (b) locally (direct) hired. She applied
for employment as Branch Credit
Officer, Ruben C. Tobias (General
Manager) found her eminently qualified
and wrote a letter to the President of the
Bank in Manila, recommending the
appointment of Florence O. Cabansag,
for the position.
> The President of the Bank was
impressed with the credentials of
Florence O. Cabansag that he approved
the recommendation of Ruben C.
Tobias. She then filed an Application,
with the Ministry of Manpower of the
Government of Singapore, for the
issuance of an Employment Pass as an
employee of the Singapore PNB Branch.
Her application was approved for a
period of two (2) years.
> She was then appointed as temporary
Credit Officer and upon her successful
completion of her probation to be
determined solely, by the Bank, she may
be extended at the discretion of the
Bank, a permanent appointment and
that her temporary appointment was
subject to the following terms and
conditions.
> Florence O. Cabansag accepted the
position and assumed office and she
was issued by the Philippine Overseas
Employment
Administration,
an
Overseas
Employment
Certificate,
certifying that she was a bona fide
contract worker for Singapore.
7
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitration
branch of the NLRC in the National
Capital Region has jurisdiction over the
instant controversy?
RULING:
YES. The jurisdiction of labor
arbiters and the NLRC is specified in
Article 217 of the Labor Code. Labor
arbiters clearly have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
from
employer-employee
relations,
including termination disputes involving
all workers, among whom are overseas
Filipino workers (OFW).
We are not unmindful of the fact that
respondent was directly hired, while on
a tourist status in Singapore, by the PNB
branch in that city state. Prior to
employing respondent, petitioner had to
obtain an employment pass for her from
the Singapore Ministry of Manpower.
Securing the pass was a regulatory
requirement pursuant to the immigration
regulations of that country.
Similarly, the Philippine government
requires non-Filipinos working in the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alien spouse
can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse>
RULING:
11
FUJIKI vs MARINAY
FACTS:
RULING:
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife
of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy?
VALMONTE vs CA
FACTS:
> Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
foreign resident.
> Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and
Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and
wife. They are both residents of
Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte, who is a member of the
Philippine bar, however, practices his
profession in the Philippines, commuting
for this purpose between his residence
in the state of Washington and Manila.
> private respondent Rosita Dimalanta,
who is the sister of petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition
of real property and accounting of
rentals against petitioners Lourdes A.
Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte
before the RTC. The subject of the
action is a three-door apartment located
in Paco, Manila.
> Service of summons was then made
upon petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte,
who at the time, was at his office in
Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte
accepted the summons, insofar as he
was concerned, but refused to accept
the summons for his wife, Lourdes A.
Valmonte, on the ground that he was not
authorized to accept the process on her
behalf. Accordingly the process server
left without leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint for petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte.
> Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte
thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte, however, did not file her
Answer. For this reason private
respondent moved to declare her in
default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte
entered a special appearance in behalf
of his wife and opposed the private
respondents motion.
> Trial court denied private respondents
motion to declare petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default.
15
Strict
compliance
with
these
requirements
alone
can
assure
observance of due process. That is why
in one case, although the Court
considered publication in the Philippines
of the summons (against the contention
that it should be made in the foreign
state where defendant was residing)
sufficient, nonetheless the service was
considered insufficient because no copy
of the summons was sent to the last
known
correct
address
in
the
Philippines.
In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her
husband
as
her
attorney-in-fact.
Although she wrote private respondents
attorney that
all
communications
intended for her should be addressed to
her husband who is also her lawyer at
the latters address in Manila, no power
of attorney to receive summons for her
can be inferred therefrom. In fact the
letter was written seven months before
the filing of this case below, and it
appears that it was written in connection
with the negotiations between her and
her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta,
concerning the partition of the property
in question. As is usual in negotiations
of this kind, the exchange of
correspondence was carried on by
counsel for the parties. But the authority
given to petitioners husband in these
negotiations
certainly
cannot
be
18
RAYRAY vs LEE
FACTS:
Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan,
Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was
able to secure a marriage license which
is a requirement in Korea prior to
marrying. They lived together until 1955.
Rayray however later found out that Lee
had previously lived with 2 Americans
and a Korean. Lee answered by saying
that it is not unusual in Korea for a
woman to have more than one partner
and that it is legally permissive for them
to do so and that there is no legal
impediment to her marriage with
Rayray. Eventually they pursued their
separate ways. Rayray later filed before
lower court of Manila for an action to
annul his marriage with Lee because
Lees
whereabouts
cannot
be
determined and that his consent in
marrying Lee would have not been for
the marriage had he known prior that
Lee had been living with other men. His
action for annulment had been duly
published and summons were made
known to Lee but due to her absence
Rayray moved to have Lee be declared
in default. The lower court denied
Rayrays action stating that since the
marriage was celebrated in Korea the
court cannot take cognizance of the
case and that the facts presented by
Rayray is not sufficient to debunk his
marriage with Lee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it
having been solemnized in Seoul,
Korea?
