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CQI-14

Consumer-Centric Warranty Management


Version 2 Issued 03/2010

MANUAL AND NTF CASE STUDIES


Color-coded copies of the Case Study Decision Tree Paths are available on the CD for reference.

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Consumer-Centric Warranty Management


Version 2 Issued 03/2010

Figure 10: Case Study Matrix


The following matrix illustrates the NTF case study categories applied to the Case Study files utilized
during the development of the manual to ensure coverage of the various subsystems that make up the
vehicle were adequately represented. This also helped to verify the NTF Decision Tree was applicable
across the various vehicle subsystems

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Consumer-Centric Warranty Management


Version 2 Issued 03/2010

Water Leaks and Wind Noise (ZZ01)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Warranty, OEM Engineering, OEM Manufacturing, OEM
Dealerships, Supplier Engineering
PART/ COMPONENT: Sunroof module
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Body - Exterior
DURATION: Approximately 60 days from detection to interim corrective action; permanent corrective
action implementation took 5 months due to major equipment changes.
TIME IN FIELD: Mean of failures 6 months in service
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Water was leaking into vehicle from sunroof and exhibited excessive wind
noise.
MAGNITUDE: 41.00 C/1000
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Sunroof glass, weatherstrip, or headliner
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Water testing of module revealed no issues
with the module that would cause wind/water to escape into the vehicle. Team evaluated adjoining
components in roof buck to recreate issue in the lab. Several possible contributors were observed
including; kinked/not connected drain tubes, improper glass setting, and improper placement of module in
vehicle. Team observed assembly process at OEM and found module placement needed to be precisely
located in order to assure proper glass setting. As well, proper glass setting had to be controlled in order
to assure gaps were not present that would allow wind/water to enter the vehicle. OEM and supplier
worked to develop module placement tooling and a new process to improve flushness of the glass.
Ultimately new cycle equipment was implemented at OEM to prevent placement issues of module and
glass. Through calls to OEM diagnostic call center, dealer visits were performed to assess and assist
dealers in diagnostic and repair procedures to detect and correct without complete module replacement.
A tool was developed to allow dealers to gauge and guide proper module placement. In addition, glass
flushness instructions were provided.
ROOT CAUSE: Final Solution by OEM Assembly plant
SOLUTION: Improvement in assembly process and diagnostic procedures for dealers reduced failure
rate and cost.
RESULT: When permanent corrective actions and dealer instruction were implemented the same model
year saw over 30.00 C/1000 drop in performance rating.
LESSONS LEARNED: System problems require collaborative effort and many times remain
inconclusive at supply base level. Looking at adjoining components, assembly processes and dealership
repair procedures leads to a reduction in consumer complaints and reduces cost to the OEM and supplier.
Future design activity requires assembly robustness consideration, influence of assembly variation.

Problem-Solving Path: A02 B03 C04 D01 E01 and E02 and E06

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Figure 11: Water Leaks and Wind Noise (ZZ01)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Consumer-Centric Warranty Management


Version 2 Issued 03/2010

Slow Moving Glass (ZZ02)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Warranty, OEM Engineering, OEM Manufacturing, OEM
Dealerships, Supplier Engineering
PART/ COMPONENT: Window Regulator
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Body - Interior
DURATION: Approximately 6 months from detection to correction
TIME IN FIELD: Mean of failures 14,000 miles
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Window glass hesitates, drags, or is slow going up
MAGNITUDE: 7.20 C/1000
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Motor, glass channel, and weatherseal
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Parts analysis revealed no issue with the
window regulator. Received 210 parts for analysis. 87 parts indicated NTF when bench tested and sent
to supplier facility for end of line cycle testing and motor analysis. Consumer indication of slow glass led
team to recreate conditions in mating components that would duplicate the failure. One test performed
included improper positioning of glass in glass channel. After observation in test of slow glass movement
due to improper positioning the team followed OEM assembly process to witness improper positioning on
the assembly line. A high percentage of improper positioning was witness on the line. Through these
observations the team was able to provide operator instructions for glass position that guarantee proper
functioning of the glass when the window regulator continually cycled. To address the issue on parts
already in the field a technical service bulletin was published to dealers instructing them to check glass
adjustment. If it was found to be out of alignment, dealers were instructed how to correct the condition.
Once corrected, dealers were instructed to cycle the regulator and verify the condition was corrected prior
to replacing the window regulator, motor, glass channels or weather-strip.
ROOT CAUSE: Final Solution by OEM Assembly plant
SOLUTION: Improvement in assembly process and diagnostic procedures for dealers reduced failure
rate and cost
RESULT: Following model year had 30% performance improvement
LESSONS LEARNED: System problems require collaborative effort and many times remain
inconclusive at supply base level. Looking at adjoining components, assembly processes and dealership
repair procedures leads to a reduction in consumer complaints and reduces cost to the OEM and supplier.
Future programs should consider assembly process and alignment method.

Problem-Solving Path: A02 B02 C02 D01 E01 and E02

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Figure 12: Slow Moving Glass (ZZ02)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Air/Fuel System Misfire (ZZ05)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Warranty, OEM Engineering, Supplier Quality, Supplier
Engineering, Supplier Manufacturing
PART/ COMPONENT: Fuel Injector
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Powertrain Engine Components
DURATION: Approximate duration of problem was 12 months
TIME IN FIELD: A mean average of failures is 6500 miles
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Random misfire of cylinder at hot and cold temperature and in some cases,
Service Engine Light.
MAGNITUDE: Normal condition @ 12 MIS 0.8 C/1000; Abnormal condition was at 6.8 C/1000
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Vehicles exhibited multiple claims/repairs at
same time or short durations after first repair for injectors, spark plugs, calibration, and cylinder heads.
Some vehicles had multiple same repairs.
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: 100% parts retention instituted. Received
131 parts for analysis and testing. All injectors tested on bench and in vehicle for 50-500 miles to confirm
NTF. 3 parts failed in vehicle testing and were traced back to metal contamination problem on a specific
production day. 128 parts performed to specification. Data analysis indicated higher tendency of repairs in
bank #1 cylinders 5 and 3. TSB developed by supplier to recommend best method to troubleshoot and
check parts during repair to reduce NTFs. Joint vehicle tear downs were found to exhibit high degree of
coking on spark plug and injector. Information was provided to OEM Engineering and supplier dismissed,
OEM then focused on cause of coking.
ROOT CAUSE: Final Solution was implemented by the OEM Customer once they became aware of
where to focus problem-solving.
SOLUTION: Improvement in diagnosis OEM Customer made change to reduce failure rate.
RESULT: Following model year had 0.68 C/1000 performance.
LESSONS LEARNED: Complex system problems require collaborative effort and many times may
remain inconclusive at the supply base level. Looking at adjoining systems and improved repair
procedures is frequently necessary to determine where the actual problem is occurring.

