Relations Between 'Conjoined Twins' and Friendly India

Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Relations Between 'Conjoined Twins' and Friendly India

Author(s): Salma Malik
Source: Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 63, No. 2, Security Concerns in South and West Asia (April
2010), pp. 69-81
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24711086
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Relations Between 'Conjoined Twins' and Friendly
India
Salma Malik
The security dynamics of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India remain

intractably interlinked. Given their shared histories, shared borders and
shared ethnicities, any political and strategic development in any one of
these countries find resonance in the other two. It was indeed a befitting
statement by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, when in his recently

concluded visit to Pakistan, he alluded to this triangular relation as
'India is a close friend of Afghanistan but Pakistan is a twin brother of
Afghanistan. We are more than twins, we are conjoined twins. There is
no separation, there cannot be a separation'1. Any political development
in Afghanistan has a deep impact on cross-border relations. Kabul, even
prior to the Soviet occupation in 1979 faced extreme political turmoil,
whose geostrategic implications were largely felt in the region. Physically
in the shape of mass exodus of refugees, the first mass movement was
generated as a result of political unrest post-Saur Revolution. Later, the
Cold War between the then superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union
was finally settled on Afghan soil as a fight by proxy where Pakistan
became an active conduit on behalf of the US, and exploitation of religio
ethnic actors in the shape of predominant Sunni Mujahideen. A huge
number of Afghan nationals fled their homes for safety in the
neighbouring countries, mainly Pakistan, then Iran, Central Asia, India
and Europe. However, the problem did not end with the Soviet
withdrawal from the region and the termination of the Cold War.
Current trends
A new and rather disturbing chapter in the history of the region be

where Afghanistan, owing to lack of any post-conflict rehabilitativ
process, swiftly sank into a deadly and spiralling civil war. This led t
acute political vacuum, which resulted in a free hand for non-state actor
such as the Taliban and al Qaeda. The five years of Taliban regime i
Afghanistan not only spelt gross human rights violations and miseries fo
the Afghan people, but its linkage to al Qaeda and the 9/11 terror attack
Salma Malik is Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Stud
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
1 Baqir Sajjad Syed and Ahmad Hassan, 'Pakistan will be privy to talks wi
Taliban: Karzai', Dawn (Karachi), 12 March 2010, www.dawn.com.
PAKISTAN HORIZON
70
initiated the US-led global war on terror. This global effort ha

drastically impacted and shaped world politics in the last nine yea
Pakistan, owing to its links with the Mujahideen and then Talib
militia was also served the ultimatum of either joining the US allian
face drastic consequences. As a result, Pakistan joined the global war
terror, and short of allowing space for physical incursions into and fro
Pakistani territory, it committed to assistance at logistical as well
material levels.
A major negative consequence of this non-NATO alliance, as coined by

the US, was a spilling over of terrorist elements into the frontier tribal
areas of Pakistan as viable safe havens and setting up their operations
from those areas. Gradually, Pakistan also got inextricably embroiled in
fighting terrorism and militancy, as the insurgency spread from tribal
areas into settled areas and a spate of countrywide suicide bombings

caused a major security dilemma for the country. Given that insurgency
cannot be curbed through traditional militaristic means, the government
launched various operations, the latest being Operation Rah-e-Raast to
reclaim settled areas of Swat and pre-empt a major humanitarian crisis
in the shape of massive exodus of internally displaced persons (IDPs)

from the affected valley. According to UN estimates, no less than 360,000
people were uprooted from their homes in the Swat conflict.2 Though
successful to a large extent, as yet Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is not
completely rid of terrorist elements, mainly Afghan or Pakistani Taliban
and al Qaeda leadership, which are still believed to be hiding in these
areas, even if now dispersed and not as fortified as before.
In the eight years that followed, the US policies under the Bush
administration made it thoroughly unpopular, especially in the Muslim
world, which considered itself on the receiving end. Also in its wake, the
US as a country not only lost its popular support internationally, but the
Republican administration also lost a re-election bid especially on the
grounds that owing to overstretching its military engagements, the US
economy had suffered a major setback. This had a corresponding impact
not only on the country's socio-political dynamics; it also contributed in
2 'US offers $4.9mn aid for Swat IDPs', Dawn, 11 May 2009, www.dawn.com.
RELATIONS BETWEEN 'CONJOINED TWINS'
71
turn to a global recession.3 The Democrat administration under President

