Mind Over Matter?

The
Inability to Counteract
Contrast Effects Despite
Conscious Effort
Stewart Shapiro
University of Delaware

Mark T. Spence
Bond University, Australia

ABSTRACT
The nature of contrast effects is equivocal. Prior research has conceptualized contrast effects as emerging from an effortful attempt to
counteract the natural tendency to assimilate to relevant contextual
information. Others have suggested that contrast effects can be the
natural, default outcome if the context stimulus is extreme relative to
the target. Even with this latter perspective, however, individuals are
believed to be sufficiently aware of the contextual influence so as to
be able to counteract it if so motivated. These conceptualizations call
into question the extent to which contrast effects can occur automatically, without awareness. By using an opposition paradigm that pits
automatic influences against conscious influences, unequivocal evidence is provided that contrast effects can occur automatically; contrast effects emerged even when the contextual information was not
accessible from memory and study participants were explicitly trying
to avoid the influence of contextual information. Explanations are
proffered as to why evaluations driven by automatic contrast effects
could be inconsistent with preference judgments. 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Psychology & Marketing, Vol. 22(3): 225245 (March 2005)

Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com)
2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/mar.20056
225

Consider a consumer shopping for a stereo. She may want to avoid the
influence of a prior brand she evaluated when judging a new brand
because the prior brand is out of her price range; thus, she actively seeks
to avoid the possibility of either an assimilation or contrast effect. Is she
capable of doing so, or do context-induced influences occur automatically? This question is particularly germane to marketers because they
often have the ability to influence the order of product trials and/or product trial accessibility. Readers are likely familiar with the sales strategy of first showing a prospective customer a brand that is outside the
customers stated price range (to raise the customers noncompensatory
price ceiling or to lower performance expectations), or harping on a
brands performance on certain attributes to heighten their salience and
improve memory for the brand.
It is known that judgments are not context-free (Dato-on & Dahlstrom,
2003; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). A variety of factors inherent in the
decision context (e.g., task interruptions, context-target similarity, time
delays, atmospherics), characteristics of the information per se (its distinctiveness, emotive content, or salience) and personal factors (emotional state, motivation) have been advanced that affect the evaluation
of a target object (cf. Edwards & Bryan, 1997; Fiore, Yah, & Yoh, 2000;
Herr, 1986; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Much research has demonstrated that
context-relevant information serves as an interpretive frame (which
leads to assimilation) or comparison standard (which leads to contrast)
from which one evaluates target stimuli (for a good review, see Stapel &
Winkielman, 1998).
Consumers are often aware of the biasing nature of the context stimulus on target evaluation. Hamilton (2003) convincingly demonstrates
that subjects know how to use unattractive alternatives to create menus
that systematically influence others choices; Novemsky and Ratner
(2003) found that in anticipation of contrast effects, subjects altered
their preferred sequences of hedonic experiences; and Petty and Wegener
(1993) show that subjects persuasion knowledge is sufficiently developed to allow them to predict whether a given situation will lead to an
assimilation or contrast bias. Can these apparently engrained reactions be subverted by conscious effort? Several related issues become
apparent.
First, the idea that environmental factors automatically elicit responses
that alter judgment and behavior without conscious thought is gaining
support from marketers (Bargh, 2002; Krishnan & Trappey, 1999). Evidence has been advanced that suggests both assimilation effects (Braun,
1999; Hoch & Ha, 1986; Wilson & Brekke, 1994) and contrast effects
(Petty & Wegener, 1993) can occur automatically, without intent. But in
general, contrast effects are thought to be more effortful (Martin, 1986;
Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993; Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1997). Thus, the
extent to which contrast effects occur automatically and under what conditions is unclear.
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Second, prior research has assumed that counteracting a contextual

bias requires that context information be accessible at time of target
evaluation (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Petty, Wegener, & White, 1998).
Without memory for the context information there would be no comparison standard from which one could compensate for contextual bias.
At a minimum, as Stapel, Martin, and Schwarz (1998) note, one must
be able to smell the bias; that is, the context must be made salient.
What happens, however, if the prior trial experience is no longer consciously accessible from memory, but automatic biasing effects persist?
Product trials occur sequentially, raising the possibility that a context
brand cannot be intentionally, let alone accurately, recalled from memory when evaluating a target brand (Shapiro & Spence, 2002). In light
of the weight consumers place on product trial experiences (Smith,
1993), it is surprising that no research on contrast effects has been
conducted that manipulates the accessibility (direction and magnitude)
of the context stimulus.
Finally, if unconscious memories of a context stimulus affect the interpretation of a target stimulus, what happens in choice contexts involving both the context and target stimuli? In addition to exploring judgments of a target stimulus, the effect of context stimulus accessibility
on choice is also examined. It seems reasonable to assume that a strong
relationship exists between evaluations and preferences (Fitzsimons &
Shiv, 2001), although evidence using partial-list priming indicates that
is not always the case (Nedungadi, 1990). If no conscious memories exist
for the context stimulus, yet its trace is unconsciously accessed when
evaluating the target, how could one choose the context stimulus?
The goal of this manuscript is to demonstrate the automatic nature of
contrast effects and explore the moderating role of context accessibility
on ones ability to consciously override these effects. To achieve this goal,
an opposition paradigm is used that pits automatic influences against conscious influences when forming judgments of a target stimulus (Jacoby,
1991). A secondary goal is to determine whether a targets evaluation
can be unknowingly altered by contextual information without subsequently affecting brand choice.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
The Nature of Contrast Effects
With few exceptions, prior researchers have conceptualized assimilative
effects to be the spontaneous, default outcome of contextual influence, with
contrast effects requiring effortful, conscious processes (e.g., Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982; Martin, 1986; Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; Meyers-Levy &
Sternthal, 1993; Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1997; Petty & Wegener, 1993;
Schwarz & Bless, 1992). The idea that assimilative effects are the natuMIND OVER MATTER

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ral outcome of contextual influence has been found across a variety of

domains. For example, research on the interpretation of ambiguous trial
experiences (Hoch & Ha, 1986), postexperience advertising on reconstructed memories of a target stimulus (Braun, 1999), and the biasing
effect of hypothetical but relevant questions (Fitzsimmons & Shiv, 2001)
all suggest that assimilating a target stimulus to that of the context is
the default mode, particularly when making low-involvement evaluations. These authors advance a variety of explanations supporting their
positions. A perspective that accommodates their views is Martins (1986)
setreset model: Assimilation occurs because of the perceived overlap
between the context stimulus and the target stimulus. The perceived
overlap could be created by marketers, as when one confirms advertising claims of an otherwise ambiguous target stimulus, or stem from
faulty reconstruction or contamination of recalled memories, which are
inherently malleable. Only with effort, and apparently veridical recall of
the context stimulus, can one remove the perceived overlap. If so, resetting takes place, which in turn subverts natural assimilative effects.
It is this effortful, correction process that is proposed by some as leading to contrast effects. Meyers-Levy and Tybout (1997) assert that contrast effects are due to overcorrection when one is attempting to partial
out contextual influences during a resetting process. Meyers-Levy and
Sternthal (1993) suggest that such a process cannot occur unless cognitive resources available at judgment are sufficiently high that they overcome the natural tendency to assimilate. Hence, according to this view,
contrast effects do not arise automatically, but rather are attributable to
effortful, conscious processes. Not all hold this view, however. For example, classic early studies concluded that when the context stimulus is
extreme relative to the target, contrast is the likely default outcome,
occurring without conscious effort (Herr, 1986; Sherif & Hovland, 1961;
for a meta-analytic investigation, see Dato-on & Dahlstrom, 2003). Clearly
conflicting perspectives exist as to whether contrast effects can occur
automatically.
To reconcile these conflicting perspectives, Petty and Wegener (1993;
Wegener & Petty, 1995) advance their flexible correction process model.
They demonstrated that a context stimulus can result in either assimilation or contrast, depending on the nature of the paired stimuli, but
these default tendencies can be subvertedand even reversedby
increasing motivation, hence cognitive elaboration. They achieved this by
requesting that subjects ignore an extreme context stimulus when they
are evaluating the target. Explicit instructions to avoid the influence of
the context stimulus reversed a contrast effect that otherwise emerged,
presumably automatically, in a no-instructions-to-avoid condition (Petty
& Wegener, 1993).
Although this pattern of results suggests that (in their case) contrast
effects emerge automatically, greater evidence is needed. The contrast
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rection process that was then reversed when participants were instructed
to do so. Automatic processes are by definition outside ones volitional control, and have typically been conceptualized as occurring without awareness (Jacoby, 1991). However, for self-correction processes such as those
found by Petty and Wegener (1993) to be successful they argue the decision maker must be sufficiently motivated, identify a source of bias, estimate the direction and magnitude of bias, and act upon this information
(Petty et al., 1998). Hence, the amount of awareness that was necessary
for subjects in the Petty and Wegener (1993) study to counteract the contrast effect, and the fact that through conscious effort subjects could subvert the contrast effect, raises the question as to the extent to which the
contrast effect found in their study was due to automatic (unconscious)
versus effortful (conscious) processes. Evidence for automatic processes
would have been provided if conscious effort to avoid the contrast effect
failed, a result opposite from what they found.
Evidence Needed to Demonstrate Automatic Processes
Recent work in psychology (e.g., Anooshian & Seibert, 1996; Debner &
Jacoby, 1994; Hay & Jacoby, 1996; Nelson, Bennett, & Xu, 1997; Toth,
1996) and marketing (Shapiro, 1999; Shapiro & Krishnan, 2001) claim
that unambiguous evidence for automatic processes can be found by pitting conscious and automatic influences against one another. Further,
because conscious influences are believed to supersede automatic influences when placed in opposition with one another, a situation is needed
wherein conscious processes are likely to fail, allowing automatic influences to manifest (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 1991). The instructions used by Petty and Wegener (1993) fulfils the first requirement.
Specifically, given explicit instructions to avoid contextual influence, conscious processes should lead to a tempering or reversal of a contrast
effect (which is the result Petty and Wegner found), whereas automatic
processes should lead to the persistence of a contrast effect. In order to
provide evidence of automatic contrast effects the second requirement
needs to be met. Specifically, it is necessary to use an opposition paradigm
that demonstrates when conscious processes fail and automatic influences (if indeed they exist) prevail. A failure in conscious processes may
occur, for example, when contextual information is not consciously accessible at time of judgement. The next section elaborates upon this point.
Accessibility of the Context Information
Theories relying on resetting or flexible correction processes (e.g., Martin, 1986; Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993; Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1997;
Petty & Wegener, 1993) require context information to be accessible at
time of judgmentresetting cannot occur unless the goodness or badness
of the context item relative to the target item is accessible when the latMIND OVER MATTER

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ter is evaluated. Although Stapel, Koomen, and Velthuijsen (1998) manipulate the type of context stimulus that is accessible at time of judgment
(abstract attribute vs. exemplar), they explicitly refer to the bias as relying on accessible context information.
However, contextual information is not always accessible when a subsequent item is being judged, particularly in product trial situations.
Consider the previous example of comparing the sound quality of two
stereos. The respective sensory attributes are inherently ambiguous, difficult to veridically encode, and decay quickly from memory (Shapiro &
Spence, 2002), characteristics that run counter to the notion that a prior
trial experience can be consciously accessed when judging a subsequent,
target experience. Could contrast effects persist when the context information is no longer consciously accessible at time of judgment? Evidence
from the implicit memory literature suggests that they may, if indeed
they do not rely on conscious processes.
Implicit memory is revealed by a change in task performance (a
response bias) due to a prior exposure episode without conscious recollection of the previously encoded information (Schacter, 1987). This contrasts with explicit memory retrieval, which is deliberate and occurs
with awareness (common examples of which involve recall and/or recognition exercises). The nature of implicit memory has been a topic of much
debate (for reviews, see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Schacter,
1987), but is not the focus of this article. For the present purposes implicit
(unconscious) memory for previously encountered information has been
found to automatically, without awareness, affect judgment long after
explicit (conscious) memory for the same information has decayed (Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Schacter, 1987; Shapiro & Krishnan, 2001).

HYPOTHESES REGARDING AUTOMATIC CONTRAST

EFFECTS
Transferring implicit memory insights into an assimilation/contrast context would suggest that the biasing effect of context-on-target could persist due to automatic, implicit processes when context information is no
longer consciously accessible, even if subjects were warned of a potential
for bias. If contrast effects can truly be automatic in naturewhich is
more likely if the paired stimuli are extremethen, consistent with the
opposition paradigm, the following hypotheses are predicted:
H1: When not encouraged to avoid the influence of a context item, given
extreme stimuli contrast effects should emerge regardless of
whether or not the context information is consciously accessible.
H2: When explicitly encouraged to avoid the potential influence of a
context item, accessibility of the context information should mod-

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erate the aforementioned biasing effect. When context information

is accessible, conscious efforts to avoid contextual influence should
succeed, and contrast effects should be subverted or even reversed.
When context information is inaccessible at time of evaluation,
conscious efforts to avoid contextual influence should fail, and contrast effects should persist.

Petty and Wegener (1993; Petty et al., 1998) argue that self-correcting
processes require memory for both direction and magnitude of the biasing context vis--vis the target. To investigate this claim, the effect of
rating the context sensory experience prior to exposure to the target
experience is examined. Ratings transform an inherently ambiguous
sensory experience into a form that is more concrete and easily remembered (Shapiro & Spence, 2002; Siegal & Siegal, 1976). Furthermore,
because numerical ratings are not as easily forgotten as sensory experiences, they are likely to be used as inputs to judgment when the trial experience itself is inaccessible (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). Hence, the following is advanced:
H3: When explicitly encouraged to avoid the potential influence of a
context item that is sensory in nature, rating the sensory experience immediately after trial will facilitate efforts to avoid contrast
effects, when the experience itself is inaccessible from memory.

Distinguishing Evaluations from Preferences

The discussion thus far has focused on evaluative judgments. It has been
proposed that a context stimulus can alter a consumers evaluation of a
subsequent target even if the context is not consciously accessible from
memory at the time of judgment. For example, if a consumer listens to
a good-sounding stereo (Brand A) at Time 1 and an objectively worsesounding stereo (Brand B) at Time 2, an automatic contrast bias would
predict that the implicit memory trace for Brand A would lower a consumers evaluation of Brand B even if the consumer could not consciously
recall whether Brand A sounded better than Brand B. As a consequence,
this would lead to a greater disparity in evaluative judgments between
Brands A and B (and a lower evaluation of B absent an exposure to A)
than would be the case if Brand A were consciously accessible and the
decision-maker was sufficiently motivated to debias their judgment.
According to the value-maximization principle, the greater the disparity
in evaluative judgments, the greater the preference for Brand A over B.
However, if memory for the first alternative is insufficient to allow the
decision maker to consciously perceive one alternative being better than
the other they might simply claim indifference between the two options.
It is proposed that evaluations can be unconsciously altered (Hypothesis 2) without a corresponding shift in brand choice because the decision
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maker has no conscious memory of the context stimulus. The authors

are aware of only one study, cast in a consideration set context, which
shows that preferences can be altered without a corresponding shift in
evaluations (Nedungadi, 1990).

THE STUDY
Method
Design. This study used a 2
2
2 between-subjects, full-factorial
design with the amount of time that transpired between exposure to the
context stimulus and target stimulus (no delay/20-min delay), whether
or not the context stimulus was rated immediately after exposure
(rated/not rated), and instructions provided prior to rating the target
stimulus (explicit instructions to avoid the influence of the context when
rating the target versus no instructions). In addition, a control group
was used that was exposed only to the target item and not the context
item.
Subjects. Two hundred ninety-seven undergraduate students participated for course credit. Subjects were randomly assigned to conditions
and, with the exception of the delay/no-delay conditions and control
group, all conditions were represented in each experimental session. Sessions lasted approximately 35 min.
Stimuli. Three criteria drove the selection of the context and target stimuli. First, consistent with the desire to study sensory attributes, sound
quality was chosen for the relevant context and target. A scenario relatively
consistent with a shopper comparing stereos was created. Discerning two
noticeably different stereos in a side-by-side comparison is unambiguous,
but prior research investigating memory for sensory information has shown
such experiences are nonveridical and decay quickly (Shapiro & Spence,
2002)at least in explicit memory. Second, a situation was needed that was
conducive to automatically eliciting contrast effects. Prior research suggests
that when a context stimulus is extreme relative to a target, contrast is
likely (Dato-on & Dahlstrom, 2003). Hence, stimuli that represented sufficient differences in sound quality were required. Third, a recurring theme
in assimilation/contrast literature is that contrasts require an unambiguous benchmark. Hence, an intentionally difficult environment was
desired within which to demonstrate the persistence of contrast effects
when there was a delay between exposures to sensory attributes, thereby
providing a strong test of the hypothesis.
To this end, three, 30-s, CD-quality excerpts of Hollywood soundtracks
(Star Wars, Jurassic Park, Superman) were recorded and used for the
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context information. For the target item the same 30-s excerpt of the
Star Wars soundtrack was recorded, but in degraded form. A professional
sound studio electronically altered the recording so that the sound quality was perceptually inferior to that of the CD-quality recordings. When
both the good and bad recording of the Star Wars soundtrack were played
back-to-back for 28 students blind to the conditions, all indicated that the
good recording sounded best. Upon debriefing, they indicated that it was
easy to determine which recording was better. Although this demonstrates that there was perceived variability in the sound quality of the
two recording levels, in order to ascertain whether contrasts effects can
emerge automatically when context information is not consciously accessible, an appropriate amount of time was needed between listening to the
two sound-quality levels so that the sound-quality level of the first was
no longer consciously accessible when evaluating the second. The appropriate length of time chosen was verified in a pretest.
Pretest. The main purpose of the pretest was to verify that a 20-min
delay was sufficient to reduce memory for the good recordings to a point
where sound-quality differences between the good and inferior recordings
could not be perceived consciously. A secondary goal was to provide evidence that rating of the good recording enhances memory for the level
of sound quality, allowing differences to be perceived between the good
and inferior recordings in the delay condition.1 Thus, the pretest consisted of a 2
2 between-subjects design with time (delay/no-delay) and
rate (rate sound quality of the good recording prior to hearing the inferior recording/do not rate the sound quality of the good recording) the
between-subjects factors.
One hundred thirty subjects participated for course credit and were
randomly assigned to conditions. Subjects first listened to the good recording of the 30-s excerpt from Star Wars and were asked to identify what
movie the soundtrack was from. At this point, half the subjects rated the
sound quality of the recording on a 9-point scale (with a 1 meaning the
music sounded like a radio with a lot of static and a 9 meaning the music
sounded like a live symphony). Immediately thereafter, or 20 min later,
subjects were told that they were now going to hear either the same
recording of the Star Wars soundtrack that was copied using the MP3 file
format or an alternative recording of the same musical excerpt, but one
that was copied using a different file format (MXA). Having subjects
believe that the recordings were made using different file formats is analogous to having them believe they are experiencing two different brands.
1

The purpose of this article is not to shed light on the underlying process by which rating a sensory experience enhances memory, but rather to demonstrate how memory for context information influences contextual biasing effects. Shapiro and Spence (2002) provide empirical data
showing that providing a rating of sound quality enhances memory by facilitating encoding of
an otherwise holistic, ambiguous experience. Memory for the rating alone (i.e., a retrieval explanation) could not fully account for enhanced memory for the experience.

