(David Castiglione) - Hume's Two Views of Modern Scepticism

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History of European Ideas 32 (2006) 127

www.elsevier.com/locate/histeuroideas
Humes two views of modern scepticism

Dario Castiglione
Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter, Devon, EX4 4RJ, UK
Available online 9 September 2005
Abstract
Humes position in the history of philosophical scepticism can hardly be questioned. But the
nature of his own philosophical scepticism is a matter of contention in both the historical and
philosophical literatures. In this essay, I argue that a philosophical reconstruction of Humes
scepticism needs to pay attention to the way in which Hume and his contemporaries
understood the place of sceptical thinking in the history of modern philosophy. When looked
at in this context, Humes philosophy of knowledge and the understanding is self-evidently
sceptical. It is so, because it develops both a critical and a positive view of what a sceptical
attitude implies. From a critical perspective, Hume aims to show that human reason is
incapable of being its own foundation. From a more positive perspective, Hume sketches a
phenomenology of the understanding by developing a probabilistic and self-referential view of
philosophical knowledge, one which is not different from common knowledge and which relies
on the workings of human nature and the imagination to make sense of the world and of our
actions.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Hume; Modern scepticism; History of philosophy; Certainty; Theory of knowledge
Was David Hume a sceptic? Historically, the question sounds odd. What would
the history of philosophical scepticism look like without Hume? Philosophically, it
sounds more plausible, though there are at least two ways in which we can look at it.
From a meta-historical perspective, the question raises issues of coherence and
consistency, subjecting Humes own understanding of scepticism to abstract
philosophical scrutiny. From a more contextualist perspective, issues of consistency
E-mail address: d.castiglione@exeter.ac.uk.
0191-6599/$ - see front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2005.07.003
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D. Castiglione / History of European Ideas 32 (2006) 127
and coherence become subordinate to the appreciation of Humes own intentions

and to the contemporary reception of his philosophy. Arguably, the latter is a more
historical way of putting the philosophical question. Yet this can still be answered in
a philosophical mode by engaging in a critical reconstruction of Humes position.
Indeed, much of the history of philosophy approaches its own subject matter by such
a combination of historical and philosophical arguments and techniques; and even
though this approach is neither history nor philosophy, it remains one of the ways in
which we make sense of philosophys past. The question of whether or not Hume
was a philosophical scepticif we can make sense of this question at allis perhaps
best approached from such a perspective.
Scepticism and truth in modern philosophy

At rst sight, textual evidence seems overwhelming. Humes two main
philosophical statements on the nature of human knowledgeBook I of A Treatise
of Human Nature, and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 1 conclude
with a profession of philosophical scepticism of some sort. There are, however, two
caveats we may wish to consider. First, Hume often protested against those critics
who argued that his philosophical system ended in nothing more than sceptical
doubt. Secondly, at least since Norman Kemp Smith, there have been a series of
inuential interpretations emphasising either the naturalist or the realist aspects of
Humes philosophy, thus downplaying the allegedly sceptical conclusions of his
theory of knowledge.2 Indeed, Kemp Smith maintained that, in writing his
philosophy, Hume had started from the theory of morals, working his way
backward to the theory of the understanding. This interpretation opened up an
entirely new perspective on Humes work and philosophical inuences, suggesting
that Hutcheson, rather than Locke and Berkeley, had played a formative role in
Humes philosophy, while undermining the common viewdating back to Thomas
Reidthat Humes scepticism followed directly from his empiricist theory of ideas.
Kemp Smiths interpretation shifted scholarly attention from Humes criticism of the
faculty of reason to his description of the power of the passions. Thus Humes
famous assertion that reason is the slave of the passions was now evaluated more in
view of its constructive implicationsas an explanation of how human nature
worksthan for its indictment of human reason.3
1
Cf. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, In: D. Fate Norton, M.J. Nortoneds (Eds.), (Oxford, 1st
2000, reprinted with corrections in 2001), pp. 1718, 1.4.7 (hereafter, cited as T., followed by page number,
and by book, part and section numbers); In: T.L. Beauchamp (Ed.), An Enquiry concerning Human
Understanding, Oxford, 1999, pp. 199211, Section 12 (hereafter cited as EHU, followed by page and
section numbers).
2
N. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London, 1960).
3
It should be noted, however, that according to Hume the statement that reason is the slave of the
passion, if taken literally, is entirely sceptical. The essay The Sceptic, in which Hume discussed the
sceptical approach to life, was indeed based on the assumption that philosophy has no particular inuence
on the actions of people, because they are led by their passions. Cf. D. Hume, Essays.
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Although the pendulum of Hume scholarship has swung away from the naturalist
reading suggested by Kemp Smith, while a number of studies have suggested
interesting ways in which Humes scepticism can be qualied as either constructive,
enlightened, creative, or realist;4 there is still no consensus on what part sceptical
reasoning play in his work. One explanation for such a disagreement is that Hume,
and most of his contemporaries, did not think in terms of naturalism versus
scepticism. For them, dogmatism, not naturalism, was the opposite of scepticism.
Moreover, throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, scepticism, as a
philosophical position, was radically transformed, a process that paradoxically
ended in its partial eclipse from mainstream philosophical debates for at least a
century. This gives to the scepticism of that time a transitional quality, which is
partly underlined by the self-conscious way in which historical narratives of
philosophical scepticism became part of the philosophical arguments on scepticisms
role in modern philosophy. Indeed, we can date the concerted effort to develop a
historical approach to philosophy roughly to the end of the seventeenth century.
Pierre Bayle, who considered himself an historienne des opinions, gave a notable
contribution to such a history with the publication of his Dictionnaire,5 which
Eugenio Garin rightly regards as one of the earliest attempts at a critical history of
the philosophical literature.6 This link between scepticism and the history of
philosophy was not perfunctory. One of the topoi of sceptical literature consisted in
listing the different opinions and theories held by philosophers. Such a variety of
opinions was meant to both illustrate and demonstrate the elusive nature of truth.
But the passage from the rather haphazard catalogue of opinions which, for
instance, is to be found in Montaigne, to the more systematic investigation of the
history of opinions typical of Bayles work, meant that scepticism itself had to be
placed within a meaningful historical narrative.
The philosophical importance of this historical dispute was evident to Hume as
well as to his critics. The issue was raised in one of the earliest attacks published
against Humes alleged scepticism. In 1768, James Balfour of Pilrig published a series
of philosophical essays7, one of which was pointedly meant to deny the existence of a
meaningful link between scepticism and the academic philosophy, an assumption
clearly made by Hume in the very title of the nal section of the Enquiry on the
Human Understanding: Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. According to
Balfour, Platos school (the First Academy) and his philosophy were in direct
opposition to scepticism. Hume maintained that the cautious use of the understanding propounded by both Socrates and Plato was not meant to undercut the
distinction between truth and falsehood; for neither of them denied that there is truth
4
Cf. R. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism (San Diego, 1980); S.C. Brown, The Principle of Natural
Order: or What the Enlightenment Sceptics did not Doubt, in idem (ed.), Philosophers of the
Enlightenment, Brighton, 1979; E.C. Mossner, The Enlightenment of David Hume, in Studi su Hume,
Quaderni Critici di Storia della Filosofia, II, 1968; R. Read, K.A. Richman (Eds.), The New Hume Debate,
(London and New York, 2000).
5
P. Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (Rotterdam, 1697 1st).
6
Cf. E. Garin, Rinascite e Rivoluzioni (Firenze).
7
J. Balfour, Philosophical Essays, Edinburgh, 1768, in particular Of the Academical Philosophy.
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in things themselves. Balfour associated the emergence of scepticism with the

teaching of Arcesilas, whom he considered as the true initiator of the Second
Academy, and philosophically akin to Pyrrho. He described Carneadess probabilistic theory of knowledgesubsequently embraced by Ciceroas a rather awkward
attempt to avoid the embarrassing consequences that followed from Arcesilass
theory. To reinforce his point, Balfour gave credence to some of the stories told
about Pyrrho and his misconceived attempt at living as a sceptic.8
A somewhat similar line of interpretation can be found in the Encyclopedies entry
on the Academiciens,9 which argued that both Socratess and Platos profession of
ignorance were not to be taken literally. Socrates had used this as an ironic device,
while Plato as way of preparing the ground for proper philosophical enquiry. The
Second Academy was instead considered as a denitive departure from Platonic
philosophy, with Arcesilas and Carneades fully embracing Pyrrhonian scepticism.
The only difference between their position was that one made his case in positive,
and almost dogmatic, terms by suggesting that we know nothing; while the other
had taken a more consistently sceptical position by questioning whether it was at all
possible to arrive at the truth.
The historical interpretation of the relationship between the two Academies was of
philosophical consequence. Authors who were critical of scepticism tended to draw a
sharp line between the two, while more sceptical minded philosophers preferred to
emphasise their continuities, an interpretation that they could easily rest on Ciceros
authority:
Arcesilas directed his attack entirely against Zeno [the stoic philosopher], in no
spirit of obstinacy and contentiousness, as I at least believe, but inuenced by the
mysteriousness of these matters which had led Socrates and even before the time
of Socrates, had led Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and almost all the
men of old to admit their nescience: these declared cognition, perception,
knowledge to be utterly impossible; the sense they maintained were restricted, the
mind was weak, the course of life short, and, in the words of Democritus, truth
was plunged in an abyss, everything was encircled by fancies and coventions, there
was no room left for truth, all things one after another were found to be
overwhelmed by darkness. So Arcesilas refused to admit that knowledge of
anything whatever could be attainedy[y] This Academy they styled the New,
but it appears to me to be the Oldy.10
In his article on Arcesilas, Bayle drew on Ciceros interpretation. In note E he
further contended that Arcesilas followed Socrates maieutic method, though
perhaps in a somewhat more contentious manner.11
8
Balfour, Philosophical Essays, pp. 3132.

