G.R. No.

178323

March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO CHINGH y PARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Armando Chingh y Parcia (Armando) seeks the reversal of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01119 convicting him of Statutory Rape and Rape
Through Sexual Assault.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On March 19, 2005, an Information for Rape was filed
against Armando for inserting his fingers and afterwards his
penis into the private part of his minor victim, VVV,2 the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or before March 11, 2004 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, [Armando], with lewd design and by means of
force, violence and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and
lascivious conduct upon a ten (10) year old minor child,
[VVV], by then and there pulling her in a dark place then
mashing her breast and inserting his fingers in her vagina
and afterwards his penis, against her will and consent,
thereby causing serious danger to the normal growth and
development of the child [VVV], to her damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to law.3
Upon his arraignment, Armando pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the
victim, VVV; the victims father; PO3 Ma. Teresa Solidarios;
and Dr. Irene Baluyot. The defense, on the other hand,
presented the lone testimony Armando as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution

Born on 16 September 1993, VVV was only 10 years old at

the time of the incident. On 11 March 2004 at around 8:00
p.m., along with five other playmates, VVV proceeded to a
store to buy food. While she was beckoning the storekeeper,
who was not then at her station, Armando approached and
pulled her hand and threatened not to shout for help or talk.
Armando brought her to a vacant lot at Tindalo Street, about
400 meters from the store. While in a standing position
beside an unoccupied passenger jeepney, Armando mashed
her breast and inserted his right hand index finger into her
private part. Despite VVVs pleas for him to stop, Armando
unzipped his pants, lifted VVV and rammed his phallus inside
her vagina, causing her to feel excruciating pain.
Threatened with death if she would tell anyone what had
happened, VVV kept mum about her traumatic experience
when she arrived home. Noticing her odd and uneasy
demeanor as well as her blood-stained underwear, however,
her father pressed her for an explanation. VVV confessed to
her father about her unfortunate experience. Immediately,
they reported the matter to the police authorities. After his
arrest, Armando was positively identified by VVV in a police
line-up.
The genital examination of VVV conducted by Dr. Irene
Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) of the Philippine General Hospitals
Child Protection Unit, in the morning of 12 March 2004,
showed a "fresh laceration with bleeding at 6 oclock
position" in the childs hymen and "minimal bleeding from
[said] hymen laceration." Her impression was that there was
a "clear evidence" of "penetrating trauma" which happened
within 24 hours prior to the examination. The photograph of
the lacerated genitalia of VVV strongly illustrated and
buttressed Dr. Baluyots medical report.4
Evidence for the Defense
Armando denied that he raped VVV. Under his version, in
(sic) the night of 11 March 2004, he and his granddaughter
were on their way to his cousins house at Payumo St.,
Tondo, Manila. As it was already late, he told his
granddaughter to just go home ahead of him while he
decided to go to Blumentritt market to buy food. While
passing by a small alley on his way thereto, he saw VVV
along with some companions, peeling "dalanghita." VVV
approached him and asked if she could go with him to the
market because she will buy "dalanghita" or sunkist. He
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refused her request and told VVV instead to go home. He

then proceeded towards Blumentritt, but before he could
reach the market, he experienced rheumatic pains that
prompted him to return home. Upon arriving home, at about
8:30 oclock in the evening, he watched television with his
wife and children. Shortly thereafter, three (3) barangay
officials arrived, arrested him, and brought him to a police
precinct where he was informed of VVVs accusation against
him.5
On April 29, 2005, the RTC, after finding the evidence of the
prosecution overwhelming against the accuseds defense of
denial and alibi, rendered a Decision6 convicting Armando of
Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
accused ARMANDO CHINGH GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of Statutory Rape defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify private complainant [VVV] the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) as moral damages and to pay the
costs.
It appearing that accused is detained, the period of his
detention shall be credited in the service of his sentence.

a total of P80,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral

damages; and P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a
grand total ofP200,000.00 for the two counts of rape.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.8
In fine, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and
considering that the appeal opened the entire case for
judicial review, the CA also found Armando guilty of the crime
of Rape Through Sexual Assault. The CA opined that since
the Information charged Armando with two counts of rape: (1)
by inserting his finger in the victims vagina, which is
classified as Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph
2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
and (2) for inserting his penis in the private part of his victim,
which is Statutory Rape, and considering that Armando failed
to object thereto through a motion to quash before entering
his plea, Armando could be convicted of as many offenses as
are charged and proved.
The CA ratiocinated that coupled with the credible, direct,
and candid testimony of the victim, the elements of Statutory
Rape and Rape Through Sexual Assault were indubitably
established by the prosecution.
Armando now comes before this Court for relief.

SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Armando appealed the Decision before the CA,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119.
On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision7 finding
Armando not only guilty of Statutory Rape, but also of Rape
Through Sexual Assault. The decretal portion of said
Decision reads:

In a Resolution9 dated September 26, 2007, the Court

required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. In their respective Manifestations,10 the parties waived
the filing of their supplemental briefs, and instead adopted
their respective briefs filed before the CA.
Hence, Armando raises the following errors:
I

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court is

AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: accusedappellant is hereby found GUILTY of two counts of rape and
is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer, for the crime of statutory
rape, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and, for the offense of
rape through sexual assault, the indeterminate penalty of 3
years, 3 months and 1 day of prisioncorreccional, as
minimum, to 8 years and 11 months and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the victim,

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused

guilty of the crime of rape under article 266-a,
paragraph 1 (d) of the revised penal code in spite
the unnatural and unrealistic testimony of the
private complainant.
II
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The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the

offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Simply stated, Armando is assailing the factual basis of his
conviction, which in effect, mainly questions the credibility of
the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution,
particularly his victim, VVV.
Armando maintains that the prosecution failed to present
sufficient evidence that will overcome the presumption of
innocence. Likewise, Armando insists that the RTC gravely
erred in convicting him based on the unrealistic and
unnatural testimony of the victim. Armando claims that VVVs
testimony was so inconsistent with common experience that
it deserves careful and critical evaluation. First, it was so
unnatural for VVV to remain quiet and not ask for help when
the accused allegedly pulled her in the presence of several
companions and bystanders; second, VVV did not resist or
cry for help while they were on their way to the place where
she was allegedly abused, which was 300 to 400 meters
away from where he allegedly pulled her; third, VVV could
have run away while Armando was allegedly molesting her,
but she did not; fourth, Armando could not have inserted his
penis in the victims organ while both of them were standing,
unless the victim did not offer any resistance.
Generally, the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses, as it was in the better
position to observe their candor and behavior on the witness
stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court; it
had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under
cross-examination. Its assessment is entitled to respect
unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.11
From the testimony of the victim, VVV, she positively
identified Armando as the one who ravaged her on that
fateful night of March 11, 2004. VVV clearly narrated her
harrowing experience in the hands of the accused.
Notwithstanding her innocence and despite the thorough
cross-examination by Armandos counsel, VVV never faltered
and gave a very candid and truthful testimony of the
traumatic events. VVVs testimony was corroborated and
bolstered by the findings of Dr. Irene Baluyot that the victims
genital area showed a fresh laceration with bleeding at 6

oclock position in her hymen.12 Dr. Baluyot concluded that an

acute injury occurred within 24 hours prior to the examination
and that the occurrence of rape within that period was very
possible.13 Also, the age of VVV at the time the incident
occurred, which was 10 years old, was duly established by
her birth certificate,14 her testimony,15 and that of her
fathers.16
Time and again, this Court has held that when the offended
parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts
are inclined to lend credence to their version of what
transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but
also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be
exposed if the matter about which they testified were not
true.17 A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of
defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her
honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and
undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been
raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her
honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the
wicked acts committed against her.18 Moreover, the Court
has repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the victim in a
rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.19
On the other hand, Armando admitted that he saw VVV on
the date of the incident, but denied the accusations against
him and merely relied on his defense that he was watching
TV with his family when barangay officials arrested him.
Armandos defenses were also unavailing. His contention
that it was unnatural and unrealistic for VVV to remain quiet
when he pulled her from her companions and why she did
not cry for help or run away when he was allegedly ravaging
her deserves scant consideration. Clearly, the reason why
VVV did not shout for help was because Armando told her
not to shout or talk.20 Likewise, the reason why VVV did not
run when Armando was molesting her was because his
finger was still inside her private part.21 Moreover, Armandos
argument that he could not have inserted his penis in the
victims organ while both of them were standing is
preposterous. It is settled that sexual intercourse in a
standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not
improbable.22
Armando tendered nothing but his bare denial and contention
that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed. Aside
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from this, he presented no more evidence to substantiate his

claims. Jurisprudence dictates that denial and alibi are the
common defenses in rape cases. Sexual abuse is denied on
the allegation that the accused was somewhere else and
could not have physically committed the crime. This Court
has always held that these two defenses are inherently weak
and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence in
order to be believed. As negative defenses, they cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of the
complainant.23Consequently, Armandos bare denial and alibi
must fail against the testimony of VVV and her positive
identification that he was the perpetrator of the horrid deed.
Unmistakably, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Armando had carnal knowledge of VVV.1awphil
Anent Armandos conviction for the crime of Rape Through
Sexual Assault.
The CA correctly found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape
Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 24 From the
Information, it is clear that Armando was being charged with
two offenses, Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, and rape as an act of sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando was
charged with having carnal knowledge of VVV, who was
under twelve years of age at the time, under paragraph 1 (d)
of Article 266-A, and he was also charged with committing an
act of sexual assault by inserting his finger into the genital of
VVV under the second paragraph of Article 266-A. Indeed,
two instances of rape were proven at the trial. First, it was
established that Armando inserted his penis into the private
part of his victim, VVV. Second, through the testimony of
VVV, it was proven that Armando also inserted his finger in
VVVs private part.
The Information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant
that he is being charged with two counts of rape. Although
two offenses were charged, which is a violation of Section
13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge
only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses." Nonetheless, Section 3,
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also
states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information but the accused fails to object

to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as

many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings
of fact and law in each offense." Consequently, since
Armando failed to file a motion to quash the Information, he
can be convicted with two counts of rape.
As to the proper penalty, We affirm the CAs imposition of
Reclusion Perpetua for rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article
266-A. However, We modify the penalty for Rape Through
Sexual Assault.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the
sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years old. This calls for the
application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act," which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes
the penalty therefor in Section 5 (b), Article III, to wit:
SEC. 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
x xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period.25
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also
with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not
only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also
where one through coercion, intimidation or influence
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engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a

child.26
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations27 of R.A.
No. 7610 defines "Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person.28
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time
of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the abovequoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 8353,29 for Rape Through Sexual
Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed
therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was
below 12 years of age, and considering further that
Armandos act of inserting his finger in VVVs private part
undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate
imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its
medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who
commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation
to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more
severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault,
which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is
undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not
the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have
disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual
abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A.
No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be
applied when the victims are children or those "persons
below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition."30

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum

term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could
be properly imposed under the law, which is fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal. On the other hand, the minimum term shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months.
Hence, Armando should be meted the indeterminate
sentence of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twentyone (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
As to Armandos civil liabilities, the CA correctly awarded the
following damages: civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages for Rape under
paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A; and civil indemnity
ofP30,000.00 and moral damages also of P30,000.00 for
Rape under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. In line, however, with
prevailing jurisprudence, we increase the award of exemplary
damages from P25,000.00 and P15,000.00, for Rape under
paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A and Rape under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A, respectively, toP30,000.00 for each count of
rape.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals
Decision dated December 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01119 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For Rape under
paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A, Armando Chingh y Parcia is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and
for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article
266-A, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay VVV the total
of P80,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral
damages, and P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 160451

February 9, 2007

EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68492,
and its Resolution2 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collectormessenger by City Service Corporation, a domestic
corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was
assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc.
(Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to collect checks
payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also
delivered invoices to Caltexs customers.3
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and
Insurance Department Manager Ramon Romano, filed a
criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification
of commercial documents. Romano alleged that, on October
16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily
electronic report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial
Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa, Makati Branch, one of its depositary
banks, it was discovered that unknown to the department, a
company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in
the amount of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez,
had been cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997. An
investigation also revealed that two other checks (Check
Nos. 73999 and 74000) were also missing and that in Check
No. 74001, his signature and that of another signatory, Victor
S. Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No.
72922 dated September 15, 1997 in the amount

ofP1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, was

also cleared through the same bank on September 24, 1997;
this check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the
signatures appearing thereon had also been forged. Upon
verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001 and
72922 were deposited at the Banco de Oros SM Makati
Branch under Savings Account No. S/A 2004-0047245-7, in
the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante R.
Gutierrez.
Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as
his signatures on the dorsal portions thereof. He also denied
having withdrawn any amount from said savings account.
Further investigation revealed that said savings account had
actually been opened by petitioner; the forged checks were
deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrezs name. A
bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. DonableDela
Cruz, positively identified petitioner as the person who
opened the savings account using Gutierrezs name.4
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount
of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998. However, the
City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this
development. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the
City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents on June 29, 1998
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 63. The Informations are worded as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-1611
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a private individual, with intent to defraud and intent
to gain, without the knowledge and consent of Caltex
Philippines,
Inc.
through
its
duly
authorized
officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of
commercial document, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the following
manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of
PCIBank check no. 72922 dated September 15, 1997
payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of
Php1,790,757.50 with intent to defraud or cause damage to
complainant Caltex Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously affixed or caused to be affixed signatures
purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco, Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of
payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing it to appear that Ramon
Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the
issuance of PCIBank check no. 72922 and that Dante R.
Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check
previously stolen from Payables Section of CALTEX, was
neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the
check, a commercial document, was falsified in the manner
above set forth, the said accused purporting himself to be the
payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco
De Oro under Account No. 2004-0047245-7, thereby
appropriating the proceeds of the falsified but cleared check,
to the damage and prejudice of complainant herein
represented by Ramon Romano, in the amount of
Php1,790,757.50.
Criminal Case No. 98-1612
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a private individual, with intent to defraud and intent
to gain, without the knowledge and consent of Caltex
Philippines,
Inc.
through
its
duly
authorized
officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of
commercial document, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the following
manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of
PCIBank check no. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 payable
to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of Php5,790,570.25 with
intent to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex
Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or
caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of
Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized
officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez,
causing it to appear that Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank
check no. 74001 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed
it, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, such
was not the case, since said check previously stolen from
Payables Section of CALTEX, was neither duly signed by
Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco nor endorsed by
Dante R. Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial document,
was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused
purporting himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez,
deposited the check with Banco De Oro under Account No.
2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the
falsified but cleared check, to the damage and prejudice of
complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano, in the
amount of Php5,790,570.25.5
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded
not guilty to both charges.6 Pre-trial ensued and the cases
were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses,
after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law
Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of

Evidence.7 Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that

the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law
Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and
it was only after the prosecution had rested its case that
SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor
representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and
Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance,
SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor.
Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and
not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by
SRMO should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were
amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his
right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out,
however, that the Informations can no longer be amended
because he had already been arraigned under the original
Informations.8 He insisted that the amendments of the
Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for
Caltex would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that
the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent
of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to
the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant.
Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil
indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the
accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out
on cross-examination by Ramon Romano who testified for
the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had marked
in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank
dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to
Caltex.9
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of
SRMO.10 In his Rejoinder, he averred that the substitution of
PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral
motion; the Information must be amended to allege that the
private complainant was PCIB and not Caltex after the
preliminary investigation of the appropriate complaint of PCIB
before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as
provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name
of the offended party is a mere formal defect which can be
cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the
Information. To support its claim, PCIB cited the ruling of this
Court in Sayson v. People.11
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the
motion of the private prosecutor for the substitution of PCIB
as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied
7 | Page
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

petitioners motion to have the formal offer of evidence of

SRMO expunged from the record.12 Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which the RTC denied on November 14,
2001.13
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with Urgent Application for Temporary
Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying for
the annulment of the RTCs Orders of July 18, 2001 and
November 14, 2001. The petitioner averred that:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN
RENDERING ITS ORDER ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY ALLOWING THE
SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE
ACUSED
WAS
ALREADY
ARRAIGNED
AND
PROSECUTION
HAS
ALREADY
TERMINATED
PRESENTING ITS EVIDENCE THEREBY PATENTLY
VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION IMPOSED UPON BY
RULE 110 SEC. 14 RULES ON CRIMINAL ROCEDURE.

The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the

amount of the checks to Caltex, it was subrogated to the
latters right against petitioner. It further declared that in
offenses against property, the designation of the name of the
offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as
the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can
be properly identified. The appellate court cited the rulings of
this Court in People v. Ho16 and People v. Reyes.17
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored
on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES
874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR
CONSIDERING
THE
PACTS
ARE
SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT.
II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES
CA, 50 (2) OG 665, NOVEMBER 11, 1953 HAS NO
MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT CASE.

II
AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN ORDER
RECOGNIZING THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW
PROSECUTOR WITHOUT WRITTEN OR EVEN ORAL
WITHDRAWAL OF THE COUNSEL ON RECORD.14
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended
party is an essential element of estafa. The amendment of
the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the
offended party would prejudice his rights since he is deprived
of a defense available before the amendment, and which
would be unavailable if the Informations are amended.
Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case
did not apply to this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered
judgment dismissing the petition. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul
the orders dated July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-1611 and 98-1612 is hereby DENIED and
consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15

III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL

SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF
THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY
SEC. 14 OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION
BETWEEN CALTEX AND PCIBANK. ASSUMING
THERE IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE
DISMISSED TO PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH
PETITIONER WAS INDICTED, ARRAIGNED, PRETRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
TERMINATED THE PRESENTATION OF ITS
EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ARE DEFECTIVE AND
VOID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE
APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTOR FOR
PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE
NOT SUPORTED BY THE RECORD NOR
EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION
OF FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONERS SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT VIOLATE THE
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE

15 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.19

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as
private complainant at this late stage of the trial is prejudicial
to his defense. He argues that the substitution is tantamount
to a substantial amendment of the Informations which is
prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 11020 of the Revised Rules of Rules,
all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control
of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual
acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said
criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party
has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute
it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil)
remains under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal
action personally or by counsel, who will act as private
prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to
be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties
and further delay the final disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied
institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of
the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense,
to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.21
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for
the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability
established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code
includes:
1. Restitution;

On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14.Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters
his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when
it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades
the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused
from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party
and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or
substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only
a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court
and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.23
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.24 The following have been held to be mere formal
amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event
of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect
any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment
that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce new and material facts, and
merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.25
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is
9 | Page
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

made, and whether any evidence defendant might have

would be equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other. An amendment to an information which
does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance.26
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as
private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The
substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner.
The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks
remained the same, and all such evidence was available to
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated
to the rights of Caltex, considering that he has no knowledge
of the subrogation much less gave his consent to it.
Alternatively, he posits that if subrogation was proper, then
the charges against him should be dismissed, the two
Informations being "defective and void due to false
allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with
falsification document. In estafa one of the essential
elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article
315 of the Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as
essential element of the felony should be clearly indicated
and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL
PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information
filed against him alleged the felony committed " to the
damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE
and FALSE for there is no question that as early as March
24, 1998 or THREE (3) LONG MONTHS before the twin
information were filed on June 29, 1998, the prejudice party
is already PCIBank since the latter Re-Credit the value of the
checks to Caltex as early as March 24, 1998. In effect,
assuming there is valid subrogation as the subject decision
concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on March
24, 1998 THREE (3) MONTHS before the twin information
were filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the
felony is limited to the person DEFRAUDED in the very act of
embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other persons

which the loss may ultimately fall as a result of a contract

which contract herein petitioner is total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of
commission of the offense of September 24, 1997 and
October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded
by the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin
information are DEFECTIVE AND VOID due to the FALSE
ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the
prejudice of Caltex when it truth and in fact the one
prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the
same should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of
another information which should state the offense was
committed to the prejudice of PCIBank if it still legally
possible without prejudicing substantial and statutory rights
of the petitioner.27
Petitioners argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court
agrees with respondent PCIBs comment that petitioner failed
to make a distinction between legal and conventional
subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the
creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all his
rights.28 It may either be legal or conventional. Legal
subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but
by operation of law because of certain acts.29 Instances of
legal subrogation are those provided in Article 130230 of the
Civil Code. Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is
that which takes place by agreement of the parties.31 Thus,
petitioners acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to
take place because the instant case is one of legal
subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without
need of the debtors knowledge.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations, the case of People v.
Yu Chai Ho32 relied upon by the appellate court is in point.
The Court declared
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that
the commission of the crime resulted to the prejudice of Wm.
H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the International
Banking Corporation was the prejudiced party, but Wm. H.
Anderson & Co. compensated it for its loss and thus became
subrogated to all its rights against the defendant (article
1839, Civil Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co., therefore, stood
exactly in the shoes of the International Banking Corporation
in relation to the defendant's acts, and the commission of the
crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously to the
filing of the information in the case. The loss suffered by the
firm was the ultimate result of the defendant's unlawful acts,
10 | P a g e
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and we see no valid reason why this fact should not be

stated in the information; it stands to reason that, in the crime
of estafa, the damage resulting therefrom need not
necessarily occur simultaneously with the acts constituting
the other essential elements of the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through
counsel, has the right to intervene in the proceedings, and
under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its
properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification.
Petitioners gripe that the charges against him should be
dismissed because the allegations in both Informations failed
to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
states:
Sec. 6.Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense; and the place wherein the
offense was committed.

juridical person or that it is organized in accordance

with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,33 the Court held that in case of offenses
against property, the designation of the name of the offended
party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the
criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be
properly identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or
information to state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed or any appellation or nickname by which such
person has been or is known and if there is no better way of
Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name
(Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule
110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In
case of offenses against property, the designation of the
name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable
for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified. Thus, Rule 110,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party

When the offense is committed by more than one person, all

of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or
information must state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such
person has been or is known. If there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the
offended party is unknown, the property must be
described with such particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed
is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court
must cause such true name to be inserted in the
complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is
sufficient to state its name, or any name or
designation by which it is known or by which it may
be identified, without need of averring that it is a

(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the

name of the offended party is unknown, the
property, subject matter of the offense, must be
described with such particularity as to properly
Identify the particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the
person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained,
the court must cause the true name to be inserted in
the complaint or information or record.

In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down

the rule that when an offense shall have been described in
the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act,
an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect
which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the
defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which
had a factual backdrop similar to the instant case, where the
defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation
of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without
authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the
effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner
11 | P a g e
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of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was

the one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on
the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant,
was described in the complaint with such particularity as to
properly Identify the particular offense charged. In the instant
suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the
Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the
subject-matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it
becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused,
that it was established during the trial that the offended party
was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor
Bank of America as alleged in the information.
Lastly, on petitioners claim that he timely objected to the
appearance of SRMO34 as private prosecutor for PCIB, the
Court agrees with the observation of the CA that contrary to
his claim, petitioner did not question the said entry of
appearance even as the RTC acknowledged the same on
October 8, 1999.35 Thus, petitioner cannot feign ignorance or
surprise of the incident, which are "all water under the bridge
for [his] failure to make a timely objection thereto."36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Facts:
Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City
Service Corporation. He was assigned to collect checks
payable to Caltex. He then opened a bank account in the
name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular customer of caltex. He
did so by forging the signatures of the dorsal portions of the
stolen check and deposited it in that same bank account.
Upon knowledge of his crimes, he was charged by the
officers of Caltex with estafa through falsification of
commercial documents.
In the original infomation filed by the prosecutor,
Caltex appeared to be the only offended party because the
prosecutor was not informed that PCI Bank credited certain
amount to Caltex.

information can no longer be amended because he had

already been arraigned under the original information, and
that doing so would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIBank argued that it had re-credited the amount to
Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had
been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as
private complainant.
Issue: Whether or not an information can be amended even
after the accused had been arraigned and had entered his
plea.
Held: Yes, because the amendment in the name of the
complainant is one of form. Before the accused enters his
plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the
entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but
with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other. An amendment to an information which
does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as
private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The
substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner.
The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks
remained the same, and all such evidence was available to
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution.

After the arraignment and enter of plea, PCIBank

appeared as the complainant. Then, Ricarze averred that the
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The Decision of the Trial Court

G.R. No. 172060

September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap
(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC
Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72
(RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 047392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section
36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and
the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May

20053 holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon
City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the
case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage
with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August
2005 Order,5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005
and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the
acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand,
the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals
ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to
the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that
all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that
at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is
still subsisting.