Problem-Solving Path: A02 B03 C04 D04 E01

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Figure 13: Air / Fuel System Misfire (ZZ05)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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O2 Sensors Inoperative (ZZ06)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: Supplier Engineering, Supplier Quality
PART/ COMPONENT: O2 Sensor
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Powertrain Exhaust Systems
DURATION: Approximately 90 days from detection to corrective action
TIME IN FIELD: 78% of claims happened before 5,000 miles
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Service engine light in hot engine condition occurs
MAGNITUDE: 7.5 C/1000
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): None
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Initial parts tested showed a NTF condition.
Complete teardown of component to element level revealed scratches and small "divots" on contact pad
surface. Re-testing parts while pulling and twisting wire harness revealed intermittent contact and test
failure. Using a structured problem-solving process, initial root cause was identified as contact gripper
was not opening contacts far enough for element insertion and causing scratches in the contact surface.
Trial run with wider contact opening reduced intermittent condition but did not eliminate the problem. A
second study conducted to analyze gripper drive alignment.
ROOT CAUSE: Zero set alignment of contact gripper drive (per machine set up) caused contacts to be
misaligned with element contact pads during insertion. This problem was not detected in first production
because the gripper drive gear was actually misaligned by one tooth, an advanced 5 degrees.
SOLUTION: Installed a break through beam on the gripper drive gear to insure proper alignment with 5
degrees of advance. Instituted pull and twist of harness test for checking of intermittent contact both in
production and in parts return testing.
RESULT: 0 C/1000 for intermittent contacts
LESSONS LEARNED: Complete teardown of products is necessary to identify cause even when no
trouble initially found; and developing a more real life aggravated testing (i.e., pull/twist) procedure to
check quality may be required.

Problem-Solving Path: A03 B04 C02 D01 E02 and E04

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Figure 14: No Trouble Found 02 Sensors (ZZ06)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Version 2 Issued 03/2010

Fuel Delivery System Warranty Investigation (ZZ07)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: Supplier Manufacturing, Supplier Quality, OEM Quality.
PART/ COMPONENT: Fuel Delivery System
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Powertrain Fuel System
DURATION: 1 year
TIME IN FIELD: 0 to 12 MIS
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Dealer Narratives state fuel gage inaccurate.
MAGNITUDE: Not provided
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Fuel pump, fuel level sensor, fuel tank
assembly.
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1. Warranty Data analysis Found complaints for component function.
2. Warranty Part analysis Limited information. Parts found NTF.
3. Dealership Go and See activity Responded to claims at local dealers. Through careful
inspection of the fuel system the issue was found. The failure cannot be detected through part
return and is only detectible through inspection of the fuel pump in the tank.
4. Manufacturing Process Audit A process audit was performed for all steps of the manufacturing
process. The potential for the failure was found in the assembly customer process.
5. Countermeasure Development - Countermeasures were designed and implemented in multiple
steps. Initial countermeasure involved an assembly customer process change. Additional
countermeasures will require product design change.
6. Verification of effectiveness
ROOT CAUSE: Removal of protective packaging can dislodge a suction port on the fuel pump.
SOLUTION:
1. Modify process for assembly worker to reduce possibility of damage.
2. Modify packaging to reduce possibility of damage during removal.
3. Modify part design to increase strength of snap lock on port.
RESULT: Reduction in warranty for this failure mode.
LESSONS LEARNED: The design of system did not completely consider manufacturing conditions.
Additionally, the warranty claims were thought to be caused by a calibration problem due to NTF
warranty returns. The evidence was lost during the replacement of the module. Checking the vehicle
condition in its "failed state" was necessary to determine the root cause of the issue.

Problem-Solving Path: A07 B16 A02 B02 C02 A08 B19 C08
D01 E02 and E03

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Figure 15: Fuel Delivery System Warranty Investigation (ZZ07)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Inoperative Power Window System (ZZ08)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: Supplier Manufacturing, Supplier Quality, OEM Quality.
PART/ COMPONENT: Power Window System
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Electric/Electronic Component System
DURATION: 1 year
TIME IN FIELD: 0 to 12 months-in-service
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Dealer Narratives state rear power window system inoperative
MAGNITUDE: Not provided
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Power window motor, power window
regulator, power window switch.
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1. Warranty data analysis found that adjoining components were being replaced
2. Warranty part analysis limited information, due to all parts being NTF
3. Go-and-see activity/vehicle testing - best source of information, and confirmed customer
complaint
4. Recreation testing -verified the hypothesis of system failure and provided greater understanding
of the root cause
5. Countermeasure development and implementation.
6. Verification of effectiveness.
ROOT CAUSE: Vehicle power window regulator system deceleration time out of specification due to
vehicle build variation.
SOLUTION: Eliminate power window regulator stopper to correct deceleration time.
RESULT: 97% reduction in warranty for the system
LESSONS LEARNED: Design of system didn't take into account build variation. Consider the entire
system when evaluating warranty data/warranty parts. Check actual vehicle condition (Go-and-see
activity) when getting NTF parts, and retrieve as much data as possible from vehicle. Work closely with
OEM to examine parts and vehicles.

Problem-Solving Path: A07 B16 A06 B07 C07 A08 B19 C07
A02 B03 C02 D01 E03

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Figure 16: Power Window System Warranty Investigation (ZZ08)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Version 2 Issued 03/2010

NTF Case Study Aftermarket Modifications (ZZ09)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Design/ Engineering, OEM Service, Supplier Design/ Engineering,
Supplier Product Support, Dealer Sales/ Service
PART/ COMPONENT: ABS System Components (i.e., Controllers, Sensors, Hydraulic Modulators)
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Chassis
DURATION: 1 2 Months
TIME IN FIELD: 0 3000 Miles
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Consumer experiences an ABS warning light indicating that the ABS system
has deactivated and may require service.
MAGNITUDE: ~ 1 5 C/1000
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Batteries
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Various ABS components were being
returned from the OEM dealers as failed components. Returned part analysis activities indicated that the
components met all performance criteria specified on the print and Customer Technical Requirements.
Based on the analysis results, a joint OEM/ supplier vehicle level analysis team was formed to investigate
at the vehicle level. Vehicle level testing performed with several returned components confirmed all
analysis results and was not able to duplicate the dealer reported failure or condition. Follow up,
performed through the OEM's Technical Service group, was successful at locating several "local" vehicles
with repeat failure histories that could be made available for inspection. The inspections led to the
discovery that aftermarket electrical devises had been incorrectly installed on the vehicles. These
incorrect installations resulted in documented power and ground issues as well as dead/ low batteries.
Correct installation of these devises resolved the failure conditions reported by the consumers.
ROOT CAUSE: Dealer and Aftermarket electronic equipment installation personnel were splicing into
the vehicle power and ground circuits when installing aftermarket radio and cell phone equipment. In
many cases, they used unapproved wiring practices (i.e. "scotch lock" connectors, corrosion prone
hardware, etc.) to establish the connection. The inappropriate connections resulted in vehicle low voltage
conditions, poor grounds, and ABS signal corruption, noise, or loss of signal.
SOLUTION: 1. Train dealer technicians to use approved installation processes for aftermarket equipment.
2. Train dealership service personnel to look for incorrectly installed aftermarket equipment before
proceeding w/ formal diagnostic procedures.
RESULT: Significant reductions in the return of NTF components and a reduction in the claim rates
LESSONS LEARNED: 1) Advise all OEM/ dealer diagnostic personnel to first check for incorrectly
installed aftermarket equipment before proceeding through the formal diagnostic sequence. 2) Design
vehicle systems to be as robust as possible to interaction w/ aftermarket electrical equipment.