Academiciens, in Encyclopedie, au Dictionnaire , D. Diderot, DAlembert (Eds.), vol. I, (Paris, 1756),
pp. 49b51a.
10
Cicero, The Academics, J.S. Reid (Trans.), (London, 1885), pp. 26-27.
11
Bayle, Arcesilas, in: Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. I, note E, p. 285.
9
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It is difcult to overestimate the importance of the continuity argument. It

emphasised the pervasive inuence of scepticism throughout ancient philosophy; it
indicated the genetic source of the sceptical attitude, as a reaction against
dogmatism; nally, it singled out the modesty effect as the most relevant and
welcome result of the same attitude. One needed not to be a sceptic to recognise all or
some of these points. In an article in the Encyclopedie dedicated to scepticism in
general, Pyrrhonienne ou Sceptique,12 it was argued that, though the abolition of
fundamental distinctions such as truefalse, and justunjust, risked jeopardising the
progress of society, scepticism had some positive effect, in that it curbed the excessive
dogmatism of the schools, encouraged a more judicious attitude towards enquiry,
and favoured tolerance. The article was even more sympathetic towards modern
sceptics, suggesting that Sanchess own scepticism was merely meant as a refutation
of scholastic philosophy; that Montaignes argument, though vicious in nature,
were both fascinating and often persuasive; and that Bayle was the most formidable
of them all, his Pensees in particular being a powerful plea for toleration. Bayles
erudition was used as a kind of explanation for his scepticism, for it was said that he
knew too much to believe anything; but, at the same time, that he also knew too
much to doubt everything. In conclusion, the article suggested that ancient
scepticism was more a reaction against philosophical dogmatism, rather than an
indictment against reason. As for modern scepticism, this was far from being an
attack against the authority of revelation, whilst on the contrary it could often be
used to bolster religious faith against the questioning to which this was subjected by
natural reason.
In this respect, it is interesting to note the variety of roles that the opposition
between scepticism and dogmatism was made to play in dening both the history
and nature of philosophical thinking. In the hand of some authors it was also
deployed to distinguish between different forms of scepticism. Concluding his essay
on Des Boiteux, Montaigne observed that Carneadess pretension to give assent to
nothing reminded him of Aesops tale of two fellow slaves who, when asked by a
prospective buyer what they were capable of doing, launched in extravagant
accounts of their own abilities. When Aesops turn came, his curt answer was that he
knew nothing, and was capable of nothing, but that this should not worry the buyer
much, since the other two could do everything.
That is what has happened in the schools of philosophysays MontaigneThe
pride of those who attributed to the human mind a capacity for all things produce
in others, through spite and emulation, the opinion that it is capable of nothing.
These men maintain the same extreme in ignorance that the others maintain in
knowledge.13
12
Pyrrhonienne ou Sceptique, in Encyclopedie, vol. XIII, pp. 608a14a.

M. de Montaigne, Essais, in: A. Thibaudet, M. Rat (Eds.), Oeuvres Comple`tes, Paris, 1962, p. 1013
(English translation from, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, Stanford, 1958, p. 792).
13
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In his Dialogues, Hume drew similar conclusions with regard to the moral maxims
of the philosophical sects:
There appear a great resemblance between the sects of the Stoics and Pyrrhonians,
though perpetual antagonists; and both of them seem founded on this erroneous
maxims that what a man can perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can
perform always and in every disposition.14
In fact, neither Montaigne nor Hume wished to suggest that scepticism and
dogmatism were the reverse of each other and equally wrong. More subtly, they
acknowledged that some forms of scepticism originated as an unreective reaction to
dogmatism and consequently shared in its same failings. The reverse-of-the-medal
theory15 was used more critically by those who did not support scepticism.
Condillac, for instance, put it to good use by suggesting that scepticism was the byproduct of early and unrened philosophical reasoning. Sceptical arguments could
be persuasive when pitted against the opinions of ancient philosophy, since this
lacked method; but had no power against the much sounder kind of reasoning
adopted by modern philosophers.16
Condillacs and others conviction, that the conclusions of modern philosophy
were not as easily assailable by the sceptics as ancient philosophy was, rested on two
assumptions. First, it was felt that the progress witnessed in many elds of human
understanding and scientic knowledge supported the conviction that the human mind
could penetrate some of the inner mechanisms and mysteries of the external world.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the question of truth, the bugbear of
scepticism, was now posed in an entirely new way. Modern philosophers tended to
stress the more subjective aspects of truth by emphasising certainty and evidence,
rather than relying on the attainment of truth itself. This suggested a more selfreferential conception of knowledge, whose foundations did not depend on a necessary
correspondence between our mind and external reality. Such a correspondence could
be taken from granted a priori by either assuming a benevolent creator or by
presupposing the functional role that knowledge plays in practical lifeor, indeed,
variations and combinations of both theories.17 Modern philosophy generally avoided
confronting the question of the semiotic nature of certainty and evidence, which would
have required a demonstration of the passage from the signs of truth to metaphysical
truth. For them, this amounted to placing the explanans and the explanandum in a
14
D. Hume, Dialogues, (Signicantly, both Philo and Cleantes agree on this) pp. 78.
Montaigne quotes an Italian proverb: Ogni Medaglia ha il suo riverso, Essais, p. 1012. (which he
used as his own motto, as also testied by the famous portrait of Montaigne handling a medal).
16
Cf. E. de Condillac, Cours detudes pour linstruction du Prince de Parme, in: G. Le Roy (Ed.), Oeuvres
Philosophiques, vol. II, (Paris, 1948). (Condillac suggests that the confusion between the sceptics and the
philosophers of the true Academia was due to the fact that the sceptics were forced to conceal their
philosophical principles, thus nding it convenient to disguise themselves as adherents to that
philosophical school).
17
For this view, cf. amongst others, J. Locke, An Essay on Human Understanding, Quesnay, who wrote
the entry on Evidence, in: Encyclopedie, vol. VI, pp. and sGravesande, Oeuvres Philosophiques et
Mathematiques, Rassemblees et Publiees par Jean Nic. Seb. Allamand, (Amsterdam, 1774), vol 2.
15
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logical circle. They were happy to leave these kinds of arguments to the sceptics and
old-fashioned scholastic philosophers. Besides, they thought that these arguments
about ultimate truths cut both ways, for if certainty could not be attained, and no
evidence accepted as true, the sceptical position was as untenable and self-defeating as
any other. Such an avoidance strategy did not prevent the sceptics from continuing
mounting their attacks against reason and knowledge, by remarking upon the general
impossibility of establishing foundational theories of knowledge. However, their more
subtle and original arguments were often aimed at deating the dogmatists selfcondence, by showing both the inner contradictions of their philosophical systems,
and the shakiness of their particular assumptions.
The new sceptic challenge to philosophical knowledge developed through a line of
internal criticisms of the certainties of modern philosophy. It suggested that the latter,
not dissimilarly from ancient philosophy, bore the seeds of scepticism within itself. This
line of argument was not exclusive to the sceptics. In Emile, Rousseaus Savoyard Priest
described the whole of modern philosophy as dogmatic, cold, over-subtle, and
materialistically oriented, yet eventually leading to scepticism. To this he opposed a
philosophy of the heart, guided by the love of truth, and following the simple method
of accepting all self-evident things that I could not honestly refuse to believe.18
The two single features of modern philosophy which he particularly criticised were
the representation of the knowing subject as a passive entity, and the emphasis given
to general and abstract ideas. The former was said to be wrong because, as the
character of the Savoyard priest says:
I seek in vain in the merely sensitive entity that intelligent force which compares
and judges; I can nd no trace of it in its nature. This passive entity will be aware
of each object separately, it will even be aware of the whole formed by the two
together, but having no power to place them side by side it can never compare
them, it can never form a judgement with regard to them.19
Abstract ideas, on the other hand, were considered particularly pernicious, and
singled out as the main cause of mistakes and philosophical absurdities, made yet
more senseless by the jargon of metaphysicians.
Rousseaus own philosophy of the heart emphasised the power of the will and of
sentiment. He considered man to be moved by an internal, active force, which
manifested itself in the freedom of judgement (to declare something to be either true
or false), as well as in the freedom of will (to be able to choose between good and
evil). He contended that true philosophical meditation should be no different from a
heightened form of introspection, like the one practised by [l] homme simple et
vrai,20 who asks straightforward questions, and seeks answers from the inner voice
which cries aloud toy[him], in a tone which can hardly be mistaken.21
18
J.-J. Rousseau, Emile. Ou de leducation, in (Barbara Foxley, Trans., Oeuvres Comple`tes, vol. IV,
p. 570, from Everymans Library edition, London, 1974, p. 232).
19
Rousseau, Emile, pp. 5712 (Transl. p. 233).
20
Rousseau, Emile, p. 582.
21
Rousseau, Emile, p. 585 (Transl. p. 242), and passim.
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It is interesting to compare the tone and voice of this monologue in Emile with
those of the conclusion to Book I of Humes Treatise, a monologue of a sort. Both
speeches intimate the dangers of embarking upon a voyage in those immense depths
of philosophy (Hume), and on the sea of human opinion (Rousseau); both depict
the sense of despair that such boundless horizons provoke in the philosophical
navigators:
ywithout compass or rudder, and abandoned to their stormy passions with no
guide but an inexperienced pilot who does not know whence he comes or whither
he is goingy.22
and
ylike a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escapd
ship-wreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the
same leaky weather-beaten vessely(T.172: 1.4.7.1).
There is, however, only a faint similarity of tone between these two passages. The
metaphysical solitude they express develops towards different conclusions, and is the
result of antipathetic processes of philosophical investigation. The coldness of
reasoning and subtlety of argumentation censured by Rousseau were Humes stock
in trade throughout most of the Treatise. While Rousseau was not willing to
contemplate doubt even as a purely methodical device, Hume, and modern
scepticism generally, pushed doubt to the extreme with the utmost seriousness.
Their probing of modern philosophy was internal, testing the consistency of its
principles, exploring its consequences for human action and knowledge in general,
and assessing the limits it set itself. Scepticism, as Hume himself suggested, created a
sense of momentary amazement,yirresolution and confusion. Such a state is the
result of a kind of criticisms that admit of no answer and produce no conviction
(EHU, 203, XII, part I, ft. 32).
It remains difcult to imagine how Humes own theory of morals and the passions,
or his analysis of justice, government and commerce could follow from a philosophy
of the human understanding that, as he maintained, admits no answer and produces
no conviction. In the Treatise, Hume reconciled the two parts of his philosophy by
sharply distinguishing between the powers of reason, that lead us to perplexity and
scepticism, and those of nature, which inform our beliefs and action (T. 171-8, 1.4.7,
passim). In the Enquiry, Hume introduced a kind of mitigated scepticism, as an
attitude of mind, which is caused by the scepticism of reason, but which remains in
tune with our nature.23 Yet, even such a mitigated form of scepticism, to be coherent,
needed a more distinctively sceptical view of human understanding and human
knowledge on which to challenge modern philosophy. Humes own interpretation of
modern philosophical scepticism developed along two lines of argumentation. One
Rousseau, Emile, p. 567 (Transl. p. 229).
I have discussed Humes idea of mitigated scepticism in The Practical Value of Humes Mitigated
Scepticism, in: R. Popkin, J. van der Zande (Eds.), Skepticism at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning
of the nineteenth century, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, pp. 22134.
22
23
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pursued a view of scepticism as an internal criticism of the certainties of modern

