RULE 10 Amended and Supplemental pleadings

Leobrera v.
CA

Facts:
- Carlos Leobera was granted an P800k credit facility by Bank of
the Philippine Islands as part of an amicable settlement
between him and BPI wherein the latter agreed to drop his claim
for damages against the former for its alleged failure to deliver
on time three export letters of credit opened in Leobreras favor.
The credit facility was secured by two real estate mortagages.
The facility was later on entirely converted into a revolving
promissory note that was renewed in March 1986 as evidenced
by two 90-day promissory notes. Aside from that credit facility,
Leobrera also obtained from BPI a separate three-year term
P500k loan evidenced by a promissory note. This was secured
by a third real estate mortgage.
- Upon maturity of the 90-day notes, Leobrera unsuccessfully
tried to negotiate a renewal. BPI demanded full payment of the
loan but Leobrera failed to pay. BPI prepared to foreclose the
REM. Before BPI could institute foreclosure proceedings
however, Leobrera filed a complaint for damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial
court issued an order restraining BPI from foreclosing the REM
securing the 90-day loans.
- Meanwhile, the bank wrote Leobrera claiming that he failed to
pay the amortization due on the three-year term loan. BPI
demanded payment and Leobrera could not pay. Thus, BPI
threatened to foreclose the third REM. Before they could
foreclose, Leobrera filed with the RTC a Motion to File
Supplemental Complaint attaching a supplemental complaint
prating for the issuance of an injunction to restrain BPI from
foreclosing the third REM. Trial court granted the motion and
issued a restraining order. BPI contested the validity of the
motion but their motion to set it aside was denied.
- BPI filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA but,
before CA could act, the trial court granted the injunction
prayed for in the supplemental complaint. CA issued a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of BPI and rendered a decision
favoring them as well. Leobrera filed the instant petition. SC
issued a TRO but BPI had already foreclosed two of the
properties. Leobrera filed two motions asking for the extension
of suspension of the period to redeem the properties but the
Court denied the motions as well as the MR.
Issue: WON CA erred in holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the supplemental complaint
Held:
- No, it did not. The supplemental complaint should not have
been admitted. PETITION DENIED. TRO IS LIFTED.
Section 6 of Rule 10 expressly provides that the
Court may allow a party upon motion to serve a
supplemental pleading after reasonable notice has been
given the other party.
Petitioner filed the Motion to File the
Supplemental Complaint on March 11, 1987
attaching a copy of the supplemental complaint. A
copy of the motion was sent to BPI on the same day

but was received only on March 13, 1987. A fay

earlier, the trial court had already issued an order
granting the motion and admitting the complaint!
--> NOT REASONABLE NOTICE! (Also, the motion
to file the supplemental complaint contained an
invalid notice of hearing and lacked proof of its
service.)
The notice of hearing is
intended to prevent surprise and to afford the
adverse party a chance to be heard before the
motion is resolved. A seasonable service of a
copy of the motion on adverse party or
counsel with a notice of hearing indicating the
time and place of hearing are mandatory
requirements that cannot be dispensed with as
these are the minimum requirements of
procedural due process
Additionally, the matters involved in the
supplemental complaint are entirely different from the
causes of action mentioned in the original complaint.
Petitioners main cause of action in
the original complaint concerned BPIs threat to
foreclose two REMs securing the 90-day promissory
notes as this allegedly violated the 1980 amicable
settlement. The supplemental pleading on the other
hand alleged acts of harassment committed by BPI
in unreasonably opting to declare petitioner in
default. This three-year term loan was entirely
distinct and separate from the two promissory
notes.
A supplemental complaint
should supply only deficiencies in aid of an
original complaint. It should contain causes of
action relevant and material to the plaintiffs
right and which help or aid his right or
defense. It must be based on matters arising
subsequent to the original complaint related to
the claim or defense presented therein and
founded on the same cause of action. It
cannot be used to try new matter or a new
cause of action.
Although there is identity
in remedies asked for (i.e., injunction), the
petitioners subsequent cause of action giving
rise to the claim for damages in the
supplemental complaint is unrelated to the
amicable settlement.

Pasay City v.
CFI

Doctrine: A supplemental complaint must be consistent with

and in aid of the cause of action set forth in the original
complaint and a new and independent cause of action cannot
be set up by such complaint especially where judgment has
already been obtained by him in the original action. In this case,
VDs alleged supplemental complaint seeking rescission of the
compromise agreement it entered into with the Pasay City

Government did not only serve to supply deficiencies in its

original complaint for damages but served to substitute it
altogether. Thus, the CFI was wrong in admitting it despite the
writ of execution it already ordered based on VDs original
complaint.
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari of the CFIs order
Petitioners: Pasay City Govt, Mayor of Pasay, Members of the
Municipal Board of Pasay City, Pasay City Treasurer
Respondents: CFI Manila, Br. X; Vicente Isip (whose firm is
named V.D. Isip Sons & Associates)
Facts:
1. VD Isip Sons & Associates (VD) represented by Vicente
David entered into a contract with the City of Pasay
(represented by Mayor Pablo Cuneta; yes, Sharons dad)
for the construction of a new Pasay City Hall.
2. VD was able to accomplish work amounting to approx.
P1.7 million of the total contract price of approx. P4.9
million. Pasay City Govt only paid P1.1 million (approx.
P613k due to VD)
3. VD demanded payment of the P613k but Pasay City Govt
failed to pay.
4. VD filed an action for specific performance w/ damages vs.
Pasay City Govt with the CFI.
a. Pasay City Govt filed a motion for amendment of
VDs complaint and for a bill of particulars; CFI
denied this.
b. Pasay City Govt filed a motion for reconsideration;
CFI also denied this
c. Pasay City Govt FINALLY filed their answer
5. The parties were able to enter into an agreement w/c was
submitted to the Municipal Board of Pasay. CFI suggested
that under the principle of quantum meruit VD is
entitled to what is due him and that public interest
requires the continuity of the construction of the city hall.
6. Municipal Board of Pasay approved the Compromise
Agreement via Ordinance 1012; it also authorized Mayor
Claudio to represent Pasay City Govt, subject to the CFIs
approval.
7. CFI approved the Compromise Agreement including the
Manifestation and Addendum to it; Compromise
agreement contained the following modifications,
important among w/c are:
a. That the case against Pasay City Govt, the mayor,
treasurer, and municipal board are waived
b. That willful violation of the terms of the Compromise
Agreement by either party will entitle the aggrieved
party to the immediate execution of the said terms,
plus reliefs/remedies
8. Pasay City Govt filed an urgent motion seeking

declaration of legality of the original contract; CFI issued

an order that the original contract is legal and valid
9. CFI granted an order of execution at VDs instance;
writ of execution was thus issued
a. Application was made for the effective of the
garnishment on Pasay City Govt funds that are with
the Philippine National Bank
10.
The Pasay City Govt filed an urgent motion to set
aside CFIs order of execution alleging that:
a. Execution of the garnishment was still premature
b. Bec. VD has not yet put up a new performance bond,
Pasay City Govt cannot be obliged to pay sum due it
c. Sheriff has no power to levy the general funds nor
the trust funds of Pasay City
11.
CFI ordered the writ of execution and
garnishment be complied with
12.
Pasay City Govt filed an MR; CFI denied the MR and
ordered the enforcement of the garnishment issued to the
City Sheriff to take P613k from Pasay City Govt funds.
13.
Pasay City Govt et al. filed their notice of appeal;
then filed their manifestation and withdrawal of notice of
appeal w/c the CFI approved.
14.
IMPORTANT: Pasay City Govt et al filed an
Amended Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal duly
approved by the CFI and a Notice of Transmittal
15.
IMPORTANT: Vicente David Isip (in the original
complaint for specific performance) filed an urgent motion
for permit to serve a supplemental complaint seeking
rescission of the original contract titled Contract &
Agreement and of the Compromise Agreement
a. Claimed P672k in damages bec. of Pasay City Govts
violations of the compromise agreement
16.
SC required Pasay City Govt to file a petition for
review on certiorari
17.
Pasay City Govt filed their cautionary answer to
the supplemental complaint alleging the ff:
a. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the
supplemental complaint
b. Cause of action already barred by prior judgment
(thus res judicata applies)
c. No cause of action; VDs claim has been paid
18.
Pasay City Govt filed their petition for review on
certiorari w/c was denied by the SC for lack of merit
19.
CFI set the supplemental complaint for pre-trial
20.
SC granted Pasay City Govt MR and petition for
certiorari given due course
21.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION GROUND INVOKED BY
VD: VD filed their brief asking for the dismissal of the peti.
For review on certiorari bec. the issues in the
supplemental complaint are prejudicial to the petition for
review
22.
Pasay City Govt filed their manifestation and petition

denying VDs claim

Issue: W/N CFI erred in entertaining the supplemental
complaint filed by VD
Held/Ratio: YES
1. CFI erred in entertaining the supplemental complaint filed
by VD
- When the CFI entertained the said complaint, it no longer
had jurisdiction over the subject matter
- Laws involved:
o CC 2028: A compromise is a contract whereby
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
o CC 2037: A compromise has upon the parties the
effect and authority of res judicata; but no execution
except in acc. with a judicial compromise.
- A judgment on a compromise is final and executory, if not
set aside via a motion
o CC 2041: If a party fails to abide by the compromise,
the other party may either enforce or rescind the
compromise
- VD wanted BOTH to have the compromise executed and to
rescind it w/c cant be done.
- CFI was correct in refusing to quash the writ of execution
over Pasay City Govt funds that are with the PNB since
the transaction involved here falls within the exception on
the prohibition against the garnishment of govt funds
since it has issued an ordinance expressly appropriating
P613k to pay VD.
- Bec. the compromise agreement was final, immediately
executory and was already enforced, CFI was wrong in
entertaining the supplemental complaint filed by VD for at
that time, CFI had no more jurisdiction over the subject
matter since its decision had already become final and
exceutory. Its only power is to order its decisions
execution (Ocampo v. Caluag)
o Alama v. Abbas, Commissioner of Immigration v.
Romera, etc.: After the perfection of an appeal,
the trial court loses jurisdiction over its
judgment and cannot vacate the same
-

IMPORTANT: Supplemental pleadings = meant to

supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading, not
entirely substitute the latter.
o VD originally sought specific performance; this was
later subjected to a compromise.
o VD then sought rescission of the contract with Pasay
City Govt AND the compromise agreement using the
supplemental complaint complaint thus aimed

not only to supply deficiencies in the original

pleading, but to substitute it altogether.
-

Torres v. CA

DOCTRINAL PHRASE: A supplemental complaint must

be consistent with and in aid of the cause of action set
forth in the original complaint and a new and
independent cause of action cannot be set up by
such complaint especially where judgment has
already been obtained by him in the original action.