Problem-Solving Path: A06 B07 C07 D08 E01 and E06

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Figure 17: Aftermarket Modifications (ZZ09)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Dealer Training Intermittent Fault Conditions (ZZ10)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Design/ Engineering, OEM Service, Supplier Design/ Engineering,
Supplier Product Support, Dealer Service
PART/ COMPONENT: ABS System Components (i.e., Controllers, Sensors, Hydraulic Modulators)
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Chassis
DURATION: 1 Month
TIME IN FIELD: Duration of Warranty Period
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Consumer experiences an ABS warning light indicating that the ABS system
has deactivated and may require service.
MAGNITUDE: ~ 1 5 C/1000
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Vehicle/ System interface components
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Various ABS components were being
returned from the OEM dealers as failed components. Returned part analysis activities indicated that the
components met all performance criteria specified on the print and Customer Technical Requirements.
Based on the analysis results, a joint OEM/ supplier vehicle level analysis team was formed to investigate
at the vehicle level. Vehicle level testing performed with several returned components confirmed all
analysis results and was not able to duplicate the dealer reported failure or condition. Follow up,
performed through the OEM's Technical Service group and supplier warranty personnel determined that
additional ABS components were changed after the initial repair had been made. Contact with the dealer
confirmed that the first few repairs had been unsuccessful and that a third repair was necessary to fix the
vehicle. Dealer conversations indicated that the repair technician performing the first few repairs had
noted that the diagnostic code was not present at the time of the repairs. The technician used the
information available at the time to make a judgment about which component(s) were at fault. The
technician replaced the suspected components, cleared the diagnostic code information, and returned the
vehicle to the consumer. Each time the consumer returned a short time later complaining of the same
fault condition. More in depth vehicle diagnostic activity performed during the third visit was successful
in duplicating the fault condition and repairing the vehicle.
ROOT CAUSE: Diagnosing intermittent conditions can be very difficult and time consuming if the
condition is not present during the diagnostic activity. The technician should use all available techniques
to duplicate the problem, (i.e. replicating the conditions when set, inspecting for aftermarket electronic
equipment, spraying salt water on wheel and underhood wire connections to provide ground paths as
experienced in winter weather conditions, reviewing service bulletins and information notices, etc.), but
shouldn't replace components without verified evidence that a component fault exists. It's usually much
better to be honest with the consumer than to potentially mislead them into thinking that their vehicle has
been repaired when in fact the potential condition may still exist. It's also never a good idea to intrude into
system interfaces unless absolutely necessary. Intrusions can cause additional problems and hinder future
diagnostic investigations.
SOLUTION: 1) Train dealer technicians/ service personnel to use approved diagnostic processes for
intermittent fault conditions. 2) Train dealer technicians/ service personnel to replace components only
when fault conditions are verified. 3) Improve dealer/ OEM communication when intermittent fault
conditions have been experienced, so that OEM designs and service strategies can be improved for future
products and repairs.

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Consumer-Centric Warranty Management


Version 2 Issued 03/2010

RESULT: Significant reductions in the return of NTF components and a reduction in the claim rates
LESSONS LEARNED: 1) Diagnosing intermittent fault conditions can be very difficult and time
consuming. 2) Components should only be replaced when fault conditions have been verified. 3)
Dealership repair personnel should be thoroughly trained on intermittent condition diagnostic strategies.

Problem-Solving Path: A07 B18 A10 B21 C11 D09 A06 B04
C07 D03 E01 and E04 and E06
Figure 18: Dealer Training Intermittent Fault Conditions (ZZ10)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Loose Shift Lever (ZZ11)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Engineering, Supplier Engineering, OEM Quality, OEM Assembly
Plant
PART/ COMPONENT: Shift Lever
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Powertrain - Driveline
DURATION: 4 Months
TIME IN FIELD: Less than 6 months
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Shift lever was inoperable
MAGNITUDE: 3.5 claims/1000 vehicles
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Shift knob, center console, shift cable and park
brake cable
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Supplier warranty investigation resulted in
NTF for the part involved (shift lever). Further investigation suggested that excessive force was placed to
the shift lever which leads to a conclusion of consumer misuse. Dealership visits/calls confirmed that the
issue could not have been caused by consumer. The supplier continued to look at all variables which led
to an investigation of assembly processes revealing unapproved assembly methods occurring on the
vehicle assembly line. Observation of the process provided additional clues to do root cause analysis.
Further investigation of mating component revealed an out of specification part that caused unapproved
assembly method.
ROOT CAUSE: Out of specification mating component resulted in vehicle assembly process variation
and introduction of excessive force.
SOLUTION: Correction of the out of specification mating part
RESULT: After correction of part, no further instances noted - 100% reduction
LESSONS LEARNED: 1) Investigate the entire system, not solely the failed component, 2) Due
diligence on finding true root cause - not stopping at NTF and verifying the accuracy of the data provided
by all suppliers and OEMs involved, and 3) Starting at the consumer end point and backing up through
the system eliminating root causes at each step.

Problem-Solving Path: A03 A02 B02 C02 A08 B18 C04 D04
E02

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Figure 19: Loose Shift Lever (ZZ11)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Replace Transmission Solenoids for Wear (ZZ12)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM, Supplier X, Dealer, End Customer
PART/ COMPONENT: Hydraulic Solenoid
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Automatic Transmission
DURATION: 3 months
TIME IN FIELD: 12 28 months, range 30,000 to 35,000 miles
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Fleet consumer requested replacement of all potential wear parts as part of
their annual vehicle yearly maintenance for Public Service vehicles.
MAGNITUDE: 18 pieces, $1200.00 repair cost each
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Valve Body, Transmission
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Parts were received from consumer and run
through the test criteria originally used to qualify the parts. Every part returned was classified NTF.
Meetings with the OEM to investigate the system yielded no solutions. Disassembly and testing yielded
no identified failures. Access to dealer data revealed no information. Access was given to call a particular
dealer and speak with the repair person.
ROOT CAUSE: Technician was told by the consumer, the Public Service Fleet Maintenance
Management, that it was time for yearly maintenance and the dealer should replace any parts they feel are
worn or could fail. Technician initiated work on 18 transmissions that had this solenoid replaced as it was
considered normal maintenance service work. From the time in use, these solenoids were under warranty.
SOLUTION: Analysis of the data reveled that all 18 repairs came in the same month, from the same
dealer, with the same diagnosis, and with the same information supplied. The only difference was varying
VIN numbers. The technician was instructed not to replace the solenoid unless a failure occurred. The
durability testing/qualification of the part was explained. The dealer listened to recommendations.
RESULT: This incident has not recurred.
LESSONS LEARNED:

Access is needed to dealers and technicians to help them understand warranty claims
and receive training.
Improved communication is needed to provide greater access and faster response.
Deep dive of the warranty data earlier in the investigation stage would have revealed
that it was the same dealer who requested all of the repairs.

Manual Phase 5 Section 5.3


Problem-Solving Path: A07 B09 B18 C11 D09 E06

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Figure 20: Replace Transmission Solenoid for Wear (ZZ12)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Transmission Loss of Drive (ZZ13)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Warranty, OEM Engineering, Supplier Quality, Supplier
Engineering, Supplier Manufacturing
PART/ COMPONENT: Low/Intermediate Piston
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Powertrain Driveline
DURATION: Approximately 4 months of production
TIME IN FIELD: Mean of failures 6 months in service
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Consumer was typically impacted by a loss of forward Drive
MAGNITUDE: Ambient warranty @ 12 MIS $0.02 CPU; Inflated condition was at $0.24 CPU
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Part is immersed in transmission fluid.
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: 100% parts retention instituted. Failed
pistons were analyzed from failed units built between the suspect build period. Carbon content and
manganese of all the failed units were below typical levels but still within print specifications for material
grade. It was found that the upper tier customer increased the transmission oil pressure 180 to 270 psi for
sustained operating pressure (50% increase). This change was significant in that the original design limit
was 220 psi max with 180 psi operating pressure. Conclusion is the part needed to have stronger,
controlled steel to survive this new environment.
ROOT CAUSE: Variation in carbon and manganese content allowed system pressures, which were
above design intent, to cause deformation.
SOLUTION: Material change to HSLA over low carbon steel
RESULT: Significantly increased strength of the piston and provides substantial safety factor (410 psi)
for either pressure or material variations. Warranty on parts produced after this change returned back to
the original ambient warranty rates.
LESSONS LEARNED: Change in operating conditions was not communicated. Complex system
problems require collaborative effort and many times require complete communication between the entire
supply chain to ensure that all requirements are fully understood and can be proven to be met.

Problem-Solving Path: A02 B05 C07 B07 C02 D02 E03 and E05

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Figure 21: Transmission Loss of Drive (ZZ13)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Power Folding Mirrors (ZZ15)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Warranty, OEM Field Analysis, Dealer Technicians
PART/ COMPONENT: Exterior Mounted Power Folding Rear-view Mirrors
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Body - Exterior
DURATION: Approx 60 days
TIME IN FIELD: N/A
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Mirror failed to operate properly, failed to adjust, was reported to be "loose",
would not lock and would not fully extend
MAGNITUDE: Not provided
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Mirror unit and switch only
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Problem was discovered when a large
number of power mirrors were returned to the Warranty Parts Return Center with no problem found. The
mirrors were replaced when they should have been "reset" (realigned with the detent). The problem
occurs when the mirrors are manually folded (e.g., at a car wash). The diagnostic and replacement
procedures were reviewed in the Shop Manual and it was discovered that the reset/recycle process was
not fully explained. The mirrors were operating correctly. Consumers and technicians did not fully
understand the operation of the side mirrors, leading to an inaccurate diagnosis and subsequent
replacement.
ROOT CAUSE: Correct and thorough operating procedures were not included in the Shop Manuals and
were not fully explained in consumer literature.
SOLUTION: A Technical Service Bulletin was released which documented the issue, the proper function
of the mirror, and an explanation of the reset procedure. A Warranty Action Notice was released to the
Field Organization and to all dealership personnel. Additional information was added to future versions
of the Owners Manuals and mirror operation and reset procedures were added to the Customer Quick
Reference Guide.
RESULT: Effectively eliminated future inappropriate mirror replacements
LESSONS LEARNED: New product features must be fully explained to consumers and service
personnel and be easy to understand.

Problem-Solving Path: A03 B06 C07 A01 B02 A10 B01 B21
C01 C11 C12 D09 E01 and E06

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Figure 22: Power Folding Mirrors (ZZ15)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Transmission Fluid Leak (ZZ17)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Assembly Plant and Transmission Release Engineering, Supplier
Design and Applications Engineers and Dealer Technicians
PART/ COMPONENT: Output seals, pan gaskets, bottom covers and transmission housings
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Automatic Transmission
DURATION: Early 02 through July 03
TIME IN FIELD: 0 MIS to 36 MIS
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Staining of oil at bottom of the transmission
MAGNITUDE: 15/1000 to 100/1000
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Transmission housings, bottom pans and
gaskets
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Initial activity focused on improved seal
design and material to address vehicle assembly issues that reduced failure rate over 50% but rate
remained higher than expected. All previous identified improvements were implemented that should have
brought rates to a benchmark level. Analysis of the limited number of field returns available after
countermeasures were implemented indicated seals function correctly. Data analysis for geographic, time
of year, by mileage, and test information or adjoining components did not provide any help in identifying
higher than expected rates. A request for approval to visit dealers was not successful as there were no
complaints received to allow onsite participation in the repair, yet the warranty data were showing field
failures.
ROOT CAUSE: Analysis of the warranty data looking at frequency by dealer indicated the majority of
failures were with a select number of dealers. Over a six-year period, the average number of repairs was
fewer than 10 except for these select dealers who were at +200 (one at 1,800). Dealers turned out to be
rental fleets that facilitate their own repairs. Visits to the fleet maintenance facilities found repairs
initiated at the sight of any visible oil leak or staining. Analysis of reported leaking seals indicated seals
were functioning correctly, so leakage or staining was from another source.
SOLUTION: Visited the vehicle assembly line and observed the assembly of the half shaft. Some oil
may leak out when the shipping plug is removed. Normal practice is to clean the housing if some oil
leaks, but this was not 100% effective. Increasing awareness that staining was being mistaken as field
leakers resulted in improved cleaning procedures and change in fleet repair procedure to first wipe the
stain clean and then observe before a repair is conducted.
RESULT: Greater than 75% reduction in the failure rate (reduced from top 10 highest vehicle warranty
cost to no longer on top 100 warranty cost list).
LESSONS LEARNED: 1. Analyze all of the available warranty data, not just a select few fields (we
would have found repairs centered on a handful of dealers or fleets). 2. Review repair procedures and
agree on what constitutes a failure (staining or actual drops leaking). 3. Closely monitor the assembly
over an extended time period to observe any abnormal practices (not just a walk by review of the
assembly operation).