13 | P a g e
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Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing

the Court of Appeals decision.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial

question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action.

The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the
action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil
Case
Must
Before the Criminal Case

be

Instituted

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal

Procedure6 provides:
Section 7.Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first
before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August
2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004
as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The
RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for
pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served
summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February
2005.8 Respondents petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was
dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing
of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was
filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a

criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x xx one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any
person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide
from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged
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crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The

subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition
in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on
the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x xx." First,
the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy.
There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled inTenebro that "[t]here is x xx a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that
"a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned."19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of
the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20
March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear

before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pretrial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to

suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of

marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under

Article 36 is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the
victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that
was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. CA that

the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
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between the spouses is concerned x xx. First, the issue in

Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy.
There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x xx a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that
a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter,

Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of
August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street,
Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators
of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and
executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated
that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree
that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd
Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed
Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family
what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely
resembled Columna.4
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the
strength of Gerons affidavit, the investigating
prosecutor5issued a resolution dated December 5, 2003
finding probable cause against Columna and three John
Does.6 On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations
for murder were filed against them in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of
Atty. Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the
death of the minor Gail Franzielle. 7 Columna was arrested in
the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought
to Manila for detention and trial.8

G.R. No. 177727

January 19, 2010

HAROLD V. TAMARGO, Petitioner,

vs.
ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO
ANTIPORDA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION

On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel,

Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his
participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as the gunman
and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds
respondent LicerioAntiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent
Lloyd Antiporda.9 The former was the ex-mayor and the latter
the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing
took place, LicerioAntiporda was in detention for a
kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private
prosecutor.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo
(brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those
implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila.10

CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the November 10,
2006 decision2 and May 18, 2007 resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610.

On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the

investigating prosecutor11 who subjected him to clarificatory
questions.12

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Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They

alleged that Licerio was a candidate for mayor in Buguey,
Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case
was instituted by his political opponents in order to derail his
candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was
their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty.
Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd and once by
Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case
against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan
against Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were
dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections
and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.13
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio
presented Columnas unsolicited handwritten letter dated
May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail
cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents
of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been
tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He
stated that those he implicated had no participation in the
killings.14 Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of
Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially
repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable
Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his
unsolicited letter. During the hearing held on October 22,
2004, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and
voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May
25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been
employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from
him.151avvphi1
Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was
approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City
Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna
said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements
against respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory
hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He
requested that he be transferred to another detention
center.16

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an

appeal to the Department of Justice (DOJ).17 On May 30,
2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,
reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the
Informations for murder.18 He opined that the March 8, 2004
extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the
subsequent recantation and that there was enough evidence
to prove the probable guilt of respondents.19 Accordingly, the
Informations were filed and the cases were consolidated and
assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29.20
However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted
the Antipordas motion for reconsideration (MR) and directed
the withdrawal of the Informations.21 This time, he declared
that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was
inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was
admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence.22 As a
result, on August 22, 2005, the trial prosecutor filed a motion
to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary
Gonzalez denied petitioners MR.
The RTC, through Judge CielitoMindaro-Grulla, granted the
motion to withdraw the Informations in an order dated
October 26, 2005.23 Petitioner filed an MR but the judge
voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same. The
cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge
Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of
petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, 2005. She ruled
that, based on Columnas March 8, 2004 affidavit which he
affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was
probable cause to hold the accused for trial. She denied the
MR of the Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006.
Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition in the CA docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another
certiorari case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No.
93610, the CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her
discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment
and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ
Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that
there was no probable cause against all the accused. It also
held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not
admissible against the respondents because, aside from the
recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence
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presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy.

