Drilon v.

Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.
Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for noncompliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec
187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over
LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the
enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy
of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the
LGC
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2),
of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon
the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized
that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before
declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the
executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

1

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax

Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality
or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary
Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of
what the Code should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the
said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with
law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act
not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed,
he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That
section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of
these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination
of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would
smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this
Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187.
All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without
the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has
no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on
two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the
wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no
publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into
Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been observed in
the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to
prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within
which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to
the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been
observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The
minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show
that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21

and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993
issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does
not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of
general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the
ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of
local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to
tax ordinances.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned
by the private respondents. The latter demand that the just compensation for the property should
be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which
fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the
owner, whichever is lower. The RTC ruled for the private respondents. The CA affirmed said
decision. Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, etc. et al., the Court held the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function and it thereby
declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree
No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of
judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent
cases.
Issue:
Whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not retroactive,
application.
Held:
There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute:
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection;
it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is
therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the
parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no
one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is,
in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the
question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if
such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the
law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The
opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar
cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede,
revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one
else is bound.

The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing that when the courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. . . .
An otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate
retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that
extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of
contracts. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all
the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration.
The fact of the matter is that the expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still
pending appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said parties.
The appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed decision. The
instant petition is dismissed.

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,vs.ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,vs.ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio
Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on
the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of
the second district of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:

Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the
private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared
a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the
elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers
and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were
both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely
exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of
residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence
and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of

a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,vs.EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However,
Manzanos proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the
ground that he is an American citizen.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino
father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14,
1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzanos certificate
of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40),
dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the divisions ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano
was both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an
alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport, this did
not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship
and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when
respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as
such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law,
he no longer had US citizenship.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:

Whether

Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office

HELD:

or

not

Manzano

was

no

longer

US

citizen

DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of
jus soli;Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
LGC prohibits Dual Allegiance not Dual Citizenship
The phrase dual citizenship in the LGC must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of different states.
By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the

other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
PETITIONERS ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that Manzanos act of registering himself as a voter was an
effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration
and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that a person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election
in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory. But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, our SC
held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his
citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to
take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his
previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got
the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of
Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application
to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under
Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3)
taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of
allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the
decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it
should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the
government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino
nation.
ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing
rules and regulations insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the
subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the
State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and
actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the
board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial,
marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual
entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

Limbona vs Mangelin
G.R. No. 80391
February 28, 1989
Facts:
Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Assembly of Central Mindanao. On October 21,
1987, Congressman Matalam invited Limbona in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Limbona accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly Members through the
Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the
House Committee hearing of Congress.
However, the Assembly held a meeting on November 2, 1987, and unseated Limbona from his
position. Limbona prays for the session to be declared null and void and that he still be declared
Speaker of the Regional Assembly.
Pending the case, the SC also received a resolution from the Assembly expelling Limbonas
membership.
Issues:
What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous regions of Region XII?
Held:
Yes.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
Decentralization of Administration is the delegation by the central government of
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and, in the process, to make local governments more responsive and accountable and
ensure their development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and progress.
It also relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. An autonomous government under this category is under the
supervision of the national government through the President. The President exercises
supervision but has no control over them and does so only to ensure local affairs are
administered according to law.
Decentralization of Power, on the other hand, involves the abdication of power in favor of
autonomous local governments. The autonomous government is free to manage its affairs with
minimum intervention from central authorities. An autonomous government enjoying
autonomy under this category is only subject to the organic act creating it and accepted
principles on the effects & limits of autonomy.
PD 1618 mandates that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over autonomous regions. Hence, courts of law can assume jurisdiction. The courts can validly
review the removal of Limbona as Speaker.
Where a law is capable of 2 interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Under Sec. 31 of Region XII Sanggunian Rules, sessions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook.
However, the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions are declared invalid since at the time Limbona
called the recess, it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. Secondly, the
invitation by the House of Representatives Committee on Muslim Affairs provides a plausible
reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does
not appear that respondents called his attention to his mistake. What appears is they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under these circumstances,
equity is on his side. The recess was called on the ground of good faith.

Montejo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

Facts:
The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district
of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a
regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a
consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the
resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan
of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district
of Leyte.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another legislative district
Held:
The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But
based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the
major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the
Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment
made. Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance
did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought
about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of
Leyte. But the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and
petitioners remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically
gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution
transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of
Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

CASCO Philippine Chemical v Gimenez G.R. No. L-17931. February 28, 1963.
Facts:
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise
known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on
July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring
that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the
last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of
P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding
margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in
audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary
Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the
provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069.
Issue:
Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid
margin fee.
Held:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
It is so ordered.
Ratio:
It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1
and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter
one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well

considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by
the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after
the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Antonio Carpio vs The Executive Secretary

In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a
member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said
law as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
by limiting its power to administrative control over the PNP thus, control remained with the
Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of
letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA
6975.
HELD:
No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to
the control powers of the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of
the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE vs DESIERTO

528 SCRA 9 (G.R. No. 130140. October 25, 1999)
FACTS:
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG
as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative each from the
Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of
Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank,
Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON
BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, the COMMITTEE reported that the
Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the
Directors, was one of the twenty-one corporations which obtained behest loans. On 2 March
1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the
COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI
namely, Jose Z. Osias, Pacifico E. Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and
Juanito Ordoveza; and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved
the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.
ISSUE:
Does the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth apply to both civil
and criminal cases?
RULING:
No. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as
the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission of 1986. Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e.,
paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable
rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended,
which provides, Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. In the present case, it was well-nigh

impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the prescriptive
period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be
computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.