Facts:
Margarita Torres was married to Claro Santillan. Children:
Vicente and Antonina.
o Claro died. Antonina married and had 6 children.
Antonina died. Vicente died.
Margarita cohabited with Leon Arbole without the benefit of
marriage. Child: Macaria.
o Margarita and Leon subsequently married. Later on,
the spouses died.
An urban lot was previously leased by the Government to
Margarita. A sale certificate was later on issued in her favor.
The previous rentals paid were credited as part of the
purchase price. The instalments were paid by Leon from his
earnings; the last 3 instalments having been settled after his
death.
Prior to his death, Leon sold and transferred all his rights and
interests over of the lot to Macaria.
Vicente executed an affidavit claiming possession over the
lot and asking for the issuance of the title in his name. He
and the heirs of Antonina filed a Forcible Entry case against
Macaria before the Justice of the Peace Court.
The court ruled against Macaria.
CFI: Appeal by Macaria
CFI: Action for Partition by Macaria
o Contention: The lot is conjugal property of Margarita
and Leon, and she is a legitimated child.
The Ejectment case and the Partition case were tried jointly.
CFI Decision: The lot is paraphernal property of Margarita.
o 2/3 to Vicente et al.
o 1/3 to Macaria
CFI: MR by Macaria. Vicente et al. opposed.
The Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned. The records of
the 2 cases were completely burned but later on partially
reconstituted.
CFI Decision: Granted MR.
o The lot is conjugal.
o Macaria is a legitimated child.

 CA: Appeal by Vicente et al.

CA Decision: Modified CFI ruling
o The lot is conjugal.
o Macaria is NOT a legitimated child.
CA: MR and Motion for New Trial by Macaria
o Macaria submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement by
Margarota and Leon, acknowledging her as their
legitimized daughter.
o The non-production of this notarial document during
the trial was because said document was then in the
custody of Vicente who may have attempted to
suppress it. It was only after Vicentes death that
said document was found.
CA Decision: Denied both MR and New Trial
SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari by Macaria
In connection with Rule 10
MACARIAs Contention: Vicente et al. have already admitted
that she is a legitimized child
o Vicente et al.s Original Complaint
the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A.
Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins
of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite
on December 20, 1931.
BUT Vicente et al. have submitted an Amended Complaint
which reads:
o That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of
kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on
December 20, 1931.

Issue: WON the original complaint may be taken as an

admission by Vicente et al.
Held/Ratio:
NO.
The Amended Complaint takes the place of the original.
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint, she
should have offered it in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its
character as a judicial admission, which would have required
no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission,
which required its formal offer to be admissible as evidence.
Therefore, there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial
admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer
it in evidence.

Versoza v. CA Doctrine: When an amended complaint does not introduce new

issues, causes of action or demands, the suit is deemed to have
commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not on
the date of the amended complaint.
Facts:
- Private Respondent Fe Uson owned a parcel of land which
she mortgaged to petitioner Wilfredo Versoza for the
amount of P25,000.
- For having failed to pay her entire obligation, Versoza had
the mortgaged foreclosed. The Provincial Sheriff set a date
for the foreclosure sale.
- Uson then filed a complaint against petitioner and the
sheriff a complaint for annulment of mortgage with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Injunction. She
alleged that the remaining unpaid balance was P915.75,
an amount she was willing to consign to the TC.
o Versoza filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
it was not personally verified by Uson. TC dismissed
the case.
o Uson filed an MR, which the TC granted.
o Uson filed her first amended complaint with the
proper verification
- Uson wrote the Sheriff requesting the latter not to push
through with the sale considering the pending court
action. Nonetheless, the foreclosure sale was conducted
by the Sheriff, with the property being sold to Versoza.
- Two months after the sale, the TC admitted the amended
complaint.
- Versoza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
questioning the admission of the amended complaint
- Upon expiration of the redemption period of 1 year, the
Sheriff issued the Final Deed of Sale to Versoza. He later
sold the land to Pilar Martinez.
- CA then dismissed Versozas petition and sustained the
TCs admission of the Usons complaint.
- Uson then filed a second amended complaint, impleading
as additional defendants the Register of Deeds of
Alaminos and Pilar Martinez, praying for the annulment of
the latters title.
- TC issued a WPI based on Usons second amended
complaint, ordering Versoza and Martinez to cease and
desist from entering, making constructions and performing
any act of possession or ownership over the land in
question
o TC later clarified that the status quo being
maintained is the possession of Uson, not the
possession/ownership of Martinez

Petitioners Versoza and Martinez challenged the WPI

before the CA on certiorari. CA dismissed.
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari before
the SC

Procedure:
- RTC: Uson filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage
with prayer for WPI
o Versoza Motion to Dismiss
o Complaint dismissed.
o Uson MR
o MR granted. Uson filed amended complaint.
o Amended complaint admitted
- CA: Versoza filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
admission of the second complaint
o Dismissed.
- RTC: Uson filed a second amended complaint, impleading
Martinez
o WPI issued, order for status quo ante
- CA: Versoza and Martinez challenged the WPI on certiorari
o Dismissed
- SC: Versoza and Martinez filed a petition for review on
certiorari, challenging CAs dismissal
Issue/s:
- WoN private respondent Uson entitled to an injunctive
writ;
- What is the status quo ante that the said writ seeks to
preserve?
Held/Ratio:
- YES. USON IS ENTITLED TO AN INJUNCTIVE WRIT
o An injunctive writ may be used when the following
requisites concur:
Invasion of right is material and substantial
Right
of
complainant
is
clear
and
unmistakeable
There is an urgent and permanent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage
o In the instant case, Uson was the undisputed owner
of the property mortgaged, who, upon learning of the
foreclose sale, filed a Complaint to annul the
mortgage. She had title to and possession of the
property the moment she filed the complaint, hence
her clear and unmistakeable right to protect her title.
Hence, she was entitled to the injunctive writ.
- USONS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE
FORECLOSURE SALE IS THE STATUS QUO SOUGHT TO BE

