.

Application for Invention Patent

The application for a grant of Philippine Patent (for Invention) must be filed
with the Bureau of Patents (BOP) of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) through the
Receiving Section/Counter of the Administrative, Financial and Human Resource
Development Services Bureau (AFHRDSB) located at the ground floor of the IPO
Building. To obtain a filing date, the following has to be submitted:
(a) Properly filled-out Request Form for a Grant of Philippine Patent;
(b) Name, address and signature of applicant(s); for non-resident applicant, the
name and address of his/her/their resident agent; and
(c) Description of the invention and one or more claims.
NOTE: It is advised that any drawing/s necessary to understand the subject invention
should be submitted at the time of filing so that there would not be a possible change
in filing date due to late submission/filing of said drawing/s . (Rule 602 of the IRR)The
other formal requirements, which are not needed to obtain a filing date, but maybe
included at the time of filing are:
(a) A filing fee (for big or small entities) which maybe paid during application
filing or within one month from the date of filing. The application shall be deemed
automatically cancelled/withdrawn in case of non-payment of such fees;
(b) Drawing(s) necessary to understand the invention;
(c) An abstract; and
(d) If the priority of an earlier filed application is being claimed, the details of
the claim, i.e. filing date, file number and country of origin.
2. Formality Examination
Upon receipt of the application, the examiner checks if the application satisfies
the formal requirements needed for the grant of a filing date. The date of filing is
very important under the present first-to-file system because it serves to
determine, in case of a dispute with another applicant for the same invention, who
has the right to the patent.
3. Publication of Unexamined Application
After the formality examination, search and the classification of the field of
technology to which the invention is
assigned, the application together with the results of the search (which contains a list
of published patent applications or issued patents for inventions, which are identical
or equivalent to those claimed by the application), will be published in the IPO
Gazette (after the expiration of 18 months from the filing date or priority date). After
the publication of the application, any person may present observations in writing
concerning the patentability of the invention. Such observation shall be
communicated to the applicant who may comment on them.
4. Request for Substantive Examination Substantive examination is
conducted upon request

The request for substantive examination of the application must be filed within
six (6) months from the date of the publication. The application is considered
withdrawn if no request is made within that period. If the examiner finds reason to
refuse the registration of the application, i.e. the application is not new, inventive or
industrially applicable, the Bureau shall notify the applicant of the reason for
refusal/rejection giving the applicant the chance to defend or amend the application.
5. Decision to Grant Patent Registration or Decision of Refusal
If the examiner finds no reason for refusal of the application, or if the notice of
reason for refusal is satisfactorily complied with by amendment or correction, the
examiner issues a decision to grant the patent registration. Otherwise, the examiner
refuses the application.
6. Inspection of Records
The grant of a patent together with other information shall be published in the
IPO Gazette within six (6) months. Any interested party may inspect the complete
description, claims, and drawings of the patent on file with the Office.
7. Appeal
(a) Every applicant may appeal to the Director of Patents the final refusal of
the examiner to grant the patent within two (2) months from the mailing date of the
final refusal. The decision or order of the Director shall become final and executory
fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy by the appellant unless within the same
period, a motion for reconsideration is filed with the Director or an appeal to the
Director General is filed together with the payment of the required fee. (b) The
decision of the Director General may be appealed to the Court of Appeals. If the
applicant is still not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, he may appeal
to the Supreme Court.
- See more at: http://www.ipophil.gov.ph/services/patents/patent-application-flowchart#sthash.QgdOhPT0.dpuf

Dispute[edit]
The case arose from a dispute over patents covering diagnostic tests for HIV infection (U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,968,730,[3]6,503,705,[4] and 7,129,041[5]), originally owned by Stanford
University, and HIV diagnostic tests sold by Roche.[1] When Stanford sued Roche for
infringing the patents in 2005, Roche countered by claiming that it jointly owned the patents,
due to an agreement that a Stanford faculty member, Dr. Mark Holodniy, signed in the late
1980s when he did research at Cetus, the biotechnology company that invented PCR and
that was later acquired by Roche.
When Holodniy had joined the faculty of Stanford shortly before he had visited Cetus, he, like
all scientific personnel at companies and research institutions, had signed an agreement in
which he agreed that his employer would own any inventions he made. Stanford's

agreement, in particular, stated that he "'agree[d] to assign' to Stanford his 'right, title and
interest in' inventions resulting from his employment at the University." [1]:2
The Stanford lab in which Holodniy worked had been working on developing better HIV tests,
and wanted to try the new PCR method, so Holodniy's supervisor had arranged for him to
work at Cetus to learn the technique. Under standard business practice, Cetus had Holodniy
sign a confidentiality agreement before allowing him into their facilities. The particular
agreement that Holodniy signed stated that Holodniy will assign and do[es] hereby assign
to Cetus his right, title and interest in each of the ideas, inventions and improvements made
as a consequence of [his] access to Cetus.[1]:2
After completing his training at Cetus, Holodniy then returned to Stanford where he and other
Stanford employees tested the HIV measurement technique. Over the next few years,
Stanford obtained written assignments of rights from the Stanford employees, including
Holodniy, and filed several patent applications related to the procedure. Stanford secured
three patents to the HIV measurement process. Some of Stanfords research related to the
HIV measurement technique was funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), thereby
subjecting the invention to the Bayh-Dole Act. Accordingly, Stanford disclosed the invention
to the government, granted the government a nonexclusive, nontransferable, paid-up license
to use the patented procedure, and formally notified NIH that it elected to retain title to the
invention.

Ownership of inventions[edit]
As succinctly described by Dennis Crouch, "ownership of patent rights and inchoate pre-filing
rights are somewhat confusing because they involve a mixture of federal patent law and state
laws of contracts, employment, and trade secrets."[6]
The US Constitution grants inventors ownership of inventions they make under the Copyright
Clause which grants Congress the authority "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." However, for inventors who are employed,
complications ensue.[7] In the absence of a written agreement, under common law an
employee will own an invention he or she makes, unless the employee was hired specifically
to invent and provided means and direction to make the invention.[8] However, companies and
universities that hire scientists to conduct research obligate their employees to sign contracts
in which inventions are assigned to the employer, and these contracts are governed by a
mixture of federal law and state law.[8][9]
When the employer itself contracts with third parties, those contracts may also create
obligations with respect to intellectual property invented by employees. Especially in fee-forservice contract research, assignment of inventions from the contract research organization

(CRO) to the sponsor is common.[10] Therefore the inventor could either first assign his or her
invention to the CRO, which would in turn assign it to the sponsor, or for the sake of
simplicity, the CRO employee could assign directly to the sponsor. Before the Bayh-Dole Act
was passed in 1980, research grants and contracts issued by the US government often
obligated recipient institutions and companies to assign inventions to the US government,
and scientists generally directly assigned inventions to the US government.[11] The Bayh-Dole
Act changed this; the specific language of the statute is: "Each nonprofit organization or
small business firm (that receives a federal grant) may... elect to retain title to any subject
invention"[12] and also: "If a contractor does not elect to retain title to a subject invention in
cases subject to this section, the Federal agency may consider and after consultation with
the contractor grant requests for retention of rights by the inventor subject to the provisions of
this Act and regulations promulgated hereunder."[13] It is this specific language upon which
Stanford would rely in its dispute with Roche.

District Court case[edit]

In 2005, the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University filed suit against
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., alleging that Roche's HIV detection kits were infringing the
three patents. Roche argued that it had acquired rights to the patents when it purchased
Cetus, and pleaded the ownership theory in three forms: (i) as a declaratory judgment
counterclaim; (ii) as an affirmative defense; and (iii) as a challenge to Stanford's standing to
sue for infringement. The district court held that Roche's counterclaim for ownership of the
patents was barred by California statutes of limitation.
Stanford also argued that it had a "right of second refusal" to the patents subject to the
Government's right of first refusal, under 35 U.S.C. 202(d) of the Bayh-Dole Act as
described above. The district court agreed with Stanford, holding that Holodniy could only
keep title to his inventions "[i]f a contractor does not elect to retain title to a subject invention."
However, the district court also held that the patent claims were invalid for obviousness.
Both parties appealed.[14]

Federal Circuit case[edit]

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Roche's ownership counterclaim was
barred by the California statutes of limitation, but held that the affirmative defense of
ownership was not barred, and that "questions of standing can be raised at any time and are
not foreclosed by, or subject to, statutes of limitation." The court then determined that Cetus
(and therefore Roche) had in fact acquired rights to the three patents due to the agreement
that Holodniy had signed with Cetus.[14]