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Manual Phase 5 Section 5.3


Problem-Solving Path: A07 B09 B18 D09 A08 B18 C08 E01
and E02
Figure 23: Transmission Fluid Leak (ZZ17)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Rear Seal / Main Bearing Cap Leak (ZZ18)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: Supplier Quality and On-Site engineering, OEM Design Release Engineer,
Plant Quality, Resident Engineer, and Supplier Quality Engineer
PART/ COMPONENT: Rear crank seal
DURATION: 12 months
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Engine oil leakage
C/1000 @ 12 MIS

VEHICLE SYSTEM: Engine


TIME IN FIELD: 12 36 MIS
MAGNITUDE: 5.5% repeat repairs, 1.8 to 2.4

ADJOINING PARTS: Rear crank seal, bearing cap, oil pan, oil pan gasket, front engine cover, front
cover gasket
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Initial concern was the quality of the
supplied component and attention focused on verifying quality records/systems. Field-returned product
was found to still function, it measured correctly, and no causal factor was visible. The Engine assembly
plant leak test records showed no issues, supplier quality records indicated parts were to print and passed
in-process functional audit testing. Reviewed past Lessons Learned and found similar issue occurred five
years earlier, which then helped to focus on the problem-solving area. All adjoining components
indicated the same increase in failure rate at the same time. Dealer visits to observe repairs confirmed
that it was a repeat issue.
ROOT CAUSE: Application equipment at the assembly plant had large positional variability resulting in
an insufficient gasket bead application. Variation continued to deteriorate over time resulting in rising
repair rates. Insufficient quantity of the bead combined with 5S (sanitize) resulted in improper curing
of gasket that leaked at +12 MIS. Leak path was across the rear main seal resulting in an incorrect
diagnosis and repair being made.
SOLUTION: Positional capability of robotic dispenser was improved along with 5S procedures for the
station being implemented. A Technical Bulletin was issued to repair the cap instead of only changing
the rear crank seal. Plant PFMEA was revised.
RESULT: 0.2 C/1000 @ 12 MIS after countermeasures were implemented. All adjoining components
also saw a similar reduction in failure rate. Warranty cost savings $500k.
LESSONS LEARNED: Prior Lessons Learned were not institutionalized resulting in a repeat issue. The
process was allowed to degrade over time and relied on air leak test to detect issues. Considerable time
was spent focused on investigating the single component. Had the adjoining component warranty been
reviewed at the beginning, it would have helped identify the problem more quickly, potentially triggering
an earlier review of past Lessons Learned.

Problem-Solving Path: A03 B06 A02 B12 B03 C07 D09 E01
and E02 and E06

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Figure 24: Rear Seal / Main Bearing Cap (ZZ18)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Heated Seat Inoperative (ZZ20)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM, Supplier X, Consumer
PART/ COMPONENT: Seat Heater

VEHICLE SYSTEM: Interior

DURATION: 6 months

TIME IN FIELD: 12 MIS

CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Consumers experience a failure of their heated seats.


MAGNITUDE: 14.88 C/1000 failure rate, $3.40 CPV
ADJOINING PARTS: Seat cushion, seat cover
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1.

Listen to the consumer complaint.

2.

Observe the failure.

3.

Measure the difference.

4.

Converge to the major influence.

5.

Confirm the major influence.

6.

Implement corrective action.

ROOT CAUSE: By using engineering problem-solving tools, the customer failure event (heater INOP)
was connected to the feature of a broken wire. The location of the broken wire was shown to be nonrandom, always in the same location where the drivers hip would roll off the seat cushion when exiting
the vehicle. To replicate the broken wire feature, an aggressive knee test was developed. This test
replicated the same failure mode as the consumer vehicles. This test was applied at the point of the seat
cushion where the drivers hip would roll off when exiting the vehicle. This test was cycled until the
heater wire fatigued and broke, causing the INOP condition.
SOLUTION: Short term: Change from a single wire design to a fanned wire design to dissipate the stress
input into the part. Long term: Relocate and reroute the wire to remove it from the high stress region.
RESULT: Elimination of this warranty issue.
LESSONS LEARNED: The angle at which the seat heater wire passes through the seat cushion is critical.
If it is perpendicular, the resulting sharp angles will act as stress concentrators as the part is cycled. If the
pass-through angle is closer to parallel, this greatly minimizes the stresses on the part.

Applicable Manual Phase 5 Section 5.1 and 5.4


NTF Problem-Solving Path: A05 B05 C07 A03 B04 C02 D02
E03 and E05

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Figure 25: Heated Seal INOP (ZZ20)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Door Outer Belt Molding Misalignment (ZZ21)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM, Supplier X, Consumer, Assembly Plant
PART/ COMPONENT: Rear Door Outer Belt Molding

VEHICLE SYSTEM: Exterior

DURATION: 3 months

TIME IN FIELD: 0 MIS

CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Assembly Plant auditors are calling an out-of-alignment condition that
increases rework time and cost, and warranty cost.
MAGNITUDE: PPH failure rate
ADJOINING PARTS: Door outer sheet metal, side light, rear stationary glass, B-pillar appliqu
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1.

Listen to the consumer complaint.

2.

Observe the failure.

3.

Measure the difference.

4.

Converge to the major influence.

5.

Confirm the major influence.

6.

Implement corrective action.

ROOT CAUSE: By using engineering problem-solving tools, the failure location was shown to be nonrandom. It always occurred on the rear doors in the same location on both sides. The team was able to
converge to the source of variation being in the rear outer belt moldings. When looking at bad moldings
compared to good moldings, the team saw a twist in the bad moldings. The twist was allowed to manifest
itself as a misalignment because there are no locating features at the front of the molding to force it to
follow the door metal.
SOLUTION: Short term: Instruct the operator at the supplier to minimize the twist inherent to the part
when manufacturing it. Long term: Add a retention feature to the front edge of the molding to ensure that
it follows the door sheet metal.
RESULT: Elimination of this plant audit / J. D. Power / warranty issue.
LESSONS LEARNED: The checking fixture at the supplier did not represent how the part interfaced with
the actual vehicle. There was no check to measure the alignment with the front outer belt molding that it
was supposed to align with. Also, a clamp at the leading edge of the fixture providing positive location
was not present in the vehicle.

Applicable Manual Phase 5 Section 5.4


NTF Problem-Solving Path: A05 B05 C07 A02 B03 C04 C02
D01 E03 and E04

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Figure 26: Door Outer Belt Molding (ZZ21)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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OEM Outside Rear View Mirror (OSRV) Vibration (ZZ22)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM, Tier 1 Supplier, Tier 2 Supplier
PART/ COMPONENT: OSRV Mirror

VEHICLE SYSTEM: Exterior

DURATION: 3 Weeks

TIME IN FIELD: 1 6 Months

CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Vibration at Highway Speeds


MAGNITUDE: 50 C/1000

ADJOINING PARTS: Door Panel

PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:


1.

Listen to the consumer.

2.

Observe the failure.

3.

Measure the contrast.

4.

Converge to the major influence.

5.

Confirm the major influence.

6.