PRESERVED.
o Status quo = the last actual peaceful uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy whose
preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.
o Petitioners argue that the status quo refers to the
point when Martinez was already the owner of the
property, a time before the filing of the second
amended complaint which impleaded Martinez. They
contend that the reckoning point of the status quo is
the second amended complaint (i.e. after the sale to
Martinez), not the original (i.e. prior to the
foreclosure sale).
o When an amended complaint does not
introduce new issues, causes of action or
demands, the suit is deemed to have
commenced on the date the original complaint
was filed, not on the date of the amended
complaint. The original complaint is only
deemed abandoned if the amended complaint
introduces a new or different cause of action
or demand.
o In the instant case, the amended complaints
did not introduce new or different cause of
action or demand. The first one was only to
rectify the lack of verification, while the
second only impleaded a Martinez (who had
purchased the property from Versoza). There
being no new issues introduced in the
amended complaints, the present suit is
deemed to have commenced on the date of the
filing of the original complaint.
o Hence, the status quo contemplated by the
WPI was the situation of the parties at the
time of the filing of the original complaint = a
tune when possession of the land was still with
Uson.
o Petitioners further argue that consummated acts can
no longer be restrained by injunction. The WPI being
issued after Martinez took possession of the
property, they contend that it cannot be used to
dispossess her of the same.
o General rule: consummated acts can no longer be
restrained by injunction.
o Exception: where the acts are performed after the
injunction suit is filed, such that a defendant
completes actions before the issuance of any final
order or decree, a defendant acts at his own peril.
o In this case, the action was brought to prevent
Versoza from proceeding with the foreclosure sale,

yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still

pending. In doing so, he acted at his own peril.

Magaspi v.
Ramolete

Doctrine: When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is

deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further
function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the
amended pleading only.
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the actuations of the CFI
of Cebu
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land with damages against
The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and/or The Shell
Refining Co. (Phil.) Inc., Central Visayan Realty &
Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings & Loan
Association in the CFI of Cebu. Upon filing & payment of
P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00 for sheriff fees, the
complaint was assigned Civil Case No. R11882.
The complaint contains, among others, the ff:
o To declare TCT No. 41215 issued in the name of
Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. as null
and void;
o That plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased spouses
Crispulo Magaspi and Rosalia Rodis be declared as
owners;
o That once declared as null and void, Register of
Deeds for be ordered to cancel the TCT and issue
another in their place;
o To order the defendants to pay unpaid monthly
rentals;
o To order the defendants jointly and solidarily to
return the ownership and possession of the lot to
plaintiffs;
o To order the defendants jointly and solidarily to pay
the plaintiffs the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages and attorney's fees of P250,000.00 and the
cost of this action;
o Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants
jointly and solidarity in the amount of P500,000.00
Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu
City Savings and Loan Assn. filed a motion to compel
the plaintiffs to pay the correct amount for docket
fee. The motion reads:
1. That the complaint of the plaintiffs contains or
states two, if not three alternative causes of action:
a) Reconveyance of real property.
b) Recovery of the value of the land and
Damages
c) Cancellation of Titles
[]
3. That in the suit for reconveyance, the

recovery of the improvements existing on the

land is deemed included, since defendant Cebu
City Savings is alleged to be a builder in bad
faith. The value of existing improvement, i.e.,
assessed value is P70,000.00:
4. Therefore, the docket fee should be:
Docket fee
Land and Improvement at P87,280.00 assessed
value .................... P100.00
Recovery of Value of the Land and damages:
a) P1,250,000.00 Land value
b) 500,000.00 Moral Damages
c) 500,000.00 Exemplary Damages
d) 250,000.00 Attorney,s fees
e) 890,633.24 Monthly rentals up to date of
filing of complaint 6,632.00
.
P3,390,633.24
(Six Thousand
Pesos) 6,732.00

Seven Hundred Thirty Two

5. That under the Old Rules of Court, Sec. 5,

Rule 130 provides that it is the sum claimed,
'exclusive of interest and damages while under the
new Rules of Court, Sec. 5, Rule 141, it is the sum
claimed, 'exclusive of interest,' the word 'damages'
having been excluded purposely, indicating the
intent to include damages in the computation of the
docket fee;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the plaintiffs be
made to pay the correct docket fee within the time
prescribed by this Honorable Court, as properly computed
by the Clerk of Court and failing to pay the same within
the prescribed period to dismiss the case.
Further, until such time as the correct docket fee is paid,
the time for filing of responsive pleadings by the
defendants be suspended.
Petitioners opposed claiming that the main cause of action
was the recovery of a piece of land and on the basis of its
assessed value, P60.00 was the correct docketing fee and
that although the Revised RoC do not exclude damages in
the computation of the docket fee, damages are still to be
excluded.
Clerk of Court in his comment found that a reading of the

complaint in this case would show that the action is not

only for recovery of property but also for actual and moral
damages as well as for attorney's fees. He submitted that
under the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, it appears that for the purpose of determining the
amount of the fees that should be collected, the basis
should be the totality of the sum or sums claimed,
exclusive of interest, except in the case of real estate
where the assessed value thereof shall be considered in
computing the fees. Accordingly, he said that the correct
amount of the legal fees for the filing of this case should
be fixed at P3,164.00 plus P2.00 Legal Research fee.
Judge Mateo Canonoy issued an order sustaining the
Manifestation of the Clerk of Court. Court ruled that the
damages are not merely incidental or ancillary but are
principal demands. Besides, Rule 141, Sec. 5 (a) no longer
excludes damages, like interest, from computing the filing
fees. Hence, it ordered the petitioners to pay an additional
sum of P3,104.00 as filing fees.
Shell companies filed their respective answers & Central
Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed a
manifestation that praying that in the computation of the
correct docket fee, besides the sum of P3,104.00, an
additional sum of Pl,000.00 be imposed in accordance with
Sec. 5 (Par. 9) Rule 141 of the Rules of Court; and should
the plaintiffs within a period fixed by this Court fail to pay
the same, the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint to include the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines (GRP) as a defendant. The amended
complaint still sought the return of the lot in question but
the pecuniary claim was limited to the following:
o To order the defendants jointly and solidarily except
the GRP moral damages and attorney's fees in the
amount of P100,000 and the cost of this action;
o Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants
jointly and solidarily except GRP in the amount as
this Court may deem just and proper
Defendants filed an opposition to the admission of the
amended complaint arguing that while the only reason
given for the amendment of the complaint is the inclusion
of the GRP as an indispensable party, the plaintiffs have
taken the improper liberty of amending portions of the
allegations in the complaint and eliminating an entire
paragraph. They contend that these amendments are
intended to circumvent, if not entirely subvert, the lawful
Order of the Court for the plaintiff to pay the amount of
P3,104.00 as docket fee, on the basis of the total amount
claimed for damages.
They further argue that the
payment of the correct docket fee is a condition precedent
for the complaint, amended or otherwise, of the plaintiff to
be given due course.
Judge Canonoy admitted the amended complaint although
the plaintiffs had not yet complied with his Order to pay an
additional P3,104.00 docket fee.
Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed a

motion praying that plaintiffs be ordered to pay the

additional docket fee within 7 days, otherwise the
complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs opposed on the ground that the amended
complaint admitted by the court had replaced the original
complaint.
Republic filed its answer to the amended complaint and
the plaintiffs filed a reply.
Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed a
petition to have their motion resolved by the court.
Judge Jose R. Ramolete who had replaced Judge Canonoy
issued an order which says that the original complaint is
not deemed registered or docketed. It follows that there is
likewise no amended complaint deemed to have been filed
and admitted. The plaintiffs are given the choice to pay
the docket fee assessed or to forego the proceeding.

ISSUE:
1. WON Civil Case No. 11882 may be considered as having
been filed and docketed when P60.00 was paid to the
Clerk of Court even on the assumption that said payment
was not sufficient in amount. YES
2. (TOPICAL) Should the determination of amount of docket
fee be based on the original or amended complaint?
AMENDED COMPLAINT
RATIO:
1. Civil Case No. R. 11882 was docketed upon the payment
of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient.
Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over
the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper
and regular.
The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filing in court (Malimit vs. Degamo; Lee vs. Republic)
Is the case at bar covered by the above rule? It is not because
the question posed in the Malimit and Lee cases was the
timeliness of the payment of the docket fee whereas the case at
bar has no reference to the time of payment but concerns the
amount that has to be paid.
The case of Garcia vs. Vasquez mentioned in the order of Judge
Ramolete will be discussed below. And as to Lazaro vs.
Endencia, it does not appear to have relevance to the question.
The Garcia case appears to favor the petitioners. In that case, a
will was sought to be probated in Special Proceeding No. 62818.
Docket fees amounting to P940.00 were paid. Later, a second
will was sought to be probated in the same special proceeding.
This Court held that there was no need to pay a separate docket
fee because the probate of the second will was not sought in
another proceeding.
2. Judge Canonoy on October 14, 1970, ordered the payment

of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee based on the original

complaint. However, the petitioners assert as an
alternative view, that the docket fee be based on the
amended complaint which was admitted on November 14,
1970, also by Judge Canonoy.
The petitioners have a point. "When a pleading is amended, the
original pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to
perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands for
trial on the amended pleading only. " (1 Moran, Rules of Court,
363 119701, citing Reynes v. Compania General de Tobacos de
Filipinas, 21 Phil. 417; Reyman v. Director of Lands, 34 Phil,
428.)
On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be
paid by the petitioners should be based on their amended
complaint.
Disposition: Petition GRANTED.

MWSS v. CA

Doctrine: Sec. 5, Rule 10 is premised on the fact that the

evidence was introduced on an issue not raised by the
pleadings, without any objection thereto being raised by the
adverse party. Said section does not apply where no evidence
was introduced at trial...because the case was decided on the
basis of a stipulation of facts, as here. Consequently, the
pleadings could not be deemed amended to conform to the
evidence.
Facts: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Respondent Dagupan City (Dagupan) filed a complaint against
NAWASA (now petitioner MWSS) for recovery of ownership and
possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System before CFI of
Pangasinan.
In its Answer, NAWASA interposed as special defense RA 1813.
Said law vested upon it ownership, possession, and control of all
waterworks system in the entire country. In its Counterclaim,
NAWASA sought reimbursement for the necessary and useful
expenses it incurred for improvements.
CFI ruled for Dagupan on the basis of a stipulation of facts, and
dismissed NAWASAs counterclaim. It found NAWASA to be a
possessor in bad faith and hence, not entitled to
reimbursement.
NAWASA appealed to CA (including the dismissal of its
counterclaim). It argued that Dagupan should have been liable
for the amortization of the balance of the loan secured by it
(NAWASA) for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks
System. But CA affirmed the decision of CFI. The appellate court
ruled that the useful expenses were made in bad faith as they
were instituted after the complaint was filed, and that under CC,
a builder or possessor in bad faith is not entitled to any
reimbursement.

Hence this petition. Petitioner MWSS raises the sole issue of

whether it has the right to remove all the useful improvements
NAWASA introduced to the Dagupan Waterworks System,
notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a
possessor in bad faith.
In its brief, respondent Dagupan challenged NAWASAs act of
raising said issue for the first time in the Court. Said issue was
not raised before the court a quo. Neither was it assigned as an
error before CA.
Issue: Whether Dagupans procedural objection was correct /
Whether there could be amendment (of counterclaim) to
conform to evidence.
Held: Yes, it is technically correct / No, there could not be
amendment (of NAWASAs counterclaim) to conform to
evidence. NAWASA should have alleged its additional
counterclaim in the alternativefor reimbursement of the
expenses it incurred for necessary and useful improvements or
for the removal of all the useful improvements it introduced.
Petitioner MWSS argues that although said issue was not
pleaded as a counterclaim, it was nevertheless joined with
respondent Dagupans implied consent. This is because,
according to MWSS, Dagupan never filed a countermanifestation or objection to its (MWSS) manifestation. In its
manifestation, MWSS stated that the improvements were
separable from the system. MWSS relies on Sec. 5, Rule 10 to
support its contention.
The Court finds petitioner MWSSs argument UNTENABLE. Sec.
5, Rule 10 is premised on the fact that the evidence was
introduced on an issue not raised by the pleadings, without any
objection thereto being raised by the adverse party. HERE, no
evidence whatsoever was introduced by petitioner MWSS on the
issue of removability of the improvements. The case was
decided below on a stipulation of facts. So, the pleadings could
not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence.
xxx
Judgment AFFIRMED.

Northern
Cement v.
IAC

Facts:
1. In connection with its exportation of cement, Northwestern
Cement Corporation (NCC) contracted the arrastre,
stevedoring and other related services of Shipside. For
Shipside's "integrated services," NCC would pay it at the
fixed rate of P0.41 per bag of cement, which amount was,
after Shipside had started rendering its services, later
increased to P0.46 by agreement of the parties.
2. Shipside advised NCC of another increase in the rate and
billed it accordingly, as well as for regular and overtime
stand-by, lighting, equipment rental, gears, empty bags,

and other charges.

3. NCC acceded to the new arrangement but about two years
later questioned the billing, contending that the agreed
integrated rate of P0.46 covered all the services rendered
by Shipside and that such rate could not be increased
unilaterally.
Shipside said that only arrastre and
stevedoring services were included while all other services
were subject to separate billings.
4. Shipside (plaintiff) filed a complaint for recovery of
P453,347.82 representing arrastre, stevedoring and other
charges against Northwestern Cement Corporation
(defendant).
5. RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled in favour of the
defendant with regard to its counterclaims.
6. IAC reversed. Hence, an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue:
Held/Ratio:
Rule 10, Section 5 provides:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended and shall do so freely when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The
court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence.
In Tuazon v. Bolanos, it was held that if the facts shown entitled
plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no amendment to the
complaint was necessary, especially where defendant had
himself raised the point on which recovery was based. The
appellate court could treat the pleading as amended to conform
to the evidence although the pleadings were not actually
amended.
Amendment is also unnecessary when only clerical errors or
non-substantial matters are involved, as held in Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Laguna.
In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, it was stressed that the rule on

amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no

surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the
recent case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it
was also held that where there is a variance in the defendant's
pleadings and the evidence adduced by it at the trial, the Court
may treat the pleading as amended to conform with the
evidence.
Pursuant to the abovementioned rule and in light of the cases
cited, the trial court should not be precluded from awarding an
amount higher than that claimed in the pleadings
notwithstanding the absence of the required amendment. But
this is upon the condition that the evidence of such higher
amount has been presented properly, with full opportunity on
the part of the opposing parties to support their respective
contentions and to refute each other's evidence.
Sps. Lambino Doctrine: The admission or non-admission of a supplemental
pleading is NOT a matter of right but is discretionary on the
v. Presiding
court.
Judge of RTC
A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies
Br. 172
in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or
substitute the latter.
A supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in
aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
A new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by
such complaint.
The supplemental complaint must be based on matters
arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the
claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the
same cause of action.
However, although the facts occur before the
commencement of the suit if a party does not learn of their
existence until after he has filed his pleading, he may file a
supplemental pleading.
Facts/Procedure:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
CA Decision and Resolution which affirmed RTC 172s ruling that
denied the motion of petitioner Spouses to admit Supplemental
complaint.
The spouses secured a housing loan in the amount of
P600,000 from BPI Family Savings Bank, payable in
installments. They executed a mortgage loan agreement (MLA)
over their property as security for the housing loan. Under the
MLA, the proceeds of the loan would be released to them in
staggered basis by crediting the same to the spouses Savings
Account in BPI Valenzuela.
The Spouses failed to pay their monthly amortization and so
the Bank filed an extrajudicial foreclosure of the property. The
public auction was set.

I. The spouses filed a COMPLAINT to annul the MLA and

the foreclosure sale with a prayer for TRO, because they
allege that BPI had only released P555,047.19 out of the
P600,000 loan.
The RTC issued a TRO and reset the foreclosure sale.
Negotiations ensued between the parties. Spouses offered to
pay the balance of their loan minus the late charges, mortgage
redemption insurance (MRI) premium interests, foreclosure
expenses, attorneys fees and liquidated damages. Bank
refused their offer.
Private respondent Bank furnished the spouses with their
statement of accounts which indicate their debt has gone up to
P1,243,919.60 inclusive of the MRI, foreclosure expenses,
attorneys fees and liquidated damages.
After the pre-trial, the evidence hearing of petitioners was
set. The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit their
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT which alleges among others
that the Bank was guilty of unlawful imposition of escalating
and arbitrary rate of interest without consent of the plaintiffs
and deducting advance interest from the principal loan. That
the said unauthorized deductions and advance interest were
known to the plaintiff only for the first time in the pre-trial
briefs.
The RTC denied their motion. It held that the charges and
interest had accrued long before the complaint was filed, hence,
under Rule 10 Section 6, the said charges may not be set forth
in the supplemental complaint. MR was denied
II. The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA. They reiterated that they only came to know about the
escalating and arbitrary charges, liquidated damages, and
attorneys fees assessed on their account after they had already
filed their complaint, hence, they could not have alleged them
in their original complaint.
The CA dismissed the petition.
III. Hence, this SC Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues:
1. W/N RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the petitioners Supplemental Complaint?
Held/ Ratio:
1. No. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
The court said: A supplemental complaint must be
consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the
original complaint. A new and independent cause of action