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Furthermore, subjects were told that another group of students indicated

that when the recording using the alternative MXA file format was played
immediately after the recording using the MP3 file format, the recordings sounded noticeably different. Subjects were to listen to the sound
quality of the music and identify which recording was being playedthe
original one they heard or the one copied using the alternative MXA file
format. Half the time the original good recording was played and half the
time the inferior recording was played. After hearing the second playing
of the Star Wars excerpt subjects completed a two-alternative forcedchoice memory measure (this recording was the original MP3 file format
I heard previously/this recording was the alternative MXA file format).
Results on the memory measure indicate that the quality level of the
good recording decays within 20 min, making the sound-quality differences between the good and inferior recordings imperceptible, at least on
a conscious level. There was a lower percentage of correct recognition
responses in the delay/no-rate condition (61.1%) versus the other three
conditions (delay/rate condition  87.5%, no-delay/no-rate condition 
93.8%, no-delay/rate condition  96.7%); (all 2[1]  6.0, ps  .01). A
20-min delay was thus used in the main study. Additionally, memory performance in the delay/no-rate condition was no better than chance levels (50%; 2[1]  1.78, p  .18). Further, memory in the delay/rate condition was statistically equivalent to memory in the no-delay/rate
condition (2[1]  1.75, p  .19) suggesting that rating the quality of the
first soundtrack moderates the delay effect.
Procedures, Main Study. Experimental sessions were held in a room
that could seat up to 24 subjects and had speakers mounted in the ceiling. Participants in the experimental conditions were told that they were
going to listen to three, 30-s excerpts of musical pieces that were used in
Hollywood movies. To increase attention levels, a game-show atmosphere
was created by asking subjects to write down the Hollywood movie associated with each soundtrack. The true purpose of this task was to expose
subjects to the good-quality musical recordings. At this point, half the subjects (rate condition) rated the sound quality of the three musical excerpts
they had just heard on the same 9-point scale used in the pretest.
Experimental subjects then either immediately went to the second
phase of the study, which involved listening to the inferior sounding
recording (no-delay condition) or completed a 20-min distracter task that
was irrelevant to this study prior to completing the second phase of the
study (delay condition). The inferior recording was the target stimulus.
For the second phase of the study subjects were told that the experimenter was going to play one of the soundtracks they heard earlier and
then were given the same cover story as that used in the pretest regarding the use of different file formats (MP3 and MXA). In reality the MXA
format was the inferior recording of the 30-s excerpt from Star Wars.
Subjects were told that they were to listen to the new recording and to
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rate the sound quality. Prior to hearing and rating the new recording
half the experimental subjects (instruction condition) were also given
the following instructions in bold lettering, modified from Petty and
Wegener (1993):
When rating the sound quality of this recording your judgment could
be influenced (consciously or not) by your perceptions of the sound quality of the musical recordings you heard at the beginning of this session.
Please make all efforts to avoid this by rating the quality of this recording independently, without considering or comparing it to the recordings you heard previously.

These instructions are consistent with an opposition paradigm in that

they pit conscious influences against automatic influences; conscious
influences should lead to a dampening of the contrast effect, whereas
automatic influences should lead to the persistence of a contrast.
After providing the sound-quality rating, subjects completed a preference measure for the two recording formats (MP3 vs MXA, in reality
the good and inferior recordings, respectively) and a measure assessing
how confident they were that they could recall the sound quality of the
first recordings. Because control-group subjects were exposed only to the
inferior recording, they could not complete the preference and confidence
measures.
Dependent Measures. The evaluative rating measure for the target
stimulus (inferior recording) included endpoints (1 was labeled, Radio
with lots of static and 9 was labeled Live symphony). Without these endpoints it could be argued that those in the experimental conditions who
were exposed to the good-quality recordings defined the upper and/or
lower ends of the scale differently than those in the control group. By
using anchored endpoints this concern is alleviated (Petty & Wegener,
1993).
A preference measure required subjects to indicate the extent to which
the MP3 file format (good recordings) produced better-quality sound
than the MXA file format (inferior recording). Subjects responded on
an 11-point scale, with 1 meaning the first file format heard (MP3) produced much better sound quality than the second (MXA), and an 11
meaning that the second file format (MXA) produced much better sound
than the first (MP3). Lower numbers therefore suggest greater preference for the good (versus inferior) recording; a 6 on the scale meant that
they felt the two file formats produced approximately equivalent levels
of sound quality. Subjects were then asked to indicate how confident
they were in their ability to recall the level of sound quality of the first
three recordings that used the MP3 file format. Expectancy-value models suggest that attitudes toward brands are jointly affected by both
belief(s) concerning attribute(s) performance and confidence with which
one holds their beliefs (Smith, 1993). This was collected with a 10-point
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scale, with a 1 meaning they were not at all confident and a 10 meaning they were extremely confident.2

RESULTS
Rating of the Target Soundtrack. Results of an ANOVA (see Table 1 for
cell means and Table 2 for ANOVA results) on the evaluation measure reveal
a main effect of time (F[1,251]  8.15, p  .01) and instructions to avoid
(F[1,251]  60.1, p  .01), which were both qualified by higher-order interactions. There was a significant two-way interaction between time and
instructions (F[1,251]  6.19, p  .01) and between rate and time (F[1,251]
 6.89, p  .01; see Figure 1). There was also a significant three-way interaction between rate, time and instructions (F[1,251]  5.25, p  .05).
Table 1. Cell Means by Measure and Condition (Target Stimulus Was the
Inferior Quality Recording).
Evaluation
of Inferior
Recording
No instructions to avoid good recording
Did not rate good recording
Immediate
Delay
Rated good recording
Immediate
Delay
Instructions to avoid good recording
Did not rate good recording
Immediate
Delay
Rated good recording
Immediate
Delay
Control group

Preference for
Inferior versus
Good Recording

Confidence
in Memory for
Good Recording

3.33*
3.21*

2.13
5.55

7.57
5.55

3.18*
3.18*

2.53
2.61

7.79
7.12

5.47
3.58*

3.79
5.64

7.06
5.79

4.84
4.77

3.23
3.35

6.61
7.55

4.55

An * means are statistically lower than the control group using the Dunnetts t test at p  .05.  means not
statistically different from the indifference point of 6, both ps  .10.Evaluation of the inferior recording (target
stimulus) was measured on a 9-point scale. Higher numbers represent higher evaluation. Preference for recording was measured on an 11-point scale. Lower numbers represent greater preference for the good (versus inferior) recording. Confidence in memory for the good recording (context stimulus) was measured on a 10-point
scale. Higher numbers represent greater confidence.
2

The same memory measure used in the pretest could not be used in the main study. If the good
recording was played once again after completion of the dependent variables in order to assess
memory, then responses would represent subjects ability to recall and hence discriminate between
the good and bad recording in a no-delay condition only; the inferior recording would have just
been played in order for the dependent measures to be completed, and therefore little time would
have transpired before playing the good recording to assess memory. The pretest results can be
used as a proxy for subjects memory of the good recordings in the main study. The measure used
in the main study to assess ones confidence in their memory for the good recording supplements
the pretest results.

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Table 2. ANOVA Results for Evaluation and Preference Measures.

Evaluation of the Inferior
Recording
Source
Instructions
Rate
Time
Instructions
rate
Instructions
time
Rate
time
Instruction
rate
time
Error

Preference Measure

Degrees of
Freedom

Degrees of
Freedom

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

60.11
.20
8.15
1.05
6.19
6.89
5.25

.00
.66
.01
.31
.01
.01
.02

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

11.78
37.22
36.67
.11
2.89
31.83
3.28

.00
.00
.00
.74
.09
.00
.07

251

6
5.47b No rate/No delay

Evaluation

4.84b Rate/No delay

Control group
4.55b

4.77b Rate/Delay

3.33a
3.21a
3.18a

3.58a No rate/Delay

2
No Instructions
to Avoid
Context Info

Instructions to
Avoid Context
Info

Means with different subscripted letters are significantly different from each other at p  .05.

Figure 1. Evaluation of the inferior recording by condition.

Planned contrasts were conducted in order to interpret these interactions. No significant differences existed across the experimental conditions when no instructions to avoid the context (good recordings) was
given (all contrasts t[62]  .60, ps  .38; see Figure 1). As predicted in
H1, a contrast effect emerged in each of these conditions with subjects
providing a lower rating for the target, inferior recording (average X 
3.22) compared to control group subjects who were not exposed to the
good recordings (X  4.55; ps  .01). Contrast effects are therefore the
default processing mode, as predicted.
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If memory for the good recordings was consciously accessible at time of

judgment, subjects in the instructions to avoid condition should have
engaged in self-correction processes, tempering the contrast effect. This was
predicted to be the case in the no-delay and rate conditions, with the former being consistent with the first part of H2 and the latter with H3. As
suggested by the pretest results discussed previously and memory confidence measure results to be discussed shortly, memory for the good-quality recordings failed in the delay/no-rate condition, making differences in
sound quality between the good recordings and inferior recording imperceptible at a conscious level. However, as predicted by the second part of
H2 and with H3, if implicit memory for the good recordings persists, and
contrast effects are automatic in nature, then self-correction processes
should fail in the delay/no-rate condition resulting in a contrast effect.
Results support these predictions. The evaluative ratings given by
those in the instruction/no-rate/no-delay, instruction/rate/no-delay and
instruction/rate/delay conditions were not statistically different from
each other (all ts[63]  1.56, ps  .12) and were all directionally higher
than that of the control group (see Figure 1). In fact, the mean rating in
the instruction/no-rate/no-delay condition was significantly higher (X 
5.47; p  .06) than that of the control group, suggesting a tendency to
overcompensate. This is supportive of the first part of H2 and is consistent with Petty and Wegener (1993) who found overcorrection to a contrast effect leading to an assimilation effect. The opposite was found in
the instruction/no-rate/delay condition suggesting that conscious influences failed in this condition and automatic influences persisted. The
rating in this condition (X  3.58) was significantly below that of the
control group (p  .05) and, in fact, equivalent to the ratings provided in
the no-instruction conditions where contrast effects were pervasive (see
Figure 1). This result supports the second part of H2. Further, H3 is fully
supported as evidenced by the significant three-way interaction mentioned previously and the moderating effect of the rate condition as indicated by the planned contrasts.
Preference Measure. According to the value-maximization principle,
there should be greater preference for the good-quality recording over the
inferior recording in those conditions where a contrast effect emerged
(versus did not emerge). The contrast effect led to lower evaluative ratings for the inferior recording than was the case for those who self-corrected, which should translate to a decrease in preference for this recording over the good-quality recording. This being the case, the
value-maximization principle would predict less preference for the inferior recording over the good-quality recording in the no-instruction conditions and instruction/delay/no-rate condition where contrast effects
were found.
As predicted, results of an ANOVA on the preference measure do not
fully support the value-maximization principle. Cell means are shown in
Table 1 and ANOVA results are presented in Table 2. In support of the
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value-maximization principle there was a main effect of instruction