Citing two prior Federal Circuit cases, the court held that the language "agree to assign" in
the agreement that Stanford had Holodniy sign, was merely a promise to assign his invention
rights to Stanford at some undetermined future point. Also, when Holodniy signed the
contract, Stanford's Administrative Guide to "Inventions, Patents, and Licensing" stated that:
"[u]nlike industry and many other universities, Stanford's invention rights policy allows all
rights to remain with the inventor if possible." And with respect to the Cetus contract, the
Federal Circuit interpreted the contract language "do hereby assign" to be "a present
assignment of Holodniy's future inventions to Cetus," thereby giving Cetus immediate rights
in Holodniy's future inventions. By the time Holodniy executed an assignment to Stanford
three years later with respect to the patent applications that Stanford filed, his rights had
already transferred to Cetus and the subsequent assignment was void. The Court found that
Stanford itself received constructive notice of Cetuss ownership rights at least through
Holodniys employment by Stanfordin other words, Holodniy's knowledge of the Cetus
agreement was imputed to his employer. The Court also found that Stanford had similar
constructive notice through Holodniys supervisor, who directed Holodniy to work with Cetus
and executed agreements of his own that transferred intellectual property rights to Cetus.
Although Stanford asserted that Holodniy signed the agreement with Cetus solely on his own
behalf, not Stanfords, the Court found that this argument missed the point. According to the
Court, the agreement with Cetus indicates that Holodniy was acting as an independent
contractor with respect to Cetus, not with respect to Stanford, and that Holodniy [had] signed
away his individual rights as an inventor, not Stanfords.[15]
With respect to Stanford's claims about the Bayh-Dole Act, the Federal Circuit overruled the
District Court decision, holding that the Act does not void an otherwise valid prior transfer of
rights. As a result, Stanford was entitled to only those rights that remained after the
Government declined to exercise its option.
According to the Court, Stanford therefore lacked standing to sue Roche, the district court
lacked jurisdiction over Stanfords infringement claim, and the district court should not have
addressed the validity of the patents. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district courts
finding of invalidity and remanded the case for dismissal due to lack of standing.
Stanford appealed to the Supreme Court based on its argument that Bayh-Dole overrides
normal ownership of inventions.[16]

Supreme Court case[edit]

In November 2010 the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. [16] The case was decided on
June 6, 2011. The decision was "largely moot" as the majority, led by Chief Justice Roberts,
held that US patent rights have always (since 1790) initially vested in "the inventor" and that
the non-specific language of the Bayh-Dole Act does nothing to change the original setup. [6]

Effects[edit]
The effects on patent law were negligible: "The Supreme Courts grant of certiorari for this
case came as a surprise to many intellectual property attorneys who did not believe that the
Bayh-Dole Act changed the centuries old proposition that inventors ultimately have rights in
their patents. As a result, the Supreme Courts decision certainly reassured inventors, as well
as all those involved in the practice of law involving inventions, that their longstanding belief
that the ownership rights in inventions belong first and foremost to inventors is correct." [2]
As the case unfolded, it was clear that the problems arose because of Stanford's "failure to
negotiate a tight assignment agreement with its researchers and scientists" and further that
the simple solution would be to have existing university employees agree to a new, more
explicit and immediately effective assignment agreement and have all new employees sign
such agreements.[6] Universities including MIT and Stanford have done so.

ANGELITA MANZANO v ca
FACTS:The petitioner filed an action for the cancellation of Letters of Patent
covering a gasburner registered in the name of responded Melecia Madolaria
who subsequently assigned theletter of patent to United Foundry. Petitioner
alleged that the private respondent was not theoriginal, true and actual inventor
nor did she derive her rights from the original, true and actualinventor of the utility
model covered by the letter of patent; further alleged that the utilitymodel covered
by the subject letter of patent had been known or used by others in
thePhilippines for than one (1) year before she filed her application for letter of
patent on Dec1979. For failure to present substantive proof of her allegations, the
lower court and Court of Appeals denied the action for cancellation. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent court wrongfully denied the cancellation of
letter of patent registered under the private respondent.
HELD:No. The issuance of such patent creates a presumption which yields only
to clear andcogent evidence that the patentee was the original and first inventor.
The burden of provingwant of novelty is on him who avers it and the burden is a
heavy one which is met only by clearand satisfactory proof which overcomes
every reasonable doubt. Clearly enough, the petitionerfailed to present clear and
satisfactory proof to overcome every reasonable doubt to afford thecancellation
of the patent to the private respondent.
GODINEZ V CA
Through this petition for review in certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the trial court, petitioner Pascual Godines seeks to
reverse the adverse decision of the Court a quo that he was liable for
infringement of patent and unfair competition. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision is hereby quoted to wit:
WHEREFORE, with the elimination of the award for attorney's fees, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against appellant. 1
The patent involved in this case is Letters Patent No. UM-2236 issued by the
Philippine Patent Office to one Magdalena S. Villaruz on July 15, 1976. It covers
a utility model for a hand tractor or power tiller, the main components of which
are the following: "(1) a vacuumatic house float; (2) a harrow with adjustable
operating handle; (3) a pair of paddy wheels; (4) a protective water covering for
the engine main drive; (5) a transmission case; (6) an operating handle; (7) an
engine foundation on the top midportion of the vacuumatic housing float to which
the main engine drive is detachedly installed; (8) a frontal frame extension above
the quarter circularly shaped water covering hold (sic) in place the
transmission case; (9) a V-belt connection to the engine main drive with
transmission gear through the pulley, and (10) an idler pulley installed on the
engine foundation." 2 The patented hand tractor works in the following manner:
"the engine drives the transmission gear thru the V-belt, a driven pulley and a
transmission shaft. The engine drives the transmission gear by tensioning of the
V-belt which is controlled by the idler pulley. The V-belt drives the pulley attached
to the transmission gear which in turn drives the shaft where the paddy wheels

are attached. The operator handles the hand tractor through a handle which is
inclined upwardly and supported by a pair of substanding pipes and reinforced by
a U-shaped G.I. pipe at the V-shaped end." 3
The above mentioned patent was acquired by SV-Agro Industries Enterprises,
Inc., herein private respondent, from Magdalena Villaruz, its chairman and
president, by virtue of a Deed of Assignment executed by the latter in its favor.
On October 31, 1979, SV-Agro Industries caused the publication of the patent in
Bulletin Today, a newspaper of general circulation.
In accordance with the patent, private respondent manufactured and sold the
patented power tillers with the patent imprinted on them. In 1979, SV-Agro
Industries suffered a decline of more than 50% in sales in its Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur branch. Upon investigation, it discovered that power tillers
similar to those patented by private respondent were being manufactured and
sold by petitioner herein. Consequently, private respondent notified Pascual
Godines about the existing patent and demanded that the latter stop selling and
manufacturing similar power tillers. Upon petitioner's failure to comply with the
demand, SV-Agro Industries filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
infringement of patent and unfair competition.
After trial, the court held Pascual Godines liable for infringement of patent and
unfair competition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff SV-Agro Industries Enterprises, Inc., and against defendant Pascual
Godines:
1. Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court against
defendant as permanent;
2. Ordering defendant Pascual Godines to pay plaintiff the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages to its business reputation and goodwill, plus the
further sum of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) for unrealized profits during
the period defendant was manufacturing and selling copied or imitation floating
power tiller;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff, the further sum of Eight Thousand
Pesos (P8,000.00) as reimbursement of attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation; and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 4
The decision was affirmed by the appellate court.
Thereafter, this petition was filed. Petitioner maintains the defenses which he
raised before the trial and appellate courts, to wit: that he was not engaged in the
manufacture and sale of the power tillers as he made them only upon the special
order of his customers who gave their own specifications; hence, he could not be
liable for infringement of patent and unfair competition; and that those made by
him were different from those being manufactured and sold by private
respondent.
We find no merit in his arguments. The question of whether petitioner was
manufacturing and selling power tillers is a question of fact better addressed to
the lower courts. In dismissing the first argument of petitioner herein, the Court of
Appeals quoted the findings of the court, to wit:

It is the contention of defendant that he did not manufacture or make imitations or

copies of plaintiff's turtle power tiller as what he merely did was to fabricate his
floating power tiller upon specifications and designs of those who ordered them.
However, this contention appears untenable in the light of the following
circumstances: 1) he admits in his Answer that he has been manufacturing power
tillers or hand tractors, selling and distributing them long before plaintiff started
selling its turtle power tiller in Zamboanga del Sur and Misamis Occidental,
meaning that defendant is principally a manufacturer of power tillers, not upon
specification and design of buyers, but upon his own specification and design; 2)
it would be unbelievable that defendant would fabricate power tillers similar to the
turtle power tillers of plaintiff upon specifications of buyers without requiring a job
order where the specification and designs of those ordered are specified. No
document was (sic) ever been presented showing such job orders, and it is
rather unusual for defendant to manufacture something without the specification
and designs, considering that he is an engineer by profession and proprietor of
the Ozamis Engineering shop. On the other hand, it is also highly unusual for
buyers to order the fabrication of a power tiller or hand tractor and allow
defendant to manufacture them merely based on their verbal instructions. This is
contrary to the usual business and manufacturing practice. This is not only time
consuming, but costly because it involves a trial and error method, repeat jobs
and material wastage. Defendant judicially admitted two (2) units of the turtle
power tiller sold by him to Policarpio Berondo. 5
Of general acceptance is the rule imbedded in our jurisprudence that ". . . the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the
review of errors of law, and that said appellate court's findings of fact are
conclusive upon this Court." 6
The fact that petitioner herein manufactured and sold power tillers without
patentee's authority has been established by the courts despite petitioner's
claims to the contrary.
The question now arises: Did petitioner's product infringe upon the patent of
private respondent?
Tests have been established to determine infringement. These are (a) literal
infringement; and (b) the doctrine of equivalents. 7 In using literal infringement as
a test, ". . . resort must be had, in the first instance, to the words of the claim. If
accused matter clearly falls within the claim, infringement is made out and that is
the end of it." 8 To determine whether the particular item falls within the literal
meaning of the patent claims, the court must juxtapose the claims of the patent
and the accused product within the overall context of the claims and
specifications, to determine whether there is exact identity of all material
elements. 9
The trial court made the following observation:
Samples of the defendant's floating power tiller have been produced and
inspected by the court and compared with that of the turtle power tiller of the
plaintiff (see Exhibits H to H-28). In appearance and form, both the floating power
tillers of the defendant and the turtle power tiller of the plaintiff are virtually the

same. Defendant admitted to the Court that two (2) of the power inspected on
March 12, 1984, were manufactured and sold by him (see TSN, March 12, 1984,
p. 7). The three power tillers were placed alongside with each other. At the center
was the turtle power tiller of plaintiff, and on both sides thereof were the floating
power tillers of defendant (Exhibits H to H-2). Witness Rodrigo took photographs
of the same power tillers (front, side, top and back views for purposes of
comparison (see Exhibits H-4 to H-28). Viewed from any perspective or angle,
the power tiller of the defendant is identical and similar to that of the turtle power
tiller of plaintiff in form, configuration, design and appearance. The parts or
components thereof are virtually the same. Both have the circularly-shaped
vacuumatic housing float, a paddy in front, a protective water covering, a
transmission box housing the transmission gears, a handle which is V-shaped
and inclined upwardly, attached to the side of the vacuumatic housing float and
supported by the upstanding G.I. pipes and an engine base at the top midportion
of the vacuumatic housing float to which the engine drive may be attached. In
operation, the floating power tiller of the defendant operates also in similar
manner as the turtle power tiller of plaintiff. This was admitted by the defendant
himself in court that they are operating on the same principles. (TSN, August 19,
1987, p. 13) 10
Moreover, it is also observed that petitioner also called his power tiller as a
floating power tiller. The patent issued by the Patent Office referred to a "farm
implement but more particularly to a turtle hand tractor having a vacuumatic
housing float on which the engine drive is held in place, the operating handle, the
harrow housing with its operating handle and the paddy wheel protective
covering." 11 It appears from the foregoing observation of the trial court that these
claims of the patent and the features of the patented utility model were copied by
petitioner. We are compelled to arrive at no other conclusion but that there was
infringement.
Petitioner's argument that his power tillers were different from private
respondent's is that of a drowning man clutching at straws.
Recognizing that the logical fallback position of one in the place of defendant is
to aver that his product is different from the patented one, courts have adopted
the doctrine of equivalents which recognizes that minor modifications in a
patented invention are sufficient to put the item beyond the scope of literal
infringement. 12 Thus, according to this doctrine, "(a)n infringement also occurs
when a device appropriates a prior invention by incorporating its innovative
concept and, albeit with some modification and change, performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the
same result." 13 The reason for the doctrine of equivalents is that to permit the
imitation of a patented invention which does not copy any literal detail would be
to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such
imitation would leave room for indeed encourage the unscrupulous copyist
to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent
which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside
the claim, and hence outside the reach of the law. 14
In this case, the trial court observed:

Defendant's witness Eduardo Caete, employed for 11 years as welder of the

Ozamis Engineering, and therefore actually involved in the making of the floating
power tillers of defendant tried to explain the difference between the floating
power tillers made by the defendant. But a careful examination between the two
power tillers will show that they will operate on the same fundamental principles.
And, according to establish jurisprudence, in infringement of patent, similarities or
differences are to be determined, not by the names of things, but in the light of
what elements do, and substantial, rather than technical, identity in the test. More
specifically, it is necessary and sufficient to constitute equivalency that the same
function can be performed in substantially the same way or manner, or by the
same or substantially the same, principle or mode of operation; but where these
tests are satisfied, mere differences of form or name are immaterial. . . . 15
It also stated:
To establish an infringement, it is not essential to show that the defendant
adopted the device or process in every particular; Proof of an adoption of the
substance of the thing will be sufficient. "In one sense," said Justice Brown, "it
may be said that no device can be adjudged an infringement that does not
substantially correspond with the patent. But another construction, which would
limit these words to exact mechanism described in the patent, would be so
obviously unjust that no court could be expected to adopt it. . . .
The law will protect a patentee against imitation of his patent by other forms and
proportions. If two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and
accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they
differ in name, form, or shape. 16
We pronounce petitioner liable for infringement in accordance with Section 37 of
Republic Act No. 165, as amended, providing, inter alia:
Sec. 37. Right of Patentees. A patentee shall have the exclusive right to make,
use and sell the patented machine, article or product, and to use the patented
process for the purpose of industry or commerce, throughout the territory of the
Philippines for the terms of the patent; and such making, using, or selling by any
person without the authorization of the Patentee constitutes infringement of the
patent. (Emphasis ours)
As far as the issue regarding unfair competition is concerned, suffice it to say that
Republic Act No. 166, as amended, provides, inter alia:
Sec. 29. Unfair competition, rights and remedies. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of unfair competition, the
following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who in selling his goods shall give them the general appearance
of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or
in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or
words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely
to influence purchasers that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or
dealer other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the
goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of
his legitimate trade. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the foregoing, we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming with modification the decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED and this petition DENIED for lack of merit.
Cresser Precision Systems v. CAOnly the patentee may file for infringement.
There can be no infringement of a patent until a patent has been issuedsince
whatever right one has to the invention conferred by the patent arises alone from
a grant of patent.Smith Kline v. CAArticle 5 of the Paris Convention unequivocally
and explicitly respects the right of the member countries to adoptlegislative
measures to provide for grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which
might result from the exerciseof the exclusive rights conferred by the
patent.Parke Davis v. Doctors PharmaceuticalsFact of existence of 2 different
substances of medicine of which the court could not take judicial notice of
norcompetent to so find in the absence of evidence, and the existence of two
patents require presentation of evidence toshow whether the substances are the
same or not.Godinez v. CATests to determine infringement are; 1) Doctrine of
Literal Infringement 2) Doctrine of Equivalents. The reason for thedoctrine of
equivalents is that to permit the imitation of a patented invention which does not
copy any literal detailwould be to convert the protection of the patent grant into
hollow and useless thing.Smith Kline Beckman v. CAThe doctrine of equivalents
thus requires satisfaction of the functions-means-and-result test, the patentee
having theburden to show that all three components of such equivalency test are
met.Manzano v. CAThere is a presumption that the Philippine Patent Office has
correctly determined the patentability of the model andsuch action must not be
interfered with, in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary. Maguan
v. CAAn invention must possess the essential elements of novelty, originality, and
precedence and for the patentee to beentitled to protection, the invention must
be new to the world. A single instance of public use of the invention by apatentee
for more than two years(now more than 1 year under Sec.9 of Patent Law)
before the date of application forhis patent will be fatal to the validity of the patent
when issued.