philosophy, while the other offered a positive view, so to speak, of the sceptical tenets
concerning the limits of the human understanding and knowledge.
Critical scepticism
As we have already seen, the more critical form of modern scepticism tended to
develop a technique of argumentation widely used by ancient sceptics, though it had
now to contend with a distinctively different conception of philosophical truth and
philosophical method. In his Dictionnaire, Bayle made several attempts at such a
critical scepticism. Although only a few modern authors were accorded entries in the
Dictionnaire, their theories were scrutinised in detail in the remarks appended to a
number of articles on ancient philosophers, where ancient and modern approaches
were compared. In general, Bayle found that ancient philosophers, although often
mistaken in both their methods and particular theories, were usually more coherent
in their conclusions.
An instance of the Moderns inconsistency was their utter rejection of scepticism.
In support of his thesis, Bayle developed two main lines of argument. On the one
hand, he maintained that modern natural philosophers were Pyrrhonist at bottom.
Their search for the causes of phenomena stopped at probable hypotheses and
experiments; they made no pretence of uncovering the ultimate sources of the
phenomena themselves, an approach very similar to the sceptics own emphasis on
appearances and their rejection of necessary truth. Bayles probabilistic representation of experimental knowledge contrasted with the attempt to separate several
manifestations of non-deductive knowledge from probability, by claiming a special
status for the evidence attached to the former. He considered such an attitude to be
incoherent, insisting that all certainty and evidence supporting the knowledge of
appearances did not amount to more than mere probability.24
Bayles second line of argument was mainly directed against Christian rationalism.
Remark B of the article on Pyrrho-written in the dramatic form of a philosophical
discussion between two abbots, one of common learning, the other, a subtle
philosopher with sceptic leanings-succinctly expounded the main points of the
argument. Throughout the dialogue Bayle insisted that the modern theory of the
subjectivity of secondary qualities tends to strengthen the sceptical argument that
things cannot be known in themselves. He also added that the way in which we are
deceived with regard to secondary qualities-something readily admitted by modern
philosophers-could well happen with regard to the primary qualities of extension and
existence:
The objects of my senses cannot be the cause of my sensations: I might therefore
feel cold and heat, see colours, gures, extension, and motion; tho there was not
24
P. Bayle, The Dictionary Historical and Critical. New York and London, 1984, p. 732. (based on the
second edition, London 1738).
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10
one body in the world. I have not therefore one good proof of the existence of
bodies.25
Moreover, partly following Malebranche,26 Bayle observed that the belief in the
subjective nature of secondary qualities undermined one of the proofs often
advocated in support of the existence of the external world, which predicated this on
the veracity of the Divine Being:
the only proof they can give me for it, is, that God would deceive me, if he
imprinted in my soul the ideas I have of body, if there were no bodies, but that
proof is very weak; it proves too much.27
Indeed, according to Bayle, this proof applied to primary as well as secondary
qualities, so that if God deceived us on the presence of colours in the objects, there
was no reason why he may not do the same with regard to our spatio-temporal
representation of external bodies.
Bayle also extended the nature-of-God argument to the theories of the self and the
feeling of identity. If, he maintained, omnipotence is necessarily part of the nature of
a perfect being, nothing prevents this being from creating and re-creating a mans
soul every moment, and from giving an impression of permanence to each of the
succeeding souls. In a sense, Bayle observed, it could be argued that the very
conservation of creatures-both material and spiritual-is not very different from a
continuous act of creation.
The second half of the dialogue shifted the attention to other ways in which
modern philosophy and Christian beliefs undermined each other. Bayle recognised
that one the principles of modern philosophythat evidence is a necessary
characteristic of truth, and that there is no recognisable truth without evidence
was beyond dispute. But he noted that such a principle undermined some of the
fundamental tenets of Christian belief. As one of the characters in his dialogue said,
such evident principles as that of personal identity; of the coincidence of the qualities
of individuality, nature, and personhood; of the impossibility for a body to be in two
places at the same time, contradicted some of the foundational mysteries
Christianity, such as those of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, and of the Eucharist.28
Similar contradictions could also be detected in matters of morals. The principle that
we have an obligation to prevent evil acts did not square well with Gods act of
creation. The punishment imparted to all humanity for the Original Sin could hardly
be reconciled with the principle that, where there is no action, there is no
responsibility, hence no punishment should follow. The conclusion of dialogue, also
reinforced by Remark C,29 was that one of Pyrrhonisms advantages over
25
Bayle, Dictionary, p. 732a.