(F[1,251]  11.78, p  .01), with less preference for the inferior recording in the no-instruction (X  3.22) versus instruction-to-avoid (X  4.30)
condition. There were also main effects for rate and time, which were
qualified by a significant two-way interaction between the two factors
(F[1,251]  31.83, p  .001). This interaction was due to higher preference for the inferior recording in the delay/no-rate condition (X  5.59)
versus all other conditions (see Figure 2). This result is counter to the
value-maximization principle, since contrast effects emerged in this condition (see Figure 1). Upon further examination of the means shown in
Table 1, it can be seen that the greater preference for the inferior recording was found in the delay/no-rate condition across both the no-instruction (X  5.55) and instruction (X  5.64) conditions and further, these
mean preferences indicated complete indifference between the two recoding qualitiescomparisons against the indifference point of 6 on the
preference scale yielded nonsignificant results (both ps  .10).
Confidence in Memory for the Good-Quality Recording. After completing the preference measure subjects memory for the sound quality
of the good-quality recordings was assessed with a self-report measure
(recall that a direct test of memory was not possiblesee Footnote 2).
Results of an ANOVA are consistent with pretest results assessing memory as well as the preference results. Cell means are provided in Table
1. Relevant to present purposes, an ANOVA on the confidence measure
showed main effects of time (F[1,251]  8.59, p  .01) and rate (F[1,251]
 9.03, p  .01) that were qualified by an interaction between the two
(F[1,251]  11.33, p  .01). The interaction was due to lower confidence
in subjects ability to remember the good-quality recording among those

Preference

Inferior
recording

11

5. 59b
Delay
3. 02a

2.97a
2.86a

No Delay

Good
recording 1
Rate

No Rate

Means with different subscripted letters are significantly different from each other at p  .01.

Figure 2. Two-way interaction between delay and rate with the preference measure.
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in the delay/no-rate condition (X  5.67) versus all other conditions (X

 7.30 in the no-delay/no-rate condition, X  7.33 in the delay/rate condition, X  7.23 in the no-delay/rate condition; all t(128) values  4.0, all
p values  .01). Without rating the context stimulus the delay decreased
conscious accessibility of the context (evidenced by their neutral preference) as well as ones confidence in their ability to recall the context.

DISCUSSION
Prior research suggests that, in general, an assimilation effect is the initial, spontaneous response to contextual information, with contrast effects
emerging only after effortful processes are applied (e.g., Martin, 1986;
Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993; Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1997). For example, consistent with Martins setreset model (1986), Meyers-Levy and
Tybout (1997) found that contrast effects are a result of overcorrection
to the initial contextual bias due to effortfully partialling out elements
of the context stimulus deemed inappropriate. They propose that if context information is not readily accessible from memory, contrast effects
will likely only emerge when retrieval of the contextual information is
encouraged. Although not explicitly stated, findings from Novemsky and
Ratner (2003) as well as Hamilton (2003) support this perspective. Combined, their research suggests a high level of awareness among consumers as to the circumstances that are likely to lead to a contrast effect.
Petty and Wegener (1993; Petty et al., 1998) are more explicit, arguing
that flexible correction processes require memory for direction and magnitude of biasing influences and a desire to act upon that information.
The findings from this study broaden the understanding of biasing and
self-correction processes by acknowledging the role of context accessibility and automaticity. Contrast effects can occur spontaneously and, importantly, do not require retrieval of the contextual information. Contrast
effects emerged across all conditions when subjects were not explicitly
asked to avoid the influence of the context stimulus, both when the context was accessible from memory and when it was not. When explicitly
asked to avoid the influence of the contextual information and when the
context was accessible from memory, effortful processes devoted to doing
so dampened and even reversed the contrast effect, as the Petty and
Wegener (1993) flexible-correction model predicts.3 But this study extends
their work by providing unequivocal evidence that contrast effects can
emerge automatically, and despite conscious effort cannot be corrected.
With the use of an opposition paradigm, this study pitted automatic influences against conscious influences by explicitly instructing subjects to
avoid the influence of the context information. In those conditions in which
the context information was accessible, the contrast effect was subverted
3 This

finding also suggests other instances when self-correction processes may be successful. For
example, advertising claims that are objective and easily processed may bias evaluations of alternative brands, but the memorability of the claims allows for self-correction.