Implement control

Assemblies were initially inspected and found to be NTF. Statistical Engineering methods were used to
determine the contrast between warranty returned assemblies (Best of the Best [BOB]) and non-vibrating
mirrors (Worst of the Worst [WOW]). Aggravation with excessive energy in a controlled setting on a
vibration table was required to reveal the contrast. A laser was reflected off the mirror glass and
measured with a scale. With very large contrast between BOBs and WOWs, this measurement system
increased the ability to see differences between assemblies. While doing this, the vibration was revealed
in the warranty returned mirror, while the non-vibrating mirror remained good. The movement of the
vibration was non-random, which drove the project to the Powerfold Actuator. Upon confirmation that
the result of the vibration resided in the actuator, components within that assembly were exchanged. The
results showed a significant difference within a feature of a sheet metal stamped component.
ROOT CAUSE:
A feature of a sheet metal stamped component within the actuator assembly was found to drive the
vibration.
SOLUTION:
Stamping and trim dies were modified to bring the measurement of the feature within the distribution of
the BOB component.
RESULT:
Warranty returns were significantly reduced from previous results of 50 C/1000.
LESSONS LEARNED:
Listen to the consumer. Look for non-random patterns to the failure. By understanding the physics of the
failure on NTF parts, you can move forward by understanding how to aggravate the parts. With
aggravation, you want to see the potentially bad part get worse, while the good part remains good.
With a consistent measurement system, one can leverage the contrast between BOB and WOW
parts/assemblies going forward.

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Problem-Solving Path: A05 B04 C07 D07 A03 B04 C02 D02
E03 and E04
Figure 27: OEM Outside Read View Mirror Vibration (ZZ22)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Window Regulator Motor Inoperative (ZZ23)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM, Supplier X, Consumer
PART/ COMPONENT: Window Regulator Motor
DURATION: 9 months

VEHICLE SYSTEM: Electrical


TIME IN FIELD: 36 MIS

CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Customer experiences power window inoperative


MAGNITUDE: 61.2 C/1000 / $12.07 CPV @ 36 MIS
ADJOINING PARTS: Door inner sheet metal, side light
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1.

Listen to the consumer complaint.

2.

Observe the failure.

3.

Measure the difference.

4.

Converge to the major influence.

5.

Confirm the major influence.

6.

Implement corrective action.

ROOT CAUSE: By using engineering problem-solving tools, the concern was determined to be caused
by a stalled motor. The stalled motor condition was caused by insufficient power getting to the motor
through the thermal switch. The difference between the good switch versus the bad switch was the
amount of resistivity present. This was caused by the thermal switch wearing out due to repeated stall
conditions. This was confirmed with 95% confidence.
SOLUTION: Redesign part to be more robust to aggravated OEM customer usage.
RESULT: Elimination of this warranty issue.
LESSONS LEARNED: The part was susceptible to degradation in performance because it had excessive
grease applied inside it that was not well controlled when it was applied, causing it to get into the thermal
switch and degrade its performance.

Problem-Solving Path: A05 B06 C07 D07 A03 B04 C07 D01
E02 and E04

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Figure 28: Window Regulator Motor Failure (ZZ23)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Tail Lamp Water Ingress (ZZ24)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM, Supplier X, Consumer
PART/ COMPONENT: Tail Lamp
DURATION: 3 months

VEHICLE SYSTEM: Exterior


TIME IN FIELD: 12 MIS

CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Customer experiences visible water/condensation in tail lamps


MAGNITUDE: 10.83 C/1000 / $2.11 CPV
ADJOINING PARTS: Quarter panel, tail lamp pocket, deck lid, rear fascia, main body wire harness
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1.

Listen to the consumer complaint.

2.

Observe the failure.

3.

Measure the difference.

4.

Converge to the major influence

5.

Confirm the major influence.

6.

Implement corrective action.

ROOT CAUSE: By using engineering problem-solving tools, the leak path was shown to be non-random,
always occurring at the same location on all returned parts. A comparison between bad lamps and good
lamps showed a large difference in the height of the back plate seal: the good lamp had a large seal and
the bad lamp had a small seal. This was due to process variation at the supplier. This was confirmed
statistically.
SOLUTION: Short term: Update service bulletin to replace on the back plate, not entire lamp assembly.
Long term: Add more material to seal to ensure adequate sealing surface.
RESULT: Elimination of this warranty issue after corrective action was fully implemented.
LESSONS LEARNED: The 100% online test at the supplier was masking this failure mode. The test was
to draw a vacuum on the lamp assembly and measure the decay rate of the vacuum. This drew the lamp
housing and back plate together increasing the seal between the two parts. This is the opposite of the
physics of how this system works. As the lamp generates heat and light, it causes the air internal to the
lamp to expand, causing the low areas of the seal to lose contact with the lamp housing and create a leak
path.

Problem-Solving Path: A03 B06 C07 C06 D06 E01 and E04

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Figure 29: Tail Lamp Water Leak (ZZ24)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Power Track Flex Shaft (ZZ30)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM, Tier 1 and Tier 2 Suppliers were active participants. Warranty
Analysts, Product Engineers and Test/Validation Engineers participated.
PART/ COMPONENT: Power Track

VEHICLE SYSTEM: Seats / Interior

DURATION: 18 months, due to commercial issues. The concern was identified via early claims data at
2MIS. Solution was available for production 3 months later.
TIME IN FIELD: 1-36MIS (Occurs early and throughout warranty life cycle).
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Power seat track does not adjust before or after. System is inoperative.
MAGNITUDE: #1 reason for inoperative power tracks (based on analyzed returns).
ADJOINING PARTS: No adjoining parts contribute to this repair (included in same or related claim).
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:
1.

Use DFSS tools to understand failure modes.

2.

Create low cost (component) service kit for field repairs. Flex shafts were made available to
dealerships in lieu of replacing entire power track adjuster.

ROOT CAUSE:
1.

Fleet consumers pulling on motor flex shaft thinking it is a towel bar.

2.

The flex cable is easily accessed by customer.

3.

Lack of shielding around motor flex shaft.

4.

Shielding was removed pre-start of production as a cost savings per OEM customer direction.

SOLUTION:
Add a front motor trim plate that anchors the motor and shaft to the seat frame. This gives the assembly
more rigidity and does not allow the customer to reach the flex cable.
RESULT:
90% incident reduction in inoperative power track(s) has been realized.
LESSONS LEARNED:
Trim plate was removed from original design as a cost savings. The removal did not affect normal track
use or any life cycle validation requirements. However, it did allow for the inoperative/pulled off flex
shaft condition when subjected to unforeseen consumer use. Future cost-saving changes need to be RISK
analyzed more diligently.

Problem-Solving Path: A03 B04 C06 C02 D02 E01 and E03

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Figure 30: Power Track Flex Shaft (ZZ30)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Dead Battery Due to Prolonged Storage at Dealership (ZZ39)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Quality Engineers (for field analysis and information gathering),
OEM Field Specialists (for dealer evaluation), OEM Warranty Group, Dealer technicians
PART/ COMPONENT: Vehicle Battery

VEHICLE SYSTEM: Electrical

DURATION: 2004 to current


CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Consumer experiences a no-start condition with the vehicle. The battery has
experienced a significant loss of charge upon receipt of the vehicle. Thus, a large percentage of batteryrelated warranty occurs at 0-1 months-in-service (MIS).
MAGNITUDE: Battery warranty is a Top issue for 0-3 MIS warranty. 10% of battery warranty occurs
before the vehicle sale at 0 MIS.
ADJOINING PARTS: None
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: The first indication of this problem occurred
when the OEM Quality Engineers began noticing an increase in 0-1 MIS battery-related warranty claims.
The OEM Quality Engineers gathered dealer-specific warranty data for battery repairs and identified the
top dealerships that exhibited the greatest increase in battery repairs at 0-1 MIS. By coordinating the
OEM Field Specialists, the OEM Quality Engineers and the OEM Warranty Group conducted a go-andsee study at two (2) separate dealerships to investigate factors leading to the high warranty claim
occurrence for batteries. The study yielded the following factors that were consistent at both dealers:

Lack of maintenance on aging vehicles on the lot


No routine checks of vehicle battery charge state
Minimal moving/operation of aging vehicles

Furthermore, a correlation analysis of claim rate versus average storage time (time in between vehicle
production date and sales date or repair date) yielded a high correlation index (0.75-0.89 per vehicle)
between the two variables, giving a strong indication that the occurrence rate of 0-1 MIS battery repairs
varied jointly with average storage time.
Figure 31: Example: Claim Rate vs. Storage Time Correlation Study

c ase /1 0 0veh ic le s (0 - 1

C o r re la tio n fo r M o d e l 1

20

40

60

80

10 0

s to rag e d ay s

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ROOT CAUSE:
1.

Lack of maintenance on aging vehicles on the dealership lot.

2.

Dealer negligence of the OEM warranty policy. Under this policy, dealerships are not
permitted to submit warranty claims for dead batteries due to lack of maintenance on the lot.

SOLUTION: A formal audit of the two dealerships was conducted in order to assess their procedures in
routinely checking vehicles before the date of sale. In addition to the go-and-see audit, both dealerships
were retrained on the OEM warranty policy concerning battery replacement.
Taking the approach and Lessons Learned of this pilot study, the OEM Warranty Group released a
bulletin on the dealer network in order to explain the policy regarding battery warranty claims. For future
occurrences, they also developed a dealer scorecard to identify each region's top dealerships in terms of 01 MIS battery warranty. If a dealership is flagged on this scorecard, the OEM Field Specialists shall
conduct an audit of the dealership in the same manner as the pilot study. In addition, the OEM Warranty
Group may elect to seek reimbursement for these warranty claims at specific dealerships. However, this
option has proved more difficult to pursue due to the lack of sufficient evidence that the battery
replacements are a result of lack of maintenance.
RESULT: 0-1 MIS battery warranty was reduced by 86% for the two dealers involved in the pilot study.
Warranty results for post-implementation of scorecard/audit are still being monitored closely.
LESSONS LEARNED: Some warranty issues are not simply misdiagnosed by the dealer technician but
caused by the dealership practices. In these situations, the actual cause can be seen only by visiting the
dealership, and thus the OEM should allow for go-and-see opportunities at the dealership in order to
confirm this issue. For actual countermeasure, the OEM is the main stakeholder for the dealerships, thus
the OEM should be responsible for developing standardized tools to prevent future occurrences and
enforcing the warranty policy onto the dealer.

Problem-Solving Path: A09 B18 C10 C11 D09 E01 and E06

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Figure 32: Dead Battery Due to Prolonged Storage at Dealership (ZZ39)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Shift Hesitation Due to Engine Computer Software (ZZ40)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Design Groups (for part/system analysis + C/M), Tier 1 Supplier
(for part analysis), OEM Quality Engineers (for field analysis), Dealership Technician (for facilitation of
field analysis), and Vehicle Consumer (for information gathering)
PART/ COMPONENT
Engine Computer

VEHICLE SYSTEM:
Powertrain/Engine Control

DURATION: Start of the 2007 model year 10/06 (production month)


CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Consumer Experiences Shift Delay/Hesitation under normal driving
conditions such as: 1) accelerating from a stop, 2) reaccelerating from a rolling stop. This condition was
usually noticed within the first 3 months-in-service (MIS). Check Engine light was not recorded as
being on.
MAGNITUDE: Total ECU warranty was 5% of all Powertrain warranty, which was 41% of all vehicle
warranty during this time period.
ADJOINING PARTS: For many consumers who complained about the hesitation, the dealer would not
perform a repair since all other vehicles (of the same model) exhibited the same condition. However,
many dealerships would replace the computer to please the consumer (even though there is no real
improvement to the consumers condition). In other cases, dealers would replace spark plugs or throttle
body based on prior experience with hesitation issues. In the rarest cases, the transmission assembly
would be replaced.
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: The first indicator of the problem was
received through field reports from the OEM sales branch. The OEM Quality Engineers also began to see
increasing PP/100 from consumer surveys, as well as an increase in claims for the Engine Computer.
Most verbatim indicated a hesitation while driving, but the details were unclear. By implementing a
100% warranty parts recovery program for new model launch, the OEM also received some Engine
Computers, which were then forwarded to the Tier 1 Supplier for investigation. The OEMs analyzed
claim details to pinpoint driving conditions to experience the hesitation. These OEMs worked together
with the field representatives and dealership technicians to confirm the consumer complaint and gather
flash memory data during the particular driving conditions for analysis. Further data analysis by the
OEMs showed that the previous model years had few complaints. As the supplier reported NTF on
returned parts, the OEMs gathered memory data from a previous model year vehicle, and the results were
compared to the current 2007 model. The consumers complaint could be seen quantitatively from the
memory data. The information was presented to the OEM Design group, who then modified the Engine
Computer software to match the performance of the previous model year. An evaluation activity was
held to confirm that the customers complaints were corrected using the new software. Further
evaluations were completed to ensure that no negative side effects arose due to the new software. After
testing was complete, the new software was made available to dealership technicians via a TSB as a
current field fix. For future prevention, the mass production parts were revised to include the updated
software.
ROOT CAUSE: Insufficient calibration of gear hold logic, shifting sequence control, shift pressure
control, and spark retard control when compared to previous model year.
For the new model year, an unconventional throttle position sensor and accelerator pedal sensor were
adopted, causing fundamental changes to the Engine Computer software from the previous model year.

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SOLUTION: Improve the computer software to match the performance of the previous model.
For a field fix, re-program the Engine Computer with the improved software by issuing a TSB.
For production countermeasure and recurrence prevention, install the new Engine Computer that has the
improved software.
RESULT: Claim rate did not significantly decrease. Dealerships had already been denying consumers for
the repairs for the engine computer before countermeasure. The most substantial evidence of increasing
consumer satisfaction was through the use of consumer surveys, which decreased the overall Problems
Per 100 vehicles rating for engine performance by 50+%.
Warranty claim costs decreased by 35% due to TSB instructions not to replace full Engine Computers
during repair.
LESSONS LEARNED:
1.

Teamwork is required for quickly detecting and resolving field issues. Collaboration by the
supplier, the OEMs, and the dealership technicians allowed for comprehensive analysis and
dynamic evaluation of the problem and how it could be triggered by certain driving
conditions. Collaborative testing was done at the component levels (Supplier) and the vehicle
levels (OEM) in order to investigate and identify all possible root causes of the issue.

2.

Design specification does not always capture the consumers expectation. Finally, by
comparing design changes made in the previous model year changeover, the root cause was
identified as a fundamental software change due to the added complexity of the engine
control system itself. The information was quickly communicated to Design, with sufficient
evidence of actual customer verbatim, to instigate a change in the new design specification in
order to meet the customers expected usage.