Barack Obama tried to indulge in a major damage control, and one part
of the appeasement strategy was the announcement of a phased
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. While the second most significant and
important decision was the announcement of a policy review on

Afghanistan. Termed as the Af-Pak Strategy4, this policy announcement
was made on 27 March 2009. Despite major reservations from Pakistan,
the rationale for coupling the two countries was based on the perceived
common challenges and security threats faced by the two neighbours
jointly. These commonalities, according to the US administration, range
from those mentioned previously to terrorism, cross-border infiltration,
narcotics and arms trafficking, as well as the realization that security

interdependence has made it virtually impossible to seek a solution to the
Afghan problem in isolation or try to tackle rising terrorism and

militancy in Pakistan independent from the larger Afghan picture.
Major issues in Indo-Pak cooperation in Afghanistan

The March 2009 Af-Pak Strategy or the White Paper of the Interagency
Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan,
was based on five broad goals:
Disrupting terrorist networks inside Afghanistan and Pakistan so

as to degrade and shrink space available to the terrorists,
Promoting better, effective and sustainable governance

opportunities in Pakistan,
3 'Based on DOD estimates and budget submissions, the cumulative total for
funds appropriated from the 9/11 attacks- through FY2009, total funding
enacted to date for DOD, State/USAID and VA for medical costs for the wars in
Iraq, Afghanistan and enhanced security is $944 billion including: $683 billion
for Iraq; $227 billion for Afghanistan, $29 billion for enhanced security; and $5
billion unallocated. Of this total, 72% is for Iraq, 24% for Afghanistan, 3% for
enhanced security and 1% unallocated. Almost all of the funding for Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) is for Afghanistan. Some 94% of this funding goes to
the Department of Defense to cover primarily incremental war-related costs,

that is, costs that are in addition to normal peacetime activities. These costs
include funds to deploy troops and their equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, to
conduct military operations, to provide in-country support at bases, to provide
special pay for deployed personnel, and to repair, replace, and upgrade war
worn equipment'. Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other
Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Congressional Research Service,
28 September 2009, www.fas.org.
* 'White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy Toward
Afghanistan and Pakistan', www.whitehouse.gov.
PAKISTAN HORIZON
72
Strengthening security and law enforcement forces in

Afghanistan to make them self-reliant and be able to
independently initiate and execute counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency operations,
Trying to bridge the crucial trust deficit shared independently by

both countries with regard to the US by promoting democracy and
economic and political stability,
Achieving these goals through the active involvement of the

international community.
On the same lines, the administration's later circulated draft metrics

for progress also spelt out in nuanced vernacular the future policy
options, regardless of troops deployment and specified timelines. These
included disrupting of terrorist networks both inside Afghanistan as well
as Pakistan, supporting stability in Pakistan, strengthening and

developing Afghan security forces, harnessing international support for
the effort and establishing a capable, strong, transparent, accountable
and politically legitimate popular Afghan government.
At the same time, Richard Holbrooke was appointed as the special

envoy of the US to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Richard Holbrooke has
made repeated trips to the region, including Delhi, and after a year of the
unfolding of the Af-Pak policy, not only has the Holbrooke mission failed
to achieve anything at all, the Afghan presidential elections were widely

condemned as being rigged, and reminiscent of the elections the US
administration at the time had engineered in Vietnam. One can also
observe President Karzai distancing himself from US policies, especially
in his approach towards reconciliation and reintegration with the 'good'
Taliban. This has had the US administration worried about a possible
comeback of the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus into Afghanistan in the near to
intermediate future.
On the other hand, in a final policy review announced by Barack

Obama in December 2009, the US government apparently announced a
formal exit strategy from Afghanistan. In his December 2009 speech at
the West Point Military Academy, Obama stated that in 18 months' time
the US troops will begin to come home.5 However, at the same time,
Obama pledged an additional 30,000 troops to be deployed in the first
part of 2010. The latter announcement, along with the Obama
administration's clear signalling to the Karzai government to weed out
5 Barack Obama, 'The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan', address to the
nation at the US Military Academy at West Point, New York, 01 December
2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
73
corruption and enhance transparency and accountability in government

functioning, is of great importance. The announcement regarding troops'
withdrawal had speculations rife that now the US was losing interest in
Afghanistan, and eight long years of military engagement had turned the
US public opinion against further engagement. Additionally, such a