Additionally, the confession was made only after Columna
was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
After this decision was promulgated, CA-G.R. SP No. 93610
was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 94188. The CA
denied reconsideration in a resolution dated May 18, 2007. In
a decision dated August 24, 2007, the CA likewise granted
the petition for certiorari of respondents Antiporda.24
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 93610. Later on, he filed an amended petition
impleading respondents Antiporda and likewise assailing the
CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94188. The Court treated this
as a supplemental petition.
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA
erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the
Informations for murder against respondents.

itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence

against the accused.27
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only
to the following: (1) Columnas affidavit dated March 8, 2004
wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders; (2) his
affirmation of this affidavit during the April 19, 2004
clarificatory hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004
and (4) the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the
prosecutors recommendation to file the murder charges.28
She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence
such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004 letter to respondent
Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him
to admit his participation in the crimes and to implicate the
respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004 affidavit where he stated
that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in
the murders and (3) his testimony during the October 22,
2004 clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed
his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
We declared in Jimenez v. Jimenez29 that

Petitioner argues that, based on the independent

assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable cause
based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all
the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columnas
recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave
abuse of discretion by limiting her evaluation and
assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause
while completely disregarding contradicting evidence. They
also contend that Columnas extrajudicial confession was
inadmissible against respondents because of the rule on res
inter aliosacta.
We find no merit in the petition.
It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw
an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to
hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ
Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an
independent assessment of the merits of the motion.25 It may
either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.26 The court must

[although] there is no general formula or fixed rule for the

determination of probable cause since the same must be
decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not disregard the
facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should
not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this
would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold.30 (Emphasis supplied)
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the
investigation, she would have seen that, aside from the
pieces of evidence she relied on, there were others which
cast doubt on them. We quote with approval the reflections of
the CA on this point:
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of
resolving the motion to withdraw the informationseffectively
sidetracked the guidelines for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the merits of the case. Respondent RTC
Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of the accused.
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Instead, she should have made a circumspect evaluation by

looking at everything made available to her at that point of
the cases. No less than that was expected and required of
her as a judicial officer. According to Santos v. Orda, Jr., the
trial judge may make an independent assessment of the
merits of the case based on the affidavits and counteraffidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the
Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the
court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any
evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at
the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.31

that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside

from the extrajudicial confession.36 Thus, in order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b)
the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has
been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out
the conspiracy.37 Otherwise, it cannot be used against the
alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional
right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to
cross-examine them.38

Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas

extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not
admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the
rule on res inter aliosacta.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later

on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to
prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the
recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and
was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Res inter aliosactaalterinocerenondebet. The rule on res

interaliosacta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another.32 Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his
or her co-accused33 and is considered as hearsay against
them.34 The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans
own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against
him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a
man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.35
An exception to the res inter aliosacta rule is an admission
made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.1avvphi1
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided

Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence

presented against the respondents, it would be unfair to hold
them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused,
they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full
blown court case.39 When, at the outset, the evidence offered
during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an
uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged
conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that
the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense
of such useless and expensive litigation.40 The rule is all the
more significant here since respondent LicerioAntiporda
remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the
warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna.41
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge
Daguna was only to satisfy herself whether there was
probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for
trial as co-conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient
basis for a finding of probable cause against respondents,
her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for
murder against them were issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
Hence, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error in
granting the petitions for certiorari of respondents.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST

was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA

reversed the decision.
Tamargo appealed. Petitioner argues that, based on the
independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was
probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna.
Awingan and the Antipordas, on the other hand, contend that
Columnas extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against
them because of the rule on res inter aliosacta.

FACTS:
ISSUE:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were
shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the
perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron
surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein he stated that a
certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that
Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that
he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.
Columna was arrested.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein
he admitted his participation as look out during the shooting
and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one
Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds
LicerioAntiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor
and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo
(brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those
implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the
investigating prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented
Columnas handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the
contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been
tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. Licerio
also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004
wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his
handwritten letter. The investigating prosecutor set a
clarificatory hearing so that Columna could clarify his
contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the
hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and
voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating
prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges.
In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor,
however, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw
all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory
hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. The
RTC judge denied the motion to withdraw the informations
and held that based on the March 8, 2004 affidavit which
Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there

Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible

against Awingan and the Antipordas
HELD:
Columnas extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004
affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents
in view of the rule on res inter aliosacta. The rule on res
interaliosacta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on
the confessant, is not admissible against his or her coaccused and is considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter aliosacta rule is an admission
made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided
that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside
from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or
her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b)
the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has
been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out
the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the
alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional
right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to
cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later
on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to
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prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other

prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the
recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and
was inadmissible as evidence against them. (Harold V.
Tamargo vs Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No. 177727,
January 19, 2010)

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