Bermudez vs. Torres G.R. No.

131429, August 4, 1999

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial

Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for
the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado
Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second
District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office.
Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed
the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor.
Petitioner Bermudez challenged theappointment of Quiaoit primarily on
the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec.
Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that all provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of
the
Secretary.

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the

Secretary of Justice
the appointment of

to

the

President

can

be

held

fatal to
Quiaoit

Held: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of

designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of
anindividual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an
office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act
required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its
acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified
among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to
appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as
necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint.
The Pres. is the head of government whose authority includes the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or
modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has
done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the
judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be
appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the functions
of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be
inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of
officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.
The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary found in Sec. 9,
Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should
be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which
is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory
upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here
nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head
of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away
with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the
exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said
as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.

Bernardino Marcelino vs Fernando Cruz, Jr.

121 SCRA 51

Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August

4, 1975, the prosecution finished presenting evidence against
Marcelino and rested its case. On the same date, the attorneys of
both parties in the criminal case moved for time within which to
submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando
Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only
Marcelino submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a
copy of his decision, his decision bears the same date of November
28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions was scheduled in
January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the court can no
longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month
period (90 day period) within which lower courts must decide on
cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction
over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the
allotted period.
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September
4, 1975 (date of last day of filing of the memoranda by the
respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to run
so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge
Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The
date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of
court. Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3month period because November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day
from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in
January 1976, could not serve as the reckoning date because the
same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon
the effectivity of this constitution, the maximum period within which
case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its
submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months
for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the
Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The
provision is mandatory, its merely directive. Extensions can be

granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as

mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system.
Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve cases
within the prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as
an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

(Environmental Law)
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay
had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that
ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively
ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit
for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water
Quality. Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s
state will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned
shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of
such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up
Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove
and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his
failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such
pollution.
HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and
cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution
incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state
will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general application and
are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila
Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw
the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.

While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decisionmaking process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the
law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing
mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is
institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases.
20 days Temporary restraining order

Gamboa v. Teves (Case Digest)

Gamboa v. Teves etal., GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012
Facts:
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of
shares involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First
Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37
percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in
PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates the
Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership
of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court
ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence this new case, resolving the
motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term
capital in its 2011 decision?
Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its
State policy of developing an economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Asserting the ideals that our Constitutions Preamble want to achieve, that is
to conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a
Filipino-controlled economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in
the construction of the term capital which refers to the shares with voting
rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies
that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is
tantamount to an effective control. Therefore, the Courts interpretation of the
term capital was not erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is
denied.

Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]

15
AUG
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square
meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court
in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, in
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial

hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to respondent

Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled
that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands
represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the
notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication
of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement.
The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.
There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after
all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

GMCR
INC.;
SMART
COMMUNICATIONS,
INC.;
INTL
COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO. INC.,
vs. BELL COMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC., THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND THE HON. SIMEON
KINTANAR
(G. R. No. 16496, April 30, 1997)

FACTS: Bell Telecommunications (BellTel) filed before the NTC an

application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
(CPCN) to procure, install, operate and maintain Nationwide
Integrated Telecommunications Services (NITS) and a Provisional
Authority (PA) to effect such. During such application, BellTel has not
been given a legislative franchise to engage in the telecoms service
which made in unable to participate in the deliberations for service
area assignments for local exchange carrier service (LEC) where the
petitioners participated in. Subsequently, RA 7692 was enacted
granting BellTel a congressional franchise.
On July 12, 1994, BellTel filed a second application for a
CPCN, proposing to install 2.6 million telephone lines in 10 years and
to provide a 100% digital local exchange network. It also moved for
the withdrawal of the first application, without prejudice, which was
granted by the NTC. BellTels application was opposed by various
telecommunications companies. BellTels application was referred to
the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD), which
found the BellTels proposal technically feasible and BellTel to be
financially capable. The two deputy commissioners of the NTC
signified their approval of the CCAD recommendation. The working
draft was prepared by the legal department, was initialed by the two
deputy commissioners, but was not signed by NTC Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar.
The petitioners questioned the validity of the PA because
according to them it is the prevailing policy and procedure in the
NTC that the Commissioner has the exclusive authority to sign,
validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and
decisions of the NTC and only his vote counts. BellTel filed two
motions to resolve the application and the issuance of the PA but
the NTC did not act on it. In that relation, the petitioners filed an
opposition. Commissioner Kintanar issued then an Order setting said
motions for hearing but did not resolve said motions. However, no
hearing was conducted and it was rescheduled.
BellTel filed a motion to promulgate, after previously filing
two urgent ex-parte motions to resolve application, which was not
acted upon by the NTC. The NTC denied the motion in an order
signed solely by Commissioner Kintanar. BellTel then filed a petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against NTC before the SC.
The Court referred the case to the CA. The CA granted BellTels
position. Hence, the petitions for review by the opposing
telecommunication companies and Commissioner Kintanar.
ISSUE: Whether the vote of the Chairman of the Commission is
sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution and decision.