perceived disengagement would have had a negative impact on the future
course of governance in the country. Also the indigenous Afghan forces,
whether the army or the police, still remain miserably lacking in skills
and the ability to tackle thorny issues such as the drug and land mafia,
increasing crime, pressure from the splinter al Qaeda-Taliban groups.
But the three goals set ahead in this review, along with General Stanley
McChrystal's assessment of future Afghan engagement, would have put
all kinds of suspicions to rest.
With regard to Pakistan, neither the issue of cross-border infiltration
a concern raised by both countries at their own terms has been

completely dealt with nor have the militant and terrorist elements
completely been checked from their operations. In fact, the situation
becomes extremely complex in the face of foreign militants and
insurgents, external actors (state as well as non-state) who, given their
own agenda, are fuelling the militancy through money, infiltration of
arms as well as ideological indoctrination encouraging these elements to
operate across the border. Then there are Pakistani Taliban and more
difficult to pinpoint sleeper elements which are present in the shape of
ideological or political supporters. The kidnapping for ransom of high
level targets, such as a member of the Iranian diplomatic mission,
ambassador-designate of Afghanistan, and a Greek missionary from the
reclusive Kalash Valley are just few such examples. Members of the
Afghan Taliban militia actually cross the Durand Line and hold these
individuals as hostages in lieu of money or release of their fellow
insurgents, in places such as Nuristan inside the Afghan territory.
The trafficking of contraband as well as food items, free flow of

weapons, drugs, terrorist operators and cross-border incursions have
become a sour point in the relations between the two neighbours. The
very fact that the 2,640 kilometres long Durand Line is selectively
considered an international boundary only exacerbates the dilemma.
Allied operations in hot pursuit of Afghan Taliban entering Pakistani
territory, especially drone attacks and the not so pronounced ground
offensive of February 2009, have given rise to serious reservations and
protests from all quarters in Pakistan However, better and stringent
border control mechanisms are needed. Although Pakistan is very keen to
demarcate and then fence the border and negotiate with the Kabul
government over the formalization of the Azad border, the Kabul
PAKISTAN HORIZON
74
administration and concerned circles were giving mixed signals un

recently but now appear reluctant to even talk about a possible
settlement.
In spite of the military aid sanctioned for the Af-Pak operations, not
only is there a significant trust deficit and suspicion with regard to the
US, the general feeling initially shared by the Pakistani public was that
post-9/11 Pakistan's ruling junta played into American hands in order to
seek international legitimacy and support. And as such, Pakistan is
supporting and fighting America's war, a world power which will discard
Pakistan once its purpose has been fulfilled. This gave credence to
extremist elements within the country, as time and again they would
point to past US relations with Pakistan, which had been more or less
interest driven. However, the rise of insurgency and militancy, first in
FATA and then Swat and its surrounding areas, and the atrocities
committed by the Pakistani Taliban have ended up invoking public
ownership and acceptance in counter-insurgency operations. But with
regard to the US, the Obama administration has brought about a marked
change of perception in comparison to the Bush administration, but
suspicions still remain. Regardless of the conditional aid package, the
expansion of the US diplomatic mission in Pakistan, contradictory reports
of Blackwater (now Xe) private security firm setting up operations inside
Pakistan, the long simmering issue of extraordinary rendition and

missing persons, coupled with detainees at Guantanamo Bay prison have
only heightened the ill will towards the US. The mistrust and suspicions
are mutual. In spite of the capturing of some important al Qaeda
operatives, including Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar, Washington and
Kabul both consider the three main anti-Afghan groups, namely the
Quetta Shura led by Mulla Omar, the Haqqani group and Hikmatyar's
faction to be operating from within Pakistan.
The significance of the US as a regional, and in Pakistan's case, next

door neighbour for an indefinite time period is enormous. For Pakistan, it
is the second time in its contemporary history to have a global power in

its neighbourhood, first the Soviets during the decade of the 1980s, and
now the United States. The dynamics of the time helped Pakistan fight
the last battle of the Cold War as a favoured proxy, but not without
drastic strategic consequences. However for India, an aspirant from

regional to great power status, then and even now, Afghanistan is a
regional neighbour whose problems should be dealt with at a regional
level. In spite of being a Soviet friend, India was vocal in protesting
against the Soviet occupation and in the current phase, if seen from
Pakistan's perspective, India is grooming itself as the most viable
alternative to the US and allied forces, once they withdraw from