Problem-Solving Path: A06 B07 C07 C06 D02 E01 and E03

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Figure 33: Shift Hesitation Due to Engine Computer Software (ZZ40)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) Poor Capture Rate (ZZ41)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: OEM Design Groups (for parts / system analysis + C/M), Tier 1 Supplier
(design-responsible), and OEM Quality Engineers (for field analysis).
PART/ COMPONENT
TPMS Receiver

VEHICLE SYSTEM:
Chassis/Tire Pressure Monitoring System

DURATION: Start of the 2007 model year (11/06) to February 25, 2007 (production month)
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Consumer Experiences TPMS warning light on after 20 minutes of vehicle
operation.
MAGNITUDE:
TPMS receiver warranty claim rate increased 12 times from 2006 model year to 2007 model year.
ADJOINING PARTS:
For customers with TPMS warning light on, the dealer would perform any of the following repairs in
order of most likely occurrence:
1.

Re-register TPMS sensors

2.

Replace TPMS ECU

3.

Replace TPMS receiver

PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS:


The first indicator of the problem was through field reports during pre-production vehicle evaluation.
Although the issue was detected, actual parts verification yielded No Trouble Found results. The
intermittent condition and past history of TPMS performance allowed for the problem to pass through to
the production phase. After the model launch, returned warranty parts analysis of sensors, ECU, or
receiver all showed No Trouble Found condition when evaluated by the supplier. OEM Quality
Engineers with OEM and supplier design groups conducted vehicle-level evaluations of the complete
TPMS system with both new and returned parts. By isolating and measuring signal inputs/outputs of each
component within the system, a specific capacitor in the TPMS receiver circuit was found to be the cause
of a poor signal capture rate between the receiver and the sensors during synchronization.
ROOT CAUSE:
The capacitor specification prevented the receivers threshold circuit to settle quickly after various vehicle
system variations. As a result, the threshold circuit would still be elevated during synchronization,
causing the receiver to fall down to around a 60% capture rate of transmitter sync bits from the sensors.
This would lead to the receiver sending imperfect synchronization bits to the ECU. After 6-7 missed sync
bits, the ECU would then ignore the subsequent tire pressure data, leading to a sensor silent fault
condition and triggering the TPMS warning light on.
SOLUTION:
Influenced the data slicer threshold circuit to settle faster by reducing the capacitor specification value.
The resulting improvement in receiver settling time results in a greatly improved data capture rate from
60% to 90%.

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For a quick field fix, the OEM coordinated replacement of pre-countermeasure TPMS receivers with new
level hardware by issuing a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) to the dealer network.
For production countermeasure and recurrence prevention, the OEM changed over to the new level
receiver.
RESULT:
The warranty claim rate showed a reduction of 60% after the countermeasure. Furthermore, issues with
the ECU were discovered after the receiver countermeasure was completed; after ECU issues were
addressed, the claim rate dropped an additional 25%.
LESSONS LEARNED:
1.

Component level bench testing is not always sufficient to catch issues that may be related to
vehicle architecture. Thus, vehicle-level testing is needed in order to isolate individual system
components and measure working specifications and inputs/outputs while in a simulated
system of vehicle variation.

2.

This issue was captured in pre-production stages, however, it was allowed to flow out to the
field due to NTF condition of investigated parts and moderate tolerance for chronic TPMS
light-on issues. Vehicle-level system testing implemented at this stage could have intercepted
this issue before flowing out to the customer.

Problem-Solving Path: A06 B07 C07 A02 B03 C02 D02 E01
and E03

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Figure 34: Tire Pressure Monitoring System Poor Capture Rate (ZZ41)

Illustration to show steps only. See fold-out insert at end of manual for details

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APPENDIX SECTION vi. REDUCING RISK ON A GLOBAL


PLATFORM LOCALIZATION PROJECT (ZZ19)

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Reducing Risk on a Global Platform Localization Project (ZZ19)


VALUE CHAIN MEMBERS: Lower tier supplier die design, quality, and process engineers; production
overseas partner product design, die design, process engineering; and our design, process, supplier
development, and quality engineering
PART/ COMPONENT: Bonded Metal Pistons
VEHICLE SYSTEM: Transmission
DURATION: Limited development time to localize and launch production of five components to support
the customers launch date. Risk was therefore very high.
TIME IN FIELD: NA New Launch Program
CUSTOMER SYMPTOM: Risk of either cracked metal stampings as received from lower tier supplier
or fatigue failure if improperly stamped. Experience of launch at partner identified risks indicating
proactive use of Lessons Learned necessary to mitigate risk.
MAGNITUDE: Component failure is internal, making detection of root cause very difficult. Repair is
extensive should failure occur.
ADJOINING PARTS (included in same or related claim): Clutch packs, clutch springs, and electronics
that control shift may be affected as well as other internal components. Often symptom is misdiagnosed
until more serious, costly repair is required.
PROCESS/PROBLEM RESOLUTION ACTIONS/STEPS: Product requires precision metal stampings
with difficult-to-process material. Application conditions push the design limit of the product. Tight
controls over the stamping are required to meet radii, surface roughness and thickness specifications,
which are all controlled by a lower tier supplier. Detection is very difficult so there is increased risk with
noncompliant stampings. Issue is further complicated by designs and tolerances not previously required
of the supplier.
ROOT CAUSE: Previous transfer method was to send product drawings, material specifications, and
high-level process information and let the localization partner define assumed requirements with local tier
suppliers. Activity tended to be in series versus in parallel, resulting in longer development time.
Incoming inspection would be based on lower tier certifications with minimal sampling. Issues with
lower tier supplier were confrontational as a result of less defined requirements.
SOLUTION: Components were originally launched at Global Partner, and the challenge of stamping
consistent metal cases was identified in development that required tight controls over the die design and
allowable tolerances of finished product. Controls were more stringent than are typical in this market.
Brought both lower tier supplier and our engineers to review design steps, countermeasures, and control
elements to Global Partner (multiple trips) at the beginning of the project. Partner then worked onsite at
lower tier suppliers site to ensure that stamping sequence, surface control, and punch clearances were
achieving the goals (multiple trips). Inspection methods and measurement techniques were then taught to
both lower tier supplier and to our quality engineers and correlation studies completed. Multiple material
lot runs were conducted as part of the round robin correlation studies.
RESULT: Product launched flawlessly with no quality issues with the lower tier supplier for over a three
year period.
LESSONS LEARNED: Involve the lower tier supplier early in the development, which allows
requirements to become clearly defined. Apply Lessons Learned from development and launch from the
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originating location versus having to struggle with going through the learning curve. Collaboration
resulted in a clear understanding of requirements, print interpretations, measurement methods, and
acceptance criteria. Final process verification was through multiple material lot trials to verify that both
the lower tier supplier and our organization were capable and correlate.

Applicable Manual: Phase 3Sections 3.1, 3.9 and Phase 4Section 4.1

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