>NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP GR NO.

183591
Posted on May 7, 2010 by krizsexzy
>FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOAAD) brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli
Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement
mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which it grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of
the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within
internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the
organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD
brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated
the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and
the provisions of the constitution thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public
consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for peace
agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples
participation in the peace process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be
recognized, access to official records and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to

government research data used as basis for policy development shall be

afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article
II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic
consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such
consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as
hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and
geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide
for
legislative
powers
over:
1.
Administrative
organization;
2.
Creation
of
sources
of
revenues;
3.
Ancestral
domain
and
natural
resources;
4.
Personal,
family,
and
property
relations;
5.
Regional
urban
and
rural
planning
development;
6.
Economic,
social,
and
tourism
development;
7.
Educational
policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed
by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with
the present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing
constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend
therein.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V CAMPOS RUEDA & CTA

11FEB
L 55020 | August 20, 1990 | J. Medialdea
Facts:
Campos Rueda imported 46 cartons or 27,000 pieces of Tungsol flashers.
Before the goods arrived at the port of Manila, Campos Rueda filed with the
Collector of Customs of Manila a request for value information for the
declaration of the imported flashers under Tariff Heading No. 85.09 of the
Tariff and Customs Code at 30% ad valorem duty, for classification
purpose. The Customs appraiser however, re-classified the goods
under Tariff Heading No. 85.19 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 50% ad
valorem.
When the goods arrived at the port of Manila, Campos Rueda immediately
filed a Customs Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration under Tariff
Heading No. 85.19 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 50% ad valorem but,
under protest and paid duties and taxes on the goods, also under protest. It
then filed a timely protest against the re-classification resulting in the
payment of additional customs duty and advance sales tax and prayed for
the refund of the said.
The Collector of Customs dismissed the protest. Campos Rueda appealed
to the Commissioner but was denied, and then appealed to CTA which
modified the Commissioners decision by ordering the refund to Campos
Rueda of the sum of the additional customs duty but not the advance sales
tax. The Commissioner now appeals via petition for review the said
decision.

Issue: W/N Campos Rueda should pay 30% or 50% ad valorem duty
Held:
30%. TH No 85.09 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:

85.09. Electrical lighting and signalling equipment and electrical

windscreen wipers, defrosters and demisters, for cycles or motor vehicles
ad val. 30%.
On the other hand, the same Code provides under TH No. 85.19:
85.19. Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits, for
the protection of electrical circuits, or for making connections to or in
electric circuits (for example, switches, relays, fuses, lighting arresters,
surge suppressors, plugs, lamp-holders and junction boxes); resistors,
fixed or variable (including potentiometers), other than heating resistors,
printed circuits, switch boards (other than telephone switchboards) and
control panels:
In finding for Campos Rueda, CTA found that it has adduced sufficient
evidence to establish the general purpose or predominating use to which
flashers are applied, and for which petitioner imported them, is precisely as
electrical equipment for signalling purposes for motor vehicles; that is, to
signal or indicate a right or left hand turn by means of electrical flashes in
front and at the rear of motor vehicles and not merely as electrical
apparatus as the Commissioner claims.
It is the predominating use to which articles are generally applied or
used that determines their character for the purpose of fixing the duty,
and not the specific or special use which any particular importer may
make of the articles imported.
Parts of machines, apparatus of appliances which are suitable for use
solely or principally with a particular kind of machine or with a number of
machines falling within a specific heading, as a rule, are to be classified
with the machines in the same heading. Also, the law does not provide that
an article imported for electrical lighting and signalling equipment for motor
vehicles falling under Tariff Heading No. 85.09, if imported alone, shall be
classified under Tariff Heading No. 85.19 as electrical apparatus for making
and breaking electrical circuits that provision should not be read into the
law per the circular of the former Acting Customs Collector. Petition
denied. CTA decision affirmed.

Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita

May 10, 2014
655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is
Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic
baselines of the Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the
Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by
the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular
arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other
ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over
Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward
of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and
aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging
marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to
UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS,
itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the
baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or

diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to

acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle
on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it
increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we
adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that
it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522,
and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our
maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for
comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights.

G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.
JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,

DESIDERIO,

G.R. No. 161634

March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FPJ
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential
elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes)
certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen
despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,
holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of
the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the
basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding
qualification of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a

Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are
"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as
evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his
death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents
father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though
an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

VALLES versus COMELEC (337 SCRA 543)

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17,
1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections
in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez on citizenship grounds, in May 1998 elections for governor
of Davao Oriental.
Respondent was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and
an Australian mother, who ran for governor of Davao Oriental. In 1998, she
applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent is a Filipino.
2. Whether or not, if proven that she is a Filipino, did she, in anyway
renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued
an Australian passport.
Held:
YES. Respondent is a Filipino since her father is a Filipino.
In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones
Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their
children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondents father was
therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her.
As for issue number two, respondent did not lose her citizenship.
Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and
Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are
merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Holding of an Australian passport and an alien

certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of

citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. At
most, she has dual citizenship.

Go vs. LUIS T. RAMOS

Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit [9] for deportation
initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that
the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances
and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis
presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as
FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth
certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos
appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He
also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth,
machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and
with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to
procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,verring that the
complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case
designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings.
Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien,
and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father
Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.

In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab

Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy.
On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their
contention is that Carlos election of citizenship was made out of time.
The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for apprehension and
deportation of Jimmy Go to China.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the
said court.
They questioned the said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of appeals. The petition was granted.
Their motion for reconsideration was denied at Bureu of immigration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
RULING:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is
valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into
is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the
time of the filing of the application.[99]

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer

question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant
of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed
after the party sought to be released had been charged before any
court. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like
the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. [100] Likewise, the
cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas
corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for
deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board,
the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even
in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. [101]

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in
fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Courts
pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue
with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to
touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the
same subject.

BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
BENGSON
vs.
HRET
and
CRUZ
G.R.
No.
142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view
of the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service
to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship
was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection
with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service

To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner
Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article
VI,
section
6
of
the
Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1.
by
naturalization,
2.
by
repatriation,
and
3.
by
direct
act
of
Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship
due
to:
1.
desertion
of
the
armed
forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,

4.
marriage
of
a
Filipino
5. political economic necessity

woman

to

an

alien;

and

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means

that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A.
No.
2630
provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides
or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which
he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in

the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of

the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines;
and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November
12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated
February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:

WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his
residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought
from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate

of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was

born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside

community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices.
He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan

met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong
who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided
to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life
in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a
result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong
Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of
where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose
Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance
of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final
and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to
him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old,
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos
insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to
acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and
passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities
were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job
in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on
the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil
Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional

Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship

since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV

read:

1.
2.
3.

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

4.

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are

citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying

not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but
also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship
before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while
one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of

the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing

elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in

1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a
citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right
of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on
a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest