The Supreme Court ruled that there was a need for the exercise of judicial review in this case regarding the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Court found that an actual case or controversy existed, as the petitioners alleged that the agreement violated constitutional duties. Additionally, the issues raised involved paramount public interest as they related to territory and political modifications. The Court also determined that the petitions were not moot, as the agreement could require future legal enactments or constitutional amendments.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was a need for the exercise of judicial review in this case regarding the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Court found that an actual case or controversy existed, as the petitioners alleged that the agreement violated constitutional duties. Additionally, the issues raised involved paramount public interest as they related to territory and political modifications. The Court also determined that the petitions were not moot, as the agreement could require future legal enactments or constitutional amendments.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was a need for the exercise of judicial review in this case regarding the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Court found that an actual case or controversy existed, as the petitioners alleged that the agreement violated constitutional duties. Additionally, the issues raised involved paramount public interest as they related to territory and political modifications. The Court also determined that the petitions were not moot, as the agreement could require future legal enactments or constitutional amendments.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was a need for the exercise of judicial review in this case regarding the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Court found that an actual case or controversy existed, as the petitioners alleged that the agreement violated constitutional duties. Additionally, the issues raised involved paramount public interest as they related to territory and political modifications. The Court also determined that the petitions were not moot, as the agreement could require future legal enactments or constitutional amendments.
Topic: Judicial Review Title: NORTH COTABATO vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Reference: G.R. No. 183591 FACTS Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court. The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same. Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners. However, respondents motion to dismiss is DENIED. ISSUES Whether or not there is a need for the exercise of judicial review? RULINGS Yes. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
The contention of the Solicitor General is that there is no
issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied. The Supreme Court emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness. With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and
prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance
Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD. On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the Supreme Court disagrees. The court reiterates that the Moot and Academic principle, not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Courts issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. Contrary too to respondents position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere list of consensus points, especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these consensus points, foremost of which is the creation of the BJE. In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-
AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements
necessary for its realization. It is beyond obvious that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the countrys territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity. Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.