Afghanistan. Although this may not be possible in the near future, the
75
massive rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, to the tune of 1.2 billion

dollars and close ties with the Afghan ruling elite, is an enormous source
of discomfort for Pakistan.
Even prior to the Soviet occupation, Pak-Afghan relations remained

thorny, largely owing to the Durand Line and the Pashtunistan claim
which Pakistan generally blamed as instigated by India. In the current
circumstances, New Delhi's growing interest in Kabul, perceived
sponsoring of anti-Pakistan factions of the Northern Alliance, are
askance with Pakistan's quest for the elusive strategic depth which is
part of its security outlook. With regard to similar Indian issues, at times
state, and in certain cases, non-state actors' involvement in cross-border

terrorism and Pakistan's support to the Kashmir movement has only
increased the disconnections between the two countries. As a result, the
composite dialogue process between the two countries has reached a
standstill. This is also a major cause of concern to the US, which is now
an important stakeholder in the dynamics of regional stability.
India's role as an important stakeholder has time and again been

acknowledged, highlighted and accepted by the US. Likewise, New Delhi
is very keenly participating and observing developments on the Pak
Afghan front. However, India distanced itself when the Obama

administration spelled out the joint Af-Pak strategy by raising the
reservation that it did not want to get bracketed with fragile or failing
states. Is India interested in a proactive military role? For the moment,
New Delhi has not made its intentions clear. What is obvious is that
India's traditional Nehruvian mindset that South Asia is its extended
domain, with little space for regional or extra-regional actors to ass
their power in regional politics, stands true today as well. Being
bracketed in the same index as Afghanistan was looked upon by Paki

with reservations. However, given the commonalities and shared
challenges, the term Af-Pak had gradually and reluctantly been accepted
in the Pakistani strategic lexicon, albeit with a pinch of salt, to be
discredited by its very authors.
Much of the regional stability and progress remains hostage to the
larger India-Pakistan impasse. The Composite Dialogue Process
mentioned previously, is now conditionally hinged on terrorism, more so

after the December 2008 Mumbai attacks. The recently concluded March
2010 India and Pakistan foreign ministers' meeting has paved the path
for resumption of the dialogue process, yet no proper timelines have been
established as yet. The issue of terrorism still looms large, in spite of a
joint terrorism mechanism that the two countries had agreed upon.
Terrorism as an issue also affects Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and
bilateral as well as trilateral dimensions such as the Aman Jirga or the
PAKISTAN HORIZON
76
US-Pakistan and Afghanistan forum, structures which can be bett

exploited and used.
Another important yet thorny issue which all three neighbo
complain to each other about is the intervention of non-state elemen

proxies to destabilize each other. Pakistan's premier intelligence age
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has in the recent years come unde
enormous scrutiny for its role in promotion of jihad and religiou
extremism. Likewise, complaints have been made from the Pakistani
that India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has been an active fa
initially in the Karachi unrest of the 1980s, which led to separ
conflict in this mega port city, and is now instigating ultra nation
elements in Balochistan. Ironically, the passage of the controversi
Kerry-Lugar Bill coupled with the Barman Bill in the US legisla

remains conditional and seeks guarantees from Islamabad for non
interference in neighbouring politics. However, it carries no similar
provisions vis-a-vis the regional neighbours. Thirdly, time and again
Kabul insists that its soil should neither be used for proxy wars between
bigger powers nor between its regional neighbours. This was also stated
by President Karzai and the head of the Afghan National Security
Council, Dr. Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, in a recent meeting with Pakistani

academics and media personnel.6
The road ahead: Overcoming problems

What is the way forward? What kind of a role should be played by
regional actors and how can Pakistan, Afghanistan and India's triangular
relation be worked out, especially in the light of the broader Afghan
Pakistan or reappraised development parameters. Keeping true to these
guidelines only, there is a lot which can be done, with piecemeal efforts
already underway. The biggest impediment in this triangular relation is
varying degrees of human development and capacity building in the three
countries. Whereas democracy, though for a limited phase in the 1970s,

has never been breached in India, Pakistan has had to face repeated
military takeovers and Afghanistan remains a classic transitional state
which exhibits traces of conflict past and present.
In order to realize the first goal of countering and eradicating

terrorism, a problem shared by all three countries, there is a need for
adequate capacity building. Unfortunately, in the case of India and
Pakistan, given the intractable Kashmir conflict, terrorism is a relatively
obscure term; both countries accuse each other of state-sponsored