RULING:
YES. In order that a given case
could be validly decided by a court of
RAYTHEON vs ROUZIE
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in refusing to dismiss the
20
HASEGAWA vs KITAMURA
FACTS:
RULING:
Petitioner contended that their written
contract with respondent included a
valid choice of law clause, the laws of
the State of Connecticut, hence the
application
of
the
doctrine of forum non conveniens beca
me necessary .
Under this doctrine, a court in conflictsof -law cases may refuse impositions on
its jurisdictions where it is not the most
convenient forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.
However, the
Supreme
Court rejected petitioners contention
stating that the presence of a valid
choice of law clause did not suggest that
Philippine courts are precluded from
hearing the civil action. The High Court
ratiocinated that jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the
law.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the respondent upon the filing of the
complaint. It also acquired jurisdiction
over the petitioner when it appeared
voluntarily in court. The Supreme Court
also pointed out that the Court of
Appeals correctly rules the need for a
full-blown trial to determine the alleged
merging of BMSI and Rust International.
Hence, the petition for review of
DENIED.
Petitioner
Nippon
Engineering
Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a
Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in
the infrastructure projects of foreign
governments,
entered
into
an
Independent Contractor Agreement
(ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura,
a Japanese national permanently
residing in the Philippines. The
agreement provides that respondent
was to extend professional services to
Nippon for a year. Nippon then assigned
respondent to work as the project
manager of the Southern Tagalog
Access Road (STAR) Project in the
Philippines, following the company's
consultancy contract with the Philippine
Government.
When the STAR Project was near
completion, the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged
the consultancy services of Nippon, this
time for the detailed engineering and
construction
supervision
of
the
Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement
(BBRI) Project. Respondent was named
as the project manager in the contract's.
Petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's
general manager for its International
Division, informed respondent that the
company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His
services would be engaged by the
company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project, just in
time for the ICA's expiry.
Threatened
with
impending
unemployment, respondent, through his
lawyer,
requested
a
negotiation
conference and demanded that he be
assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon
insisted that respondents contract was
for a fixed term that had already expired,
21
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the subject matter
jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil
cases for specific performance and
damages involving contracts executed
outside the country by foreign nationals
may be assailed on the principles of lex
loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the
state of the most significant relationship
rule, or forum non conveniens?
RULING:
NO. It should be noted that when
a conflicts case, one involving a foreign
element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three
alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case,
either because of lack of jurisdiction or
refusal to assume jurisdiction over the
case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the
case and apply the internal law of the
forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over
the case and take into account or apply
the law of some other State or States.
22
JOHANNES vs HARVEY
FACTS:
> Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes died
intestate in Singapore. Her immediate
family there remained the husband, B.
E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick
Charles
D'Almeida
and
Alfred
D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida
Johannes. Of these, the husband, the
brother Frederick, and the sister Ida,
were residents of Singapore, while the
brother Alfred was in Manila. The
Singapore heirs apparently joined in
asking that letters of administration be
granted by the Supreme Court of
Singapore to B. E. Johannes, the lawful
husband of the deceased.
> Under the British law, it would seem
that the husband is entitled to the whole
of the estate of his wife if she die
intestate to the exclusive of any other
next of kin.
> The brother Alfred D' Almeida was, on
his petition, appointed administrator of
the Manila estate of the deceased. The
sum of money appears, was on deposit
in the Manila banks under and by virtue
of guardianship proceedings for the late
Carmen Theodora Johannes, which
were finally terminated by the discharge
of the guardian, the Philippine Trust
Company.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable
George R. Harvey, as judge of First
Instance of the City of Manila, has acted
in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing
Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the
funds of the estate on deposit in the
Philippines?
RULING:
NO. Relators pray that the
administration in the jurisdiction is
unnecessary, pray the court to annul the
23
2.
celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
A valid divorce
is obtained abroad by
the
alien
spouse
capacitating him or her
to remarry.
alleged
and
proved. Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article
26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
RULING:
YES. Even if the Court does not
apply Article 26, Par. 2 of the Family
Code, there is sufficient jurisprudential
basis in the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. where it was held that a Filipino
spouse should no longer be considered
married if the alien spouse validly
obtains a divorce outside of the
PHILSEC vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondent Ducat obtained
separate loans from petitioners Ayala
International Finance Limited (AYALA)
and
Philsec
Investment
Corp
(PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock
owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the
loans, private respondent 1488, Inc.,
through its president, private respondent
Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under
an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc.
executed a Warranty Deed with
Vendors Lien by which it sold to
petitioner
Athona
Holdings,
N.V.
(ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas,
U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA
extended a loan to ATHONA as initial
payment of the purchase price. The
balance was to be paid by means of a
promissory note executed by ATHONA
in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently,
upon their receipt of the money from
1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA
released Ducat from his indebtedness
and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares
of stock in their possession belonging to
Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on
the balance, the entire amount covered
by the note became due and
demandable.
Accordingly,
private
respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners
PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the
United States for payment of the
balance and for damages for breach of
contract and for fraud allegedly
perpetrated
by
petitioners
in
misrepresenting the marketability of the
shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc.
under the Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the
United States, petitioners filed a
complaint For Sum of Money with
Damages and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against private respondents
28
RULINGS:
ISSUES:
29
NORTHWEST AIRLINES vs CA
FACTS:
Northwest
Orient
Airlines,
Inc.
(hereinafter NORTHWEST),
a
corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought
to enforce a Judgment by a Japanese
Court in their favor against Sharp &
Company, a corporation incorporated in
the Philippines.
Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through
its Japan branch, entered into an
International Passenger Sales Agency
Agreement, authorizing SHARP to sell
its air transportation tickets. Unable to
remit the proceeds of the ticket sales
Northwest Airlines sued defendant in
Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales,
with claim for damages.
A writ of summons was issued and the
attempt to serve the summons was
unsuccessful. After the two unsuccessful
attempts of service, the Tokyo District
Court decided to have the complaint and
the writs of summons served at the head
office of the defendant in Manila. The
Director of the Tokyo District Court
requested the Supreme Court of Japan
to serve the summons through
diplomatic
channels
upon
the
defendant's head office in Manila.
Sharp received from Deputy Sheriff
Rolando Balingit the writ of summons.
Despite receipt of the same, defendant
failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court
rendered judgment in favor of Northwest
Airlines.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the
decision in Japan, hence, a suit for
enforcement of the judgment was filed
by plaintiff before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether a Japanese court can
acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine
corporation doing business in Japan by
serving summons through diplomatic
channels on the Philippine corporation
at its principal office in Manila after prior
attempts to serve summons in Japan
had failed?
RULING:
A foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until the contrary is
shown. It is also proper to presume the
regularity of the proceedings and the
giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, a judgment in an action in
personam of a tribunal of a foreign
country having jurisdiction to pronounce
the same is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent
title. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule
131, a court, whether of the Philippines
or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption
that it was acting in the lawful exercise
of jurisdiction and has regularly
performed its official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a
foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its
validity. Being the party challenging the
judgment rendered by the Japanese
court, SHARP had the duty to
demonstrate the invalidity of such
judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not HLB has capacity
to sue?
RULING:
34
BELLIS vs BELLIS
compulsory
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a
citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis
executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations,
and
expenses
of
administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in
equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos
G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of
the deceased should determine the
successional rights of the illegitimate
children?
RULING:
YES. Article 16, par. 2, and Art.
1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as
personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is
situated.
35
However,
intestate
and
testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person
whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
The parties admit that the decedent,
Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
MICIANO vs BRIMO
FACTS:
> The partition of the estate left by the
deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
> The judicial administrator of this estate
filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however,
approved it.
> The appellant's opposition is based on
the fact that the partition in question puts
into effect the provisions of Joseph G.
Brimo's will which are not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is void?
RULING:
NO. Nevertheless, legal and
testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and
the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it
may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not
prove that said testimentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present
any evidence showing what the Turkish
laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they
are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines.
The oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent
evidence, we find no abuse of discretion
on the part of the court in this particular.
36
AZNAR vs GARCIA
FACTS:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in
New York, migrated to California where
he resided and consequently was
considered a California Citizen for a
period of nine years to 1913. He came
to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until the time of his death.
However, during the entire period of his
residence in this country, he had always
considered himself as a citizen of
California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951,
he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his
only heir but left a legacy of some
money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia who, in a decision rendered by
the Supreme Court had been declared
as an acknowledged natural daughter of
his. Counsel of Helen claims that under
Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California
law should be applied, the matter is
returned back to the law of domicile, that
Philippine law is ultimately applicable,
that the share of Helen must be
increased in view of successional rights
of illegitimate children under Philippine
laws. On the other hand, counsel for
daughter Maria , in as much that it is
clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil
Code, the national of the deceased must
apply, our courts must apply internal law
of California on the matter. Under
California law, there are no compulsory
heirs and consequently a testator should
dispose any property possessed by him
in absolute dominion.
ISSUE:
Whether Philippine Law or
California Law should apply?
RULING:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant
more successional rights to Helen
38
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and
testament is valid?
RULING:
The first issue refers to the share that
the wife of the testator, Magdalena C.
Bohanan, should be entitled to receive.
The will has not given her any share in
the estate left by the testator. It is
argued that it was error for the trial court
to have recognized the Reno divorce
39
ISSUE:
THSE filed a request for arbitration
before the ICC International Court of
Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore after
TGTC failed to deliver the full quantity of
the promised heavy metal scrap iron
and steel.
The ICC ruled in favor of THSE and
ordered TGTC to pay THSE.
THSE filed an action against TGTC for
the recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral award before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati. TGTC moved to
dismiss the case based on THSE lack of
capacity to sue and for prematurity.
TGTC
subsequently
filed
a
supplemental motion to dismiss based
on improper venue. TGTC argued that
the complaint should have been filed in
Cebu where its principal place of
business was located.
The RTC denied TGTC motion to
dismiss.
TGTC moved to reconsider the order
and raised the RTCs alleged lack of
jurisdiction over its person as additional
ground for the dismissal of the
complaint.