Bayle, Dictionary, pp. 6145.
27
Bayle, Dictionary, p. 732b.
28
Bayle, The Dictionary, in: Eclaircissement III Bayle wrote: Que ce qui a ete dit du Pyrrhonisme, dans
ce Dictionnaire, ne peut point prejudicier a` la Religion, Dictionnaire, pp. 641647.
29
Bayle, The Dictionary, pp. 733734, and passim.
26
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11
dogmatism was that it made us see the weakness of our rational capacities, thus
preparing us to accept faith as the proper guide to salvation.30
In two chapters of Book I of the Treatise, Hume explored a number of
philosophical contradictions similar to those discussed by Bayle. The chapters were
devoted to Ancient and Modern philosophy, and in discussing them Hume
attempted to distinguish the effects that scepticism had on these respective
philosophical systems. He described the principles of Ancient philosophy as neither
unavoidabley, nor necessary, or so much as usefuly, but he insisted that they
often addressed problems as real as those confronted by the Moderns. The ctions
of the ancient philosophy, concerning substances, and substantial forms, and
accidents, and occult qualities represented a fanciful way of solving paradoxes like
that presented by the individuality and unity of things, on the one hand, and the
distinctiveness and multiplicity of sensible qualities, on the other. Substance and
accidents were terms of art used to express these two irreconcilable views of things,
and through their frequent use a philosophical illusion was established, so that these
authors convinced themselves of the truthfulness of their own ctitious ideas,
arriving at the same indifference, which the people attain by their stupidity, and true
philosophers by their moderate scepticism (T.148: 1.4.3.10).
Modern philosophy was not subject to the same illusions:
The fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colours,
sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but
impressions in the mind, derivd from the operation of external objects, and
without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects.
[y]This principle being once admitted, all the other doctrines of that philosophy
seem to follow by an easy consequence. (T.14950: 1.4.4.35).
One of the consequences was that the exclusion of secondary qualities from the
objective nature of things leaves primary qualities, i.e. extension and solidity, as their
only real permanent characteristics. Butas Hume contented in the chapter on
modern philosophythis opinion
instead of explaining the operations of the external objects by its means,yutterly
annihilate[s] all those objects, and reduce[s] ourselves to the opinions of the most
extravagant scepticism concerning them. If colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be
merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest of a real, continud, and
independent existence; not even motion, extension and solidity, which are the
primary qualities chiey insisted on. (T.150: 1.4.4.6)
The rest of the chapter consisted of a number of intriguing arguments by which
Hume tried to show the impossibility of establishing the reality of primary qualities.
These could only be identied either by making reference to other primary qualities,
so that any explanation ended in a kind of circular reasoning; or by reducing them to
the more simple perceptions of secondary qualities, which, however, lacked objective
reality by denition. The sceptical conclusion that Hume drew from all this was that
30
Cf. Montaigne, Essais, pp. 46768.
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there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses (T.152:
1.4.5.15).31 Such a conclusion was further reinforced by the discussion, undertaken
in the next two chapters, on the immateriality of the soul and on personal identity.
Both chapters arrived at the same conclusion, that the metaphysical arguments in
favour or against the two sides of the questions are equally inconclusive (T.164:
1.4.6.35), and that the subtleties involved in such issues should be regarded rather as
grammatical than as philosophical difculties (T.171: 1.4.7.21).
In the concluding section of the Enquiry, Hume returned again to these criticisms
of modern philosophy. He dismissed the scepticism originating from the recognition
of sense experiences partiality as inconclusive, because at most it proves the essential
role played by reason in correcting the evidence provided by the senses; but noted
that modern theories of the mind-body problem, and of primary and secondary
qualities were embarrassingly open to the cavils and objections of the sceptics.
Apart from a difference in presentation, nothing distinguished the treatment of
primary and secondary qualitiesput forward in this text from the one in the Treatise.
However, the discussion of the mind-body problem, although much shortened,
presented an important addition, in so far as here Hume referred to the argument on
the veracity of the supreme Being, which reproduced in substance what had already
been argued by Bayle and Malebranche:
If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely
infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that,
if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to nd
arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that being or any of his
attributes (EHU.202: 12.13).
In the Enquiry, as in the Treatise, Humes conclusion was that modern philosophy
strengthened a number of rational opinions which contradicted natural instinct, so
that it left
only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions; a
notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it
(EHU.203: 12.16).
Thus Humes criticism of the general tendency of the philosophy of his time
reached the same sceptical conclusion that Bayle had arrived at half a century earlier.
There were, however, important differences, which were not simply the result of a
greater degree of coherence in the treatment of the subjectwhich undoubtedly
Humes text offered. Hume concurred with Bayle that the nature of experimental
knowledge in contemporary natural philosophy was sceptical in essence; but his
insistence that the experimental method should be extended to the moral sciences
had important philosophical consequences, both for the application of the method
itself, and for the nature of knowledge in general. Hume agreed with Bayle that
philosophical reason was incapable of sustaining a fully coherent system of
knowledge; but, in proving his point, he referred only to the paradoxes to which
31
Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Phyrronism, in: R.G. Bury (Ed.), (London, 1976), p. 23.
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the use of reason may lead, leaving aside most of Bayles arguments on the antithesis
between reason and faith.
Humes own scepticism centre instead on the antithesis between reason and
nature, which he subjected to a new and original treatment. Classical sceptics had
indeed attempted to make several classications of the arguments that lead us to
ataraxia, or suspension of judgement. Although they considered this to be a moral
state (Hume, on his part, thought of it as a state of total lethargy) (EHU.207:
12.23); they regarded its origins as being more of an epistemological nature. In his
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus gave a list of the kinds of general
oppositions that resulted in the suspension of judgement. To this he added a number
of specic arguments, or modes (tropoi), which bring about these oppositions. In
fact, the general antitheses could be considered as super-ordinate modes. But Sextus,
on his part, simply listed two groups one after the other, occasionally remarking on
their similarity, though, strictly speaking, they belonged to different orders of
classication.32 Yet, in spite of his unsystematic treatment of the subject, Sextuss
general antitheses can be considered as for of categorisation of the way in which
suspension of judgement may result from the balance between two equally strong
beliefs in our mind. These oppositions, or general modes, are of three kinds:
yapperances to appearances when we say the same tower appears round from a
distance, but square from close at hand;ythoughts to thoughts, when in answer
to him who argues the existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly
bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and
draw from this the inference that Providence does not exist. And thoughtsyto
appearances, as when Anaxagoras countered the notion that snow is white with
the argument, Snow is frozen water, and water is black; therefore snow is also
black.33
Humes antithesis between reason and nature, comprising the characters of both
the antithesis between thoughts and thoughts and that between thoughts and
appearances, represented a drastic reduction of Sextuss oppositions to a single one.
Hume dismissed the antithesis between appearances, which was meant to show the
weakness of the evidence from the senses, as trite and supercial. The internal
antithesis of reason (thoughts to thoughts), paradigmatically represented by the ageold paradoxes of The Liar and The Sorites, was deployed only in a limited way in
the discussions of the abstract ideas of space and time and of the groundlessness of
pure reason. On the whole, Hume believed that reason, when left to its own devices,
produced positive and dogmatic conclusions, whilst its paradoxes were hardly
convincing.
Both in the Treatise and the Enquiry, Humes sceptical arguments followed the
pattern suggested in Sextuss third antithesis. In the main, they purported to show
that the arguments of the philosophers (reason) and those of common sense (instinct)
reach opposite conclusions regarding the reality of the world, of experience, and of
32
Cf. Sextus, Outlines, pp. 25107.

Sextus, Outlines, p. 23. (emphasis added).
33
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human knowledge. This antithesis resulted in an impossibility to judge, or, in other