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via conscious influences. Importantly, in the instruction/delay/no-rate condition, when the context information was no longer accessible from memory, the contrast effect persisted despite subjects efforts to correct for the
contextual influence. This latter result provides unambiguous evidence of
automatic influence (Jacoby, 1991). It is also important to note that these
effects emerged with inherently complex stimuli, that being sound quality, which previous research has shownusing an explicit memory test
decays quickly (Shapiro & Spence, 2002).
These results also add to the knowledge of the nature of implicit memory. Seamon et al. (1997) show implicit memory performance to be invariant to changes in size while such changes inhibited explicit (recognition)
memory (see also Hubbard, 1994, concerning the latter). They concluded
that representations that facilitate explicit memory rely on spacial information regarding size, whereas implicit memory is more general and is
insensitive to feature changes that do not alter an objects form. In other
words, magnitude information that is visual in nature (size) must not be
represented, or at least relied upon, for implicit memory performance.
These results, however, suggest that auditory magnitude information is represented in implicit memory, otherwise differences in sound quality would
not have been perceived unconsciously, leading to a contrast effect. Perhaps
changes in sound quality altered the form of the representation, thus being
detected unconsciously. Although the amount of treble and bass remained
constant across recording qualities, other aspects of the recording, such
as the range of instruments one could hear and overall sharpness of the
sound, did differ between the good and bad recordings. This difference was
apparently stored and perceived implicitly, altering judgment. Similar
findings emerge in the visual system. Changing the font of a target word
between exposure and test has been shown to hinder implicit memory
(Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). Additional research is needed to determine
how magnitude information is represented in implicit memory.
An interesting pattern of results emerged across the evaluation ratings and preference ratings. The inferior recording was evaluated equally
across the rate and delay conditions, and lower than that of the control
group, when no instructions to avoid the influence of the good recording
were provided. The value-maximization principle would predict equal
levels of preference across groups with equal evaluative ratings. Counter
to this, subjects in the no-instruction/delay/no-rate condition showed
greater preference for the inferior recording than subjects in the other
no-instruction conditions. Similar inconsistencies between evaluations
and preferences emerged in the instruction-to-avoid conditions. Specifically, those in the instruction/delay/no-rate condition evaluated the inferior recording as being of poorer quality relative to those in the other
instruction-to-avoid conditions, yet showed greater preference for the
inferior recording compared to these same subjects (see Table 1).
These inconsistencies can be explained by the different processes used
to complete each task as well as the accessibility of the context stimulus.
According to Jacoby (1991), a decision can be based on both conscious and
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automatic influences. When both influences are operating and are in conflict, conscious processes supersede automatic influences. When conscious
processing is not encouraged, as was the case in the no-instruction condition, or conscious processes fail due to inaccessibility of a context stimulus, as was intended by the delay and no-rate manipulations, automatic
influences have an opportunity to prevail. In the rate and no-delay conditions, even in the no-instruction conditions, the contexttarget pair was
sufficiently extreme to result in a contrast effect. However, these results
demonstrate that automatic processes can dominate conscious processes
and therefore bias evaluative judgments when the context stimulus is
not accessible from memory (i.e., in the delay/no-rate conditions), regardless of whether or not self-correction processes are encouraged.
With respect to the preference task, assuming unfamiliar stimuli and
at least a modest level of interest, preference judgments require subjects
to make an explicit, conscious comparison between alternatives, which
would suggest conscious influences would dominate automatic influences
(Jacoby, 1991). Two possible explanations could account for conscious
influences leading to greater preference for the inferior recording when
the context stimulus was not (versus was) accessible from memory. First,
subjects in these conditions may have applied a less-risky decision rule
indicating that they were indifferent between the two recordings because
they lacked the confidence in their memory for the first alternative (as
evidenced by the memory-confidence measure, Table 1). Second, because
subjects in this condition could not perceive differences in sound quality
across the two recording formats (as evidenced by pretest results), a
response of indifference may have been the rational choice.
In sum, when an evaluative judgment of a target stimulus (in this
case the inferior recording) was being made, responses were based on
automatic influences due to prior exposure to the context stimulus (i.e.,
the good recording). This led to a contrast effect. When completing the
preference task, subjects invoked conscious processes in order to make
a comparison between the context and target recordings; however, inaccessibility of the context stimulus led subjects to claim indifference
between the two recordings, a rational response given their lower confidence in their memory for the context stimulus. These findings further
the understanding of the causes and effects of automatic decision
processes within a context of practical import to marketers, namely, situations involving sequential exposure to product trial experiences.
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This research was supported by a grant from the Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics to the first author. The authors thank H. Shanker Krishnan
and Stephen Holden for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to: Stewart Shapiro, Department of Business Administration, Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 (shapiros@lerner.udel.edu).

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