cannot be set up by such complaint. The supplemental

complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the
original complaint related to the claim or defense presented
therein, and founded on the same cause of action. However,
although the facts occur before the commencement of the suit
if a party does not learn of their existence until after he has filed
his pleading, he may file a supplemental pleading.
However, the admission or non-admission of a supplemental
pleading is NOT a matter of right but is discretionary on the
court. Among the factors that the court will consider are: (1)
resulting prejudice to the parties; and (2) whether the movant
would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to be
denied.
It should be noted that the petitioners were already aware of
the deductions made on the proceeds of the loan, for interest
charges, MRI premium, and fire insurance premium in the total
amount of P44,952.88 (the deficiency in the total amount of
their loan of P600,000).
They should have sought to nullify such charges in the
original complaint, but they did not. They are thus proscribed
from incorporating the same via a supplemental complaint.
Petitioners filed their Motion to Admit their Supplemental
Complaint on July 10, 2000, or almost two (2) years after
pretrial was concluded and after their repeated failure to
present their testimonial and documentary evidence.

Phil. Ports
Authority v.
Gothong

Petition for Review on Certiorari

After the expiration of the lease contract of Veterans Shipping
Corporation over the Marine Slip Way in the North Harbor on
December 31, 2000, petitioner WG&A requested respondent
PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the said facility.
The Economic Coordinating Council (ECC) has approved the
request of petitioner WG&A to lease the Marine Slip Way from
January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that respondent
PPA turns over its operations to the winning bidder for the North
Harbor
Modernization
Project.
Pursuant
to
the
said
Memorandum, a Contract of Lease was prepared by respondent
PPA. However, believing that the said lease already expired on
June 30, 2001, respondent PPA subsequently sent a letter to
petitioner WG&A dated November 12, 2001 directing the latter
to vacate the contested premises not later than November 30,
2001 and to turnover the improvements made therein pursuant
to the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract. In
response, petitioner WG&A wrote PPA on November 27, 2001
urging the latter to reconsider its decision to eject the former.
Said request was denied by the PPA.
On November 28, 2001, petitioner WG&A commenced an

Injunction suit before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Petitioner claims that the PPA unjustly, illegally and prematurely
terminated the lease contract.
On December 11, 2001, petitioner WG&A amended its
complaint for the rst time. The complaint was still
denominated as one for Injunction with prayer for TRO. In the
said amended pleading, the petitioner incorporated statements
to the effect that PPA is already estopped from denying that the
correct period of lease is "until such time that the North Harbor
Modernization Project has been bidded out to and operations
turned over to the winning bidder. It likewise included, as its
third cause of action, the additional relief in its prayer, that
should the petitioner be forced to vacate the said facility, it
should be deemed as entitled to be refunded of the value of the
improvements it introduced in the leased property. Following the
first amendment in the petitioner's complaint, respondent PPA
submitted its answer. TRO was denied by the lower court. WGA
filed an MR. Shortly thereafter, petitioner led a Motion to Admit
Attached Second Amended Complaint. This time, however, the
complaint was already captioned as one for Injunction with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and damages and/or for Reformation of
Contract. Also, it included as its fourth cause of action and
additional relief in its prayer, the reformation of the contract as
it failed to express or embody the true intent of the contracting
parties. PPA opposed the admission of the second amended
complaint. It postulated that the reformation sought for by the
petitioner constituted substantial amendment, which if granted,
will substantially alter the latter's cause of action and theory of
the case. Respondent judge denied the admission of the second
amended complaint. WG&A then led a petition for certiorari
with the CA. CA granted WG&As petition pursuant to Sec. 3
Rule 10.
WHETHER THE

CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RTC COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE ADMISSION OF

THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

SC denied the petition.

The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals, 3 thus: Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense
is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the
new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3,
Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now)

substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should

only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments
sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of
substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
The application of the old Rules by the RTC almost ve years
after its amendment by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Wallem
Shipping v.
S.R. Farms

petition for review on certiorari

On March 25, 1992, Continental Enterprises, Ltd. loaded on
board the vessel M/V "Hui Yang," at Bedi Bunder, India, a
shipment of Indian Soya Bean Meal, for transportation and
delivery to Manila, with respondent as consignee/notify party.
The vessel is owned and operated by defendant Conti-Feed,
with defendant [herein petitioner] Wallem as its ship agent. At
the instance of the respondent, a cargo check of the subject
shipment was made by one Lorenzo Bituin of Erne Maritime and
Allied Services, Co. Inc., who noted a shortage in the shipment
which was placed at 80.467 metric tons based on draft survey.
Petitioner then filed a Complaint for damages against ContiFeed, RCS Shipping Agencies, Inc., the ship agent of Conti-Feed;
Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI), the arrastre operator and
Cargo Trade, the customs broker. On June 7, 1993, respondent
filed an Amended Complaint impleading herein petitioner as
defendant alleging that the latter, and not RCS, was the one
which, in fact, acted as Conti-Feed's ship agent. complaint
against Cargo Trade was dismissed at the instance of
respondent on the ground that it has no cause of action against
the former. Subsequently, upon motion of RCS, the case against
it was likewise dismissed for lack of cause of action. Meanwhile,
defendant OTSI filed its Answer with Counterclaim and
Crossclaim denying the material allegations of the Complaint
and alleging that it exercised due care and diligence in the
handling of the shipment. For its part, petitioner denied the
allegations of respondent claiming, among others, that it is not
accountable nor responsible for any alleged shortage sustained
by the shipment while in the possession of its co-defendants.
Conti-Feed did not file an Answer. RTC rendered its Decision
dismissing respondent's complaint, as well as the opposing
parties' counterclaims and crossclaims. Respondent filed an
appeal with the CA. CA reversed the RTC ordering defendantsappellees Conti-Feed and Maritime Pvt. Ltd. and Wallem
Philippines Shipping, Inc., to pay the sum representing the value
of the 80.467 metric tons of Indian Soya Beans shortdelivered.