HELD: No. Having been organized under Executive Order 146 as a

three-man commission, the NTC is a collegial body and was a
collegial body even during the time it was acting as a one-man
regime. NTC is a collegial body requiring the majority vote out of the
three members of the commission in order to validly decides a case
or any incident therein. The vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, absent the required concurring vote coming from the
rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a
majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
resolution or decision. EO 546, which created NTC under the
Ministries of Public Works and of Transportation and Communication,
does not specifically provide that the NTC is not a collegiate body
nor did it mention that NTC should meet an En Banc in deciding the
case or quasi-judicial functions. However, this does not militate
against the collegial nature of the NTC because the Rules of
Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings states
that in cases heard by the Board En Banc, the order or resolution
should be reached with the concurrence of at least two regular
members after deliberation and consultation. NTC Circulars 1-1-93,
31-1-93 and the Order of Commissioner Kintanar, declaring the NTC
as a single entity, are contrary to law and thus are null and void.

Alfon v. Republic
[GR L-51201, 29 May 1980]
Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur

Facts:
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May
1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was
registered at the Local Civil Registrars Office as Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte.
On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong,
Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of
by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon.
She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector
Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name
Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high
school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon.
After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano
University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her
scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was
registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised
her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed
any felony or misdemeanor.
She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her
name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to
Estrella S. Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioners
prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name but
not the surname.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners name be changed;
Held:
The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as
that petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also
her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon; without costs.
1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively.
The word principally as used in article 364 of the Civil Code
is not equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal
obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use
the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. In the
case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that as legitimate
child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should
principally use the surname of her father.
2. Grounds for change of name.
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for
change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when
the request for change is aconsequence of a change of status,
such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated;
and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1
Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong

v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion,the petition of

name should be granted as the petitioner has been using the
name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood.

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES VS QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 [Constitutional Law - Article

VI: Legislative Department; Taxation ]
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of
PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real property taxes when the
City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital
building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable
institution. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QCLBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner
alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real
property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA
dismissed the petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on
appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the
context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section
234(b) of RA 7160.
2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution
within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD
1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which,
subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the
Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of
Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to
render medical services to the public in general including those who
are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under
PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift
or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government.
2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any
property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as
the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision was implanted
by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled
to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a
charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly
and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the
portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt
from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are
not exempt from such taxes.

PABLO C. FRANCISCO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE

HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS G.R. No. 108747.
April 6, 1995
FACTS:

Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation by his employees. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati sentenced him of prision correccional in its minimum
period in each crime committed on each date of each case. Francisco then elevated the
case to the RTC in which they sentenced him only of eight straight months for
appreciating mitigating circumstances.

Francisco failed to make an appeal on the RTCs decision making it final. The MTC issued
a warrant of arrest, but before Francisco was to be arrested, he filed an application for
probation which the MTC denied. He went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which
was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether Pablo Francisco is still qualified to avail of probation.

RULING:

No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. First, Francisco violated Sec.4 of the
Probation Law in which no application for probation shall be entertained after the
judgement is final.

Second, Francisco misunderstood when he thought that his prison sentence held by the
MTC was not qualified for probation. Multiple prison terms should not be added up.
Consequently, Francisco lost his right to probation when he appealed the MTC decision
to the RTC. The law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

Third, Franciscos appeal to the RTC was not for reducing his penalties but for his
assertion of his innocence. The Probation Law prevent opportunism when petitioners
apply for probation when their appeal was dismissed.

Lastly, the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law

IBAAEU v. Inciong
G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984, Makasiar, J.
(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of
Labor Laws)
FACTS
The Secretary of Labor, issued Policy no. 9 interpreting article 94 of
Labor Code as regards Right to Holiday pay, stated among others,
that PD 850 principally intended to benefit daily-paid workers. Those
who are paid by the month, i.e., he is paid uniformly from January to
December is presumed to have been paid with legal holidays, unless
his salary is deducted for the month the holiday occurs. Invoking
this Policy, the Bank stopped paying its employees for the legal
holidays.
ISSUE
Whether or not, PD 850 was intended only for daily wage workers.
RULING
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken
to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of
the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are
clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion
from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of
Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is
principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly
states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This

is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the

Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature
intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have
the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs.
Haskell, 155 A. 112.)