6 Imtiaz Gui, 'Countering Afghani perceptions of Pakistan', Weekly Pulse
(Islamabad), 12 March 2010.
77
terrorism, but in a different contextual framework. However, the current
deadlock on the peace process demands that the neighbours review their
policies and work out a joint strategy. As mentioned previously, both
India and Pakistan not only share a joint terrorism mechanism with each
other which entails mutual and bilateral cooperation at various levels,
but also share critical intelligence which may be of mutual benefit to
both. Secondly, under the South Asian Association of Regional
Cooperation's (SAARC) regional framework, not only these two but now
Afghanistan also is signatory to regional protocols. Unfortunately
SAARC, the only forum for the most populated region of the world, is not
taken seriously and remains hostage to India-Pakistan bilateral conflicts,

though it was on purpose not mandated to discuss bilateral contentious
issues.
As mentioned before, there are also pre-existing arrangements in

place between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which means that it is not lack
of institutional capacity but the will to implement that is the main
impediment. At the practical level, all three countries have been fighting
their own domestic battles against terrorism; in case of India and

Pakistan, law enforcement as well as military and paramilitary forces
have been involved in fighting this menace. In case of Afghanistan, it is
primarily the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
effort, with a parallel attempt to develop and strengthen the Afghan
army and police forces that are tasked to carry out anti-terrorist
operations. The US ascendancy over the entire security apparatus in
Afghanistan has its ISAF partners voicing major displeasure over their
specific roles in reform and reconstruction being pushed aside. Besides,
another major concern voiced by the alliance partners is to include
regional countries, such as Iran, in any decision pertaining to
Afghanistan, as they have a direct stake in the stability and
sustainability of the state.
To prevent cross-border infiltration, stringent control across the

Durand Line is required. Although the ISAF-NATO forces have already
implemented various means of monitoring and checking illegal flow of
individuals and resources, least of all being the Iris Recognition
Immigration System (IRIS), the long stretch of border, its ambiguous
political status, the easement clause for affected tribes, and a sizable
number of unmanned border crossing points, coupled with the

treacherous mountainous terrain, make the task extremely arduous.
Unlike the past, there is sufficient will, though tacit, in Afghanistan to
recognize the Durand Line as the international border between the two
countries. Pakistan has already been trying to bring the Afghans on
board, and it would actually be of great significance that the contentious
PAKISTAN HORIZON
78
status of this border is now removed once and for all. Ironically, du
the Soviet invasion and later as well, the Durand Line has been
selectively recognized as the international border, especially from the
Afghan side. Therefore, with sufficient political backing, it would be
strategically suitable to confirm its status.
At the domestic level, not only is there a need to build, train, develop
and strengthen military and law enforcement agencies to counter

terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, or what can be termed as
operations other than war, but most importantly to revamp, train and
adequately equip the justice system. For this purpose, a lot is being done
by international donor agencies and actors but the most effective would
be to share regional best practices without any prejudice and bias, as
these measures would be most viable and sustainable. There could be
possible joint training exercises, and intelligence sharing. However, giv

the complex security dynamics, such cooperative measures remain
elusive. According to Dr. Spanta, the Afghan government is more than
ever keen to engage with the intelligence and military institutions of
Pakistan, an opportunity which must be looked into further.
With regard to capacity building, it is most important to gain local

ownership and support both at individual and regional levels. From
Pakistan's experience, the 2009 anti-Taliban Swat operation, in
comparison to similar counter-insurgency operations launched in
previous years was only possible when the local population were made
stakeholders in peace. The massive mobilization of residents of the valley
into IDP camps, in order to minimize collateral damage and the military's
strategy of controlled media exposure, along with taking the political and
civil actors into complete confidence made the operation a huge success.
Although it was the military which led these initiatives, more important
is the strengthening of law enforcement agencies and police forces that
actually should be carrying out these operations. There are similar
examples found within the region which can be replicated and tailored to
suit individual case studies, instead of relying on hypothetical models.
The recently launched Marjah Operation by ISAF and NATO forces is
considered by many as a replication of the Malakand operation
successfully waged by Pakistani forces. Capacity building, as previously

mentioned, is both institutional and a human resource, and channelled
towards both formal as well as existing, viable alternate justice and

correctional setups, such as commonly shared jirga, shura, or panchayat
systems.
Secondly, strengthening and supporting a stable Pakistan. Owing to

warped civil-military relations and regional dynamics, democracy as a
sustained process has more or less remained elusive in Pakistan's case.
79
Ironically, in the three major military takeovers, the quest for legitimacy
always found a friendly audience in the West which, owing to its Cold
War and then post 9/11 strategic interest, was seeking allies. The
coinciding interests meant sufficient military aid, though if seen from the
recipient perspective, during the 1950s it was dumping of redundant