WHETHER THE CLAIM AGAINST PETITIONER WAS TIMELY FILED

Petitioner claims that pursuant to the above-cited provision,

respondent should have filed its Notice of Loss within three days
from delivery. It asserts that the cargo was fully discharged from
the vessel on April 15, 1992, but that respondent failed to file
any written notice of claim. Petitioner also avers that, pursuant
(COGSA), Section 3 (6), respondent's claim had already
prescribed because the complaint for damages was filed more
than one year after the shipment was discharged.
In the instant case, the Court is not persuaded by respondent's
claim that the complaint against petitioner was timely filed.
Respondent argues that the suit for damages was filed on March
11, 1993, which is within one year from the time the vessel
carrying the subject cargo arrived at the Port of Manila on April
11, 1993, or from the time the shipment was completely
discharged from the vessel on April 15, 1992. There is no
dispute that the vessel carrying the shipment arrived at the Port
of Manila on April 11, 1992 and that the cargo was completely
discharged therefrom on April 15, 1992. However, respondent
erred in arguing that the complaint for damages, insofar as the
petitioner is concerned, was filed on March 11, 1993. As the
records would show, petitioner was not impleaded as a
defendant in the original complaint filed on March 11, 1993. It
was only on June 7, 1993 that the Amended Complaint,
impleading petitioner as defendant, was filed. Respondent
cannot argue that the filing of the Amended Complaint against
petitioner should retroact to the date of the filing of the original
complaint.
The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does
not retroact to the date of the filing of the original; hence, the
statute of limitation runs until the submission of the
amendment. It is true that, as an exception, this Court has held
that an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies
facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date
of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the
statute of limitations which expired after the service of the
original complaint. The exception, however, would not apply to
the party impleaded for the first time in the amended
complaint.
In the instant case, petitioner was only impleaded in the
amended Complaint of June 7, 1993, or one (1) year, one (1)
month and twenty-three (23) days from April 15, 1992, the date
when the subject cargo was fully unloaded from the vessel.
Hence, reckoned from April 15, 1992, the one-year prescriptive

Sps. Dionisio
v. Linsangan

period had already lapsed.

FACTS:
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands inSan Rafael,
Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San Mateo (Romualdo)
cultivated.Upon Romualdos death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruzs
permission to stay on the property provided she would vacate it upon
demand.In September 1989, spouses Vicente and Anita Dionisio (the
Dionisios) bought the property from Cruz. In April 2002, the Dionisios
found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already
Wilfredo Linsangan (Wilfredo) who occupied it under the strength of a
"Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan" dated April 7, 1977.
The Dionisios, on April 22, 2002, demanded that Wilfredo vacate the land
but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction suit
against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Rafael,
Bulacan.Wilfredo filed an answer with counterclaims in which he
declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. At the
pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their complaint.The
Dionisios filed their amended complaint on August 5, 2003; Wilfredo
maintained his original answer.
The MTC ruled for the Dionisios and asked Wilfredo to vacate the
property and pay rent and costs. The RTC affirmed, adding that the
action was one for forcible entry. The CA, however, reversed. The CA
held that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively changed
their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of possession
which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC.Further, since the
amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing on August 5, 2003
marked the passage of the one year limit from demand required in
ejectment suits.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amended complaint changed the cause of
action
2. Whether or not the action is within the jurisdiction of the MTC
HELD:
The petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: Effect of amendment of the complaint; nature of the
action.
First issue: To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of
action, the test is whether such amendment now requires the defendant
to answer for a liability or obligation which is completely different from
that stated in the original complaint.

Here, both the original and the amended complaint have identical
allegations, and required Wilfredo to defend his possession based on the
allegation that he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of the
owners mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded that he leave.It
did not introduce a new cause of action.
Second issue: Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case since it involved tenancy relation under the
DARABs jurisdiction. But jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The records show that
Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he was a tenant of the land.
Second, the Court ruled that this is not an action for forcible entry, since
the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in
possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of eviction
suit.
The Court ruled that this is an action for unlawful detainer: (1) the
defendant has possession of property by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff; (2) such possession became illegal upon plaintiffs notice to
defendant, terminating the latter's right of possession; (3) the defendant
remains in possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his
property; and (4) within a year from plaintiff's last demand that defendant
vacate the property, the plaintiff files a complaint for ejectment. If the
defendant had possession of the land upon mere tolerance of the owner,
such tolerance must be present at the beginning of defendants
possession.
Here, while there was no specific allegation of "tolerance" in the
complaint, the Court concedes that the rules do not require the plaintiff in
an eviction suit to use the exact language of such rules.The Dionisios
alleged that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant and that when he
died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise
that she would leave upon demand.These allegations clearly imply the
Dionisios "tolerance" of her (or any of her assignees).
Petition is GRANTED.