words, in the true sceptical doubt. It can be interpreted either as the opposition
between what is rationally thought and what is believed (thoughts to appearances) or
as that between a philosophical and a popular system of belief (thoughts to
thoughts). But, whichever characterisation it is adopted, it is apparent that, through
logical simplication, Hume identied the essence of modern scepticism in the
contrast between the arguments of reason and those of nature.
One only needs to examine the particular reasonings put forward in Humes main
philosophical texts. In the section of the Treatise which deals with scepticism relating
to reason, Hume advanced a rational argument to demonstrate the fallibility of the
faculty of judgement in contrast to the natural condence evinced by its very use.
The section on scepticism with regard to the senses expounded the different
principles by which the philosophical and the vulgar systems answer the question,
What causes induce us to believe in the existence of the body? (T.125: 1.4.2.1).
Other problems, such as those of personal identity, of abstract ideas, of the innite
divisibility of space and time, and of primary and secondary qualities, were all
minutely analysed so to reveal that philosophical reason and common sense are in a
deadlock.
From what just argued it may be concluded that Humes critical philosophy was
sceptical in intent. But before moving on to an analysis of his more positive
characterisation of a sceptical epistemology, it may be necessary to clarify a couple
of points. There is in fact both an ambiguity and a seeming contradiction in some of
Humes treatment of the deadlock resulting from reason and common sense. The
contradiction rst. It has been said that the main antithesis from which Humes
scepticism originated was that between nature and reason. But the possibility that by
simply following a positive philosophical system one could arrive at sceptical
conclusions seems to imply that Hume gave more weight to Sextuss second
antithesis, the one internal to reason, than I have so far argued. In commenting upon
the section on scepticism with regard to reason, Hume referred to total scepticism
as that process through which
the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most
general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of
evidence in any proposition, even in philosophy or in common life. (T.174:
1.4.7.7)34
From this it follows that simply turning the rules of reason against reason itself
may generate a vicious circle (the antithesis thoughts against thoughts) which leaves
no epistemic ground on which to establish ones convictions and beliefs. However,
from the rest of the relevant section it appears that there is another, more reective,
level of discourse through which a similar sceptical conclusion is reached. Indeed, the
theoretical opposition of reason against reason manifests itself, as it were, in a more
lively form in the practical act of reasoning-against-reason, so that it is the latter, and
34
See above, sect. I.
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not the former, which is the most relevant manifestation of the understanding
subverting itself.35
The ambiguity to which I referred earlier, of a positive philosophy which is also
sceptical, nds some explanation in what Hume says about reason. As it has already
been suggested, nature, custom, instincts, and that peculiar faculty which he calls the
imagination, are at the centre of Hume s philosophical conception of the role and
functioning of the understanding. Reason takes a subordinate role, and, in the
measure in which it plays any role at all, it is often regarded as a natural faculty, or a
more rened (less lively) instinct. The reduction of the operations of the
understanding to natural occurrences, and their subordination to a small number
of rst principles which have a certain similarity with the workings of the passions,
can be said to give origins to a naturalistic philosophy; but, within Humes own
philosophical context, this characterisation of his philosophy does not make much
sense. As Hume stated when he tried to explain why the philosophy of the Treatise
was very sceptical:
Almost all reasoning is reduced to experience; and the belief, which attends
experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively
conception produced by habit. Nor is this all, when we believe any thing of
external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer
perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. (Abstract,
T.41314: 27)
Hume and his contemporaries clearly saw the reduction of reason to sentiment,
which implied that the one is as ckle in its operations as the other, as a typically
sceptical argument. Montaigne, for one, had put it epigrammatically: iappelle
raison nos resveries et nos songes.36 Hume was aware that his own theory of the
understanding did what sceptics had done for centuries, when they inverted the
relationship between reason and nature as it was normally imagined by the
dogmatists; those who, as Montaigne once again put it, in pretending to understand
reality, unwittingly made reason dictate its own rules to nature.37
Positive scepticism, with regard to the understanding

Turning now to the positive features of Humes philosophy, his theory of the mind
and belief, as clearly exemplied in the account of the principle of causation,
contended two main points: that custom and nature determines the mind in its
operations and in its beliefs; and that there is an important difference between
conceiving and believing something. In the Abstract, both points were deemed to
35
There is also a problem of terminology, which emerges from this discussion. On the one hand,
following a well-established tradition, Hume distinguished between a dogmatic, extreme scepticism and a
self-conscious, or true scepticism. On the other hand, as will be shown in the next section, he tried to
introduce a new meaning to the distinction. The result is at times conceptually confusing.
36
Montaigne, Essais, p. 504.
37
Cf. Balfour, Philosophical Essays, p. 46.
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follow from the impossibility of reducing the relationship between cause and effect to
a demonstrable proposition. Indeed, the primacy of custom and nature over reason
was generally interpreted as having sceptical implications, and the same can be said
of Humes distinction between necessary and contingent truths, which he also
applied to the act of conceiving an idea:
What is demonstratively false implies a contradiction; and what implies a
conctradiction cannot be conceived. But with regard to any matter of fact,
however strong the proof may be from experience, I can always conceive the
contrary, tho I cannot always believe it. The belief, therefore, makes some
difference betwixt the conception to which we assent, and that to which we do not
assent. (Abstract, T.411: 18)
According to Hume, the important difference between believing and conceiving an
object requires some explanation; this was, moreover, a new question unthought of
by philosophers (Abstract, T.411: 17). There were only two possible explanations:
either that belief adds a new idea to a particular conception or that it is a different
way of representing an object to the mind. He rejected the rst hypothesis on the
ground that believing in the existence of an object does not add any new quality to
the conception of the object itself, and that belief is not within ones control, as, by
contrast, ideas are. He therefore concluded that belief is:
ya different MANNER of conceiving an object; something that is distinguishable
to the feeling, and depends not upon our willy.
[y] tis impossible by words to describe this feeling, which every one must be
conscious of in his own breast. He [Hume himself] calls it sometimes a stronger
conception, sometimes a more lively, a more vivid, a firmer, or a more intense
conception. And indeed, whatever name we may give to this feeling,yit [is]
evident, that it has a more forcible effects on the mind than ction and mere
conception. This he [Hume again] proves by its inuence on the passions and the
imagination; which are only moved by truth or what is taken for such.38
The nal reference to truth as that which drives the passions and the imagination
must not be taken literally. What is taken for truth conveys Humes meaning more
accurately. As he stated in the Treatise, the only criterion for distinguishing truth
from falsehood and for assenting to the most accurate and exactyreasoningsy[is]
a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that view, under which they
appear to oneself.
Whithout this quality [the imagination], by which the mind enlivens some ideas
beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial and so little founded on reason) we
coud never assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects,
38
D. Hume, An Abstract of a Book lately Published; Entitled, a Treatise on Human Nature, &c. Wherein
the Chief Argument of that Book is further illustrated and explained [published anonymously, and reprinted
in Treatise, pp. 40317, hereafter cited as Abstract, T. and followed by page and paragraph numbers], at
T.41112: 2122; cf. also EHU.12526: 5.12.
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which are present to our senses. [y] The memory, sense, and understanding are
therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas.
No wonder a principle so inconstant and fallacious shoud lead us into error when
implicitly followd (as it must be) in all its variations. (T.172-73: 1.4.7.3-4)
Humes argument on the role that the imagination plays in transforming
conceptions into beliefs could be graphically illustrated by adopting a thoughtexperiment later suggested by Wittgenstein in his reections on certainty.
Wittgenstein asked his reader to imagine a language where there were no word
corresponding to our know. The people simply make assertions. (That is a tree,
etc.)39 Humes previous passage is asking for a similar leap of the imagination.
Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, one could pose Humes question in the following way:
Suppose that it were impossible for human beings to believe in/assent to an
argument. People would simply express their belief in those things that are present to
their senses by uttering the word Tree, for instance, or by pointing at a tree, or
even by trying to represent in gestures what a tree looks like. In fact, such a thoughtexperiment seems unimaginable. It is indeed questionable whether in these
circumstances communication through any kind of sign (either linguistic, or
indexical, or representational) were at all possible. Although in Humes theory
belief is the product of the imagination, there is little doubt that Hume considered it
to be unavoidable. He did not deny the strength of psychological certainty; he simply
excluded that it could be grounded in either transcendental principles or higher
certainties.
Yet, the admission that the operations of the imagination are necessary would
satisfy neither the dogmatists nor those philosophers who rejected the idea that
mans assent to the existence of things, or his certainties depended on so inconstant
and fallacious a principle. Moreover, as Hume suggested in the Enquiry, nothing is
more free than the imagination of man (EHU.124: 2.10). In the Treatise, for
instance, Hume compared the just and natural conclusion of someone, who infers
from the clear sound of a voice heard in the dark, that there must be another person
besides him, to the equally naturalbecause arising from natural causes
obsession of someone else, who hears mysterious voices in the dark, and attributes
them to the presence of spirits (T.1489: 1.4.4.1). Both beliefs are the products of the
same faculty, a fact that casts doubts on whether order and method can be injected in
human knowledge, or indeed in human life itself.
By adopting a kind of Cartesian language, once could ask whether life was a
dream writ large. Humes answer was that, even though neither reason nor the senses
are capable of establishing the reliability of common beliefs, the permanent,
irresistible, and universal principles of the imagination provide such assurance, and
by doing so they establish their superiority over the changeable, weak, and irregular
principles of the imagination (T.148: 1.4.4.1). The best illustration which can be
found in Humes writings of this power of the imagination, of shaping ones world
and making it real, is in the passage where he explained that we are certain of the
39
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 57, para. 443.
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continud and distinct existence of body only because of the imagination. In the
passage, Hume maintained that it is the constancy and coherence of certain
impressions which force themselves upon the imagination, so to conjure up the image
of an external body entirely independent from the subject who perceives it. At the
same time, the imaginationwhich, as Hume wrote, when set into any train of
thinking, is apt to continue, [y] and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries
on its course without any new impulse (T.132: 1.4.2.22)extends the constancy and
coherence of its representations beyond the original material furnished by the senses,
leading one rmly to believe that there are such things as external bodies, which
cause sensations.
Our belief in the reality of the external world is therefore the complex result, on the
one hand of the structural similarity between the workings of the imagination and of
the senses, and on the other of the holistic nature of some natural beliefs.40 This
explanation seemed to reinforce Humes main contention that belief and assent are
acts of the sensitive, rather than of the cogitative part of our nature (T.123: 1.4.1.8).
Such a conclusion, however, cannot be regarded to be, in itself, sceptical. In his
Nouveaux Essaispublished too late for Hume to have made use of themLeibniz
maintained that the way in which phenomena linked together in our mind is what
ultimately makes it possible for us to distinguish between real experience and mere
dreams. He specically rejected the argument he attributed to the sceptics, that the
difference between real sensation and fancy is one of degrees only, and not of kind.
He stressed that the way in which phenomena link together is the criterion for their
truthfulness, something that is corroborated by reason.
yconnectedness of what happens at different times and places and in the
experience of different menwith them themselves being phenomena to one
another, and very important ones so far as this present matter is concerned. And
the linking of phenomena which warrants the truths of facts about sensible things
outside us is itself veried by means of truths of reason, just as optical appearances
are explained by geometry.41
The rst part of Leibnizs argument corresponds exactly to Humes coherenceand-constancy principle; the second departs from it, since it suggests that there is an
external criterion (reason), which substantiates experience. Hume, as we know,
pitched reason against experience and the imagination. But this was not the only
difference between them, or perhaps the most important one on such issues.
Although Leibniz was prepared to consider the linking of phenomena, conrmed by
reason, as knowledges verication principle; he also maintained that this did not
amount to the highest degree of certainty, at least when one was speaking from a
metaphysical perspective. A dream as coherent and prolonged as real life, for
instance, even though highly improbable,42 would fully satisfy the linking principle.
40
See below.
G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, edited by P. Remnant and J. Bennett
(Cambridge, 1981), pp. 37475.
42
Leibniz, New Essays, p. 375.
41
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This was not the case with primary truths, both of facts and of reason, which Leibniz
considered as being of the greatest possible certainty.43 According to Hume, instead,
all kinds of certainty are the result of a strong internal feeling of assenta dream as
coherent and prolonged as real life is real life, to all intents and purposes:
We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether they be
true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the
senses (T.59: 1.3.5.2).
Positive Scepticism, with regard to Knowledge

Although Humes positive scepticism with regard to the understanding offered a
phenomenology of its way of working, it provide no rm criterion of how it may get
to some form of truth or certainty. The conception that derived from it could also be
developed in a similar sceptical direction. Hume insisted on three issues, which were
deeply subversive of contemporary visions of both common and philosophical
knowledge. Firstly, he claimed that there is only one kind of cause, while distinctions
such as those between nal and efcient, or between moral and physical causes, etc.
were entirely ctitious. Secondly, he maintained that, all knowledge resolve itself
into probability (T.122: 1.4.1.4). Thirdly, he considered philosophical and scientic
thinking to be only a methodised form of common knowledge.
The three arguments were closely related, and formed part of what became known
as the sceptical problem of induction. There is no reason to insist here on the
importance of this problem in the history of modern philosophy, and on its
complexities. A succinct, but stimulating treatment, can be found in Ian Hacking,
The Emergence of Probability.44 In a way, it is remarkable that Humes discussion of
induction did not focus the mind of philosophers until Kant. Even the Scottish
common-sense philosophers, who wrote to confute Humes scepticism, did not pay
nearly enough attention to the centrality of the issue, of which Hume was instead
particularly aware, as it emerges from reading the Abstract he published
anonymously to promote the fortunes of the Treatise.45 Humes contemporaries
were more concerned with both the consequences and the corollaries of the problem
raised by Hume, rather than with its central epistemological point. As Hacking has
remarked, the publication of the essay On Miracles, in 1748, prompted more
critical study in the next two years than his work on induction was to receive for a
century.46
One of the reasons for such relative indifference was that, by opposing some of the
other arguments, Humes critics probably thought to undermine his main
contention. One of these questions was that of nal and efcient causes. Within
the present context, it may be noticed that the removal of nal causes from
43

Cf. I. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 176185, passim. (Ch. 19)
45
Cf. Abstract, T. 40912: 822.
46
Hacking, Emergence, p. 178.
44
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philosophical discourse reduced all knowledge of matters of facts to a phenomenal

account of events lacking reason. Empiricists and common-sense philosophers
accepted that such a phenomenological account of contingent relationships was the
only thing open to human investigation. They were less sanguine on the possibility of
resting knowledge and a vision of the world on the mere concatenation of events,
lacking any meaning besides those injected into them by the human mind. Final
reasons, or causes, though not discoverable, still played an important supportive role
in their system of general knowledge.
Rationalist were of course even more concerned with preserving a place for nal
causes. Leibniz, who was one of those rationalists who more directly confronted the
problems raised by empirical knowledge, stressed the fundamental role that rational
knowledge has in the empirical sciences. As he said in a letter to Bayle,
I agree that the particular effects of nature can and ought to be explained
mechanically, without forgetting still their admirable ends and uses, arranged by
Providence, so that the general principles of physics and of mechanics itself
depend on the conduct of a sovereign intelligence and cannot be explained
without having it enter into consideration.47
In the rest of the letter, Leibniz insisted on the importance of nal causes in
scientic enquiry: we must from these deduce everything in Physics.48 Moreover,
Leibniz expressed the preoccupation that failure to consider reasons in science may
lead to materialism, which, apart from any moral consideration, he regarded as
deeply awed in its approach:
everything can be explained by efcient and nal causes; but whatever concerns
reasonable substances (the minds of men) is more naturally explained by the
consideration of ends, whereas other substances (bodies) are better explained by
efcient causes.49
The general consensus amongst Humes contemporaries was that the omission of
nal causes left human knowledge suspended in a void, dangerously close to opinion,
or at best to probable knowledge. This was the second issue raised by Humes theory
of knowledge. The emergence of the idea of probability and of a cluster of other
associated concepts in European thought mirrored, and partly contributed to, the
gradual demise of scepticism in philosophical discourse.50 There is a sense in which
Hume is not only the culmination, but also the end, of the early modern sceptical
revival. Intriguingly, arguments based on probability contributed to the formation of
the modern sceptical mindin so far as they backed a certain secular and more
empirically minded frame of mindbut also the opposite of a sceptical attitude, by
contributing to philosophical scientism.
47
Leibniz, New Essays, p. 70; Hacking, Emergence, p. 185.

49
Leibniz, New Essays, p. 89; cf. also pp. 6970.
50
Cf. Hacking, Emergence.
48
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The ambiguous role of probability was partly the result of what Hacking considers
the characteristic duality of the concept, as emerged in European philosophy
towards the end of the 17th-century.51 Broadly speaking, the two faces of the
concept represented the opposite directions towards which probability was pulled.
The aleatory concept, dealing with stable frequencies and stochastic laws of chance
occurrences, mainly contributed to establishing the credentials of the science of
probability, as something different from mere opinion or educated guess work. On
the other hand, the epistemological concept, concerned with degrees of belief, still
presented a picture of probability inclining towards uncertainty and scepticism.52
However, epistemic and aleatory probability were rarely distinguished with any
precision in discussions on the trustworthiness of human knowledge. This was no
less true of philosophically sophisticated thinkers such as Hume and Leibniz. A brief
comparison between their treatments of the subject may indeed reveal both the kind
of confusion arising from this lack of distinction and the specic meaning that
Humes contention that all knowledge can be resolved into probability carried for his
contemporaries.
There is a passage in the Abstract where Hume outlines the kind of system of the
sciences that the Treatise was meant to expound.
The celebrated Monsieur LeibnitzHume wrotehas observed it to be a defect in
the common systems of logic, that they are very copious when they explain the
operations of the understanding in the forming of demonstrations, but are too
concise when they treat of probabilities, and other measures of evidence on which
life and action entirely depend, and which are our guides even in most of our
philosophical speculations. [y] The author of the treatise of human nature seems
to have been sensible of this defecty, and has endeavoured, as much as he can, to
supply it (Abstract, T.408: 4).
Although it is not certain which of Leibnizs works Hume intended here, Leibnizs
own preoccupation with the logic of probabilities is well testied. In the Nouveaux
Essais, he wrote that I have more than once said that we should have a new kind of
Logic which would treat of degrees of probabilitiesy53 The sequel to this statement
makes two interesting references: one to Aristotles Topics, which Leibniz considered
to be going in the same direction, but not far enough; and the other to games of
chance, which Leibniz wished mathematicians would investigate, as part of the art
of discovery.
Leibnizs logic of probabilities was intended as a kind of mathematical rhetoric,
aimed at extending the exactitude of mathematics to the other sciences and to
metaphysics in general. This characterisation would seem to contradict what Hume
had in mind, since he wanted to separate sharply demonstration from the logic
concerning matters of fact; but, in principle, his reading of Leibniz was correct.
Probabilitiesas Leibniz said in a letter to Bourguetare estimated a posteriori by
51
Hacking, Emergence, passim. (Ch. 2)