weapons systems, in the 1980s it was Afghanistan-specific, though with
sufficient space for leakage, and post 9/11, it was highly conditional to
stringent performance parameters. But military regimes have been more
suitable to US interests. The foremost need is to invest in, support and
help build and strengthen democratic political forces and institutions.
Also promotion of better governance is an important goal.
Both India and Pakistan have, in their own right, initiated various
reform measures such as police reforms, command and control
mechanisms, justice and correctional reforms, restructuring and

strengthening institutional capacity to deliver. But whereas in India, the
security sector reforms and governance is an important part of security
discourse, Pakistan has yet to embrace the concept as a holistic term,
with very little investment in discourse development. Learning from each
other's experience and building stakes in Afghan Security Sector Reforms
(SSR) could be a positive step in the direction, though in the latter's case,
it is US-ISAF dominated.
The third aspect of promoting transparency, governance,

accountability and strengthening of the security sector vis-a-vis
Afghanistan is again very important, as any significant to major unrest
and instability has a direct consequence across the border. Both India
and Pakistan have been involved in Afghan rehab, refugee repatriation
as well as reconstruction activities. It would be better if they are also
considered partners in a long-term solution. Both the countries also need
to understand and acknowledge the other's interest in Afghanistan. If
India seeks an active share in the Afghan pie, then New Delhi must also
acknowledge that its presence in Afghanistan heightens Pakistan's
security dilemma, especially given that Pakistan has always considered
Afghanistan as its strategic depth while spelling its strategic outlook. The
question remains that neither Pakistan nor India would ever remain at
ease with the other's over-engagement and investment in Afghan affairs,
as invariably it is considered contrary to their national interests.
Combining the last two points, the region has had its fair share of
external involvement already; rather, it suffers from a classic overdose.
The question is, do we need more proactive involvement, whether in the
shape of the US as a strategic ally, partner, friend of Pakistan mulling
over economic bailout packages or a donor rushing into rebuilding
Afghanistan on its own terms. Too much external support leaves little
PAKISTAN HORIZON
80
space for harnessing internal support mechanisms, which are mo
critical. With regard to trust deficit, a lot of lost ground was covered wit
Secretary Clinton's admission that the US was largely responsible for t
rise of extremism and terrorism in the region, by promoting jihad during
the 1980s. It is an uphill task and less collateral damage attributed to

drones and redressai of flawed policies of the previous US administrati
can certainly be helpful.
Pakistan needs to strengthen and cultivate existing infrastructure an

institutional mechanisms as well as invest in new avenues, such as
improved cultural, academic and institutional engagements and
interactions. Kabul's micro-economy is heavily reliant on Pakistan. We
must open more trade and commercial opportunities that are mutually
beneficial. With regard to India and Pakistan, the Composite Dialogue
Process that has been reinitiated should be without further
preconditions, and both sides should try to ink agreement

resolved issues such as Siachen and Sir Creek for enforcing
between the two states and making this process work bey
official meetings.
Security Sector Reforms (SSR) are being carried out piece
two countries, at times driven by donor interest. However, the
institutionalize the security sector and justice development

at domestic, bilateral and regional levels. In the case of Afg
mentioned before, it is a transitional state, with active co
continuing in many parts of the country. The need is to im
best security system workable which syncs in well with the
cultural norms. At present, the entire security apparatus and law
enforcement is in the hands of foreign actors, with the poorly equipped
Afghan forces trying to define their role in this chaos. The need is not
only to review security and strategic outlook for future regional stability
but also to carry out a domestic appraisal. Though it is an ideal goal, it is

very critical for the future benefit of all the countries concerned.
Blame gaming as well as the policy of seeking strategic depth and

proxies needs to be critically reviewed. Mutual engagement and demands
such as non-intervention and interference need to be reciprocal, or else
this unhealthy trend would continue. Learn from each other and build
local solutions to local problems, a most critical element. India, vis-a-vis
Pakistan, needs to engage with democratic political forces a lot more than
remaining focused on the military as the main actor.
Terrorism as a policy option should be discarded as it is highly

counterproductive. All three neighbours should realize that investment in
peace and future stability is most important, as they share their present
and future together. Promoting bilateral as well as trilateral initiatives

such as energy pipelines and corridors would not only help to overcome
the mutually faced energy crisis but also be an enormous bridge-building
exercise.
81

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