Hacking, Emergence, passim. (Ch. 3)
53
52
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experience; and we should take recourse to it in the absence of a priori reasons.54 In

his commentary of Locke on probability, Leibniz addressed the problem of its
epistemological role more directly:
Opinion, based on the probable, also deserves perhaps the name of knowledge;
otherwise nearly all historical knowledge and many other kinds will fall. [y] The
fault of the moralists, lax on this point, has been in good part due to too limited
and inadequate notion of the probable which they have confused with Aristotles
endoxon or opinable [y]. Endoxon for him means what has been accepted by the
greatest number of people or the most authoritative [y]. But the probable is more
extensive; we must derive it from the nature of things; and the opinion of person
... is one of the things which may contribute to rendering an opinion likely.55
In short, like Humes, Leibnizs project of inductive logic starts from the
recognition that syllogistic logic is unsuitable for dealing with matters of fact, a fact
that leaves a very large area of scientic knowledge uncharted and with no certain
method to be followed. The similarities, however, seem to end here. Leibnizs
intention was to make probable knowledge as unassailable as demonstrative
knowledge. He tried to do this, rstly, by arguing that there is a kind of metaphysical
congruence between what we consider probable with what we regard as being true,
rather than with the known as suggested by Locke.56 Secondly, he attempted to
reintroduce exact demonstrations and mathematical precision at a lower level of
argumentation, suggesting that in matters where one cannot demonstrate a
certitude, we can nevertheless give demonstrations at least concerning the
probability itself.57 The art of discovery, of which the logic of probabilities was
a fundamental part, was described by Leibniz as the analytical dissection of what he
considered to be the empirically ascertained prerequisites (denition, nature, and
essential properties), leading to the grasping of things through perfect knowledge:
The mark of perfect knowledge is that nothing appears in the thing under
consideration which cannot be accounted for, and that nothing is encountered
whose occurrence cannot be predicted in advance.58
Once this perfect knowledge is consolidated in a catalogue of simple thoughts, it
is possible, according to Leibniz, to start the reverse process by a synthetic and a
priori type of reasoning, explaining the origin of things from a rational perspective.
It appears that Leibniz believed that there are certain essential similarities between
demonstrative and probable knowledge. Both start from exact denitions and
assumptions (though, the ones are rational and the others empirical), and both aim
at the reasons of things (though, the ones are certain, and the others only probable).
It should not surprise, therefore, that one of Leibnizs most enduring aspiration was
54
Leibniz,
Leibniz,
56
Leibniz,
57
Leibniz,
58
Leibniz,
55
New
New
New
New
New
Essays,
Essays,
Essays,
Essays,
Essays,
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
88.
82.
83.
38.
79; cf. also pp. 7780.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
23
to give to the world a general science entirely based on a kind of calculus, where
instead of numbers there were characters or signs appropriate for expressing all our
thoughtsydenitely andyexactly. Leibnizs theory of knowledge aimed at
bringing forward the time when all disputes could be settled by simply saying, let
us calculate, Sir.59 The universal calculus as a panacea was far from Humes own
intentions, of course. His philosophy was, so to speak, intensely discoursive in
nature. His logical reasoning was intricate, interspersed with qualications, second
thoughts, and even ironic innuendos. It is difcult to imagine what kind of algebra
could result from Humes philosophical arguments. Although his interest in
probability started from very similar preoccupations to Leibnizs own, it clearly
went in the opposite direction: not from likelihood to knowledge, but from
knowledge to likelihood.
To show this point with more precision, something must be said about Humes
own understanding of knowledge and probability, a subject that gave the title to Part
III of Book I of the Treatise. By knowledge, Hume meant the way in which the mind
perceives those relations that depend on the comparison between ideas, or, in other
words, whatever comes under either demonstrative or intuitive forms of knowledge.
There are other relations,60 which do not simply involve comparison of ideas, but the
discovery of matters of fact. The apperception we have of the latter is said to require
a second examination, since these relations do not carry with them that immediacy
and feeling of certainty accompanying instead the rst group of relations (cf.
T.5051: 1.3.16). The title of Part III would seem to suggest the second group of
relations are concerned with probability. In fact, both in the Treatise (86: 1.3.11.2)
and in a brief footnote of the Enquiry (131: 6.n.10), Hume criticised Locke for having
accepted such a simple dichotomy, whilst pointing out that a distinction is usually
drawn between matters of fact that are known for certain, and others for which there
is only a certain degree of probability. Hume therefore concluded that we should
divide all kinds of arguments into three groups: demonstrations, proofs and
probabilities.
I shall come back to Humes specic meaning of knowledge, but the originality of
his tri-partition clearly lies in the philosophical arguments offered in support of the
distinction made in common usage between certainties of fact and probability.
Rather perversely, after having accepted this distinction, Hume went on to show that
the difference is only one of degree. Since proofs are all those arguments based on
clear and long-established relations of cause and effect, it is evident from his
explanation of the nature of causal belief that proofs are as strong and certain as the
habit which, by inuencing the imagination, makes the mind feel a necessary
connection. But this is not very different from Humes conception of probability,
which is also the result of his associationistic theory of belief, consisting in the
production, through custom and by degree, of a conviction also based on registering
some form of constant connection between different phenomena. As Hume pointed
out, the gradationy from probabilities to proofs is in many cases insensible. This
59

Cf. T. 11: 1.1.3.
60
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concerns in particular what Hume called probability of causes, which can be

distinguished from proofs only because
there are some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a
particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or
irregularity in their operation. [y] But there are other causes, which have been
found more irregular and uncertainy(EHU.132: 6.4: my italics).
Probability of causes and proofs represent different gradations in a homogeneous
scale of beliefs, consisting in the habit-induced inference of transferring the past to
the future, whenever circumstantial similarities can be found. But Hume also
considered probability of chances, which seem to point towards what it was
previously described as the aleatory concept, to be a matter of belief. In analysing the
likelihood of the occurrence of chancy events, like the tossing of a coin, Hume
stressed the subjective and psychological elements, playing down the mathematical
and stochastic features of the problem. The pragmatic reduction of the complexities
of probability to the epistemic dimension of the concept allowed Hume to reinforce
his main contention, that all kinds of reasoning concerning matters of fact have the
same origin in nature and custom, and that can be explained according to the
principles of association and of the imagination. This is even true of reasoning
discussed in the Treatise, but omitted in the Enquirythat lead to wrong
conclusions. Ultimately, the variety in the degrees of certainty and propriety shown
by human judgement and reasoning is not considered by Hume to disclaim the fact
that all reasoning has the same origin and nature. On the contrary, this variety shows
how it all results from the piecemeal way in which particular beliefs concerning
matters of fact are formed.61
Humes inductive logic (of proofs and probabilities) is separated from deductive
logic (knowledge) not only by the nature of their respective arguments but also by
their methods. We have seen the importance that Leibniz attached to a
demonstrative language that could derive perfect knowledge from a number of
empirical premises and denitions. Humes attitude was very different. In a long
footnote to Section V of the Enquiry, where he was arguing on the impotence of
abstract reason in capturing real existence, he commented on those writers on moral,
political or physical subjects (EHU.121: 5.n.8) who distinguish between arguments
from reason and arguments from experience.
If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences above mentioned,
are supposed to be the mere effects of reasoning and reection, they will be found
to terminate, at last, in some general principle or conclusion, for which we can
assign no reason but observation and experience. The only difference between
them and those maxims, which are vulgarly exteemed the result of pure
experience, is, that the former cannot be established without some process of
thought, and some reection on what we have observed, in order to distinguish its
circumstances, and trace its consequences: whereas in the latter, the experienced
61
Beliefs in the external world appear to be holistic beliefs in Hume.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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event is exactly and fully similar to that which we infer as the result of any
particular situation. (EHU.122:5. n.8)
The rest of Humes discussion shows that in all the empirical sciences the variety of
circumstances is such that no experienced reasoner can make any progress without
proceeding with extreme caution and relying on many particular observations and
experiments. And even then, all his speculations however accurate, may still retain a
degree of doubt and uncertainty. (EHU.124: 5.9)62
In spite of Humes acceptance of common opinion as reecting accurate
distinctions in degrees of belief and certainty, his complex theory of proofs and
probability, at bottom, reduced all knowledge of matters of fact to a sort of
probability. This meant that his vision of empirical knowledge lacked an epistemic
criterion of truth and falsehood, according to which the likelihood of empirical
occurrences could be established. The criteria of probability he suggested originated
instead in natural instincts and were merely internal and pragmatic. This, as he
admitted, left scope for doubt and uncertainty. But what about his conception of
strict knowledge? In fact, Hume had already limited knowledge to a very narrow
compass by excluding proofs from it. Nonetheless he was willing to accept that
abstract reasoning and intuitionwhich, in his view, were the basis of knowledge
come with full certainty, and leave no doubt in the mind. Yet, this implied no
particular admission on his part. He was indeed aware, as Leibniz had remarked,
that doubting the validity of immediate experience or the truths we reach by pure
reason would lead nowhere. No argument, let alone one in support of philosophical
scepticism, could be built on pre-reective doubt. On closer examination, however,
the kind of certainty he attached to pure reasoning and psychological intuition was
minimal.
By admitting that immediate intuitions are unquestionable and indubitable, Hume
was simply stating what almost all sceptics had always said, that appearances carry
their own evidence, but that this is not a sign of anything beyond appearances
themselves. Humes explanation of the origin of ideas from impressions, which are in
turn original to the soul (T.11: 1.1.3.1), presented them as the row material for
reasoning. Their certainty, as far as the mind of the perceiving subject is concerned,
is absolute, but pre-reective and, like the language of simple conceptions imagined
earlier, incapable, in itself, of articulation. One of the implications is that this kind of
certainty is passive, unable to perform either indexical or semiotic functions outside
the individual mind. Moreover, the certainty conveyed by sense perception and
memory has no more liveliness and strength than the one carried by beliefs that
derive more immediately from custom and the imagination. The only difference is
that, in the cases of the senses and of our memory, liveliness and force of perception
are both stronger and strike at rst sight, thus constituting the rst act of judgement
(T.61: 1.3.6.7). The same pattern of argumentation which we saw previously applied
to proofs and probabilities is now applied to intuitive knowledge. Hume started from
differences that he recognised as being commonly and justly accepted, explaining
62
Contrast Leibniz, New Essays, p. 44.
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them as variations in the application of a single principle. Thus, for instance, the
capacity of the imagination to produce ideas of such a force and vivacity, as to pass
for an idea of the memory, and couterfeit its effects on the belief and judgement
(ibid.) make us realise that the trustworthiness of intuitive knowledge is not beyond
reective doubt.
Things are not very much different with the certainty accompanying demonstrations. At the beginning of the section in Book IV of the Treatise (T.121122:
1.4.1.16), where he discussed scepticism with regard to reason, Hume admitted that
all abstract sciences use arguments and rules that are certain and infallible. But
both certainty and infallibility depend on the capacity of particular individual to
apply rules and arguments correctly. Even in a series of simple calculations there is a
real possibility of being mistaken, so that, in order to gain in certainty, one tends to
operate a control over ones own judgement and accuracy, by gradually reducing the
whole continuous series to a number of discrete operations. A similar process of
gradual increase in probabilities applies to scientic discoveries in the demonstrative
sciences:
Every time he [an Algebraist or Mathematician] runs over his proofs, his
condence encreases; but still more by the approbation of his friends; and is raisd
to its utmost perfection by the universal assent and applause of the learned world.
(T.121: 1.4.1.2)
Humes resolution of rational certainty into a series of discrete acts, particularly if
viewed from a psycho-social perspective, lead him to conclude that demonstrative
knowledge is parasitic on empirical knowledge, and that therefore all knowledge
resolves itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature with that
evidence, which we employ in common life. (T.122: 1.4.1.4).63 This statement, which
places common and philosophical knowledge on the same level, can be considered as
the completion of Humes positive scepticism. The compenetration of common and
philosophical beliefs and arguments illuminates Humes own idea of philosophy.
This principle of Humes meta-philosophy is repeated several times in his writings,
and profusely illustrated.64 Although this conviction would appear to follow from
his conception of the natural, gradual, and piecemeal formation of human reasoning
and beliefs; at a closer examination, it emerges that there is something more intricate,
and more distinctly sceptical in his application of this principle. The discussion of
unphilosophical probabilityconsidered together with the other kinds of probability
in the Treatiseis an instance of how philosophical and common reasoning
combine.
Hume did not give a precise denition of unphilosophical probability. By this he
meant the kind of opinions or prejudices that bear some formal similarity to
philosophical reasoning, but are based on evidence directly undermined by what
normally passes for sound judgement. The whole intent of this section was to show
63
Cf. Wittgenstein, Certainty, p. 86. (para. 651)

D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, edited by Norman Kemp Smith (Indianapolis,
1947), p. 9.
64
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that upon the whole,yevery kind of opinion or judgement, which amounts not to
knowledge is derived from the force and vivacity of the perception (T.104: 1.3.13.19:
my italics). Amongst the unphilosophical species of probability, the one which
originates from the rash application of general rules, and results in prejudices,
seems to be the one that intrigues Hume most. He observed that the imagination not
only establishes connections between objects customarily seen as sequentially linked,
but makes the same natural transition in the presence of similar objects. In other
words, the imagination operates not only according to the principle of objectassociationism, but also of rule-associationism. As Hume remarked, prejudices have
the same structural formation of analogical reasoning, where we transfer our
experience in past instances to objects which are resembling, but are not exactly the
same with those concerning which we have had experience (T.100: 1.3.13.8).
The problem with this kind of unphilosophical probability from general rules (and
I suspect Hume would also add, with false analogies), is that opposite conclusions
follow from the same principle underlying custom, thus pitching the imagination
against judgement. But this is not all. The propensity to rule-associationism also
operates in the formation of philosophical judgements. As Hume observed, there are
a number of general rules formed in order to regulate reasoning concerning causes
and effects:
By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efcacious
causes; and when we nd that one effect can be producd without the concurrence
of any particular circumstance, we conclude that that circumstance makes not a
part of the efcacious cause, however frequently conjoind with it. (T.101:
1.3.13.11; cf. also T.11618: 1.3.15)
The particular application of the philosophically based rules is intended to correct
the effect produced by the unphilosophical rules upon the imagination, by presenting
this as operating in a capricious and uncertain way, thus unduly perverting the
extensive and constant operations of the judgement. In conclusion, philosophical
and unphilosophical probability, judgement and unbound imagination, not only
originate from the same natural principles (custom and associationism), but also
follow similar procedures (rule production) in order to gain the upper hand on each
other.
Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal
contradiction in our reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by
a principle of human nature, and again saved by a new direction of the very same
principle. The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of
probability; and yet tis only by following them that we can correct this, and all
other unphilosophical probabilities. (T.102: 1.3.13.12)
A sceptical paradox, if ever there was one: knowledge saved by opinion.

(David Castiglione) - Hume's Two Views of Modern Scepticism

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History of European Ideas 32 (2006) 127

Humes two views of modern scepticism

and coherence become subordinate to the appreciation of Humes own intentions

Scepticism and truth in modern philosophy

in things themselves. Balfour associated the emergence of scepticism with the

Balfour, Philosophical Essays, pp. 3132.

It is difcult to overestimate the importance of the continuity argument. It

Pyrrhonienne ou Sceptique, in Encyclopedie, vol. XIII, pp. 608a14a.

pursued a view of scepticism as an internal criticism of the certainties of modern

Bayle, Dictionary, p. 732a.

Cf. Montaigne, Essais, pp. 46768.

Cf. Sextus, Outlines, pp. 25107.

human knowledge. This antithesis resulted in an impossibility to judge, or, in other

See above, sect. I.

Positive scepticism, with regard to the understanding

Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 57, para. 443.

Positive Scepticism, with regard to Knowledge

Leibniz, New Essays, p. 367.

philosophical discourse reduced all knowledge of matters of facts to a phenomenal

Leibniz, New Essays, p. 70; Hacking, Emergence, p. 185.

Hacking, Emergence, passim. (Ch. 2)

experience; and we should take recourse to it in the absence of a priori reasons.54 In

Leibniz, New Essays, p. 15.

concerns in particular what Hume called probability of causes, which can be

Beliefs in the external world appear to be holistic beliefs in Hume.

Contrast Leibniz, New Essays, p. 44.

Cf. Wittgenstein, Certainty, p. 86. (para. 651)

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